How Vulnerability and Social Factors Cause 'Natural' Disasters

7. A hazard need not a disaster make:
vulnerability and the causes of 'natural'
disasters
T. CANNON, University of Greenwich
INTRODUCTION
Not very many years ago, most people assumed that the
disasters
associatedwith earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and other natural
hazards were themselves 'natural' disaster^.^ It was accepted
that their impact could. be reduced (through attempts at
preparedness, mitigation and post-event humanitarian action),
but
the emphasis (including in much academic and policy work) was
on
the naturalness of disaster events. There has long been an
awareness that some disasters, which may resemble those
usually
blamed on nature, are inherently caused by human action (as
with
famines triggered by war). But this perception was limited, and
it seemed difficult for people to extend such explanations to
other types of disaster (especially those linked with sudden-
onset hazards like earthquakes) which might have less obvious,
more complex, but just as significant links with human causes.'
Much disaster policy still puts emphasis on the impact of
nature,
and this has led to the dominance of technical interventions
focused on predicting the hazard or modifying its impact.

This paper intends to clarify those less obvious human
connect~ons between natural hazards and disastrous outcomes.
It
argues that hazards are natural, but that in general disasters
are not, and that they should not be seen as the inevitable
outcome of a hazard's impact. The stress here is on the
condition
bf the people which make it possible for a hazard to become a
disaster. This includes the extent and types of their
vulnerability, in combination with the technical issue of how
society deals (or does not deal) with the hazard in terms of
mitigation and preparedness. To concentrate on preparedness
and
mitigation of hazards without considering the social and
economic
systems that both generate vulnerability and determine the type
of technical interventions leads to inadequate and potentii
dangerous situations. One pioneer of hazards research expres
this well nearly twenty years ago:
[Mlodern societies cannot expect to cope effectively r
hazards in the environment by relying solely upon technibas
solutions. A crucial aspect . . . is the skilful, sensitive use
of a wide range of adjustments, including engineering
devices, land management and social regulation. To depend on
only one sort of public action is to court social disaster,
iith
..-1
92 Natural disasters. Thomas Telford, London, 1993
VLlLNERABILITY OF COMMUNITIES

environmental deterioration, and enlarged public obligations.
(White, 1974: 13)
The technical interventions themselves which are supposed to
reduce hazard intensity or prepare people for them are not
socially-neutral, must not be taken in isolation from the factors
that create vulnerability, and should only be implemented with
full awareness of their impact on different sections of the
people. The paper argues for the use of vulnerability analysis
as a framework for understanding disasters and the development
of better policy interventions.'
NATURAL HAZARDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Nature presents Humankind with a set of opportunities and risks
which vary greatly in their spatial distribution. Opportunities
include the many different ways in which people utilise nature
for production (raw materials, energy sources) and to service
their livelihoods (absorbing or recycling waste products). The
risks inherent in nature consist of a wide range of hazards that
put constraints on production (e.g. frosts affecting agriculture)
and on other aspects of livelihoods and safety (earthquakes,
floods, droughts etc.).
Conventional analysis of the relationship between Humankind
and
the environment has tended to emphasise nature as a set of
determinants, without adequately integrating nature with social
and economic systems. I argue that in effect the environment is
itself a social construction. Opportunities and risks are
fashioned by the varying characteristics of different types of
social system, and the differing demands each society puts on
Nature, combined with the varying impacts that nature may have
on varying types of social system.' This means that there are no
really generalised opportunities and risks in Nature, but instead
there are sets of unequal access to opportunities and unequal

exposures to risks which are a consequence of the socio-
economic
system.
Much conventional analysis of disasters considers a direction of
hausality that proceeds from hazard through spatial variability
to the impact on society. The argument of this paper is that
explanation of disaster causality is only possible by
understanding the ways in which social systems themselves
generate unequal exposure to risk by making some groups of
people, some individuals, and particular societies more prone to
hazards than others. In other words, disasters are not 'natural'
(not even sudden ones) because hazards affect people
differently
within societies, and may have very different impacts on
different societies (e.g. earthquakes of equal energy may cause
devastation in one country, but not in another).
Inequalities in risk (and opportunity) are largely a function of
the principle systems of power operating in all societies, which
are normally analysed in terms of class, gender and ethnicity.
These in turn may be seen as social structures rooted in (and
mutually influencing) the patterns of national and international
economic and political systems. In other words, in order to
understand the relationship between humans and nature, it is
more
important to discern how human systems themselves place
people
NATURAL DISASTERS
in relation to each other and to the environment than it is to
interpret natural systems. Concern here is not with the
opportunities provided by the environment, but its risks. This

paper attempts to interpret how social and economic systems
place
people at different levels of risk from nature's hazards. The
main concept by which this 'social causation' is explained is
vulnerability, being a measure of the degree and type of
exposure
to risk generated by different societies in relation to hazards.
This approach can be termed vulnerability analysis.
DISASTERS ARE NOT NATURAL
Many people now accept that human activity itself has created
the
conditions for disaster events. This is partly because of growing
awareness that through negligence or inappropriate response,
the
workings of social systems have made a disaster out of a
situation which otherwise might not have been so serious. There
has also been a growth in understanding that it is hazards that
are natural, but that for a hazard to become a disaster it has
to affect vulnerable people. The last decade has seen increasing
use of various concepts of vulnerability by academics and
development practitioners. These are also indicative of how
disasters can be analysed as the product of economic and
political factors. This shift in opinion is a vital step in the
creation of a new international framework of thought and action
for avoiding disasters.
Another reason for the shift is the growth in awareness of
development problems and the difficulties of improving peoples
living standards in Third World countries. Many now realise
that
the impact of disasters in the Third World often produce only a
more acute, more extreme form of the general chronic daily
suffering of many of the people. There is a realisation that
explanation of the entire set of problems is required, rather

than understanding of the 'naturalr disaster in isolation.
Another reason for the new awareness is the more widespread
recognition of human destruction of the environment, and that
natural hazards themselves can be precipitated (or exacerbated)
by the pursuit of economic and social goals which hitherto were
seen as the normal objectives of economic growth.
But there are two other reasons why attitudes have changed,
especially among people in Western countries. First has been
the
growing critique of international inequalities, including the
awareness of the surplus of food in the West contrasted with the
dearth in Africa. Although the general public may not be aware
that a transfer of this surplus will not solve the problems, its
existence (and the international system which gives rise to it)
at least showed them that something was wrong with 'nature' as
an explanation. Secondly, and linked with the first, the
widespread civil unrest and wars in areas affected by famine (in
Mozambique, Ethiopia and Sudan especially) showed, even if in
a
rather crude manner, that the famines were at least partly man-
made. The result is that more people than perhaps ever before
are
conscious that economic and political factors are causes of
disasters, and that (in those instances at least) famines are not
simply a result of the lack of rain.
W N E R A B I L I T Y OF COMMUNITIES
Yet there are gaps in this new awareness, or rather it is patchy
and disconnected. Much of it is a product of reactions to single
events (e.g. the Ethiopian famines) or particular processes (e.g.
deforestation and desertification), and fails to connect a wider
range of phenomena. While the new awareness is to be

welcomed,
it is still incomplete and not yet universally accepted. Even the
focus of the 1990s United Nations 'International Decade for
Naturak Disaster Reduction' (my emphasis) betrays the strength
of the old outlook. Not only does the approach of the UN
Decade
fail to distinguish the naturalness of hazards from the human
causation of disasters; it also (by focusing on the behaviour of
nature) encourages technical solutions to the supposed excesses
of that natural, yet untamed side of nature.
This paper instead develops a framework of factors and
processes
which explain how it is vulnerable people who are the victims
of
disasters. This is no mere tautology: it is not like saying that
the victims of disasters were vulnerable to that hazard, as is
demonstrated by their being its victims. The purpose is to
demonstrate that there are particular characteristics of
different groups of people (derived from economic, social and
political processes) which mean that with the impact of a
particular type of hazard of a given intensity, some avoid
disaster and others do not.' The processes which make people
?more or less vulnerable are largely (but not exactly) the same
as those which generate differences in wealth, control over
?resources, and power, both nationally and internationally. The
*vulnerability concept is a means of 'translating1 known
everyday
I processes ofthe economic and political separation of people
into
?a more specific identification of those who may be at risk in
,hazardous environments.'
h
,The emphasis which many of those involved in 'disasters work'
have placed on economic and political factors as the 'causesf of

tiisasters seems to be percolating through to the public, to aid
workers, and even to some governments.' Something which has
been
obvious to many victims of disaster - that their suffering is not
simply the result of an act of God - is being understood. It is
easy to identify war and civil disturbance as relevant economic
and political factors. What is more difficult but essential is
,to identify the processes and conflicts which generate and
maintain vulnerability to disaster in the more general sense.
This is more difficult to substantiate, because it usually
involves analysis of the means by which some people live (and
survive hazards better) at the expense of others. While many
will
condemn wars, and be critical of desertification, famine and
pestilence, or population growth, there is more reluctance
(especially amongst those who have power) to accept that the
conditions which create vulnerability in some people have as
their counterpart a more comfortable life for others.
This conflict of economic interests is one of the most
intractable barriers to the mitigation of disasters. It is
evident in widely different circumstances. These include the
enforced marginalizing of people onto less productive land, or
the need for those who earn low wages, have few resources, or
are
discriminated against, to live in particular places where hazards
strike more harshly.
NATURAL DISASTERS
In the first type of case, the move is often so that superior
land can be used for commercial agriculture or ranching, and
the
losers are made more vulnerable to drought and other hazards.

In
the second, examples include the need for those dispossessed of
land or other income opportunities in Bangladesh to live in
extremely flood-prone areas of the delta, the unemployed and
those on low wages having to live in insubstantial housing
located on unstable slopes in many cities (e.g. Rio de Janeiro),
and the poor living in buildings which landlords and
governments
fail to proof against earthquakes.
To see disasters as being natural is about as useful as a doctor
signing a death certificate with the explanation of 'natural
causesf. It gives no indication as to whether the person's life
might have been extended by a different social system which
allocated resources differently (leading for instance to
provision of a better diet, which would increase physical and
mental ability, longevity and resistance to disease), or provided
a health care system which makes early diagnosis and treatment
possible (including appropriate technological interventions) of
many natural1 causes of death, and regulated risks in a
different way (for instance by the removal or reduction of
health
hazards from the workplace, and discouraging self-damaging
behaviour such as drug taking, including tobacco and excessive
alcohol), and enabling access to scientific knowledge of factors
such as diet and toxins.
Of course the analogy with disasters is not perfect, but the
parallels are there in terms of resource allocations, risk
management and the type of science and education. In disasters
associated with natural hazards, it is much more useful to
understand how the political and economic processes in a
society
act in various ways to generate varying levels of exposure to
risk among different people. The economic system and class
structure allocates income and access to resources, and this has

an impact in terms of peoples1 ability to cope with hazards (in
nutritional level and health resilience, and subsequent access
to resources, all affecting their potential for recovery). These
also affect the degree of preparedness and mitigation through
the
level of scientific concern, resource allocation, and type and
extent of technical preparation allocated within society. The
manner in which social systems assign resources for the
reduction
of the impact of hazards is particularly important. It often
fails to take account of peoples8 needs, just as in medical care
preventive work is often neglected and resources spent on
expensive curative facilities. The level of scientific knowledge
of both hazards themselves and their impact, and the allocation
of the resulting technologies as means for intervening to reduce
their intensity or impact, are normally determined by the power
of private companies and government agencies. These are
driven
by their own criteria for success, which need not correspond
with
the needs of people.
1
Obviously in the death certificate illustration, the people would
not die were it not for the factors which are inadequately
labelled 'natural causes1. But such information on the death
certificate is hardly informative about the underlying reasons
for the many medical conditions which can hasten death.
Equally
in an earthquake, were it not for the ground shaking there would
not be the potential for deaths, injuries and disruption. But
VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNITIES

&-his is far from being the same thing as saying that the
earthquake caused an associated disaster.
The analogy can be extended. For various reasons 'natural
causesf
can be recorded on death certificates because the medical
?rofession, other interest groups, or even the state, wishes to
suppress knowledge of the underlying cause of death. The
reasons
=ay be personal (to protect the feelings of family), social, or
=.olitical (to guard the reputation of the state). Similarly, it
3ds served some political interests to maintain the notion that
2isasters are natural rather than causedf by political and
economic processes.
Someone who dies in their nineties might be said without much
controversy to have died from natural causes, since there is
Little likelihood that any modification of lifestyle or medical
intervention could have delayed it further. In disasters there
are also cases which reach the limits of the analysis presented
frere, and which are similarly - at least partially - natural. For
instance, there may be completely unforseen or unknown
hazards,
or a hazard with a return period so long that people are unable
zo anticipate it at all. With the impact of such hazards, it is
difficult to blame human action (or inaction) for any disastrous
outcome (although there is an argument that human inaction
should
be blamed where there is a body of scientific knowledge that
could have been used to warn of such occurrences). But in
general
iisasters are not natural: they happen to people who are put at
risk as a result of their vulnerability.'
DEFINING WLNERABILITY

The vulnerability we are concerned with here is that associated
with natural hazards. Vulnerability is a characteristic of
individuals and groups of people who inhabit a given natural,
social and economic space, within which they are differentiated
according to their varying position in society into more or less
wlnerable individuals and groups. It is a complex characteristic
produced by a combination of factors derived especially (but
not
entirely) from class, gender, or ethnicity.lo Differences in
--hese socio-economic factors result in hazards having a
different
degree of impact. Secondary factors may be important, such as
Tge: older people may be generally less robust in recovery from
:llness or injury (and less able of escape from some hazards),
'bough the elderly from poorer classes or ethnic groups may be
3ore vulnerable than others.
Vulnerability itself may be divided into three aspects: the first
is the degree of resilience of the particular livelihood system
of an individual or group, and their capacity for resisting the
impact of a hazard. This reflects economic resilience, including
+-he capacity for recoverability (another measure of economic
strength and responsiveness to hazards). This can be called
'livelihood resiliencef, and has some affinity with Senfs concept
of entitlement (Sen, 1981). The second is the healthf
component
{medical), which includes both the robustness of individuals
(itself largely a function of livelihood strength), and the
operation of various social measures (especially preventive
sedicine). The third component is the degree of preparedness of
an individual or group. This is determined by the protection
NATURAL DISASTERS

available for a given hazard, something which depends on
people
acting on their own behalf, and on social factors.
Preparedness is the area which is most recognisable in disastsr
planning, because it relates to the various technical
interventions that are commonly seen as necessary for disaster
avoidance (especially warning systems, land zoning,
preparedness
planning). But it is also clear that peoplesf ability to protect
themselves depends on their livelihood strength, and on their
relationship to the state or other social and political
structures. For instance if living in an earthquake zone, self-
protection affects the nature and strength of the building, and
is closely related to income and savings capacity; in a flood-
prone area livelihood governs the price that can be paid for
building plots in different places in relation to expected flood
water levels. This self-protectionf element of vulnerability,
is in some respects linked to the economic advantages and
disadvantages of high or low levels of livelihood (though it is
not determined only by income or wealth). The level of
protection
granted by the activities of the state or other social
institutions (such as unions, co-operatives and non-
governmental
organisations (MGOs) can be termed social protectionf. These
may
intervene in determining the level of protection of particular
People or groups from a hazzrd. This The two 'protection'
elements depend on a range of factors which are clearly also
linked to the major inequality factors in a society (class,
gender and ethnicity), but also relate to the level of scientific
and technical knowledge (and the manner in which it is used).
These three components are summarized in Table 1. A hazard
may

be seen to have a greater or lesser impact on a person or group
according to their bundle of these characteristics, by virtue of
which they possess a higher or lower level of vulnerability.
Whether a disaster happens or not is conventionally related to
an emphasis on the hazard itself, and on the need for physical
protection measures. With this alternative vulnerability
approach, the intensity of the hazard (and of protection against
it) is not nearly so relevant to explaining disaster as are the
social and economic factors that affect overall vulnerability,
including technical issues of protection.
A highly vulnerable group may be badly affected by a relatively
weak earthquake, and a low vulnerability group little affected j
by a strong one. It is the degree of vulnerability of people in
the area of the hazard-strike which counts, and the different
components of their vulnerability in relation to different types
of hazard. The number of people at a level of vulnerability to
a hazard of a given intensity will be a measure of the disastrous
or non-disastrous impact of that hazard. It is therefore also
possible for two earthquakes of the same intensity and
characteristics to strike areas with similar population
densities, and for one to be a disaster (in terms of mortality,
injury, and disruption to livelihoods and future well-being) and
the other to be a (relatively minor) disruption with few deaths
and injuries and with easy recoverability. The hazard is natural;
a disastrous outcome is not, and is in many senses largely
caused
by the vulnerability conditions generated by human systems.
VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNITIES
Table 1 The Components of Vulnerability
TYPE OF COMPONENTS DETERMINANTS

W L N E R A ~ Y
Livelihood income opportunities class position;
vulnerability livelihood type gender ;
entry qualifications ethnicity;
assets and savings age ;
health status action of state:
Self- building quality Socio-economic:
protection hazard protection as above, plus
location of home/work technical ability
or availability;
Hazard-specific:
return period;
intensity;
magnitude;
Social as above plus: as above, plus:
protection building regulations level of scientific
knowledge;
technical interventi'ons level (and
characteristics) of
technical practice:
type of science and
engineering used by
state and dominant
groups ;
In areas where people face multiple hazards, the impact of one
may be less serious than another. The 'protection1 element of
vulnerability is therefore usually specific to each type of
hazard, in its interaction with the particular characteristics

of people. For instance, some people may be more vulnerable to
an earthquake than to a flood striking the same location. This
variability in regard to the type of hazard might result from the
places where a person lives or works being better protected
against flooding than earthquakes.
WLNERABILITY AND THE CAUSES OF DISASTER
What is it' about the condition of the people (rather than the
natural hazard) which make it possible for a hazard to become a
disaster? Disasters happen when a natural hazard strikes
vulnerable people, as illustrated in Figure 1. Thus they involve
both the extent and types of vulnerability generated by peoples'
situations within political and economic systems, and the
manner
in which society deals with the hazard in terms of mitigation
and
preparedness. If people can be made less vulnerable or non-
vulnerable, then a hazard may still occur, but need not produce
a disaster.
From this analysis, it is apparent that reducing disasters is
possible not only by modifying the hazard, but also by reducing
vulnerability. However, most of the efforts of those concerned
with.c$s+=ters is focused either on reducing the impact of the
hazard 1 Self (sometimes in expensive and inappropriate ways),
or on reducing one rather narrow aspect of vulnerability - social
protection through certain forms of technological
preparednes~.'~ The major determinants which make people
vulnerable (i.e. the social, economic and political factors which
determine the level of resilience of peoples' livelihoods, and
their ability to withstand and prepare for hazards) are rarely
tackled.

Mitigation of hazards is normally associated with attempts to
reduce the intensity of a hazard, or to make some other
modification which is supposed to lessen its impact. It is often
hazard-centred rather than a people-centred approach. As a
result
It may deal with the hazard threat without taking account of
peoples' needs, as with the major plans for taming floods in
Bangladesh. By contrast, preparedness should aim at reducing
the
impact of a hazard by improving the protection of people in
ways
that centre on people and reducing their vulnerability. This may
be done by people themselves, for instance in the type of
building and its resilience in earthquakes (self-protection). It
may be organised at a higher level (social protection) by the
state (e.g. through building regulations) or through local groups
or NGO activities. However, the State is often unreliable .' It
may
recognise the need to offer social protection to reduce
vulnerability, but it is normally a party to the economic and
social processes that lead people to be unable to protect
themselves in the first place.
The vulnerability of a group can be improved by changes in the
different components of their vulnerability bundle, and
improvements in preparedness and mitigation measures are only
one
aspect. It is dangerous to rely on the development of scientific
knowledge and technical means of hazard reduction, because
they
may have little or no effect, depending how other components
of
the vulnerability profile are altered. For instance, expensive
satellite warning systems for hurricanes (tropical cyclones) may
have no impact on people who cannot afford radios, or live in

places where the state is unwilling or unable to provide
warnings. At present the Government of Bangladesh and major
industrialised countries are planning major engineering works to
counter river floods (like those that covered much of the
country
in 1987 and 1988). There is grave uncertainty about the efficacy
of these enormously expensive measures, or indeed whether
they
are even the best way of dealing with the vulnerability of the
people affected (Boyce, 1990; Rogers et al, 1989).
In general, many people in most Third World countries are
vulnerable in both the lack (or inappropriateness) of
preparedness measures (the level of protection), and in the
livelihood level and resilience. It is often the case that they
are unable to provide themselves with self-protection, and the
state is unable or unwilling to offer much relevant social
protection. In developed industrialised countries, the
preparedness levels may be high, and in general livelihoods are
more secure and insurance makes them more resilient. This has
given rise to a perception of disasters as having little impact
in terms of deaths in industrialised countries but much material
damage (in physical and value terms), while in the Third World
NATURAL DISASTERS
the situation is seen as the opposite. This is based on a crude
and ill-informed understanding of the value of a great deal of
property in Third World countries for the actual users. While
the
homes, goods, tools and animals which might be lost by Third
World disaster victims may have low values when converted
into
Western currency and culture, they are often of great value and

their loss may be devastating for the people concerned.
But vulnerability analysis is not only valid in Third World
situations. There are sizeable groups of people in the
industrialised countries who are economically vulnerable to
barious hazards. For instance in the United States not everybody
enjoys social protection (preparedness and mitigation measures)
against hurricanes or earthquakes, and although the state may
alleviate their livelihood damage through Federal aid, not all
are eligible and many poorer people cannot improve their
recoverability through insurance.
CONCLUSION
Better awareness about what causes natural hazards is
insufficient for reducing their impact unless it is also
translated into an understanding of the way economic systems
affect people differentially. This is a major difficulty: if one
of the obstacles to disaster reduction is self-interest of some
groups in maintaining their position within economic systems,
then how useful is it to develop this knowledge? The
vulnerability approach to disasters is immediately concerned
with
political and economic power. It is focused on peoplesf access
to resources, their livelihoods, and on external pressures which
may act detrimentally on these. It is concerned with the type of
(and absence of) social protection affecting different groups of
people, and is therefore concerned with the role of the state,
the type of technical interventions used in hazard preparedness,
and whether or not self-organisation of vulnerable people to
improve their own protection is permitted by powerful groups.
Does the vulnerability approach involve irreconcilable conflicts,
since we have to live with governments and systems (national
and
international) that maintain the economic inequity which causes
vulnerability?

That vulnerability analysis is inherently about power and
politics is no argument for abandoning it as a superior way of
understanding disasters. A combined effort by academics, civil
servants, political activists, NGOs, aid workers and others to
promote some new thinking about disasters is part of the way in
which dominant interest groups can be changed (see Maskrey,
1989
for related ideas). There is usually scope for something to be
done within existing situations to reduce vulnerability and
promote disaster mitigation. It is rare for governments to
explicitly support the processes by which some people become
more
vulnerable than others; there are 'spaces' in most societies
where the political shift which accompanies this type of disaster
analysis can be inserted. In particular I would argue for the
need to support and promote organisations of civil society
which
can provide the monitoring of hazards, and the measurement and
analysis of vulnerability, outside of the control of the state.
The struggle to make vulnerability analysis available (which
includes the formation of such institutions) - both to potential
William and Jennifer Mendoza, each age 39, married June 12,
2011. William and Jennifer file a joint return for 2012.
William's social security number is 111-11-1111 and Jennifer's
social security number is 222-22-2222. They live at 12345
Alabama Street, Redlands, CA 92373. William was divorced
from Nataie Mendoza in March 201. Under the divorce
agreement William is to pay Natalie $800 per month for the
next 10 years or until Natalie's death, whichever occurs first.
William paid Natalie $40,000 in 2012. In addition, in January
2013, William pays Natalie $50,000, which is designated as
being for her shar of the marital property. Also, William is
responsible for all prior years' income taxes. Natalie's social

security number is 333-33-3333. William is a CFO and his
salary for 2012 is $132,000 and his employer, Trinity Finacial,
Inc. (Federal ID No. 98-1234567). Trinity Financial, Inc. paid
$8,500 in health insurance premiums for William and Jennifer.
His employer withheld $25,500 for Federal income taxes and
$8,000 for state income taxes. The following amounts were
withheld for FICA taxes: $4,624 ($110,000 X 4.2%) for Social
Security and $1,914 ($132,000 X 1.45%) for Medicare. Jennifer
is employed by Webber Financial Group (Federal ID No. 27-
1234567). Jennifer is the Company's part-time Controller. She
received a salary of $40,000 in 2012. Her employer withheld
$6,500 for Federal income taxes and $1,200 for state income
taxes. The following amounts were withheld for FICA taxes:
$1,680 ($40,000 X 4.2%) for Social Security and $580 ($40,000
X 1.45%) for Medicare. William's father passed away at the end
of 2012 and his mother Eva Mendoza moved in with William
and Jennifer. Eva was the beneficiary on her husband's life
insurace policy and received $150,000 in 2012. Eva gifted
$50,000 to William and Jennifer in 2012. Eva works as a nurse
at St. Bernardine Medical Center and earned $62,000 in 2012.
Her social security numbe is 444-44-4444 and her date of birth
is April 24, 1950. Jennifer has a son from a previous marriage
that lives with William and Jennifer. His name is Adrian
Gonzales, and he was born on December 11, 2002. His social
security number is 555-55-5555. Adrian spends every other
weekend with his father, Mario. Jennifer received $700 per
month in child support payments from Mario Gonzales. William
has a son from his marriage to Natalie. His name is Nathan
Mendoza. Nathan also lives with William and Jennifer. He was
born on September 22, 1995. HIs social security number is 777-
77-7777. Noah is in high school and works part-time at Von's
and made $5,200 in 2012. William and Jennifer have jont
interest income as follows: Wells Fargo Bank $400, Altua
Credit Union $330, U.S. Treasury Obligations $4,200 and City
of Oakland Water Bonds $1,200. Jennifer received $370 in
qualified dividends on Prudential Corporation stock she

inherited. In 2012, William and Jennifer received an $800
refund on their 2011 state income taxes and a $200 refund of
federal income taxes. They itemized deductions on their 2011
Federal income tax return (total=$36,000 and total state income
tax deduction of $13,000). Jennifer owns a home in Lake
Arrowhead that they use for vacation purposes. In 2012,
Jennifer rented the home for ten days during summer. The total
rent collected was $2,300. Expenses for the home wre as
follows: Mortgage interest $1,800, real estate taxes $2,200,
utilities $700, landscaping $1,200, and cleaning $600. On
November 8, 2012, William attended continuing education
courses in Atlantic City. The course was paid by his employer.
Th total cost of the trip and contiuning educationg was $3,600.
While in Atlantic City, William won $2,200. William had
gambling losses of $300 while in Atlantic City. William and
Jennifer pay $9,800 of mortgage interest and $6,600 of real
estate taxes. They also paid personal property taxes on their
vehicles (3 in total). The deductible portion for each auto was
$325, $100, and $275. Their charitable contributions were paid
as follows: Immaculate Conception Church $2,500, American
Diabetes Association $500 and donated clothing and household
goods valued at $400 to the Goodwll Industries. William also
paid $400 to the City of Riverside for a speedng ticket he got on
his way to work. They paid sales taxes of $3,800 for which they
maintain receipts. William and Jennifer also had $2,300 in
gambling loses in 2012 from their visit to Morongo Casino.
Jennifer has a small buiness where she prepares tax returns. For
2012, she had the following income and expenses related to his
small business. Fees collected $35,000, annual software costs of
$2,000, mal-practice insurance $450, office supplies $375, dues
and subscriptions $800, rent $4,000, business license $325,
telephone $400, internet $500, and continung education of $850.
Please prepare the federal tax return for 2012 for William and
Jennifer Mendoza. The state return is not required. You can use
the H & R Tax program provide with your book. Turn in the
actual federal forms. Do not print worksheets. If you work in

groups, each of you must turn in an original return. No
photocopies allowed. Put all students' names on the top of your
project.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
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ISSN 0280-7270
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS
Volume 21, No. 2 August 2003
CONTENTS
ARTICLES
Vulnerability as a Measure of Change in Society 5
Greg Bankoff
Disaster Evangelism: 31
Religion as a Catalyst for Change in Post-Mitch Honduras
Marisa Olivo Ensor
Writing Disaster:
Autobiography as a Methodology in Disasters Research 51
Jacqueline Homan
FEEDBACK FROM THE FIELD

Observations on the August 2003 Power Blackout 81
Joe Scanlon
FILM REVIEW
Review of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Channel 2 documentary series “Crowded Skies” 89
Simon Bennett
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
August 2003, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 5–30
Vulnerability as a Measure of Change in Society
Greg Bankoff
Associate Professor, School of Asian Studies
University of Auckland, New Zealand
and
Research Fellow, Disaster Studies
Wageningen University, Netherlands.
[email protected]
or [email protected]
Assessing risk and evaluating crises—be they financial,
social, political or environmental—have come increasingly to
preoccupy the interests and concerns of analysts around the
globe. In developed countries or what until recently was usu-
ally referred to as the First World, such considerations involve
the re-conceptualization of post-industrial societies as ones in

which the rise of “manufactured uncertainties” have under-
mined the state’s established safety systems and its
conventional
calculus of security (Giddens 1991). Yet to the billions of
humanity who continue to live in the less developed countries
of the Third or Fourth Worlds and whose peoples still have faith
in the benefits of development or have seen that promise come
and go in a single lifetime1, these finer considerations of risk
may seem less important. The threats posed by dumping indus-
trial wastes, unsafe chemical production and the pollution of
air and water, though real and graphically manifest on occa-
sion, often pale in comparison to the daily risks posed by
natural hazards and human-induced calamities that recent
decades have only intensified2. Rather than the “risk society”
proposed by Ulrich Beck and others (1992), it is the need to
understand the historical evolution of vulnerability and the
degree to which different social classes are differently placed
at risk that require more urgent consideration for most com-
munities (Susman et al. 1983)3.
5
Vulnerability, social security and sustainable livelihood
Vulnerability has been proposed as the key to understanding a
novel
conceptualization of risk that attempts to break with the more
causal,
mechanistic attitudes that have characterized the relationship
between
human societies and their environments over past centuries and
that has
often been associated with western cultural norms (O’Keefe et
al. 1976;

Hewitt 1983). Rather than regarding disasters as purely
physical hap-
penings requiring largely technological solutions, such events
are now
viewed primarily as the result of human actions (Lewis 1999:
8). Terry
Cannon persuasively argues that while hazards are natural,
disasters are
not. Social systems generate unequal exposure to risk by
making some
people more prone to disaster than others and that these
inequalities in
risk and opportunity are largely a function of the power
relations oper-
ative in every society. Critical to discerning the nature of
disasters, then,
is an appreciation of the ways in which human systems place
people at
risk in relation to each other and to their environment, a causal
rela-
tionship that can best be understood in terms of an individual’s,
household’s, community’s or society’s vulnerability.
Vulnerability is
itself a “complex characteristic produced by a combination of
factors
derived especially (but not entirely) from class, gender and
ethnicity”
(Cannon 1994: 14-15, 19; Wisner 1993: 131-133). Since the
1980s, the
dominance of technical interventions focused on predicting
hazard or
modifying its impact has increasingly given ground to an
alternative
approach that seeks to combine the risk to which people and
commu-
nities are exposed with their abilities to cope with its

consequences.
Nor is this a static relationship but rather one that expresses
changing
social and economic conditions relative to the nature of hazard
in terms
of dynamic, evolutionary and accretive processes (Lewis 1999:
14). It
is also useful to recognize that the same socio-economic
processes that
give rise to vulnerability are themselves partly subordinate to
larger-
scale systems and are enmeshed in broader processes that are
expressions of international and national political and economic
con-
siderations (Cannon 1994: 24).
Employing vulnerability as a conceptual framework in this
manner,
disasters often appear more as the consequence of unsolved
develop-
mental problems rather than natural events; as the product of
the
deficient relation between the physical and organizational
structures of
society rather than as a break with its “normal” lineal
expansion. Instead
of a unitary stairway to development, the emerging new world
order has
6 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
also created a system of specialized global inequality, “ghettos
of cap-
italism” characterized by decline and disinvestment where the

whole
project of development “stands like a ruin in the intellectual
landscape”,
a disastrous failure made “obsolete” and “outdated by history”
(Ferguson 1999: 236-241; Sachs 1992: 1). Here lies, too, the
social,
economic and political responsibility for a major part of the
processes
that give rise to the conditions that make disasters happen.
Through
linking disasters to development, moreover, vulnerability shares
many
issues with the overlapping discourses of social security and
sustain-
able livelihoods: all three are primarily engaged with the means
by
which individuals and the communities they constitute attempt
to cope
with risk, uncertainty and insecurity in their lives. Such
common con-
cerns, in fact, can lead to a fruitful intellectual interchange that
has
important theoretical and practical implications for how
vulnerability
as a concept can be applied in novel ways to determine the
extent to
which societies are successful in protecting people against the
effects
of disasters.
Social security is usually defined as the totality of public
measures
that provide some form of protection for the members of a
particular
society in specified situations of need and distress4. The main
issue of

debate concerns those institutions established by the state to
fulfill these
public services and pays only scant attention to the sets of
customary
practices that also operate, though not exclusively, in this
sphere (Swaan
1988). State provision is regarded as “modern” and
progressive, a func-
tion of specialized agencies in the “formal” sector of the
economy.
Provision, however, based on indigenous cultural mechanisms
that
obligate individuals, groups or communities to provide
assistance is
seen as “traditional” and regressive to capital formation, ill-
defined and
part of the “informal” sector of the economy (Midgley 1984).
Accordingly, the latter is supposed to gradually give way to the
former
as societies become more urbanized, their economies more
industrial-
ized and an increasingly larger percentage of the population is
included
within the provision of the state sector. Despite the manifest
failure of
such a process to eventuate in many non-western societies over
recent
decades, attention has still largely been focused on the
shortcomings of
the former rather than on the potentialities of the latter (Benda-
Beckmann 2000). Yet not only do customary practices extend
the only
form of social security coverage that most of the world’s rural
popula-
tions actually experience, indigenous welfare systems may
actively

contribute to realizing the so far elusive goal of universal
provision.
James Midgley suggests how customary and state systems can
be inte-
Bankoff: Vulnerability as a Measure of Change 7
grated through an approach that strengthens traditional familial
respon-
sibilities, enhances community obligations and encourages
communities to form cooperatives, mutual benefit societies and
rotat-
ing credit associations5. Rather than seeking to replace them,
states
should attempt to incorporate existing local practices into
national
strategies through elaborating complex mixes of policies that
might bet-
ter serve as protection against the perennial insecurities of daily
living
(Midgley 2000: 224-225).
How to deal with the uncertainties posed by increasing
pressures
upon the human and physical environment is also the primary
concern
underlying the concept of (“sustainable”) livelihood. It is an
individ-
ual, household or group’s access to resources, their entitlements
and
endowments according to Amartya Sen, that determine their
ability to
maintain an adequate level of living (Sen 1981). Access, in
turn,

depends on the nature of the linkage between people’s
differential capa-
bilities, assets and activities and their options as sanctioned by
laws,
rules and societal norms and delimited through social relations
such as
class or gender (Chambers and Conway 1992: 7; Ellis 2000: 7).
The
strategies ultimately adopted to maintain or enhance livelihood
are the
consequences of this correlation, one that is also dynamic in
that it
changes according to circumstances (De Haan and van Ufford
2001:
286). Usually a distinction is made between longer-term
strategies that
anticipate gradual and structurally determined changes and
shorter-term
strategies that are more reactions to sudden disruptions to
livelihood
systems caused by natural hazards or human-induced crises.
Over time,
these strategies may even prove to be adaptive in that the ways
people
respond to adverse events can either improve their capacity to
withstand
future shocks or, alternatively, render them more vulnerable by
reduc-
ing their resilience (Davies 1993). People’s vulnerability,
therefore, is
determined not only by identifying the environmental or
economic fac-
tors involved but also the social and political dimensions of risk
that
detract from their capacity to withstand and recover from
adverse events.

Clearly these considerations are pertinent to how people
experience
and deal with crises in their lives. The concept of vulnerability
encom-
passes both the notions inherent in social security systems as
well as
the concerns associated with sustainable livelihoods and the
discussion
of all three would benefit substantially from wider inter-
perspective
analyses and comparisons. In particular, they share a common
lexicon
when it comes to exploring people’s intrinsic resilience to the
uncer-
tainties of daily living and an appreciation of the significance
multi-faceted coping strategies have in managing risk and
dealing with
crises of all types. Just as people’s exposure to hazard is
currently
assessed in light of their vulnerability, so too is their resilience
to deal
with its effects increasingly regarded as dependent upon what is
termed
their capacity. The strategies adopted by communities to reduce
the
impact of hazard or avoid the occurrence of disaster are known
as cop-
ing practices (or mechanisms) and include the specialized
knowledge
of skilled individuals as well as the social knowledge held by

commu-
nities at large. They comprise an enormous variety of recourses,
including land utilization and conservation strategies, crop
husbandry
and diversification practices, exploitation of geographical
comple-
mentarities in ecosystems, symbiotic exchanges between
communities,
the development of patronage relationships, migration, the
redeploy-
ment of household labor and complex dietary adjustments
(Drèze and
Sen 1989: 71–75).
The current emphasis on the importance of this local knowledge
is
a belated recognition that non-western peoples have historically
devel-
oped sophisticated strategies and complex institutions to reduce
the
constant insecurity of their lives. The previous assumption that
a com-
munity’s own methods of coping with risk were too primitive,
too
inefficient or too ineffectual to deal with the situation only
reinforced
belief in the power of the technical fix: the ability of external
expertise
to correctly identify the problems and introduce the appropriate
solu-
tions. The respect now accorded to coping practices forms part
of a
wider attempt to broaden local participation in the entire
development
process through bottom-up planning and to empower local
people

through encouraging community participation. Local knowledge
is seen
as the key to success as it is the only resource controlled by the
most
vulnerable, is already present at a potential disaster site, and in
many
cases constitutes a viable operational strategy. All that is
required is to
find the proper balance between the need for external assistance
and
the capacity of local people to deal with the situation.
At present, however, any greater theoretical exchange between
vul-
nerability analysis, social security systems and sustainable
livelihoods
seems to be hampered by a serious underestimation of the
usefulness
of the former as a concept for understanding people’s exposure
to all
forms of insecurity and its application instead to events seen as
largely
random and/or the product of inequitable social structures.
David
Alexander argues that this is the inevitable result of
practitioners of all
persuasions constantly reinventing the wheel of “disasterology”
because
of their ignorance of previous work outside their own
specialized fields
of expertise (1997: 297). In fact, neither of these conditions is
neces-

sarily the case. Vulnerability is a useful analytical tool for
determining
how long-term adaptation to risk may not always be beneficial
to a com-
munity but may actually leave individuals further disadvantaged
(Cohen
1968: 41). Nor should disasters caused by natural hazard be
regarded
as mainly unpredictable given the frequency and magnitude of
their
occurrence in many parts of the globe. Rather than an abnormal
rup-
ture with some preconceived notion of a balanced state of
nature, they
should be considered as frequent life-experiences for many
people and
the “normalization of risk” as a part of daily existence (Bankoff
2003a:
179-183). Moreover, the analytical approach proposed by Franz
and
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann that conceptualizes social security
as a
field of problems operative at different layers of the social
organization
may provide a useful addition to the methodological framework
for
understanding how communities perceive vulnerability and
realize their
capacity to deal with disaster6. Vulnerability has proven to be
a diffi-
cult concept to grasp at the local level and other terms and ways
are
required to help people understand how and why they are
regularly
exposed to calamity (Heijmans and Victoria 2001: 15).

Working with
vulnerability means working as much in the conceptual realms
and pol-
icy implications of social security and sustainable livelihoods as
it does
with disaster preparedness and response.
Vulnerability and historical causality
Vulnerability, however, is not just concerned with the present or
the
future but is equally and intimately a product of the past. A
proper appre-
ciation of the construction of vulnerability is still often
hampered by the
lack of an adequate historical perspective from which to
understand the
contexts and roots of disaster causality (Oliver-Smith 1986a: 18
and Lees
and Bates 1984: 146)7. It is not simply the occurrence,
frequency and
intensity of environmental events that are significant but their
sequence
that is of critical importance (Winterhaler 1980). The insights
that
referred to the 1970 disaster in Peru as a “500-year-earthquake”
(Oliver-
Smith 1994) or the 1975 earthquake in Guatemala City as a
“classquake”
(Susman et al. 1983: 277) had their origins in an appreciation of
the struc-
tural role played by external and internal colonialism as factors
in
determining those disasters8. Similarly, the condition of
dependency cre-
ated by colonialism and cash-cropping along with climate were

credited
by some French Marxist economic anthropologists as the
principal
causes for drought and famine in the Sahel (Copans 1975;
Meillassoux
1974). Certain segments of a population are often situated in
more per-
ilous settings than others due to the historical consequences of
political,
economic and/or social forces. History reveals that
vulnerability may
take centuries in the making. Social security is also implicitly
about his-
torical causality in that the potentiality of its arrangements
constitutes
promises made in the past whose fulfillment is to be invoked at
some
time in the future (Benda-Beckmann 2000: 13). At the root of
the notion
of livelihoods, too, is recognition that social and economic
institutional
arrangements through which human beings access and alter the
physi-
cal environment in their quest for sustenance and shelter evolve
over
time. Resource use, the striving of individuals and groups to
meet their
various consumption and economic necessities through coping
with
uncertainties, responding to new opportunities and choosing
between

different values positions are also key elements in the evolution
of dis-
asters (Oliver-Smith 1999: 30; Long 2000: 196). In all respects,
societies
and destructive agents are mutually constituted and embedded in
natural
and social systems as unfolding processes over time. As
Anthony Oliver-
Smith so eloquently states: “a disaster is a historical event—and
the
aftermath of disaster is process coming to grips with history”
(1979: 96).
Asking why disasters happen is essentially a political question
but
understanding how they occur is a fundamentally historical one.
Attributing causality is largely an ideational construct
dependent on
respective worldviews but comprehension of its unfolding
requires a
diachronic appreciation of events. Above all, it is the present
condition,
the outcome of past factors that transforms a hazard into a
calamity and
determines whether people have the resilience to withstand its
effects
or are rendered vulnerable to its consequences. The sequence of
causal-
ity now widely accepted as underlying risk is the model given
expression
by Piers Blaikie et al that identifies certain types of pressures
that give
rise to vulnerability (1994: 21-45). In this Pressure and Release
Model,
the latter is understood to arise when unsafe local conditions,
them-

selves the product of both dynamic processes and root causes at
the
intermediate and global level, intersect with a physical hazard,
the trig-
ger event, to create a disaster9. The “chain of explanation”
articulated
here gives recognition to the significance of temporality, a
dimension
that achieves further elaboration with the acknowledgement that
“these
pressures are all subject to change” and “are probably changing
faster
than in the past” (Blaikie et al 1994: 26). The importance of
history is
also strongly present in the other accepted model of disaster
causation
or what is sometimes referred to as the Access Model proposed
by Sen
in Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and
Deprivation
(1981). Here vulnerability is regarded as generated by the
difficulties
some social groups or families have in accessing certain
resources over
time, a condition that is determined by identifying both the
limitations
and facilities through which accumulation is achieved and
capacity is
decreased when faced with disasters. Risks are different for
everyone
even in the face of the same hazard and depend on the capacity

of each
family (and even its individual members) to absorb its impact
or, that
is to say, the circumstances (their pasts) that have brought them
to that
state at that particular time and place. Oliver-Smith refers to
this as a
historically produced pattern of vulnerability and argues that
“the life-
history of a disaster begins prior to the appearance of a specific
event-focused agent” (1999: 29-30).
Disasters as agents of change
Most studies treat disasters solely as agents of destruction, as
banes
to the human condition that are, at best, to be prepared for as
well as
possible and, at worst, simply endured in whatever way. This
fixation
with the destructive qualities of the event is understandable
from a
human viewpoint in that what is mainly lost or damaged are
lives,
buildings and property. While there is no denying the
destructive con-
sequences of disasters in terms of human suffering, they are
also simply
agents of change in the broadest perspective. The earthquake
that
struck the upland city of Baguio on 16 July 1990, the largest
seismic
disturbance of this nature to affect the Philippine archipelago
during
the 20th century, caused massive losses: 1,666 dead, a thousand
miss-

ing, three thousand injured, over a million homeless and an
estimated
PhP12.2 to PhP16 billion (US $488 to US$640 million) in
damages—
an enormous human and financial loss to a medium level
developed
country. The earthquake, however, also caused unprecedented
slope
failures in central and north-western Luzon resulting in an
estimated
100,000 landslides that transformed affected areas, particularly
in the
Cordillera Central and Caballo Mountains (Bankoff 2003a: 63-
66). In
other words, the event was also a significant agent of
geomorphology:
altering the landscape, soil density, vegetation cover, wildlife
and even,
ultimately, the potential for human activity. In the longer term,
the
earthquake was as much an agent of change as it was an agent
of
destruction. Without trying to diminish the human cost, perhaps
it is
possible to view the long-term effects of disasters on society in
much
the same way? Certainly Oliver-Smith’s study on the aftermath
of the
earthquake that struck the Peruvian town of Yungay on 31 May
1970
suggests just such an outcome in terms of socio-economic and
class

changes experienced in the communities most directly affected
by that
event (1979 and 1986b).
The linear nature implied by any causal explanation of
vulnerabil-
ity, what Charles Perrow calls “tight-coupling”—a term used to
denote
relationships between items when what happens in one directly
affects
what happens in another according to a specific sequence and
without
any temporal delay (1984: 89-94)—is complicated here by the
opera-
tion of choice. The Human Development Index elaborated by
the United
Nations Development Program recognizes the significance of
choice
and even defines human development as a process of enlarging
people’s
choices (UNDP 1990). The actuality of people faced with a
hazard,
whether they can avail themselves of many options with which
to respond
to present circumstances or whether they are restricted to little
or no
choice, can be taken as a measure of their exposure to risk.
Those who
have many stratagems or “coping practices” from which to
attempt to
find an appropriate response can be said to enjoy a degree of
“layered
resilience”, a state that endows them with a greater likelihood
of suc-
cessfully overcoming present difficulties. Even though the

choice of
action actually made may not be the “right” one in the event,
they have
the capacity to sample from among many fallbacks or “options”
to find
another more appropriate to their immediate circumstances and
the
nature of the hazard encountered. Those, however, with few
options,
even though they may be fully cognizant of the dangerous
situation in
which they find themselves, can be seen as “inherently
vulnerable”10.
That is, they have no choice but to accept the risk in which they
find
themselves because the nature of their vulnerability proves to be
intractable. Their vulnerability is so interwoven into the socio-
economic,
political, environmental and even cultural fabric of daily life
that it is, to
all extent and purposes, unsolvable under the existing order of
society.
In this context, a disaster can also be defined as an intense
period
of change whereby the magnitude, scope and/or intensity of
external
agents, be they natural or human-induced or a combination of
the two,
are such as to cause the people affected to take stock of their
present
condition, reassess their normal behavior and either choose to
continue
much as before or to adopt new stratagems that they hope might
better
meet the challenges that they now confront11. Though it may

appear on
the surface for some that nothing has altered, the conduct of
others will
undergo transformation either through relocation, the
implementation
of alternate livelihoods, adjustment in their relative social
standing in
the community or some other visible indication. The defining
condi-
tion, however, that identifies the moment as one of disaster or
crisis is
that all those affected will be forced to review their current
activities in
the light of the emergent situation. As a consequence, changes
may take
place as a disaster acts as a catalyst to facilitate socio-economic
recon-
figuration through occasioning loss and generating opportunity.
Figure 1 to go about here
Most people, of course, will endure privation and deterioration
in
their standard of living as a consequence of the disaster but a
surprising
number will also experience greater opportunities and a
lowering of soci-
etal barriers based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or even age
that
permits upward social mobility12. The net result, however, is a
possible

Figure 1: Disaster/Crises as Agents of Change
change in the socio-economic composition of society as some
groups
are able to profit from the situation while others lose out.
Shifts in the
power balance between groups may also occur as a result of
disasters,
an underrated and under-researched aspect of historical
development.
In the process of this reconfiguration, though, new conditions of
both
layered resilience and inherent vulnerability are created (Figure
1).
People seldom become either resilient or vulnerable as such but
more or
less so in different ways. It is the changed nature of their
capacity that
establishes the circumstances that turns a subsequent natural or
human-
induced hazard into the next disaster and so perpetuates the
cycle.
This understanding of vulnerability in terms of limited choices
and
of disasters as agents of change emphasizes the pivotal role of
histori-
cal causality in the construction of risk while, at the same time,
retains
the importance of personal volition and eschews the notion of
deter-

minacy. Above all, it is the historical antecedents that give rise
to the
availability of options from which to choose. As such, it
perhaps comes
closest to the ideas inherent in the total environment concept
first for-
mulated by Rene Dubos to explain the global relationship
between
humanity and infectious agents that he characterized as so
complex as
to require consideration of everything “that makes up an
organism’s
internal environment and all the living and inanimate things
with which
it comes into contact” (Dubos 1959). Here, a level of
ecological think-
ing is required that comprehends the broadest possible
formulation of
causality and encompasses the whole system of relationships
(Susser
1973). In particular, responsibility for disease causation is
placed on
human agency as a result of both behavioral and environmental
changes
that lead to the emergence of new viruses and that favor their
rapid dis-
semination (Morse 1992: 389-409). In terms of disasters, this
relationship is more commonly characterized as one of
“mutuality”
(Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 1999: 6) as integrative approaches
have
gained acceptance for hazard research (Possekel 1999: 41). The
struc-
ture and development of a system can only be understood by an
analysis
of the dynamic interactions between environment and all aspects

of soci-
ety, including unexpected events (Emel and Peet 1989: 51-73).
More
specifically, Allan Lavell refers to a form of everyday risk that
is so
embedded in people’s lifestyles that it constitutes a more or less
per-
manent condition of disaster. The hazards related to
environmental
extremes, then, are only one more impermanent and irregular
compo-
nent of a threat to general human physical and psychological
security
represented by health problems, malnutrition, un- or
underemployment,
income-deficit, illiteracy, substance abuse and endemic
violence.
Moreover, the exceptional losses associated with environmental
extremes attain the category of a disaster precisely because
people were
in a previous state of near destitution and not necessarily
because of the
absolute size of the losses incurred (Lavell 2003).
It is this appreciation of the significance of historical causality
and
the multi-relational nature of society to environment, that is to
say, of
simultaneously both the diachronic and the synchronic that
underlies
the concept of inherent vulnerability. “Many people” writes

Cannon,
“now realize that the impact of disasters in the Third World
often pro-
duces only a more acute, more extreme form of the general
chronic daily
suffering of many of the people” (Cannon 1994:16). In fact,
exposure
to hazard may actually be chosen as the lesser of two evils
given its
greater relative infrequency compared to the more pressing day
to day
problems of homelessness, lack of income or inaccessibility.
Poor peo-
ple especially are vulnerable to hazards as a result of processes
that have
deprived them of any power to affect their own physical, social
or eco-
nomic environment and often their only remaining freedom is to
choose
between different hazards (Maskrey 1989: 25). Inherent
vulnerability
attempts to express the experience of many people for whom all
types
of hazard are compounded by such an aggravating combination
of
socio-economic, political, environmental and cultural problems
that it
effectively renders their plight irredeemable under the existing
social
order. Even though, individual aspects of their condition might
be ame-
liorated, collectively the interrelated nature of their situation
renders
such problems almost intractable. Not only does this include
systemic
problems with historical origins but also those that arise from

the devel-
opment process, “development aggression”, and even others that
might
be the direct result of disaster mitigation and rehabilitation
operations
or what can be termed “relief aggression”13. The International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
acknowledges
this process in their World Disaster Report 2002 when it refers
to
“flawed development” or how certain forms of economic growth
actu-
ally exacerbate people’s physical, economic, political and social
vulnerability (Walter 2002: 11-12). Examples of the inter-
relatedness
of such factors might include malnutrition to landlessness,
limited
capacity to earn income to lack of education, living in unsafe
dwellings
to lack of choice, and poverty to not receiving a fair return on
one’s
labor. The current preoccupation in practice and literature with
“local
knowledge” stems from the realization that for many people this
is the
only remaining asset or capacity that they possess (Bankoff
2003b).
Any attempt to fundamentally address the root causes of this
vulnera-
bility must necessarily have a political agenda and be either a
direct or,

at the very least, an implied call to social revolution.
Vulnerability as a measure of change
The realization that historical causality underlies people’s
vulnera-
bility to disaster also leads to a re-consideration of the role such
disturbances play in society. Most social and physical science
litera-
ture is premised on the assumption that the “normal” state of
affairs in
both the human and natural sphere is one of stability from
which there
are temporary, if aberrant and usually violent periods of
deviation. Such
a model pervades the western conceptualization of the world
and is
embodied in the paradigm that people often refer to as “the
balance of
nature”. The implied assumption is that the product of biotic
interac-
tions necessarily leads to a form of equilibrium that has been
variously
expressed in concepts such as carrying capacity, steady state
economy
or climax community among others14. According to Seith
Reice, how-
ever, “the nature of nature is change” and the disturbances
produced by
non-equilibrium are important agents facilitating change.
Disturbance
should not be regarded as simply destructive but as a valuable
experi-
ence: the real danger is its absence not its presence. It is human
attempts
to establish static societies that really represent the principal

hazard and
the normal state of a community can be thought of as one of
recover-
ing from the last disturbance (Reice 2001: 15-17)15. While the
many
millions in the Third World usually on the receiving end of such
“dis-
turbances” may not exactly share Reice’s optimistic evaluation
of the
wider significance of disasters, modern hazard research has
increas-
ingly come to focus on these inter-relational aspects as a
starting point
to understand such events and their significance.
The importance of non-linearity and mutualism in exploring the
state of dynamic tension that exists between disturbances and
society
is captured through the concept of complexity. Complexity
theory
focuses on how new structures emerge, become and evolve
(Possekel
1999: 17). As individual components interact with each other,
they nec-
essarily generate processes that in turn affect their original
behavior
(Langton 1989)16. Though these emergent systems may appear
to be in
a stationary state, the apparent surface stability only serves to
disguise
the underlying tensions that exist and which even the smallest
variation
in energy can upset. Far from being in equilibrium, they
operate in a
manner that can best be described as one of imbalance, what
Ilya

Prigogine calls a state of far-from-equilibrium (Prigogine
1980).
Complexity is inherent to these systems in that interacting
components
have a certain degree of local influence and information but no
one
agent is ever in a position to determine the structure of the
whole sys-
tem. In fact, there are so many elements at work that a system’s
dynamics can never be completely discerned and any attempt to
do so
must inevitably be reductive and lead to misunderstanding
and/or
incomprehensibility (Perrow 1994: 72-86). Moreover, the
diversity of
interactions is such that they can be defined in a variety of
different
ways, each of which corresponds to a distinct subsystem that
requires
its own separate description (Schneider and Kay 1994)17.
This sense of complexity is important to the way in which
disasters
are increasingly conceptualized. The notion that hazards are
mere phys-
ical phenomena slowly gave way to one that also incorporated
consideration of those that were the products of modern
technology—
that were not simply “natural”. Recognition of human agency
as a
contributing factor led to a considerable extension of what is

thought
to constitute a disaster. War and conflict, the resultant
immiseration,
displacement and death, and their interaction with climatic and
seismic
events gave rise to the idea of complex emergencies; ones where
the
root causes of vulnerability lie in a variety of relational
exchanges
(Alexander 1997: 297)18. The definition of these events has
more
recently begun to include activities that were previously
categorized as
developmental such as mining, logging and fishing when these
are car-
ried out in a non-environmentally sustainable manner. It is the
dynamics
between stakeholders (human agency and animal behavior),
ecosystem
(the specifics of the environment) and nature (extreme physical
phe-
nomena) that determines the increasing interrelated complexity
of these
events. War precipitates environmental crisis, environmental
problems
precipitate conflict, and natural hazard triggers developmental
aggres-
sion that, in turn, leads to environmental degradation and
further
violence. The interactions are both simultaneously synchronic
and
diachronic and the permutations endless19.
While its origins may be increasingly complex, people’s
vulnerabil-
ity is very real. The total number of reported disasters in the

world is
rising rapidly from 368 in 1992 to 712 in 2001, an increase of
over 93
per cent in a decade. More telling is the doubling in the number
of peo-
ple affected over the same period, rising from 78,292,000 to
170,478,000
and peaking at 344,873,000 in 1998 (Walter 2002: 185, 187).
While the
accuracy and comparability of such figures are certainly
debatable, more
people are certainly at risk that ever before. They are more
vulnerable
to disasters through a combination of urbanization and
migration,
resource depletion and competition, and population growth.
Vulnerability analysis, however, is more than simply a means of
gaug-
ing the degree of exposure to these disasters; it is also a much
more
instructive way of measuring change, of determining a
particular soci-
ety’s “success” in providing for its members, both historically
and in the
present, than any form of current economic or technology-based
indices.
In the first instance, vulnerability is a much more precise
measure-
ment of people’s exposure to risk and, conversely, of their well-
being

than other conceptualizations. In western perceptions, so strong
is the
correlation between economic and technological development
and the
degree of civilization that one has become equated with the
other, one
has become the measure of the other. When US President Harry
Truman coined the term “underdeveloped” in his inaugural
speech
before Congress on 20 January 1949 to refer to the less
developed coun-
tries that he sought to assist through the transfer of capital and
technology, he effectively elevated per capita income to become
the
yardstick by which to measure how countries fared. Gross
National
Product as a scale, however, correlates the level of production
with a
society’s health and comfort, an unfounded assumption that
ignores the
patent inequality between people’s differing access and
entitlement to
resources. Hazard, accordingly, is then mainly conceived of in
terms
of the appropriate technology and management structures, while
dis-
asters are regarded as largely a matter of probability analyses
and
feasibility studies. Vulnerability, on the other hand, as a
measure of peo-
ple’s welfare recognizes their strengths as well as their
weaknesses in
determining that status. It lays less stress on technology and,
instead,
places a premium on the organizational capacity of vulnerable
sectors

through the formation of grassroots organizations that it
considers as
essential to effective disaster management. Moreover, in the
form of
community-based disaster management (CBDM) practices,
vulnera-
bility analysis implies that the developed world has something
to learn
from developing countries, that it is more of a two-way traffic
and not
simply a question of the appropriate technology transfer from
the for-
mer to the latter20.
Secondly, vulnerability is a much more accurate concept than
wealth
or poverty in understanding the link between disasters and
development.
Not all poor people are vulnerable to disasters, nor are the poor
vul-
nerable in the same way, and some people who are not poor are
also
vulnerable. Employing vulnerability as a conceptual
framework, dis-
asters appear more as a consequence of unsolved developmental
problems rather than simply natural events. Development
renders many
people vulnerable: of the 712 disasters recorded by the Red
Cross in
2001, 56 per cent occurred in “medium human development
countries”

(that is countries undergoing rapid development) compared to
19 per
cent in the “low” and 25 per cent in the “high” categories
(Walter 2002:
185). Vulnerability, as a measure of well-being, implicitly
leads to a
reconsideration of the nature of the development being
undertaken or
sponsored and to an appreciation of the need for more
sustainable devel-
opment practices. As is palpably obvious, out-and-out
economic
development does not necessarily improve a population’s
welfare.
As a basis of assessing societies, finally, vulnerability is not
simply
concerned with the present or the future but is equally and
intimately a
product of the past. It recognizes that certain people may be
situated in
a more perilous setting than others as a result of a particular
configu-
ration of political, economic and/or social processes over time.
By
drawing attention to the processes that put these people at risk
in the
first place, vulnerability provides a “natural” indicator that
something
may not be “quite right” and that the tensions between a society
and its
environment may have gone beyond the latter’s ability to
absorb. At the
same time, it places emphasis on the significant role disasters
may play
as transformative agents, calling into question the mainly

western view-
point that regards them as simply abnormal events, deviations
from a
sense of normalcy to which a society will return on recovery
(Bankoff
2003a: 3-4). In fact, disasters may not only be hazardous events
but
also significant catalysts of change in their own right, causing
political,
economic and social adjustments, triggering needed adaptations
in
human behavior and modification to structures, and even
contributing
to the overthrow of civilizations at times (Davis 2001; Fagan
1999).
Vulnerability analysis emphasizes the need to understand the
increas-
ingly complex inter-relationship between a society and its
changing
environment over time by focusing on the degree of mutualism
that
exists between the two at any moment in time.
In the end, societies in which a higher percentage of people are
less
vulnerable to the onslaught of disasters display a more mature
relation-
ship between human and physical forces than those that simply
build
bigger or dig deeper: complexity may be just as much a source
of vul-
nerability as it is an answer to risk. Moreover, vulnerability has
important
implications for the manner in which disasters are “managed”:
attempts
to control the environment need to be replaced by approaches

that empha-
size ways of dealing with unexpected events, ones that stress
flexibility,
adaptability, resilience and capacity. Nor are such attributes
the reserve
of modern science or western technology but are equally to be
found
among the know-how and organizational aptitude of all peoples.
As the
modern world becomes an increasingly complex one that
necessitates a
more holistic understanding of the inter-relational aspects
between envi-
ronment and society over time, the application of vulnerability
as a
concept not only reveals the multi-faceted construction of
disaster but can
also serve to determine its historical development.
Vulnerability may be
as much a measure of people’s well-being and an indication of
their suc-
cessful adaptation to environment as it is a simple condition of
exposure
and it may be more meaningful to rank or index societies
accordingly21.
Note
1. According to James Ferguson, the current construction of a
new
world order not only continues to marginalize and exclude large

num-
bers of people but actually robs them of even the promise of
development (Ferguson 1999: 237-8).
2. United Nations experts calculate that disasters affected an
aver-
age of 200 million people each year during the 1990s, a fourfold
increase from the late 1960s (Walker and Walter 2000: 188;
Smith 1996:
39). Such figures, however, should be regarded more as
indicative of
trends rather than precise data as there are no universally agreed
defi-
nitions of what constitutes a disaster or standard methodologies
for the
collection of information on them. Ulrich Beck argues that
productive
risks are now increasingly overshadowing any gains in power
from
techno-economic “progress”. While he argues that these risks
are no
longer localized as they were in “classical” industrial societies
but
exhibit a tendency towards the creation of globalized hazards,
he is still
primarily concerned with the “immanent contradictions between
modernity and counter-modernity” within industrial societies
and with
the process of “reflexive modernization” that has only limited
applica-
tion to the populations of the developing world.
3. Such a statement is not meant to preclude consideration of
“risk
societies” as clearly the notion has application in all societies
but is

rather a question of the degree of importance it is accorded. For
more
recent critiques of Ulrich Beck’s idea and his rebuttal, see
Barbara Adam
et al The Risk Society and Beyond (2000).
4. The International Labor Organization defines social security
as “the
protection which society provides for its members, through a
series of
public measures against the economic and social distress that
otherwise
would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of
earnings
resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury,
unemployment,
invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; and
the pro-
vision of subsidies for families with children” (ILO 1984: 2-3).
5. On the role of the state, see Abram de Swaan In the Care of
the State
(1988); on mutual benefit societies, see Marcel van de Linden
Social
Security Mutualism (1996); and on rotating credit associations,
see Shirley
Ardener The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations
(1964)
and Clifford Geertz The Rotating Credit Association (1962).
The latter
two, though dated in some respects, are still seminal works.

6. What the Benda-Beckmanns call a functional approach
involves
analyzing the provision of social security at the level of culture
and reli-
gion, institutional provision, individual perception, actual social
relations, and through social and economic consequences
(Benda-
Beckmann 2000: 13-15). It actually has much in common with
the
typology employed by Piers Blaikie et al in formulating their
Disaster
Pressure and Release Model (1994: 21-45).
7. The absence of an historical perspective has not gone
completely
unnoticed and there have been persuasive calls for a more
diachronic
approach most recently by Kenneth Hewitt in Regions of Risk
(1997) and
Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susana Hoffman in The Angry Earth
(1999).
8. The concept of internal colonialism has its origins in the
depen-
dency theory first popularized by Raúl Prebisch (1967) and
André
Gunder Frank (1967) in the 1960s that apportioned the world
into devel-
oped cores and underdeveloped peripheries in which the latter
were as
much a feature of the modern capitalist system as were the
former. The
nature of this relationship is held to exist both between states as
well as
within them, with underdeveloped hinterlands dependent on

certain com-
paratively developed regions, often primate cities and/or coastal
enclaves.
9. Global level pressures called “root causes” are equated with
polit-
ical, economic and social pressures; intermediate level
pressures known
as “dynamic pressures” include population growth, urban
development,
environmental degradation, the absence of ethics, etc; and local
level
pressures referred to as “unsafe conditions” equate with social
fragility,
potential harm and poverty.
10. Oliver-Smith uses the expression to indicate the degree to
which
all systems are unable to guard against every threat completely
(1999:
26) and a similar term, “persistent vulnerability”, is sometimes
applied
to suggest the combined effect of all the social, economic and
political
conditions that people experience though without the same
implied
sense of historical causality (Grunewald et al. 2000: 2).
11. Debate over what is a disaster has been both energetic and
heated
and definitions vary considerably (Quarantelli 1985 and 1995).
Differences

are apparent in definitional emphasis between geographers and
sociolo-
gists as to whether a disaster is primarily a physical event or a
social
phenomenon. On the one hand, geographers perceive disasters
to be the
product of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, volcanoes,
typhoons
and the like that are rendered hazardous precisely because
human societies
have failed to sufficiently adapt to them (Smith 1996; Chapman
1994; and
Alexander 1993). Populations are subsequently assessed as to
whether they
are “at risk”, a notion determined by the degree of hazard and
their level of
vulnerability (Alexander 1997: 291). Sociologists, on the other
hand, are
concerned almost exclusively with the structures, functions and
activities
of formal human organizations and the impact of disasters upon
them and
generally accord the environment only a minor role (Quarantelli
and Dynes
1977). They eschew the idea of vulnerability and favor instead
definitions
that frame disasters in terms of human behavior at a spatially
specific
moment and location. In this context, disasters are often
reduced to “an
array of socially derived effects” (Oliver-Smith 1999: 24). In
contrast,
anthropologists take a more holistic approach to defining
hazards and dis-
asters, viewing them as integral parts of both environmental and

human
systems. Rather than an aberrant act of nature, disasters are
seen as the con-
sequence of a process that involves a potentially destructive
agent and a
population in a socially produced condition of vulnerability
(Hoffman and
Oliver-Smith 1999: 4). Disasters are seen as a measure of a
society’s suc-
cessful adaptation to certain features of its natural and socially
constructed
environment in a sustainable fashion (Oliver-Smith 1996: 303).
As distinct
from geographers and sociologists, anthropologists regard
disasters as
embedded in the daily human condition and define them in
terms of a seam-
less web of relations that link society to environment to culture.
Many of
these distinctions have become blurred in recent years as the
need to con-
fer greater recognition on the interplay between environmental
and social
systems has been more widely accepted by practitioners from all
discipli-
nary backgrounds. The debate is now more often to do with the
relative
weight accorded the various key social and environmental
factors rather
than to substantive divergence over what constitutes the
definitional nature
of disasters (Oliver-Smith 1999: 22).
12. Approximately 20 per cent of the Russian population
reportedly
fell into poverty during the financial crisis of 1998 but this

figure dis-
guises the fact that 42 per cent of people actually experienced
an
increase in family expenditure while 61 per cent endured a
decrease
(World Bank 2001: 161-76).
13. Development can be called development aggression when
pro-
jects are implemented against the will of the people, directly
cause
damage and/or negatively affect the livelihood of already poor
sectors
of the community, result in the forced displacement of
communities and
cause environmental damage (Caspile 1996 and Brand 2001).
See also
Annelies Heijmans and Lorna Victoria (2001: 87). Similarly,
relief
aggression can be defined as the negative social, economic,
political,
cultural and environmental effects of programs implemented to
assist
communities to recover from hazards, especially in relation to
resettle-
ment, relocation and loss of livelihood.
14. Carrying capacity refers to a nominal limit to growth, a
norm in
the ratio between population and the physical environment that
allows

maximum productivity without depletion of the resource base
available
to a society. The concept is not new: John Stuart Mill
expounded his
vision of what he called a “stationary state” in his Principles of
Political
Economy published in 1857. More recently, Mill’s concept has
found
widespread acceptance in H. Daly’s version of the “steady state
econ-
omy” (1973), T. Roszak’s idea of a “visionary commonwealth”
(1973)
and I. Illich’s notion of a “convivial community” (1974). A
climax com-
munity signifies the concept that nature, when left to its own
devices,
will inevitably climax in a biotic community based on maximum
diver-
sity and harmonious balance such as in a tropical rainforest.
15. There is much in Reice’s approach that closely parallels
Buddhist
conceptualizations of reality, especially the emphasis on the
constancy
of change and the impermanence of everything. See David
Kalupahana,
Man and Nature: Toward a Middle Path of Survival (1986).
16. For a more popular explanation of complexity theory, see
Roger
Lewin Complexity; Life at the Edge of Chaos (1999) and M.
Mitchell
Waldrop Complexity; The Emerging Science at the Edge of
Chaos (1992).
17. Langton refers to this continual state of tension as “the edge

of
chaos” but argues that it is actually an extremely productive
one, char-
acterized by an adaptability of functions and maximized
efficiency
(Langton 1989).
18. Complex emergencies have no common etymology with
com-
plexity theory as such only that both emphasize the
interrelatedness of
factors that lie behind disasters.
19. According to Per Bak, in fact, the dynamics at work in
these
systems naturally result in such conditions or in “states of
criticality”
(Bak 1991).
20. CBDM refers to an alternative approach that emphasizes
peo-
ple’s participation in strengthening their own capabilities and
reducing
their vulnerabilities, and removing the structures that generate
inequal-
ity and underdevelopment through partnership with less
vulnerable
sectors of the population. See Annelies Heijmans and Lorna
Victoria
Citizenry-Based and Development-Oriented Disaster Response
(2001).

21. On the difficulties faced in creating even just an
econometric
version of such an index, see the excellent discussion by
Charlotte
Benson, Macro-economic Concepts of Vulnerability: Dynamics,
Complexity and Public Policy (2003).
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