Organizational Change Management PaperContentsYour paper.docx

Organizational Change Management Paper
Contents
Your paper MUST follow this outline:
Identify and describe a failed organizational change
Identify and describe one organizational change theory
Apply the theory above to the failed change above
In General
Strict APA formatting
Minimum three professional sources
Full use of in-text citations
8-10 pages on content
Title page
Running head
Table of Contents
Reference page
Due Date
Due by the 7th class meeting at class time
Late papers will suffer a 10% grade reduction
Managing Organizational Change
By Michael W. Durant, CCE, CPA

The increased pace of change that many of us have encountered
over the past ten years
has been dramatic. During the late 1980s, many of us were
grappling with issues that we
had never encountered. The accelerated use of leverage as a
means of increasing
shareholder wealth left the balance sheet of some of America’s
finest organizations in
disarray. Many of our largest customers, that for years
represented minimal risk and
required a minimum amount of time to manage, consumed most
of our energy. By the end
of 1993, many of these organizations had either resolved their
financial troubles in
bankruptcy court or no longer existed.
Just as we began to think the external environment would settle
down and our
professional lives would return to a normal pace, many of our
organizations initiated
efforts to improve operating efficiency to become more
competitive in the world
marketplace.
Competition has heated up across the board. To succeed, the
organization of the future
must serve customers better, create new advantages and survive
in bitterly contested
markets. To stay competitive, companies must do away with
work and processes that
don’t add value.
This hypercompetition has invalidated the basic assumptions of
sustainable markets.
There are few companies that have escaped this shift in
competitiveness. Entry barriers,

which once exerted a stabilizing force on competition, have
fallen in the face of the rapid
changes of the information age. These forces have challenged
our capacity to cope with
organizational life.
Permanent White Water
Things are not going to settle down. Many things we used to
take for granted are
probably gone forever. We cannot predict with any certainty
what tomorrow will be like,
except to say that it will be different than today.
Peter Vaill has captured the essence of the problem of a
continuously changing context in
a compelling image - “permanent white water.” In the past,
many of us believed that by
using the means that were under our control we could pretty
much accomplish anything
we set out to do. Sure, from time to time there would be
temporary disruptions. But the
disruptions were only temporary, and things always settled back
down. The mental image
generated by these thoughts is that of a canoe trip on a calm,
still lake.
However, Vaill explains, in today’s environment, we never get
out of the rapids. As soon
as we digest one change, another one comes along. Usually
there are many changes
occurring simultaneously. We have limited control over the
environment, but to navigate
the rapids we must exercise skill. The “permanent white water”

image has a strong visual
appeal, conveying as it does a sense of energy and providing a
visual sense of navigating
on an unpredictable wild river.
Creating the Vision
Vision and leadership drive successful change. As the change
agent, first you must create a
vision of the future that is capable of focusing the group’s
energy. The vision should
contrast what is with what can be and it must be comprehensive
enough to direct
attention at how to bridge the gap to the future.
Change must become a core organizational value using customer
feedback, internally
developed organizational improvements and other external
feedback. Change initiatives
should also be linked to efforts to improve overall performance
and profitability.
Commitment from senior management at the earliest stages of
the change process is
required. Managing change effectively requires an
understanding of the variables at play,
and adequate time must be allowed for implementation.
Three Stages of Change
To thrive in the chaotic world we live in, we must embrace
strategies that have been
developed to successfully manage change. The theory and
practice of organizational
change contains elements of both behaviorist and cognitive
learning theories. An
investigation into change within an organizational setting
reveals a three-stage process of
unfreezing, change and refreezing.

Unfreezing is the first stage of the change process and consist
of unlearning past behavior.
The change process begins when the organization experiences
disconfirmation.
Disconfirmation is experienced in the form of cognitive
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance
is a concept taken from the field of psychology that refers to
incompatibility between
two or more attitudes or between behavior and attitudes.
Inconsistencies from the desired
state are uncomfortable and we try to reduce the dissonance and
thus the discomfort.
Disconfirmation may be caused by external pressures or
convincing data from within the
organization. An external example might occur due to pressure
applied to senior
management by shareholders to increase the return on their
investment. Dissonance may
be generated by internal benchmarking research that reveals
areas in the organization that
require attention. If the factors creating the dissonance are
relatively important the
pressure to correct the imbalance will be high.
Once a potential problem surfaces an information search begins
to determine what action
is required to resolve the issue. If a problem exists, creative
solutions are developed.
Support for unlearning develops when existing systems are
challenged. Unfreezing
involves dismantling past learning.

The second stage of the change process consist of incorporating
new behaviors into
organizational processes. Behavior and ideas that are embedded
in the corporate culture
must be replaced. Redirecting people’s attention is an essential
part of change. The
development of skills to enable people to do things differently
is required. Training must
be provided to insure that employees understand their roles in
making change happen.
Processes and people must be aligned to support change. Skills
and competencies to
enable people to do things differently must be developed.
Employees must understand
the dynamics of the change process and also the functional
requirements of the job.
New rules and policies that reinforce the desired ways of
operating must be created and
documented. Old customs and norms that reinforce the old ways
of doing things must be
replaced with norms that reinforce the new ways. For example,
if the organization is
developing teams and moving away from functional
departments, then team work across
departmental boundaries should be emphasized. Rewards should
be specific to the change
goals that have been set.
Refreezing is the final stage of the change process. It is
comprised of reinforcing and
measuring behavior change. After the training requirements are
defined, the reward
system, reporting relationships and other systems can be
designed to reinforce the new
behavior.

If the change process requires certain behaviors from
employees, then performance
appraisals, promotions and bonuses should be based on the
desired performance
outcomes. Creating objective measures for performance will
demonstrate your
commitment to the change initiative.
Emotional Phases of Change
Organizational change has an element of loss inherent in the
process, and it is a loss that is
often deeply felt by employees. The Kubler - Ross Grief Model
addresses the emotional
issues associated with change. The four emotional states
experienced throughout the
change process may be expressed by employees in behaviors
that are obstacles to the
process of change. By understanding the emotions employees
often encounter during
change, you will be better prepared to facilitate the change
process.
Kubler - Ross Grief Model
Stage 1 Denial
Stage 2 Resistance
Stage 3 Exploration
Stage 4 Commitment
The first emotional state experienced during change is denial.
For example, employees
encountering a change initiative might be saying to themselves,
“I can’t believe this is
happening to us.” Unresolved fears about the change initiative
need to be addressed during

this phase. Fear and mistrust need to be replaced by acceptance.
To be an effective change
agent, you should encourage acceptance to change by initiating
trust-building activities.
The second emotional state is resistance to the change process.
It is common for
employees to begin to resist the change initiative. During this
phase, employees attempt
to slow down or derail the change initiative. You must be able
to spot resistance when it
occurs and formulate sound strategies for overcoming it.
Resistance is a natural reaction to change, and it can take many
forms. The easiest form of
resistance to recognize is those who loudly indicate their
dissatisfaction with the changes
taking place in the organization. Soliciting feedback from these
individuals lets you know
where they stand, so that you can overcome their objectives.
Employees often resist change through denial. These individuals
refuse to acknowledge
that a problem exists. For example, competition might force a
business to organize work
around processes to improve operating efficiencies. Functional
departments involved in
these processes would be combined. Employees might not see a
need for this change. The
reasons for change must be fully explained so that employees
understand why it is
necessary to embrace the change.

Another common resistance is exhibited by individuals who
willingly embrace the change,
but when they realize that it takes additional time and effort,
they begin to undermine the
change process. It is best to slow down and allow people to
absorb change gradually
before forging ahead.
Sometimes employees use confusion to postpone change. After
explaining the changes
repeatedly, employees ask the same questions over and over
again. They may truly be
confused or they may be using confusion as a form of resistance
to avoid accepting
change.
The most dangerous form of resistance is referred to as
malicious compliance. Employees
enthusiastically support change, but covertly undermine the
effort. For example, during
presentations, the questions are polite and employees seem
accepting. As you move
forward they act as though they are implementing the new
program. Months later you
find out nothing has changed.
How we respond to resistance is very important. Forcing
compliance may increase
resistance. Those affected by the change probably know a lot
about what is required to
implement something new, and their input is important to the
change process. The degree
to which employees will support your new initiatives depends
on how many of their
recommendations are used. Compromise can accelerate the
change process.

The third emotional state encountered is exploration. If
employees are unable to stop the
changes from occurring, they begin to explore their new roles.
Both individual roles as
well as the overall role of the group are specifically defined in
this stage. During the
exploring stage, it is important that unresolved issues that
continue to surface be
addressed. Be alert for employees who remain angry about the
change initiative. Those
individuals should be counseled at the first sign of falling back
to old behaviors. If trust
has been created among the group, then peer influence can be
used to encourage behavioral
change.
The final emotional state is commitment to the change
initiative. Mutual commitment is
established for the change effort. Obstacles have been removed
and the focus is on
successful implementation of the changes.
Reasons for Failure
Research indicates that two-thirds of all organizational changes
fail. This represents a
tremendous cost to companies in money, resources, and time.
Several of the most
common reasons for failed change programs include a lack of
commitment from the top,
change overload, lack of incentives tied to the change initiative
and a lack of training.

Commitment from senior management is required if the change
program is to succeed.
People reveal their values through their actions, not their words.
Employees infer what is
important from management’s behavior.
Trying to do too much at once is often an obstacle because
trying to accomplish too many
activities can create confusion. Helping the group to on well-
defined steps that carry them
from one initiative to another will instill a sense of order and
confidence in the process.
Often change programs are initiated without changing
incentives to reinforce the desired
new behavior. Change is expected, but the old behavior is still
being rewarded. The
organization must publicly recognize and reward employees
who change by linking
promotion and pay rewards to the desired behaviors. Rewards
that reinforce old methods
must be eliminated.
Another cause of failure is that too little attention is given to
developing the skills people
require to make a new technology work. The organization must
develop experiential
training that provides real time hands-on experience with new
processes and procedures.
The physical environment must also reinforce these changes.
Communicate the Facts
Employees view the change process differently. They often
view change as disruptive. A
successful change program requires that employees understand
why the need for change is

necessary. Employees must buy into the change program.
Employees’ commitments
must be linked to the company’s change outcomes.
During transitions, employees speculate about how change will
benefit or possibly harm
them. People require more information during the change
process. They want to know
how changes will affect them and how to prepare. By providing
specific information to
everyone at the same time, rumors can be minimized.
Communicate only the facts. Not communicating to employees
when implementing
change programs is the worst mistake a company can make.
During times of uncertainty
communication voids are filled with rumors. Communication
lowers stress and anxiety.
When restructuring jobs or refocusing the organization’s
direction, it is very important to
clarify roles and how they support each other. Role clarification
helps raise issues in a
neutral manner and avoids confusion when change is in process.
Change must be continually managed to yield sustained results.
Measurement provides a
way to track progress. An effective measurement system would
be specific, simple to
understand, creative and involve both managers and employees.
The results should be
visually displayed so that employees can track their progress. A
consistent process of
measuring the results of the change initiative combined with a
rewards program that

reinforces the desired behavior is the backbone of an effective
change program.
Michael W. Durant, CCE, CPA is the Director of Credit, VF
Jeanswear, Greensboro NC.
He is the former Director of Research for Credit Research
Foundation.
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Teams During Profound
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Trimble, The Knowledge
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All rights in this book are reserved.
No part of the book may be reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written
permission.
Printed in the United States of America
Credit Research Foundation
8840 Columbia 100 Parkway
Columbia MD 21045
410-740-5499
Leading Change:

Why Transformation
Efforts Fail
Harvard Business Review
by John P. Kotter
Reprint 95204
MARCH-APRIL 1995
Reprint Number
JOHN P. KOTTER LEADING CHANGE: WHY
TRANSFORMATION EFFORTS FAIL 95204
NOEL M. TICHY THE CEO AS COACH: AN INTERVIEW
AND RAM CHARAN WITH ALLIED SIGNAL’S LAWRENCE
A. BOSSIDY 95201
ROBERT SIMONS CONTROL IN AN AGE OF
EMPOWERMENT 95211
JOHN POUND THE PROMISE OF THE GOVERNED
CORPORATION 95210
B. JOSEPH PINE II, DON PEPPERS, DO YOU WANT TO
KEEP YOUR CUSTOMERS FOREVER? 95209
AND MARTHA ROGERS
A. CAMPBELL, M. GOOLD, CORPORATE STRATEGY:
95202
AND M. ALEXANDER THE QUEST FOR PARENTING
ADVANTAGE

GEOFFREY OWEN WHY ICI CHOSE TO DEMERGE 95207
AND TREVOR HARRISON
REGINA FAZIO MARUCA HBR CASE STUDY
HOW DO YOU GROW A PREMIUM BRAND? 95205
SIMON JOHNSON WORLD VIEW
AND GARY LOVEMAN STARTING OVER: POLAND AFTER
COMMUNISM 95203
RICHARD O’BRIEN BOOKS IN REVIEW
WHO RULES THE WORLD’S FINANCIAL MARKETS? 95206
PERSPECTIVES
REDRAW THE LINE BETWEEN THE BOARD AND THE CEO
95208
JOHN G. SMALE • ALAN J. PATRICOF • DENYS
HENDERSON •
BERNARD MARCUS • DAVID W. JOHNSON
Leading Change:
Why Transformation Efforts Fail
by John P. Kotter
HBR
M A R C H - A P R I L 1 9 9 5
Over the past decade, I have watched more than
100 companies try to remake themselves into sig-
nificantly better competitors. They have included
large organizations (Ford) and small ones (Land-

mark Communications), companies based in the
United States (General Motors) and elsewhere
(British Airways), corporations that were on their
knees (Eastern Airlines), and companies that were
earning good money (Bristol-Myers Squibb). These
efforts have gone under many banners: total quality
management, reengineering, right sizing, restruc-
turing, cultural change, and turnaround. But, in al-
most every case, the basic goal has been the same:
to make fundamental changes in how business is
conducted in order to help cope with a new, more
challenging market environment.
A few of these corporate change efforts have been
very successful. A few have been utter failures.
Most fall somewhere in between, with a distinct
DRAWINGS BY KURT VARGO Copyright © 1
tilt toward the lower end of the scale. The lessons
that can be drawn are interesting and will probably
be relevant to even more organizations in the in-
creasingly competitive business environment of
the coming decade.
The most general lesson to be learned from the
more successful cases is that the change process
goes through a series of phases that, in total, usual-
ly require a considerable length of time. Skipping
steps creates only the illusion of speed and never
produces a satisfying result. A second very general
John P. Kotter is the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of
Leadership at the Harvard Business School in Boston,
Massachusetts. He is the author of The New Rules: How
to Succeed in Today’s Post-Corporate World (New York:
Free Press, 1995), Corporate Culture and Performance,
coauthored with James L. Heskett (New York: Free Press,

1992), and A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs
from Management (New York: Free Press, 1990).
995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All
rights reserved.
LEADING CHANGE
e
g
lesson is that critical mistakes in any of the phases
can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum
and negating hard-won gains. Perhaps because we
have relatively little experience in renewing organi-
zations, even very capable people often make at
least one big error.
Error #1: Not Establishing a Great
Enough Sense of Urgency
Most successful change efforts begin when some
individuals or some groups start to look hard at a
company’s competitive situation, market position,
technological trends, and financial performance.
They focus on the potential revenue drop when an
important patent expires, the five-year trend in de-
clining margins in a core business, or an emerging
market that everyone seems to be ignoring. They
then find ways to communicate this information
broadly and dramatically, especially with respect to
crises, potential crises, or great opportunities that
are very timely. This first step is essential because
just getting a transformation program started re-
quires the aggressive cooperation of many individu-
als. Without motivation, people won’t help and the

effort goes nowhere.
Compared with other steps in the change pro-
cess, phase one can sound easy. It is not. Well
over 50% of the companies I have
watched fail in this first phase. What
are the reasons for that failure?
Sometimes executives underesti-
mate how hard it can be to drive
people out of their comfort zones.
Sometimes they grossly overesti-
mate how successful they have al-
ready been in increasing urgency.
Sometimes they lack patience:
“Enough with the preliminaries;
let’s get on with it.” In many cases, executives be-
come paralyzed by the downside possibilities. They
worry that employees with seniority will become
defensive, that morale will drop, that events will
spin out of control, that short-term business results
will be jeopardized, that the stock will sink, and
that they will be blamed for creating a crisis.
A paralyzed senior management often comes
from having too many managers and not enough
leaders. Management’s mandate is to minimize risk
and to keep the current system operating. Change,
by definition, requires creating a new system,
which in turn always demands leadership. Phase
one in a renewal process typically goes nowhere un-
til enough real leaders are promoted or hired into
senior-level jobs.
O
d

lar
60
Transformations often begin, and begin well,
when an organization has a new head who is a good
leader and who sees the need for a major change. If
the renewal target is the entire company, the CEO
is key. If change is needed in a division, the division
general manager is key. When these individuals are
not new leaders, great leaders, or change champi-
ons, phase one can be a huge challenge.
Bad business results are both a blessing and a
curse in the first phase. On the positive side, losing
money does catch people’s attention. But it also
gives less maneuvering room. With good business
results, the opposite is true: convincing people of
the need for change is much harder, but you have
more resources to help make changes.
But whether the starting point is good perfor-
mance or bad, in the more successful cases I have
witnessed, an individual or a group always facili-
tates a frank discussion of potentially unpleasant
facts: about new competition, shrinking margins,
decreasing market share, flat earnings, a lack of
revenue growth, or other relevant indices of a de-
clining competitive position. Because there seems
to be an almost universal human tendency to shoot
the bearer of bad news, especially if the head of the
organization is not a change champion, executives
in these companies often rely on outsiders to bring
unwanted information. Wall Street analysts, custom-
ers, and consultants can all be helpful in this re-
gard. The purpose of all this activity, in the words of
one former CEO of a large European company, is

“to make the status quo seem more dangerous than
launching into the unknown.”
In a few of the most successful cases, a group has
manufactured a crisis. One CEO deliberately engi-
neered the largest accounting loss in the company’s
history, creating huge pressures from Wall Street in
the process. One division president commissioned
first-ever customer-satisfaction surveys, knowing
full well that the results would be terrible. He then
made these findings public. On the surface, such
moves can look unduly risky. But there is also risk
in playing it too safe: when the urgency rate is not
pumped up enough, the transformation process
ne chief executive officer
liberately engineered the
est accounting loss in the
history of the company.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1995
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1995 61
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Eight Steps to Transforming Your Organization

Establishing a Sense of Urgency
Examining market and competitive realities
Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major
opportunities
Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition
Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change
effort
Encouraging the group to work together as a team
Creating a Vision
Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
Developing strategies for achieving that vision
Communicating the Vision
Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision
and strategies
Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
Empowering Others to Act on the Vision
Getting rid of obstacles to change
Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the
vision
Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and

actions
Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins
Planning for visible performance improvements
Creating those improvements
Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the
improvements
Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change
Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and
policies that don’t fit the vision
Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can
implement the vision
Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and
change agents
Institutionalizing New Approaches
Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and
corporate success
Developing the means to ensure leadership development and
succession
LEADING CHANGE
cannot succeed and the long-term future of the or-
ganization is put in jeopardy.

When is the urgency rate high enough? From
what I have seen, the answer is when about 75% of
a company’s management is honestly convinced
that business-as-usual is totally unacceptable. Any-
thing less can produce very serious problems later
on in the process.
Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful
Enough Guiding Coalition
Major renewal programs often start with just one
or two people. In cases of successful transformation
efforts, the leadership coalition grows and grows
over time. But whenever some minimum mass is
not achieved early in the effort, nothing much
worthwhile happens.
It is often said that major change is impossible
unless the head of the organization is an active sup-
porter. What I am talking about goes far beyond
that. In successful transformations, the chairman
or president or division general manager, plus an-
other 5 or 15 or 50 people, come together and devel-
op a shared commitment to excellent performance
through renewal. In my experience, this group nev-
er includes all of the company’s most senior execu-
tives because some people just won’t buy in, at least
not at first. But in the most successful cases, the
coalition is always pretty powerful – in terms of
titles, information and expertise, reputations and
relationships.
In both small and large organizations, a success-
ful guiding team may consist of only three to five
people during the first year of a renewal effort. But
in big companies, the coalition needs to grow to the

62
In failed transformations, you often find pl
20 to 50 range before much progress can be made in
phase three and beyond. Senior managers always
form the core of the group. But sometimes you find
board members, a representative from a key cus-
tomer, or even a powerful union leader.
Because the guiding coalition includes members
who are not part of senior management, it tends to
operate outside of the normal hierarchy by defini-
tion. This can be awkward, but it is clearly neces-
sary. If the existing hierarchy were working well,
there would be no need for a major transformation.
But since the current system is not working, reform
generally demands activity outside of formal bound-
aries, expectations, and protocol.
A high sense of urgency within the managerial
ranks helps enormously in putting a guiding coali-
tion together. But more is usually required. Some-
one needs to get these people together, help them
develop a shared assessment of their company’s
problems and opportunities, and create a minimum
level of trust and communication. Off-site retreats,
for two or three days, are one popular vehicle for ac-
complishing this task. I have seen many groups of 5
to 35 executives attend a series of these retreats
over a period of months.
Companies that fail in phase two usually under-
estimate the difficulties of producing change and
thus the importance of a powerful guiding coali-
tion. Sometimes they have no history of teamwork
at the top and therefore undervalue the importance

of this type of coalition. Sometimes they expect the
team to be led by a staff executive from human re-
sources, quality, or strategic planning instead of a
key line manager. No matter how capable or dedi-
cated the staff head, groups without strong line
leadership never achieve the power that is required.
enty of plans and programs, but no vision.
v
Efforts that don’t have a powerful enough guiding
coalition can make apparent progress for a while.
But, sooner or later, the opposition gathers itself to-
gether and stops the change.
Error #3: Lacking a Vision
In every successful transformation effort that I
have seen, the guiding coalition develops a picture
of the future that is relatively easy to communicate
and appeals to customers, stockholders, and em-
ployees. A vision always goes beyond the numbers
that are typically found in five-year plans. A vision
says something that helps clarify the direction in
which an organization needs to move. Sometimes
the first draft comes mostly from a single individu-
al. It is usually a bit blurry, at least initially. But
after the coalition works at it for 3 or 5 or even 12
months, something much better emerges through
their tough analytical thinking and a little dream-
ing. Eventually, a strategy for achieving that vision
is also developed.

In one midsize European company, the first pass
at a vision contained two-thirds of the basic ideas
that were in the final product. The concept of
global reach was in the initial version
from the beginning. So was the idea
of becoming preeminent in certain
businesses. But one central idea in
the final version – getting out of low
value-added activities – came only
after a series of discussions over a
period of several months.
Without a sensible vision, a trans-
formation effort can easily dissolve into a list of
confusing and incompatible projects that can take
the organization in the wrong direction or nowhere
at all. Without a sound vision, the reengineering
project in the accounting department, the new 360-
degree performance appraisal from the human re-
sources department, the plant’s quality program,
the cultural change project in the sales force will
not add up in a meaningful way.
In failed transformations, you often find plenty of
plans and directives and programs, but no vision. In
one case, a company gave out four-inch-thick note-
books describing its change effort. In mind-numb-
ing detail, the books spelled out procedures, goals,
methods, and deadlines. But nowhere was there a
clear and compelling statement of where all this
was leading. Not surprisingly, most of the employ-
ees with whom I talked were either confused or
alienated. The big, thick books did not rally them
together or inspire change. In fact, they probably
had just the opposite effect.

A
clari
an or
In a few of the less successful cases that I have
seen, management had a sense of direction, but it
was too complicated or blurry to be useful. Recent-
ly, I asked an executive in a midsize company to de-
scribe his vision and received in return a barely
comprehensible 30-minute lecture. Buried in his
answer were the basic elements of a sound vision.
But they were buried – deeply.
A useful rule of thumb: if you can’t communicate
the vision to someone in five minutes or less and
get a reaction that signifies both understanding
and interest, you are not yet done with this phase
of the transformation process.
Error #4: Undercommunicating the
Vision by a Factor of Ten
I’ve seen three patterns with respect to commu-
nication, all very common. In the first, a group ac-
tually does develop a pretty good transformation
vision and then proceeds to communicate it by
holding a single meeting or sending out a single
communication. Having used about .0001% of the
yearly intracompany communication, the group is
startled that few people seem to understand the
new approach. In the second pattern, the head of
the organization spends a considerable amount
of time making speeches to employee groups, but
most people still don’t get it (not surprising, since
vision captures only .0005% of the total yearly

communication). In the third pattern, much more
effort goes into newsletters and speeches, but some
very visible senior executives still behave in ways
that are antithetical to the vision. The net result is
that cynicism among the troops goes up, while be-
lief in the communication goes down.
Transformation is impossible unless hundreds or
thousands of people are willing to help, often to the
point of making short-term sacrifices. Employees
will not make sacrifices, even if they are unhappy
with the status quo, unless they believe that useful
change is possible. Without credible communica-
tion, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the
troops are never captured.
This fourth phase is particularly challenging if
the short-term sacrifices include job losses. Gain-
ision says something that
fies the direction in which
ganization needs to move.
63
LEADING CHANGE
t
ing understanding and support is tough when
downsizing is a part of the vision. For this reason,
successful visions usually include new growth pos-
sibilities and the commitment to treat fairly any-
one who is laid off.
Executives who communicate well incorporate

messages into their hour-by-hour activities. In a
routine discussion about a business problem, they
talk about how proposed solutions fit (or don’t fit)
into the bigger picture. In a regular performance ap-
praisal, they talk about how the employee’s behav-
ior helps or undermines the vision. In a review of
a division’s quarterly performance, they talk not
only about the numbers but also about how the
division’s executives are contributing to the trans-
formation. In a routine Q&A with employees at
a company facility, they tie their answers back to
renewal goals.
In more successful transformation efforts, execu-
tives use all existing communication channels to
broadcast the vision. They turn boring and unread
company newsletters into lively articles about the
vision. They take ritualistic and tedious quarterly
management meetings and turn them into exciting
discussions of the transformation. They throw out
much of the company’s generic management edu-
cation and replace it with courses that focus on
business problems and the new vision. The guiding
principle is simple: use every possible channel, es-
pecially those that are being wasted on nonessen-
tial information.
Perhaps even more important, most of the execu-
tives I have known in successful cases of major
change learn to “walk the talk.” They consciously
attempt to become a living symbol of the new cor-
porate culture. This is often not easy. A 60-year-old
plant manager who has spent precious little time
over 40 years thinking about customers will not
suddenly behave in a customer-oriented way. But

I have witnessed just such a person change, and
change a great deal. In that case, a high level of ur-
gency helped. The fact that the man was a part of
the guiding coalition and the vision-creation team
also helped. So did all the communication, which
Worst of all are bosses who
refuse to change and who m
demands that are inconsis
with the overall effort.
64
kept reminding him of the desired behavior, and all
the feedback from his peers and subordinates,
which helped him see when he was not engaging in
that behavior.
Communication comes in both words and deeds,
and the latter are often the most powerful form.
Nothing undermines change more than behavior
by important individuals that is inconsistent with
their words.
Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to
the New Vision
Successful transformations begin to involve large
numbers of people as the process progresses. Em-
ployees are emboldened to try new approaches, to
develop new ideas, and to provide leadership. The
only constraint is that the actions fit within the
broad parameters of the overall vision. The more
people involved, the better the outcome.
To some degree, a guiding coalition empowers
others to take action simply by successfully com-
municating the new direction. But communication

is never sufficient by itself. Renewal also requires
the removal of obstacles. Too often, an employee
understands the new vision and wants to help make
it happen. But an elephant appears to be blocking
the path. In some cases, the elephant is in the per-
son’s head, and the challenge is to convince the in-
dividual that no external obstacle ex-
ists. But in most cases, the blockers
are very real.
Sometimes the obstacle is the or-
ganizational structure: narrow job
categories can seriously undermine
efforts to increase productivity or
make it very difficult even to think
about customers. Sometimes com-
pensation or performance-appraisal
systems make people choose be-
tween the new vision and their own self-interest.
Perhaps worst of all are bosses who refuse to change
and who make demands that are inconsistent with
the overall effort.
One company began its transformation process
with much publicity and actually made good
progress through the fourth phase. Then the change
effort ground to a halt because the officer in charge
of the company’s largest division was allowed to
undermine most of the new initiatives. He paid lip
service to the process but did not change his behav-
ior or encourage his managers to change. He did not
reward the unconventional ideas called for in the
vision. He allowed human resource systems to re-
main intact even when they were clearly inconsis-

ake
ent
Too often, an employee understands the new vision and wants to
help make it happen.
But something appears to be blocking the path.
tent with the new ideals. I think the officer’s mo-
tives were complex. To some degree, he did not be-
lieve the company needed major change. To some
degree, he felt personally threatened by all the
change. To some degree, he was afraid that he could
not produce both change and the expected oper-
ating profit. But despite the fact that they backed
the renewal effort, the other officers did virtually
nothing to stop the one blocker. Again, the reasons
were complex. The company had no history of
confronting problems like this. Some people were
afraid of the officer. The CEO was concerned that
he might lose a talented executive. The net result
was disastrous. Lower level managers concluded
that senior management had lied to them about
their commitment to renewal, cynicism grew, and
the whole effort collapsed.
In the first half of a transformation, no organiza-
tion has the momentum, power, or time to get rid of
all obstacles. But the big ones must be confronted
and removed. If the blocker is a person, it is impor-
tant that he or she be treated fairly and in a way that
is consistent with the new vision. But action is es-
sential, both to empower others and to maintain
the credibility of the change effort as a whole.

Error #6: Not Systematically Planning
For and Creating Short-Term Wins
Real transformation takes time, and a renewal ef-
fort risks losing momentum if there are no short-
term goals to meet and celebrate. Most people
won’t go on the long march unless they see com-
pelling evidence within 12 to 24 months that the
journey is producing expected results. Without
short-term wins, too many people give up or active-
ly join the ranks of those people who have been re-
sisting change.
One to two years into a successful transforma-
tion effort, you find quality beginning to go up on
certain indices or the decline in net income stop-
ping. You find some successful new product intro-
ductions or an upward shift in market share. You
find an impressive productivity improvement or
a statistically higher customer-satisfaction rating.
But whatever the case, the win is unambiguous.
The result is not just a judgment call that can be
discounted by those opposing change.
Creating short-term wins is different from hop-
ing for short-term wins. The latter is passive, the
former active. In a successful transformation, man-
agers actively look for ways to obtain clear perfor-
mance improvements, establish goals in the yearly
planning system, achieve the objectives, and re-
ward the people involved with recognition, promo-
tions, and even money. For example, the guiding
coalition at a U.S. manufacturing company pro-
duced a highly visible and successful new product

introduction about 20 months after the start of its
renewal effort. The new product was selected about
six months into the effort because it met multiple
criteria: it could be designed and launched in a rela-
tively short period; it could be handled by a small
team of people who were devoted to the new vision;
it had upside potential; and the new product-devel-
opment team could operate outside the established
departmental structure without practical problems.
Little was left to chance, and the win boosted the
credibility of the renewal process.
Managers often complain about being forced to
produce short-term wins, but I’ve found that pres-
sure can be a useful element in a change effort.
65
66
While celebrating a win is fine, declaring the war won
can be catastrophic.
When it becomes clear to people that major change
will take a long time, urgency levels can drop.
Commitments to produce short-term wins help
keep the urgency level up and force detailed analyt-
ical thinking that can clarify or revise visions.
Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon
After a few years of hard work, managers may be
tempted to declare victory with the first clear per-
formance improvement. While celebrating a win is
fine, declaring the war won can be catastrophic.
Until changes sink deeply into a company’s cul-

ture, a process that can take five to ten years, new
approaches are fragile and subject to regression.
In the recent past, I have watched a dozen change
efforts operate under the reengineering theme. In
all but two cases, victory was declared and the ex-
pensive consultants were paid and thanked when
the first major project was completed after two to
three years. Within two more years, the useful
changes that had been introduced slowly disap-
peared. In two of the ten cases, it’s hard to find any
trace of the reengineering work today.
Over the past 20 years, I’ve seen the same sort
of thing happen to huge quality projects, organi-
zational development efforts, and more. Typically,
the problems start early in the process: the urgency
level is not intense enough, the guiding coalition is
not powerful enough, and the vision is not clear
enough. But it is the premature victory celebra-
tion that kills momentum. And then the powerful
forces associated with tradition take over.
Ironically, it is often a combination of change
initiators and change resistors that creates the pre-
mature victory celebration. In their enthusiasm over
a clear sign of progress, the initiators go overboard.
They are then joined by resistors, who are quick to
spot any opportunity to stop change. After the cele-
bration is over, the resistors point to the victory as
a sign that the war has been won and the troops
should be sent home. Weary troops allow them-
selves to be convinced that they won. Once home,
the foot soldiers are reluctant to climb back on the
ships. Soon thereafter, change comes to a halt, and
tradition creeps back in.

Instead of declaring victory, leaders of successful
efforts use the credibility afforded by short-term
wins to tackle even bigger problems. They go after
systems and structures that are not consistent with
the transformation vision and have not been con-
fronted before. They pay great attention to who is
promoted, who is hired, and how people are devel-
oped. They include new reengineering projects that
are even bigger in scope than the initial ones. They
LEADING CHANGE
understand that renewal efforts take not months
but years. In fact, in one of the most successful
transformations that I have ever seen, we quanti-
fied the amount of change that occurred each year
over a seven-year period. On a scale of one (low) to
ten (high), year one received a two, year two a four,
year three a three, year four a seven, year five an
eight, year six a four, and year seven a two. The
peak came in year five, fully 36 months after the
first set of visible wins.
Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes
in the Corporation’s Culture
In the final analysis, change sticks when it be-
comes “the way we do things around here,” when it
seeps into the bloodstream of the corporate body.
Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and
shared values, they are subject to degradation as
soon as the pressure for change is removed.

Two factors are particularly important in institu-
tionalizing change in corporate culture. The first is
a conscious attempt to show people how the new
approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped
improve performance. When people are left on their
own to make the connections, they sometimes cre-
ate very inaccurate links. For example, because re-
sults improved while charismatic Harry was boss,
the troops link his mostly idiosyncratic style with
those results instead of seeing how their own im-
proved customer service and productivity were in-
strumental. Helping people see the right connec-
tions requires communication. Indeed, one company
was relentless, and it paid off enormously. Time
was spent at every major management meeting
to discuss why performance was increasing. The
company newspaper ran article after article show-
ing how changes had boosted earnings.
The second factor is taking sufficient time to
make sure that the next generation of top manage-
ment really does personify the new approach. If the
requirements for promotion don’t change, renewal
rarely lasts. One bad succession decision at the top
of an organization can undermine a decade of hard
work. Poor succession decisions are possible when
boards of directors are not an integral part of the re-
newal effort. In at least three instances I have seen,
the champion for change was the retiring execu-
tive, and although his successor was not a resistor,
he was not a change champion. Because the boards
did not understand the transformations in any de-
tail, they could not see that their choices were not
good fits. The retiring executive in one case tried
unsuccessfully to talk his board into a less seasoned

candidate who better personified the transforma-
tion. In the other two cases, the CEOs did not resist
the boards’ choices, because they felt the transfor-
mation could not be undone by their successors.
They were wrong. Within two years, signs of re-
newal began to disappear at both companies.
There are still more mistakes that people make,
but these eight are the big ones. I realize that in a
short article everything is made to sound a bit too
simplistic. In reality, even successful change efforts
are messy and full of surprises. But just as a relative-
ly simple vision is needed to guide people through a
major change, so a vision of the change process can
reduce the error rate. And fewer errors can spell the
difference between success and failure.
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An Improvisational Model of Change
Management: The Case of Groupware
Technologies
Wanda J. Orlikowski and J. Debra Hofman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge
MA 02142-1347
Sloan Management Review, January 1997
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Introduction
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
Case Example: Zeta
Summary of Zeta Case
Enabling Conditions
Aligning Key Change Dimensions
Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support

Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Figures
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the editor and reviewers for their
helpful comments on an earlier version
of this manuscript. We gratefully appreciate the research
support of MIT's Center for
Coordination Science and Center for Information Systems
Research.
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An Improvisational Model of Change Management:The Case of
Groupware Technologies

Abstract
In this paper, we present an alternative way of thinking about
technological change in
organizations. This alternative approach is motivated by a
recognition that traditional models for
managing technological change - in which the major steps of the
change are defined in advance
and the organization then strives to implement these changes as
planned in a specified period of
time - are not particularly useful given the more turbulent,
flexible, and uncertain organizational
situations that many companies face today. Traditional models
are also not particularly useful for
helping the implementation of technologies such as groupware
whose unprecedented, open-
ended, and context-specific nature make it difficult to predefine
the exact changes to be realized
and to predict their likely organizational impact.
We suggest an alternative model of managing technological
change, one that reflects the
dynamic and variable nature of contemporary organizations and
technologies, and which
accommodates iterative experimentation, use, and learning over
time. We label such a model of
managing technological change "improvisational," and suggest
that it may enable organizations
to take advantage of the evolving capabilities, emerging
practices, and unanticipated outcomes
that accompany use of new technologies in contemporary
organizations.

Introduction
In the preface to her discussion of technology design, Suchman
(1987: vii) refers to two different
approaches to open sea navigation -- the European and the
Trukese:
The European navigator begins with a plan -- a course -- which
he has charted according to
certain universal principles, and he carries out his voyage by
relating his every move to that plan.
His effort throughout his voyage is directed to remaining "on
course." If unexpected events
occur, he must first alter the plan, then respond accordingly.
The Trukese navigator begins with
an objective rather than a plan. He sets off toward the objective
and responds to conditions as
they arise in an ad hoc fashion. He utilizes information provided
by the wind, the waves, the tide
and current, the fauna, the stars, the clouds, the sound of the
water on the side of the boat, and he
steers accordingly. His effort is directed to doing whatever is
necessary to reach the objective.
(Berreman 1966, p.347)
Like Suchman, we too find this contrast in approaches
instructive, and will use it here to
motivate our discussion of managing technological change. In
particular, we suggest that how
people think about managing change in organizations most often
resembles the European
approach to navigation. That is, they believe they need to start
with a plan for the change, charted
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according to certain general organizational principles, and that
they need to relate their actions to
that plan, ensuring throughout that the change remains on
course.
However, when we examine how change actually occurs in
practice, we find that it much more
closely resembles the voyage of the Trukese. That is, people
end up responding to conditions as
they arise, often in an ad hoc fashion, doing whatever is
necessary to implement change. In a
manner similar to Argyris and Schon's (1978) contrast between
espoused theories and theories-
in-use, we suggest that there is a discrepancy between how
people think about technological
change and how they do it. Moreover, we suggest that this
discrepancy significantly contributes
to the difficulties and challenges that contemporary
organizations face as they attempt to
introduce and effectively implement technology-based change.
Traditional ways of thinking about technological change have
their roots in Lewin's (1952) three-
stage change model of "unfreezing," "change," and "refreezing"
(Kwon and Zmud, 1987).
According to this model, the organization prepares for change,
implements the change, and then
strives to regain stability as soon as possible. Such a model,
which treats change as an event to be
managed during a specified period (Pettigrew, 1985), may have
been appropriate for
organizations that were relatively stable, bounded, and whose
functionality was sufficiently fixed
to allow for detailed specification. Today however, given more
turbulent, flexible, and uncertain

organizational and environmental conditions, such a model is
becoming less appropriate; hence,
the discrepancy.
This discrepancy is particularly pronounced when the
technology being implemented is open-
ended and customizable, as in the case of the new information
technologies that have come to be
known as groupware.[1] Groupware technologies provide
electronic networks that support
communication, coordination, and collaboration through
facilities such as information exchange,
shared repositories, discussion forums, and messaging. Such
technologies are typically designed
with an open architecture that is adaptable by end users,
allowing them to customize existing
features and create new applications (DeJean and DeJean, 1991;
Malone et al., 1992). Rather
than automating a predefined sequence of operations and
transactions, these technologies tend to
be general-purpose tools which are used in different ways
across various organizational activities
and contexts. Organizations need the experience of using
groupware technologies in particular
ways and in particular contexts to better understand how they
may be most useful in practice. In
such a technological context, the traditional change model is
thus particularly discrepant.
The discrepancy is also evident when organizations are using
information technologies to
attempt unprecedented and complex changes such as global
integration or distributed knowledge
management. A primary example of this is the current attempt
by many companies to redefine
and integrate global value chain activities which were

previously managed independently. While
there is typically some understanding up front of the magnitude
of such a change, the depth and
complexity of the interactions among these activities is only
fully understood as the changes are
implemented. For many organizations, such initiatives represent
a new ball game, not only
because they haven't played the game before but because most
of the rules are still evolving. In a
world with uncertain rules, the traditional model for devising
and executing a game plan is very
difficult to enact. And as recent strategy research has suggested
(Mintzberg, 1994; McGrath and
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McMillan, 1995), planning in such circumstances is more
effective as an ongoing endeavor,
reflecting the changing and unfolding environments with which
organizations interact.
In many situations, therefore, predefining the technological
changes to be implemented and
accurately predicting their organizational impact is not feasible.
Hence, the models of planned
change that often inform implementation of new technologies
are less than effective. We suggest

that what would be more appropriate is a way of thinking about
change that reflects the
unprecedented, uncertain, open-ended, complex, and flexible
nature of the technologies and
organizational initiatives involved. Such a model would enable
organizations to systematically
absorb, respond to, and even leverage unexpected events,
evolving technological capabilities,
emerging practices, and unanticipated outcomes. Such a model
for managing change would
accommodate -- indeed, encourage -- ongoing and iterative
experimentation, use, and learning.
Such a model sees change management more as an ongoing
improvisation than a staged event. In
this paper, we propose such an alternative model. After
presenting the model, we describe a case
study of groupware implementation in a customer support
organization to illustrate the value of
this alternative model in practice. We conclude by discussing
the conditions under which such an
improvisational model may be a powerful way of managing the
implementation and use of
advanced technologies.
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
The improvisational model for managing technological change
is based on research we have
done into the implementation and use of open-ended
information technologies. The model rests
on two major assumptions which differentiate it from traditional
models of change: first, that the
changes associated with technology implementations constitute
an ongoing process rather than
an event with an end point after which the organization can
expect to return to a reasonably

steady state; and second, that the various technological and
organizational changes made during
the ongoing process cannot, by definition, all be anticipated
ahead of time.
Given these assumptions, our improvisational change model
recognizes three different types of
change: anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based. These
change types are elaborations on
Mintzberg's (1987) distinction between deliberate and emergent
strategies. Here, we distinguish
between anticipated changes -- changes that are planned ahead
of time and occur as intended --
and emergent changes -- changes that arise spontaneously out of
local innovation and which are
not originally anticipated or intended. An example of an
anticipated change would be the
implementation of electronic mail software which accomplishes
its intended aim to facilitate
increased and quicker communication among organizational
members. An example of an
emergent change would be the use of the electronic mail
network as an informal grapevine
disseminating rumors throughout an organization. This use of e-
mail is typically not planned or
anticipated when the network is implemented, but often emerges
tacitly over time in particular
organizational contexts.
We further differentiate these two types of changes from
opportunity-based changes -- changes
that are not anticipated ahead of time but are introduced
purposefully and intentionally during the
change process in response to an unexpected opportunity, event,
or breakdown. For example, as
companies gain experience with the World Wide Web, they are

finding opportunities to apply
and leverage its capabilities in ways that were not anticipated or
planned before the introduction
of the Web. Both anticipated and opportunity-based changes
involve deliberate action, in
contrast to emergent changes which arise spontaneously and
usually tacitly out of people's
practices with the technology over time (Orlikowski, 1996).
These three types of change build on each other over time in an
iterative fashion (see Figure 1).
While there is no predefined sequence in which the different
types of change occur, the
deployment of new technology often entails an initial
anticipated organizational change
associated with the installation of the new hardware/software.
Over time, however, use of the
new technology will typically involve a series of opportunity-
based, emergent, and further
anticipated changes, the order of which cannot be determined in
advance because the changes
interact with each other in response to outcomes, events, and
conditions arising through
experimentation and use.
One way of thinking about this model of change is to consider,
as an analogy, a jazz band. While
members of a jazz band, unlike members of a symphony
orchestra, do not decide in advance
exactly what notes each is going to play, they do decide ahead

of time what musical composition
will form the basis of their performance. Once the performance
begins, each player is free to
explore and innovate, departing from the original composition.
Yet, the performance works
because all members are playing within the same rhythmic
structure and have a shared
understanding of the rules of this musical genre. What they are
doing is improvising -- enacting
an ongoing series of local innovations which embellish the
original structure, respond to
spontaneous departures and unexpected opportunities, and
iterate and build on each other over
time. Using our earlier terminology, the jazz musicians are
engaging in anticipated, opportunity-
based, and emergent action during the course of their
performance to create an effective and
creative response to local conditions.
Similarly, an improvisational model for managing technological
change in organizations is not a
predefined program of change charted by management ahead of
time. Rather, it recognizes that
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technological change is an iterative series of different changes,
many unpredictable at the start,
that evolve out of practical experience with the new
technologies. Using such a model to manage
change requires a set of processes and mechanisms to recognize
the different types of change as
they occur and to respond effectively to them. The illustrative
case presented below suggests that

where an organization is open to the capabilities offered by a
new technological platform and
willing to embrace an improvisational change model, innovative
organizational changes can be
achieved.
Case Example: Zeta
Zeta is one of the Top 50 software companies in the US, with
$100 million in revenues and about
1000 employees. It produces and sells a range of powerful
software products providing
capabilities such as decision support, executive information,
and marketing analysis. Zeta is
headquartered in the Midwest, with sales and client service field
offices throughout the world.
Specialists in the Customer Service Department (CSD) at Zeta
provide technical support via
telephone to clients, consultants, value-added resellers, Zeta
client service representatives in the
field, and other Zeta employees who use the products. This
technical support can be quite
complex. Specialists typically devote several hours of research
to each problem, often searching
through reference material, attempting to replicate the problem,
and/or reviewing program source
code. Some incidents require interaction with members of other
departments such as quality
assurance, documentation, and product development. The CSD
employs approximately fifty
specialists and is headed by a director and two managers.
In 1992, the CSD purchased the Lotus Notes groupware
technology within which they developed
a new Incident Tracking Support System (ITSS) to help them

log customer calls and keep a
history of progress towards resolving the customers' problems.
Following a successful pilot of
the new system, the CSD decided to commit to the Notes
platform and to deploy ITSS
throughout its department. The acquisition of new technology to
facilitate customer call tracking
was motivated by a number of factors. The existing tracking
system was a home-grown system
which had been developed when the department was much
smaller and Zeta's product portfolio
much narrower. The system was not real-time, entry of calls was
haphazard, information
accuracy was a concern, and performance was slow and
unreliable. It provided little assistance
for reusing prior solutions and no support for the management
of resources in the department.
The volume and complexity of calls to the CSD had increased in
recent years due to the
introduction of new products, the expanded sophistication of
existing products, and the extended
range of operating platforms supported. Such shifts had made
replacement of the tracking system
a priority, as CSD managers were particularly concerned that
the home-grown system provided
no ability to track calls, query the status of particular calls,
apprehend the workload, balance
resources, identify issues and problems before they became
crises, and obtain up-to-date and
accurate documentation on work in progress and work
completed. In addition, calls would
occasionally be lost, as the slips of paper on which they were
recorded would get mislaid or
inadvertently thrown away.
The initial introduction of the new ITSS system was

accompanied by anticipated changes in the
nature of both the specialists' and managers' work. In contrast to
the previous system, which had
been designed to only capture a brief description of the problem
and its final resolution, ITSS
was designed to allow specialists to document every step they
took in their process of resolving a
particular incident. That is, it was designed to enable the
capture of a full incident history. As
specialists began to use ITSS this way, the focus of their work
shifted from primarily research--
solving problems--to both research and documentation--solving
problems and documenting work
in progress.
The ITSS database quickly began to grow as each specialist
documented his/her resolution
process in detail. While documenting calls took time, it also
saved time by providing a rich
database of information which could be searched for potential
resolutions. Moreover, this new
database of rich information served as an unexpected and
informal learning mechanism by
providing the specialists with exposure to a wide range of
problems and solutions. As one
specialist noted: "If it is quiet, I will check on my fellow
colleagues to see what ... kind of calls
they get, so I might learn something from them. ... just in case
something might ring a bell when
someone else calls." At the same time, however, using the ITSS
database as a sole source of
information did pose some risk, since there were no guarantees
as to the accuracy of the

information. To minimize this risk, the specialists tacitly
developed a set of informal quality
indicators to help them distinguish between reliable and
unreliable data. For example, resolutions
that were comprehensively documented, documented by certain
individuals, or verified by the
customer were considered more reliable sources of information.
In addition to these changes in specialists' work, use of the new
system by the CSD managers
improved their ability to control the department's resources.
Specialists' use of ITSS to document
calls provided managers with detailed workload information,
which was used to justify increased
headcount and adjust work schedules and shift assignments on a
dynamic and as-needed basis.
ITSS also supplied managers with more accurate information on
specialists' work process, for
example, the particular steps followed to research and resolve a
problem, the areas in which
specialists sought advice or were stalled, and the quality of
their resolutions. As managers began
to rely on the ITSS data to evaluate specialists' performance,
they expanded the criteria they used
to do this evaluation. For example, quality of work-in-progress
documentation was included as
an explicit evaluation criterion and documentation skills became
a factor in the hiring process.
As the CSD gained experience with and better understood the
capabilities of the groupware
technology, the managers opportunistically introduced a change
in the structure of the
department to further leverage these capabilities. This change
had not been planned prior to the
implementation of ITSS, but the growing reliance on ITSS and

an appreciation of the capabilities
of the groupware technology created an opportunity for the CSD
to redistribute call loads. In
particular, "first line" and "second line" support levels were
established, with junior specialists
being assigned to the first line, and senior specialists to the
second line. Partnerships were
created between the less experienced, junior specialists and the
more experienced, senior
specialists. Front line specialists now took all incoming calls,
resolved as many of these as they
could, and then electronically transferred calls to their second
line partners when they were
overloaded or had calls which were especially difficult. In
addition to handling calls transferred
to them, senior specialists were expected to proactively monitor
their front line partners' progress
on calls and to provide assistance as needed.
While this partnership idea was conceptually sound, it regularly
broke down in practice. Junior
specialists were often reluctant to hand off calls, fearing that
such transfers would reflect poorly
on their competence or that they would be overloading their
more senior partners. Senior
specialists, in turn, were usually too busy resolving complex
incidents to spend much time
monitoring their junior partners' call status or progress. In
response to this unanticipated
breakdown in the partnership idea, CSD managers introduced
another opportunity-based
structural change. They created a new role, that of an
intermediary, which was filled by a senior
specialist whose job it was to mediate between the first and

second lines, regularly monitoring
junior specialists' call loads and work in progress, and
dynamically reassigning calls as
appropriate. The new intermediary role served as a buffer
between the junior and senior
specialists, facilitating the transfer of calls and relieving senior
specialists of the responsibility to
constantly monitor their front line partners. With these
structural changes, ITSS in effect
changed the prior undifferentiated and fixed division of labor
within the department to a dynamic
distribution of work reflecting different levels of experience,
various areas of expertise, and
shifting workloads. In response to the new distribution of work,
managers adjusted their
evaluation criteria to reflect the changed responsibilities and
roles within the CSD.
Another change which emerged over time was a shift in the
nature of collaboration within the
CSD from a primarily reactive mode of collaboration to one that
was more proactive. Because all
specialists now had access to the database of calls being worked
on in the department, they
began to browse through each others' calls to see which ones
they could provide help on. Rather
than waiting to be asked if they had a solution to a particular
problem (which is how they had
solicited and received help in the past), specialists actively
browsed through the database of calls
seeking problems for which they could offer help. This shift
from solicited to unsolicited
assistance was facilitated by the capabilities of the groupware
technology, the complex nature of
the work, existing evaluation criteria that stressed teamwork,
and the long-standing cooperative

and collegial culture in the CSD. Consider the following
specialists' comments: "Everyone
realizes that we all have a certain piece of the puzzle ... I may
have one critical piece, and Jenny
may have another piece. ... And if we all work separately, we're
never going to get the puzzle
together. But by everybody working together, we have the entire
puzzle"; "Here I don't care who
grabs credit for my work ... this support department does well
because we're a team, not because
we're all individuals" (Orlikowski, 1995). Managers responded
to this shift in work practices by
adjusting specialists' evaluation criteria to specifically take
unsolicited help giving into account.
As one manager explained: "When I'm looking at incidents, I'll
see what help other people have
offered, and that does give me another indication of how well
they're working as a team."
After approximately one year of using ITSS, the CSD
implemented two further organizational
changes around the groupware technology. Both of these had
been anticipated in the initial
planning for ITSS, although the exact timing for their
implementation had been left unspecified.
First, the ITSS application was installed in three overseas
support offices, with copies of all the
ITSS databases replicated regularly across the four support sites
(US, UK, Australia, and
Europe). This provided all support specialists with a more
extensive knowledge base on which to
search for possibly helpful resolutions. The use of ITSS in all
the support offices further allowed
specialists to transfer calls across offices, essentially enacting a
global support department within
Zeta.

Second, the CSD initiated and funded the development of a
number of bug tracking systems
which were implemented within groupware and deployed in
Zeta's departments of product
development, product management, and quality assurance.
These bug tracking applications,
which were modeled on the ITSS application, were linked into
ITSS and enabled specialists to
enter any bugs they had discovered in their problem resolution
activities directly into the relevant
product's bug tracking system. Previously, the reporting of bugs
by the CSD to other departments
was done manually, took many weeks, and involved minimal
communication. With the new bug
tracking applications and linkages to ITSS, specialists could
also directly query the status of
particular bugs, and even change their priority if customer calls
indicated that such an escalation
was needed. Specialists in particular found this change very
valuable. For the other departments,
the link with ITSS allowed users such as product managers and
developers to access the ITSS
records and trace the particular incidents that had uncovered
certain bugs or uncovered certain
use problems. Only the developers had some reservations about
the introduction of the bug
tracking application, reservations that were associated with the
severe time constraints under
which they worked to produce new releases of Zeta products.
In addition to the improved coordination and integration
achieved with other departments and

offices, the CSD also realized further opportunity-based
innovations and emergent changes
within their own practices. For example, as the number of
incidents in ITSS grew, some of the
senior specialists began to realize that the information in the
system could be used to help train
newcomers. By extracting certain records from the ITSS
database, these specialists
opportunistically created a training database of sample problems
with which newly hired
specialists could work. Using the communication capabilities of
the groupware technology, these
senior specialists could monitor their trainees' progress through
the sample database and
intervene to educate when necessary. As one senior specialist
noted: "So we can kind of keep up
to the minute on their progress. ... If they're on the wrong track,
we can intercept them and say,
'Go check this, go look at that.' But it's not like we have to
actually sit with them and review
things. It's sort of an on-line, interactive thing." As a result of
this new training mechanism, the
time that it took for new specialists to begin taking customer
calls was reduced from eight weeks
to about five weeks.
An emergent change realized during this time related to access
control. An ongoing issue for the
CSD was who (if anybody) outside of the CSD should be given
access to the ITSS database with
its customer call information and specialists' work-in-progress
documentation. This issue was not
one that had been anticipated prior to the acquisition of the
technology. While the managers were
worried about how to respond to the increasing demand for
access to ITSS as the database

became more valuable and word about its content spread
throughout the company, they
continued to handle each access request as it came up. Over
time, they had used a variety of
control mechanisms ranging from giving limited access to some
"trusted" individuals, generating
summary reports of selected ITSS information for others, and
refusing any access to still others.
As one of the managers explained, it was only after some time
that they realized that their
various ad hoc responses to different access requests amounted
to, in essence, a set of rules and
procedures about access control. By responding locally to a
variety of requests and situations
over time, an implicit access control policy for the use of ITSS
had evolved and emerged.
Summary of Zeta Case
Figure 2 represents the change model around the groupware
technology followed by Zeta in its
CSD. Along with the introduction of the new technology and the
development of the ITSS
application, the CSD first implemented some planned
organizational changes, expanding the
specialists' work to include work-in-progress documentation and
adjusting the managers' work to
take advantage of the real-time access to workload information.
These changes were anticipated
prior to introducing the new technology. As specialists and
managers began to work in new ways
with the technology, a number of changes emerged in practice,
such as the specialists developing
norms to determine the quality and value of prior resolutions,

and managers paying attention to
documentation skills in hiring and evaluation decisions.
Building on these anticipated and emergent changes, the CSD
introduced a set of opportunity-
based changes, creating junior-senior specialist partnerships to
take advantage of the shared
database and communication capabilities of the technology, and
then adding the new role of
intermediary in response to the unexpected problems that arose
around partnership and work
reassignment. These changes were not anticipated at the start,
nor did they simply emerge
spontaneously in working with the new technology. Rather, they
were conceived of and
implemented in situ and in response to the opportunities and
issues which arose as the CSD
gained experience and developed a deeper understanding of the
new technology and their
particular use of it. This change process around the groupware
technology continued through the
second year at Zeta when some anticipated organizational
changes were followed by both
emergent and opportunity-based changes associated with
unfolding events and the learning and
experience gained by using the new technology in practice.
Overall, what we see here is an iterative and ongoing series of
anticipated, emergent, and
opportunity-based changes which allowed Zeta to learn from
practical experience, respond to
unexpected outcomes and capabilities, and adapt both the
technology and the organization as
appropriate. In effect, Zeta's change model cycles through
anticipated, emergent, and

opportunity-based organizational changes over time. It is a
change model which explicitly
recognizes the inevitability, legitimacy, and value of ongoing
learning and change in practice.
Enabling Conditions
Clearly, there were certain aspects of the CSD and the Zeta
organization which enabled it to
effectively adopt an improvisational change model to implement
and use the groupware
technology. Our research at Zeta and other companies suggests
that at least two sets of enabling
conditions are critical: aligning key dimensions of the change
process, and dedicating resources
to provide ongoing support for the ongoing change process. We
will consider each in turn.
Aligning Key Change Dimensions
An important influence on the effectiveness of any change
process is the interdependent
relationship among three dimensions: the technology, the
organizational context (including
culture, structure, roles and responsibilities), and the change
model used to manage change (see
Figure 3). Ideally, the interaction among these three dimensions
is compatible, or at a minimum,
not in opposition.
First, consider the relation of the change model and the
technology being implemented. When

the technology has been designed to operate like a "black box,"
allowing little adaptation by
users, an improvisational approach may not be more effective
than the traditional approach to
technology implementation. Similarly, where the technology is
well-established and its impacts
are reasonably well understood, a traditional planned change
approach may be effective.
However, when the technology being implemented is new and
unprecedented, and additionally
has an open-ended and customizable nature, an improvisational
model providing the flexibility
for organizations to adapt and learn through use becomes more
appropriate. Such is the case, we
believe, with the groupware technologies available today.
Second, the relation of the change model to organizational
context is also relevant. A flexible
change model, while likely to be problematic in a rigid, control-
oriented or bureaucratic culture,
is well-suited to a more informal and cooperative culture such
as the one characterizing the CSD.
In another study (Gallivan et al., 1994), we examined the
MidCo organization's successful
adoption and implementation of CASE (Computer-Aided
Software Engineering) tools within its
IS organization. While MidCo, a multi-national chemical
products company with revenues of
over $1.5 billion, was a relatively traditional organization in
many ways, key aspects of its
culture--a commitment to total quality management, a focus on

organizational learning and
employee empowerment, as well as a long-term time
orientation--were particularly compatible
with the improvisational model it used to manage ongoing
organizational changes around the
new software development technology.
Finally, there is the important relationship between the
technology and the organizational
context. At Zeta, the CSD's cooperative, team-oriented culture
was compatible with the
collaborative nature of the new groupware technology. Indeed,
CSD's existing culture allowed it
to take advantage of the opportunity for improved collaboration
afforded by the groupware
technology. Moreover, when existing roles, responsibilities, and
evaluation criteria became less
salient, the CSD managers expanded or adjusted these to reflect
new uses of the technology.
Compare these change efforts to those of Alpha, a professional
services firm which introduced
the Notes groupware technology to leverage knowledge sharing
and to coordinate distributed
activities (Orlikowski, 1992). While the physical deployment of
groupware grew very rapidly,
anticipated benefits were realized much more slowly. Key to the
reluctance to use groupware for
knowledge sharing was a perceived incompatibility between the
collaborative nature of the
technology and the individualistic and competitive nature of the
organization. As in many
professional services firms, Alpha rewarded individual rather
than team performance, and
promoted employees via an "up or out" set of evaluation
criteria. In such an environment,
knowledge sharing via a global Notes network was seen to

threaten status, distinctive
competence, and power. In contrast to Zeta, managers at Alpha
did not adjust policies, roles,
incentives, and evaluation criteria to better align their
organization with the intended use and
capabilities of the technology they had invested in.
Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support
An ongoing change process requires dedicated support over time
to adapt both the organization
and the technology to changing organizational conditions, use
practices, and technological
capabilities. Opportunity-based change, in particular, depends
on the ability of the organization
to notice and recognize opportunities, issues, breakdowns, and
unexpected outcomes as they
arise. This requires attention on the part of appropriate
individuals in the organization to track
use of the technology over time and to implement or initiate
organizational and/or technological
adjustments which will mitigate or take advantage of the
identified problems or opportunities. At
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refg
Zeta, it was the managers and technologists who primarily
played this role, incorporating it into
their other responsibilities. So, for example, the managers
adjusted the structure of their
department by introducing first line/second line partnerships to
facilitate a dynamic division of
labor, and then made further adaptations by introducing an
intermediary role to overcome some

unanticipated difficulties associated with the initial change.
Similarly, the technologists working
with the CSD incorporated enhancements to the ITSS system as
they realized ways of improving
ease of use and access time. The CSD's commitment to noticing
and responding to changes when
appropriate did not end after the implementation of the
technology. The managers clearly
realized that the change process they had embarked on with the
use of groupware was an
ongoing one, as one manager noted: "We've had ITSS for two
years. I'm surprised that the
enthusiasm hasn't gone away. ... I think it's because it's been
changed on a regular
basis....Knowing that [the changes are going to get implemented
keeps you wanting to think
about it, and keep going."
Ongoing change around the use of groupware technology also
requires ongoing adjustments to
the technology itself as users learn and gain experience with the
new technology's capabilities
and their uses of it over time. Without dedicated technology
support to implement these
adaptations and innovations, the continued experimentation and
learning in use central to an
improvisational change model may be stalled or thwarted. At
Zeta, the CSD's use of groupware
and ITSS was supported by a dedicated technology group.
Initially consisting of one developer,
this group grew over time as use of the technology expanded.
After two years of technology use,
the group included four full-time technologists who provided
technology support for the various
systems that had been deployed within Zeta via the Notes
platform. The group also maintained

strong ties with all their users through regular meetings and
communications with them. This
dedicated and ongoing technical support ensured that the
technology would continue to be
updated, adjusted, and expanded as appropriate.
The value of ongoing support to enable ongoing organizational
and technological change was
similarly important in another organization we studied, the
R&D division of a large Japanese
manufacturing firm (Orlikowski et al., 1995). A newly-formed
product development team within
the R&D division installed its own groupware technology, the
Usenet news-system (a computer
conferencing system). Similar to Zeta, the team's use of this
new technology also iterated among
anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based changes over time.
Here, a small group of users
who had previously used the groupware technology took on the
responsibility to manage and
support its ongoing use for themselves and their colleagues.
They tracked technology usage and
project events as they unfolded, responded as appropriate with
adjustments to communication
policies and technology functionality, and proactively made
changes to the team's use of the
conferencing system to leverage opportunities as they arose.
Conclusions
Global, responsive, team-based, networked--these are the
watchwords for organizations of the
nineties. As managers redesign and reinvent organizations in a
new image, many are turning to
information technologies to enable more flexible processes,
greater knowledge sharing, and

global integration. At the same time, effectively implementing
the organizational changes
associated with these technologies remains difficult in a
turbulent, complex, and uncertain
environment. We believe that a significant factor contributing to
these challenges is the growing
discrepancy between the way people think about technological
change and the way they actually
do it.
We have proposed here that people's assumptions about
technology-based change and the way it
is supposed to happen are based on models which are no longer
appropriate. Traditional models
for managing technology-based change treat change as a
sequential series of predefined steps
which are bounded within a specified period of time. With these
models as a guide, it makes
sense -- as the European navigator does -- to define a plan of
action in advance of the change and
track events against the plan, striving throughout the change to
remain on track. Deviations from
the intended course -- the anticipated versus the actual -- then
require explanation, the subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) implication being that there has been
some failure, some inadequacy in
planning, that has led to this deviation. Indeed, many
organizational mechanisms such as
budgeting and resource planning are based on these notions. The
problem is that change as it
actually occurs today more closely resembles the voyage of the
Trukese navigator, and the

models and mechanisms most commonly used to think about and
manage change do not
effectively support the experience of change in practice.
In this paper, we have offered an improvisational change model
as a different way of thinking
about managing the introduction and ongoing use of information
technologies to support the
more flexible, complex, and integrated structures and processes
demanded by organizations
today. In contrast to traditional models of technological change,
this improvisational model
recognizes that change is typically an ongoing process made up
of opportunities and challenges
which are not necessarily predictable at the start. It defines a
process which iterates among three
types of change -- anticipated, emergent and opportunity-based
-- and which allows the
organization to experiment and learn as it uses the technology
over time. Most importantly, it
offers a systematic approach with which to understand and
better manage the realities of
technology-based change in organizations today.
Because such a model requires a flexible and responsive
environment, adopting it implies that
managers relinquish what is often an implicit paradigm of
"command and control" (Zuboff,
1995). An improvisational model, however, is not anarchy and
neither is it a matter of "muddling
through." We are not implying that planning is an activity which
is unnecessary or should be
abandoned. We are suggesting, instead, that a plan is a guide
rather than a blueprint (Suchman,
1987), and that deviations from the plan, rather than being seen
as a symptom of failure, are to be

expected and actively managed.
Rather than pre-defining each step to be taken and then
controlling events to fit the plan, the idea
is to create an environment which facilitates improvisation. In
such an environment, management
provides, supports, and nurtures a set of expectations, norms,
and resources which guide the
ongoing change process. Malone (1996) refers to such a style of
managing as "cultivation."
Consider again the jazz band. While each member of the band is
free to improvise during the
performance, the result is typically not discordant. Rather, it is
harmonious because each player
operates within an overall framework, conforms to a shared set
of values and norms, and has
access to a known repertoire of rules and resources. Similarly,
while many of the changes at
Zeta's CSD were not pre-planned, they were compatible with the
overall objectives and
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refz
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refz
intentions of the department's members, their shared norms and
team orientation, and the designs
and capabilities of the technology at hand.
Effectively executing an improvisational change model also
requires aligning the technology and
the organizational context with the change model. Such
alignment does not happen

automatically. It requires explicit and ongoing examination and
adjustment, where and when
necessary, of the technology and the organization. As such,
mechanisms and resources allocated
to ongoing support of the change process are critical. Tracking
and noticing events and issues as
they unfold is a responsibility that needs to be owned by
appropriate members of the
organization. Along with the responsibility, these organizational
members require the authority,
credibility, influence, and resources to implement the ongoing
changes. Creating the
environment, aligning the technology, context, and change
model, and distributing the
appropriate responsibility and resources are critically important
in the effective use of an
improvisational model, particularly as they represent a
significant (and therefore challenging)
departure from the standard practice in effect in many
organizations today.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that an improvisational
model of change will not apply
to all situations. As we have noted, it is most appropriate for
open-ended, customizable
technologies or for complex and unprecedented change. In
addition, as one of our reviewers
noted, "jazz is not everyone's 'cup of tea'... some people are
incapable of playing jazz much less
able to listen to what they consider to be 'noise.'" We noted
above that some cultures do not
support experimentation and learning. As a result, they are
probably not receptive to an
improvisational model, and are less likely to succeed with it.
However, as these organizations
attempt to implement new organizational forms, they too may

find an improvisational model to
be a particularly valuable approach to managing technological
change in the 21st century.
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Gallivan, M.J., Hofman, J.D., and Orlikowski, W.J.
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Computer Supported Cooperative
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"Shaping Electronic Communication:
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Pettigrew, A.M. The Awakening Giant. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
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