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CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Práticas de gestão de segurança
Anchises M. G. de Paula
Formação CISSP
Grupo de Estudos de São Paulo
Fevereiro de 2006
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Purpose
• Purpouse of Information Security
Management
– Confidentiality
– Integrity
– Availability
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Purpose
• Confidentiality
– Unauthorized people, resources and processes
cannot access the information
– Crucial aspects:
• user identification, authentication and authorization
– Threats:
• Hackers
• Masqueraders
• Unauthorized user activity
• Unprotected downloaded files
• Networks
• Trojan horses
• Social engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Purpose
• Integrity
– Protection from intentional or accidental
unauthorized changes
– Ensure that information and process are
maintained in the stat that users expect
– 3 basic principles are used to establish
integrity controls:
• Need-to-know access (least privilege)
• Separation of duties
• Rotation of Duties
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Purpose
• Availability
– Assurance that computer systems are
acessible by authorized users whenever
needed
– Two facets:
• Denial-of-service
• Loss of data processing capabilities
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Risk Analysis is a method of identifying
risks and assessing the possible
damage that could be caused in order
to justify security safeguards.
• Risk management addresses 3
fundamental questions:
– What can be done? (risk mitigation)
– How much will it cost?
– Is it cost-effective?
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Quantitative risk analysis:
– Assign indenpendently objective numeric
numbers
• Estimate value of assets to be protected.
• Identify each threat and corresponding risk
• Estimate loss potential of each risk
• Estimate possible frequency of threat
– Recognize and recommend remedial
measures
– “fact-based”
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Qualitative risk analysis:
– Walk through different scenarios and rank
threats or sensitivity of assets.
– Techniques include judgement, intuition and
experience.
• Some methods are delphi, brainstorming, story
boarding, focus groups, surveys, questionnaires,
one-on-one meetings and interviews.
– “perception-based”
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Qualitative - Pros
– Calculations are simple and readily understood and execute
– Not necessary to determine quantitative threat frequency & impact data
– Not necessary to estimate the cost of recommended risk mitigation
measures & calculate cost/benefit
– A general indication of significant areas of risk that should be addressed is
provided
• Qualitative - Cons
– Risk assessment & results are essentially subjective in both process &
metrics. Use of independently objective metrics is eschewed.
– No effort is made to develop an objective monetary basis for the value of
targeted information assets
– No basis is provided for cost/benefit analysis of risk mitigation measures.
Only subjective indication of a problem
– It is not possible to track risk management performance objectively when
all measures are subjective
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Quantitative - Pros
– Assessment & results are based substantially on independently objective
processes & metrics. Thus, meaningful statistical analysis is supported
– The value of information (availability, confidentiality & integrity) as
expressed in monetary terms with supporting rationale, is better
understood. Thus, the basis for expected loss is better understood.
– A credible basis for cost/benefit assessment of risk mitigation measures is
provided. Thus, information security budget decision-making is supported
• Quantitative - Cons
– Calculations are complex. If they are not understood or effectively
explained, management may mistrust the results of black-box testing
– A substantial amount of information about the target information & its IT
environment must be gathered
– There is not yet a standard, independently developed & maintained threat
population & frequency knowledge base. Thus, users must rely on the
credibility of the vendors who develop & support the automated tools or do
perform the research.
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Elements of risk metrics:
– Asset value
– Threat frequency
– Threat exposure factor
– Safeguard effectiveness
– Safeguard Cost
– Uncertainty
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Exposure Factor
– Magnitude of loss or impact on the value of the asset
– Percent (0 to 100%)
• Annualized Rate of Occurence (ARO)
– The frequency with which a threat is expected to
occur
– 50 times in a given year -> ARO = 50.0
• Single Loss Expectancy or Exposure (SLE)
– Monetary loss (impact) for a threatened event
– SLE = Asset value X Exposure Factor
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE)
– Establish the basis for meaningful
cost/benefit analysis of risk reduction
measures
– ALE = SLE X ARO
– Ex:
• Threat that is expected to occur about once in 10
years (ARO = 1/10)
• Impact for the threat: $ 1.000.000 (SLE)
• ALE = $ 100.000,00
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Information Risk Management
– Establish Information Risk Management
Policy
– Establish and fund na IRM team
– Establish IRM methodology & tools
– Identify and measure risk
– Project sizing
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Remedies
– Risk Reduction - implementation of controls
to alter risk position
– Risk Transference - get insurance, transfer
cost of a loss to insurance
– Risk Acceptance - Accept the risk, absorb
loss
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Exemplo 1 (Official Guide, pg 21)
– Take a look at the risk of fire.
– Assume that the asset value is 1 M$, the exposure
factor is 50% and the annualized rate of occurance is
1/10 (once in 10 years).
– SLE = 1 M$ x 0,5 = $ 500,000
– ALE = SLE x 1/10 = $ 50K
http://urru.org
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Exemplo 2 (Harris, Shon; “Security School”)
– If ALE for a specific asset is $78,000, and after
implementation of the control the new ALE is
$20,000 and the annual cost of the control is
$60,000, what is the value of the control to the
company?
– Should the control be implemented?
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Risk Analysis
• Exemplo 2
– If ALE for a specific asset is $78,000, and after
implementation of the control the new ALE is
$20,000 and the annual cost of the control is
$60,000, what is the value of the control to the
company?
– Should the control be implemented?
Safeguard benefit:
$78,000 - $20,000 = $58,000
Value of the countermeasure to the company:
$58,000 - $60,000 = -$2,000
– A countermeasure should mitigate the identified risk
and be cost-effective !
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Information Classification
• The primary purpose of data
classification is to indicate the level of
confidentiality, integrity and availability
that is required for each type of
information.
• Tools:
– Policy
– Risk Analysis
– Establish classifications
– Establish mechanisms (minimum controls)
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Information Classification
• Classifications (example):
Commercial Military
Confidential Top Secret
Private Secret
Sensitive Confidential
Public Sensitive but unclassified
Public
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Information Classification
• Roles & responsibilities
– Information owner
– Information custodian
– Application owner
– User manager
– Security administrator
– Security analyst
– Change control analyst
– Data analyst
– Solution provider
– End user
Págs 40-44 Official Guide
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Data Classification
• Layers of Responsibility:
– Information Owner: Senior management, ultimately
responsible for protection and use of data.
Determines data classification.
– Information Custodian: Responsibility for
maintenance and protection of data. Usually IT
department. Makes backups, performs restores, etc.
– End User: Any individual who routinely uses the data
for work related purposes. Also considered
“consumer” of the data. Must follow operating
procedures and take due care to protect.
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Security Policy
• Policies, standards, baselines ando procedures
are key elements in ensuring that personnel
understand hos to handle specific job tasks.
• Objectives:
– State and clarify goals
– Define duties, responsibilities and authority
– Formalize duties
• Separation of duties
• Rotation of assignments
– Establish standards
– Provide information (communicate management
directions)
– Educate users
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Separation of Duties
• The principle of separation of duties is that an
organization should carefully seperate duties, so that
people involved with checking for inappropriate use are
not also capable of making such inappropriate use. No
person should be responsible for completing a task
involving sensitive, valuable or critical information from
beginning to end. Likewise, a single person must not be
responsible for approving their own work.
• Some examples of things that should be separated are:
– development / production
– security / audit
– account payable / accounts receivable
– encryption key management / changing of keys
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Security Policy
• Security Policy: General statement produced by senior
management.
• Standards: Specify a product or mechanism selected
for universal use. Usually mandatory activities, actions,
rules or regulations).
• Baseline: Mandatory descriptions of how to implement
security packages (for each platform).
• Procedures: Detailed step by step actions to achieve
the tasks necessary for compliance with standards.
• Guidelines: More general statements to provide
direction in policy grey areas (controls not covered by
procedures). Not mandatory – discretionary
recommendations.
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Security Policy
• Exemplo:
– Security Policy: “Information Custodians are
responsible to provide a safe and secure processing
environment (...)”.
– Standard: “Custodians of information processing
systens must use XXXX anti-viral software to ensure
the system is free from destructive software
elements (...)”.
– Procedure: “All users utilizing XXXX anti-viral
software will have anti-viral signature files updates
weekly”.
– Guideline: All employees having acess to computer
systems should attend a trainning session on the
virus trhreat to understand the risks and damage of
a virus infection”.
Págs 51-53 Official Guide
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Security Awareness Training
• Benefits of Awareness
– Measurable reduction in unauthorized
access attempts
– Increase effectiveness of control
– Help to avoid fraud and abuse
• Periodic awareness sessions for new
employees and refresh other
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Principais tópicos
• Purpouse (CIA)
• Risk Analysys & Assessement
• Information Classification
• Policies, procedures, standards, etc
• Awareness
• Social Engineering
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Social engineering
• Process of attempting to change
people´s behavior on a predictable
manner
– Sucessfull (or not) attempts to influence a
person(s) into either revealing information
or acting in a manner that would result in
unauthorized access to / unauthorized use
of / unauthorized disclosure of na
information system, a network or data.
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Social engineering
• Social engineering attacks:
– Intelligence gathering
– Target Selection
– The attack:
• Ego (or vanity) attack
• Sympathy attacks
• Intimidation attacks
• Protection:
– Physical security
– Logical security
– Administrative security
• Awareness and education
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Fontes
• Official (ISC)2 guide to the CISSP exam
• Ben Rothke, apresentação “Security Management
Practices” (www.securitydocs.com)
• Derek Prueitt , documento “CISSP_KEEP”
(www.securitydocs.com)
• JWG, CISSP Study Notes from CISSP Prep Guide
(www.securitydocs.com)
• Harris, Shon, Security School
(http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/content/0,290959,sid14_gci10107
19,00.html)
• Fotos “The Hitchhiker's Guide To the Galaxy”: Yahoo! Movies
• Fotos de posters: http://www.securityawareness.com
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Obrigado
Don’t panic.
CISSP
SP
Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006
http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp
Non-commercial Share Alike (by-nc-sa)
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 License. To view a copy of this
license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/
or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th
Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.

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Praticas de gestão de segurança

  • 1. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Práticas de gestão de segurança Anchises M. G. de Paula Formação CISSP Grupo de Estudos de São Paulo Fevereiro de 2006
  • 2. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 3. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 4. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Purpose • Purpouse of Information Security Management – Confidentiality – Integrity – Availability
  • 5. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Purpose • Confidentiality – Unauthorized people, resources and processes cannot access the information – Crucial aspects: • user identification, authentication and authorization – Threats: • Hackers • Masqueraders • Unauthorized user activity • Unprotected downloaded files • Networks • Trojan horses • Social engineering
  • 6. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Purpose • Integrity – Protection from intentional or accidental unauthorized changes – Ensure that information and process are maintained in the stat that users expect – 3 basic principles are used to establish integrity controls: • Need-to-know access (least privilege) • Separation of duties • Rotation of Duties
  • 7. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Purpose • Availability – Assurance that computer systems are acessible by authorized users whenever needed – Two facets: • Denial-of-service • Loss of data processing capabilities
  • 8. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 9. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Risk Analysis is a method of identifying risks and assessing the possible damage that could be caused in order to justify security safeguards. • Risk management addresses 3 fundamental questions: – What can be done? (risk mitigation) – How much will it cost? – Is it cost-effective?
  • 10. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Quantitative risk analysis: – Assign indenpendently objective numeric numbers • Estimate value of assets to be protected. • Identify each threat and corresponding risk • Estimate loss potential of each risk • Estimate possible frequency of threat – Recognize and recommend remedial measures – “fact-based”
  • 11. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Qualitative risk analysis: – Walk through different scenarios and rank threats or sensitivity of assets. – Techniques include judgement, intuition and experience. • Some methods are delphi, brainstorming, story boarding, focus groups, surveys, questionnaires, one-on-one meetings and interviews. – “perception-based”
  • 12. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Qualitative - Pros – Calculations are simple and readily understood and execute – Not necessary to determine quantitative threat frequency & impact data – Not necessary to estimate the cost of recommended risk mitigation measures & calculate cost/benefit – A general indication of significant areas of risk that should be addressed is provided • Qualitative - Cons – Risk assessment & results are essentially subjective in both process & metrics. Use of independently objective metrics is eschewed. – No effort is made to develop an objective monetary basis for the value of targeted information assets – No basis is provided for cost/benefit analysis of risk mitigation measures. Only subjective indication of a problem – It is not possible to track risk management performance objectively when all measures are subjective
  • 13. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Quantitative - Pros – Assessment & results are based substantially on independently objective processes & metrics. Thus, meaningful statistical analysis is supported – The value of information (availability, confidentiality & integrity) as expressed in monetary terms with supporting rationale, is better understood. Thus, the basis for expected loss is better understood. – A credible basis for cost/benefit assessment of risk mitigation measures is provided. Thus, information security budget decision-making is supported • Quantitative - Cons – Calculations are complex. If they are not understood or effectively explained, management may mistrust the results of black-box testing – A substantial amount of information about the target information & its IT environment must be gathered – There is not yet a standard, independently developed & maintained threat population & frequency knowledge base. Thus, users must rely on the credibility of the vendors who develop & support the automated tools or do perform the research.
  • 14. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Elements of risk metrics: – Asset value – Threat frequency – Threat exposure factor – Safeguard effectiveness – Safeguard Cost – Uncertainty
  • 15. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Exposure Factor – Magnitude of loss or impact on the value of the asset – Percent (0 to 100%) • Annualized Rate of Occurence (ARO) – The frequency with which a threat is expected to occur – 50 times in a given year -> ARO = 50.0 • Single Loss Expectancy or Exposure (SLE) – Monetary loss (impact) for a threatened event – SLE = Asset value X Exposure Factor
  • 16. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) – Establish the basis for meaningful cost/benefit analysis of risk reduction measures – ALE = SLE X ARO – Ex: • Threat that is expected to occur about once in 10 years (ARO = 1/10) • Impact for the threat: $ 1.000.000 (SLE) • ALE = $ 100.000,00
  • 17. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Information Risk Management – Establish Information Risk Management Policy – Establish and fund na IRM team – Establish IRM methodology & tools – Identify and measure risk – Project sizing
  • 18. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Remedies – Risk Reduction - implementation of controls to alter risk position – Risk Transference - get insurance, transfer cost of a loss to insurance – Risk Acceptance - Accept the risk, absorb loss
  • 19. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Exemplo 1 (Official Guide, pg 21) – Take a look at the risk of fire. – Assume that the asset value is 1 M$, the exposure factor is 50% and the annualized rate of occurance is 1/10 (once in 10 years). – SLE = 1 M$ x 0,5 = $ 500,000 – ALE = SLE x 1/10 = $ 50K http://urru.org
  • 20. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Exemplo 2 (Harris, Shon; “Security School”) – If ALE for a specific asset is $78,000, and after implementation of the control the new ALE is $20,000 and the annual cost of the control is $60,000, what is the value of the control to the company? – Should the control be implemented?
  • 21. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Risk Analysis • Exemplo 2 – If ALE for a specific asset is $78,000, and after implementation of the control the new ALE is $20,000 and the annual cost of the control is $60,000, what is the value of the control to the company? – Should the control be implemented? Safeguard benefit: $78,000 - $20,000 = $58,000 Value of the countermeasure to the company: $58,000 - $60,000 = -$2,000 – A countermeasure should mitigate the identified risk and be cost-effective !
  • 22. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 23. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Information Classification • The primary purpose of data classification is to indicate the level of confidentiality, integrity and availability that is required for each type of information. • Tools: – Policy – Risk Analysis – Establish classifications – Establish mechanisms (minimum controls)
  • 24. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Information Classification • Classifications (example): Commercial Military Confidential Top Secret Private Secret Sensitive Confidential Public Sensitive but unclassified Public
  • 25. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Information Classification • Roles & responsibilities – Information owner – Information custodian – Application owner – User manager – Security administrator – Security analyst – Change control analyst – Data analyst – Solution provider – End user Págs 40-44 Official Guide
  • 26. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Data Classification • Layers of Responsibility: – Information Owner: Senior management, ultimately responsible for protection and use of data. Determines data classification. – Information Custodian: Responsibility for maintenance and protection of data. Usually IT department. Makes backups, performs restores, etc. – End User: Any individual who routinely uses the data for work related purposes. Also considered “consumer” of the data. Must follow operating procedures and take due care to protect.
  • 27. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 28. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Security Policy • Policies, standards, baselines ando procedures are key elements in ensuring that personnel understand hos to handle specific job tasks. • Objectives: – State and clarify goals – Define duties, responsibilities and authority – Formalize duties • Separation of duties • Rotation of assignments – Establish standards – Provide information (communicate management directions) – Educate users
  • 29. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Separation of Duties • The principle of separation of duties is that an organization should carefully seperate duties, so that people involved with checking for inappropriate use are not also capable of making such inappropriate use. No person should be responsible for completing a task involving sensitive, valuable or critical information from beginning to end. Likewise, a single person must not be responsible for approving their own work. • Some examples of things that should be separated are: – development / production – security / audit – account payable / accounts receivable – encryption key management / changing of keys
  • 30. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Security Policy • Security Policy: General statement produced by senior management. • Standards: Specify a product or mechanism selected for universal use. Usually mandatory activities, actions, rules or regulations). • Baseline: Mandatory descriptions of how to implement security packages (for each platform). • Procedures: Detailed step by step actions to achieve the tasks necessary for compliance with standards. • Guidelines: More general statements to provide direction in policy grey areas (controls not covered by procedures). Not mandatory – discretionary recommendations.
  • 31. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Security Policy • Exemplo: – Security Policy: “Information Custodians are responsible to provide a safe and secure processing environment (...)”. – Standard: “Custodians of information processing systens must use XXXX anti-viral software to ensure the system is free from destructive software elements (...)”. – Procedure: “All users utilizing XXXX anti-viral software will have anti-viral signature files updates weekly”. – Guideline: All employees having acess to computer systems should attend a trainning session on the virus trhreat to understand the risks and damage of a virus infection”. Págs 51-53 Official Guide
  • 32. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 33. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Security Awareness Training • Benefits of Awareness – Measurable reduction in unauthorized access attempts – Increase effectiveness of control – Help to avoid fraud and abuse • Periodic awareness sessions for new employees and refresh other
  • 34. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Principais tópicos • Purpouse (CIA) • Risk Analysys & Assessement • Information Classification • Policies, procedures, standards, etc • Awareness • Social Engineering
  • 35. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Social engineering • Process of attempting to change people´s behavior on a predictable manner – Sucessfull (or not) attempts to influence a person(s) into either revealing information or acting in a manner that would result in unauthorized access to / unauthorized use of / unauthorized disclosure of na information system, a network or data.
  • 36. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Social engineering • Social engineering attacks: – Intelligence gathering – Target Selection – The attack: • Ego (or vanity) attack • Sympathy attacks • Intimidation attacks • Protection: – Physical security – Logical security – Administrative security • Awareness and education
  • 37. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Fontes • Official (ISC)2 guide to the CISSP exam • Ben Rothke, apresentação “Security Management Practices” (www.securitydocs.com) • Derek Prueitt , documento “CISSP_KEEP” (www.securitydocs.com) • JWG, CISSP Study Notes from CISSP Prep Guide (www.securitydocs.com) • Harris, Shon, Security School (http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/content/0,290959,sid14_gci10107 19,00.html) • Fotos “The Hitchhiker's Guide To the Galaxy”: Yahoo! Movies • Fotos de posters: http://www.securityawareness.com
  • 38. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Obrigado Don’t panic.
  • 39. CISSP SP Grupo de estudos de São Paulo - 2006 http://br.groups.yahoo.com/group/cisspbr-sp Non-commercial Share Alike (by-nc-sa) This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.