Monitoring The Implications of the Global Financial Crisi.docx

Monitoring The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis on
Primary
Schools, Teachers and Parents in 12 Countries
U N E S C O , D i v i s i o n f o r P l a n n i n g a n d D e v e
l o p m e n t o f E d u c a t i o n S y s t e m s ,
S e c t i o n f o r P o l i c y A d v i c e a n d I C T s i n E d
u c a t i o n 1
I. Introduction and Relevance to UNESCO
T h i s s t u d y e x a m i n e s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t
h e g l o b a l e c o n o m i c c r i s i s o n
s c h o o l c o n d i t i o n s a n d resources by researching how
primary schools, teachers and
households adapt and cope with global crises. While there are
numerous studies on the
effects of macroeconomic shocks on households and the demand
for schooling as well as
on public education, less has been done on how macroeconomic
shocks trickle down to
schools and education delivery. In the immediate aftermath of a
global shock, national
and cross-national data for monitoring the impact and long-term
education implications
are not available. This study seeks to fill that gap by
interviewing primary schools,
teachers, and pupils’ household to examine (1) changes in
teaching and learning
conditions in the years before and after the 2008/9 crisis; (2)

respondents’ perceptions of
how the global economic crisis impacted them, their schools and
their households; and
(3) how respondents coped with changes. The study also
explored the implications of the
crisis on teachers and parents’ households.
The study complements initial exploratory research conducted
by United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
which examined the early
consequences of the crisis by reviewing education budget
amendments, government
documents, policy speeches, official decrees and circulars,
journal and press news as well
as expenditure data for twelve countries. Furthermore, it is
within UNESCO’s mandate of
assessing global progress towards achieving the six Education
for All2 (EFA) goals. It
1 This paper summarizes a research project supported by UN
Global Pulse’s “Rapid Impact and
Vulnerability Assessment Fund” (RIVAF) between 2010 and
2011. Global Pulse is an innovation initiative
of the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, which
functions as an innovation lab, bringing
together expertise from inside and outside the United Nations to
harness today's new world of digital data
and real-time analytics for global development. RIVAF supports
real-time data collection and analysis to
help develop a better understanding of how vulnerable
populations cope with impacts of global crises. For
more information visit www.unglobalpulse.org.
2 Education for All goals include (1) expanding early childhood
care and education; (2) providing free and

compulsory primary education for all; (3) promoting learning
and life skills for young people and adults;
(4) increasing adult literacy by 50 per cent; (5) achieving
gender parity by 2005 and gender equality by
2015; and improving the quality of education.
also builds and strengthens UNESCO’s research agenda on
education financing,
particularly in contexts of economic crises.3
Methodology and Survey Themes: The study incorporates a
comparative case-study
approach involving twelve countries: Armenia, Barbados,
Botswana, Cambodia, Chad,
Jordan, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Paraguay
and Ukraine.4 Surveys
were conducted with head teachers, teachers and
parent/guardians surveys covering the
following themes the following themes:
on school financing
(including school tuition fees and non-tuition fees charged by
schools),5 facilities,
pupils, staff, the learning environment and school climate, and
safety;
teachers’ contract type, their
work schedule and workload, their salary source, payment of
benefits and allowances,
payment delays, additional jobs and income, and professional

development. It also
includes employment issues for parents, such as changes in their
labour force
participation, employment status and economic activity of their
establishment;
ues of child
labour
households’ coping
strategies.
A total of 297 primary schools were visited in the twelve
countries, representing an
average of 25 schools per country. Research teams in the twelve
countries conducted
4,282 surveys total, with 292 head teacher, 2,556 teachers and
1,434 parent/guardian
surveys completed.
II. Key Findings
Throughout the years of the financial crisis, there were
observed school-related changes
in some countries and not in others. In addition, the impacts
detected varied across
countries. The full report delves into many of these nuances;
however, by far the most
consistent findings across the twelve countries pertain to school
financing, related in
particular to changes in school fees, difficulties that parents
face paying fees, and
schools’ budgetary coping strategies. Issues of school financing
are among the most
critical impacts, as they challenge directly the goal of universal
free primary education,

emphasized both in the EFAs and the Millennium Development
Goals.
3 More than twenty years ago, UNESCO played an important
role in understanding the consequences for
education and training of the widespread economic problems
seen in the late 1970s and 1980s and the
structural adjustment policies they stimulated. In 1989, the ILO
and UNESCO established a Task Force on
Austerity, Adjustment and Human Resources, which facilitated
policy-oriented research to learn from
country responses to the financial crisis and economic
reorganization, with reference to decision-making
processes and the institutional contexts of the policies and
responses adopted.
4 While UNESCO developed the study’s design, surveys and
sampling frame, the fieldwork, data
collection, data entry and analysis was done with research
partners in each country.
5 School tuition fees are those fees paid by parents or families
for their children to attend school, whereas
non-tuition fees are charges that schools might demand for
extra-curricular activities, sports, provision of
uniforms, etc.
In six of the twelve countries examined, no major post-crisis
change was observed in the
amount of school fees being charged. However, four of these six
countries reported
relatively high numbers of schools already charging tuition and
non-tuition school fees
before the crisis. In Botswana, Chad, Madagascar and

Mauritania, for example, between
50 per cent and 100 per cent of respondents say their schools
charge tuition fees in 2010.
In Armenia and Cambodia, the situation looks alarming: Head
teachers, teachers and
parents consistently report that tuition fees are increasingly
being charged by schools. In
Cambodia, there is an annual increase of about 25 per cent of
the schools charging tuition
and non-tuition fees. In Armenia, responses varied between
head teachers, teachers and
parents. The number of parents saying their children’s school
expected school tuition
payments increased 23 per cent annually between 2007 and
2010, whereas there was only
a 7 per cent annual increase in the per cent of teachers saying
schools expected tuition
payments. Nevertheless, respondents are consistent in indicating
that around half the
schools in Armenia charge tuition fees. Non-tuition fees are
apparently not prominent in
this country.
The only countries where school tuition fees declined are Jordan
and Mexico. In Jordan,
for example, between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of respondents
say schools expect them
to pay for their child to attend, an average annual decline of 8
per cent or slightly more
compared with 2007. Tuition and non-tuition fees declined in
Mexico, albeit slightly, as
reported by all respondents except for head teachers. In this
case, it is interesting to note
that the decline in schools charging fees might be due to
observed increases in actual

school budgets, particularly from local and federal
governments.
According to head teachers and teachers, the number of pupils
having difficulties paying
tuition fees increased in about half of the countries’ schools and
classes. The crisis years
seem to have exacerbated pupils’ financial difficulties in
Armenia, Chad, Jordan,
Madagascar, Mexico and Paraguay, where the number of pupils
demonstrating
difficulties increased by about 15 per cent annually, on average,
between 2007 and 2010.
In some of these countries the rate of change is high but the
actual numbers are still low.
In some countries, however, such as Jordan and Madagascar, an
average of 42 and 149
pupils per school respectively had difficulties paying tuition
fees in 2010. If these
children were to drop out of schools, as sometimes occurs when
households are facing
financial difficulties, entire primary education classes would
vanish.
Parents’ claims are more categorical than head teachers and
teachers’ in relation to
increased household difficulties paying tuition in the year after
the global financial crisis.
In all countries except for the Maldives and Jordan, the
percentage of parents reporting
difficulties paying school tuition fees increased in more than 5
per cent annually, with an
annual increase of 20 per cent in Barbados and Cambodia and
the highest increase of 57
per cent annually observed for Mexico’s parents. In some cases
(particularly Madagascar

but to a lesser extent Armenia, Jordan and Mauritania), the
increase is less notable, but
the overall numbers are high, resulting in more than a third of
the primary schools parents
strained to afford their children’s primary schooling. In Chad,
the change in parents’
difficulties affording to school fees were low; however 88 per
cent reported facing
difficulties in all four years examined.
For the majority of the 4,282 respondents (with the exception of
18 per cent of head
teachers and 43 per cent of teachers), school financing issues
were considered most
important before other issues related to pupils, staff and the
school learning environment.
Parents’ and head teachers’ perceptions point to financial
difficulties as being the most
significant impact of the global economic crisis. Percentages
range from as low as 31 per
cent of parents in Barbados to as high as 96 per cent of head
teachers in Mauritania. To a
lesser extent, another perceived impact is pupils’ increased
difficulties paying fees.
Increased school fees are highlighted by more than a fourth of
respondents in Armenia
and a third of teachers in Cambodia, countries where the before
and after data show
consistent increases in schools charges.
Like households, schools have to cope with external or internal
challenges to their day-to-
day operation. Income generating strategies such as seeking

additional funding from the
community ranks first in head teachers and teachers’
perceptions on the budgetary coping
strategies taken by schools. This is particularly the case in
Barbados, Botswana,
Cambodia, Maldives and Paraguay where 22 per cent to 70 per
cent of respondents
reported that seeking resources from the community was the
primary strategy—in all
these cases this was higher than any other category. It remains
unclear if seeking
resources from the community primarily includes tuition fees
from households, as
appears to be the case, or if it also includes other larger yet
proximate social groups. In
Chad and Madagascar, charging non-tuition fees is the coping
strategy most used by
schools, as perceived by the majority of teachers.
Findings from the qualitative and quantitative school surveys in
these twelve countries
consistently showed that seemingly global financial difficulties
do indeed become local
and micro, reaching the level of schools, individuals and
families. To cope with the
context of extended global crises, schools appear to be charging
user fees despite global
advocacy and national legislation promoting free primary
education. In the absence of
other buffers against difficult economic times, charging fees
seems to be a default school
coping strategy in the context of budget-strapped governments.
III. Key Challenges
It is worth noting some of the implementation challenges of the
research. In some

countries, the data to build the school sampling frame was
outdated, as the national
education statistics were at least two years old. The list of
schools sampled thus had to be
revised and adjusted during the fieldwork. Challenges that arose
during the fieldwork
relate to:
any type of data
collection in schools, education authorities often request an
official permit,
obtained after the researchers submit a research application
describing the study
and methods. Although UNESCO facilitated the processes
(which could
otherwise have been even lengthier), the process delayed the
actual data collection
stage, in some countries putting the activities off by about two
months.
access to the
schools was another major obstacle. Despite having permit
letters from the
authorities concerned, many of the schools refused to engage in
the study. Hence,
it was not possible to comprehensively survey the initial sample
during the first
round of fieldwork, forcing researchers to look for other schools
and extend the
fieldwork period. Another difficulty was the physical access to
some sampled
schools, as was the case in Madagascar.

by researchers was
to engage with schools that did not have a big enough sample of
teachers or
parents (this was mostly the case in small, rural schools), which
resulted in
visiting more schools than planned in order to fulfil the quota.
were administered
and filled in with the researchers’ presence, in few other
countries researchers
were asked to leave the surveys with head teachers and collect
them back at a
later date. The following difficulties arose: head teachers forgot
to distribute the
surveys to teachers, teachers were allowed to take the surveys
home but forgot to
bring them back, or surveys were not ready when researchers
were scheduled to
collect them.
visits had to be
rescheduled because of school holidays, national elections,
cyclones or other
events that disrupted instruction and, therefore, the scheduled
visits.
mostly common in
public schools, where head teachers and teachers did not deal
directly with
changes in the school budget and allocation of financial
resources, simply because

schools generally do not manage a budget. In public schools,
resources are
allocated by governments in the form of teacher salaries or
school supplies; head
teachers manage petty cash. In other cases, questions were not
always fully
understood without the guidance of the surveyors, which
required surveyors’
presence throughout the data collection stage.
Data entry was done electronically, using online surveys
developed and facilitated by
UNESCO. Some countries selected for the study faced
important problems to access
stable Internet connections and the necessary equipment to
properly engage in the online
data entry process. In Chad and Madagascar, for example,
UNESCO coordinated with
other local UN agencies to facilitate access to Internet.
Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee
Women and the Journey to the EU
A L I S O N G E R A R D
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Charles Sturt
University, Bathurst, NSW
Australia
[email protected]
S H A R O N P I C K E R I N G

School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University,
Victoria 3800, Australia
MS received October 2012; revised MS received April 2013
European Union (EU) Member States have cultivated the
‘securitization of mi-
gration’, crafting a legal framework that prevents irregular
migrants, including
asylum seekers, from arriving in the EU. As external and
internal border controls
are reinvigorated to achieve this aim, the experiences of asylum
seekers beyond the
EU border, in designated ‘transit’ countries, necessitate further
inquiry. Concepts
of ‘transit’ are shaped by government accounts of ‘secondary
migration’ as illegit-
imate, and asylum seekers as a security threat warranting
containment. Based on
interviews with Somali refugee women who have travelled
through North Africa to
reach the southern EU Member State of Malta, this article traces
the impact of the
securitization of migration on women’s experiences of ‘transit’.
Women’s stories,
historically neglected in the literature on migration, provide a
lived account of
securitization and the gendered ways ‘functional border sites’
operate beyond the
EU, enlisting state and non-state actors in producing direct and
structural violence.

This article argues EU policy is blind to the lived realities of
those who seek
refugee protection in the EU, and urgently needs to address the
structural contra-
dictions exacerbating violence experienced by refugee women
in transit.
Keywords: gender and irregular migration, securitization of
migration, transit, border
control
Introduction
One of the objectives of the European Union is the gradual
creation of an area
of freedom, security and justice, which means, inter alia, that
illegal immigration
must be combated (EC 2002: 62).
As this statement from a European Union (EU) Directive on
unauthorized
arrival makes clear, the battle against irregular migration is
intrinsic to the
EU project of creating an area of ‘freedom, security and
justice’. Huysmans
Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 27, No. 3 � The Author 2013.
Published by Oxford University Press.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email:
[email protected]
doi:10.1093/jrs/fet019 Advance Access publication 27 October
2013

(2006: 64) sets out three themes that he argues are part of the
EU’s ‘multi-
dimensional process’ of securitizing migration: internal
security, cultural
identity and the crisis of the welfare state. Securitization uses
many ‘tech-
niques of government’ (Foucault 1991) to permeate migration,
three of which
are central (Huysmans 2006). First, securitization seeps into
policy develop-
ment and implementation. Second, securitization is mobilized
through polit-
ical discourse that exaggerates the risks of migration and
asylum. Third,
securitization constructs migration as a security problem and
poses security
solutions as the only viable remedy.
Based on interviews with refugee women who have travelled
through North
Africa to reach the southern EU Member State of Malta, this
article traces
the impact of the securitization of migration on women’s
experiences of
‘transit’. Refugee women’s narratives reveal the structural
contradictions be-
tween the securitization of migration and refugee protection. EU
policy on
transit indirectly sustains a cycle of violence on mobility
pathways between
North Africa and the EU.
Scholars have drawn attention to the loaded use of terminology
in irregular

migration research (Kapur 2005; Pickering 2011: 11). In this
research we use the
term ‘irregular migration’ to refer to the phenomenon of people
crossing borders
outside accepted legal pathways. Specifically, we refer to
participants in this
research as ‘refugee women’, defined as those who have
received some form
of humanitarian protection status, be it temporary, subsidiary or
Convention
status (see Gerard and Pickering 2012: 518). More generally,
the term ‘illegalized
traveller’ (Weber and Pickering 2011) will be used to refer to
those asylum
seekers, refugees and other migrants who have fallen outside of
the narrow
legal migration categories recognized by states. ‘Transit’ is a
similarly politically
charged term that has risen to prominence within discourses of
‘migration man-
agement’ (Oelgemöller 2010). Oelgemöller has traced this
emergence among
inter-governmental working groups since the 1980s. The term
‘transit country’,
she argues, has a political function immersed in an ‘us and
them’ binary, which
is ‘conceptually undecided about whether to formulate itself as
a security/threat
or a development/humanitarian discourse, or both’ (Oelgemöller
2010: 408).
This has contributed to the development of language around
‘secondary migra-
tion’ that delegitimizes this concept; only the migration from
country of origin
to the first ‘transit country’ is presumed to be legitimate. In this
research, ‘tran-

sit’ is taken to mean the journey from the point of exit, in this
case Somalia, to
the point of arrival in the EU, in this case Malta. This
geographical limitation is
adopted because refugee women interviewed in Malta spoke
about transit as
having a separate, albeit intersecting, relationship to the rest of
their journey. In
adopting this definition of ‘transit’ it is acknowledged that
migration is non-
linear, and therefore that clean divisions between each stage—
exit, transit, ar-
rival—are not assumed (Düvell 2012). Moreover, it is
acknowledged that the
definition used here is state-centric, or based on the primacy of
state sovereignty;
however, in contrast to state approaches, value judgments that
‘transit’ migra-
tion is ‘wrong’, ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ are not found in this
analysis.
Gender, Securitization and Transit 339
This article will begin by exploring recent co-operation between
the EU
and Libya on ‘irregular migration’. Second, a securitization,
refugee protec-
tion and transit framework is established before identifying the
three border
sites that figured most in the stories of refugee women
interviewed in Malta.
The article is concerned with the reach of security arrangements
beyond the
physical EU border, radiating south from the Central

Mediterranean and into
North Africa. It will explore the relationship between the sites
of women’s
experiences of violence en route to the EU, and the efforts of
the EU to
secure its external borders to exclude illegalized travellers by a
policy offi-
cially labelled ‘externalization’. Women’s stories provide a
lived account of
securitization and elucidate the gendered ways in which
functional border
sites (Weber 2006) operate beyond the EU, enlisting state and
non-state
actors in producing direct and structural violence.
Protecting the EU from its Refugee Convention Obligations: the
EU and
South–North Migration
The past decade has seen EU migration policy implementation
increasingly
centred on South–North migratory routes with the aim of
preventing and
deterring the arrival of illegalized travellers, popularly termed
‘illegal mi-
grants’. While southern Europe was previously thought of as the
Achilles
heel of EU border control (Watts 2002), the focus of EU
institutions and
individual Member States has shifted considerably to North
African states
including Libya, Tunisia and Morocco (Betts 2006; Collyer
2010; Gil-Bazo
2006; Hamood 2008). Previously, countries on the EU migration
route had

been threatened with reduced foreign aid if they did not co-
operate with the
EU on efforts to stop irregular migration (Reynolds 2003). At
the Seville
negotiations in 2002, the UK sought support for this initiative
under the pre-
text of ‘positive conditionality’. Ultimately, these third
countries were instead
absorbed within the EU security programme, part of movements
to create a
new ‘circle of friends’ as the EU enlarged (Hayes 2004).
EU engagement with Libya increased as the number of boats
leaving
Libyan shores, carrying illegalized travellers bound for the EU,
rose rapidly
from the beginning of this century. Libya had been a pariah in
the interna-
tional community until UN sanctions were lifted in 2003
(Hamood 2008).
Previous ad hoc arrangements have developed into significant
bilateral and
multilateral agreements on ‘illegal migration’. Chief among
these has been the
‘Treaty of Friendship’ between Italy and Libya that intensified
Italy’s role in
border security in North Africa, including patrolling the Libyan
coastline
with ‘mixed crews’ (Ronzitti 2009: 130). In addition,
arrangements have
been formalized to police land borders in Libya by satellite,
entailing a de-
tection system financed jointly by Italy and the EU that
effectively pushes the
patrol of the EU’s borders further back into Africa. Enhanced
border secur-

ity cooperation between Mediterranean EU Member States and
Libya is
credited for the sharp drop in the numbers of people arriving in
Malta and
340 Alison Gerard and Sharon Pickering
the Italian islands of Sicily and Lampedusa throughout 2010. To
illustrate,
the number of people who arrived by boat in Malta dropped
from 1,508 to
47 between 2009 and 2010 (NSO 2011). These arrangements
have had sig-
nificant human rights implications to which we later return.
To prevent illegalized travellers from arriving in the EU and
applying for
asylum, in late 2010 the EU and Libya signed a bilateral
framework agree-
ment to provide financial support to Libya for cooperation on
irregular mi-
gration. During negotiations for this agreement, the Libyan
leader had asked
for E5 billion to combat ‘illegal migration’ (Times of Malta
2010); eventually
an amount of E60 million was agreed. The agreement contained
several issues
for further negotiation including: awareness-raising campaigns
around the
dangers of irregular migration; cooperation to target smuggling
networks;
strengthening the relationship between Libya and its transit
countries; a
‘gap-analysis’ on existing Libyan border controls; an integrated

surveillance
system on land borders; and cooperation on return and
readmission (EC
2010). Negotiations were suspended in February 2011 when the
conflict in
Libya erupted (ENPI 2011). A recent Council of the EU report
(2012) reiter-
ates its ‘readiness’ to provide assistance to the National
Transitional Council
(NTC) in Libya on ‘security and border management’. Italy has
already
concluded its own bilateral agreement with the NTC, which
reflects the
same terms as that brokered with Gaddafi (Giuffré 2012).
Women, Securitization and Transit
The securitization of migration has come to dominate asylum
and migration
policy, creating a ‘hierarchy of mobility’ (Bauman 1998).
Although statistics
on the number of women migrating outside legal frameworks
are difficult to
isolate, it is suggested that their numbers are increasing
(Bhabha 2004: 235).
Academic research is making a significant contribution in
analysing how
gender shapes access to refugee protection in developed
countries (Bhabha
2004; Pickering 2011; Spijkerboer 2000), and the protracted
processes around
gaining refugee protection. To date, however, studies of gender,
transit and
refugee protection have focused heavily on the refugee camp
experience
(Beswick 2001; Khawaja et al. 2008; Turner 1999). This

research has detailed
shifts in gender roles amongst families (Szczepanikova 2005),
the prevalence
of domestic violence and women’s susceptibility to violence in
certain camp
contexts (Crisp 2000; HRW 2009a).
There is a growing illumination of issues of gender and transit
migration
outside the refugee camp (AI 2010; Dolma et al. 2006; Hamood
2006; HRW
2009b; JRS 2009). Using secondary sources, our previous
research examined
how women experience opportunistic and systematic gender-
based violence in
crossing borders from Somalia (Pickering and Gerard 2011). A
cross sectional
household survey of both men and women by Nagai et al. (2008)
observed
that refugees of both sexes experienced a heightened level of
violence in
transit. This research was conducted with Sudanese refugees
and Ugandan
nationals in a district of Uganda, and Sudanese non-refugees in
Sudan. Their
study found that sexual violence was most common during
routine trips
across the border rather than flights for personal safety. Women
faced
increased risk of sexual violence compared to men, and the
mode of travel

influenced exposure to sexual violence:
Travelling by truck posed significantly less risk of sexual
violence for women,
compared with walking (OR 0.48). Associated with sexual
attacks was the theft
of personal property, or being threatened or otherwise
physically attacked,
during migration. The risk was much higher for women than
men. Age at
the migration, marital status, days of preparation for the travel
(a measure of
suddenness of departure), and days of travel, were not
associated with the
experience of being sexually abused or raped (Nagai et al. 2008:
260).
This research by Nagai et al. shows how transport by truck can
reduce
exposure to violence for women, and that the regularity of
border crossing
may amplify susceptibility to violence. Examining the contexts
in which
violence occurs has the potential for reducing the risk of
violence, as this
article will explore.
This study is concerned with the operation of border security
around the
edges of the EU. However, it seeks to examine its impact by
being attentive
to voices often overlooked, those of women. In this research, we
are inter-

ested in women’s accounts not just in the physical spaces of the
external
border of the EU, but in those border sites that seemingly
radiate back
from Europe and further into Africa—effectively impacting
women from
when they exit their homeland. In so doing this examination
considers first
the impact of opportunistic and organized violence which
women experience
as they journey north through Africa, violence often perpetrated
by a mix of
state and non-state agents. It is also interested in their
experiences of state
violence in Libya and then in the impact of bilateral and
multilateral arrange-
ments to interdict and deter illegalized travellers as they cross
the
Mediterranean. While there is a rich tradition of human rights
groups high-
lighting the violence of these journeys (AI 2010; HRW 2009a,
2009c; JRS
2009), there is relatively little academic empirical research that
has sought out
the voices of those negotiating these borderlands. There has
been even less
specifically concerned with some of the gendered dimensions of
the experience
of transit through Africa.
Method
This study employs a qualitative, feminist methodology to
elucidate women’s
lived reality of seeking asylum; how they made sense of the
journey and

negotiated the impact of securitization (Denzin and Lincoln
2003; Holland
and Ramazanoglu 2002). Qualitative methods offered greater
scope to foster
a narrative and contextual understanding of women’s
experiences, particu-
larly where participants’ first language was not English
(Riessman 1993;
Silverman 2000). The feminist method adopted sought to blend
standpoint,
empiricist and post-modern approaches (Madriz 2003).
Employing a feminist-
based interviewing method meant avoiding formal interview
techniques and
instead embracing what became ‘documented conversations’
with refugee
women, often over the course of many interactions (Gerard
forthcoming).
This provided room for participants to ask questions about our
knowledge
of migration pathways in Malta and Australia, the authors’
country of resi-
dence (May 2001; Oakley 1990). The approach described here
consciously
circumvents the cool, objective scientific methods of
quantitative research
(Rodgers 2004). Openness, engagement and building a
relationship was im-
portant (Rice 1990), as was managing expectations of what
involvement in
this research would deliver. Moreover, we have sought to avoid

portrayals of
women from the Global South as in need of rescue from
permanent victim-
ization (Mohanty et al. 1991), by highlighting women’s agency
and resistance,
and the contexts of induced vulnerability to which EU policy
indirectly con-
tributes. The research objective is not to universalize or
generalize the ac-
counts presented here as reflective of all refugee women’s
experiences (Rice
1990). Rather, this is a focused qualitative study that stands to
contribute to
understandings of securitization and refugee protection, and of
their gendered
impact, operating at both the micro and macro levels. Finally, in
document-
ing and analysing the experiences of refugee women in this
study, we seek to
acknowledge intersections of race, class, disability, age and
other structural
determinants that are key to understanding women’s experiences
in context
(Hyndman 2004). Relational and comparative aspects of a
gendered analysis
are not pursued here, beyond the extent to which they were
discussed by
refugee women. This is an area requiring further research.
Basing ourselves in Malta, we interviewed 26 Somali refugee
women in
periodic visits to Malta between 2009 and 2011, as well as two
members of
law enforcement agencies and two employees of non-
government organiza-
tions. This research was conducted prior to the wave of

demonstrations
known as the Arab Spring that took place in early 2011. As
conflict erupted
in Libya, Malta assumed a prominent role evacuating citizens
from select
countries such as the US, UK, Canada and Brazil (BBC 2011).
In sharp
contrast, many illegalized travellers remained stranded, many of
whom
were asylum seekers. Reports during the uprising suggested that
some illega-
lized travellers were being confused with outside mercenaries
and subse-
quently abused or even killed (Times of Malta 2011). The
experiences of
transit collected here will not take into account this 2011
conflict, but will
reflect other conflicts impacting the region.
We met participants in several ways: signage at venues
frequented by trans-
national migrants (n¼3); introductions from NGO workers
(n¼2); and intro-
ductions from other transnational migrants (n¼21). Interviews
were
conducted one-on-one and in English, an obvious limitation of
this research
design. Participants elected to meet either at their place of
accommodation
(n¼19), workplace (n¼4) or other public venue (n¼3). Refugee
women

respondents were provided with E20 for costs associated with
participating in
this research. All participants are given pseudonyms in this
article.
Somali refugee women were the selected population group as
Somalia is
widely recognized as a country challenged by a multifaceted
humanitarian
crisis (ICG 2008; UNIE 2010). Since the beginning of this
decade, Malta has
seen a dramatic increase in the number of boats carrying people
seeking
asylum arriving on its shores or within its territorial waters,
most departing
from Libya (Hammarberg 2011). In 2009 and 2011, Malta
received the high-
est number of asylum seekers in Europe per head of population
(Bitoulas
2012; Eurostat 2010). Malta has one of the highest rates of
acceptance of
asylum applications in the EU and globally (Hammarberg 2011);
an indica-
tion that the majority of those who arrive by boat are indeed
fleeing perse-
cution. The overwhelming number of asylum seekers who arrive
by boat are
Sub-Saharan African, with Somali nationals comprising the
largest majority
(Eurostat 2010; NSO 2012). Women constitute an increasing
minority of
asylum seekers (Gerard forthcoming). The latest figures suggest
that in the
first six months of 2013, Malta had received around 600
illegalized travellers
(UNHCR 2013).

Exposure to Violence in Transiting North Africa
On the journey here there are a lot of people suffering and
people dying.
People are running away to safety. The journey is very
dangerous. You have
a 50/50 chance of losing your life. (Miriam)
All participants interviewed journeyed from Somalia to Malta
via Ethiopia,
Sudan, Libya and then across the Mediterranean. All transited
through the
same countries, known for their history of sustained conflict,
famine, and
political instability, in some cases spanning decades (de Waal
1997). None
of the women interviewed spoke of obtaining refugee protection
in any of the
transit countries, even though all but Libya are signatories to
the 1951
Refugee Convention.
The women interviewed spoke about transit in two main ways.
First, they
talked of the variability of transit: exposure to violence,
conditions of accom-
modation, incarceration, how long the journey took and how
safe it was were
all dependent on numerous factors: primarily, access to
financial resources,
but also, gender. Second, the women spoke about the danger and
violence
they had to negotiate at particular transitory junctures
throughout the jour-

ney. The three sites specifically highlighted by participants—
transit through
the desert, through Libya and travel by sea to Malta—provide
insights as to
the impact of securitization on women’s experiences of transit
and how
women negotiated that impact.
To enhance the visibility of women’s experiences of violence
and the steps
required to reduce it, we characterized women’s experiences of
transit accord-
ing to Galtung’s (1969, 1990) framework of violence. This
framework affords
three characterizations of violence: direct, structural and
cultural. Direct vio-
lence is personal violence or the somatic realization of violence
and can in-
clude physical and psychological violence (Galtung 1969).
Structural violence
includes violence resulting from systemic and structural
inequalities that
affect people’s daily lives, such as racism, sexism and poverty
(Anglin
1998). Galtung first distinguished between personal and
structural violence
in 1969, and in 1990 came to add ‘cultural violence’ to his
typology of vio-

lence (Galtung 1990). Cultural violence constitutes a
legitimizing force for
direct and structural violence. For Galtung (1996: 2), ‘the major
causal dir-
ection for violence is from cultural via structural to direct
violence’.
Criminologists have used notions of structural violence to
account for the
deaths at the border of significant numbers of undocumented
migrants
(Weber and Pickering 2011). This article adopts Galtung’s
conceptualizations
of direct and structural violence to consider the impact of
border securitiza-
tion in the context of refugee protection for women’s
experiences of transit
from Somalia to Malta. We identify and examine direct and
structural
violence in relation to: sexual violence, extortion and
abduction; living in
the shadows in Libya; and during the boat crossing to Malta.
‘It Depends’: Key Variables Influencing Women’s Experiences
of Transit to
Malta
All of the women participants talked about the dangers inherent
in the jour-
ney from Somalia to Malta but also its variability. Blota was 22
years old

and had been in Malta for 18 months. She described the journey
as highly
unpredictable. When asked how long it takes to reach Malta she
responded
that:
It depends; sometimes it takes two weeks, sometimes two
months, and some-
times three years. Some stay in prison, some even die in the
Sahara. Some are
shot. Some people die trying to escape. Sometimes in Malta
people are in
detention for two years, some for one year, and others for one
month, it
depends. (Blota)
The kaleidoscope of violence in transit, to which some
illegalized travellers
are exposed, shapes the journey and produces highly variable
experiences of
transit from Somalia to Malta. Harm experienced can be located
on a spec-
trum which at one end results in death, as described by Miriam
in her extract
at the top of this section. Deaths at border crossings are rising
to ‘unprece-
dented levels’ (Weber and Pickering 2011: 9) and the drivers of
such violence

deserve consideration. Scholars write of the phenomenon of
‘deviancy amp-
lification’ (Weber and Grewcock 2011) created by the
illegalization of border
crossing, or rather ‘selectively illegalizing’—creating people-
smuggling mar-
kets, and heightening the physical risks of clandestine crossing
that serve to
expose increasing numbers of illegalized travellers to harm
(Nevins 2008).
This violence makes the journey unpredictable. We turn now to
the first site
highlighted by participants.
Site One: Exposure to Violence Crossing the Sahara Desert—
Sexual Violence,
Extortion and Abduction
Eleven women in this study described their experiences of
direct violence in
the context of the desert crossing between Somalia and Libya.
Hamood’s
(2008: 31) research mainly drew upon experiences of starvation,
thirst and
fatalities, overcrowding, and rationing of food and water over a
long journey.
In our conversations with women, experiences of violence and
extortion were

most prominent. In the excerpt below, Sena describes the Sahara
crossing:
On the journey from Somalia, it’s very difficult for women.
They have to get
across the desert and there are men there, like soldiers but not.
They have cars
for the women and the men to get into to go across the desert
but they will stop
the car and rape the women over the course of the journey,
which lasts about
seven days. Then new groups of women arrive and they are
replaced. If men
object then they will be killed. If they pay then they can protect
their wives. In
this way it is more difficult for women because they take them.
It’s not the same
for men. (Sena)
Sena’s experience of the desert crossing demonstrates the
gendered and
relational aspects of violence in transit. For some women,
sexual violence
is a feature of travel through the Sahara. Male partners of
women are threa-
tened with harm if they object or attempt to intervene. Sena’s
experience
indicates the kinds of power relationships that dominate during
this part of

the journey: those perpetrating the violence also facilitate
transport and navi-
gation, the price of passage may be rape. Single women and
women with
partners may both be subject to sexual violence. Women and
men face dif-
ferent kinds of violence. According to Sena, if men protest at
the violence
being carried out on women, they will be killed. Sena makes
sense of this
violence in characterizing it as part of the journey away from
Somalia. She
also spoke about being relieved that her husband was able to fly
directly from
Ethiopia to China, and avoid the overland journey to the EU.
Sena’s account provides an impression of the perpetrators of the
violence.
They seem unaccountable to any authority for their actions.
Sena claims that
they look like official soldiers, but are not. We might presume
from this
comment that they are not government soldiers, but perhaps
private militia
who appear to operate with impunity. In Sena’s narrative, the
level of or-
ganization around the border crossing appears high, testimony
to the consid-
erable market in mobility, in opposition to EU transit policy
favouring
containment. She implies that there is a degree of regularity to
this kind of
violence exercised throughout the Sahara Desert crossing: for
example, the
car will be sent back and another group taken. This correlates
with research

on the regularity of border crossing as heightening exposure to
violence
(Nagai et al. 2008). What Sena’s experience also reveals is that
exposure to
violence can be mediated by money, an intersection of class and
gender.
Extortion was identified by women as a feature of border
crossing through
the desert. Thus, the desert crossing is made possible by
meeting the demands
of those who would otherwise prevent their passage. It was
understood by
one NGO participant that women could provide sexual services
or cash to
secure a successful border crossing:
In the desert they are stopped and they have to wire money
through and that is
how they guarantee passage. Those without money will provide
sexual services.
They give cash or sexual favours. (NGO 1)
The desert crossing is depicted as one in which people are
detained and
prevented from continuing the journey unless they meet what
seem to be
specific and organized demands for money or sexual services. If
women

lack adequate access to finances, their bodies may become a
currency. This
highlights the significant industry that facilitates the mobility
needs of illega-
lized travellers (Salt and Stein 1997). Notably, the quote above
paints a dif-
ferent image to that presented in Sena’s narrative: her
experience refers to
rape, whereas the NGO participant talks about ‘sexual favours’,
distinguish-
ing such favours from rape but suggesting some kind of
informed exchange
of services. Both highlight the gendered nature of violence and
extortion that
occurs during the crossing of the desert. The border agents
facilitating
mobility across the desert expose male and female illegalized
travellers to
violence through differing means.
Site Two: ‘Life in the Shadows’ in Libya
Life is really in the shadows in Libya because they will put you
in detention. So
you have to really hide. (Pia)
After traversing the Sahara, most of the women interviewed
entered Libya.
Participants travelled through Libya prior to the revolution that
ended
Gaddafi’s rule. Libya at that time was viewed by participants as
a place of
intermediate or extended stay where migrants gathered
resources to fund the
final leg of their journey on to Europe. In a previous issue of

this journal,
Hamood’s (2008) research demonstrated how the EU’s claims to
have
adopted an integrated approach to migration management in
Libya within
a framework of human rights, have failed to materialize. This
conclusion was
vividly reflected in our conversations with refugee women. In
our research,
the conditions in Libya were described by women in terms that
emphasized
both their vulnerability and their agency in seeking to avoid
detention. For
Pia, the threat of detention was so great that it impacted on her
daily nego-
tiation of life in Libya. Illegalized travellers’ avoidance of
detection by mini-
mizing their use of public space has been highlighted by
McDowell and
Wonders (2009) in the context of the US–Mexico border.
Speaking with
women migrants residing in two large cities in Arizona, led
McDowell and
Wonders to observe how technologies of control over those with
unlawful
status shape migrants’ use of public space. Similarly, as
described by Pia,
while in Libya the participants in this study made strategic
decisions about
how they would negotiate public life and sought to avoid the
use of public

spaces.
Residing in Libya for days, months or even years necessitated a
strategic
approach to accommodation. One participant described the
accommodation
in Libya as akin to a prison. Aziza was corralled into
accommodation with
other illegalized travellers, where her movements were
controlled by those
facilitating her onward migration. She had to negotiate to leave
each day:
The living situation is difficult because you are not free. There
are people
standing over you and you have to negotiate to leave. Some
people pay
money to leave, others provide sex or are raped. (Aziza)
This description evidences the precarious existence of
illegalized travellers:
unable to live freely and subject to the controls of agents whose
identity is
unclear. Despite this, Aziza sourced and maintained
employment as a domes-
tic helper. Once in public space, Aziza said avoiding interaction
with police
was paramount in order to stay out of detention.
While around two-thirds of participants described their fear of
detention
and how it influenced their decisions to avoid public spaces,
only two women
spoke about their direct experience of detention in Libya. In

both cases, the
two participants were arrested while in the process of boarding
a boat that
was heading for the southern Member States of the EU:
I was in Libya for one year and two months. I was arrested one
time and spent
one month in detention. I was arrested trying to get onto a big
boat to go to
Europe. There were 160 on board and 30 were arrested. I was
arrested because
I was in the car waiting to get on the boat. The boat eventually
left and made it
to Italy and the people made it to Italy. (Sena)
I was held in detention for nine months after being arrested. I
was about to catch
a big boat. I think because it was a big boat the police heard us.
Detention in
Malta is not as bad as Libya, you don’t get beaten in Malta.
(Syrad)
The detention centres in Libya were partly funded by the Italian
Government
(Brothers 2007), illustrating the functional mobility of the EU
border (Weber
2006). Since the Revolution, Italy has restored bilateral
cooperation with
Libya on irregular migration and border control, although the
terms of the
agreements reached remain unclear. Reportedly, cooperation in

several areas
has been agreed, including the construction of health facilities
for a detention
centre (Statewatch 2012). Conditions in the Libyan detention
centres have
been criticized by many human rights groups as overcrowded,
unhygienic and
violent (AI 2010; HRW 2009c; JRS 2009). No healthcare is
provided, there is
minimal access to food and water, and ailments such as scabies,
dermatitis and
respiratory problems are endemic (JRS 2009). Hamood’s (2006)
study addressed
the gendered nature of violence in Libya’s detention centres,
observing that
female participants had been threatened with rape and both male
and female
detainees subjected to beatings. Syrad’s narrative above
suggests she was phys-
ically abused in a Libyan detention centre. Research by
Amnesty International
(2010) similarly found evidence of violence against women in
detention.
Women’s experiences show that detention implicitly served to
stop and
punish those seeking to get to the EU by boat. The amount of
time spent
in detention varied for each participant. Syrad described
detention in Malta
as comparatively better than Libya, specifically because there

was no physical
abuse in the former. However, she did not elaborate on what she
had experi-
enced in Libya. Neither of the participants detained in Libya
talked about
rape in the detention centres, and we did not expect that
participants would
reveal this information. On this point, however, NGO
participants who had
worked in a medical capacity with migrant women in Malta
testified that
women had reported rape in Libyan detention centres:
Detention centres in Libya warehouse people who are illegal.
The people are
exploited and treated poorly and there is rape and protection sex
and impris-
onment. (NGO 1)
Levels of poverty coupled with the low wages in Libya made
the detention
system susceptible to corruption (NGO 1). Corruption is a form
of structural
violence, with guards accepting bribes to supplement their poor
pay and
conditions. Border control policies thus create the conditions
that encourage
guards to accept money to release illegalized travellers, but also
to use
migrants as a commodity, sometimes releasing them and
arresting them
again on the same day to yield more money (JRS 2009: 11). The
cycle of
violence against illegalized travellers in public life in Libya—

arrest, detention,
freedom and arrest once more—was understood to be the
manifestation of a
considerably organized and lucrative industry.
Some of the participants interviewed were able to seek and find
work in
Libya. Libya has a long history of being both a destination
country for
workers, and a transit country (see Düvell 2012). Some migrants
transit
quickly whereas others work to fund their onward journey.
Research suggests
migrant women adapt more flexibly to formal and informal
markets in
receiving countries, so are more likely to be the main income
earner (Franz
2003; Szczepanikova 2005). Libya was recognized by most
participants as a
place where women could potentially work in order to save
enough money to
buy a ticket on a boat to Europe:
I worked in Libya for four months as a housekeeper. I made
good money there
and was able to pay to come to Europe with my husband. (Ayan)
This view was not universal. Several participants offered
alternative accounts
of employment in Libya. Nina transited Libya quickly, and was
alarmed by

what she experienced there, saying ‘there is no work. There are
a lot of
people suffering and people dying’ (Nina).
The stories of those who did work in Libya revealed how work
opportu-
nities were gendered. Women mainly worked as cleaners in
domestic settings,
a hallmark of gendered global inequalities (Rodrı́guez 2007).
Strobl (2009) in
her examination of ‘housemaids’ in Bahrain, writes that in many
countries
around the globe, domestic workers have become increasingly
vulnerable to
abuse including that of a physical and sexual nature. One NGO
participant in
this research observed that some women pay for their journey
across borders
through the financial gains from sex work, either actively
choosing this work
or coerced by the circumstances. Despite studies suggesting
women are more
able to adapt flexibly in informal economies, there remain a
limited number
of options for work available to women, which can result in
them being
drawn into the informal economy of sex work in order to fund
their migra-
tion to the EU. Participants in Hamood’s (2008) research stated
that failure
to pay illegalized travellers for work undertaken was a common
problem in
Libya. The women we interviewed did not directly discuss
experiences of
abuse, although some did discuss whether securing pay for their

work was
easier than it was for male illegalized travellers. Two
participants described
how men were not always paid for their work, while women had
a better
chance of being paid by their employers. Women’s accounts of
employment
in Libya illustrate several gendered dimensions in gaining
access to financial
resources to secure a successful border crossing to the EU, one
of the most
dangerous parts of the journey.
Site Three: The Boat Journey to Malta
There were lots of people on my boat to Malta. I couldn’t sleep
on the boat. We
were on the boat for three days and two nights. When we were
rescued it was
fantastic! We all thought we were going to die. I have lost many
friends at sea.
Twice my boat was turned back before I successfully arrived in
Malta. We all
didn’t know where we were going on the boat. We had a driver
who was very
smart. He stopped the boat so we could wait out a storm. When
it was clear we
kept going. There is no choice when you are to get on the boat;
you have to go
when they tell you. (Amina)
All of the women participants in this research had survived the

journey by sea
from Libya to Malta. There is no clear reporting or accounting
system for the
number of boats that go missing in the Mediterranean, a trend
reflected in
many securitized border zones across the globe (Weber and
Pickering 2011).
Although migrant deaths at sea are not systematically recorded,
it is esti-
mated that around 10,000 migrants have perished in the
Mediterranean and
Atlantic Oceans over the past two decades (Weber and
Pickering 2011: 99).
Whilst fewer fled to the EU than to other neighbouring North
African coun-
tries, the Arab Spring saw around 58,000 illegalized travellers
arrive in the
EU via the Mediterreanean in 2011. The Mediterranean was
declared the
most dangerous stretch of water in the world for refugees and
migrants in
2011 with over 1,500 people recorded as drowned or missing
trying to
reach the EU (UNHCR 2012). Given the huge number of deaths
and the
high incidence of border crossings by sea, there is arguably an
increased

obligation on EU Member States to ensure the safety of people
who adopt
this method of travel (Carling 2007; Hamood 2008; Weber and
Pickering
2011).
Travelling to Malta by sea from Northern Africa can take many
days
(HRW 2012). The law enforcement participants in this research
confirmed
that most of the boats arrived between April/May and
September/October
each year, as this was the period during which the seas were
calmest. Despite
this, the journey was described by most refugee women in terms
that evoked
a sense of danger and fear:
My boat had about 80 people and 12 women. The boat took four
days. I was
crying, just the whole time by myself. It was bad. (Blota)
On the other hand, five participants said they had access to life
jackets and
that the journey to Malta was relatively quick:
We came on a boat in 2008 to Malta. There were 40 to 50
people on board.

There were six children and four women. There were 40 men. It
was safe and we
had life jackets. We were on the boat for two days. I came with
my husband
and eight-year-old child. (Dekha)
This research suggests that like other parts of the transit, the
conditions of
boat travel are determined by the amount of material and social
resources to
which women had access. This was influenced by membership
of a travelling
family group, by networks of family and kin and financial
resources. For
Dekha, the conditions on her boat were good enough to be
described as
‘safe’. However, even with safety supports such as life jackets,
the journey
could still be overcrowded and harrowing. As Ayan describes:
I came on the boat pregnant. I came with 80 people. We had
those reflector
jackets. You are just sitting with your elbows pressed against
other people.
There is water lapping up at you. (Ayan)

The boat journey from Libya to Malta covers a great expanse of
sea
navigated with rudimentary gear, according to the law
enforcement partici-
pants interviewed in this study. Two participants completed the
journey heav-
ily pregnant and described it as extremely uncomfortable.
Dehydration is a
particular danger for pregnant women, as other researchers have
found in the
context of crossings of the US–Mexico border (Falcon 2001).
This was also
confirmed by a law enforcement officer interviewed for this
research:
The most terrible memory I have is of two women arriving dead
on the boat
and both were pregnant. The autopsies said they dehydrated.
(LE 1)
One NGO participant felt that women are at the bottom of the
social
hierarchy on these journeys: given the most precarious position

on the boat
and at times subject to burns by being too close to the engine
(NGO 1). The
boat trip to Malta is invariably overcrowded, offering limited
access to safety
supports and exposing illegalized travellers to gendered harms.
Structurally, bilateral agreements struck between Member States
and North
African countries have been implemented to avoid obligations
owed to ille-
galized travellers at sea. This has had the greatest impact
through practices of
interdiction, involving the return of boats containing asylum
seekers to Libya,
after they have reached international and sometimes Italian or
Maltese waters
(Betts 2010). This was the case with the previous ‘Treaty of
Friendship’ be-
tween Italy and Libya, which allowed for boats to be returned to
Libya
without those on board accessing refugee determination
procedures. As of
November 2009, 1,409 people had been forcibly returned to
Libya and de-
tained, without having their asylum applications adjudicated
(JRS 2009). This
bilateral arrangement proved vastly more effective in stopping
irregular
migration than the Frontex patrols that had taken place each
year between

2006–2009. Frontex patrols in this region stopped in 2010 as
Malta declined
to participate, citing concerns over a condition that mandated
Member States
to receive intercepted boats (Camilleri 2011). This condition
was later
annulled (Camilleri 2012). Italy’s interdiction practices were
recently struck
down by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Hirsi v Italy.
1
The Court decided in a unanimous verdict that Italy’s conduct
had breached
numerous articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights. It should
be a source of concern to human rights activists that the court
took from mid
2009 to early 2012 to decide the case, during which time
uncertainty about
the legitimacy of the practice prevailed.
Notwithstanding the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at
Sea, which imposes a ‘duty to render assistance’ to boats in
distress (see
Goodwin-Gill 1996: 157), the practice of EU Member States to
contest
responsibility for rescue operations has arguably exacerbated
distress, princi-
pally by delaying the provision of medical care to those on

board (UNHCR
2011). While the women interviewed in this research did not
talk about any
direct experiences of interdiction, they did discuss interacting
with other ves-
sels at sea. Two of the refugee women spoke of being ‘in
trouble’ on their
boat, including mechanical and navigational failings, the impact
of over-
crowding on the operation of the vessel, and of interception by
another
vessel. One participant described interacting with people on
another boat,
receiving minimal assistance:
We set off at 4 am and it took two days. On the second day the
sea was very
rough. We were sitting with our knees up to our heads and the
water was
directly behind me. We were so scared. A big boat came past on
the second
day and we asked them for petrol. We only had 40L and we
were begging them
‘please, please’ for petrol. The boat said no. They said we are
only three hours

from Malta. But it was the day and we couldn’t see Malta. At
night you can see
for the lights. But we couldn’t see so we decided to stop and
continue at night.
Then we arrived in Malta. (Katna)
Women’s experiences of the reluctance of some vessels to get
involved upon
coming across a boat in distress with illegalized travellers on
board was in
many ways emblematic of their exposure to harm during transit
to the EU.
The Council of Europe has recently called NATO countries to
account for
failing to come to the aid of a boat carrying 72 illegalized
travellers during
the recent Libyan conflict (Davis 2012). NATO’s blockade of
the waters
between Italy and Libya ensured they were being closely
monitored, yet no
country came to the aid of the vessel after repeated distress
calls by Italian
maritime authorities. After 15 days at sea, their boat eventually
drifted back
to Libya with only 11 people alive. Two others later died
ashore. These
incidents demonstrate the reluctance of key players to save the
lives of ille-
galized travellers at risk at sea. Transit is a period of significant
environmen-
tal, social, sexual and legal risk for women who participated in
this study,
where there are not clear demarcations for state and non state
actors to be

considered accountable or engaged for either the direct or
structural violence
Galtung explained.
Conclusion
The experience of transit is a period of direct and structural
violence for
refugee women journeying from Malta to Somalia. The violence
occurs in
a range of sites. Considering transit as a period of direct and
structural vio-
lence seeks to make often hidden or unspoken violence more
visible to EU
policy makers. Direct violence shapes women’s experiences of
transit through
exposure to sexual violence, exploitation, extortion and even
death. Despite
evidence of agency in some contexts, structural violence is
clearly relatable to
the broader conditions in which individual and collective
violence is experi-
enced. Women’s experiences of transit en route to Malta reveal
the inaccess-
ibility of refugee protection in the regions neighbouring
Somalia. The failure
to protect produces conditions that generate and sustain
violence throughout
the transit period. Moreover, border securitization that is based
on the broad
exclusion of undesirable migrants compounds and extends the
direct violence.
That racialized and gendered groups of illegalized travellers are
drawn into
making long, dangerous and expensive journeys to the EU is
illustrative of

the structural violence of blanket border securitization,
especially for those
from North Africa. The securitization of migration contributes
to the condi-
tions in which mobility comes at a higher price, literally and
metaphorically.
The ability to withstand and/or negotiate direct and structural
violence in
transit is a major determinant of who is able to successfully
transit to the EU.
Whilst much has changed in North Africa and particularly Libya
since this
research was conducted, this transit region remains strategically
important to
both the EU and those in need of refugee protection. Recent
statistics reveal
that irregular migration to the EU via the Central Mediterranean
has not
returned to its 2011 peak, although more were using this route
in 2012 than
in 2009 and 2010 (Frontex 2013). The number of Tunisian
nationals arriving
in the EU fell in the aftermath of an agreement negotiated
between Italy and
Tunisia on return (Frontex 2012). An increasing number of Sub-
Saharan
African nationals are travelling through the Central
Mediterranean, with
Eritreans comprising the largest nationality and overtaking
Somalis

(Frontex 2013). Many have their asylum claims accepted; 90 per
cent of
those that applied for asylum in Malta in 2012 successfully
gained some
form of humanitarian protection (NSO 2013). Reportedly, Sub-
Saharan
Africans continue to be vulnerable to ‘extreme violence’ in
Libya (Frontex
2013: 23; see also HRW 2012). Libya is again the subject of
intense EU
securitization efforts. Frontex (2013) reports that a lack of
professional and
technical expertise amongst law enforcement agencies within
Libya make
migration management cooperation with the country an urgent
and core
priority for the EU. EUROSUR, the European Border
Surveillance
System, is not yet operational but is intended to create a
technical framework
for external border surveillance in the Southern Mediterranean
and eastern
EU borders, and lead to greater information sharing between
Member States
(AAS 2011). Some argue it was developed to prevent irregular
migration
from North Africa to the EU in the aftermath of events such as
the Arab
Spring (Hayes and Vermeulen 2012). The architects of
EUROSUR also claim
it will reduce loss of life at sea (EC 2013). Its impact on
refugee protection
will have to be closely monitored.
Interviews with women who have travelled through North
Africa and suc-

cessfully sought refugee protection in Malta, illustrate the fact
that the risks
involved in irregular border crossing have gendered dimensions.
Pregnant
women are more prone to dehydration and women were more
likely to be
placed at the most vulnerable position on the boat to the EU.
Refugee
women, NGO and law enforcement participants all experienced
and/or
observed women experiencing specifically gendered experiences
crossing bor-
ders into Europe. Sexual violence or the provision of sexual
services was
often the border toll paid by many women to negotiate their
crossing.
NGO participants understood that some women were sometimes
agentive
in using sexual services to pay for their journey. It was their
view that
women were drawn into sex work as part of an exchange for
assistance in
crossing borders. This has significant consequences for women
when they
arrive in the EU, such as pregnancy or other health issues, as
our previous
research has highlighted (Gerard and Pickering 2012).
Current EU policy embodies clear structural contradictions that
bear a
disturbing relationship with the violence experienced by refugee
women in
transit. On the one hand, refugee protection obligations exist at
law and
women’s experiences in securing some form of refugee
protection are testi-

mony to that lived reality, however partial and compromised
(see Gerard and
Pickering 2012). On the other hand, the EU and individual
Member States
are doing all that they can to securitize the border and stop
illegalized trav-
ellers from arriving in the EU and applying for asylum. Transit
is an import-
ant part of the picture for EU politicians and policy makers who
have
worked to craft a latticework of functional border sites to
prevent illegalized
travellers from reaching the EU. The securitization of migration
may put in
place bilateral agreements and other arrangements to deter
illegalized travel-
lers but ultimately they divert people into riskier methods of
travel (Weber
and Pickering 2011), symbiotically reinforcing each other in the
borderlands
surrounding the Global North (Michalowski 2007; Pickering
2011).
Constraints on the mobility of illegalized travellers drive an
economy for
guards, private militia, and other actors in North Africa.
The recent trend that sees an increase in funding to refugee
protection
programmes in North Africa, may lead to more Member States
designating
Libya a ‘safe third country’ to facilitate readmission agreements

that enable
deportation of asylum seekers from the EU to Libya. The cycle
of violence
analysed here will continue until sound policy based on human
rights breaks
the impasse. Such policy may contain increased regular legal
pathways of
migration, an increase in resettlement quotas and secure
protections to refu-
gees upon arrival in the EU. There is a strong relationship
between the sites
of women’s experiences of violence and the efforts of the EU to
secure its
external borders to exclude illegalized travellers. Securitization
heightens ex-
posure to harm for illegalized travellers and aligns poorly with
the humani-
tarian emphasis of the international legal refugee protection
framework.
Acknowledgements
Research partly supported by the Australian Research Council
FT100100548
Border Policing: Security, Human Rights and Gender. We would
like to
thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive
comments on
this manuscript.
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Assignment no: 1
Source document: Monitoring The Implications of the Global

Financial Crisis on Primary
Schools, Teachers and Parents in 12 Countries
1. What is the problem statement in this paper?
2. What are the purposes of the study?
3. Describe the sample used for this study. What is the total
sample size?
4. What are some of the findings? (Give three examples)
5. What are the limitations of the study the researcher
acknowledged? (Give two examples)
6. What is a limitation of the study the researcher did not
acknowledge?

Part 1: (5 points)
1. What is the annual payroll in Delaware in Agriculture?
2. What is the total employment in Construction?
3. Which state has the highest total employment?
4. What is the range for number of firms in Health Care and
Social Assistance?
a. Min: ………………………… Max:
………………..….
5. What industry has the widest range in number of firms?
Part 2: (5 points)
1. Complete the following table
Average Employment
Median
Employment
Agriculture

Construction
Education
Finance
Health
2. In which industry do you see the largest difference between
Mean and Median employment? Why do you think there is such
as difference between Mean and Median employment for this
industry?

Number 3
are interested in) (Total of 20 points)
1. Write up a purpose for a study involving this construct (2
points)
2. Write up research questions for this study (3 points)
3. Create a survey to measure this construct
a. Include at least 5 background or contextual questions (5
points)
b. Create a construct map (5 points)
c. Include at least 6 questions measuring dimensions and
elements of the construct (5 points)

Number 4
Your name:
Due date:
Date submitted:
Use data gathered from the following survey:
Question 1: What type of smart-phone do you own?
(1) IPhone 2) Samsung Galaxy
Question 2: Which is your cell phone provider?
1) Verizon 2) AT&T 3) T-Mobile
4) Sprint
1.Strongly Disagree 2: Disagree 3: Agree 4:Strongly Agree
Question 3: I am satisfied with the overall quality of my smart-

phone
Question 4: I would choose another smart-phone if I had the
chance
Question 5: My smart-phone is the best of its class in the
market
Question 6: I would recommend my smart-phone to my friends
Question 1.
a. Complete the frequency distribution below (2 points)
Iphone
Samsung Galaxy
Verizon
AT&T
T-Mobile
Sprint

b. Complete the mean and median for each question below (3
points)
Mean
Median
Question 3: I am satisfied with the overall quality of my smart-
phone
Question 4: I would choose another smart-phone if I had the
chance
Question 5: My smart-phone is the best of its class in the
market
Question 6: I would recommend my smart-phone to my friends
Question 2.
a. Compute a total Customer Service score. (3 points) (note:

review “Attitude Toward School” example in October 21
lecture)
b. Compute the mean Customer Service score by brand by
provider (5 points)
Iphone
Galaxy
Verizon
AT&T
T-Mobile
Sprint
c. List two observations/conclusions/inferences based on table
above (3 points)
1.
2.

Question 3. (4 points)
A researcher interested in identifying factors that lead to
absenteeism at a high school administers a survey questionnaire
to the students on school campus.
a. What kind of bias is a potential risk in this research?
b. What other data collection method would you use in
conducting this study to minimize this bias?

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