Meeting #2.

1. Dissecting Blackberry Z10:
2-in-1
By Alexander Antukh &
Yury Chemerkin
Jun 30, 2013

2. /whoami
Alexander Antukh
 Security Consultant
 Offensive Security Certified Expert
 Interests: kittens and stuff

3. /whoami
Yury Chemerkin
 Experienced in :
 Mobile Security and MDM
 Cyber Security & Cloud Security
 Compliance & Transparency
 and Security Writing

4. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
4

5. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Blackberry OS review
Built on QNX!
5
 Tiny
 Micro-kernel architecture
 Virtual memory alloc for each process
 POSIX-compilant
QNX = MK + PM + processes

6. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Blackberry OS review
That’s how the system looks like:
6

7. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Blackberry OS review
That’s how the microkernel looks like:
7

8. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
8

9. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Shell Access
Extremely easy!
9
 development mode  on
 generate a 4096-bit RSA key (ssh-keygen/putty)
 blackberry-connect <t> -password <p> -sshPublicKey <k>
 ssh 169.254.0.1  nuts
Even easier:
 Dingleberry  nuts
/accounts/devuser/

10. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
10

11. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
1. General permissions
11
 SUID/SGID
-rwxrwsrwx 1 root root
 Writable files and folders
"find all suid files" => "find / -type f -perm -04000 –ls”
"find all sgid files" => "find / -type f -perm -02000 –ls”
"find config* files" => "find / -type f -name "config*””
"find all writable folders and files" => "find / -perm -2 –ls”
"find all writable folders and files in current dir" => "find . -perm -2 -ls"

12. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
2. Fuzzers
12
 IOCTL fuzzing
• no params
• overlong strings
• pre-determined DWORDs
Process 1924486014 (python3.2) terminated SIGSEGV code=1 fltno=11
ip=011c90c4(/usr/lib/ldqnx.so.2@ioctl+0x113c) mapaddr=000790c4. ref=00000000
 Binary bit-/byteflipping (EDB-ID #7823)

13. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
3.1. System utilities. BOFs
13
Many missing: setuidgid, id, dumpifs…
Many interesting:
• confstr – current configuration including path, architecture and network
info
• dmc – digital media controller
• fsmon – file system monitor
• jsc – JavaScript engine for Webkit used on a device
• ldo-msm – LDO Driver
• mkdosfs – format a DOS filesystem (FAT-12/16/32)
• mkqnx6fs – format a filesystem (for QNX6, however, is presented in
Blackberry OS)
• and also tools such as mount, on, nfcservice, nvs_write_bin and displayctl.

14. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
3.1. System utilities. BOFs
14
Process 57340127 (displayctl) terminated SIGSEGV code=1 fltno=11
ip=788293d2(/base/usr/lib/graphics/msm8960/displayHAL-
r086.so@dsi_get_pclk_freq+0x121) mapaddr=000093d2. ref=00000008
Process 249935086 (nowplaying) terminated SIGSEGV code=1 fltno=11
ip=78102cce(/usr/sbin/nowplaying@main+0x19d) ref=00000000
Process 1545237780 (charge_monitor) terminated SIGSEGV code=1 fltno=11
ip=010b998c(/usr/lib/ldqnx.so.2@message_detach+0x8) mapaddr=0003998c.
ref=00000028
Process 1543295477 (shutdown) terminated SIGSEGV code=1 fltno=11
ip=78117c3e(/proc/boot/shutdown-msm8960.so@pmic_ssbi_read+0x15)
mapaddr=00001c3e. ref=ffffffff

15. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
3.2. System utilities. Vulnerable syscalls. displayctl.
15

16. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
The Approaches
3.2. System utilities. Vulnerable syscalls. nvs_write_bin.
16
Nonvolatile (sometimes written as "non-volatile")
storage (NVS) - also known as nonvolatile memory or
nonvolatile random access memory (NVRAM) - is a
form of static random access memory whose
contents are saved when a computer is turned off or
loses its external power source. NVS is implemented
by providing static RAM with backup battery power
or by saving its contents and restoring them from an
electrically erasable programmable ROM (EPROM)

17. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
17

18. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
Firmware update? Yes, please!
MFCQ  QNX image
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19. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
Tools to deal with:
19
qfcm_parser.py  partitions!
chkqnx6fs  info about the images
dumpifs  IFS dump 
https://github.com/intrepidusgroup/pbtools

20. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
Pearls inside:
20
ALL the scripts and configs can be read now!
 .script (starting up)
 ifs_variables.sh (sysvars)
 os_device_image_check
Microkernel itself

21. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
21
Pearls inside:
Protected tools can be launched now!
Bootrom Version: 0x0523001D (5.35.0.29)
DeviceString: RIM BlackBerry Device
BuildUserName: ec_agent
BuildDate: Nov 3 2012
…
IsInsecureDevice: false
HWVersionOffset: 0x000000D4
NumberHWVEntries: 0x00000014
MemCfgTableOffset: 0x000000FC
MemCfgTableSize: 0x00000100
Drivers: 0x00000010 [ MMC ]
LDRBlockAddr: 0x2E02FE00
BootromSize: 0x00080000
BRPersistAddr: 0x2E0AFC00
persist-tool:
insecure syscalls
can be reproduced
(read/dump data)

22. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
22
Pearls inside:
Funny comments (code reviewers will like it)
function setScreenScaling (width, height) { ...
//ZOOM TO POINT IS FULL OF BUGS - Docs state that coordinates should only ever be in center
of screen
// TODO: Once the QML bug about not being to access the page values that are provided as a
parameter to this slot is fixed ...
// The zipfile.ZipFile.write() method has a bug where it raises struct.error: ushort format requires 0
<= number <= USHRT_MAX
// Too many bytes for PNG signature. Potential overflow in png_zalloc()
… and more

23. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Firmware from the inside
23
Pearls inside:
Facebook – too much;)
 IDs
 Emails
 Mobile phones
 Secrets
 Passwords
Plaintext!

24. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
24

25. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Playing with the browser
 Webkit rendering engine
 Vulnerabilities are just the same (i.e. as for Google
Chrome)
25

26. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Playing with the browser
Local file access from the browser
26
HTML page as an email
attachment
file://  nuts
Currently the vulnerability is removed

27. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research
27

28. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Security on the Application Level
BlackBerry Z10 – Vulnerability in BlackBerry Protect
Limited:
by the inability of a potential attacker to force
exploitation of the vulnerability without significant
customer interaction and physical access to the device
Affected Software
 BlackBerry 10 OS version 10.0.10.261 and earlier,
except version 10.0.9.2743
 BlackBerry Z10 smartphone only
28
Currently the vulnerability is removed

29. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Security on the Application Level
Special artifacts “.all” as a kind of logs
 PATH : /pps/system/<name>/.all
 Browsers : history
 Networking : ID, flags, MACs
 Device IDs : Hardware, PIN, Name, Serials, etc.
 Video Chats : params, call details:
 BlackBerry Bridge
 SapphireProxy
 Status, name, address, auth token, key
 Autostart param
 Routes: BB, BIS, BER: 127.0.0.2:188/189/187
 Results : access to internal network, internal storage, media
files, the rest (contacts, cal, .etc) in case of non-QNX device
29
Currently there is no details if it is solved
Author’s opinion : can’t be solved or cracked in similar ways

30. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
30
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research

31. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Funny with APIs
 Useful ideas that make no enough sense
 Merging permissions into one group
 No way to emulate hardware inputs but results of
pressing are strongly restricted if there are
 Sandbox
 Malware is a personal application subtype in terms
of blackberry’s security
 Sandbox protects only app data, while user data
stored in shared folders
31

32. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Funny with APIs
 Non-controlled activity by any permission
 Accessing to data passed through the clipboard
 Access to ‘Accounts’ leads to a ‘read’ access to
contacts,messages, notebooks, calendar by default
 MediaPlayer is a great way to access to the FS
 Access to file system in many ways and most cases
managing device’s resources
 Camera activity,
 Contact photos
 Calendar event attachments
 Message attachments (Email, BBM)
 Saving records (camera photos, video, audios)
32

33. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
33
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research

34. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
34
BlackBerry Old iOS BlackBerry QNX Android
Quantity of Groups 55 16 7 4
Average perm per group 20 5 7 4
Efficiency 80,00 38,46 31,82 10,26
Totall permissions 1100 80 49 16
55
16
7 4
20
5 7 4
80,00
38,46
31,82 10,26
1100
80
49
16
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
BlackBerry MDM
Quantity of Groups Average perm per group Efficiency Totall permissions

35. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
35
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research

36. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Efficiency of security features
 Activity
 Common Min/Average/Max quantity :: 2 / 8 / 34
 Additional Min/Average/Max quantity :: 0 / 2 / 7
 Derived Min/Average/Max quantity :: 3 / 31 / 116
 Permission
 Common Min/Average/Max quantity :: 0 – 1 – 3
 Additional Min/Average/Max quantity :: 1 – 0 – 1
 Derived Min/Average/Max quantity :: 4 – 4 – 8
 APIs
 Common / Significant quantity :: 100 – 61
 The most security unit is LED activity
36

37. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Efficiency of security features
37
6
21
5
34
7
18
6
3
17
3
4
2
4 4
8
3
4
2
14
1
4
3
2
1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
4
1
2
5
10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Ratio of common activities to permissions
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission

38. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Efficiency of security features
38
6
116
24
59
7
89
16
23
47
3
11
3
19
46
9
24 25
2
27
1
4 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
8
1 2
5
10
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ratio of derived activities to permissions
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm

39. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Efficiency of security features
39
16,67
19,05
60,00
5,88
14,29
5,56
16,67
66,67
11,76
66,67
25,00
50,00
25,00 25,00
50,00
33,33
50,00
250,00
7,14
16,67
3,45
12,50
5,08
14,29
3,37
6,25
8,70
4,26
66,67
9,09
66,67
5,26
2,17
88,89
4,17 8,00
250,00
3,70
0,00
50,00
100,00
150,00
200,00
250,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm

40. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Agenda
40
Blackberry OS review
Shell Access
The Approaches
Firmware from the inside
Playing with the browser
Security on the application level
Funny with APIs
MDM capabilities
Efficiency of security features
Future research

41. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Future research
41
Image parser fuzzing
Jailbreak
IOCTL / syscalls further research
Play more with SSH
Blackberry Balance is not available yet
Permission collision
Overpemissioning by system applications and
services
Bypassing MDM features by both of previous

42. Dissecting Blackberry Z10
Full articles
… are available here (no SMS to send is required! Free for
a very limited time!)
42
http://goo.gl/dP9iRBlackberry Z10 research
http://goo.gl/PpXxgBlackberry and more