Presentation on The Logic

1. The Logic of Property

57. New Condition—Proto-State (K)G i Group i A Restored Equilibrium Condition PH1 i I I I I I I I In this new condition, the state of nature condition remains in different locations, but the most severe violence will be managed. With the guarantee that the new king (K) will maintain both Group interest (G i) and Pledgeholder interests (PH 1...n ), the persons in conflict can return to “Always Co-operate” at least as regards the group of pledgeholders and the king. The King (K) will necessarily retain an ability of self-help since he is in control of all violence—so he remains in the state of nature viz a viz all others, including his pledgeholders. But the King will be strongly motivated to satisfy his pledgeholders, since his position will ultimately depend on their selecting “Always Co-operate.” PH2 i PH3 i PH42 i PH5 i

58. New Condition—Proto-State (K)G i Group i A(t) Restored Equilibrium Condition PH1 i I I I I I I I The original claims would have been somewhat varied and inchoate. Originally, all that is required is that the Proto-King arbitrate and then defend claims presented by pledgeholders. It is these claims that will determine the sorts of “rights” that the new king can and will defend. These can, will, and must be expressed in law. It is specifically the need and desire of prospective pledgeholders and their desire to limit their violence among themselves with respect to those claims that makes them willing to submit to the proto-king. The key to success is the status relationship with the proto-king. Only Pledgeholders have “rights.” And specifically the right to demand from the proto-king satisfaction in disputes. PH2 i PH3 i PH4 i PH5 i Archaic Aristocracies

60. (t)State Limiting Conditions (K)G i Group i A(t) Restored Equilibrium Condition PH1 i I I I I I I I The First Problem “solved” is internal violence within the group. All group members are motivated to maintain an equilibrium of conflict (Don’t Co-operate) in order to secure/maintain/grow surplus and abundance. Success of the model will principally depend upon (K) successfully maintaining control of recourse to force and violence among PH. The model creates a coalition of force-users that provides for both external defense (military) and internal stability (policing). Co-operation among (PH) is secured by (K) delivering tangible, specific, and difficult to remove benefits. Non-Interest holders (I) will experience a “neighborhood effect” through the stability created, even though they possess no specific benefits. PH2 i PH3 i PH4 i PH5 i

61. Notes on — Proto-State (K)G i Group i A Restored Equilibrium Condition PH1 i I I I I I I I The original claims would have been somewhat varied and inchoate. Within groups this would seem a likely opportunity for the emergence on non-magical religion in the form of structured moralities that support the overall model of co-operation and mutual support that has been created. Generalized “moral” behavior would be very important to the success of the scheme established. Notions of “honor” would also need to play a large role in a system without a great deal of available subtlety in enforcement options. It is clearly evident that the PH group has an ability to organize into its own interest group, independent of either K or I. This is the model of the first systems with their proto-aristocracies. PH2 i PH3 i PH42 i PH5 i