Barings Bank Team 3 Final

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Analysis on the Collapse of Baring bank.

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Barings Bank Team 3 Final

  1. 1. Barings Bank PLC,Nick Leeson’s Lesson Team 3 Ashmita Srivastava Alexis Druon Dorra Mahbouli Majid Salehizadeh Congjie Li David Bensimon S
  2. 2. Barings Bank• Founded in • “There are six • Banking, 1762 by Sir great powers asset Francis in Europe: management Baring England, and security France, brokering Prussia, Austria, Russia and Baring Brothers.
  3. 3. The story of Barings Bank • Same reserve for all business lines • Loss of control over operations • Bankrupt in 1995 • Banks Trader in Singapore • Lost $1.4 Billion in derivatives • Imprisoned for 6.5 years • ING, a Dutch bank bought Barings bank for £1 • Formed subsidiary: ING Barings
  4. 4. How did it happen?
  5. 5. Nick Leeson
  6. 6. Nick Leeson’s Career
  7. 7. What was ‘Questionable’?• How can a single person make a giant financial bank a fiasco ?• Why was he given such an authority?• What was he supposed to do?• What was senior management suppose to do?
  8. 8. How was it ‘Justified’? Cost saving by Time gap between having one buying and selling person in front and back office Trading losses byhaving one person in Minimize the risk involved front and in switchingback office
  9. 9. Leeson’s Arbitrage
  10. 10. Deception• Unauthorized trades in Singapore• Doubling• Falsifying records• Margin call stories• Sold straddles• Used Error account ‘88888’ to hide his trades
  11. 11. Doubling Strategy • Bet 10 on black or red = Loss • Bet 20 on black or red = Loss • Bet 40 on black or red = Loss • Bet 80 on black or red = LossNick Leeson applied the same strategy:Increased his investments to offset his losse
  12. 12. Nikkei 225 Overview
  13. 13. Nikkei 225 IndexMid June 1994 to February 27, 1995
  14. 14. Long Futures Contracts Leesons Long Futures Positions 1,500 1,000 500Gains/Losses (Yen) Declining Nikkei 225 Index 0 Losses 18,000 18,500 19,000 19,500 20,000 -500 -1,000 -1,500 Nikkei 225 Index
  15. 15. Short Put Short Call 1,500 1,500 1,000 1,000Gains/Losses (Yen) Gains/Losses (Yen) 500 500 0 0 17,000 17,500 18,000 18,500 19,000 19,500 20,000 18,000 18,500 19,000 19,500 20,000 20,500 21,000 -500 -500 -1,000 -1,000 -1,500 -1,500 Nikkei 225 Index Nikkei 225 Index Short Straddle 3,000 2,000 1,000 Gains/Losses (Yen) 0 -1,000 -2,000 -3,000 -4,000 -5,000 -6,000 -7,000 Nikkei 225 Index
  16. 16. 1 Short Straddle + 1 Long Future 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000Gains/Losses (Yen) 500 0 17,000 17,500 18,000 18,500 19,000 19,500 20,000 20,500 21,000 -500 -1,000 -1,500 -2,000 -2,500 Nikkei 225 Index
  17. 17. Many Short Straddle + 1 Long Future 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 14,750 15,250 15,750 16,250 16,750 17,250 18,000 18,500 19,000 20,250 21,500 22,750 24,000Gains/Losses (Yen) -2,000 -4,000 -6,000 -8,000 -10,000 -12,000 -14,000 Nikkei 225 Index
  18. 18. The Five Eights Account• Switching from 99905 account to 88888 account July 3rd 1992• Request to switch back to 99905 account several weeks later.• Leeson did not follow orders
  19. 19. Use of 88888 account to cover Margin Calls • Increase of commissions generated by using non-market prices • Used Barings Financial resources as a cash cow • Booked fictitious trades and falsified records • Sold Put and Call options in the form of short straddles
  20. 20. Reported Earnings v/s Actual losses • Reported • £28.8 • £8.8 Million EarningsArbitrage Million of End of End ofstarted in 1993 1993 1994 • £185 • £21 • Actual Million Million Losses
  21. 21. Reality of 88888 Account
  22. 22. Lessons Learned• Ineffective and • Auditors unable control recommendations system and warnings• No analysis on • Signals from SIMEX unrealistic facts and • Inquiries from Bank figures of England and Bank• Lack of knowledge for International among senior Settlement managers
  23. 23. Lessons Learned (Cont.)• Obvious violation of • Checking all the • Skipping routine restrictions on accounts rather than tasks and reporting traders ending balance to the headquarter• Integration of front- • Relying on original and back- office sources management • Board of directors• Giving too much role in setting up a autonomy and risk-reporting authority to a trader system
  24. 24. Thank You.

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