Running head EVALUATION OF A QUALITATIVE STUDY1EVALUATION O.docx

Running head: EVALUATION OF A QUALITATIVE STUDY
1
EVALUATION OF A QUALITATIVE STUDY
9
Evaluation of a Qualitative Study
First and Last Name
Capella University
Evaluation of a Qualitative Study
For this assignment you will locate an article from the peer-
reviewed scholarly journals in your field using one of the
databases available in the Capella University Library. This
assignment should be between 4 and 6 pages in length, double-
spaced using 12-point Times New Roman font, not counting the
title page and reference section.
You will notice the running head contains the words “evaluation
of a quantitative study” and it is presented in all capitals. Also,
notice that the words “running head” appear only on the first
page and just the running head itself appears on subsequent
pages.
Next, notice that the title on the second page above is centered
and capitalized but it is not in bold. This follows the example
on page 42 of the APA Manual and also a second example found
on page 54. Below you will notice that headings have been
provided for this assignment. They follow the protocols for
formatting level one and two headings found on page 62 and the
example presented on page 58 of the APA Manual. It is sound
practice to consult the APA Manual for formatting guidance.

In the section immediately under the title, you are to provide a
brief introduction to your assignment; however, you should not
create a heading that states “Introduction.” You should present
your introduction without a heading in order to comply with the
guidance offered on page 63 of the APA Manual. Your
introduction should tell the reader what the paper is about, such
as what study is being evaluated and how your evaluation will
proceed. A single brief paragraph is all that is required. You
can find more information about how to develop an introduction
at the Capella Writing Center.
Evaluation of the Research Problem
In most cases the research problem appears early on in a
research report. However, it is not always set off in its own
section with a clear heading identifying it. You may have to do
a bit of detective work to locate the description of the research
problem. In your own words, without using direct quotes,
summarize the research problem.
Evaluating the Significance of the Problem
Address the following questions.
Does the problem statement indicate a counseling issue to
study? You will have to make a judgment call as to whether or
not the research article addresses a counseling issue and explain
why or why not you have taken this position.
Has the author provided evidence that this issue is important?
Briefly describe the evidence presented in the discussion of the
research problem that demonstrates this is an important issue
deserving of being researched. Summarize in your own words,

not direct quotes, the evidence presented and explain your own
view of whether or not this is an important issue.
Evaluation of the Literature Review
Sometimes the literature review is nicely organized and set off
in its own section with thoughtful headings. In other instances,
comments on the literature associated with the research topic
are scattered throughout the research report. Develop your
evaluation of the literature review portion of the article.
Points to think about in your evaluation are how well the
author(s) tell the story of the topic by synthesizing the literature
they have reviewed, and what themes are present in the
literature review. Another point to consider is whether it
appears that the author(s) conducted an unbiased review of the
literature, presenting more than one possible point of view.
Evaluation of Research Purpose Statement and Questions
Qualitative is a broad approach to research, consisting of many
specific research designs. Examples are: grounded theory, case
study, narrative, phenomenological, and ethnographic. Each
research design has been developed to address certain kinds of
research questions. Researchers should explicitly state the name
of their chosen research design, but sometimes they do not.
Likewise, sometimes authors state their purpose statement and
research questions very clearly and sometimes they do not. Use
your growing knowledge to find these elements in the article
you are evaluating. Formal hypotheses are devices that are
used for statistical analyses, so they will probably not appear in
qualitative studies.
Research Design
Name the research design used and briefly, in your own words,
describe how this design is going to address what the

researchers want to know. For example, a phenomenological
design will explore the lived subjective experience of a group of
people who share an experience in common.
Research Purpose Statement
The research purpose statement declares the intent of the study.
An example is: The purpose of the study is to use
phenomenological research to explore the lived experience of
intentionally childfree Hispanic women. Identify the research
purpose statement, and offer your thoughtful opinion on how the
author(s) presented their purpose. If you found the purpose
statement lacking, be specific as to why.
Research Questions
Research questions may be stated as questions or declarative
statements. They have a specific focus. An example is: what
is the lived experience of intentionally and permanently
childfree Hispanic women? Sometimes the research questions
are clearly identified in a research report, other times you have
to look for them, and sometimes they are not presented at all.
Examine your article and list the research questions if they are
presented. Offer your opinion on how well the research
question was developed. There may be more than one research
question. Evaluation of Data Collection Plan
In your own words, without using direct quotes, describe how
participants were selected for this study. Identify the type of
sampling strategy that was used in this research study. It will
probably be explicitly stated in the article, using terms such as
convenience, purposeful or snowball. Explain why you have
taken this position (other than, it says so in the article). Offer
your opinion of how the selection of participants could be
improved in order to produce a stronger study. Go beyond

simply saying the sample could be larger, which would not
demonstrate your growing knowledge of the purpose of specific
sampling strategies. Remember, the purpose of sampling is
different for qualitative studies than it is for quantitative
studies. In qualitative studies, the goal is not to be able to
generalize findings from the sample to the population.
Selection of Participants
In your own words without using direct quotes, describe how
participants were selected for this study. Offer your
assessment of what type of sampling was used in this research
report. Offer your opinion of how the selection of participants
could be improved in order to produce a stronger study.
Gaining Permission
Qualitative research is usually more intrusive than quantitative
research because qualitative researchers typically spend more
time at the research site and engage with the participants more
directly than quantitative researchers. As a result, qualitative
researchers have to be more sensitive and thoughtfully respect
individual participants and research sites. Briefly summarize
how the researchers gained permission to enter the research site
and also how they obtained informed consent from the research
participants to gather data. Offer an evaluation of whether or
not the researchers gained permission according to ethical
standards. If this is not described in the research report, offer a
brief explanation of how you would have gained permission and
consent if you were conducting the research project.
Determining the Data to Collect
In your own words, without using direct quotes, briefly describe
the data that was collected in order to fulfill the study’s purpose
and answer the research questions. The primary forms of data in

qualitative research are observations, interviews and
questionnaires, documents, and audiovisual materials. Which of
these forms of data were collected? Were any other forms of
data collected? Offer an evaluation of the appropriateness of the
data that was collected in order for meeting the study’s goals.
Recording Data
Data recording protocols are usually forms designed by
qualitative researchers to record information during interviews
and observations. Did the researcher(s) describe the protocols
they used? If so, what were they? Offer an evaluation of the
effectiveness of these protocols. If they are not described, what
protocols would you recommend for this study? Evaluation of
Data Analysis and Interpretation Plan
In order to develop this section you may refer to the sections of
the course text which address data analysis and interpretation
for specific qualitative research designs. Most of the data
collected by qualitative researchers involves transcripts of
interviews and field notes. Some kind of coding of the data
takes place. There are many specific procedures for coding and
analyzing the data. Two specific strategies are thematic
analysis and the constant comparative method.
Preparing and Organizing Data for Analysis
In your own words, briefly describe how the researcher(s)
prepared and organized their data for analysis. Offer an
evaluation of the effectiveness of this process. If this is not
described in the research report, explain how you would have
done it.
Exploring and Coding the Data
In your own words, briefly describe how the researcher(s)

explored and coded the data. Offer an evaluation of the
effectiveness of this process. If this is not described in the
research report, explain how you would have done it.
Using Codes to Build Description and Themes
In your own words, briefly describe how the researcher(s) built
description and themes. Offer an evaluation of the effectiveness
of the process. If this is not described in the research report,
explain how you would have done it.Representing and
Reporting Findings
Typically qualitative findings are presented in tables, figures
and narrative. In your own words, briefly describe how the
researcher(s) reported their findings. Offer your opinion of how
effectively you feel their findings were presented and offer
suggestions for improvement.
Interpreting Findings
Qualitative researchers must step back and form larger
meanings about the phenomenon under investigation based on
their personal views, comparisons with past studies described in
the literature, or both. Offer an evaluation of the
meaningfulness of the interpretation provided in the research
report. Briefly summarize the limitations of the study pointed
out by its author(s). If no limitations are offered, present what
you consider to be its limitations.
Validating the Accuracy of the Findings
Typically, qualitative researchers rely on three techniques to
validate their findings: triangulation, member checking, and
external auditing. Briefly summarize how the researchers

validated their findings. Offer an evaluation of the effectiveness
of the process. If they do not describe how this was done,
explain how you would have validated the findings.
Evaluation of Ethical and Culturally Relevant Strategies
Qualitative research typically involves entering the research site
for an extended period of time, and extensively interacting with
participants. Interviews may involve collecting in-depth and
highly personal information. In your opinion, how well did the
researcher(s) address ethical issues? If the research report does
not provide this information, what steps would you have taken
if you were doing the research?
Conclusion
Offer your overall assessment of the quality of the research
report. Explain how you could use the information in the
research report to inform your own work in the counseling
profession. Complete the reference section below using proper
APA formatting.
References
Use this area to list the resources you cited in your paper. The
reference below provides an example citation for an article. For
more information about References, see chapter 7 in the APA
6th Edition Manual. Delete this text before submitting your
assignment.
Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (year). Title of
article. Title of Periodical, volume#(issue#), xx–xx.
Fast track report
Are integrative or distributive outcomes more satisfactory? The
effects of interest-
based versus value-based issues on negotiator satisfaction

PETER LUCAS STÖCKLI1* AND CARMEN TANNER2
1
Department of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy,
Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf,
Switzerland;
2
Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich,
Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract
Negotiation research usually distinguishes between integrative
and distributive outcomes. Integrative outcomes satisfy the
nego-
tiation parties’ most important interests (by trading off less
important for more important issues). In contrast, distributive
out-
comes require negotiators to give up their most important
interests (as they make concessions on both less and more
important
issues). Integrative outcomes are more beneficial, but do they
offer greater satisfaction? In this research, we hypothesized that
satisfaction with integrative versus distributive outcomes
depends on whether people negotiate interest-based or value-
based
issues. Three experiments consistently revealed that people in
interest-based negotiations were more satisfied with integrative
outcomes, whereas those in value-based negotiations tended to
be more satisfied with distributive outcomes. Copyright ©
2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The negotiation literature usually recommends aiming for
integrative
rather than distributive outcomes (e.g., Brett, 2007; Fisher &

Ury, 1991; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997; Thompson,
2008). Distributive outcomes are agreements in which ne-
gotiators make concessions on all negotiation issues. Such
50/50 or “split down the middle” outcomes (Neale &
Fragale, 2006, p. 37) are suboptimal because they require
both negotiators to concede on their most important issues
(Thompson, 2006). In contrast, integrative or win-win out-
comes are agreements in which negotiators obtain mutually
better outcomes by making concessions on issues less impor-
tant to them, while gaining something that is more important
(i.e., logrolling; Froman & Cohen, 1970). Integrative out-
comes are more beneficial than distributive outcomes, but
are benefits equivalent to negotiator satisfaction?
Intuitively, one would think that negotiators who gain more
should also be more satisfied (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart,
2000). However, objectively better outcomes are not necessarily
more satisfactory (e.g., Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Negotia-
tion research has shown that negotiator satisfaction depends
on more than the actual outcome, such as on how favorable
the negotiator’s outcome is as compared with the other party’s
outcome (i.e., social comparison, e.g., Gillespie et al., 2000;
Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Novemsky &
Schweitzer, 2004) or whether the negotiator’s outcome meets
his or her expectations (e.g., Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry,
1994). Furthermore, negotiators have been found to be less
satisfied when the other party accepted their offer immediately
versus some time later (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec,
2002b), and when they had focused on the aspiration rather
than the reservation price (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec,
2002a; see also Thompson, 1995), or when more, rather
than less, negotiation issues were at stake (Naquin, 2003).
This is because people may be more apt to engage in coun-
terfactual thinking (i.e., consider whether other, possibly
better, outcomes might have been possible) when (i) the

other party’s acceptance was immediate, (ii) they focused
on the aspiration price, or (iii) there were many negotiation
issues (for reviews on negotiator satisfaction, see Barry,
Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Neale & Fragale, 2006; Thompson,
Wang, & Gunia, 2010).
Without a doubt, negotiator satisfaction with the outcome
has important implications. Unsatisfied negotiators may feel
less desire to meet the same counterpart again (Oliver et al.,
1994) or committed to implementing the negotiated contract
(Barry & Oliver, 1996), whereas satisfied parties may even
cooperate on issues that were not part of the original deal
(Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). In agreement, more recent
findings suggest that the subjective evaluation of negotiations
have a greater and longer-lasting impact on a negotiator’s
future behavior than actual economic outcomes (Curhan,
Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009).
In this paper, we aim to further this important line of
research by examining how the nature of conflict issues (i.e.,
interests versus values) affects negotiator satisfaction. Past
research has shown that negotiations on value-based rather
than interest-based issues lead to less desirable outcomes
(Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and more
*Correspondence to: Peter Lucas Stöckli, Department of
Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, Military Academy
at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf, Switzerland.
E-mail: [email protected]
European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.
44, 202–208 (2014)
Published online 30 January 2014 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2003
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 24 August
2012, Accepted 29 June 2013

impasses (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009), but none has examined its
influence on outcome satisfaction. We propose that the negotia-
tion content is another essential determinant of negotiator
satisfaction. More precisely, whether integrative or distributive
outcomes are experienced as more satisfactory depends on
whether negotiators are dealing with interest-based or value-
based negotiation issues.
Negotiations are interest-based when involving the alloca-
tion of scarce resources, such as money or other benefits. Here,
the negotiators bargain over who gets how much (e.g., price of
a product). Negotiations are value-based when the parties
focus on personal norms, deeper beliefs, or ideological
worldviews. Here, the negotiators focus on what is (morally)
right or wrong (e.g., is the product price fair or unfair and is
torture acceptable or not in a given situation) (e.g., Deutsch,
1973; Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1977; Harinck & De
Dreu, 2004). In general, values can refer to abstract and
strong beliefs about desirable states or behavioral conduct
(i.e., freedom, justness, honesty, love, or honor; Rokeach,
1973; Schwartz, 1992), entities of the human or nonhuman
world that are valued “for their own sake” (such as human
or animal lives, endangered species, and environment; e.g.,
Hargrove, 1989; Tanner, 2009; Taylor, 1986) or rights (e.g.,
human rights).
Recent findings suggest that people in value-based
negotiations are very reluctant to make concessions (e.g.,
Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and unwilling to make trade-offs
among the issues (e.g., Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck,
De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000). To stimulate interest-based
versus value-based negotiations, one group of participants
was instructed to aim for outcomes that would be advanta-

geous for their career (interest-based) while another aimed
for the most just outcomes (value-based) (Harinck & De
Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000). The authors found that
participants in value-based negotiations had lower tendencies
to make trade-offs among the issues (thus were less likely to
reach integrative agreements) than those in interest-based
negotiations.
Thus, it appears that in value-based negotiations, people are
reluctant to forsake one issue to obtain another. To avoid such
trade-offs, negotiators may make concessions on both issues,
resulting in distributive agreements. Accordingly, and although
distributive outcomes are suboptimal from an objective perspec-
tive, we propose that parties in value-based negotiations would
achieve greater satisfaction with distributive than integrative
outcomes (because the former do not require any trade-offs
among the issues). In contrast, negotiators pursuing interest-
based issues would focus on obtaining the maximum benefit.
They would therefore be more satisfied with integrative rather
than distributive outcomes.
Even though the abovementioned results (Harinck & De
Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000) could be related to negotia-
tor satisfaction as hypothesized earlier, their purpose was not to
measure satisfaction. We therefore conducted three experiments
whereby participants indicated the degree of satisfaction with
an
integrative and distributive outcome. In all experiments, we
expected to identify an interaction effect between negotiation
content and outcome. Negotiators in interest-based negotiations
would prefer integrative to distributive, but those in value-
based
negotiations would prefer distributive to integrative outcomes.
EXPERIMENT 1

Method
Design and Participants
The first experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design,
with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative
versus
distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator satisfac-
tion as the dependent variable. Fifty-seven students (31 female,
26 male; M age = 24.7 years) participated and received CHF 30
(approximately USD 36) as compensation for their time. They
were randomly assigned to the interest or value condition and
one of two orders of negotiation outcome. The order of negotia-
tion outcome had no effect on the results.
Procedure
After participants engaged in a simulated negotiation (which is
irrelevant to the present paper), they were given an additional
task and a questionnaire. In a first attempt to test our hypothe-
sis, we provided participants a scenario where a good friend
who desires to purchase a used car had requested their assis-
tance with negotiations to bargain for a low price and an
extended warranty (participants were given a representative
negotiator role, i.e., they were to negotiate on behalf of some-
one else, to enable simpler manipulations of the interest versus
value conditions). The introduction to the questionnaire
provided information about the scenario and a payoff chart,
revealing that the friend considered the duration of the warranty
more important than the price (as they had engaged in a nego-
tiation before, they were familiar with such payoff charts). The
manipulation approach was adapted from Harinck and De
Dreu (2004). Participants in the value condition were informed
that their friend aimed for both a fair price and a fair warranty
duration. The payoff chart consisted of corresponding verbal

labels, such as “unfair” and “fair” (Table 1). In the interest
condition, participants learned that their friend aimed for both
a favorable price and a warranty duration. The payoff chart
consisted of points (Table 1).
Participants were then presented with two possible negotia-
tion results: an integrative (a trade-off between the two issues,
Table 1. Negotiator payoff charts in Experiment 1
Price Duration of guarantee
Interest condition
CHF 30 000 80 points 2.5 years 100 points
CHF 32 500 60 points 2 years 75 points
CHF 37 500 20 points 1 years 25 points
Value condition
CHF 30 000 Fair 2.5 years Very fair
CHF 32 500 Rather fair 2 years Fair
CHF 35 000 Neither fair
nor unfair
1.5 years Neither fair
nor unfair
CHF 37 500 Rather unfair 1 years Unfair
CHF 40 000 Unfair 0.5 years Very unfair
Negotiator satisfaction 203
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc.
Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)

thus no concessions on the high-priority and large concessions
on the low-priority issue; i.e., CHF 40 000, 2.5 years) and a
distributive outcome (a “classic” 50/50 outcome; i.e., CHF
35 000, 1.5 years). For each outcome, they would rate their
level of satisfaction from a scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to
7 (very satisfied).
Results
A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed the predicted
interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation
outcome, F(1,55) = 21.12, p < .001, η2 = .28. Participants in
the interest condition displayed greater satisfaction with the
integrative (M = 5.03) than the distributive (M = 4.07)
outcome, F(1,55) = 16.49, p < .001, η2 = .23. In contrast,
those in the value condition were more satisfied with the dis-
tributive (M = 4.04) than the integrative (M = 3.39) outcome,
F(1,55) = 6.31, p = .015, η2 = .10 (Figure 1). The analysis also
revealed a significant main effect for negotiation content.
Participants in the value condition generally reported lower
satisfaction (M = 3.71) than those in the interest condition
(M = 4.55), F(1,55) = 10.13, p = .002, η2 = .16. This
unpredicted finding could suggest that making concessions
on value-based issues is experienced more aversively than
making concessions on interest-based issues.
EXPERIMENT 2
The first experiment provided preliminary evidence that the
nature of the conflict issues affects whether distributive or
integrative outcomes are more satisfactory. However, the use
of different payoff charts in the different conditions could have
potentially influenced our results. The verbal labels (value
condition) may not correspond exactly to the points (interest

condition) in terms of their subjective utility to the partici-
pants. Thus, participants may have perceived the contrast
between the high-priority and low-priority issues differently.
To account for this drawback in Experiment 2, we employed
the same payoff chart (consisting of points) in both conditions.
Method
This experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, with
conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator
satisfaction as the dependent variable. Another sample of
32 students (19 female, 13 male; M age = 23.9 years) partici-
pated for monetary compensation (CHF 30). Participants
engaged in two succeeding negotiations tasks, one leading to
an integrative and the other to a distributive outcome. The
allocation of participants to the interest or value condition and
the order of negotiation tasks and outcomes were randomized.
Neither variation of negotiation task order nor outcome order
affected the results and will therefore not be reported in the
succeeding text.
Materials and Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were seated in separate rooms and
informed that the experiment purported to investigate how
people proceed in negotiations when they are only allowed
to make two offers and whether people learn from experiences
with such short negotiations (cover story). They were
instructed to play the role of a lawyer and to perform two
pen-and-paper negotiation tasks involving penalties for differ-
ent criminal cases (adapted after Harinck & De Dreu, 2004;
Harinck et al., 2000) with a district attorney played by another

participant. Upon failure in reaching an agreement, the judge,
also played by another participant, would determine the out-
comes on the basis of the negotiation process.
In reality, the actions of the other participants (district attorney
and judges) were pre-prepared written arguments. The district
attorney’s final negotiation offers were designed in a way that
the actual participants were likely to refuse them, thus the need
to employ judges for decision-making. The judge’s decision
was designed to be an integrative outcome after one negotiation
task and a distributive outcome after the other task.
One negotiation task concerned a case involving
pickpocketing (high-priority issue) and another involving a
domestic peace disturbance (low-priority issue). The other task
concerned a case involving clothes theft (high-priority issue)
and another involving minor assault (low-priority issue). For
each case, there were five possible levels of penalties, yielding
different numbers of points for participants (as an example, see
the payoff chart depicted in Table 2). Participants in the inter-
est condition were instructed to aim for monetary fines for
their clients because this would help their career. Those in
the value condition were asked to aim for monetary fines
because this penalty was most just (see Harinck & De Dreu,
2004).
Prior to the first negotiation, participants were tested to ensure
that they understood the payoff chart. They then began to ex-
change offers by filling out forms that the investigator carried
back and forth between the rooms. The simulated counterpart
consistently utilized the predetermined concession-making strat-
egy. For both negotiations, the opponent’s first counteroffer
was
“two weeks jail penalty” on the participant’s high-priority issue
and “one month jail penalty” on the participant’s low-priority

Figure 1. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 1 as a function
of
negotiation content and outcome
204 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner
Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
issue (see Table 2). The final counteroffer was “community
service” (high-priority issue) and “one month jail penalty”
(low-priority issue) in the first negotiation (when the participant
refused this offer, the judge’s decision was an integrative out-
come: a “small monetary fine” on the high-priority issue and a
“one month jail penalty” on the low-priority issue, yielding 50
points) and “two weeks jail penalty” on both issues in the
second
(after which the judge’s decision was a distributive outcome:
“community service” on both issues, yielding 40 points). All but
one participant (who was excluded from the analysis) refused
the second counteroffers and decided to let the judge determine
the penalties. A few minutes after the negotiation, they received
the judges’ decisions. Two participants who suspected that the
op-
ponent or the judge was not real were excluded from the
analyses.
After each negotiation, participants rated two items on a
scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Specifically,
participants were asked (i) how satisfied they were with the
judge’s decision and (ii) how satisfied they would have been
if they had agreed with their counterpart on this outcome.
These ratings were averaged to measure satisfaction
(r = .562, p < .001).

As a manipulation check, participants rated the extent to
which they wanted monetary penalties for fairness (“because
monetary penalties are most fair”) or career reasons (“because
monetary penalties are good for my career”) on two 7-point
scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) after the second
negotiation.
Results
Manipulation Check
A repeated measures ANOVA with conflict issue as the inde-
pendent variable and the two questions checking the manipu-
lation of interest-based versus value-based conflict issues as
the dependent variables revealed a significant interaction
between conflict issue and reasons to aim for a monetary
penalty
(career versus fairness), F(1,29)=37.48, p < .001, η2 =.56.
Participants in the interest condition indicated that they had
aimed for monetary penalties because this would be good for
their career (M = 6.59) rather than it being most fair
(M = 2.18), F(1,29) = 46.22, p < .001, η2 = .61. In contrast,
participants in the value condition stated that they had aimed
for monetary penalties because they were most fair
(M = 5.36) rather than being good for their career (M = 3.86),
F(1,29) = 4.40, p = .045, η2 = .13. This result pattern suggests
that the manipulation was successful.
Negotiator Satisfaction
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interac-
tion between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,30) = 27.65,
p < .001, η2 = .48. Negotiators in the interest condition were
more satisfied with integrative (M = 5.59) than distributive

(M = 4.21) outcomes, F(1,30) = 25.18, p < .001, η2 = .46. In
contrast, those negotiating values were more satisfied with
distributive (M = 5.27) than integrative (M = 4.53) outcomes,
F(1,30) = 6.25, p = .018, η2 = .17 (Figure 2). No other effects
were significant.
It appears unlikely that the negotiator satisfaction measure
is confounded with an evaluation of the negotiation process
itself or an evaluation of the purported counterpart: The ques-
tionnaire employed after the two negotiations also included
two questions designed to assess (i) the participant’s satisfac-
tion with the negotiation process itself and (ii) the participant’s
willingness to negotiate with the same counterpart again. None
of these items correlated significantly with the satisfaction
with the judge’s decision (r’s < .22, p’s > .20), neither were
there differences between the two conflict issue conditions
(F’s < 0.29, p’s > .59) nor were there any significant
interaction effects between the conflict issue and outcome
(F’s < 2.64, p’s > .11).
EXPERIMENT 3
Findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provided consistent
evidence that people are more satisfied with integrative out-
comes in interest-based negotiations but more satisfied with
distributive outcomes in value-based negotiations. However,
in both studies, we employed the same value (“fairness”) to
induce value-based negotiations. Our third experiment there-
fore aims to examine whether the effects of conflict issue on
Table 2. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 2
Pickpocketing Disturbance of public peace
Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points
Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points

Community service 20 points Community service 20 points
Monetary fine, big (CHF 3000) 35 points Monetary fine, big
(CHF 3000) 30 points
Monetary fine, small (CHF 1500) 50 points Monetary fine,
small (CHF 1500) 40 points
Figure 2. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 2 as a function
of
Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
negotiator satisfaction also apply with another value, namely,
environmental protection.
Method
The third experiment also used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design,
with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator
satisfaction as the dependent variable. Fifty-one students
(21 female, 30 male; M age = 24.1 years) voluntarily partici-
pated in this study and were randomly assigned to the interest
or value condition. Again, the order of outcomes was varied
with no significant impact on the results.
Procedure

As in Experiment 1, participants read a negotiation scenario
(adapted after Ryf, Tanner, & Binder, 2007) and were then
asked to indicate how satisfied they would be with an integra-
tive and with a distributive outcome. However, this time, the
study was conducted online where participants were sent
e-mails containing a link to a website providing all informa-
tion and questions. On this website, participants were asked
to imagine that they were a representative of a winter sports
resort and that they were negotiating about how many acres
of two different forests (Forest 1 and 2) should be logged for
the construction of two additional ski slopes. A payoff chart
was provided, revealing that they could earn more points on
Forest 1 than Forest 2 (Table 3).
Participants in the interest condition were asked to oppose
deforestation to prevent financial loss. Because the forests were
highly popular for their nice hiking and biking trails, cutting it
down would potentially reduce resort guests during summer.
Also, they learned that Forest 1 was slightly more popular than
Forest 2. Participants in the value condition were asked to
oppose deforestation to protect the environment. Because the
forests were environmentally valuable and rich in flora and
fauna, cutting down the forest would destroy animal habitats.
Forest 1 had a slightly greater species variety than Forest 2.
Participants were then checked for payoff chart understanding.
Those who failed the test were excluded from subsequent
analyses, which was the case for two participants. Successful
participants were presented with the integrative outcome
(i.e., “0 m2” of forest cut down on the high-priority issue
Forest 1, but “200 000 m2” of forest cut down on the low-
priority
issue Forest 2, yielding 80 points) and the distributive outcome
(i.e., “100 000 m2” of both forests cut down, yielding 70 points)
on two consecutive webpages. On each of these two pages,

participants answered the question “If you had reached this
outcome, how satisfied would you be?” on a scale from 1
(very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Lastly, participants com-
pleted a similar manipulation check as in Experiment 2.
Results
Manipulation Check
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interac-
tion between conflict issue and reasons to oppose deforestation
(decline in guest nights versus protecting animal habitats),
F(1,49) = 73.78, p < .001, η2 = .60. Participants in the interest
condition indicated that they opposed deforestation to avoid
declines in guest nights (M = 6.08) rather than protect
animal habitats (M = 4.83), F(1,49) = 7.47, p = .009, η2 = .13,
whereas those in the value condition stated that they
opposed deforestation to protect animal habitats (M = 6.63)
rather than avoid declines in guest nights (M = 2.48),
F(1,49) = 92.58, p < .001, η2 = .65.
Negotiator Satisfaction
The repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted inter-
action between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,49) = 13.11,
p = .001, η2 = .21. Participants in the interest condition were
more satisfied with integrative (M = 3.46) than distributive
(M = 2.75) outcomes, F(1,49) = 10.68, p = .002, η2 = .18,
whereas those in the value condition were more satisfied with
distributive (M = 3.41) than integrative (M = 3.04) outcomes,
F(1,49) = 3.28, p = .076, η2 = .06. Nevertheless, the latter
difference was only marginally significant (Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
Across three experiments, we found consistent evidence for an

interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation out-
come on negotiator satisfaction. Integrative outcomes were
more satisfactory in interest-based negotiations, whereas
Table 3. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 3
Forest 1 Forest 2
0 m2 80 points 0 m2 60 points
50 000 m2 60 points 50 000 m2 45 points
100 000 m2 40 points 100 000 m2 30 points
150 000 m2 20 points 150 000 m2 15 points
200 000 m2 0 points 200 000 m2 0 points Figure 3. Negotiator
satisfaction in Experiment 3 as a function of
Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
distributive agreements tended to be more satisfactory in
value-based negotiations. This suggests that gaining more via
integrative trade-offs is appealing in interest-based but not
value-based negotiations.
But why would people in value-based negotiations prefer
suboptimal 50/50 outcomes to more beneficial win-win out-
comes? It is possible that people reject trading off value-based
issues and consider integrative trade-offs unacceptable
because this “would undercut their self-images and social
identities as moral beings” (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, p. 256;
Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Such a view is in line with Curhan,

Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) who found that evaluations of nego-
tiations involve multiple dimensions; negotiations are not just
evaluated in terms of their instrumental quality, but for
instance, also in terms of implications for the negotiators’ self-
understanding. Besides that, studies have shown that people
confronted with “tragic trade-offs” (pitting two so-called
sacred values—values which people hold to be absolute and
not exchangeable for anything else—against each other;
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) experienced
high levels of negative emotions and stress when contemplating
which sacred value to protect at the expense of the other
(Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). In accordance, negotiators
would not want to settle on one value issue at the expense of
the other, thus the preference for agreements which allow them
to attain some “balance” between the issues: Instead of making
large concessions on one issue and low concessions on the
other, negotiators may opt for a (fair) compromise by making
similar concessions on both issues, thus greater satisfaction
with distributive outcomes.
An alternative explanation could be that the manipulation
of the negotiation content (interest-based versus value-based)
has led to different subjective utilities across conditions.1 In
the first experiment, the payoff chart’s verbal labels in the
value condition may not have corresponded exactly to the
chart’s points in the interest condition, which could lead to dif-
ferent negotiator priorities. Also, in the second and third exper-
iment, even when points were used in both conditions, such
different utilities could be influential. For instance, people in
interest-based negotiations may tend to be profit-oriented,
whereas those in value-based negotiations may be more loss-
aversive. Because participants in the interest condition priori-
tize more on gaining profits or winning, they report greater
satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they won one
issue and more points) than distributive outcomes (because
they won less points). On the other hand, participants in the

value condition prioritize on preventing losses, thus reporting
less satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they lost
one issue) than distributive outcomes (because they did not
lose the issues but agree on a compromise).
This alternative explanation is consistent with the finding of
Tenbrunsel et al. (2009) that negotiators are more reluctant to
make concessions on value-based issues than on interest-based
issues. Our results from Experiment 1 show that participants in
the value condition generally reported being less satisfied than
those in the interest condition. Even though we did not predict
this finding, it compliments the findings of Tenbrunsel et al.
and could reflect the loss-aversive focus of negotiators in the
value-based condition.
In sum, two mechanisms could account for our findings:
trade-off reluctance or loss avoidance. The former posits that
distributive outcomes are more appealing because it is not
necessary to make trade-offs among the issues, whereas the
latter posits that distributive outcomes are more satisfactory
because none of the two issues were lost. Nevertheless, it is
also plausible that both of the mechanisms interact. Exploring
such underlying mechanisms could be an interesting avenue
for future research. Thus, whereas previous research showed
that objectively better outcomes are not necessarily more satis-
factory due to counterfactual thinking (e.g., Galinsky et al.,
2002a, 2002b; Naquin, 2003) or social comparison (e.g.,
Gillespie et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Novemsky
& Schweitzer, 2004), our findings suggest that the negotiation
content itself can be influential.
One limitation to our experiments is that we linked both ne-
gotiation issues to the same value (fairness in Experiments 1
and 2 and environmental concerns in Experiment 3). It thus
remains unclear what would happen if one issue was linked

to fairness and the other to loyalty, for instance. Furthermore,
we are not able to say how negotiations involving both inter-
est-based and value-based issues (“mixed cases”; see Harinck
& De Dreu, 2004) are related to negotiator satisfaction. We
presume that appropriate integrative outcomes, which occur
when negotiators make concessions on interest-based issues
in order to gain on value-based issues, may be associated with
greater satisfaction. It should also be highlighted again, that
we utilized only one item to measure negotiator satisfaction
in Experiments 1 and 3, and two items in Experiment 2. Future
research should address this issue with the use of a more
elaborate measure.
Another potential limitation concerns our negotiation sce-
narios. More precisely, all of our participants assumed the role
of a representative negotiator (negotiating on behalf of one’s
friend in Experiment 1, negotiating on behalf of one’s clients
in Experiment 2, and negotiating on behalf of a winter sports
resort in Experiment 3). We chose such negotiator roles (i)
because it is easier to successfully manipulate interest-based
versus value-based negotiation content (a participant would
probably be more willing to overtake the view that an issue
is value-based when the actual outcome affects someone
else) and (ii) because the scenarios in the second (Harinck
et al., 2000; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004) and third experiments
(Ryf et al., 2007) have been used successfully in past studies.
However, representative negotiators may generally be more
motivated to achieve a desirable outcome in order to make a
good impression on those that they are negotiating on behalf
of (e.g., Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus, it is possible that par-
ticipants in the second experiment’s value condition preferred
the distributive option simply because they do not leave a bad
impression on their clients due to an unfair outcome (rather than
because the participants view the distributive outcome as the
fairer option). One could argue that the results may differ, if
the participants’ very own outcome would be affected. In such

cases, the participants may be less reluctant to pursue integra-
tive outcomes rather than distributive ones. Future research
should therefore develop a scenario in which the participant’s
very own outcome is at stake.1We would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
Notwithstanding the limitations and beyond contributing to
negotiation research, we believe that this work has important
practical implications. In fact, our findings present a certain
dilemma. When aiming for optimal outcomes, negotiation
literature typically recommends aiming for integrative agree-
ments as they are more beneficial for all parties. However,
when the negotiation goal includes the achievement of negotia-
tor satisfaction, following this advice could sometimes backfire,
as suggested by our findings. Integrative outcomes may be
perceived as more satisfactory than distributive outcomes in
interest-based negotiations but, in value-based negotiations,
distributive outcomes tend to be more satisfactory than integra-
tive outcomes. We thus conclude that win-win outcomes
may not be generalized to greater satisfaction as this may
be dependent on the nature of the negotiation itself.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was supported by a research grant from the
University of Zurich (no. 56232603) to the first author.
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® Academy of Managemenl /ournal
1990, Vol. 33, No. 4. 833-846.
INFLUENCE OF SPEED OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION
AND OUTCOME ON NEGOTIATOR AND CONSTITUENT
FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS
DONALD E. CONLON
University of Delaware
PETER M. FASOLO
Human Resource Associates
Using a simulated organizational dispute, we tested the impact
of a
third-party's intervention on disputants' perceptions of
procedural and
distrihutive justice and satisfaction with the third party. We
manipu-
lated disputants' roles in the negotiation, the speed of third-
party in-
tervention, and the outcome imposed by the third party in a two-
by-two-by-five factorial design. The results suggest that the
speed of
third-party intervention influenced perceptions of procedures
more
than perceptions of outcomes. Speed of intervention also
influenced
disputants differently depending on their role. Outcome
influenced all
measures of procedural and distributive fairness. We discuss
implica-
tions for managerial behavior in dispute resolution and

consequences
for the measurement of procedural justice.
Research on dispute resolution and resource allocation has
identified
two dimensions of fairness that are important to participants in
disputes.
Early research focused on distributive justice, or equity, the
perceived fair-
ness of the outcomes of a dispute. More recently, researchers
have studied
procedural justice, which is the perceived fairness of the
procedures used to
generate outcomes. The present study examined the influence of
the speed
of third-party intervention on disputants' perceptions of
distributive and
procedural justice.
Researchers have advanced theories of procedural justice based
on work
in legal (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978] and organizational
settings (Lev-
enthal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980]. In their theory of procedure,
Thibaut and
Walker distinguished between process control, or the degree to
which dis-
putants exerted influence over a resolution procedure, and
decision control,
or the degree to which disputants exerted influence over the
final outcome
of a dispute. Leventhal and colleagues' allocation preference
theory identi-
fied a number of dimensions that influenced procedural justice,
many
of which overlapped with the dimensions Thibaut and Walker

iden-
The authors would like to thank Allan Lind, Howard Garland,
and this journal's reviewers
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks are
also due to John Scott, Steven
Roth, Cary Polkowitz, and Karin Muenning for their assistance
in the data collection.
833
834 Academy of Management Journal December
tified (Lind & Tyler, 1988]. Researchers investigating
procedural justice in
organizations have examined performance evaluation and job
transfers (Lis-
sak, 1983], pay raise decisions (Folger & Konovsky, 1989], and
dispute res-
olution (Karambayya & Brett, 1989; Sheppard, 1984; Sheppard
& Lewicki,
1987]. Many of the same effects found in legal contexts have
also occurred in
organizational contexts: for example, in both laboratory and
field settings,
people have seen performance evaluation procedures that
provide a high
level of voice, or personal expression (a component of process
control], as
more fair than procedures that limit input (cf. Lind & Tyler,
1988].
Some recent studies have suggested that the manner in which a
proce-

dure is enacted or interpreted plays an important role in
subsequent evalu-
ations of fairness. For example, using concepts found in
research on lead-
ership, Ross, Conlon, and Lind (1990] found that disputants
involved with
task-oriented mediators were more satisfied with mediation
when the dead-
line for a settlement was vague rather than explicit. Disputants
involved
with person-oriented mediators were equally satisfied whether
the deadline
was known or not. A similar pattern was found for disputants'
distributive
fairness ratings.
Ross and colleagues (1990] were the first to examine variation
within a
mediation procedure by varying the behavioral style of third
parties. As
Sheppard (1984] noted; there has been little research on
disputants' reac-
tions to variation withii*^ procedure. Assuming that other
variations in
enactment may influence participants' perceptions of
distributive and pro-
cedural justice, we examined one such variable, the timing of
third-party
intervention.
As McGrath and Rotchford (1983] noted, time is a pervasive
aspect of
behavior in organizations. Time can also play a prominent role
in negotia-
tions: disputants often set deadlines for reaching agreements or
stall before

making a concession in the hope that opponents will concede
first. Shep-
pard and Lewicki's (1987] study of 44 executives found that the
timeliness
of third-party intervention was an important aspect of fairness
for managers.
Views of negotiation put forth in previous research have
suggested that, all
thing being equal, people prefer procedures that can settle
disputes quickly
to those that cannot because the costs to all parties increase as
time elapses
(Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988]. But can a dispute be settled too
quickly?
Previous views of distributive justice, social exchange, and
public
choice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid,
1978] have sug-
gested that satisfaction with procedures, outcomes, and third
parties is pri-
marily, if not exclusively, a function of outcomes; thus, whether
a settlement
is reached quickly or slowly is unimportant. On the other hand,
procedural
justice theory and research (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988] have
suggested that the
speed of third-party intervention could have a significant impact
on dispu-
tants' perceptions by altering their opportunity to exercise
voice. If a third
party intervenes quickly in a procedure, it will allow little
opportunity for
disputants to express their opinions and may be seen as less fair
than a
longer procedure. In addition, disputants typically do not desire

third-party
1990 Conlon and Fasolo 835
intervention unless they realize that they cannot resolve a
dispute them-
selves (Pruitt, 1981], and this realization may not yet have
occurred if inter-
vention is fast. Lastly, Greenberg's (1990] work suggested that
rapid inter-
vention may not appear to be as fair because it violates people's
expectations
of what a fair procedure should be.
Hypothesis 1: The quick imposition of an outcome by a
third party wiJJ lead disputants to report low levels of
procedural justice, distributive justice, and satis/action
with the third party.
The present study also varied the outcome third parties imposed
on
disputants. Although most of the research on legal procedures
has focused
on all-or-nothing outcomes, agreements in which both parties
receive some
amount of the resource in question are typical in organizations.
Little pre-
vious research has examined variation in outcomes beyond total
win and
total loss.^ The present study employed five different outcomes
that varied
parametrically in their favorability to subjects.
When maintaining social harmony is important, dividing

rewards or
outcomes equally among disputants is likely to be the preferred
distribution
norm, and individuals are likely to be uncomfortable with
exceedingly large
rewards gained at the expense of the other disputants
(Greenberg, 1987;
Walster et al., 1978]. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: Although outcome satisfaction wiJJ in-
crease as the value of an outcome increases, disputants
who are co-workers wiJJ not see excessively favorable out-
comes as fair.
This study also examined perceptions of satisfaction and
fairness for
two types of disputants. We called disputants who participated
in a dispute
resolution procedure "negotiators" and called those who did not
participate
but were affected by an outcome "constituents." The
relationship between
constituents and negotiators is similar to the principal-agent
relationship
discussed in agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988], as
constituents delegate
the work of negotiating to negotiators. Gomparing these two
types of dispu-
tants allowed us to compare two roles whose occupants have
similar stakes
in an outcome—though negotiators may also have other
interests at stake,
such as prestige. In addition, most organizational disputes, both
labor nego-
tiations and less formal procedures, involve only a few
employees in nego-

tiations; the others must wait to hear the outcome and do not
experience the
procedure firsthand. Thus, studying these two roles seemed of
practical
importance.
Procedural justice studies have rarely manipulated roles,
typically com-
paring the reactions of participants in and observers of
procedures (e.g.,
Latour, 1978]. The literature on procedural justice and
participation suggests
that a high level of participation in properly enacted procedures
enhances
' Conlon, Lind, and Lissak (1989) is an exception.
perceptions of fairness, even when participants have no control
over out-
comes (Musante, Gilbert, & Thibaut, 1983].
Hypothesis 3: Negotiators will perceive themselves as
having higher levels of control over decisions and voice
than constituents.
Although we expected negotiators to report greater voice and
decision
control than constituents, we expected constituents to see
distributive jus-
tice, procedural accuracy, and third parties more favorably than
negotiators
because, lacking specific information about how a procedure

was enacted,
constituents will have an idealistic vision and assume that it
was executed
properly and competently. Negotiators, who personally
experienced the be-
haviors of opponents and third parties, will have more negative
perceptions.
Hypothesis 4: Constituents will report higher levels of dis-
tributive justice, procedural accuracy, and satisfaction
with third parties than negotiators.
Finally, role was expected to interact with the speed of third-
party in-
tervention. We expected negotiators' perceptions to vary with
the speed with
which an outcome was imposed because speed affects their
opportunity for
voice. Constituents, with no opportunity for voice in either
case, should be
unaffected.
Hypothesis 5: Constituents' perceptions of decision con-
trol, voice, and third-party propriety wiJJ show JittJe vari-
ation related to the speed of third-party intervention. Ne-
gotiators' perceptions of these values wiJJ be lower under
fast intervention than under slow intervention.
METHODS
Subjects and Research Design
Subjects were 197 undergraduate business administration
students who
participated in return for class credit and a chance at several
monetary

prizes. We conducted simulations of an organizational
negotiation for
groups of 12 to 30 subjects. The study had a two-by-two-by-five
factorial
design. Subjects took the roles of disputants, either negotiators
or constitu-
ents; third-party intervention in the dispute was either slow or
fast; and the
outcome received ranged from extremely unfavorable to
extremely favor-
able. The number of subjects in the cells formed by these
variations ranged
from 8 to 10.
Procedures
Subjects were seated at personal computers that presented the
instruc-
tions, experimental manipulations, and a questionnaire.
Experimenters,
who were blind to the assignment of subjects to experimental
conditions,
told subjects that they would be role-playing an organizational
negotiation
and that they would interact with other subjects via the
computer network.
All subjects were told they had been randomly assigned to work
in the
organization's Boston office. Those assigned to be negotiators
were given the
role "Boston bargaining rep" and those assigned to be

constituents were
given the role "Boston sales manager." The instructions then
said that the
organization's Boston office was in conflict with its New York
office and that
the bargaining representative's task was to resolve the conflict
with another
manager, the New York bargaining representative. Subjects also
learned that
a third manager, the product manager, could assist them in
settling the
dispute.
The scenario was based on an actual negotiation that occurred
in a large
securities firm. The New York and Boston bargaining
representatives nego-
tiated three issues: the size of transferable accounts, eligibility
for promo-
tion, and criteria for promotion. Subjects received information
about the
issues on the computer screen and in a manila folder. Following
past re-
search (Garnevale & Gonlon, 1988], we presented information
about the is-
sues on the screen in tabular form. The actual table used is in
Carnevale and
Gonlon (1988].
For each issue, there were nine proposal levels labeled A to I.
Subjects
were told that the bargaining representatives needed to agree on
one pro-
posal level for each issue. Points shown next to each level
indicated its value

to the disputants. Level I gave the most points to subjects on
every issue.
Subjects saw both their own and their opponents' point values
and were told
that the product manager, the third party, would see both
disputants' point
values.
On each round of negotiation, the bargaining representatives
first saw
the New York representative's issue chart and a proposal
composed of three
letters. Subjects then saw their own issue chart and the personal
outcomes
associated with particular agreements. They were told that the
points for
outcomes would be converted to lottery tickets at the
completion of the
study and that the seven winning tickets would split $300. The
instructions
emphasized that chances increased as lottery tickets increased,
so subjects
should try to get as many points as possible.
Subjects were reminded that the product manager, who was
described
as superior in the organization's hierarchy to the managers in
the New York
and Boston offices, could intervene in the negotiation. We told
them that
although the product manager might not get involved in the
negotiation at
all, he could impose an outcome at any time. They were also
told that the
product manager had a history of acting fairly and responsibly
in helping

managers resolve conflicts.
For negotiators in all conditions, the proposals generated by the
New
York manager (the opponent] produced few points. When the
third party
was to intervene slowly, the opponent's proposals on the eight
rounds of
negotiation were labeled AAA, AAA, AAB, AAB, ABB, ABB,
BAB, and BAB.
When intervention was to be fast, the opponent's were AAA and
BAB, the
same as the first and last offers made by the opponent when
intervention was
slow. Thus, negotiators' opponents conceded an equivalent
amount in both
conditions.
Negotiators were free to make counteroffers and send messages
to their
opponent on each round. When intervention was slow, the
computer inter-
rupted negotiators after their opponent's eighth proposal and
told them that
the third party had decided to impose a settlement. When
intervention was
fast, the interruption occurred after the opponent's second
proposal. After
receiving an outcome, subjects completed a questionnaire that
elicited their
perceptions of procedural and distributive justice, the third

party, and the
opponent. After they completed the questionnaire, we told
subjects that the
study was finished and gave them a debriefing.
Independent Variables
Disputant role. Negotiators, assigned the role of the Boston
bargaining
representative, were reminded that they were negotiating not
only for them-
selves, but also for their co-worker, the Boston sales manager.
In fact, we
encouraged subjects to believe that many co-workers in the
Boston office
were depending on their negotiation skills. Gonstituents,
assigned the role of
the Boston sales manager, were told that another person in the
room was
their bargaining representative. During the negotiation,
constituents were
encouraged to review the material provided in their folders
about the orga-
nization, the dispute, and the dispute resolution procedure.
While constit-
uents waited for the dispute to be settled, a message flashed on
their com-
puter screen: "PLEASE STAND BY: YOUR BARGAINING
REP IS STILL
NEGOTIATING."
Speed. The manipulation of third-party intervention varied how
many
rounds the bargaining representatives negotiated with their
opponent before
the third party imposed a settlement. Bargaining representatives

in the fast
intervention condition were interrupted before they made a
proposal on the
second round of negotiation and told that the third party had
decided to
impose a settlement. In pretests, subjects reached the second
round in about
two minutes. Gonstituents in the fast intervention condition
were thus kept
waiting for about two minutes before their computer screen
announced that
the third party had decided to settle the dispute during the
second round of
the negotiation. Bargaining representatives in the slow
intervention condi-
tion were interrupted before they made a proposal on the eighth
round of
negotiation. Gonstituents in this condition waited about ten
minutes for the
announcement that the product manager had decided to settle
the dispute,
the amount of time negotiators in the slow intervention
condition took to
reach this point in pretests.
Outcome. In the zero outcome condition, subjects were told that
the
third party had imposed settlement AAA, which gave them no
points but
gave their opponent 240 points. In the one-quarter outcome
condition, GGG
was imposed, providing 60 points to a given subject and 180 to
the oppo-
nent. In the one-half outcome condition, settlement EEE gave
each disputant

1990 Conion and Fasolo 839
120 points. In the three-quarters outcome condition, GGG gave
180 points to
a subject and 60 to the opponent. In the everything outcome
condition, III
gave 240 points to a subject and no points to the opponent.
Subjects were
told to write their settlement and its point value on a card in
their folder.
Dependent Variables
Subjects indicated their judgments about the fairness of the
settlement
and other perceptions on six- and seven-point rating scales for a
number of
measures that we constructed. A manipulation check for the
speed of third-
party intervention consisted of two questions asking how long it
took the
dispute to be resolved and how fast it was resolved (a = .76).
We measured
outcome satisfaction with two questions that asked subjects how
satisfied
they were with the outcome of the dispute [a = .94) and
measured outcome
fairness with two questions on how fair the outcome was (a =
.89).
Three indexes measured procedural justice. Decision control
was mea-
sured by asking subjects how much control and how much
influence they

had over the decision that was made (a = .64). We measured
process control
using two scales reflecting different components of the
construct. Voice was
measured by four questions: we asked for subjects' perceptions
of their op-
portunity to present evidence and express their views and asked
about their
belief that adequate information exchange preceded the
settlement and that
the third party gave proper consideration to their views (a =
.68). Accuracy,
a component of procedural justice [Leventhal et aL, 1980), was
measured by
three questions addressing beliefs that the negotiation process
was an accu-
rate way to reach a solution and that the third party had
adequate knowledge
of each disputants' positions (a = .71).
Finally, three indexes measured subjects' perceptions of the
third party.
Measures of satisfaction with the third party were five questions
assessing
subjects' satisfaction, trust, and resentment of the third party,
their satisfac-
tion with the third party's performance, and their willingness to
talk to a
manager superior to the third party to change their settlement (a
= .87).
Third-party fairness was assessed with three questions
measuring percep-
tions of the third party's fairness, lack of bias, and impartiality
(a = .76).
Finally, we measured perceptions of the speed of intervention
with an index

called intervention propriety: three questions asked if the
disputants had
had a reasonable amount of time to settle the dispute
themselves, whether
they could have reached an agreement by themselves, and
whether the third
party's assistance was necessary to reach agreement (a = .66).
Table 1 shows
means, standard deviations, and the intercorrelations among the
measures.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Subjects who received fast settlements reported that the dispute
was
resolved more quickly than did subjects who received
settlements less
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables
Distributive justice
1. Outcome satisfaction
2. Outcome fairness
Procedural justice
3. Decision control
4. Voice

5. Accuracy of procedure
Third-party
6. Satisfaction
7. Fairness
8. Propriety of intervention
Means
3.19
2.85
1.53
1.95
3.20
3.14
2.91
2.87
S.d.
2.07
1.77
0.85
0.93
1.23
1.42
1.40
0.65
1
.76

.23
.36
.42
.78
.59
.35
2
.30
.35
.44
.71
.73
.40
Correlations
3
.54
.14
.27

.25
.07"
4
.29
.45
.40
.36
5
.61
.55
.34
6
.74
.41
7
35
' All correlations except this one are significant at p < .05.
quickly (x = 10.37 and 6.78, F^.^^ = 130.68, p < .001). Subjects

who
received none, one-fourth, one-half, three-fourths, or all of the
points in
dispute correctly identified the number of points that they
received (F4 ̂ 77 =
211.17, p < .001) and their opponents received (F4 ̂ 77 = 423.84
p < .001).
Using Newman-Keuls comparisons (Winer, 1971) set at the .05
level, we
found all five levels of outcome for both questions to be
significantly differ-
ent from each other. Finally, negotiators correctly identified
themselves as
the Boston bargaining representative, and constituents identified
themselves
as the Boston sales manager (x = 3.96 and 2.96, respectively,
F^ ̂ 77 =
648.31, p < .001).
It was possible that manipulating the speed of intervention
would con-
found subjects' perceptions of how competitive or cooperative
their oppo-
nent was, with opponents who moved from the first proposal to
the last in
two rounds rather than eight perceived as more cooperative. To
examine this
possibility, we used two questions measuring subjects'
perceptions of their
own and their opponent's competitiveness. There were no
differences be-
tween subjects in the fast and slow intervention conditions in
perceptions of
their opponent's (x = 2.26 and 2.07, F^ 177 = 1.00, n.s.) or their
own com-
petitiveness (x = 2.86 and 3.19, Fj,177 = 1.99, n.s.), strong

evidence that all
subjects perceived equivalent amounts of competitiveness in the
disputes.
Major Analyses
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to
examine the
overall influences of the three factors. Significant main effects
emerged for
speed of intervention (F^ ̂ 77 = 8.36, p < .001), role (F^ ̂ 77 =
23.43, p <
.001), and outcome (F4 ̂ 77 = 18.57, p < .001) and for the role-
by-speed
(Fi,i77 = 4.37, p < .001) and outcome-by-role (F4177 = 2.15, p
< .001)
interactions. We report the results of univariate follow-up tests
next.
Speed of intervention. Hypothesis 1, which predicted that fast
third-
1990 Conion and Fasolo 841
party intervention would result in lower ratings of distributive
justice, pro-
cedural justice, and satisfaction with the third party than slow
intervention,
received strong support, especially for the procedural justice
and third-party
measures (see Table 2). Subjects for whom the imposition of an
outcome was
slow believed that their settlement was slightly more fair than
subjects re-

ceiving fast intervention, but this effect only approached
significance (p <
.11). Regarding procedural justice, subjects who received fast
impositions
reported having less decision control and less voice than those
who received
slow impositions. Lastly, subjects who received fast impositions
were less
satisfied with the third party and believed the intervention to be
less proper
than subjects who received a slow imposition.
Outcome effects. The manipulation of outcome strongly
influenced all
results (see Table 2). Hypothesis 2, regarding distributive
justice ratings,
received strong support: ratings of outcome satisfaction increase
as the level
of outcome increases, but ratings of outcome fairness peak when
subjects
receive three-fourths of the points and then decline.
The outcome imposed also strongly influenced measures of
procedural
justice: subjects who received three-fourths or all of the points
in dispute
reported having greater decision control and voice than all other
subjects. In
addition, subjects who received at least half the points in
dispute perceived
the procedure as more accurate than those receiving one-fourth,
and the
latter saw the procedure as more accurate than did subjects who
received no
points.

Finally, outcome influenced perceptions of the third party: as
outcomes
improved, satisfaction with the third party increased. Again, as
with the
outcome fairness and procedural accuracy measures, all subjects
who re-
ceived at least half the points in dispute believed the third party
was equally
fair, and these three groups reported greater third-party fairness
than sub-
jects in the remaining two conditions. Subjects who received at
least half the
points in dispute believed that the third party's intervention was
more ap-
propriate than subjects who received one-fourth, and the latter
believed the
intervention was more appropriate than did subjects who
received no
points.
Negotiators versus constituents. Role in the negotiation
influenced a
wide variety of measures (see Table 2). Hypothesis 3 received
strong sup-
port, with negotiators seeing themselves as having greater
decision control
and more voice than constituents. Hypothesis 4 also received
strong support,
with outcome satisfaction higher for constituents than
negotiators. Constit-
uents believed that the procedure was more accurate than did
negotiators,
and the former were also more satisfied with the third party and
believed the
third party was more fair than did the negotiators.

The role manipulation was also involved in several significant
interac-
tions. As predicted in Hypothesis 5, the interaction of the role
and speed
manipulations influenced three variables. Constituents'
perceptions of de-
cision control (F4 177 = 6.63, p < .011) and voice (F4 177 =
22.32, p < .001)
were not strongly influenced by the speed of intervention:
means were 1.15
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Conlon and Fasolo 843
and 1.20, respectively, for the decision control index and 1.51
and 1.72 for
the voice index. However, negotiators' perceptions of decision
control and
voice were much lower under fast intervention than under slow
intervention
(x = 1.56 and 2.17, decision control, and 1.72 and 2.83, voice).
The inter-
action also influenced perceptions of the propriety of the third
party's in-
tervention {F4177 = 10.96, p < .001). Of the four types of
subjects yielded by
the interaction, negotiators under slow intervention perceived
the third par-
ty's behavior to be most appropriate (x = 3.24), and negotiators
under fast
intervention perceived it as least appropriate [x = 1.99).
Constituents' per-
ceptions of impropriety in the slow and fast interventions were
between
these two extremes (x = 2.92 and 2.47).
The outcome-by-role interaction indicated that negotiators
generally see
themselves as having more decision control than constituents,
except when

they receive only one-fourth of the points in dispute (F4 J77 =
4.79, p < .001).
In addition, although the perceived level of voice increases for
both negoti-
ators and constituents as the rewards yielded by an outcome
increase, the
level for constituents declines at the upper end of the outcome
range but the
level for negotiators continues to increase (F4 177 = 3.94, p <
.004). We did
not predict these outcome-by-role interactions.
DISCUSSION
The hypotheses guiding this research received strong support.
When a
third party intervened quickly in a dispute, disputants reported
low per-
ceived decision control and voice. Compared to disputants
whose third
party intervened later, they were also much less satisfied with
the third party
and perceived the intervention as less appropriate. The speed of
third-party
intervention did not strongly influence perceptions of
distributive justice.
A common assumption in research on dispute resolution is that
it is
beneficial to end conflicts as quickly as possible because
protracted disputes
raise the costs incurred by both sides. Prolonged disputes can
also lead to the
escalation of a conflict. Pruitt and Rubin described the course
that conflicts
can take over time: "First, relatively light, friendly, and

inoffensive conten-
tious tactics tend to give way to heavier moves . . . the number
of issues in
conflict tends to increase . . . a focus on specifics tends to give
way to more
global, all-encompassing concerns . . . motivation in escalating
conflict
shifts from an initial interest in doing well for oneself to
beating the other
side" (1986: 7).
Although we are not suggesting that managers ignore disputes
until this
"conflict spiral" is out of control, the present results suggest
that it may be
valuable to let subordinates in conflict wrangle with each other
for a while
before intervening. Having had adequate uninterrupted time to
express their
opinions, disputants will be more amenable to third-party
suggestions and,
if they are necessary, third-party settlements. Thus, despite
pressures that
may force managers to act quickly and decisively in
organizational disputes,
they must be careful that their haste to resolve conflicts does
not result in
disputants feeling that their rights to due process have been
violated. Pre-
vious research in political contexts has documented that when
disputants

see procedural fairness as low, they typically report low
satisfaction and
commitment to their institutions and representatives (Lind &
Tyler, 1988].
Those findings suggest that procedures enacted too quickly may
lower or-
ganizational commitment among employees.
In addition, the present data clearly indicate that swift third-
party in-
tervention affects negotiators' procedural fairness judgments
more nega-
tively than it affects those of constituents. Negotiators, with
their greater
potential for using voice, were more affected by curtailment of
their oppor-
tunity to express opinions than were constituents, who did not
have this
opportunity for voice no matter how long or short the
negotiation was.
These findings suggest that negotiators are more likely to suffer
low
satisfaction and commitment than constituents. However, agents
often serve
as interpreters for principals: upon dispute settlement,
negotiators commu-
nicate their feelings and perspectives to their constituents, who
are likely to
be starved for information regarding how the procedure was
enacted.
Clearly, the explanations a third party gives to justify
intervention can have
a powerful role in determining disputants' perceptions of
satisfaction and
fairness, and such explanations were not made in our study. In

fact, the type
of explanation a third party provides can attenuate or exacerbate
feelings of
injustice.
Research by Bies and Shapiro (1987] and Baron (1985] has
demonstrated
the powerful role that explanations can play in dispute
resolution. It is likely
to be particularly important for third parties to impart their
causal accounts
to negotiators before the latter have had a chance to devise their
own inter-
pretation of events, which they will subsequently pass on to
their constitu-
ents. This study suggests that, in the absence of any negative
information
regarding the procedure, third party, or execution of the
procedure in a
dispute, constituents primarily focus on the favorability of the
outcome in
determining their satisfaction and fairness, and negotiators
focus on both
how the procedure was enacted and the outcome received.
The explanations negotiators give constituents is also a topic
worthy of
investigation. As discussed in the agency theory literature (e.g.,
Eisenhardt,
1988], negotiators may prefer constituents to evaluate them on
the basis of
their behavior in negotiations, but constituents may prefer to
evaluate ne-
gotiators on the basis of the outcomes they attained. Such
differences in
performance evaluation criteria and expectations may not only

affect con-
stituents' perceptions of procedural and distributive justice but
also their
perceptions of their negotiators, leading to a possible escalation
of within-
group conflict.
The outcome effects on distributive fairness judgments in this
study
suggest that in certain contexts, the objective favorability of an
outcome and
its perceived fairness may have a curvilinear relationship. When
disputants
believe that resource distribution should be based on an equality
norm, it
seems likely that they will see both outcomes that are extremely
favorable
and those that are extremely unfavorable to one disputant as
unfair. We
know of no research that has been able to demonstrate such a
relationship,
but it seems plausible. The present results certainly show a
ceiling effect for
measures of outcome fairness. Perhaps a negotiation task in
which dispu-
tants had a close relationship—as workers in the same office or
as good
friends, for instance— would produce results supporting this
idea.
The laboratory context of this study and the use of student

subjects
suggest that caution be used when making generalizations to
managers in
organizational settings. Nevertheless, we based the three-issue
dispute on an
actual dispute that occurred in a securities company, and several
growing
trends, including networked computers, electronic mail,
computer confer-
encing, and "worksteading" (employees working at home], offer
natural set-
tings for organizational conflict resolution that are not too
different from the
context created in this study. Certainly, more research on
managerial third-
party roles and the reactions of constituents and negotiators is
warranted.
Future research should continue to examine variation within,
and not just
between, dispute resolution procedures. The present study
suggests that
further research on how managers acting as third parties enact
conflict res-
olution procedures is necessary, and such research will continue
to enrich
understanding of procedural and distributive justice.
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Adams, J. S. 1965. Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimen-
tal social psychology, vol. 2: 267-299. New York: Academic
Press.
Baron, R. A. 1985. Reducing organizational conflict: The role
of attributions. Journal of Applied

Psychology, 69: 272-279.
Bies, R. J., & Shapiro, D. L. 1987. Interactional fairness
judgments: The influence of causal
accounts. Social Justice Research, 1: 199-218.
Carnevale, P. J., & Conlon, D. E. 1988. Time pressure and
strategic choice in mediation. Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 42: 111-
133.
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Donald E. Conlon received his Ph.D. degree in business
administration from the Uni-
versity of Illinois. He is currently an assistant professor in the
Department of Business
Administration, University of Delaware. His research interests
include disputant per-
ceptions of procedural and distributive justice, third-party
power, and decision making.
Peter M. Fasolo received his Ph.D. degree in psychology from
the University of Dela-
ware. He is an organizational consultant at Human Resource
Associates, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey. His research interests include the effects of
procedural and distrib-
utive justice on performance, organizational commitment, and
interview judgments.

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