DeltaSync_03_Delta (1)

DeltaSync 03 | Mississippi | The Flood House Concept 1
THE FLOOD HOUSE CONCEPT
A NEW APPROACH IN REDUCING FLOOD VULNERABILITY

deltacompetition
2006
DD EE LL TT AA SS YY NN CC 00 33
HELEEN VREUGDENHIL
PhD Student Policy Analysis
LEO MEIJER
MSc Student Water Management
LARS HARTNACK
MSc Student Architecture
TIES RIJCKEN
PhD Student Strategic Product Design & Building Technology
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AA NNEEWW AAPPPPRROOAACCHH IINN RREEDDUUCCIINNGG FFLLOOOODD VVUULLNNEERRAABBIILLIITTYY

ABSTRACT
Deltas throughout the world are vulnerable to natural hazards. New
Orleans provides a recent and obvious example. We analyzed the
situation in New Orleans and the Mississippi Delta after hurricane
Katrina has passed, from a vulnerability perspective. Vulnerability can
be subdivided into four components: threshold capacity, coping
capacity, recovery capacity and adaptive capacity. The vulnerability of
New Orleans could be decreased by increasing these capacities.
We propose Flood House as a concept to improve the four
vulnerability capacities simultaneously. The Flood House is a flood-proof
water management centre, in which people, science, government and
business come together, first to remember victims of Katrina, but second
to learn, discuss and create new - joint - ideas on all kinds of water
management and flood related issues. This results in innovative
strategies, policies and products to increase individual and collective
safety against further future floodings.
Pre-conditions for success are adaptation to local circumstances and
a differentiated approach to, and platforms for, the different societal
stakeholders. The Flood House facilitates an innovative approach to
governance on disaster management and could therefore even have a
function during hurricanes. Once it has been tested and proven itself,
the concept could be transplanted to other delta regions throughout the
world.

1 INTRODUCTION
The destructive force of water is high on the agendas of many scientist,
politicians and people living in sea and river shore areas. Global climate
change research predicts rising sea levels, more storms and higher
peaks in rainfall. Next to this, recent dramatic events, such as the
Tsunami in Asia and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, have raised our
awareness on the vulnerability of deltas.
In New Orleans, the floods caused by Katrina killed over 1500 people
and sent 400.000 people in exile, which is about 85% of the population.
Until now, not even half of the population has returned to the city. New
Orleans is empty and devastated. People grieve. Federal aid is limited
and the general moral is low. Comparable disasters could happen in
other deltas throughout the world.
In a way, New Orleans has an advantage over other deltas. New
Orleans can be rebuilt according to new ideas. It has real-life experience
with disasters, momentum, and (literally) space for alternative protective
measures. For example, the Delta Works of the Netherlands could only
be built after the floods of 1953. Maybe New Orleans can also benefit
from the disaster. But should it be by similar gigantic structural
interventions such as the Dutch dams and barriers? Maybe the 21st
century demands for less prestige-oriented solutions. Subtle
interventions could have a positive effect on a shorter term, involve
more people and can flexibly adapt to increasing insight on the longer
term.
Questions like ‘what exactly is safety’, ‘who is responsible for which
threat’ and ‘how do you protect yourself or the city against a flood’ are
important to be considered by all stakeholders in New Orleans. Not only
to recover from Katrina, but also to prepare for future threats. This can
be derived by increasing the threshold and coping capacity, but
moreover by being adaptive now and in the future.
The disaster in New Orleans shows the world the vulnerability of
deltas in general and the Mississippi delta specifically. At the same time
it offers us an opportunity to propose a concept, the Flood House, which
could contribute to reduce this flood vulnerability. This is not a new
storm surge barrier design, not a policy to get more funding, no plea for
restoring the whole area to its natural state, but a new attitude towards
flood protection, in which all members of society are heard and will be
offered to do what they do best.

2 CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability is a concept used to indicate ‘the sensitivity of a system for
exposure to shocks, stresses and disturbances, or the degree to which a
system is susceptible to adverse effects’ (Turner, 2003; IPCC, 2001).
Disturbances can be both exogenous or endogenous (e.g. a drought
can be caused by low river flow, bad water management or both). Graaf
and Ven (2006) identify a combination of four components of
vulnerability in deltas. These four components are the ‘Threshold
capacity’, ‘Coping capacity’, ‘Recovery capacity’ and ‘Adaptive capacity’.
2.1 Threshold capacity
In all deltas there is a certain threshold capacity. The threshold capacity
consists of the volume and flux of water that the water system can
handle without causing any damage to everyday life. For example, the
threshold capacity could be determined by long term discharge
forecasts resulting in a system of dikes and a centralized spatial
planning for the water system. The spatial planning could include the
use of the water system as a leading principle, resulting in restrictions
on building, the widening of rivers and floodplains and the application of
waterproof building concepts and technologies such as floating
constructions in hazardous regions (Commissie Waterbeheer 21e eeuw,
2000; Smits, 2000).
2.2 Coping capacity
If the volume of water is larger than the actual discharge capacity of the
water system, the excess of water will cause flooding. The ability of a
society to deal with floods or excessive rainfall is described by the term
coping capacity. There are two main aspects determining this coping
capacity. The first is the management of the excess of water. If there is
an agreement or an organisation determining where the excess water
should flow, supported by a physical structure, the flood could be
(re)directed and controlled in order to minimise damage. Emergency
inundation polders as applied in the Netherlands are an example of
attempts to control exceptionally high river discharges. The second
aspect of coping capacity is disaster management. This includes the
organisation of the evacuation of inhabitants before and after an area is
flooded, but also preventing looting, evacuation of pet animals and
reducing damage to loose objects such as cars.
2.3 Recovery capacity
The third component of vulnerability is the recovery capacity. This
component deals with the effort, costs and time for the system to
recover to the original (or desired) state. The system comprises many
elements, including ecology, economy, livability and water management.
For instance, in many flooded areas huge unexpected problems arose
with household and industrial chemicals, which caused severe
environmental pollution and put a threat on the livability of the area. The
costs and time to undo these negative effects and to make the area
livable again are main indicators of the recovery capacity. Furthermore,
the ability to manage the period in between the disaster and the fully
recovered status is also part of the recovery capacity.
2.4 Adaptive capacity
In contrast to the other three components of vulnerability, the adaptive
capacity is a rather holistic notion. In general, adaptive management is
an approach based on collaboration among agencies, researchers and
local stewards. It sees resource management as a continuous learning-
by-doing process that recognizes public participation and collaborative
learning (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005). Adaptive
management recognizes structural uncertainties. Resilience in the
ecosystem and flexibility in the management institutions are essential
factors for adaptive management (Gunderson, 1999) in order to deal
with these deep uncertainties. Pragmatic solutions for water
management would be to seek for restoration of resilience and flexibility,
which can occur through novel assessments, small-scale experiments or
when an unforeseen policy crisis allows for reformation or restructuring
of power relationships among actors (Gunderson, 1999). To increase
the adaptive capacity, ecosystem processes would be the leading factor
to which other policies are adapted instead of increasing control over the

resources. Furthermore, the institutions should have certain flexibility
and can change easily if the situation asks for it. As such, a net could be
developed in case an aspect fails.
These four components of vulnerability are interrelated. For instance,
in case of an increased adaptive capacity, the pressure on the other
components decreases. A resilient ecosystem is often able to store
large water quantities and could in that case reduce a flood peak. A
reduced flood peak could imply less stress on the threshold capacity
and since the chance for a flood and subsequent damage decreases,
coping and recovery capacity are less needed.
3 KATRINA AND NEW ORLEANS
The history of New Orleans showed that Katrina was not a unique event.
The most recent hurricanes with large social impacts include 'Camille'
and 'Betsy' in the 1960's. In fact, a disaster like Katrina has been
forecasted by Fischetti in Scientific American in 2001 and by Brouwer in
the Civil Engineering Magazine in 2003. Fischetti warned for the threat
from the sea: with the disappearing wetlands the protective nature of the
river delta at the coast around New Orleans is disappearing. Brouwer
focused on the threat of Lake Pontchartrain that in case of high speed
winds from a certain direction could overtop and breach the levees.
This, in combination with the heavy rains, is exactly what happened
during the Katrina disaster.
2.5 Threshold capacity: wetlands and levees
The threshold capacity of New Orleans is derived from a natural system
of wetlands and water storage bodies and from an artificial system of
levees, pumps and canals. New Orleans is located along the largest
wetlands of the USA. These wetlands function as hurricane and flood
protection (Restore America’s Estuaries, 2006). However, several
threats, both natural and human, are diminishing this natural buffer. The
area is subsiding with high speed (Dixon, 2006; Fontenot, 2006) and
economic developments and urbanisation reduce the size of the
wetlands.
With respect to the civil structures, it turned out that the quality of the
levees was marginal (Rogers, 2006; Independent Levee Investigation
Team, 2006) as a result of limited interest, subsequent marginal funding
(Seed, 2006) and poor cooperation between the many levee boards
(Sharky, 2006). Due to their limited quality of they could not withstand
the heavy winds, flood and rains, resulting in several breaches of levees
that should have protected the city. Since half of the city lies below sea
level, a breach means serious inundation for large areas of the city.
Besides the levees, there were limited measures as compartimentation,
flood proof architecture or excess water storage basins.
Box 1: Report on Hurricane Katrina
[Rijkswaterstaat, 2005; NOS, 2005]
Katrina
Friday, August 25, 2005, Hurricane Katrina moves over the southern tip of Florida
into the Gulf of Mexico. As predicted, the hurricane strengthens to a category 3 on
Saturday, August 27. Voluntary evacuation starts in the threatened section of the
coast. The highway lanes around New Orleans are used to transport evacuees and
the Louisiana Superdome is announced as a shelter of last resort. On Sunday,
August 28 Katrina increases in strength to Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale.
Despite a mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans, an estimated 100,000
people remain in the city.
On Monday morning Katrina lands and causes massive damage. Initial reports
speak of a total of 55 death and $60 billion in damage. As the winds above New
Orleans subside, the city seems to have been spared. However, within a few hours,
water from the Gulf of Mexico and from Lake Pontchartrain begins to inundate the
city through breaches in the levees and the worst case scenario becomes a reality.
The main disaster thus did not directly come from Katrina, but rather from the winds
raising the water levels of Lake Pontchartrain to immense heights and the heavy
rains. When about 80% of the city flooded, over 1500 died in the devastating forces
of the water and entire communities became homeless.
Besides the personal disaster, Katrina caused huge damage to the economy
and the environment. Part of the people remaining in the town did not want to leave,
but another part could not leave because of the deficiencies in the evacuation plan
that did not fully account the large number of people without private transport. Only
days after the storm, all people were evacuated, but for many it was too late.

2.6 Coping capacity: disaster management
The coping capacity of New Orleans was compiled in a disaster
management plan including evacuation of citizens and water disposal by
pumping. Technical failures (e.g. electricity breakdown), limited
experience and familiarity with the plans, and unexpected human
behavior caused unforeseen developments. For instance, the City of
New Orleans waited quite a long time before issuing a mandatory
evacuation order possibly in fear of being held liable for a loss of income
had the hurricane not affected the city (Rijkswaterstaat, 2005). Local
officials were overwhelmed by the magnitude and consequences of the
disaster including break-downs in vital communication, thereby causing
wide-scale confusion and delays, such as not putting all the available
buses into action for evacuation. Other examples causing unexpected
developments were the breakdowns of the pumps and the love of
people for their pets. Eventually, about 100,000 people remained in the
city during the hurricane. These were mainly poorer people without
possibilities of transportation and they were mainly living in the most
affected areas. Many evacuees found shelter in the Superdome or other
cities such as Baton Rouge and Houston.
2.7 Recovery capacity: a devastated and abandoned city
After the hurricane, recovery faced –and still faces- many practical
problems. Pumping the water out of the city, cleaning the city from
pollution and rebuilding the infrastructure, houses and public buildings
are a few of the challenges New Orleans is facing. Due to limited
pumping capacity, it took several months before all the excess water
had been disposed of. Excess water causes infrastructural problems
and mud deposition, but also spreads and severe pollution from
households and industrial chemicals. Recovery of the system from this
pollution takes a long time, thereby affecting both environment and
public health. The first priority of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) was to restore the levees to the pre-Katrina level of
safety before the new hurricane season (Setliff, 2006), in which they
succeeded (USACE, 2006).
Figure 2: The New Orleans ‘Diaspora’ (Source: BBC News)

To rebuild the city, a committee (Bring New Orleans Back) has been
installed by Mayor Ray Nagin. Their main task is ‘to keep the city
culturally intact while at the same time improving the areas that were
marginal’ (Legarde, 2006). Difficulties include differences in
perspectives on urban and spatial planning and limited resources. The
federal government limits its help to New Orleans 'because it would be
inconsistent with our responsibility to US taxpayers to distinguish
between deltaic regions’ (Duncan, 2005).
An important aspect in the recovering the city is the return of the
people of New Orleans. In January 2006, only an estimated 125.000
people resided in New Orleans, 300.000 have not yet returned (Sharky,
2006). The expectation is that in a few years only half of the city will
return. The people most affected by the hurricane were those living in
the low-lying parts of the city and they were generally poorer people.
They showed ability to move elsewhere and started a new life. They
often do not want to or cannot return. This diaspora has major
implications for New Orleans, including the limited availability of workers
to rebuild infrastructure, a drop in tax income and abandoned
neighbourhoods with possibilities for pauperization and criminality.
Less obvious are organisational and planning problems for
neighbourhoods where the majority of the houses are empty and
demolished, even after a year. For instance, schools with less than 20%
of the students present are hard to run and loosing the black community
with the specific jazz culture is a loss for the cultural value of New
Orleans as a whole. On the other hand, more space could offer
opportunities in reconstructing the city in terms of quality of
neighbourhoods and water storage. Not only for New Orleans the
diaspora has major implications, also for the cities where the refugees
went (see figure 1), this sudden increase in number of inhabitants
causes problems. For instance in Houston, a direct extra police force
was lacking that could deal with the increase in criminality (City Journal,
2006).
2.8 Adaptive capacity: reborn wetlands and innovation
opportunities
The resilience of the water system of New Orleans has been limited in
the past by, among others, canalisation, restricted sedimentary
processes, reduced wetlands and ground subsidence. This made the
area vulnerable for floods. The limited flexibility in institutions appeared
in institutions that did not overtake responsibilities and the absence of
scenarios and funds for failing mechanisms.
The adaptive capacity, as hard as it is to measure, will reveal itself
the coming years and decades. Ecosystem-based management and
participatory approaches offer possibilities to increase the adaptive
capacity (Gunderson, 1999; Pahl-Wostl, 2006). For instance, using the
available space in the city for water storage if needed or restoring
natural processes in the wetlands thereby slowing down speed of
subsidence (Saeijs, 2004), could increase the resilience of the
ecosystem. The business-spirit and persistence of the Americans could
also contribute to the general adaptivity. Facing the damage of the flood
so directly should provide means for innovation by developers,
insurance companies and entrepreneurs. The coming years, the
integration of the physical and societal system is a challenge for New
Orleans.

3 WATER MANAGEMENT CULTURE
Every country has its own water management culture developed over
time. As such, different countries could learn from each other or at least
better understand their own culture if compared with other cultures. In
understanding some aspects of American attitude towards water
management, a brief comparison with Dutch attitude towards water
management is depicted. This understanding gives input for
fundamental discussions at the Flood House.
The differences are derived from cultural, socio-economic and
institutional characteristics. A first difference is the role of the
government to protect residents and the individual responsibilities of
residents. In the Netherlands, the role of the government in water
management is very large, which results in large-scale spatial plans and
water management plans all directed by governmental organisations.
Private partnership and public participation are limited, although the
Dutch government acknowledges the importance of this. The trust in the
government arranging protection against floods is generally large and
people are willing to spend tax money on this. As a result, the sense of
collective safety is large, but this approach also implies that individual
choices are usually subordinated to general policies. In some cases
people even have to move out if a water management measure has
been planned on where they live. In the USA the focus is much more on
the individual safety. This could result in a larger adequacy in dealing
with disasters of individuals, but the management of the water system
as a coherent system is less adequate.
Another difference is the attitude towards risks. In the Netherlands,
risks are diminished as much as possible. Dealing with risks in general
enlarges the opportunities for innovations on a business level, but
limiting risks for floods could increase safety. However, reducing flood
risks creates a paradox of a diminished level of risk-awareness and a
subsequent reduced level of ability to deal with risks and investing in
originally flood-prone areas. In case of flooding, the damage will be even
larger. A society should ask itself to what extent it is willing to pay to
reduce risks. According to Link (2006) the limited involvement of both
government and people in public safety can be explained by the limited
available resources for flood protection. The importance of return on
investments is another explanation why the investments needed to
reduce risks are lower in the USA than in the Netherlands.

Figure 2: Three pillars or ‘floaters’ under the concept of The Flood House,
creating a ‘trimaran’ (compare: catamaran)
4 TRIMARAN: A NEW WATER MANAGEMENT APPROACH
New Orleans is currently trying to recover from Hurricane Katrina. Large
numbers of inhabitants have not returned yet. With the inhabitants, a
large part of New Orleans’ specific culture got lost. Creating job
opportunities, rebuilding the city and building trust will contribute to the
return of the inhabitants. However, focus should not be single-sided on
recovery. It is important to look ahead and consider opportunities to
decrease the vulnerability as a whole for future threats. Therefore,
serious reconsiderations on the water management system are
necessary. Questions should be raised and old viewpoints reconsidered.
What level of collective safety do we strive for? To what extent are we
willing to pay for this level of safety now and in the future, and who is
responsible for what? What is the best combination between large
structural interventions such as storm surge barriers and other
measures like smart spatial planning and restoring the natural water
system and wetlands?
Open public debates could increase understanding and awareness
and could also lead to creativity and supported management actions,
which is a precondition for success. Scientific and creative ideas could
be transferred into entrepreneurial activities. Integration of societal
actors, collaboration between stakeholders and participatory planning
are part of a global democratic trend, relevant in the 21st century
(Rischard 2002). However, offering a platform for integration is only
sensible and feasible if it is adapted to the local characteristics of New
Orleans and the US water management approach. These three
components form the basic structure of the Flood House, represented
by the ‘trimaran’ in figure 2.
considering ALL
four components
of Flood
Vulnerability
facilitating and
bringing together
science, people,
governments
and business
creating a neutral,
enjoyable and
locally inspired
environment
FLOOD HOUSEFLOOD HOUSE

Figure 3: collage showing the ‘feel’ of the Flood House (previous page)
5 THE FLOOD HOUSE
From an historical perspective, the main focus of water management in
New Orleans and many other deltas has been on increasing the
threshold capacity. Nowadays, with the new knowledge on interrelated
physical and social elements of the water system, a more holistic
approach towards flood vulnerability would be more appropriate.
Governments are expected to offer a certain level protection against
floods, but government responsibilities and effectiveness are not always
sufficient to achieve this. If more information about the many aspects of
flood vulnerability had been provided and different stakeholders had
been acting integrated, responsibilities would have been clearer, people
would have been better prepared and flood related business
opportunities would have arisen. Therefore, governments, businesses,
people and science should find a way to effectively collaborate. They
should grasp and discuss the concept of flood vulnerability scientifically
resulting in action and entrepreneurship. This can happen in an
environment that is both neutral and stimulating.
The Flood House is a multi-purpose, flood-proof, information centre
and platform in New Orleans, in which one can find all kinds of flood
management related issues and products. Through multiple activities
awareness for the shared problems will rise. The Flood House should be
self supporting and will have four major functions:
• Educating and informing people about water management and
related issues;
• Enabling people to buy products that will increase their collective
and individual sense of safety;
• A conference and knowledge centre that will bring together several
actors involved in water management and will combine their
(research) activities;
• Memorial for the people who lost their lives during the Katrina
disaster.

The Flood House concept could be regarded as an attempt to
increase the adaptive capacity in New Orleans, since it encourages and
stimulates collaboration among different type of actors and
stakeholders. Furthermore, by the nature of the education and
knowledge forums, increases in resilience of the ecosystem and
flexibility of the institutions could be reached. Because of the current
crisis in the New Orleans water management, a ‘window of opportunity’
(Kingdon, 1984) has opened that could be used to structurally increase
the adaptive capacity and as such decrease the vulnerability of the delta
as a whole.
The design of the Flood House should allow for flexibility and it
functions may have to change in time. The actual decision over the
appearance and location of the Flood House should be left to the people
of New Orleans. In a design competition everybody could be allowed to
participate and present their design. The people of New Orleans should
in the end decide which Flood House should be built.
5.1 Functions of the Flood House
Survival Shop
In the Flood House products related to floods will be advertised and
sold. Experts give advise to minimise flood damage and on life saving
products, tax structures, risks, insurances, and so on. A number of ideas
are listed below and some of them are illustrated with exemplary
posters.
Products to increase the threshold capacity:
• Adopt-a-dike: this program connects civilians to a certain piece of
dike, either financially or with practical activities such as
inspection, mowing or maintenance. In return they will be
honoured similarly to the existing American “adopt-a-highway”
programmes.

• Adopt-a-wetland: the principle of this program is equal to that of
the previous one, but here pieces of natural wetlands can be
adopted by (groups of) civilians or schools.
• Garden water storage: farmers or people with big gardens are
encouraged to store large quantities of rainwater in their garden
during excessive rain showers.
• Waterproof buildings: project developers can advertise flood-
resistant (highrise) buildings in amphibious zones, such as the
proposed Greenway Buffers (Sharky, 2006).
Products to increase the coping capacity:
• Life jackets: Everybody in New Orleans should have a life jacket
and should know how they work. In the shop life jackets will be
offered for only $2, subsidised by governmental grants and
donations to the ‘Flood House Fund’.
• Boats: The shop will offer several kinds of small boats. From
inflatable rowing boats to small motorized boats.
• Floating cars and attributes: amphibious cars and external air-
bags and lifelines prevent vehicles submerging or floating away
and damage during a flood.
• Home flooding kit: a waterproof box for storage of passports,
insurance policies, chemicals, (non-)prescription drugs, etc.
• Life-in-a-bubble: protection from water and pollution by a plastic
sleeve that automatically covers your house during a flood.
• Floating technology: floating houses, amphibious or on existing
water, do not get damaged during a flood.
• Floating dog kennels: when a flood rises, a dog or cat might
retreat to his kennel, which remains floating. Possibly, it
automatically locks when the dog is inside and the kennel has
reached a certain height.
Products to increase the recovery capacity:
• Instant house: A house that will be self supporting and can be
dropped shortly after a flood and will provide temporary housing
• Temporary utilities: generators, water pyramid (Nitsche, 2006),
vaccinations against diseases that will be there after a flood,
temporary hospitals.
• First-aid-after floods: health courses specially focussed on flood
related problems
• Visual shields: plants or fences hide ugly damaged and
abandoned houses.
5.2 The Flood House Information Centre
The Flood House provides space for research and development of new
flood protection measures. It does not facilitate full-time researchers, but
brings together the people of New Orleans, governmental, business and
residential organisations that focus on water management, disaster
management and the reconstruction of the city. Conferences can be
held and the acquired knowledge can be exported to other delta areas.
This knowledge centre will be easily accessible for people, business and
government. A website will be maintained and it will hold a large library
on flood related literature.
Many people in New Orleans did not realise the importance of a
sound water system. The possible effects of hurricanes in every day life
are not very clear. In the Flood House permanent education will be
given on water management and the water system. Special programs
for specific groups should be offered to create a better, general
understanding on the water management system of the city. This could
lead to in-depth discussions on water management. The main focus in
this part of the Flood House could shift in time: the coming years there is
plenty to tell and learn from the Katrina disaster, but in the future other
topics could be interesting as well. The measures and changes in the
water system can be explained to civilians, business and government.
Disaster management strategies can be discussed and adjusted with
everyone involved.

Examples for education and workshops include:
• Flood protection and disaster management
• Innovative technologies on water management
• Spatial planning (e.g. the role of wetlands in water management
and the role spatial planning could serve in preserving them)
• Architecture: Advice on flood prone building and furnishing of your
house
• Institutional discourses (e.g. responsibilities, implications of
changes)
• Field trips for schools or kids parties (e.g. biology classes)
• Workshops in the Louisiana wetlands: ranging from ecology to the
importance of wetlands for economy (e.g. nation’s oil and gas
supply, seafood)
5.3 Cultural activities
After the Katrina disaster a permanent memorial is needed for the
people who lost their lives to the hurricane. This memorial should have a
central place in the Flood house. In the meeting area several general
features as a bar and stage area, lavatories and management offices
can be installed. Besides of serious issues, the Flood House could also
function as a community place, where people can have fun enjoying jazz
concerts and eating in the ‘Water Restaurant’. This restaurant serves all
kind of local dishes with food derived from the wetlands.
5.4 Financing
The Flood House concept taps into the money that individuals are willing
to spend on flood protection, businesses on exposure and knowledge
development and governments on water management in general.
Considering the financial and emotional damage to restore and prevent,
there should be enough money available. It can be stated that the Flood
House has no competitors, since it aims at embracing and facilitating
anyone who works in the field. The Flood House will be a not-for-profit
organisation that is financially self supporting. The financial structure is
divided in ongoing (daily) budgeting and project-based budgets. Each
budget gets income from profit, subsidies or donations, depending on
the nature of the project, participants and responsibilities. The profit
made in the shop and knowledge centre will be used for the general
maintenance of the Flood House and to attract new artists and inventors
to develop new products or services. Excess money is stored in the
‘Flood House Fund’ to finance special projects.
The products and programs should allow all people to participate,
independent of their social or financial status. Several basic survival
products, such as the life jacket, will be offered very cheap. The poorer
people can also participate in the adopt-a-dike program by doing
maintenance. If enough investors can be found for this program, there
might even be financial compensation for the people who offer to do the
maintenance. The wealthier people can invest in dikes, increase their
safety and as such decrease their insurance premium. To get the Flood
House started, a number of organisations should collaborate and invest.
Ideally it should be a balanced mix between governmental, corporate
and individual capital. The City of New Orleans, some federal money,
insurance companies and developers should unite for their benefit and
the benefit of New Orleans.
5.5 Marketing
The architecture competition and the idea in general will probably get
enough media attention to get known throughout New Orleans. The first
feature of the marketing strategy is on getting people to the Flood
House. Jazz festivals, carnival activities and the water restaurant could
be used to attract people. Since the Katrina disaster is still very present
in the memory of many people, there will be a general interest in the
city’s water management strategy. When people enter the Flood House
they will first see the memorial for the people who lost their lives during
the disaster. After this they will be led to the informative and educative
section. Changing expositions and general information will coincide to
give people – from all walks of life and all ages – the things they need to
know on the (future) water management of New Orleans. People can be
informed about the activities in the Flood House by flyers. Information is
of course also available on the website, which could serve as an easily
accessible forum for several topics.

When people have gained the information they are being given the
possibility to participate. In the survival shop there will be both practical
and simple products that can be used instantaneously and more
sophisticated products and programs. People can commit themselves to
these programs by either financing them or participating, such that every
income group has access to knowledge and products. These programs
will have to be actively supported by the local government and it should
– in time – become a social naturalness for every inhabitant of New
Orleans. In order to get people used to these products some will be
given away for free during competitions or lotteries. Also the
participation should become something important or fashionable. People
should feel they mean something to society.
Besides of individual inhabitants, other groups include schools,
charity, NGO’s, social clubs, businesses and government. Schools
educate the next generation and the Flood House could contribute to the
educational program of the school. Social clubs could decide to
collectively participate in larger projects such as adopt-a-dike and as
such contribute to society. Businesses could be attracted by offering an
extended network of organisations and contacts nearby, public relations,
and practical issues such as conference availabilities. Governmental
organisations could be attracted to the idea of the Flood House for
ethical reasons, but moreover actively gain profits from increasing public
participation.
[CNN, 2037]
Melissa
Thursday, October 15th 2037, Hurricane Melissa moves into the Gulf of Mexico and
strengthens to a category 5 on Friday. The hurricane is aiming for New Orleans. It is
the end of the hurricane season and due to the global climate change the hurricane
season lasts longer and category 5 hurricanes are no longer an exception. The
weather services have calculated that it will pass New Orleans approximately 50
kilometres to the west. So the storm surges are closed and everybody has collected
some extra food and water. Mandatory evacuation orders are not given anymore
because of legal conflicts of the past. Inhabitants are expected to decide for
themselves if they prefer to stay or leave. Sunday morning, Melissa hits land. The
hurricane did not follow its predicted pathway, but hit New Orleans right in the middle.
All authorities are puzzled, how could the weather services be so wrong? After all,
there were billions of US dollars invested in a better warning system? With wind
speeds over 400km per hour and heavy rain showers this is the biggest storm ever to
hit the US, and it hits New Orleans right in the middle.
The city is flooding piece by piece, but in a slow and predicted way. The
restoration of the wetlands had a balancing effect on the storm and the levees were
in a good state of maintenance. The compartimentation of the city has resulted in a
predictable pattern of flooding. The new built area, with floating homes was one of the
first areas to flood, but with very little damage. Other areas followed. The city alarm
did work and people were able to take their last minute preparations on there homes,
such as storing valuable things and chemicals in the special designed boxes. Other
people took shelter in there boats and the precautionary measured seemed to work.
Around 8 o’clock the next morning the Flood House starts to undertake action.
Together with the police, in boats, they start to hand out blankets and a hot breakfast.
Some of the injured people were taken in the Flood House for first aid. The
neighbourhood coordinators knew where aid was needed most and where people
could assist other citizens. The first help was very efficient. The city had more or less
anticipated on an excess of water and emergency power and pumps were installed.
After two weeks the water was pumped out of the city and people started to rebuilt
their houses. The Flood House has found its place again and the first exhibition is
planned. The rebuilding plans are made and will be presented, and there will be a
debate on flood management. Ray Nagin will be a giving a lecture about the
differences between Melissa and Katrina.
Box 2: A new hurricane scenario (fictional)

6 THE FUTURE OF THE FLOOD HOUSE
6.1 Melissa: Katrina’s bigger sister
In box 2 a fictional future scenario is presented. The suggested
measures and products will not prevent the next disaster happening.
However, it does show what role the Flood House could play in New
Orleans. The products for sale and implemented programs will result in
an increase of the threshold capacity. Due to the fact that inhabitants
and authorities are better informed about the water management and
are familiar with the emergency plans, less surprise and panic occurs.
As such, the coping capacity has been increased. Since authorities and
citizens are prepared for a disaster, the process of cleaning up and
restoring the city is also a lot easier. The amount of damage is limited
and major environmental pollution has been prevented. The fact that
people can deal with a disaster is a result of an increased adaptive
capacity. By informing and educating people, through shared knowledge
and collective planning the Flood House has become a stage of
incredible value.
6.2 Transplantation of the Flood House concept
The Flood House is designed for New Orleans, but the concept could
offer benefits in many other deltas throughout the world. The term
institutional transplantability is used to describe the borrowings of
institutional experiences from elsewhere (Mamadouh e.a., 2002). De
Jong (2002) indicate several factors and conditions for success. The first
includes the careful consideration of the relation between the goals of
the transplantation and the actual transplanted institution. In other
words, the concept should actually have proven itself in New Orleans
and should potentially contribute to the goals of the specific area to
which it is transplanted. Only if the conditions of the host country are
clear, transplantation should be considered. Adaptation to local
circumstances is crucial.
A second factor mentioned is that an idea in general is more likely to
be transplantable than specific legal frameworks or procedures. This
implies for the Flood House that the concept itself should be considered
as transplantable, and not too much the results that emerge from it.
Another condition for success is that the transplant should be
considered as a loosely defined model rather than a strict model to be
followed. In fact, this factor stresses again the need to adapt to local
circumstances and use those parts of the concepts which actually
contribute something and leave others out. A fourth factor for success is
the timing of transplantation. Periods with a sense of emergency and
urgency, facilitate the transplantation process. This also holds for the
establishment of the concept, since only after a disaster like hurricane
Katrina a concept like the Flood House could emerge. In periods of
stability, transplantation is less easy to accomplish.
In case of the Flood House, transplantation seems possible and
reasonable since it is a concept that is subject of transplantation. It could
be attractive not only for the host country, but also for the donor country
since it increases knowledge and availability of expositions that could be
exchanged. However, it is crucial to translate the conceptual ideas to the
local institutional, physical and socio-economic circumstances as was
done for New Orleans. Before considering transplantation, the concept
first needs to prove its value in New Orleans and it should be very well
explored where to transplant it. The European Union is searching for the
establishment of practical solutions to enhance active involvement of all
interested parties in implementation of water management practices
(HarmoniCOP, 2005). The Flood House concept could be such a
solution and as such, the European Union or the individual member
states should keep an eye on the development of the Flood House in
New Orleans.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the following people for their contribution to this
paper and the development of the Flood House concept:
Tineke Ruijgh-van de Ploeg
Jill Slinger
Stef Janssen
Darby Grande
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