Odey Diciembre 2015

1. 12 Upper Grosvenor Street, London, W1K 2ND ~ Tel +44 (20) 7208-1400 Fax: +44 (20) 7208-1401 ~ www.odey.com
Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
■ In December-15 the EUR class returned +3.7% against an MSCI
Daily TR Net Europe (EUR) return of -5.3%.
■ After currency hedging the short equity book made a positive
contribution for the month (+4.6%). Positive contributions before
currency hedging came from a number of positions including Seadrill
(+92bps), Anglo American (+59bps) and Coca-Cola (+44bps). These
outweighed the negative contributions, the most notable of which were
attributable to Advanced Micro Devices (-26bps), Berkeley Group
(-24bps) and Netflix (-20bps).
■ The long equity book made a negative contribution after currency
hedging (-0.4%). The largest positive contributions before currency
hedging came from Man Group (+20bps), Dixons Carphone (+6bps)
and Circassia Pharmaceuticals (+6bps). These were outweighed by
negative contributions, the worst of which came from Sky (-54bps),
Sports Direct (-47bps) and Alcatel-Lucent (-16bps).
■ Elsewhere, active currencies returned -0.6% with government bonds,
commodities and index futures returning -0.3%, +0.4% and +0.3%
respectively. Source for above table and chart: Quintillion Limited and
Bloomberg. Calculation on a NAV basis as at 31-Dec-15.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future
performance and is shown net of fees. The data below refers
to the € share class.
Is this a bump in the road, or something more serious?
The old adage was that if the market had a problem, you sold the market and
bought the problem. The market could only go up if the problem was solved and
you made the most money from the solving of the problem. Governments have
rather turned that on its head. Ever since Greenspan bought into the S&P in 1987
and then the HKMA successfully bought 10% of the Hong Kong blue chips in
1998 in the Asian crisis, governments have seen fit to change the adage to ‘if the
market’s got a problem, buy the market!’
We are now watching this being performed on a larger screen and entirely in the
public eye. The Chinese authorities are buying everything. Their problem is that
there is no one problem. They have:
■ A bubble in housing
■ A bubble in lending and the banking sector
■ A bubble in currency
■ A bubble in the stockmarket
■ Hidden unemployment which threatens social unrest
At one stage the Chinese stockmarket represented 12% of global market capitali-
sations. Its debt is around 23% of all outstanding global debt. With China now so
integrated into the world trading system, what happens there, is felt by all. The
growth that Xi Jinping so enjoyed was created by wage growth of 12%, quite
unconnected to productivity, and now they are being forced to swallow the con-
sequences of allowing the cost of labour to rise so much faster than their pegged
currency partner, the US.
Strategy consists of OEI, OEI Mac and Odey Swan Funds.
Inception Date
Firm Size ($) 11,594.05
Strategy ($m) 2,444.56
Fund Size (€m) 1,064.36
€ Class 837.15
$ Class 387.15
£ Class 322.51
£ B Class 183.03
Index MSCI Daily TR Net Europe
31-Dec-2015
1-Jun-92
Since Inception
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Jun-92 Jun-96 Jun-00 Jun-04 Jun-08 Jun-12
%
Odey European Inc(€)
MSCI Daily TR Net Europe
€ Fund
MSCI Daily TR
Net Europe
Rel.
1-month 3.7 -5.3 9.0
3-month -12.2 5.3 -17.5
1-year -12.8 8.2 -21.0
3-year 15.6 38.6 -22.9
5-year 20.1 49.0 -28.9
YTD -12.8 8.2 -21.0
Since Inception 1537.3 445.2 1092.1
CAGR since inception 12.6 7.5 5.1
31-Dec-2015
1-year 3-year 5-year Inc.
Fund annual s.dev. 28.4 22.0 20.7 17.0
Index annual s.dev. 18.1 12.5 13.4 17.4
Alpha -0.2 0.8 0.2 1.0
Beta -0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.3
Correlation -0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.3
Sharpe Ratio -0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6
Fund Info Ratio -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.2
Fund Tracking error 40.4 26.7 21.7 21.1
Treynor 18.0 -20.8 8.3 39.6
31-Dec-2015
31-Dec-2015
% Nav
Long Equity 87.9
Short Equity -124.6
Foreign Exchange 102.0
Government Bond -6.9
Commodity 2.2

2. 12 Upper Grosvenor Street, London, W1K 2ND ~ Tel +44 (20) 7208-1400 Fax: +44 (20) 7208-1401 ~ www.odey.com
Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
For the rest of the world a sizeable devaluation of the RMB
will be uncomfortable. With the world in overcapacity in al-
most everything, the battle is on as to where that capacity gets
junked. The Chinese would like everybody else’s to be that
victim. Currency wars lead to trade wars.
The fall in the oil price has been good news for the consumer
in the west and last year saw a 34% increase in petrol demand
in the US. Everybody filled their tanks to the brim. However
the benefit has not been as great as expected. Perhaps because
since 2009 most new employees have been denied private
medical insurance by their employers, the savings ratio has
been rising to temper the benefits of a lower oil price. Else-
where the oil price decline has as yet not seen a commensurate
tightening of belts by the oil producing countries. They have
preferred to carry on producing the oil in large quantities and
suffer commensurate losses. As a result the sovereign wealth
funds, 70% of which were oil producers, have experienced
large out flows. Saudi Arabia has seen $60 billion withdrawn
from bond and equity investments over the last year, $37 bil-
lion fled Russia in December alone! This sharp selling of as-
sets into relatively illiquid markets has made these markets
vulnerable to the downside. It has not been helped by individ-
uals in the US becoming big sellers of shares and EM bonds in
the last quarter.
Governments can try and keep these markets up by buying like
the Chinese are. But here again they are not buying cheap as-
sets. The Chinese are buying shares on 4X book value, stock-
markets globally are on P/Es of nearly 20X. Bonds have never
been more expensive.
No wonder that George Osborne has been visibly warning that
a cocktail of dangers and headwinds are coming our way and
that we appear to be facing them armed only with a sense of
entitlement and a lack of financial discipline. And now we
come to the crux of today’s events; central bankers have been
worried since 2009, when they lowered interest rates to zero,
that by getting rid of the cost of money they would encourage
dangerous and speculative behaviour. However they were qui-
etly happy that the near death experience for many borrowers
in 2008 kept them disciplined in their borrowing and their be-
haviour, even as the world recovered. However since 2012
there have been growing examples of dangerous behaviour. In
banking there is always incipient bad behaviour in the form of
what we, in Europe, call syndicated lending and in the US is
called leveraged loans. The lending bank lends 100% against a
development, usually involving property, in which the devel-
oper puts up no equity. The loan is then syndicated between
nine other banks, but it can be more or less, and the initiating
bank collects a 5% upfront fee for the placing. The idea of a
5% fee for a 10% loan advance is just too appetising. However
of course, the bank then has to take other banks’ loans so it
never works out quite so sweetly. Typically the loss when the
music stops on this kind of lending is 50% of the value of the
loan. This type of lending arose like a weed in 2013 and 2014
but has recently been discouraged. Today central banks are
worried in the US and UK by the growth of unsecured lending
– 12% p.a. in the US, 9% in the UK. This is mostly auto loans
but again with large risks attached. In areas of the world in
which bank lending is the major source of credit, central banks
can introduce ‘macroprudential measures’ which effectively
cause interest rates to rise in those areas of lending regarded as
being unwise.
The Fed has a problem in this regard. Unlike its counterparts
elsewhere, it cannot use ‘macroprudential measures’ to chas-
tise the offending banks because in the US banks only repre-
sent 40% of credit. Thus faced with ill-discipline the only an-
swer is higher and rising interest rates.
Quite separately from disciplining ill-disciplined lending,
since 2012 Fischer and Bullard and several other Fed members
have increasingly been of the view that higher interest rates
overall may be the answer to creating a world of higher infla-
tion. Higher interest rates, prices, wages and then higher rates
is the cycle of the 1970s. Such a cycle is full of benefits for the
Fed because rising interest rates stop borrowing growing,
whilst higher wages can allow real not nominal interest rates
to go negative even as nominal rates go higher. Such a policy
is a reversal of everything that Greenspan instigated all those
years ago and most importantly for markets, means that the
Fed would raise interest rates into a falling stockmarket, pro-
vided wages were responding by continuing to rise!
Now it still remains to be seen just how many of the Fed mem-
bers are in agreement with what is essentially a new policy. It
is also important that Yellen is in agreement. But it rhymes
with everything that Osborne is saying here about higher inter-
est rates; and maybe their vision is that now, with the banks in
good shape, the US could suffer a recession without too much
trouble. They may also believe that the wealth effect of the
lower oil price offsets the effect of a falling stockmarket.
Meanwhile credit conditions continue to deteriorate in the US.
High yield bonds continue to sell off, loan officers continue to
insist on tighter covenants. All of this points to a more violent
year than investors are expecting. With S&P profits already
falling for 12 months, markets are fragile. Higher wages mean
lower profit margins going forward. So how much could mar-
kets fall by? Most bear markets take out the last five years’ of
gain. Valuations are high. A 40% fall will bring the S&P back
towards a 10X multiple, which will be good value but by then
earnings will be difficult to measure.
The bulls hope that the weak oil price will extend the cycle
and China will close down all offending asset classes. They
will hope that governments will support asset prices, having
realised that there is no equality before the low for them. Ra-
ther more ‘buy-di-buy’ than ‘hello a low’ has been their old
refrain.
However for those who trust not in princes, the future looks
for now more bleak. Remember though, that these crises do
provide opportunities. It just pays not to be too early.

3. 12 Upper Grosvenor Street, London, W1K 2ND ~ Tel +44 (20) 7208-1400 Fax: +44 (20) 7208-1401 ~ www.odey.com
Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
Charts above shows non-base currency exposures through forward currency contracts
31-Dec-15
31-Dec-15
31-Dec-15 31-Dec-15
Comparative benchmark Primary: Cash, Secondary: MSCI Daily TR Net Europe (€)
Fund inception date 1 June, 1992
Fund type Cayman Long-Short OEIC
Listing Irish Stock Exchange
Base currency €
Share classes €, £ (A & B), $
Hedging Non-base currencies are unhedged
Dealing 1st
/15th
of each month based on funds received the previous day forward to 5pm Dublin time / COB 14th & month end
Front end fee Up to 5%
Annual management fee 1%
Performance fee 20% of the increase in the value per share of the fund between the
beginning and the end of the year. Fees crystalise annually. Losses carried forward.
Anti-dilution fee 0.5% NAV on subs/reds
Exit fee 1% if held <1yr
Min. investment €1,000,000 or £/$ equivalent
Dividends Reporting & accumulation
Price reporting Prices published daily in FT
ISIN €-KYG6708H1157 £A-KYG6708H1645 US$-KYG6708H1496 £B-KYG6708H1728
SEDOL €-3110423 £A-B00VSM0 US$-3110434 £B-B2RGGH3
31-Dec-15
For the month ending 31-Dec-15
For the month ending 31-Dec-15
Enquiries:
Sarah St. George
Tel: +44 20 7208-1432
Email: s.stgeorge@odey.com
US Clients - Tom Trowbridge
Tel: +1 (917) 538-7838
Email: t.trowbridge@odey.com
Crispin Odey
Portfolio Manager
All sources unless otherwise stated are Odey internal unaudited data and refer to the € share class. All data shown is as at 31-Dec-2015.
-40
-20
0
20
40
ConsumerDiscretionary
ConsumerStaples
Energy
Financials
HealthCare
Industrials
InformationTechnology
Materials
Misc
Telecommunication
Services
Utilities
%
Long % of NAV Short % of NAV
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
CaymanIslands
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
HongKong
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Jersey
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
OtherGlobal
Portugal
Singapore
SouthAfrica
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
%
Long % of NAV
Short % of NAV
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Mar-05 Aug-06 Jan-08 Jun-09 Nov-10 Apr-12 Sep-13 Feb-15
%
Long Equity Exposure
Short Equity Exposure
Net Equity Exposure
Government Bond Exposure
FX Exposure
Rank Security Strategy Notional Exposure (%)
1 JPN 10Y Bond(Ose) Mar16 Short 20.4
2 ACGB 2 3/4 04/21/24 Long 13.5
3 Sky Long 12.5
4 Swatch Short 5.6
5 Las Vegas Sands Short 5.5
6 Odey Naver Long 5.3
7 Intu Properties Short 5.1
8 GOLD 100 OZ FUTR Feb16 Long 4.6
9 Ashmore Short 4.4
10 Lancashire Holdings Limited Short 4.4
-44.6
-30.7
-6.7 -5.2
-0.5 -0.2 -0.2
0.1 0.1
101.6
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
AUD
HKD
SAR
GBP
CNH
CHF
SEK
JPY
NOK
USD
%
Rank Security Strategy Notional Exposure (Ave %)
1 Seadrill Short 1.6
2 Anglo American Short 1.4
3 Coca-Cola HBC Short 4.0
4 Lancashire Holdings Short 4.2
5 Lafarge Holcim Short 3.6
Rank Security Strategy Notional Exposure (Ave %)
1 Sky Long 11.7
2 Sports Direct International Long 1.6
3 Advanced Micro Devices Short 1.5
4 Berkeley Group Short 1.4
5 Netflix Short 0.9

4. 12 Upper Grosvenor Street, London, W1K 2ND ~ Tel +44 (20) 7208-1400 Fax: +44 (20) 7208-1401 ~ www.odey.com
Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
This communication is for information purposes only and not intended to be viewed as a piece of independent investment research.
© 2015 Odey Asset Management LLP (“OAM”) has approved this communication which is for private circulation only, and in the UK is directed to persons who are professional clients or eligible
counterparties for the purposes of the FCA’s Conduct of Business Sourcebook and it is not intended for and must not be distributed to retail clients. It does not constitute an offer to sell or an
invitation to buy or invest in any of the securities or funds mentioned herein and it does not constitute a personal recommendation or investment taxation or any other advice. The information and
any opinions have been obtained from or are based on sources believed to be reliable, but accuracy cannot be guaranteed. Past performance does not guarantee future results and the value of all
investments and the income derived therefrom can decrease as well as increase. Investments that have an exposure to currencies other than the base currency of the fund may be subject to exchange
rate fluctuations. This communication and the information contained therein may constitute a financial promotion for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of the United
Kingdom (the “Act”) and the rules of the FCA. This communication is not subject to any restrictions on dealing ahead. The distribution of this communication may, in some countries, be restricted by
law or regulation. Accordingly, anyone who comes into possession of this communication should inform themselves of and observe these restrictions. OAM is not liable for a breach of such
restrictions or for any losses relating to the accuracy, completeness or use of information in this communication, including any consequential loss. Please always refer to the fund’s prospectus. OAM
whose company No. is OC302585 and whose registered office is at 12 Upper Grosvenor Street, London, W1K 2ND, is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.
The investment objective of the Fund is capital appreciation. The Investment Manager seeks to achieve this objective principally through managing a portfolio of securities,
bonds and currencies and related financial instruments. The Investment Manager expects that the Fund's investments will tend, over time, to be weighted towards European
securities with investments in non-European securities subject to the limits set out in the Investment Objective and Policy section of the prospectus.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance and is shown net of fees.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec YTD
1992 -3.6 0.2 1.4 5.7 12.0 -3.8 0.9 12.5
1993 0.7 2.5 5.4 1.8 3.6 5.7 3.6 6.4 -2.5 9.1 1.3 11.6 60.4
1994 5.7 -9.8 -11.7 -2.3 -9.8 5.9 -4.9 -7.2 0.9 -8.0 -6.6 -5.9 -43.4
1995 1.0 -1.8 7.1 2.1 0.7 -14.1 -1.7 6.3 3.0 3.5 6.3 1.5 12.6
1996 1.7 -6.4 1.8 9.0 1.7 7.5 -2.7 6.4 3.0 8.0 11.2 4.1 53.9
1997 6.3 10.6 -5.0 4.9 9.6 5.9 2.5 -1.5 6.7 1.9 -3.3 5.3 51.8
1998 5.4 4.0 16.7 -2.4 6.3 -4.2 2.4 -6.3 0.3 2.7 -1.8 2.4 26.3
1999 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 3.1 -0.5 -0.4 1.3 0.3 -2.4 -2.9 2.8 5.5 5.9
2000 0.1 -0.1 -1.8 2.2 3.6 0.9 2.3 1.4 0.1 3.4 3.8 1.5 18.7
2001 0.2 3.2 -0.4 -1.4 -0.7 0.6 0.0 1.0 1.1 -1.4 2.8 1.3 6.3
2002 0.3 2.8 1.4 4.2 0.7 1.6 -1.1 1.1 -0.2 1.5 1.9 -1.8 12.9
2003 -0.1 -0.7 0.4 3.2 3.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.9 0.3 -0.9 0.5 10.2
2004 0.6 -0.2 -1.5 -3.2 1.6 -0.4 1.7 0.9 -0.5 1.1 1.7 -1.8 0.0
2005 -0.3 3.1 0.4 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 1.1 1.8 3.2 -2.8 -0.9 2.4 7.0
2006 3.7 -2.1 2.7 2.5 -4.6 -0.7 2.2 -1.8 -4.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 -1.5
2007 -0.2 -0.8 5.3 4.4 8.3 5.5 1.6 2.0 7.4 1.4 3.5 6.7 54.8
2008 -0.4 6.6 -0.5 1.8 2.6 4.6 -5.0 -0.7 -2.7 -2.6 4.2 3.0 10.9
2009 -3.0 -4.5 5.3 27.7 8.3 -2.7 5.0 6.5 1.9 -10.2 -1.7 1.3 33.7
2010 -0.6 1.1 1.9 -1.1 -10.9 -2.0 3.2 -6.3 4.9 2.9 1.6 6.6 -0.1
2011 3.4 2.2 -2.8 3.5 -2.5 0.1 -5.3 -13.5 -8.3 10.3 -5.1 -2.8 -20.6
2012 8.1 7.6 2.9 -1.0 -5.6 1.2 -3.0 5.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 3.2 30.7
2013 9.2 2.0 3.5 1.3 5.1 -7.1 2.3 -2.5 2.2 1.8 3.4 2.8 25.8
2014 -1.7 4.6 -7.3 -7.9 0.3 -0.6 -1.6 0.5 9.8 -5.6 5.3 11.7 5.5
2015 3.6 -6.4 4.6 -19.3 5.2 0.2 0.3 6.7 7.6 -14.9 -0.5 3.7 -12.8