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Sample Paper
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The United States has a long history of policy efforts to fight
drug trafficking and cartel violence in Mexico, most recently
through the Merida Initiative in 2008. However, increasing
drug-related violence in Mexico over the last decade suggests
that existing foreign policies require reconsideration and
increased attention under the new administration. By redirecting
emphasis to promoting fair bilateral trade and institutional
change instead of simply funding Mexican militarization, U.S.
foreign policy can combat the underlying economic and social
conditions of the narcotics crisis, attacking the problem at the

root. Continuing to aid Mexico rather than estrange it will yield
positive economic benefits for both nations, strengthen the
United States’ geopolitical power, and reinforce the United
States’ role as a global humanitarian leader.
American counternarcotic operations stretching back to
Operation Intercept in 1969 have traditionally emphasized
military action as a response to Mexican drug violence.
However, due to inherent corruption within Mexican
enforcement agencies and deteriorating socioeconomic
conditions, the drug industry actually grew in spite of
crackdowns on drug trade and kingpin arrests. The Merida
Initiative, like its predecessors, focused the bulk of its aid on
arming and training Mexican security forces without first
resolving the fundamental issues that fuel the growth of the
illegal drug business. Continuing to pursue such a strategy of
fighting drug trafficking at the surface level without addressing
its root causes is an illogical approach that has been proven by
time and experience to yield few lasting results.
The traditional approach to counternarcotic policy has resulted
in the costly, suboptimal allocation of financial aid and
resources. In the years from 2007 to 2010, nearly 72% of U.S.
assistance under the Merida Initiative went towards funding
military and security expenses, particularly training and
equipment for enforcement agencies (Carpenter). In contrast,
only $15 million of the approximate $1.6 billion funding
provided went towards initiatives supporting “anticorruption,
transparency, and human rights” (Carpenter, 142). Instead of
funneling resources into wasteful and ultimately unproductive
firepower endeavors, U.S. policymakers can instead promote
social and economic initiatives that address persistent problems
like government corruption and poverty, factors that continually
drive poor citizens into the narcotics business and reinforce
their influence.
Though the current administration is considering the revocation
and repurposing of Merida funds for border wall construction,
continuing to provide Mexico with aid in fighting drug

trafficking is actually in the United States’ economic and
security interests (Gardiner and Semple). Mexico has
consistently ranked among the top three trade partners of the
United States and vice versa, including a trade increase of 506%
between the years 1993 and 2012 with the signing of NAFTA
(Figueroa Ortiz). Ceasing Merida aid would severely disrupt
Mexico’s economy and destabilize current American corporate
sector interests in the nation. Preserving a cooperative
relationship and a favorable, stable economic atmosphere in
Mexico ultimately benefits both parties by fostering increased
investment and productivity.
Encouraging more equitable bilateral trade between Mexico and
the United States can also help resolve the issue of poor labor
conditions and unemployment in the nation that drives
thousands of poor citizens into the drug industry, staunching the
steady flow of cheap, desperate labor into cartels. By
encouraging job creation and bolstering the profitability of the
legal Mexican economy, policymakers can cut off one of the
biggest factors of human capital growth to drug trafficking. If
drug cartels lose a constant source of labor to replenish losses,
ongoing military efforts to weaken their power can experience a
more sustainable impact. Notably, enforcing trade agreements
with Mexico in the past has had some negative repercussions.
The enactment of NAFTA, despite its positive influence on
overall U.S.-Mexico trade, unfortunately also increased the size
of the drug industry because cheaper imports of subsidized U.S.
corn resulted in the loss of 2.3 million jobs in the Mexican
agricultural sector (Corchado).
If bilateral economic policies are enacted fairly, however,
boosting trade with Mexico can help alleviate the chronic
poverty that many Mexican citizens experience, improving their
overall quality of life and positioning the United States as a
leader in global humanitarian efforts. As close geographic
neighbors and allies, the United States has a vested interest in
improving conditions in Mexico to mitigate border crime and
strengthen its partnership by fostering greater trust in U.S.

policies. Furthermore, the United States has a responsibility to
aid Mexico’s social condition due to its role in the proliferation
of the drug trade. The growth of cartel power is closely tied to,
if not dependent upon, American consumer demand for illegal
narcotics and the accessibility of American arms traffickers and
money launderers (Reich and Aspinwall).
Continuing Merida Initiative aid to Mexico also ensures that the
United States can maintain its geopolitical power and hegemony
in the region. A historical key tenet of U.S. military strategy in
Latin America revolves around keeping the region as a “U.S.
‘backyard’ free of European, and later Chinese, influences”
(Mercille, 1640). Because the United States partially relies on
Mexico for priority access to “raw materials essential to U.S.
security” such as oil, preserving a close cooperative relationship
with the nation will keep rival foreign interests from
intervening and assuming claim over these resources (Mercille).
Keeping foreign powers out of the region also poses security
benefits by distancing competitive superpowers from U.S.
borders and strengthening the geographic alliance of North
America.
Finally, preserving U.S.-Mexico relations and continuing U.S.
policies against narcotics trafficking is in fact aligned with the
current administration’s domestic policy goals of constraining
immigration. Clinton administration drug policy advisor
General Barry McCaffrey noted that increases in narco-
terrorism cause ‘a surge of millions of refugees crossing the US
border to escape the domestic misery of violence,’ a trend that
coinciding historical spikes in border crossing and cartel
violence seem to support (Mercille). Foreign and domestic
policy goals should reinforce rather than contradict. Continued
funding for the Merida Initiative, especially with focus on
institutional change, has the potential to create a much greater
impact on reducing illegal drug trafficking and meeting
domestic goals than constructing a costly wall.
The United States has political, economic, and security interests
in protecting its relationship with Mexico and improving the

Latin American country’s socioeconomic situation. Alliance,
not alienation, is critical for U.S.-Mexico foreign policy. Thank
you for your consideration on this issue.
Works Cited
Primary Sources:
Carpenter, Ami C. "Changing Lenses: Conflict Analysis and
Mexico's 'Drug War'." Latin
American Politics & Society 55.3 (2013):139-160. Academic
Search Complete. Web. 20 Mar.2017.
Figueroa Ortiz, Carlos Obed. "Indirect Transportation Cost in
the Border Crossing
Process: The United States-Mexico Trade." Estudios
Fronterizos, 17.33 (2016): 169-196. Academic Search Complete.
Web. 21 Mar.2017.
Mercille, Julien. "Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The
Political Economy of the
‘War on Drugs’ in Mexico." Third World Quarterly 32.9 (2011):
1637-1653.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 20 Mar.2017.
Reich, Simon and Mark Aspinwall. "The Paradox of
Unilateralism: Institutionalizing
Failure in U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies." Norteamérica:
Revista Académica Del
CISAN-UNAM 8.2 (2013): 7-39. Academic Search Complete.
Web. 20 Mar.2017.
Supplementary Sources:

Corchado, Alfredo. Midnight in Mexico: A Reporter’s Journey
through a Country’s
Descent into the Darkness. New York, NY: Penguin, 2013.
Print.
Harris, Gardiner, and Kirk Semple. "Rex Tillerson Arrives in
Mexico Facing Twin Threats
to Relations." The New York Times. The New York Times, 22
Feb. 2017. Web.
20 Mar.2017.
ETHICS ESSAY ASSIGNMENT
PLEASE WRITE A 2 PAGE ESSAY REGARDING CHAPTER 7
BUSINESS
ETHICS. THE ESSAY SHOULD CONSIST OF THE
DIFFERENT TYPES OF
ETHICAL STANDARDS, AS WELL AS, WHY BUSINESS
ETHICS ARE
IMPORTANT. GIVE EXAMPLES OF BUSINESS ETHICAL
ISSUES AND
LASTLY THE ETHICAL ISSUES YOU ENCOUNTER IN
YOUR DAILY LIFE
AND HOW YOU HANDLE THEM.
THE ASSIGNMENT REQUIRES 2 PAGES SINGLE SPACED
12 OR 14
POINT. YOUR NAME, COURSE NAME, SECTION NUMBER,
AND DATE
TYPED IN THE UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER ON EACH
PAGE.
THE PAGES MUST BE STAPLED IN THE LEFT-HAND
CORNER.

THIS CHAPTER WILL NOT BE ON AN EXAM, UNLIKE THE
OTHERS
WE WILL STUDY IN THE SEMESTER.
ANY QUESTIONS PLEASE ASK ME IN CLASS OR EMAIL
ME
THANK YOU AND GOOD LUCK!!
Following North Korean missile and nuclear tests and a series
of other bellig-
erent actions and threats, tensions on the peninsula have entered
a dangerous
phase. There is a heightened potential for regional conflict and
global reper-
cussions if the wrong precedents are set by, for example,
acquiescing to the
North’s nuclear rule-breaking. Demanding to be recognised as
nuclear-armed
and focused on leadership succession, Pyongyang seems no
longer to be
using brinksmanship for negotiation leverage. In response, the
United States
and its Asian allies have signalled that North Korea cannot
expect business
as usual. Even China’s posture has begun to shift, although not
nearly enough.
For the past two decades, the United States and its allies have
sought to
test the proposition that North Korea would be willing to trade
its nuclear
programme for the right economic and political concessions. In

1994 and
again in 2007, North Korea did pledge to give up its weapons
capabilities,
although implementation of the agreements never went beyond
the pre-
liminary steps. Regardless of whether North Korea was ever
serious about
denuclearisation, Pyongyang has now staked out, in word and
deed, the
position that it will never let go of its nuclear arsenal. In doing
so, it may
well have hastened its own demise.
Answering the threat
What a difference a year makes. In summer 2008, North Korea
submitted
a declaration of its plutonium holdings, turned over 18,000
pages from the
Stopping Nuclear North Korea
Mark Fitzpatrick
Mark Fitzpatrick is Senior Fellow for Non-proliferation at the
IISS.
Survival | vol. 51 no. 4 | August–September 2009 | pp. 5–12
DOI 10.1080/00396330903168782
6 | Mark Fitzpatrick
operating records of its Yongbyon facilities, and destroyed the
cooling tower
of its reactor. Twelve months later, North Korea has newly

tested its most
destructive weapons, resumed plutonium reprocessing, unveiled
a uranium-
enrichment programme, annulled the Korean War armistice
agreement,
declared void all bilateral agreements with South Korea and all
multilat-
eral agreements from the Six-Party Talks, and threatened
‘merciless’ nuclear
attacks if nations implement measures adopted by the Security
Council in
response to North Korea’s provocations. Given the timing of
these changes,
which can be traced back to autumn 2008, they are surely
connected with
the succession question that suddenly became more acute upon
leader Kim
Jong Il’s stroke last August.
Some analysts contend that the United States is to blame for
having
demanded excessive verification measures that went beyond the
agreed
staged requirements of the Six-Party Talks. This criticism
downplays
Washington’s September 2008 fall-back to a more reasonable
verification
plan, one that North Korea agreed to orally, then refused to put
in writing,
even though the Bush administration, at great jeopardy to its
alliance rela-
tionship with Japan, had followed through with removing North
Korea
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Bush has since been
replaced
by a president who has promised the respect and bilateral

communications
Pyongyang has long sought, but the North Korean regime has
shown no
interest.
With the North now insisting that it no longer cares about the
normali-
sation of relations with the United States,1 the Obama
administration has
reluctantly concluded that the time for incentives is over. In
case Pyongyang
does not mean what it says, the door to dialogue – whether
through the Six-
Party Talks or some other mechanism – should remain open, but
the North
must no longer be begged or paid just to show up for a meeting.
Containment of the country’s nuclear and missile programmes is
the
immediate policy objective, to block what has been
Pyongyang’s readiness
to sell such technology. For instance, North Korea was the
source of the
plutonium-production reactor that Syria began to construct in
2001; at around
the same time, Libya acquired gasified uranium through the
A.Q. Khan
network that financial records show came from North Korea. In
October
Stopping Nuclear North Korea | 7
2007, in an agreement reached through the Six-Party Talks,
Pyongyang

‘reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials,
technology,
or know-how’. In diplomatic parlance, this was the North’s way
of saying
that it never helped Syria or Libya with their fledgling nuclear-
weapons
programmes and never would do so again. On 14 April 2009,
however, the
North stated that it would no longer be bound to any agreements
under the
Six-Party Talks. Although North Korea has not repeated threats
it had made
in 2005 to transfer nuclear-weapons technology, the 2007
commitment has
to be considered nullified. Iran and Myanmar are the most likely
next cus-
tomers, if not for nuclear technology, then for missiles, which
the North has
already sold in abundance to Iran and which it offered to
Myanmar earlier
this decade. UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which bans
all North
Korean arms exports, provides the basis, indeed the obligation,
to inspect
any suspect ships, planes or trucks for contraband.
A containment policy cannot mean acquiescing to North Korean
nuclear
and missile programmes that are confined to its own territory.
Japan and
South Korea worry that Washington may come to accept a
nuclear-armed
status for North Korea the way it did for India and
Pakistan. Obama has reassured its Asian allies that the
United States would never recognise North Korea as a
nuclear power. This does not mean being blind to the

reality that the hermit kingdom has nuclear weapons
that work, albeit imperfectly, and rockets that rise. Nor
does saying the North Korean nuclear programme is
unacceptable mean that it will absolutely not be toler-
ated; for the time being there is little choice but to do
so, absent military intervention, which has too many
downsides. What Obama’s assurances mean is that these
programmes are
not accepted as legitimate or lasting. Normal diplomatic
relations with
North Korea are impossible without its denuclearisation. How,
though, to
eliminate its plutonium stockpile, given North Korea’s
disregard for both
sanctions and importuning?
If left to fester, the problem will get worse. North Korea’s
decided to
test-launch a long-range rocket on 5 April, ignoring Obama’s
outreach, and
These
programmes
are not accepted
as legitimate or
lasting
followed this with a nuclear-weapon test a mere seven weeks
later on the
flimsy excuse that the country was insulted by a Security

Council statement
that was not even a resolution. The timing of these tests is
suggestive of a
weapons-development programme that is proceeding according
to a pre-
designed plan. The North is likely to conduct further missile
and nuclear
tests, each of which will move it closer to being able to combine
the two
systems. North Korea may already be able to produce nuclear
warheads
that fit its medium- and long-range rockets. Vice Admiral
Lowell F. Jacoby,
then head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, testified four
years ago
that North Korea had the capability to mount a nuclear weapon
on a bal-
listic missile. The North’s success on 25 May in achieving a
yield of about 4
kilotonnes (estimates ranged from 2–6kt), which is what it said
it had aimed
for in its October 2006 test, may mean that it is skipping the
usual progres-
sion of simpler, larger-yield tests in order to produce a higher-
tech device
designed to fit a missile warhead.2
US officials assess, however, that North Korea probably cannot
yet accom-
plish the much harder task of delivering a missile-propelled
nuclear weapon
that can withstand the tremendous heat and buffeting a warhead
must endure
upon atmospheric re-entry. For now, Soviet-designed bomber
aircraft are
probably the North’s only delivery vehicles, but they would

almost surely be
shot down before reaching any intended target. North Korea is
more vulner-
able now than it will be when it can reliably deliver a nuclear
warhead.
There is thus an imperative to use all tools of persuasion to stop
North
Korea’s nuclear-development programme before it becomes
more deadly.
Denying North Korea international financial services,
forbidding arms
exports, and scrutinising its cargo transport in accordance with
Resolution
1874 are good measures to start with. As part of Washington’s
tougher new
approach, the United States could also lead a global imposition
of financial
controls outside the UN, as it did in 2005 when it persuaded
foreign banks
to freeze North Korean bank assets connected with
counterfeiting and
other illicit activity. The freezing that year of $25 million in
North Korean
accounts at Macao’s Banco Delta Asia caused great
consternation in the
North, although the policy backfired by contributing to the
conditions that
led to North Korea’s first nuclear test.3
Cutting off the country’s trade and cash flow will be a powerful
tool that

North Korea is likely to seize upon as an excuse for further
belligerence,
including a third nuclear test that is likely to be planned
anyway. However
strong the economic sanctions may turn out to be, they may not
prove suffi-
cient to change North Korean security calculations that seem to
be predicated
on a belief that regime survival at a time of succession
uncertainty depends
on asserting strength by possession of the ultimate weapon.
Sanctions will
work only if they convince North Korean leaders that the regime
is more,
not less, likely to topple under a continuation of the current
nuclear policy.
The role of China
Short of military action by the other members of the Six-Party
Talks, China
has the best chance of persuading North Korea to return to the
goal of
denuclearisation. China is North Korea’s only treaty ally and
supplies the
impoverished state with close to half of its food, three-quarters
of its trade,
and nearly all of its oil. This dependency, which has grown
stronger as South
Korea and other countries have reduced aid and trade, provides
China un-
rivalled leverage.
Yet China’s influence over North Korea is considerably less
than these
numbers would seem to suggest. North Koreans demonstrably
resent their

rich Communist neighbour and have repeatedly ignored its
demands.
China played the oil card in March 2003 and September 2006, in
the after-
math of North Korea’s missile test that summer, by temporarily
interrupting
supply, a move that was attributed officially to technical
troubles. North
Korea returned to multilateral negotiations, but not exactly to
praiseworthy
effect, as witnessed by the October 2006 nuclear test.
Interrupting the oil supply is not an immediate chokehold
because oil
comprises less than 10% of North Korea’s total energy mix,
most of which is
supplied by domestic coal. The oil is mostly used for
transportation and the
military industry, and would have to be cut off for a sustained
period before it
would cause suffering for the leadership, who are largely
immune to foreign
pressure. Temporary cut-offs do not directly threaten regime
survival.4
Any measure that would threaten North Korean regime survival
has
always been seen as anathema by China. North Korea employs
the power of
the weak because its collapse could threaten China’s perceived
vital security

interests in several ways. Chaos in North Korea would likely
spark a massive
wave of refugees, many of them armed, across the Yalu River,
threatening
the domestic stability – so prized by Beijing – of China’s
northeast provinces.
Collapse of the one-party Kim regime could also have a knock-
on effect in
stimulating pressures for political change in one-party China.
Disintegration
of the system would result in the loss of a buffer state for China
through
unification of the peninsula under the leadership of US-allied
Seoul. The
last time American troops took up positions north of the 38th
parallel, in
November 1950, China intervened massively to repulse them.
Among at least some of China’s strategic thinkers, calculations
are begin-
ning to change about what is best for China’s vital interests.
The Chinese
know that North Korea has become more of a lia-
bility than an ally; they just do not know what to
do about it, short of Beijing’s ever-cautious attach-
ment to the Six-Party Talks, which have become
irrelevant in the face of North Korea’s provocations.
If this behaviour continues, a regime collapse in
North Korea, even with all its attendant disruptions,
would be better for China than the degradation of
its security position caused by its ne’er-do-well
nuclear-armed neighbour. In addition to spurring
talk of nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan, North
Korea’s missile

and nuclear tests have also prompted both US allies to advance
their missile-
defence capabilities, weakening China’s nuclear deterrent.
North Korea’s
brinkmanship could also spark a conflict leading to US military
interven-
tion. The priority China places on stability perversely allows
North Korea
to destabilise the entire region in ways that seem wholly
contrary to China’s
national interests.
For all of North Korea’s neighbours, the collapse of the Kim
regime could
be best way out of a downward cycle – and the sooner this
happens, the
better. This is not to say that any of them should purposely push
for regime
change, for which the short- and medium-term costs would be
consider-
able. But neither should fear of a possible regime collapse in
North Korea
The Chinese know
that North Korea
has become
more of a liability
than an ally
continue to block Chinese actions that stand the best chance of
meeting
Beijing’s goal of Korean denuclearisation, as well as its

imperative of stabil-
ity. To start with, China should be expected to implement
Resolution 1874
by applying financial sanctions, insisting on inspection and
denying refuel-
ling and resupply to North Korean ships suspected of carrying
arms and
nuclear-related materials. Border traffic should also be strictly
regulated in
accordance with the resolution. If these steps prove insufficient,
ultimately,
China should join an oil-trade embargo, and be prepared to
enforce it for the
time it would take to be effective. China today is unwilling to
take this step,
but by employing its latent economic leverage, China could seek
to force
Pyongyang to make a choice between economic collapse and the
irreversible
dismantling of its nuclear weapons and facilities.
To assist China in coming to this conclusion, the United States,
South
Korea, Japan and Russia should engage Beijing in strategic
planning about
the future of northeast Asia.5 Contingency plans should be
coordinated for
dealing with a North Korean collapse and the resultant refugees
in a way
that does not put an undue economic burden on China. South
Korea, mean-
while, should find a way of assuring China that it need not fear
a revanchist
appeal from a unified Korea to the two million ethnic Koreans
in Manchuria.
Economics may hold the key. The introduction of capitalism and

a market
economy north of the 38th parallel would contribute to further
development
across the Chinese border.
Above all, Beijing needs to be assured that a unified Korea will
not harm
its interests. There would be less need for US troops to be
stationed in a
unified peninsula and Washington could agree to forego
permanent bases
in what is now North Korea. There would still be reason for a
US–Korea
alliance, but it would not be threatening to China if the trend of
US–China
rapprochement and economic integration continues. In fact, the
American
alliance would underscore assurances by Seoul that a unified
Korea would
be non-nuclear. Such assurances would be less credible if the
unified nation
could not rely on US extended deterrence.
* * *
In a joint statement issued to mark the 16 June White House
visit by South
Korean President Lee Myung-bak, the United States and the
Republic of
Korea reaffirmed the goal of peaceful reunification of the
Korean Peninsula
on the principles of free democracy and a market economy, in

order to build
a better future for all people on the peninsula. The statement did
not refer to
the ‘soft landing’ that remains the ideal scenario for North
Korean absorp-
tion by the South. The strategic consultations that are
emphasised in the
statement will need to focus on how best to balance the goals of
denucleari-
sation, reunification and human rights. Most of all, a similar
joint vision
is now needed with China, to establish how a reunified
peninsula could
promote peace, security and prosperity for all – except those
who cling to
the Kim regime.
Notes
1 Evans J.R. Revere, ‘North Korea’s
Latest Challenge: What Is To Be
Done?’, Issues and Insights, Pacific
Forum CSIS, vol. 9, no. 5, May 2009.
2 International Institute for Strategic
Studies, ‘North Korea’s Dangerous
Game’, Strategic Comments, vol. 15, no.
5, June 2009.
3 Ibid.
4 Julia Joo-A Lee, ‘To Fuel or Not to
Fuel: China’s Energy Assistance to
North Korea’, Asian Security, vol. 5,
no. 1, January 2009, pp. 64–5.

5 Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Reining in
Pyongyang’, Washington Post, 8 June
2009.
North Korea’s diplomacy to engage
the United States
JONGWOO HAN*
For the past two decades relations between North Korea and the
United
States have become increasingly hostile. Pervasive and
vociferous criticism
of North Korea’s dangerous and seemingly irrational behaviour
has focused
on Pyongyang’s use of nuclear brinkmanship, violations of
human rights
and general disregard for the well-being of the North Korean
people, as
exemplified by its decision to develop a nuclear programme
while the
country suffered from widespread famine. However, an alternate
view put
forth by both American and South Korean experts on North
Korea holds
that Pyongyang’s use of the nuclear wager primarily has been
intended to
demand Washington’s attention in order to initiate bilateral
talks and
eventually normalise relations with the US. Certainly,

Pyongyang’s actions
have been ham-fisted at times; however, its commitment to the
goal of
normalisation has been unwavering. The current controversy
regarding
North Korea’s nuclear programme may serve as a necessary step
to build
trust between Washington and Pyongyang and might continue
for some-
time, given the short history of direct engagement. However,
one thing is
clear: neither Washington nor Pyongyang can afford to go back
to the
starting point.
Introduction
Following the end of the bipolar system, and with strained
relations between
North Korea and both the former Soviet Union and China,
Pyongyang has been
forced to deal with Washington more directly (Lee 2000b:
357�8). With the
new Russian Federation focused on domestic troubles and
China’s highest
priority being economic development, neither country could
continue to
function as Pyongyang’s protector. The resulting gap, along
with North Korea’s
constant fear of attack, created the need for a new political
relationship that

could support economic reconstruction and guarantee the
survival of the
current regime. Although North Korea has tried to preserve
beneficial aspects of
its relationship with China and Russia, Pyongyang’s current
association with its
former allies is characterised more by bickering than by
expressions of mutual
respect and trust. With a growing rift between Pyongyang and
Beijing, Ji (2004:
2) noted that the ‘DPRK can act as a buffer zone separating
China and the
*[email protected]�
ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/09/010105-16 #
2009 Australian Institute of International Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/10357710802642209
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 63, No. 1,
pp. 105�120, March 2009
United States’. For its part North Korea has attempted to form a
new
relationship with the United States, perceived as the last
remaining superpower

that can ensure its survival and eventual economic recovery
(Lee, 2000b:
357�8). In Pyongyang’s view only Washington could stabilise
the region by
serving as an intermediary in potentially contentious relations
between the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China,
Japan, Russia and
the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Over the past 20 years two schools of thought have been
dominant in the
discourse about how to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear
ambitions. The
engagement school (Armstrong 2007; Baek 2007; Chon 2007;
Chung 2007;
Cummings 2007, 2005; French 2005; Gallucci 2006; Harrison
2002; Im 2008;
Kang 1995; Lee 2000a; 2000b; Mazarr 2007; Sigal 1998a;
1998b; 2003; 2006;
Suh 2008) argues that Pyongyang has followed a rational and
consistent
strategy on negotiation, engagement and normalisation. To this
group North
Korea’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons is interpreted as a
bargaining chip
to gain US recognition and force it into negotiations with
Pyongyang. Even
though these scholars and experts do not recognise the
legitimacy of
Pyongyang’s brinkmanship and are critical of North Korea’s use
of human
rights as a bargaining chip and, especially, of the mass
starvation of its citizens
in recent years, members of this school */ e.g. Cummings
(2005) and Sigal

(2003) */ also criticise the US government for its refusal to take
Pyongyang’s
signals requesting negotiation seriously. Some in the
engagement school */ e.g.
Cha (2002), Mazarr (2007) and Moon (2005) */ maintain that
Washington has
taken a contradictory path of rope-dancing between regime
change and
engagement, between denunciation and bold approach, and
between backward
and forward tracking.
In contrast, and at the opposite end of discourse on North
Korea, a group of
hardliners such as Bolton (2007), Eberstadt (1999; 2005; 2007),
Hwang (2006),
Nam (2006), Niksch (2003) and Sokolski (2001) argue that the
North Korean
leadership is essentially depraved, unstable and too unreliable
for meaningful
negotiations. Criticising Pyongyang’s misuse of human rights,
its neglect of its
starving population and its public support of terrorism, these
hardliners adopt
an inflexible, belligerent stance that they believe will force the
regime to
surrender as a result of severe economic sanctions, producing
its eventual
demise. Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, has advocated simply
waiting for
Pyongyang to collapse, as indicated in his recently expressed
view: ‘North
Korea is teetering on the edge of economic collapse. That, I
believe, is a major
point of leverage’ (Associated Press, 2003). Nam (2006) has
also taken a

stringent hardline approach, even claiming that the Six-Party
Talks was a
temporary measure adopted by countries to avoid tensions
associated with
North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, which would not
solve the basic
problem of Pyongyang’s having access to nuclear weapons.
Hwang (2006),
similarly, vociferously criticises any aid, including
humanitarian aid, as an ill-
advised measure that will simply prolong the North Korean
regime. Finally, in
106 Jongwoo Han
his most recent Wall Street Journal article, Bolton (2007)
argues: ‘If we continue
this approach, what is already a bad deal will become a
dangerous deal,
whether we make it with North Korea directly or in the six-
party talks’.
Since 2005, when its $25 million in assets at the Banco Delta
Asia (BDA) in
Macao were frozen by Washington, Pyongyang has generally
been seen as more
compliant. Also there has recently been progress regarding the
full declaration
of North Korea’s nuclear inventory list. In early May 2008
Pyongyang delivered

to Washington 18 000 pages of documents related to the
activities at North
Korea’s Yongbyon plutonium-based nuclear reactor. Although
the report was
six months late, it nonetheless represents an important step
toward the
normalisation of the relationship with Washington. However,
the stakes of
normalisation between Washington and Pyongyang have
increased because
conservative forces in the US Congress and hardliners in the
administration still
want to hold Pyongyang to a more stringent standard of
accountability, asking
it, for example, to clarify details about North Korea’s alleged
highly enriched
uranium (HEU) programme, or its purported collaborative
attempts toward
nuclear proliferation with Syria (Cooper 2008). One point
recognised by both
schools of thought is that the increased tensions between North
Korea and the
US have created a dangerous impasse. Paradoxically, and as this
article will

illustrate, over the past several years of US�North Korean
relations */ including
during the periods of greatest hostility */ civic/academic
collaboration, such as
the recent visit to the DPRK of the New York Philharmonic
Orchestra have
continued. The author’s leadership role in one such academic
collaboration
informs this article.
Pyongyang goes all-in and Washington raises . . . or does it
call?
In 2002 North Korea had placed an unexpected all-in wager
using its ace in the
hole */ a nuclear development programme */ to gain recognition
from the US.
By taking this path, Pyongyang seemed to be demonstrating that
North Korea
was not only a rational negotiator but also a high-stakes
gambler. In 2003, just
after the revelation of North Korea’s HEU programme caused a
showdown
with Washington, a diplomat from Pyongyang unexpectedly told
the author in
an unrelated conversation, ‘We are going to go all-in’. At that
time the message

was not clearly understood by the author. However, four years
later, in October
2007, Kang Seok-joo and Kim Gye-gwan, two North Korean
vice foreign
ministers then serving as the main North Korean strategists and
participants in
the Six-Party Talks, were summoned by DPRK Chairman Kim to
the second
South�North Summit meeting, where Kim was holding
discussions with South
Korean President Roh (Moon 2008: 78). The two vice ministers
were asked to
report the results of the recently completed Six-Party Talks in
Beijing.
According to the then ROK Minister of Unification, Jeong Se-
hyun, who also
participated in the summit, the two top diplomats said: ‘We
have gone all-in
North Korea’s diplomacy to engage the United States 107
and will now wait and see how the US will respond’. Minister
Jeong’s
observation supports the main thesis of this paper.
Five years earlier, in October 2002, officials in Pyongyang,
having received

what they thought were signals that the US was interested in
negotiating, had
looked forward to celebrating the beginning of rapprochement
during an
upcoming visit by Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly.
However,
Pyongyang’s hopes were dashed when, rather than celebrating,
Kelly unexpect-
edly confronted Pyongyang about its HEU programme during
his visit, thus
upping the ante. Once again the stakes were raised when, in
2003, the US
invaded Iraq, and yet again two years later, when it sent an
unmistakable signal
by arranging for North Korea’s assets in BDA to be frozen. In
Pyongyang’s view
this series of events pushed North Korea to the point of no
return (Mazarr
2007: 90). However, to Washington Pyongyang’s seemingly
irrational all-in bet
to seek nuclear prestige while its people starved seemed clear
evidence that
North Korea was not a regime with which the US could reliably
negotiate
(Eberstadt 2005; Mazarr 2007: 75; 2007; Moon 2005; Niksch
2003). Although
this perspective is understandable, a closer look at some of
North Korea’s
reasons for its apparently bizarre behaviour reveals that
Pyongyang has pursued
nuclear proliferation primarily in order to attain security and
economic aid.
To understand North Korea’s seemingly irrational actions over
the past
20 years, one must first understand what has motivated its

attempts to seek a
new relationship with the US and redefine itself on the world
stage. According
to former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, who won the
Nobel Peace
Prize for his Sunshine policy, ‘Every one of Pyongyang’s moves
has always been
politically motivated and strategically calculated. North Korea
Chairman Kim
thinks only America is capable of providing the military
security and large-scale
economic aid his country needs’.1 When viewed from this
perspective,
Pyongyang’s move for nuclear all-in can be seen as a risky but,
given its lack
of alternative approaches, necessary attempt to win
Washington’s attention and
force negotiations. After nearly 40 years of diplomatic relations
with Moscow
and Peking/Beijing, best characterised as ‘muddling-through’
and ‘tightrope
dancing’ (Chung 1978; Kun 1967), the DPRK began to
recognise the need for
new allies. This need became especially urgent when, in 1991,
the Soviet Union
collapsed and, the following year, South Korea established
embassies in both
Beijing and Moscow. Perceiving itself as alone at this point and
no longer secure
in its place within a bipolar system (Eberstadt 1999: 49; French
2005: 197;
Kang 1995: 262; Park 1998), Pyongyang’s all-in strategy of
playing the nuclear
card to gain US recognition can be seen as a strategy it intended
to use to
extricate itself from dysfunctional alliances, and then to partner

with a new big
brother, the United States (Gallucci 2006; Harrison 2002: 201;
Sigal 2003).
However, contrary to Pyongyang’s expectations, the US folded.
According to
Sigal (2003), Cummings (2005) and Harrison (2002), it was
Washington which
failed to follow through, not Pyongyang. Despite having signed
the 1994
Agreed Framework with Pyongyang, former President Clinton */
and later
108 Jongwoo Han
President Bush */ followed a policy of engagement that
presumed the
impending collapse of the North Korean regime. Acting
cautiously, North
Korea has taken initial steps to adjust to the changing
geopolitical realities and
revamped its 50-year-old survival strategy by attempting to
consolidate its two
former allies, China and Russia, into one pole and placing the
United States as
a geographically distant, less-threatening, hegemon, at the
other. Armstrong
(2007), for example, has stated that North Korea may be
attempting a ‘partner-
swap’ in order to survive post-cold war international politics
under the
protection of a unipolar United States. In retrospect the entire
trajectory of
nuclear development taken by North Korea since the 1994 crisis

invites changed
perceptions of the country */ not as a country led by ‘irrational
xenophobes
with a mindless anti-American hatred’ (Harrison 2002: 197)
who are ‘weak’
(Armstrong 2007), ‘unreliable’ (Mazarr 2007), ‘aggressive,
offensive, and
expansionist’ (Kang 1995) */ but rather as a boxed-in, would-be
junior partner
who has consistently pursued a carefully choreographed course
towards greater
political gains and increased economic benefits.
In contrast, US North Korea policy has been characterised by
numerous
American diplomats and scholars as ‘erratic’ (Moon 2005),
‘zigzag’ (Cha 2002:
80), or as a ‘strategic muddle’ (Mazarr 2007: 76; Noland 1997).
Like a poker
player who can’t choose whether to call, raise or fold, the US
has vacillated
between attempts at regime change and bold negotiation.
However, when the
action was on in October 2002, rather than continue to
negotiate, the US opted
to raise the stakes. Neo-conservative strategy in general, and
President Bush’s
characterisation of North Korea as one of the three ‘axes of
evil’ in particular,
followed by the US’s pre-emptive strikes against Afghanistan
and Iraq, clearly
signalled Washington’s desire for regime change and its
intention simply to wait
for the demise of the current North Korean regime (Eberstadt
2005, 2007;
Niksch 2003). According to Cummings (2007: 1), Vice

President Cheney’s blunt
statement, ‘We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it’, aptly
sums up US
strategy at this time.
In early spring 2002, as this strong no-negotiation message was
being sent by
the Bush administration hardliners, rapprochement advocates
within the
government simultaneously began to send signals suggesting
that Pyongyang
would be recognised and receive desperately needed economic
aid if it
denuclearised and joined the world community (Mazarr 2007:
82). The offer
was to be presented by Kelly, but this never happened because
of deep divisions
within the Bush administration. Instead, Kelly revealed the HEU
programme,
dramatically raising the stakes (Cummings 2007; Wit et al.
2005: 371, 378).
Cha (2002: 81) characterised this sort of vacillation within US
policy as
‘hawk engagement’. Four years later Kissinger (2006), noting
the contradictory
nature of US policy, advised the Bush administration that
‘focusing on regime
change as the road to denuclearisation confuses the issue’ and
recommended
that it instead engage in diplomacy. The following year Mazarr
(2007: 92)
similarly criticised US policy towards Pyongyang as misguided,
describing it as

‘alternately fragmented, bitterly ideological, and impelled by
top-down,
instinct-driven mandates’. For most of the Bush administration
initial American
policy towards Pyongyang has been based on both poor
conceptual strategies
and an inconsistent decision-making process, most recently
demonstrated in
Washington’s current shift towards a policy of engagement, as
signalled by
actions such as sending the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
to Pyongyang in
early 2008 (Wakin 2007). Eberstadt (2007), like others,
advocates Washing-
ton’s current ‘no-negotiation-but-wait’ policy and notes that,
ironically, ‘the
Bush team [has] embraced the very approach it had once
mocked as weak-kneed
and ‘‘Clintonesque’’’.
Strained alliances
If we examine the status of North Korea’s relationships with
China and the

former Soviet Union, it becomes clear why Pyongyang is
attempting a partner-
swap. For over 40 years, Sino-Soviet harmony and disputes
placed Pyongyang
in a vulnerable position as it strove to avoid displeasing either
of its
neighbouring communist big brothers, while also taking full
advantage of the
alliances to maximise its national interest (Chung 1978: 159;
Lee 2000b; Moon
2005). This strained alliance required Kim II Sung to walk a
fine line to both
maintain a self-reliant nationalistic platform and avoid
alienating either the
Soviet Union or China. North Korea became skilful at aligning
itself with one
ally against the other (Simmons 1975: 29), and for years this
strategy proved
quite successful as Chung (1978), Lee (2000b) and Moon (2005)
argue. Such
skilful managing of complex strategic relationships contradicts
the common
view of North Korea’s foreign policy as irrational and inept.
North Korea’s

long-term diplomatic acumen enabled it to remain independent
while lodged in
the crevice between two powerful communist states. North
Korea’s resolve and
careful political calculation, despite rejection by the
international community,
continue to this day. In this context, the Korean Juche (self-
reliance) ideology
can best be understood as an important survival tool which has
allowed
Pyongyang to capitalise on its capacity for skilful manoeuvre in
the vortex of
East Asian super powers. This approach has also been applied,
though not yet
successfully, in Pyongyang’s dealings with the US.
In 2000 President Kim Dae-jung surprised the international
community by
announcing that Chairman Kim had revised his policy and now
accepted the
benefit of US forces, even in a unified Korea, to balance power
in the region.
From this perspective Cummings’ (2005: 502) interpretation of
Chairman Kim’s
statement makes sense: North Korean leaders apparently wanted

American
troops to stay on the peninsula to deal with shifting
international power
relations (especially with regard to a strong Japan and China).
In Cummings’
(2005: 508) view, ‘the real reason’ that Pyongyang offered no
resistance to a
continued American presence was because, ‘by Kissinger’s
time, Pyongyang
110 Jongwoo Han
could not count on full and simultaneous backing from both
Beijing and
Moscow’.
The recent change in China’s approach towards Pyongyang
mirrors that of
North Korea’s earlier view of China. China currently seems to
view North
Korea as both a buffer zone and a potential threat. On the one
hand, China
recognises North Korea’s strategic value, despite its erratic
behaviour at this
point; on the other hand, it considers Pyongyang a liability
because of actions

such as Pyongyang’s vote against Beijing’s bid for the 2000
Olympic Games
(Ji 2004: 1�2). As the Sino-South Korea relationship thawed,
the then Chinese
leader, Deng Xiaoping informed North Korean leader Kim that
Beijing intended
to recognise Seoul. In response and retaliation Pyongyang stated
that North
Korea would recognise Taiwan. Kim could not carry out his
threat for fear that
China would completely suspend its alliance with North Korea.
However,
China ended up losing the opportunity to host the Olympic
Games in 2000
because of Pyongyang’s support for the alternative site, Sydney
(Ha 2007). Just
as Pyongyang’s actions reflect a desire both to act
independently and to
maintain normal relations with Beijing, the same is true of
China, whose
greatest fear is that a sudden collapse of the North Korean
regime will result in
large numbers of refugees crossing its border.
Reacting to Pyongyang’s maverick endorsement of Sydney,
Beijing wanted to

re-examine its alliance with North Korea, and Pyongyang had to
face a direct
challenge from its strongest ally. Ji (2004: 3) even claims that
‘it [China] is
closer to the United States than to the DPRK at this particular
moment’.
Eberstadt (1999: 47) has noted that, long before the Six-Party
Talks, the
China�North Korea alliance had soured: ‘Pyongyang’s allies
had made it clear
that they would not aid the DPRK if it were to provoke another
crisis on the
Korean Peninsula’. The relationship of the two former allies
was damaged
further when, in July 2006, Pyongyang took the aggressive step
of testing seven
missiles, including one long-range missile. And the relationship
reached its nadir
when, in October 2007, Pyongyang tested its nuclear bomb,
notifying Beijing
only 30 minutes before the launch occurred.
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and North Korea’s
loss of a
major ally, Pyongyang recognised the need for self-reliance.
According to

Cummings (2005: 481):
The DPRK probably decided in 1991, if not earlier, to develop a
small state-
deterrent for a country surrounded by powerful enemies, like
Israel; to
display enough activity to make possession of a nuclear device
plausible to
the outside world, but with no announcement of possession, in
order to lessen
the chance that those same enemies [would then] determine to
develop
nuclear weapons (e.g., South Korea or Japan) */ in short, to
appear to arm
itself with an ultimate trump card and keep everyone guessing
whether and
when the weapons might become available.
What Cummings’ observations reveal about North Korea’s drive
for a secret
nuclear development programme is its intention deliberately to
arouse the
suspicion of its having nuclear weapons in order to deter rash

attacks.
Retaliations and concessions
Since 2000 relations between the US and North Korea can best
be described as a
series of aggressive retaliations and subsequent concessions
leading towards
normalisation. A critical assessment of Pyongyang’s attempts to
normalise
relations with the United States and other major countries
around the Korean
Peninsula in the early 2000s challenges hardliners’ general
perception that
Pyongyang has little interest in normalisation (Moon 2005;
Sigal 2003, 2006).
Although most readers will be familiar with the series of
aggressive stances
taken by Washington in 2002, such as the ‘axis of evil’ speech
and the
confrontation over North Korea’s HEU programme, what is
generally less well
known is that, during the same period, North Korea undertook
an unprece-
dented series of positive economic and diplomatic initiatives.
Laney and Shaplen

(2003: 17) and Moon (2005) identify several occasions when
Pyongyang
instituted economic reforms and initiated high-level contacts
and talks with
Washington, Seoul and Tokyo in an attempt to normalise
relations. These talks
addressed topics such as railway reconnection, de-mining,
participating in the
Asian Games, and setting up special economic zones.
From a hardliner’s perspective based on only part of the
relevant facts, there
appears to be ample evidence of Pyongyang’s ‘erratic and
aggressive’ behaviour
to support the view that the international community should not
engage North
Korea at all. Important historical examples of North Korea’s
aggressive actions
would undoubtedly include: the 1968 Pueblo seizure, the 1969
downing of the
EC-121, the 1976 Poplar Tree Axe incident, and the 1983
Rangoon bombing.
However, those advocating appeasement, such as Kang (1995:
253) and
Harrison (2002: 197), assert that Pyongyang’s actions in

general, and even
some of its terrorist acts, have been rationally calculated
attempts to use
‘peripheral actions’ to influence either peace or destabilisation
of the area
without threatening the region’s fundamental strategic balance.
In Kang’s
(1995: 259) view Pyongyang is ‘well aware of the risks of
challenging the
central balance of power’. Kang’s insightful analysis of
Pyongyang’s strategy
can help Washington as it interprets North Korea’s attempts to
provoke it.
Two episodes illustrate Kang’s point particularly well.
According to New
York Times contributing writer Peter Maass (2003: 4): ‘At the
banquet of the
first North and South Summit in June 2000, [South Korean]
Choe Hak-rae, then
publisher of Hankyoreh Shinmun, a newspaper sympathetic to
North Korea’,
asked Kim Jong Il why the North Korean government was
spending its limited
resources on missiles instead of feeding its starving citizens.
The Dear Leader

replied without hesitation: ‘The missiles cannot reach the
United States, and
112 Jongwoo Han
if I launch them, the US would fire back thousands of missiles
and we would not
survive. I know that very well. But I have to let them know I
have missiles. I am
making them because only then will the United States talk to
me’ (emphasis
added).
The second episode, also reported by Maass, involved a card
montage
performed for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her
1999 visit to
Pyongyang, in which the image of a North Korean missile being
launched was
displayed. According to Maass, Kim said to Albright, ‘That was
our first missile
launch and our last’. To make sure his message was understood
correctly, Kim
Jong Il then turned to President Clinton’s North Korea policy
coordinator,
Wendy Sherman, who accompanied Albright, and repeated the

statement. His
meaning was clear: the missile programme can be stopped if you
offer us a new
relationship. As Sherman later said of the event: ‘This was
totally orchestrated,
the cards and turning to us’ (Maass 2003:11).
Pyongyang’s vacillating between gestures of courtship and
aggression, in
combination with Washington’s fluctuating between hawkish
engagement and
gestures of conciliation, constitute a general pattern of
retaliations and
concessions. Before most of the major breakthroughs in its
relationship with
Washington in recent years, Pyongyang has initiated a series of
aggressive acts
and concessions. Even during the Cold War North Korea can be
seen to have
offered a series of substantive conciliatory gestures after
dangerous and
belligerent actions. These include:
. putting its reactors under the supervision of the International
Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in 1977 after the Poplar Tree Axe incident;

. initiating three-way talks with South Korea and the United
States in 1984
following the Rangoon bombing;
. signing the Basic Agreement with the ROK in 1991 after the
withdrawal of
nuclear fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor (Moon 2005).
Efforts by the US to understand North Korea’s ‘erratic
behaviour’ will be
productive to the degree that this pattern of ‘one-step-back,
two-steps-forward’
is acknowledged. While some suspicion is to be expected during
the trust-
building stage of any potential relationship, the heavy fall-out
from Pyon-
gyang’s gaining nuclear status and the resulting increase in its
direct contact
with the US has allowed a tenuous relationship between the
DPKR and its new
would-be ally to take root.
The main source of the US’s current suspicion can be directly
traced to two
major, nuclear-related crises*/one in 1994 and one in
2006*/which clearly
illustrate the general pattern of retaliations and subsequent
concessions. In the
first case North Korea, which was on the verge of a major

breakthrough in its
nuclear programme in Yongbyon, nonetheless allowed a total of
six inspections
by the IAEA from 1992 to 1993. However, in late 1993
Pyongyang withdrew
from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty following a decision
by the American
and South Korean governments to resume the annual military
training exercise
Team Spirit and to re-target nuclear weapons at North Korea.
Finally, after
news of successful negotiations with former US President Carter
was broadcast
by CNN, Pyongyang withdrew 8000 nuclear fuel rods from the
Yongbyon
reactor and signed the Agreed Framework.
The second case of retaliation and concession occurred in
2005�06, when the
US froze North Korea’s account at BDA three days before
success in the Six-
Party Talks was to be announced (Department of Treasury,
2007). According to

David Asher, then the State Department’s point man on North
Korea, the US
decided to freeze the North Korean account to flaunt American
dominance of
the global financial network and its ability to ostracise
Pyongyang */ and any
branches of the Bank of China doing business with it */ from
the global
financial network (McGlynn 2007; Solomon and King Jr 2007).
By mid-
September, following urgent negotiations, the Six-Party Talks
had completed a
joint communiqué on denuclearisation. It seemed as if trust
building was on the
way. Freezing Pyongyang’s assets had proven even more painful
to North Korea
than Washington or Pyongyang could have anticipated, but it
worked. On 19
November 2007, some two years after North Korea’s assets at
BDA were
frozen, the US and North Korean delegations met in New York
to discuss
Pyongyang’s re-entry into the global financial network
(Heilprin, 2007). This
sequence of events illustrates how the mechanism of retaliation

(e.g. BDA) and
concession (e.g. Six-Party Talks) paved the way towards
normalisation through
denuclearisation.
A long-range review of this pattern readily leads one to the
conclusion that
Pyongyang’s provocative actions have mainly have been
intended to reposition
North Korea in negotiations with the United States. In this way
the two
countries’ relations over two decades can be seen as essentially
paradoxical
because provocations and aggressive gestures of retaliation have
repeatedly
seemed to help produce concessions and have increased mutual
trust.
The following section describes another paradox: the fact that
during, and in
spite of, the recent period of nuclear proliferation and hawkish
engagement,
civic and academic exchanges between North Korea and the US
have continued
to take place.
Pyongyang and Washington: towards a new relationship

It has been only 16 years since Pyongyang and Washington first
directly
encountered each other over nuclear and missile programmes.
Before this
nuclear issues were divided along cold war lines and settled by
either the US or
the Soviet Union. The US first deployed nuclear weapons in
South Korea in
1958 (Cumings 2005; Hayes 1991). It took about 30 years for
Pyongyang to
declare itself a nuclear power by completing the nuclear reactor
at Yongbyon in
1987 and then withdrawing plutonium fuel rods in 1989. During
most of this
114 Jongwoo Han
period the international community paid little attention to
Pyongyang’s ongoing
effort to develop its nuclear capability, even though it had
placed its reactors
under the regulation of the IAEA as early as 1977 (Cummings
2005; Wit et al.
2004).
However, since the collapse of the bipolar system in 1991, the
primary focal
issue within discussions of non-proliferation by the

international community
has been North Korea’s nuclear programme. From the beginning
North Korea’s
motive behind its programme has not been to be able to attack
the United States
but rather to arm itself with a nuclear deterrent in order to
establish itself as an
‘equal’ partner at the negotiating table and to normalise
relations with the
United States.
Given North Korea’s location, scholars such as Armstrong
(2007), Cummings
(2007; 2005), French (2005), Harrison (2002), Hoare and Pares
(2005), Mazarr
(2007), Sigal (1998a) and Wit et al. (2004), argue that there
were sufficient
threats from outside to justify Pyongyang’s belief that a nuclear
programme was
essential to its survival. Joint US�South Korean manoeuvres
involving nuclear
weapons clearly indicated Washington’s willingness to use them
against North
Korea, despite its simultaneous effort to ban the use of nuclear
weapons in
NATO countries (Hayes quoted in Harrison 2002: 198). French
(2005: 197)
argues that North Korea’s resulting well-founded fear of attack
has been the
primary reason behind its decision to withdraw from the Non-
Proliferation
Treaty in 1990 and develop its own nuclear capability.
Since 2003 a gradual but important process of trust building
through the Six-
Party Talks has replaced the earlier pattern of reciprocal

confrontations and
concessions described previously. Two countries, almost on the
verge of war,
instead began to explore the possibility of replacing the
armistice with a peace
treaty and normal relations (BBC News 2007).
It is notable that, as Sigal (2006: 363) has pointed out, most of
the
‘accommodations’ and ‘responses in kind’ regarding nuclear
and missile issues
have been made by North Korea. Pyongyang’s dogged
determination to press
for normal relations with the US is reflected not only in its
diplomatic actions
but also through its recent encouragement of civil exchanges
between the two
countries. Of particular note in this area are the recent visit to
the DPRK by the
New York Philharmonic Orchestra and the continuation of an
innovative
academic exchange programme between North Korea’s Kim
Chaek University
of Technology (KUT) and the US’s Syracuse University (SU),
the first of its kind
(Shin et al. 2003; Thorson and Carriere 2007). It is remarkable
that, during
2002�2006, through both governments’ encouragement, this
exchange pro-
gramme has continued, as clearly shown in Figure 1, despite
simultaneous
serious threats to diplomatic relations caused by the DPRK’s
nuclear activities.
For instance:
. In October 2002, soon after Washington revealed North

Korea’s HEU
programme to the world community, the second KUT delegation
visited SU.
. A month after the outbreak of the Iraq war in March 2003, the
KUT
delegation visited SU for five weeks.
. In November 2005, just after the freezing of North Korea’s
BDA account,
Chancellor Hong of KUT visited SU.
The irony of these extremely aggressive, and then surprisingly
conciliatory,
gestures is indicative of the many paradoxes in US�North
Korea relations as a
whole. The SU�KUT academic collaboration reflects both
Pyongyang’s desire to
advance its information technology infrastructure and
Washington’s interest in
gauging Pyongyang’s readiness for international engagement.
Conclusion
Since 1994 Washington’s dilemma with regard to North Korea
has been how to
deal with a player which has not only shown a willingness to go
all-in with a

nuclear wager but is also known worldwide for its appalling
record with regard
to human rights. In the midst of this dilemma the United States
seems to have
taken advantage of strained alliances between North Korea and
China to adopt
a strategy of using both sticks and carrots (‘hawkish
engagement’) to induce
Pyongyang’s concessionary attitude. Despite these advances, the
Cold War
continues on the Korean Peninsula */ a fact evidenced by North
Korea’s current
refusal to provide a complete nuclear declaration. As Harrison
(2002: 198) has
astutely pointed out, the seeds of the missile and nuclear
programmes in North
Korea were sown in the early 1960s, with the help of the Soviet
Union, and the
current turmoil centring on these issues between the DPRK and
the US reflects
growing pains that may be necessary to build trust in a new era
of relations
between Washington and Pyongyang.
Now, as Maass (2003: 12) has pointed out, the real issue is ‘not
whether Kim

is crazy enough to amass a nuclear arsenal but whether he is
crazy enough to
dispossess himself of his one bargaining chip’ to secure normal
relations with
Washington.
SU
establishes
research ties
with DPRK
Mission to
UN
First SU
team visits
DPRK
Six DPRK
faculty study at
SU for 4 weeks
Six DPRK
faculty study
at SU for 1
week
Second SU team
visits DPRK
Chancellors of KUT
and SU dually

endorse importance
of collaborations
RSLS meeting
held in China
RSLS meeting
in China
SU offers ICPC
training to DPRK
students in Beijing
ICPC finals
take place at
Alberta
Univ.
Cardiology
delegation visits
SU
DPRK Amb. Li
visits SU
Six faculty
members from
DPRK visit SU
April
2008
October
2007

August
2006
December
2005
November
2005
August
2005
June
2004
March
2004
April
2003
June
2002
March
2002
July
2001
May
2001
Figure 1. Chronology of bilateral research collaboration
between SU and KUT.

116 Jongwoo Han
The DPRK has now played all its cards and anxiously awaits
Washington’s
response to its wager. Washington, for its part, has sometimes
appeared
indecisive about what cards it wants to play. Moon (2088: 88),
who both
attended the second summit meeting on 2�4 October 2007 as a
special delegate
and participated in the 2000 summit, claims that:
What prompted [Chairman Kim Jong-il] to venture into a second
summit is
his perception of a genuine change in White House policy on
North Korea.
Kim seems to have high hopes that denuclearisation can be
exchanged for an
end to hostile relations and eventual diplomatic normalisation
with the
United States . . . In view of this, much still depends on
American policy,
which is why [actions by the US demand] our closest attention.
Given the short history of direct engagement between the US

and North Korea,
there will probably be more retaliations and concessions to
come. However, one
thing is clear: Washington, like Pyongyang, cannot afford to
fold and go back
to the starting point. The current negotiations on normalisation
between
Pyongyang and Washington could dramatically transform the
power politics of
East Asia. The stakes are enormous. Are we all prepared for a
new balance of
power with Pyongyang and Washington as allied forces alligned
against a rising
China and a recovering Russia? Or will it be a unified Korean
Peninsula that
serves as the primary balancing force among China, Russia,
Japan and the
United States? The emerging relationship between North Korea
and the United
States will not only shape the new political order in East Asia
but will also
greatly influence American national interest in this region.
The recent Tibetan uprising against China and gradual changes
in China’s

reaction to global forces may hint at how that country will react
if North Korea
were to come under the influence of the United States. Such an
occurrence
would grant Pyongyang more leverage, with regard to its
nuclear programme, in
its dealings with the US, because China would grant Pyongyang
more economic
aid and political support in the Six-Party Talks than before.
Perhaps
Pyongyang’s all-in for Washington is a two-track strategy to
enable it to kill
two birds with one stone. However, to be a truly winning hand,
Pyongyang’s
nuclear all-in for Washington and the latter’s move towards
normalisation must
also consider the implications of each country’s decisions for
Pyongyang’s
former allies, China and Russia, as well as for its other
important neighbour,
Japan. Vulnerable China, isolated Japan and distant Russia may
comprise a new
status quo that could prevent rapid resolution of the North
Korean nuclear issue

or normalisation of relations between Pyongyang and
Washington.
The global community is about to witness whether a long series
of retaliations
and concessions can now reach a finale, ending the last cold war
confrontation
and inviting a new form of alliance on the Korean Peninsula
involving Pyongyang,
Seoul and Washington, and a reshuffle of the power
relationships among all
parties involved, including China. The stakes have global
significance. They will
define for decades to come the impact of an eventually united
Korea on world
economic and political harmony.
Note
1. His comments were made on 11 December 2007 during a
meeting with a delegation from
Syracuse University at his residence in Seoul, Korea.
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120 Jongwoo Han
Korea’s pursuit of low-carbon green
growth: A middle-power state’s dream of
becoming a green pioneer

Heejin Han
Abstract After a brief introduction of the existing literature on
environmental
pioneer states and their internal characteristics, this study
examines various low-
carbon green growth (LCGG) initiatives that the South Korean
government
introduced to market Korea as a trendsetter in the global
environmental arena.
The country’s domestic foundations for environmental
innovation, however,
reveals a dissonance between its international aspirations and
the internal
conditions that are needed to sustain the pursuit. This case of
mixed environmental
achievements by a rising middle-power state suggests the
insufficiency of a state-led
approach to environmental innovation and leadership.
Keywords: green pioneer; Korea; green growth; environmental
innovation;
middle power.
Introduction
States remain the dominant actors in both producing and
enforcing domes-
tic and international environmental policy. They, for instance,
undertake
various leadership roles and contribute to regime formation in
the face of
increasing transnational environmental threats, such as, global
warming
(Eckersley 2004; J€anicke and Jacob 2004). Indeed,
environmental protec-

tion considerations have emerged as part of the contemporary
state’s port-
folio of core interests and responsibilities (Dryzek et al. 2002).
A country’s
response to environmental issues has also become a barometer
for measur-
ing progress of that society. Faucheux (2000) has predicted that
approxi-
mately 40% of the major innovations in 2010 would include, or
be
premised on, environmental factors. Moreover, the World
Economic
Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report (2012) has
found a
Heejin Han is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science
in the National University of
Singapore. Her research interests include environmental politics
and policy (with a regional
focus on East Asia), civil society development in China, non-
state entities’ roles in gover-
nance, and governance of water resources. E-mail:
[email protected]
Address: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts &
Social Sciences, National
University of Singapore, AS1, #04-49, 11 Arts Link, Singapore
117573
� 2015 Taylor & Francis
The Pacific Review, 2015
Vol. 28, No. 5, 731�754,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013491
mailto:[email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013491

consistent correlation between a country’s environmental policy
ambitions
and its system-wide competitiveness (J€anicke 2005: 134).
States, thus, often
adopt policy instruments and frameworks that are aimed at
shaping both
environmentally and economically competitive outcomes
(Aizawa and
Yang 2010; Damon and Sterner 2012; The Pew Charitable Trust
2009).
States primarily contribute to global environmental concerns
through
two mechanisms. First, some states contribute to building
international
environmental regimes by undertaking and exercising various
forms of
leadership (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Young 1989, 1991).
In this vein,
Young (1991) argues that states can exercise three types of
leadership �
structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual � in the process of
establishing
regimes for international environmental reform. Andersson and
Mol
(2002) add to this list the environmental leadership
demonstrated by states
that exhibit ambitious domestic environmental policies and their
effective
implementation.
Second, states contribute to global environment development
through the
diffusion and dissemination of innovative environmental

programs at both
the regional and international levels (Busch et al. 2005;
DeSombre 2000;
J€orgens 2004; Kern et al. 2001; Okano-Heijmans 2012; Tews
2005). States
have also been found to engage in regulatory competition with
one another
to obtain leading market positions and to benefit from ‘first-
mover’ advan-
tages (J€anicke 2005: 133; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Rabe
2007; Saikawa
2013; Wallace 1995), including the growth of national industrial
champions
(Andersen and Liefferink 1997). Best environmental practices,
through the
competitive behavior of states, lead to concrete economic
benefits.
Various studies have outlined the internal characteristics of
these pio-
neer or trendsetter states that lead innovation. J€anicke and
Jacob (2004:
37) maintain that states taking a lead in environmental issues
are character-
ized by a high per capita income, demanding buyers,
internationally recog-
nized high-quality standards, and innovation-friendly conditions
for
producers and users of advanced technology. J€anicke (2005:
138) further
argues that in addition to favorable windows of opportunity,
such as global
economic conditions and the emergence of new technologies,
domestic
capacity � including institutional, informational, and economic
capacity �

and strategic factors � including will and skill � make some
states natural
pioneers in the competition for sustainable environmental
policies and
practices. Moreover, green pioneer states benefit not just from
capable
government agencies, but also from the formation of advocacy
coalitions
that can uphold more progressive environmental policies
(J€anicke 2000,
2005). Various studies have found that domestic pressure from
non-
governmental entities, such as special interest groups, can affect
a state’s
decisions to promote innovative environmental policies (Bryner
2008; Dietz
et al. 2013; Kamieniecki 2006; Michaelowa 1998).
Environmental innova-
tions are, therefore, products of top-down state guidance and
promotion as
well as bottom-up demand (J€anicke and Jacob 2004: 34;
J€anicke 2005: 135).
732 The Pacific Review
Environmental pioneers, however, are not merely first-movers
in the
global green marketplace. They also aim to achieve
international visibility,
reputation, and intellectual leadership, which are highly coveted
political
objectives (J€anicke 2005: 139). The environmental policy
realm provides
opportunities to demonstrate leadership and innovation not only

for pow-
erful states, but also for middle-power states, such as those
found in north-
ern Europe (Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Andersson and Mol
2002).
The concept of a middle-power state remains somewhat
contentious.
Some authors have chosen to focus on the importance of a
state’s structural
position or economic and military capabilities (Holbrand 1971;
Neack
1993; Wood 1987). Others have chosen to focus on particular
functions and
roles a state may play in international organizations (Neack
2008). For
instance, Keohane (1969) defines a middle-power state as one
that cannot
effectively act alone, but may be able to have a systemic impact
in a small
group or through an international institution. In contrast to this,
other
authors have looked at the psychological dimension and
intentions of mid-
dle-power countries. For instance, Cooper (1997, 2013) defines
middle-
power states as those willing to take the initiative in specific
areas they see
themselves as having the necessary qualifications to effect
change in.
Particularly due to the absence of dominant global players, the
environ-
mental arena can be seen by these middle-power states as a
unique plat-
form for demonstrating their innovation and leadership abilities.

With this discussion in mind, this article critically assesses the
implemen-
tation and performance of the low-carbon green growth (LCGG)
policy
pursued by Korea during the Lee Myung-bak administration
(2008�2013).
The administration adopted various policy programs and
initiatives to meet
domestic and international challenges, and to expand its
influence as a mid-
dle-power country by marking itself as a global environmental
pioneer.
This research, by drawing attention to the country’s ambitions
to become a
global environmental leader, enriches the existing literature on
environ-
mental innovation by middle powers. It does this by
demonstrating how a
rising middle-power state can expand its power and leadership
in the global
environmental arena by pursuing aggressive environmental
policies.
Korea has characterized itself as a middle-power state since at
least the
mid-1990s, when its government began pursuing greater
international influ-
ence commensurate with the size of its economy, population,
and military
capacity. Numerous studies have applied the middle-power
concept to ana-
lyze Korea’s foreign policy (Choi 2009; Cooper 2013; Kim and
Jones 2007;
Robertson 2007; Rozman 2006; Saxer 2013). These studies
have, however,
largely described Korea’s attempts to expand its regional and

global influ-
ence through foreign economic diplomacy. Korea’s role in
global environ-
mental politics, a non-traditional security realm, has not been as
extensively documented.
Several factors make Korea an interesting case. First, studies on
green
pioneers have thus far focused on Western countries that have
dominated
H. Han: Korea’s Pursuit of Low-Carbon Green Growth 733
the field of environmental innovation for decades. By focusing
on Korea,
however, this article examines the example of an emerging
green state
from a non-Western hemisphere. The Korean experience might
generate
useful policy lessons for other emerging states (such as Brazil,
China, and
India) that have also pursued low-carbon development strategies
through
various innovative policies (Aizawa and Yang 2010; Dent
2012). Second,
Korea’s state-led campaign to market itself as a global
environmental
leader (Kang et al. 2012; Seong 2011: 20; Watson 2012) offers
critical
insights for future research into the diverse paths that a state
may take in
pursuing environmental policies. Third, in succeeding the Lee
administra-
tion, the Park Geun-hye government has promoted the concept

of a
‘creative economy’. The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future
Planning
(MSIFP) of the Park administration defines the concept as an
economic
model in which creative assets are generated through the
convergence of
ideas sourced from the fields of science and technology, and
especially in
relation to the information and communication technology (ICT)
industry
(MSIFP undated). Although the term does not explicitly
incorporate envi-
ronmental elements, a thorough examination of Korea’s LCGG
policy (as
pursued by the Lee administration) may provide the new
leadership with
valuable insights. As a middle-power state with limited
structural power to
translate its resources and capacity into bargaining leverage,
Korea is likely
to continue emphasizing the power of ideas and its intellectual
capital in
bargaining on the world stage (Saxer 2013: 411). This study
will explore
what Korea, moving forward, might learn from the successes
and failures
of Lee’s LCGG policy.
Factors driving Korea’s introduction of LCGG
Lee Myung-bak introduced the LCGG policy in a speech
entitled ‘A Great
People with New Dreams’, which he delivered in August 2008
during
Korea’s celebration of the 60th anniversary of the republic’s

foundation.1
He urged the nation to join the government in promoting his
green growth
vision (Lee 2008). This vision emphasized the need to forge a
win–win rela-
tionship between environmental concerns and economic growth
by inte-
grating environmental goals into the national development
strategy (Lee
and Yun 2011: 293; Seong 2011: 17). Lee also expressed the
new adminis-
tration’s aspiration to mark Korea as a global green pioneer.
Various factors pertinent to Korea’s national interests �
economic
growth, energy security, the need for crisis and risk
management, as well as
soft power concerns � informed the Lee administration’s
decision to adopt
LCGG (Iglauer 2011; Watson 2012). First and foremost, the Lee
adminis-
tration realized that the conventional growth model that Korea
had main-
tained in the past was no longer sustainable. This was because
the model
had resulted in a pattern of energy- and resource-intensive
economic
development that had been undertaken at the expense of the
environment
(Jeong and Seo 2012). Furthermore, Korea’s rapidly aging

population and
increasing energy dependence meant that a quantity-oriented
growth strat-
egy that simply relies on a continuous input of labor, capital,
and natural
resources would not be sustainable, and would eventually
diminish the
country’s global competitiveness. Accordingly, the government
began to
emphasize the urgency of transitioning to a knowledge-based
economy
(Lee 2010a, 2010b). It believed that green technologies and
high-tech, high
value-added industries would serve as the new engines for
economic
growth, while also redressing the negative impact that Korea’s
industrial
development had had on the environment. Lee believed that by
setting
ambitious goals and by aggressively pursuing them, Korea
would emerge
as a global environmental leader (Lee 2008). Lee’s
administration, for
instance, pledged to make an all-out investment to expand the
use of
renewable energy from 2% to more than 11% by 2030 and,
ultimately, to
more than 20% by 2050. Research and development (R&D)
investment in
green technology would also boost Korea’s global market share
to 8%
within five years (Jones and Yoo 2011: 6).
The Lee administration also expected that the shift to a greener
eco-
nomic development paradigm would help Korea reduce its

dependence on
energy imports, thus improving its overall energy security.
Korea’s export-
oriented economy had relied on imported fossil fuels, which fed
up to 97%
of its energy needs. In 2010, Korea ranked ninth in terms of oil
consump-
tion, tenth in electricity consumption, tenth in gas imports, and
fourth in
oil imports in the world (Yun et al. 2011). The country’s
growing need for
energy and its reliance on imported sources threatened its
energy security.
This vulnerability served as a driving imperative for Korea to
explore ways
of enhancing its energy security by increasing domestic supply
from renew-
able and nuclear sources (Yun et al. 2011). Lee argued that the
LCGG
vision would help Korea raise its energy self-sufficiency rate
from 5% to
18% during his tenure, and eventually to 50% by 2050 (Lee
2008).
The Korean government also began to pay greater attention to
various
global challenges that emerged in the new millennium, as both
potential
sources of crises and risk. For instance, in late 2008, the global
financial cri-
sis destabilized Korea’s export-oriented economy, decreasing its
growth
rate to below 4% and increasing the number of the unemployed
to 757,000
(Chon 2009). The oil price hike during the crisis made energy
imports

costly, further straining the Korean economy and its energy
security pro-
spectus. In 2008 alone, Korea spent over one-third of its export
revenue on
energy imports. These and other domestic problems, triggered
by the vola-
tile global economic landscape, provided the impetus for Korea
to explore
innovative avenues in an attempt to limit its vulnerability and
reliance on
the international market (Pascha 2010). While introducing
LCGG in 2008,
Lee compared the 2008 economic crisis to the 1997 Asian
financial crisis
and urged the nation to turn the experience into an opportunity
to
restructure its economy and generate new growth. Lee argued
that LCGG
and its programs should be seen as innovative solutions for
improving the
country’s competitiveness and resilience in the contemporary
economic cli-
mate (Lee 2008).
The Korean government also realized that the international
community
would increase pressure on the country to take greater
environmental
responsibility (Lee 2010b). Indeed, Korea had become one of
the world’s
heaviest polluters. Between 1971 and 1997, its energy use

increased at an
annual rate of 8.8%. In tandem with this, between 1990 and
2007, the
country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions doubled, the highest
increase of
any organization for economic cooperation and development
(OECD) coun-
try (Park and Cho 2011). As of 2012, Korea was the tenth
largest energy con-
sumer and the tenth largest GHG emitter in the world (US EIA
2012). Thus,
the Korean government expected that the post-Kyoto climate
change regime
would demand sterner environmental regulation and policy.
Korea had also
become increasingly vulnerable to the negative impact of global
climate
change. Over the last century, the country’s average
temperature increased
by 1.5 �C, double the global average (Yun et al. 2011).
Consequently, Korea
now faces higher risks of flooding and drought, induced by
climate change,
which could cost billions of dollars to rectify (World Bank
2010). These envi-
ronmental challenges have forced the Korean government to pay
greater
attention to environmental concerns. The Lee administration,
thus, adopted
the LCGG policy as a means of fulfilling responsibilities to the
global climate
change agenda while increasing economic competitiveness.
The Lee administration also saw the green growth initiative as
part of its
foreign policy vision for a ‘Global Korea’. This initiative

expressed the
administration’s commitment to global diplomacy and the
global move-
ment for peace and development and ultimately aimed to
position Korea
as a responsible and contributing member of the international
community
(Snyder 2009: 23). Through this initiative, Lee’s administration
envisioned
Korea as a proactive international leader and as one of the
strongest newly
industrialized countries (Olbrich and Shim 2012). Lee further
sought to
enhance Korea’s soft power capabilities by improving its
international
image and reputation mainly by positioning the country as a
pioneer in
green growth and innovation (Nye 2010).
Finally, Lee’s personal ambitions also influenced his promotion
of
LCGG.2 During his tenure as Mayor of Seoul, Lee implemented
the
Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project, which turned one of the
metropoli-
tan city’s most polluted conduits into a natural stream. The
stream was cov-
ered by an elevated freeway when, between 1955 and 1970,
pollution in it
became unmanageable. The road had remained one of the most
congested
areas in Seoul (Lee 2011b: 250). However, Lee completed the
river restora-
tion within two years of planning, despite several obstacles,
including traf-
fic problems, reconstruction costs, and public resistance. Since

then, the
stream has become a landmark tourist attraction in Seoul. For
the project,
Lee was awarded the Best Public Administration Award for
Urban Con-
struction at the 2003 Venice Biennale (Lee 2011b: 258�9) and
was also
chosen by Time magazine as one of its Heroes of the
Environment in 2007
(Walsh 2007). Lee acknowledged that this experience led him to
develop
an interest in sustainable development and environmental issues
(Lee
2011b: 267). Thus, the administration’s global efforts to
promote green
growth as a key element of ‘Global Korea’, with the attendant
mobilization
of financial and diplomatic resources, can be understood as
partial conse-
quence of Lee’s ambition to become a global environmental
leader (Lee
2010a). Indeed, in his keynote speech at the 64th UN General
Assembly in
September 2009, Lee expressed his commitment to expanding
Korea’s
global responsibilities through green growth initiatives (Lee
2009).
Korea’s pursuit of LCGG and policy outputs
The Lee administration introduced various programs and

measures under
the overarching LCGG vision. At the domestic level, it
assembled a presi-
dential committee solely devoted to green growth and
promulgated a com-
prehensive body of law on green growth intended to establish
institutional
and legal foundations (Jones and Yoo 2011; Seong 2011). The
government
also promulgated the National Strategy for Green Growth, a
high-level
government plan with three primary objectives: (1) to promote a
mutually
beneficial relationship between economic growth and
environmental pro-
tection; (2) to improve citizen’s quality of life and promote
environmental
sensitivity in their daily lives; and (3) to contribute to
international efforts
to fight climate change and other environmental threats (Jones
and Yoo
2011: 6). Reflecting a rising middle power’s ambition, this
national strategy
also set specific and concrete targets, such as raising Korea’s
position to
that of the seventh largest global green power by 2020 and the
fifth by 2050
(Woo 2010; Yun et al. 2011).
Moreover, the administration embarked on various initiatives to
pursue
LCGG at the international level. Although Korea has promoted
regional
cooperation as a middle-power state for some period of time
(Kim 2014;
Yoon 2006), the administration’s promotion of LCGG was more

broadly
aimed at a global audience. As such, its specific programs and
initiatives can
be grouped into two categories: (1) showcasing best practices
through the
integration of LCGG into the national development vision; and
(2) expand-
ing global environmental responsibility by contributing to
institution building
and by assisting less developed countries on their paths toward
green growth.
Showcasing best practices
One of the three objectives included in the administration’s
National Strat-
egy for Green Growth was to portray Korea as a role model by
taking the
lead in the global green growth movement. The President’s
annual State of
the Nation speech also expressed the government’s ambition to
make
Korea one of the first countries in the world to adopt green
growth as a
national developmental vision, a vision that was also shared by
both the
OECD and UN (Lee 2011a).
The concept of green growth was first introduced to Korea
during the
Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in

Asia and the
Pacific (MCED), held in Seoul in March 2005 (Chon 2009).
Jointly hosted
by Korea’s Ministry of Environment and the UN Economic and
Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the MCED
adopted
the Seoul Initiative on Environmentally Sustainable Economic
Growth.
The initiative aimed to promote sustainable economic
development in the
Asia-Pacific region by establishing communication networks
among mem-
ber countries to promote the sharing of information,
cooperation, and pol-
icy support for green growth (UNESCAP 2005). When the
OECD and
several other states reintroduced green growth as a global issue
by signing
the Green Growth Declaration in June 2009, Korea was already
at the
forefront of integrating green growth into its national economic
develop-
ment strategy (Zelenovskaya 2012). Korea’s active participation
in these
international meetings, both as a host country and participant,
indicated
that it intended to define itself as a leader in the global green
growth arena.
Accompanied by measures to promote itself as a global leader,
the
Korean government also introduced various environmental
programs as a
lever for economic recovery (HSBC 2009). The Green New
Deal, launched

in January 2009, was designed to serve these goals (World Bank
2010).
Korea adopted a stimulus package program, worth $38.1 billion
(the equiv-
alent to 4% of its GDP) to fight the recession triggered by the
global finan-
cial crisis. Of this amount, it allocated $30.7 billion, or about
81%, to its
environmental projects under the Green New Deal (Normile
2010a: 1570).
The Korean government expected that its spending on various
projects �
renewable energy ($1.80 billion), energy-efficient buildings
($6.19 billion),
low-carbon vehicles ($1.80 billion), railways ($7.01 billion),
and water and
waste management ($13.89 billion) (World Bank 2012) � would
stimulate
economic production to the tune of $141.1�160.4 billion
between 2009 and
2013. The country also expected that the domestic green market
would
grow from KRW 1.8 billion to KRW 17 billion. Consequently,
Korea’s
share in the global green market was expected to grow from
1.4% to 5%
during the same period, reaching an ultimate projected growth
of 13% by
2020 (Hahm and Choi 2009: 632). The administration expected
that this
program would create 1.6�1.8 million domestic jobs (World
Bank 2010).
Korea thus marked itself as a leader in the green economy by
imple-
menting a stimulus package just three months after the UN

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