Thesis is available at: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55134/tde-11072017-085511/en.php Abstract: Advances in communications have been unarguably essential to enable modern systems and applications as we know them. Ubiquity has turned into reality, allowing specialised embedded systems to eminent ly grow and spread. That is notably the case of unmanned vehicles which have been creatively explored on applications that were not as efficient as they currently are, neither as innovative as recently accomplished. Therefore, towards the efficient operation of either unmanned vehicles and systems they integrate, in addition to communication improvements, it is highly desired that we carefully observe relevant , correlated necessities that may lead to the full insertion of unmanned vehicles to our everyday lives. Moreover, by addressing these demands on integrated solutions, better results will likely be produced. This thesis presents HAMSTER, the HeAlthy, Mobility and Security based data communication archiTEctuRe for unmanned vehicles, which addresses three main types of communications: machine-to-machine, machine-to-infrastructure and internal machine communications. Four additional elements on co-related requirements are provided alongside with HAMSTER for more accurate approaches regarding security and safety aspects (SPHERE platform), criticality analysis (NCI index), energy efficiency (NP platform) and mobility-oriented ad hoc and infrastructured communications (NIMBLE platform). Furthermore, three specialised versions are provided: unmanned aerial vehicles (Flying HAMSTER), unmanned ground vehicles (Running HAMSTER) and unmanned surface/ underwater vehicles (Swimming HAMSTER). The architecture validation is achieved by case studies on each feature addressed, leading to guidelines on the development of vehicles more likely to meet certification requirements, more efficient and secure communications, assertive approaches regarding criticality and green approaches on internal communications. Indeed, results prove the efficiency and effectiveness of HAMSTER architecture and its elements, as well as its flexibility in carrying out different experiments focused on various aspects of communication, which helps researchers and developers to achieve safe and secure communications in unmanned vehicles.

1. HAMSTER
Healthy, mobility and security-based data communication archi-
tecture for unmanned systems
Daniel Fernando Pigatto
Advisor: Prof. PhD. Kalinka R. L. J. C. Branco
Co-advisor: Prof. PhD. Cristina Ciferri

2. Outline
• Introduction
• HAMSTER architecture
• Case studies on SPHERE
• Case studies on NCI
• Case studies on NP
• Case studies on NIMBLE
• Conclusions
1

3. Introduction / Motivation and problem statement
• Unmanned Vehicle (UV) is a vehicle without a person on board;
• Main applications: wide range of environmental sensing activities,
high risk areas monitoring, driving assistance, monitoring activities
and more;
• A major concern for acceptance and certification still relies on safety
and security issues;
• Researches in communications must take that into account.
2

4. Introduction / Motivation and problem statement
UAVs were the first focus:
• One of the most critical scenarios;
• Any person or computer-based system that meets the 3 mandatory
activities to operate an aircraft, can assume the command:
1. flight;
2. navigation; and
3. communication.
• Safety and security are underestimated when it comes to critical
embedded systems;
• Trade-off: green approaches x security and safety x performance.
3

5. Introduction / Motivation and problem statement
Missions with heterogeneous UVs have become the focus:
• Systems and applications demand more integration;
• Flexibility;
• Multidisciplinary approaches;
• Aerial, ground and aquatic vehicles need to be integrated for
future/modern applications.
4

6. Introduction / Research question
Main research question:
How to enable heterogeneous unmanned vehicles to communicate with
improved system safety, information security and reduced internal
energy consumption?
5

7. Introduction / Hypothesis
Hypothesis:
A data communication architecture with well-defined ways of:
• communication security,
• improved safety management including modules health checking,
• the possibility of reducing energy consumption specially on wireless
communications,
• mobility-specific platform that independently manages ad hoc and
infrastructured communications, and
• criticality analysis for more precise tasks delegation and accurate approaches on
aforementioned features.
6

8. Introduction / Objectives
Main objective:
Definition of a data communication architecture aimed at providing
heterogeneous unmanned vehicles with secure communication links,
safety management, targeted mobility approaches, criticality
identification and internal energy saving.
7

9. HAMSTER architecture
HAMSTER:
HeAlthy, Mobility and Security-based data communication
archiTEctuRe.
HAMSTER
Architecture
Flying
HAMSTER
Running
HAMSTER
Swimming
HAMSTER
SPHERE NIMBLE
A2A A2I IAC V2V V2I IVC W2W W2I IWC
SPHERE NIMBLE SPHERE NIMBLE SPHERE NIMBLE
NP
NP NP NP
NCI
NCI NCI NCI
8

10. HAMSTER elements
HAMSTER module:
A sensor, actuator, or any other module connected inside the unmanned
vehicle.
HAMSTER cluster of modules:
A group of sensors, actuators, or any other module that share similar
characteristics or have related functions.
HAMSTER entity:
An element belonging to an unmanned system (e.g. UAV, car, control
station).
9

11. HAMSTER architecture / HAMSTER units
HAMSTER unit:
A dedicated hardware or software running on a microprocessor.
HAMSTER Unit
Connectivity
(wired, wireless
e.g. ZigBee)
HAMSTER Unit
(e.g. hardware,
middleware)
Basic UV module
(e.g. sensor,
actuator)
Connectivity
Data storing
manager
Attitude manager
Sense Actuate
SPHERE
Navigation
phases agent
10

12. HAMSTER architecture / HAMSTER units
HMSTRm
SPHERE
CSU
SMU
Attitude
Module
Connectivity
Storage
NP Agent
HMSTRc
SPHERE
CSU
SMU
Attitude
Module Module Module
Cluster of Modules
Connectivity
Storage
NP Agent
11

13. HAMSTER architecture / HAMSTER units
HMSTRe
SPHERE
Central
Entity
NIMBLENP Manager
IMC
IMC
IMC
IMC
Connectivity
HMSTRm HMSTRm HMSTRm HMSTRc
12

14. HAMSTER architecture / SPHERE platform
Security and safety Platform for HEteRogeneous systEms:
Concentrates all the safety and security aspects of the main architecture
and all derivative versions.
HMSTRe
SPHERE Central
CSU
(Central Security Unit)
SMU
(Safety Management Unit)
HMSTRm
HMSTRm
HMSTRc
Authentication
Secure communication
Safety control
Health monitoring
SPHERE
SPHERE
SPHERE
13

15. HAMSTER architecture / NCI index
Node Criticality Index:
A rich index to help determining single and global priorities for network
nodes.
Three different situations:
• NCIm on modules;
• NCIc on clusters of modules;
• NCIe on entities.
14

16. HAMSTER architecture / NCI index
• NCIm on modules:
• Security: stored and manipulated data;
• Safety: module’s health and priority;
• NCIm is a combination of both.
• NCIc on clusters of modules:
• Security: the maximum security index among modules;
• Safety: the maximum safety index among modules;
• NCIc is the maximum NCIm among modules.
15

17. HAMSTER architecture / NCI index
• NCIe on entities:
• Pre-calculations:
• Mission penalty: field and accomplishment;
• Worth: the cost of an entity considering the maximum cost.
• Mission penalty is used on a weighted mean that relates average and
the maximum among all NCIm and NCIc;
• A combination of Worth and Mission penalty originate NCIe.
• Safety and security indices are calculated similarly.
16

18. HAMSTER architecture / NP platform
Navigation Phases:
A navigation phase is a very well defined UV operation stage where it is
attributed at least an ON/OFF state and different transmission rate
permissions for each single module.
HMSTRe
HMSTRc
HMSTRm HMSTRm
IMC IMC IMC
NP Manager
NP Agent
NP Agent
NP Agent
17

19. HAMSTER architecture / NIMBLE platform
NatIve MoBiLity platform for unmanned systEms:
Encompasses ad hoc and infrastructure communications, and mobility
in M2X communications.
NIMBLE
ADHOC
(M2M)
INFRA
(M2I)
18

20. HAMSTER architecture / NIMBLE platform
VANETUANET
FANET
MANET
19

21. Case studies on SPHERE / Case study A
• The case study: a generic implementation of an authentication protocol;
• Objective: validate SPHERE’s CSU authentication protocol;
• It was tested for authentication of modules with CSU using a laptop and an
embedded multiprocessing board;
• The authentication process is feasible and flexible enough even for embedded
units;
• Conclusions:
• SPHERE’s CSU authentication protocol validated;
• The protocol implements the general authentication approach;
• CSU demands associated cryptographic techniques for secure
communications.
20
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

22. Case studies on SPHERE / Case study B
• The case study: evaluation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography for secure
communications;
• Objective: validate SPHERE’s CSU secure communications;
• A comparison between two ECC implementations:
Exp. Library Key size (bits) Message size (kilobytes)
1 MIRACL 160 50
2 MIRACL 160 100
3 MIRACL 256 50
4 MIRACL 256 100
5 RELIC 160 50
6 RELIC 160 100
7 RELIC 256 50
8 RELIC 256 100
21
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

23. Case studies on SPHERE / Case study B
50 KB
0
5
10
15
20
25
Miracl / 160 Relic / 160 Miracl / 256 Relic / 256
AverageResponseTime(sec)
Library / Key Size
100 KB
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Miracl / 160 Relic / 160 Miracl / 256 Relic / 256
AverageResponseTime(s)
Library / Key Size
• Conclusions:
• ECC is suggested as a potential candidate for SPHERE’s CSU secure
communications both internal and external;
• ECC can be used for data encryption or secure key sharing;
• SPHERE’s CSU secure communication can use more than one
cryptographic algorithm for different security levels provision.
22
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

24. Case studies on SPHERE / Case study C
• The case study: measuring safety on avionics on-board wireless networks;
• Objective: partially validate SPHERE’s SMU;
• Investigate safety issues related with security vulnerabilities and threats in UAVs;
• Severity of attacks regarding:
• Safety of people nearby the aerial vehicle;
• Privacy of aircraft modules;
• Financial losses that may be experienced by individuals or operators;
• Interference with operational performance of aircraft;
• Data loss in cases of sensitive missions.
• Conclusions:
• It is possible to identify security risk levels based on attack probability,
threat severity and controllability;
• SPHERE’s SMU can use this risk analysis while implementing safety;
• Although safety and security can be addressed separately, they still might
influence each other.
23
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

25. Case studies on NCI / Case study D
• The case study: analysis of NCI in a precision agriculture scenario;
• Objective: empirically evaluate NCI applicability for UAVs;
• Three eBee UAVs communicate with a base station while capturing images of a
crop field;
• Each eBee is composed by several modules with individual NCIm.
24
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

26. Case studies on NCI / Case study D
• Normal operation:
Module
NCImsec NCImsaf
NCIm
storedData temporaryData total health priority total
GPS 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.5 0.25 0.275
IMU 0 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Camera 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.25
Autopilot 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Motor 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.25 0.125
Servomotor1 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.25
Servomotor2 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.25
Radio transmitter/receiver 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.15 0.225
Entity worth
Missionpenalty
NCIe NCIesaf NCIesec
field accomplishment total
eBee 1 1 0 0 0 0.345 0.331 0.213
eBee 2 1 0 0 0 0.345 0.331 0.213
eBee 3 1 0 0 0 0.345 0.331 0.213
25
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
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27. Case studies on NCI / Case study D
• eBee 2 is in failure state:
Module
NCImsec NCImsaf
NCIm
storedData temporaryData total health priority total
GPS 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.5 0.25 0.275
IMU 0 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Camera 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.25
Autopilot 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Motor 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.75 0.375
Servomotor1 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.25
Servomotor2 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.25
Radio transmitter/receiver 0 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Entity worth
Missionpenalty
NCIe NCIesaf NCIesec
field accomplishment total
eBee 1 1 0 0 0 0.345 0.331 0.213
eBee 2 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.426 0.594 0.356
eBee 3 1 0 0 0 0.345 0.331 0.213
26
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

28. Case studies on NCI / Case study D
• Conclusions:
• NCI index can reflect UAVs criticality, including eventual failures;
• It is able to reflect safety and security independently;
• It also reinforces how security and safety can be affected by the mission.
27
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

29. Case studies on NCI / Case study E
• The case study: analysis of NCI in an environmental protection scenario;
• Objective: empirically evaluate NCI applicability to heterogeneous scenarios;
• Two UAVs (eBee and Solo) and CaRINA UGV compose the senario;
• eBee UAV identifies illegal actions;
• Solo UAV is supposed to acquire more detailed information, but happens to
be captured;
• CaRINA UGV rescues Solo and takes appropriate action.
• All NCIm are determined;
• Next slide, Solo before and after being captured.
28
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
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30. Case studies on NCI / Case study E
Module
NCImsec NCImsaf
NCIm
storedData temporaryData total health priority total
GPS 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.7 0.35 0.325
IMU 0 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.4
Camera 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.25
Autopilot 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5
Motors 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0.25
Wi-Fi transmitter/receiver 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.25 0.375
Module
NCImsec NCImsaf
NCIm
storedData temporaryData total health priority total
GPS 0 0.3 0.3 1 0.7 0.85 0.575
IMU 0 0.3 0.3 1 1 1 0.65
Camera 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0.5
Autopilot 0.3 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0.75
Motors 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.5
Wi-Fi transmitter/receiver 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.75 0.625
29
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

31. Case studies on NCI / Case study E
NCIe for all the entities after the attack.
Entity worth
Missionpenalty
NCIe NCIesaf NCIesec
field accomplishment total
eBee 0.565 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.359 0.416 0.356
Solo 0.01 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.609 0.925 0.425
CaRINA 1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.517 0.468 0.458
• Conclusions:
• NCI index can reflect heterogeneous UVs criticality;
• Attacks can also affect NCI;
• NCI can help on decision-making.
30
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

32. Case studies on NP / Case study F
• The case study: fly by wireless with Flying HAMSTER;
• Objectives: provide guidelines for the development of UAS with Flying
HAMSTER and validate NP platform.
M
S1
S6S5
S3
S4
31
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

33. Case studies on NP / Case study F
32
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
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34. Case studies on NP / Case study F
Frequency of sent messages.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
TDMA without
requests
TDMA with
requests
Flurry Periodic without
requests
Periodic with
requests
Frequencyofsentmessages(persecond)
External node 1 External node 2 Internal node 1
Internal node 2 Internal node 3 Internal node 4
Successfully delivered packets.
99,33% 99,71% 97,81%
43,28% 44,86%
0,00%
20,00%
40,00%
60,00%
80,00%
100,00%
120,00%
TDMA
without
requests
TDMA with
requests
Flurry Periodic
without
requests
Periodic
with
requests
• Conlusions:
• TDMA is more efficient;
• Periodic gets slightly more successfully delivered messages;
• In absolute results, protocols performed similarly;
• Proves the viability of fly by wireless and highlights the possibility of
applying Navigation Phases approach.
33
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

35. Case studies on NP / Case study G
• The case study: reducing energy consumption on internal communications;
• Objective: validate the Navigation Phases concept with both simulated and field
experiments.
10 cm
0
25
2724
22 20
6
11
26 8 18 19 323717162
1
9
10
12
13
14
15
Mission-specific
modules
Main modules
Main Node
21
28
29
30
34
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
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36. Case studies on NP / Case study G
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800 N0
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
N10
N11
N12
N13
N14
N15
N16
N17
N18
N19
N20
N21
N22
N23
N24
N25
N26
N27
N28
N29
N30
Energyunits
Nodes
All nodes, same network usage (FP1.1)
All nodes, different network usage (FP3.3)
Main nodes only (FP3.1)
Mission nodes only (FP5.2)
35
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

37. Case studies on NP / Case study G
Arduino Leonardo. RPSMA, wire and PCB antennas.
36
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

38. Case studies on NP / Case study G
37
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

39. Case studies on NP / Case study G
0,000E+00
5,000E-04
1,000E-03
1,500E-03
2,000E-03
2,500E-03
3,000E-03
3,500E-03
4,000E-03
4,500E-03
5,000E-03
NP 1.1 NP 2.1 NP 2.2 NP 2.3 NP 3.1 NP 3.2 NP 3.3 NP 3.4 NP 4.1 NP 4.2 NP 4.3 NP 5.1 NP 5.2
Meanpower
Coordinator Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
• Conclusions:
• Both simulated and field experiments proved a reduction on energy
consumption using Navigation Phases;
• NP has great potential for energy saving, specially in less critical UVs.
38
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

40. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study H
• The case study: performance evaluation of handoff in Mobile IPv6 networks;
• Objective: validation of NIMBLE’s INFRA module;
• Two simulations:
• IPv6 with Mobility;
• IPv6 without Mobility.
Scenarios Total time
IPv6 with
Mobility
1 1 s 403 ms 899 us 971 ns
2 1 s 403 ms 882 us 88 ns
3 2 s 653 ms 873 us 282 ns
4 6 s 403 ms 910 us 278 ns
IPv6 without
Mobility
1 1 s 403 ms 828 us 132 ns
2 1 s 403 ms 900 us 339 ns
3 2 s 653 ms 899 us 207 ns
4 6 s 403 ms 925 us 996 ns
39
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
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41. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study H
• Conclusions:
• IPv6 has inherent advantages that should be explored;
• NIMBLE’s INFRA was tested regarding mobility improvements;
• NIMBLE supports different approaches for mobility.
40
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

42. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study I
• The case study: a comparison between IEEE 802.11n and IEEE 802.15.4 in
regards of M2M and M2I communications to provide safe FANETs;
• Objective: validate NIMBLE with simulated experiments.
41
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

43. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study I
IEEE 802.11n.
Star topology.
0,00094405
0,00093826
0,00432052
0,00528868
0,01299853
0,01534101
0,02515313
0,02341226
0,00000000
0,00500000
0,01000000
0,01500000
0,02000000
0,02500000
0,03000000
16 UAVs 32 UAVs 64 UAVs 128 UAVs
Endtoenddelay(seconds)
25 m/s 50 m/s
Mesh topology.
0,00051260
0,00086987
0,00133374
0,00340397
0,00051260
0,00086987
0,00133374
0,00340397
0,00000000
0,00050000
0,00100000
0,00150000
0,00200000
0,00250000
0,00300000
0,00350000
0,00400000
16 UAVs 32 UAVs 64 UAVs 128 UAVs
Endtoenddelay(seconds)
25 m/s 50 m/s
42
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

44. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study I
IEEE 802.15.4.
Star topology.
0,21587414
0,29988550
0,37810581
0,44316534
0,21463798
0,31152035
0,40929731
0,45792628
0,00000000
0,05000000
0,10000000
0,15000000
0,20000000
0,25000000
0,30000000
0,35000000
0,40000000
0,45000000
0,50000000
16 UAVs 32 UAVs 64 UAVs 128 UAVs
Endtoenddelay(seconds)
25 m/s 50 m/s
Mesh topology.
44,25225646
46,43373624
51,36265586
49,90251415
41,71331965
43,81903980
50,09151537
45,95478605
0,00000000
10,00000000
20,00000000
30,00000000
40,00000000
50,00000000
60,00000000
16 UAVs 32 UAVs 64 UAVs 128 UAVs
Endtoenddelay(seconds)
25 m/s 50 m/s
43
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

45. Case studies on NIMBLE / Case study I
• Conclusions:
• IEEE 802.11n is sensitive to speed in star topology and sensitive to number
of nodes in mesh topology;
• IEEE 802.15.4 is viable in star topology and not recommended in mesh
topology;
• Protocols have different behaviours depending on conditions;
• NIMBLE provides separate approaches to infrastructure and ad hoc
addressing distinct requirements.
44
SPHERE NIMBLENPNCI
A B C ED GF IH

46. Case studies / Final remarks
• Each case study helps validating parts of each platform that
compose HAMSTER;
• Proofs of concepts were provided regarding specific situations;
• However, these results can be extended for bigger and more complex
scenarios with similar characteristics;
• HAMSTER delivers all the features at once and permits the
interaction among platforms;
• Indeed, HAMSTER is validated for the majority of UVs.
45

47. Conclusions
• HAMSTER architecture has been proposed and validated for UVs
• Integrated solutions provide more efficient results;
• Safety and security are treated with priority at all time, which go
towards the acceptance and certification of UVs;
• Improved communications among heterogeneous vehicles enable new
applications.
46

48. Conclusions / Contributions
• HAMSTER architecture. A data communication architecture for
heterogeneous UVs (Pigatto et al., 2014, 2015, 2016b):
• Modularisation;
• Independent platform for different features provision.
• HAMSTER unit. Abstraction of physical objects on
communications.
• SPHERE. Provides specialised modules to deal with safety and
security requirements both on integrated and independent
approaches (Pigatto et al., 2015; Silva et al., 2015).
47

49. Conclusions / Contributions
• NCI. A formal criticality classification for network nodes in various
levels for tasks delegation, decision making, development of
communication protocols, and improved system safety and
information security (Pigatto et al., 2016a).
• Navigation Phases. Energy efficiency by using the knowledge on
unmanned vehicles’ operation phases (Pigatto et al., 2015, 2016a).
• NIMBLE. Manages external communications with individual
modules permitting requirements-oriented developments (Munhoz
et al., 2016; Marconato et al., 2016, 2017).
48

50. Conclusions / Limitations
• The need to integrate heterogeneous UVs;
• SPHERE got very big, hard to manage – although originating NP
and NCI, it is still very complex;
• Validation of NCI and NP were challenging due to the lack of open
vehicles;
• 3G/4G/5G and Internet of Things were not addressed because they
would introduce an extensive new universe of issues regarding safety
and security.
49

51. Conclusions / Future works
• General: new vehicles; efficient implementations in hardware and
software; data mining techniques to improve tasks performing.
• SPHERE-related: expand to non-UV elements; constantly
investigate improvements; adequately integrate UVs to the IoT;
automatic health checking.
• NCI-related: intelligent decision-making; attack-oriented alert; load
balancing and resources usage improvements.
• NP-related: automatic ways of phases identification; adaptive
control techniques to improve precision; intelligent approaches for
phases transitions.
• NIMBLE-related: accurate ways to increase Internet connectivity;
improve mobility on highly connected environments; optimise
connectivity in remote areas.
50

52. Thank you!
HAMSTER
Architecture
Soon available at:
www.lsec.icmc.usp.br/hamster
51

53. References

54. Marconato, E. A., M. Rodrigues, R. M. Pires, D. F. Pigatto, L. C. Q. Filho, A. S. R.
Pinto, and K. R. L. J. C. Branco
2017. AVENS – A Novel Flying Ad Hoc Network Simulator with Automatic Code
Generation for Unmanned Aircraft System. In The Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences (HICSS).
Marconato, E. E. A., J. A. Maxa, D. D. F. Pigatto, A. S. R. A. Pinto, N. Larrieu, and
K. R. L. J. C. K. Branco
2016. IEEE 802.11n vs. IEEE 802.15.4: A Study on Communication QoS to
Provide Safe FANETs. In 2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks Workshop (DSN-W), Pp. 184–191. IEEE.
Munhoz, L. T., G. C. de Oliveira, D. F. Pigatto, and K. R. L. J. C. Branco
2016. Avalia¸c˜ao de desempenho de procedimentos de handoff em redes IPv6 e uma
discuss˜ao sobre a viabilidade de aplica¸c˜ao em sistemas cr´ıticos. In IV Workshop on
Communication in Critical Embedded Systems (WoCCES), Simp´osio Brasileiro de
Redes de Computadores e Sistemas Distribu´ıdos (SBRC 2016), P. 12, Salvador,
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