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Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile: Board abandons
plans, fearing antitrust concerns would derail
any merger
MICHAEL J DE LA MERCED. International New York Times;
Paris [Paris] 07 Aug 2014: 15.
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Meanwhile, T-Mobile may have to contend with another
takeover bid. A French mobile upstart, Iliad, disclosed last
week that it had bid $15 billion for a 56.6 percent stake in T-
Mobile
US.
The end of the talks also leaves open the question of what
Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile's majority owner, will do next.
The German telecommunications company had signaled that it
would like to eventually sell off its T-Mobile stake, and a deal
with Sprint would have been the quickest path to that. Much of
the telecom industry has barreled relentlessly toward
consolidation, as companies have grasped for bigger scale.
Already this year, both Comcast and AT&T have announced
huge deals meant to bolster their reach.
A proposed combination of Sprint and T-Mobile, uniting the
third- and fourth-biggest carriers in the United States, had been
fiercely questioned by officials at both the Federal
Communications Commission and the Justice Department. In
2011, AT&T's attempts to buy T-Mobile for $39 billion failed
after the [Obama] administration sued to block the deal.
Sprint's board cited concerns that American antitrust regulators
would block a deal for T-Mobile, the fourth-largest wireless
provider in the United States.
Sprint and its corporate parent, the Japanese
telecommunications giant SoftBank, have decided to end their
pursuit of T-Mobile USA after conceding that antitrust
regulators would
block a deal in an industry that is dominated by just a few large
players.
The decision was made at a Sprint board meeting on Tuesday

afternoon, a person briefed on the matter said. It marks the
second failed effort by large American wireless carriers to
merge in three years. And it represents a serious blow to
SoftBank's efforts to develop a big new challenger to the two
giants of the American cellphone industry, Verizon and AT&T.
Meanwhile, T-Mobile may have to contend with another
takeover bid. A French mobile upstart, Iliad, disclosed last
week that it had bid $15 billion for a 56.6 percent stake in T-
Mobile
US.
Deutsche Telekom spurned the offer. Iliad is now reportedly
seeking additional partners to shore up a revised bid, according
to news reports. Still, analysts have questioned whether a
merger with T-Mobile would make sense -- and whether Iliad
could afford a takeover.
With no deal for now, it remains to be seen what paths Sprint
and T-Mobile will take as smaller competitors to the enormous
titans of their industry. Combined, the two control less
than a third of the wireless market in the United States.
In recent years, T-Mobile has shaken up the industry with an
array of novel pricing plans, gaining admirers among both
analysts and investors, but Sprint has lost customers for
several quarters as it struggles to upgrade its network.
"They have a lot of wood to chop," Craig Moffett, a research
analyst at MoffettNathanson, said of Sprint. "They will have to
spend a fortune to fix their network, and they will very likely
have to cut prices to stay competitive at the same time."
Sprint is making at least one major change in the near term. On
Wednesday morning, the company said it would replace its
current chief executive, Daniel R. Hesse, with Marcelo

Claure.
Mr. Claure is the founder of Brightstar, a wireless services
company that sold a majority stake in itself to SoftBank last
year. He joined Sprint's board in January.
The end of the talks also leaves open the question of what
Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile's majority owner, will do next.
The German telecommunications company had signaled that it
would like to eventually sell off its T-Mobile stake, and a deal
with Sprint would have been the quickest path to that. Much of
the telecom industry has barreled relentlessly toward
consolidation, as companies have grasped for bigger scale.
Already this year, both Comcast and AT&T have announced
huge deals meant to bolster their reach.
But the existence of both transactions -- Comcast's $45 billion
takeover of Time Warner Cable and AT&T's $49 billion
purchase of DirecTV -- has made the Obama administration
wary
of concentrating too much power in the hands of too few
companies.
A proposed combination of Sprint and T-Mobile, uniting the
third- and fourth-biggest carriers in the United States, had been
fiercely questioned by officials at both the Federal
Communications Commission and the Justice Department. In
2011, AT&T's attempts to buy T-Mobile for $39 billion failed
after the Obama administration sued to block the deal.
As recently as last month, T-Mobile and Sprint were speaking
on friendly terms. The two sides had discussed a potential
transaction worth about $32 billion, people said at the time.
Ever since SoftBank bought a majority stake in Sprint, a deal
that closed last summer, the company had its eye on bigger

ambitions. The Japanese company's founder, Masayoshi Son,
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Details
Name: Sprint Corp
Ticker: FON
NAICS: 513310, 514191
DUNS: 00-694-2395;
Name: AT&T Corp
Ticker: T

NAICS: 513310
SIC: 4822
DUNS: 00-698-0080
Company / organization
Title Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile: Board
abandons plans, fearing antitrust concerns would derail any
merger
Author MICHAEL J DE LA MERCED
Publication title International New York Times; Paris
First page 15
Publication year 2014
Publication date Aug 7, 2014
Year 2014
Publisher International New York Times
Place of publication Paris
Country of publication France
Publication subject General Interest Periodicals--France
ISSN 22699740
Source type Newspapers
Language of publication English

Document type News
ProQuest document ID 1551503418
Document URL
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1551503418?
accountid=28844
Copyright Copyright International New York Times Aug 07,
2014
Last updated 2016-10-29
Database ProQuest Central
had frequently and publicly derided the state of the American
wireless industry as antiquated, falling far behind other nations.
Not known for backing down in the face of long odds -- he once
threatened to set himself on fire in a dispute with Japanese
regulators -- Mr. Son was forced to concede that a union
with T-Mobile would have little chance of gaining regulatory
approval, the person briefed on the matter said.
Copyright International New York Times Aug 07, 2014
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and Conditions
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Leadership and decision making: A retrospective application
and assessment
Duncan, W Jack; LaFrance, Kevin G; Ginter, Peter M. Journal
of Leadership & Organizational Studies; Flint 9.4 (Spring
2003): 1.

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Duncan et al examine the applicability of the Vroom-Yetton
model of leadership and decision making to the battlefield
behavior of ten commanding generals in six major battles of the
American Civil War. The findings suggested that when the
selected commanders on the field acted consistently with the
prescriptions of the Vroom-Yetton model, they were more often
successful in accomplishing the foals of the campaign. The
findings also suggested that the lack of information sharing and
consensus building resulted in serious disadvantages.
Headnote
This paper examines the applicability of the Vroom-Yetton
model of leadership and decision making to the battlefield
behavior of ten commanding generals in six major battles of the
American Civil War. The purpose of the paper was twofold. The
first objective was to see if it is possible to utilize official war
records, autobiographies, biographies of close associates,
and scholarly works to reconstruct the thinking of decision
makers in the past and frame this thinking within a
contemporary theory of leadership and decision making. The
second
objective was to illustrate the potential value of using prior

events as retrospective test cases for a contemporary leadership
theory.
Although no attempt was made to suggest that the selection of
the appropriate decision making and leadership style was the
determining factor in the outcome of major battles of the
Civil War, the study provided some interesting findings. The
findings suggest that when the selected commanders on the field
acted consistently with the prescriptions of the Vroom-
Yetton model they were more often successful in accomplishing
the goals of the campaign. In addition, the findings suggest that
even though the commanders tended to favor
autocratic styles, the lack of information sharing and consensus
building resulted in serious disadvantages. In the cases
examined, the pressure for prompt decision making was not
sufficient to justify the loss of information that resulted from
the determination to act alone.
Much of leadership theory and practice has been founded on and
enhanced by military strategy and tactics. Weber (1947) was
fascinated by the precision of military organizations as
was Emerson (1908), Mooney and Reiley (1931), Gulick &
Urwick (1947), and Urwick (1944). More recently, Krause
(1996) used 2,500 year old writings of Sun Tzu to suggest
behavioral guidelines for modern business managers such as
"superior commanders succeed in situations where ordinary
people fail because they obtain more timely information and
use it more quickly" (p. 64).
The military maintains a long tradition of developing capable
leaders (Bass, 1998; Van Fleet & Yukl, 1986; Yukl & Van
Fleet, 1990). This leadership tradition was directed toward,
among other things, the early identification of leadership
potential and contributed to the development of trait-based
identification of leadership potential (Yukl, 1981).

This paper attempts to expand our understanding of leadership
and decision-making in military organizations by framing them
within the context of contemporary leadership theory
using the Vroom-Yetton model (1973). The Vroom-Yetten
model provides an appropriate theoretical framework because it
allows for leadership and decision making processes that can
be applied to routine conditions faced by military leaders and
may be appropriately adapted to battlefield environments
characterized by chaos, accelerated risk, and increased stress.
Model Selection
The general approach used in this study could have been applied
to a variety of leadership theories. Because leadership in
military organizations is often stereotyped as autocratic, a
styles theory may have been used to test the validity of the
stereotype. Contingency theory could have been used to test
situational demands and resulting leadership styles. Even
transformational theory may have been examined because
military leaders are often characterized as charismatic
(Northouse, 1997). Our interest, however, related to the
battlefield
decision making of military commanders. The focus on
leadership and decision making, therefore, made Vroom-Yetton
the theory of choice.
Vroom-Yetton was selected rather than the Vroom-Jago (1988)
model for three reasons. First, the Vroom-Yetton model has
been widely validated and its strengths and limitations are
well known (Field, 1982; Tjosvold, Wedley, & Field, 1986;
Vroom & Jago, 1978). Second, validation studies have provided
estimates of the likelihood of decision effectiveness and
leader conformity to the normative Vroom-Yetton model
(Vroom & Jago, 1988). Estimates provide a useful benchmark
when evaluating the results of analysis. Third, the Vroom-Jago
model has been used primarily as a guide to applying the basic

constructs developed by Vroom and Yetton. The Vroom_yetton
model, therefore, provides the most developed
theoretical constructs.
Studies by Field and House (1990), Ettling and Jago (1988),
Heilman (1984), and Field (1982) provided support for the
validity of the model. Vroom (1993) and Vroom and Yetton
(1973) reported that attempts to validate their model were
generally successful. Utilizing two separate studies, they
discovered that most successful decision processes fell within
the
constructs of their original framework although a number of
unsuccessful decisions did not conform to the model (Field,
1982).
In this study, the Vroom-Yetton model was applied to the
battlefield behavior of commanders in six battles of the
American Civil War (Davis, 1991; Gallaher, 1997). The selected
battles presented significant leadership and decision making
challenges for the commanders on the field. It should be
emphasized that our objective was not to exhaustively describe
all the circumstances facing the commanders. Almost any
statement made about any military engagement, especially in
the Civil War, is subject to debate (Jones, 1992; Wheeler,
1999). In some of the selected battles informed historians
continue to debate which side actually won the engagement.
Rather, our goal was to determine if a contemporary leadership
model could be applied retrospectively to specific situations
and, in the process, increase our understanding of
leadership and decision making. We were particularly interested
in the usefulness of the model when applied to the high risk and
high stress conditions present on battlefields. High
risk, as we use the term, relates to the "stakes" involved in the
outcome of the decision. The stakes involved in military
engagements are great. The fate of an entire army or nation

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Enlarge this image.
Problem Attributes

Enlarge this image.
Decision Methods and Rules for Group Problems
Enlarge this image.
Problem Types and the Feasible Set of Decision Styles
may depend on the outcome of decisions made by commanders
on the field. The higher the stakes the greater the stress on the
decision maker (Festinger, 1957; Hendrick, Mills, &
Kiesler, 1968; and Knox & Inkster, 1968).
Implicit in our analysis is a rejection of General Helmuth von
Molke's assertion that the American Civil War was nothing
more than "two armed mobs chasing each other around the
country, from which nothing could be learned." We believe a
great deal can be learned from this assessment of leadership and
decision making behavior. We also believe that a
retrospective "test" of the Vroom-Yetton model can provide
important insights into the practicality and validity of the
Vroom-Yetton model. It seems useful to us to take
contemporary
theories and "test" their applicability to past events and,
thereby, provide a type of practical validity that is rarely
reported in leadership and management studies (Gilderhus,
2000;
Wood, 1991).
Concept and Procedure
The early literature on leadership focused on individuals who
made decisions in order to bring people together in pursuit of a
common goal (Tead, 1935). Fiedler (1966; 1967) and
Fiedler and Chemers (1974) described leadership in terms of the
leader's style and the situation facing the leader. Vroom and

Yetton (1973) built on the research of Fiedler (1967) but
added new dimensions to all the previous situational studies. In
doing so, they proposed a normative model where the leader
adapted to the situation in which decisions were made
based on the circumstances and desired outcome
Vroom-Yetton Model
Vroom and Yetton (1973) identified three classes of outcomes
that influence the ultimate effectiveness of decisions to include;
(1) the quality or rationality of the decision, (2) the
acceptance of the decision by subordinates and their
commitment to execute it effectively, and (3) the amount of
time required to make the decision. These authors, in their
normative
decision making model, proposed that a leader could arrive at a
rational approach. Their model provided the leader with eight
problem attributes (Table 1) that could be applied to a
given leadership decision making situation. Choices relative to
each of these attributes provided the leaders with a path along
which to travel, ultimately leading to one or more
(feasible set) decision making styles. These possible styles
along with the decision rules for their selection are provided in
Table 2.
The five decision making styles can be further grouped into
three categories based on the degree of subordinate
participation. These range from autocratic or low participation
(AI, AII), to consultative or moderate participation
(CI, CII), to group decision making or high participation (GII)
(Field, 1982).
Using the problem attributes and associated diagnostic
questions for each, Vroom and Yetton developed a
decision tree and as leaders answered "yes" or "no" to
successive questions about the situation they progressed

sequentially down the branches which lead them eventually to a
termination node. The termination node was
given a number designation and labeled a problem type. These
problem types are then associated with
acceptable decision styles as shown in Table 3. The leader
subsequently uses this information to determine an
approach in a particular decision making situation.
In order to demonstrate how the model may be applied, Vroom
and Yetton (1973) used their constructs to analyze
a number of different leadership decision-making cases. Their
analysis included specification of the problem type,
feasible set, and solution indicated by the problem type
associated with the model. The methodology used in this
study is an adaptation of Vroom and Yetton's previous analysis
applied to business situations and modified for
actual historical leadership decision making situations on the
battlefield (Vroom, 1973; Vroom & Jago, 1978).
Data Collection
To apply the model to battlefield decision making, six
engagements of the American Civil War were used as
frameworks for analysis. The engagements included Shiloh,
Antietam (Sharpsburg), Chancellorsville, Gettsburg,
Chickamauga, and Nashville. These six battles were selected
because they were representative of many, perhaps
most, Civil War engagements. Some of the primary ways in
which they were representive are:
1. Both Northern and Southern victories as well as inconclusive
engagements are included in the sample. There is
general agreement that the North achieved victories at
Sharpsburg (Antietam), Gettysburg, and Nashville. The
South prevailed at Chancellorsville and perhaps Chickamauga.
The outcome of Shiloh is disputed.

2. The battles took place with equal frequency in the Eastern
and Western theaters of war. Antietam,
Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg were in the East while Shiloh,
Chickamauga, and Nashville were in the West.
3. The duration of these battles was similar to that of other
battles of the Civil War. Although there were
exceptions, battles usually lasted one to three days.
4. The battles occurred throughout the War. The first battle in
this sample (Shiloh) took place in 1862 and the
last (Nashville) occurred in 1864.
Therefore, although all battles are unique, these six battles were
representative of Civil War battles, in general,
and we believe the inferences drawn from them would apply
equally well to other engagements. Table 4 provides
a summary of essential information on each battle.
An attempt was made to reconstruct the decision making
process and leadership style of the commanding
generals in the six selected battles using the best available
information. The following process was utilized. The
preferred source of information was the official report of the
commanding general that was submitted to the
respective war departments. The best available source of this
information was the War of the rebellion: A
compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (1880, 1884, 1889, 1894). This series of
volumes was published by the Government Printing Office and
recorded the official report of each battle along
with reports of subordinate generals and staff immediately
before and after each battle (Howell & Prevenier,
2001). When the commanding general was killed in the battle as
was the case of Albert Sidney Johnston at

Shiloh the official battle report was filed by the next in
command, in this case P.G.T. Beauregard.
If all the information necessary to respond to the diagnostic
questions in the Vroom-Yetton Model could not be
found in the official records the autobiography of the
commanding general was consulted if one existed. A number of
these works were available such as Grant's two volume Personal
Memoirs (1885, 1886) and McClellan 's Own Story: The war for
the Union (1887). When the official report and an
autobiography were not sufficient to provide the needed
information,
autobiographies of subordinate generals were used. For
example, since Robert E. Lee did not write an autobiography
works by subordinates, such as Alexander's (1907) Military
memoirs of a Confederate and Longstreet's (1896) From
Manassas to Appomattox were used. In the rare cases where
additional information was needed to "get inside the
commanding general's head" highly acclaimed historical works
on particular battles were employed. The resulting collective
judgments are presented in Table 5.
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Enlarge this image.
Summary Characteristics of Selected Battles

Enlarge this image.
Attributes of Decision Making in Seven Civil War
Battles
Enlarge this image.
Battle of Shiloh - Federal Commander
Enlarge this image.
Battle of Shiloh - Confederate Commander
The sources used were read independently by two readers.
Consistent with the instructions provided by Vroom and
Jago (1978) in their tests of the Vroom-Yetton model, the
readers were familiar with the model and understood the
types of information needed to make the retrospective collective
judgments in Table 5. Both readers held graduate
degrees in management and had read research relating to the
Vroom-Yetton model. However, by design, the
readers were not well-informed about the battles, commanders,
and related aspects of the American Civil War. In
arriving at the recommended leadership and decision making
styles, tables such as those illustrated by Table 6 and
Table 7 were constructed for each battle, one for the Northern
and one for the Southern Commander. Illustrative
tables were constructed for the battle of Shiloh. Identical tables
were constructed for the other battles. On the
basis of the assessments of all the battles which are summarized
in Table 5, we constructed comparable decision
trees such as the one presented in Figure 1 that is a graphical
depiction of the information contained in the Table 6
and Table 7.

Application
The results are described for each battle situation and the
decision-making environment in which the battlefield
commanders operated. Each scenario was then documented with
an abbreviated analysis constructed in the same
manner as the method used by Vroom and Yetton.
Battle of Shiloh
General Albert Sydney Johnston led his Confederate army on a
surprise attack against the Northern forces of
General Ulysses S. Grant on the morning of April 6, 1862 (Fisk,
1900a, 190Ob). The location of the Union forces
at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee was not a good tactical position
because the Northern army which was
positioned with a river to its rear and creeks on both flanks.
Grant's forces were encamped in a loose battle line
and anticipated no attack (Daniel, 1997). The Union General
stated confidently "There will be no fighting at
Pittsburg Landing. We will have to go to Corinth" (Grant,
1886). This oversight allowed Johnston's army to camp
less than two miles away on the night before the attack and still
surprise the adversary.
Johnston decided to attack on the morning of April 6th. The
attack was completely unanticipated and Grant
found himself converting his army from an offensive to a
defensive posture. Two events prevented the Union
army from being soundly defeated (Force, 1881). Johnston was
killed during battle and his death demoralized
the Confederates and the Union army was reinforced by troops
that were part of a plan to concentrate Federal
forces in west Tennessee (Greene, 1882). To illustrate the
process used in examining the decision making of

each commander at Shiloh Table 6 and Table 7 and Figure 1
were constructed from the information gathered by
the readers.
Table 5 summarizes the problem types for all six battles
General Grant faced; a problem type fourteen (14). The
appropriate leadership style for this problem type was a
consultative approach (CII) whereby the leaders share
the nature of the problem with subordinates, obtains ideas and
suggestions, and then makes the decision that
may or may not reflect the advice of subordinate officers or GII
requiring consultation and consensus. General
Johnston faced a problem type twelve (12) so the appropriate
leadership style was GII which required both
consultation and consensus building.
Referring to Table 8 one can see that Grant employed an All
leadership style and insisted on using only his own
understanding of the situation even though he was provided
significant amounts of information by his subordinate
commanders. His strongly held belief that the Confederates
were concentrated at Corinth and were unable to
move lulled him into a false sense of security at Pittsburg
Landing even though he recognized the danger of his
position in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. The failure
to detect the presence of such a large force
indicated the danger of relying on an absentee leader removed
from the proximity of the battlefield.
Johnston also employed an All style of leadership. Although he
called frequent councils of war and asked for
advice from subordinate officers, in the end, even his most
senior commander, General Beauregard, thought the
element of surprise was lost and advised against the attack.
Johnston, however, decided otherwise and ordered

the attack because of his determination to fight. Beauregard
later stated that Grant's surprise "was a most
surprising surprise."
Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg)
The Southern victory at second Bull Run convinced General
Robert E. Lee to alter his stated defensive strategy and
invade the North (Ropes, 1881). he knew morale in the North
was low and a victory in northern territory might
cause the enemy to offer favorable terms for peace (McClellan,
1887). Moreover, Lee thought there were many
Confederate sympathizers in Maryland and they might join the
southern cause.
George B. McClellan was the new commander of the Union
Army and Lee knew he was cautious, perhaps to a
fault. Unfortunately, Lee did not know that a Union private had
found a copy of his orders and because of this
discovery McClellan was aware that the Confederate Army was
divided and vulnerable because Jackson had been
sent to attack the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry (Palfrey,
1881). In another miscalculation by Lee, McClellan's
caution had disappeared and he pursued the Southern Army.
Immediately before the battle, however, McClellan's caution
returned and he hesitated giving time for Generals
Jackson and A. P. Hill to join Lee in Maryland. In spite of the
reinforcements, Maryland did not join the Southern
cause and Lee was forced to retreat back to Virginia. Table 8
demonstrates the problem attributes and feasible set
of leadership styles facing Generals McClellan and Lee at
Antietam. McClellan faced a type five (5) problem while
Lee confronted a type nine (9) problem (see Table 5). The only
difference in the problem facing the two
commanders was that McClellan had information that gave him

an edge and Lee was unaware of his competitive
disadvantage until much of his plan was placed into action.
Both generals appear to have used an autocratic leadership style
in view of the existing situation (see Table 8).
Lee was determined to push into Maryland although at least
some of his commanders advised against it. The Army
was confident, Virginia was about used up agriculturally, and
Maryland offered a tempting storehouse for food and
supplies as well as possible recruits. Lee was in no mood to
argue the merits of an invasion. Moreover, when he
discovered through a spy that McClellan had his battle plan his
tactical response did not allow time for discussion.
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Battle of Shiloh - Confederate Commander
Enlarge this image.
Figure 1

Enlarge this image.
Decision Making Analysis and Outcomes
McClellan had information that made him overly confident. he
acted autocratically and boasted openly. However,
his eventual lapse into inaction might have been avoided if he
had involved more of his experienced commanders.
His refusal to pursue the retreating Confederate Army was a
decision that all his subordinate commanders and
certainly President Lincoln did not support. Both sides claimed
victory in this bloodiest one day battle on American
soil. In the end, the Union forces achieved their goal of
stopping the Southern invasion and Lee was forced to
retreat to Virginia.
The Battle of Chancellorsville
Union Major General Joseph Hooker was leading an army of
130,000 men when they approached Chancellorsville
to face General Robert E. Lee's army of only about 60,000
seasoned veterans. General Hooker knew the terrain
but despite the overwhelming strength of the Union Army he
made little progress against the Confederates and
was himself wounded early in the battle. The injury left him
incapacitated but unwilling to relinquish command.
Hooker received continuous reports of the Confederates' activity
but appeared to ignore them and made tactical
decisions in a virtual vacuum. Lee, knowing that he was greatly
outnumbered used every piece of information
provided to him by his staff and local citizens to make tactical
decisions (Furgurson, 1992).
Lee's decisions were bold and unconventional. Even with the
loss of Jackson to friendly fire, Lee was able to
outmaneuver the larger Northern Army (Waugh, 1994). With his

army's back to the Rappahannock River and in
an extremely vulnerable position, Hooker retreated leaving
Lee's weakened army the victor (Doubleday, 1881).
The situation was essentially reversed for Lee at Antietam. At
Chancellorsville the Southern commander had the critical
information and the Union commander was operating on the
basis of poor and incomplete intelligence. Lee faced a problem
type five (5) and appropriately employed an All style (see Table
8). Once he understood the position of the Union Army and
the possibility of using a little known road to move around it,
he acted quickly. Virtually no one, save Jackson would have
agreed with the recklessness of his battle plan. Who would
advise a commander to divide his army not once but twice in the
face of a superior enemy?
General Hooker employed the AI style and faced problem
attributes (type 14) that made CII or GII more appropriate. he
thereby violated the information and unstructured problem
rules. Perhaps it was the disorientation caused by his injury but
the Union General clearly lacked the information necessary to
make the appropriate decision and failed to gather needed
information from his subordinate commanders and spies. The
result was one of the most devastating defeats suffered
by the North during the entire War.
Battle of Gettsburg
The Army of Northern Virginia and its commander Robert E.
Lee were confident after the spectacular victory at
Chancellorsville (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Ketes de Veries,
1990; Kroll, Toombs, & Wright, 2000; Roll, 1986). Lee
again reasoned that if he could defeat the Union Army in the
North, favorable peace, terms would be offered by
President Lincoln.

Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville cost him his command.
General George G. Meade was named the new
commanding general. The Army of Northern Virginia slipped
into Maryland, and attempted to concentrate the army.
Immediately before the battle, Lee learned of Meade's
appointment and saw an opportunity. He believed Meade
would be cautious and take time to ensure the army was ready
for another battle (Nolan, 1994).
Things went well for the South on the first and second days of
the battle (Foote, 1994). However, indecision,
confusion, and the absence of Stuart's cavalry and the valuable
intelligence he had always provided cost the
Confederates the high ground and eventually the battle. Lee
himself confessed the absence of his cavalry left the
army without its "eyes" and made him fight blind in unfamiliar
territory.
Against the advice of General James Longstreet the
Confederates staged a desperate charge on the third day that
could have cost the South the War (Wert, 1993). The South
always
searched for answers and scapegoats as to why the charge failed
along with its last opportunity for victory. General George
Pickett, the Confederate commander of the charge, was
more philosophical and accurate (Reardon, 1997). Once, when
asked why the charge failed, he stated "I think the Union Army
had something to do with it."
Meade faced a type four (4) problem and appropriately
employed an AI leadership style (see Table 8). He sought
information from his field commanders, perhaps hesitated
excessively,
but eventually made the correct decision to fight from the high

ground (Jordan, 1988). Lee suffered from a lack of information
and faced a problem type eleven (11). Stuart's absence
deprived Lee of vital information about the terrain and size of
the enemy force. Lee sought information from his field
commanders but seemed determined to press the battle even
against the advice of Longstreet. The information rule was
violated. Lee's autocratic style and reluctance to employ the CII
or styles was an important factor leading to his defeat at
Gettysburg.
Battle of Chickamauga
The Battle of Chickamauga was to be General Braxton Bragg's
finest moment as a Confederate commander. Unfortunately, his
intelligence services failed him and he realized early on
that the Federal forces, led by Major General William S.
Rosecrans, were substantially larger than he first anticipated
(Cozzens, 1992). He prepared to make an attack on what he
thought was a two-column enemy force, by attacking from the
flanks. What he did not realize was that Rosecrans was leading
a three-column force and was actually pursuing him.
When Bragg gave the order to attack, his subordinates did not
respond and he lost the opportunity to inflict significant damage
to Rosecrans' army. The failure to carry out orders by
his subordinates was a serious deterrent to his operational
capabilities (Cist, 1881).
Meanwhile, Rosecrans was receiving only limited information
on the activities of Bragg's forces. He eventually realized that
the Confederates were not retreating in disorder but were
preparing to fight. On September 20, 1863 Bragg attacked and a
fierce battle ended when a tactical error by Rosecrans allowed
the Confederates to close in on his army and inflict
serious casualties. Rosencrans' second in command, General
George Thomas was so dismayed by the tactics that he stated
"nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can

save our army from total defeat." Thinking he was defeated,
Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga. Bragg concluded that no
decisive results could be achieved that day and against the
insistence of his subordinates, did not pursue the Union Army
into Chattanooga.
Both commanders did not have the information needed to make
decisions and neither was aware of the extent to which accurate
information was lacking. Rosencrans thought Bragg
was retreating and Bragg thought the Federal Army was a much
smaller force. The two generals faced essentially the same
category eleven (11) problem and would have benefited
from more information and advice from subordinate generals
(see Table 5).
Bragg employed an AI style when CII or GII would have been
preferred (see Table 8). He violated the information,
unstructured, and acceptance rules which resulted in a failure to
capitalize on a victory and some insubordination among his
officers and troops. Only major command problems could have
turned this major Southern victory into a lost opportunity.
Rosencrans autocratic style likewise did not serve him well and
perhaps more consultation and consensus building, particularly
with General Thomas, could have reversed or minimized
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the adverse outcome of the battle. In the end, the Southern
general obtained a victory but was unaware of it and lost a great
opportunity. The defeated army reassembled at
Chattanooga and avoided a more devastating loss. Neither army
achieved great advantage by the battle and in spite of its
violence, many historians contend Chickamauga was of little
consequence to either the North or the South.
Battle of Nashville
The Battle of Nashville was the last stop on the last campaign
of the Confederate Army in the West (Cox, 1882). Experts agree
that the campaign into Middle Tennessee in 1864 was a
fool's game that put the final nails in the coffin of the Southern
Army of Tennessee (McDonough & Connelly, 1983).
Confederate General John Bell Hood's goal was to invade
middle
Tennessee, maybe take Kentucky, and eventually join Lee in
Virginia (Groom, 1995). The strategy looked as if it had a slim
chance of working at Spring Hill but after the South lost
three times as many men and six generals at Franklin there was
no doubt to anyone but Hood that the grand strategy would fail
(Hurst, 1963). Although the Southern defeat
culminated at Nashville, the battle was actually the last battle in
a series of tactical movements that began a month earlier when
the Union Army under General John Schofield
withdrew from Pulaski, Tennessee to Columbia to Spring Hill to
Franklin and ultimately to Nashville where reinforcements
waited.
In spite of the losses at Franklin, Hood had few options so he
pursued the Union Army that was falling back to fortifications
at Nashville (Schofield, 1897). Although Union General
George Thomas delayed in attacking the approaching Southern
army, when he did decide to attack the Confederate Army broke
all along the front. The Southerners were outflanked

and driven back toward Franklin. Almost continuous fighting
forced the defeated and decimated Confederate Army to retreat
back across the Tennessee River into Alabama with the
Union cavalry in pursuit. In the route that characterized the
retreat, Private William Mitchell Parker summed up the plight
of many Confederate soldiers when he stated: "I don't know if
they caught me or I just quit running."
Thomas was unusually cautious and his subordinate generals
almost rebelled in order to attack the weak and disorganized
Confederates. When he decided to move, Thomas acted on
the basis of available information and employed the All
autocratic style in a situation that represented a category eleven
(11) problem when he would have more appropriately used a
CII or GII style (see Table 8). However, the utter desperation of
the Rebel situation by the time they reached Nashville made the
effects of the decision making process and leadership
style inconsequential.
Hood, on the other hand, led a disintegrating army. The number
of soldiers absent without leave was high and subordinate
generals were advising against virtually every action the
commander initiated. Hood would likely have performed much
better had he listened to his advice as recommended by a type
thirteen (13) problem. If ever a commander needed
advice it was Hood. Instead, he acted in an autocratic manner on
the basis of inadequate, incomplete, and even imaginary
information violating the information, unstructured, and
acceptance rules (see Table 5). The result was the destruction of
his army and the end of Confederate resistance in the West.
Discussion
Leadership and decision-making style are not irrelevant factors
in determining battlefield results but style alone never
determined victory or defeat. Table 8 presents our assessment of

how the Vroom-Yetton Model suggests commanders should
have behaved in particular battles, how they actually behaved,
and the ultimate outcome of the battle for both armies.
We are not suggesting, of course, that a commanding general's
employment of a leadership and decision making style
consistent with the Vroom-Yetton normative model was the
factor that determined the outcome of battles. Battlefields, like
corporate boardrooms, are complex multidimensional
environments where leader behavior is only one of many
simultaneously interacting variables. Regardless of the extent of
prior planning and analysis, battlefields rapidly become chaotic
and unpredictable. Mistakes, luck (good and bad),
heroic acts, cowardice, and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of
other factors can and do become instrumental in determining
who wins and who loses. Sometimes winning and losing is
merely a perception and disagreements among combatants and
historians are common. Strategic victories may be tactical
failures and tactical victories may be strategic failures.
However, it seems reasonable to suggest on the basis of this
analysis that the more factors a commander can "get right," all
other things equal, the better the chance of victory. The
style of the commander's decision making is certainly a
critically important factor to "get right". This analysis is an
attempt to illustrate how applying a theoretical model
retrospectively on leader behavior can be used to assist in
increasing the odds of getting at least this one thing right.
Although this study provided an application of the Vroom-
Yetton model in military decision-making, it did not directly
address the issue of decision quality. The military commanders
highlighted in this study occasionally selected the same
decision-making method suggested by the model but with
varying results. This indicates that although the decision
method
employed by the commander may be effective and efficient it

may not always yield the desired outcome.
Summary and Conclusions
This study retrospectively applied the Vroom-Yetton model to
leadership and decision making on six Civil War battlefields
(Vroom, 1973). Based on the results obtained from analyzing
these battles and ten different commanders, there is strong
evidence to support the applicability of the Vroom-Yetten
model in military decision making. Although the article
evaluated
only a narrow set of decision making scenarios, the agreement
or disagreement between what decision-making method the
model suggested, and what approach the leaders used,
was significant if not compelling.
This study also evaluated the model using historical battle
scenarios that occurred long before the model was developed
which, in itself, further supports the applicability of the model
and its underlying theory. Past research using the model has
dealt primarily with business related decision-making processes
while this study sheds some light on the usefulness of
Vroom and Yetton's model in a military context. Since the
battlefield is characterized by high risk and high stress as noted
earlier, the results of this study can only be generalized to
the instances in which decisions are being made in similar
environments - corporate crises, emergency rooms, hostile
takeovers, etc.
The results of this study have a number of implications on how
leaders make decisions when confronted with the confusion,
chaos, complexity, and uncertainty. Some of the important
implications are discussed below.
1. Leadership and Decision Making Styles Do Matter - In Most
Cases. At Chancellorsville Lee's aggressive, risky, and

unconventional decision making and leadership was probably
instrumental in the Confederate victory. Hooker's indecisiveness
and uninformed autocratic style contributed to Lee's success.
When you are outnumbered two to one and everything is
in the opponents favor, victory is possible only through
exceptional leadership. At the other extreme, Thomas'
leadership and decision making style at Nashville was largely
irrelevant.
Anything short of total incompetence would have resulted in a
Union victory. The Confederate Army was decimated. A
Confederate success at Nashville would have required a truly
remarkable leader with as much information as possible. Hood
was not remarkable except in his ability to persist in a fool's
game against all reasonable advice.
2. Conventional Wisdom Regarding Leadership in Military
Organizations Requires Reassessment. The epitome of military
leadership is the decisive and autocratic commander. It has
been said "there is nothing so much like god on earth as the
general on the battlefield." Combat is an incredibly complex
leadership and decision making environment and certainly
requires decisiveness. However, millions of dollars are spent
assuring the officers' ranks are full of trained and experienced
commanders. To ignore the repository of skills and
experience present in a council of war sometimes demands a
heavy price. Johnston's decision to attack at Shiloh against the
advice of his second in command resulted in limited
success only because of an incredible denial of evidence on the
part of the enemy. Lee's autocratic behavior at Gettysburg when
he should have listened to his second in command
helped turn the tide of the War in favor of the Union.
3. Although Leadership is Critical on the Battlefield,
Management Is Also Required. In every battle discussed, the
time available for decision making was not a major factor. Each
of the

commanders had considerable time to plan the battle and in
some cases the campaign. Both armies had underlying strategies
upon which they based their conduct of the war. For the
South it was, in most cases, defensive to overcome numbers and
take advantage of home territory. For the Union the strategy
was offensive in most cases in an attempt to occupy
territory and destroy the enemy. In such cases the conventional
autocratic style advocated by many ignores the potential
advantages of more participatory decision making.
This study questions the appropriateness of the universal
application of autocratic decision-making when leaders have the
necessary information and good support and morale from the
troops. In situations where information is lacking or support is
not certain, a more consultative approach is likely to achieve an
optimal outcome. As illustrated in our results, a number
of commanders in the Civil War chose autocratic decision-
making methods when a consultative approach would have been
more appropriate. More often than not, this approach led to
unfavorable outcomes.
In conclusion, these results fill an important gap in previous
work validating the Vroom-Yetton model. Prior studies have
demonstrated the validity of the model by using decision-
making scenarios within a business environment. This study
successfully extended that approach into a military decision-
making environment utilizing as examples battles in a war that
predated space age technology. Although we disagree, some
suggest that the American Civil War, was the last war where
individual leadership really mattered. There appeared to be at
least some identifiable relationship between the actions people
took and results attained. Consequently, the battlefield was
more personal, the numbers, while large, were small in

comparison to future world wars and international conflicts, the
weapons were crude though cruel but ultimately it was people
not technology that determined when to fight, where to
fight, how to fight, and when it was not longer advisable to
fight.
Future studies will hopefully examine different military
conflicts and more dynamic decision making environments.
Battlefields of the 20th century and today, unlike those of the
19th
century, for example are three dimensional. Speed and stealth
are greatly accelerated. Commanders have to consider attacks
from above (aircraft) and danger below (submarines and
land mines). The addition of a third dimension greatly
complicates the leadership and decision making challenges.
Acknowledgements
1 The authors wish to express their appreciation to the
following people who read and commented on various drafts of
the manuscript. In most cases their suggestions were taken.
However, any inaccuracies, historical or otherwise remain the
responsibility of the authors. First, we appreciate the advice and
personal assistance of Victor H. Vroom in assessing the
evidence presented and the selection of the most appropriate
version of the Vroom, et al model to apply. Professor Vroom
also generously provided his data base of validation studies
and offered invaluable advice throughout the project. We also
appreciate the advice of David D. Van Fleet, Professor of
Management, School of Management, Arizona State University,
West; James G. Clawson, D.B.A., The Darden School,
University of Virginia; Michael E. Fleenor, M.D., M.P.H.,
Health Officer, Jefferson County Department of Health; James
G. Hunt,
Ph.D., Horn Professor of Management, Texas Tech University;
and R. Kent Oestenstad, Ph.D., Professor of Environmental

Health Sciences, University of Alabama at Birmingham and
Civil War historian.
Sidebar
The Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 2003,
Vol. 9, No. 4
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Details
Subject American Civil War;
Military officers;
Leadership;
Decision making models
Title Leadership and decision making: A retrospective
application
and assessment

Author Duncan, W Jack; LaFrance, Kevin G; Ginter, Peter M
Publication title Journal of Leadership & Organizational
Studies; Flint
Volume 9
Issue 4
Pages 1
Publication date Spring 2003
Publisher Sage Publications Ltd.
Place of publication Flint
Country of publication United Kingdom
Publication subject Business And Economics--Management
ISSN 15480518
Source type Scholarly Journals
Document type Feature
Confederate armies. (1884). Series I, Vol. 10. Washington,
D.C., Government Printing Office.

Confederate armies. (1889). Series I, Vol. 27, Washington,
Confederate armies. (1894). Series I, Vol. 45. Washington,
Wallace, L. (1906). Lew Wallace: An autobiography. Vol. 1.
New York: Harper & Brothers.
Waugh, J. C. (1994). Class of 1846. New York: Warner Books.
Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic
organization. C. Henderson & T. Parsons (eds. & trans.), New
York: Free Press.
Wert J. D. (1993). General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's
most controversial soldier, a biography. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Wheeler, T. (1999). Leadership lessons from the Civil War.
New York: Currency Book.
Wood, G. (1991). Historian's handbook: A key to the study and
writing of history. 2nd ed. Boston: MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Yukl G. A. (1981). Leadership in organizations. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Yukl G. A & Van Fleet D. D. (1982). Cross-situational,
multimethod research on military leader effectiveness.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. 30, 87-108.
AuthorAffiliation

W. Jack Duncan, University of Alabama at Birmingham,
Birmingham, AL
Kevin G. LaFrance, United States Army - Baylor Graduate
Program in Health Administration
Peter M. Ginter, University of Alabama at Birmingham,
Birmingham, AL
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T-Mobile and Sprint Zeroing in on Merger: [Business/Financial
Desk]
Gelles, David; Michael J. De La Merced. New York Times, Late
Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y] 05 June
2014: B.1.
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[...]both sides believe that the only way to remain relevant is to
combine.
Updated, 8:51 p.m. |
Responding to a wave of consolidation in the
telecommunications industry, the nation's third- and fourth-
largest wireless phone operators have agreed on the terms of a
deal to join
forces.
Sprint and T-Mobile have talked about a combination for years
but continued to put it off, each preoccupied with other deals,
and concerned about scrutiny from antitrust regulators.

But in recent days, the two sides have settled on the terms of a
$32 billion deal that is likely to be announced this summer,
people briefed on the matter said on Wednesday.
Under the terms of the deal, which are still preliminary, Sprint
would acquire T-Mobile for about $40 a share in cash and stock,
a 17 percent premium to Wednesday's price.
Talks are incomplete and could still fall apart. But the
agreement on terms represents a turning point in a relationship
between two companies that have long contemplated a merger.
Sprint and T-Mobile have decided to press ahead now because
their two main rivals, Verizon and AT&T, each with more than
100 million subscribers, continue to grow more formidable.
Verizon's balance sheet is stronger, after agreeing to take full
control of Verizon Wireless last year in a $130 billion deal with
Vodafone. Verizon is the largest wireless operator in the
country and also provides landlines, cable television and
business services.
AT&T, the second-largest wireless provider, recently agreed to
acquire DirecTV in a $49 billion deal, which would give it
control of the country's largest satellite television operator.
Meanwhile, the cable industry is also consolidating. Comcast
and Time Warner Cable have agreed on a $45.2 billion deal that
would create by far the largest cable television operator.
The combined company would also have strong landline,
Internet and business services offerings.
Together, these mergers and acquisitions by competitors of
Sprint and T-Mobile have created a landscape that has
increasingly marginalized the two smaller companies, which
each

have about 50 million subscribers and only provide wireless
service.
Neither Sprint nor T-Mobile, on their own, would have the
financial resources to compete against these larger players, nor
the suite of offerings to attract customers who can get a
whole host of services from other rivals. As a result, both sides
believe that the only way to remain relevant is to combine.
Sprint and T-Mobile are both majority-owned by large,
international telecommunications groups, which have their own
agendas as well. T-Mobile is 67 percent owned by Deutsche
Telekom of Germany. Last year, T-Mobile merged with
MetroPCS, gaining a publicly traded stock that eased the path
for a Sprint deal.
Deutsche Telekom has been looking to get out of its T-Mobile
investment for years, and under the proposed deal with Sprint it
would own just 20 percent of the combined firm, further
reducing its United States exposure.
Sprint, meanwhile, is majority-owned by SoftBank, the Japanese
group controlled by the billionaire Masayoshi Son. Mr. Son,
known as Masa, an entrepreneur who has already
reshaped Japan's wireless industry, has made no secret of his
ambitions to do the same thing in the United States. Taking
control of Sprint last year was his first step, and at the time
that deal was announced, he acknowledged his desire to acquire
T-Mobile as well, giving him the scale he thinks he needs to
compete with Verizon and AT&T.
"AT&T and Verizon dominate the industry's Ebitda and capital
investment," said Walter Piecyk, an analyst at BTIG Research,
referring to a common indicator of a company's financial
performance. "And Masa is making a credible case that they not
only need scale to compete more effectively in the wireless

industry but could also offer new and needed competition
for wired broadband."
Should it be announced this summer, a deal to combine Sprint
and T-Mobile would surely face regulatory scrutiny. Antitrust
officials at the Justice Department are already considering
the implications of Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time
Warner Cable, and AT&T's proposed deal for DirecTV. This
would add a third megadeal to the mix, and the regulators could
consider the merits of all the deals at once.
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Details
Subject Acquisitions & mergers;
Telecommunications industry;
Competition;
Wireless carriers
Name: AT&T Inc
NAICS: 517110, 517210;
Name: Comcast Corp
NAICS: 517110, 517210, 517919;
Name: MetroPCS Inc
NAICS: 517210;
Name: Vodafone Group PLC
NAICS: 517210;
Name: Verizon Wireless
NAICS: 517210;
Name: Time Warner Cable Inc
NAICS: 517110, 517210;
Name: Sprint Nextel Corp
NAICS: 517110, 517210
Company / organization
Title T-Mobile and Sprint Zeroing in on
Merger: [Business/Financial Desk]
"Regulators have many deals in front of them and need to
consider where the market will be five years from now and how

to best stimulate competition, which not only means lower
prices but also more investment," Mr. Piecyk said.
AT&T tried to buy T-Mobile three years ago in a deal that
would also have consolidated the industry. But regulators
effectively killed the deal, contending it would have been bad
for
consumers because it would have reduced their choices.
Accounting for the regulatory uncertainty, the early terms of the
deal include a breakup fee of more than $1 billion that Sprint
would pay T-Mobile if the deal is not consummated.
Many hurdles to the deal remain, and any announcement is still
a ways off. The two sides have not conducted due diligence on
one another, drafted a definitive agreement or arranged
financing. A deal could be announced in July, according to a
person briefed on the process.
Additionally, by expanding so rapidly, Mr. Son of Japan will
have created a company with a substantial amount of debt.
Together, the two companies carried about $54 billion in long-
term debt as of March 31, according to regulatory filings.
There is also the issue of T-Mobile's brash chief executive, John
J. Legere. Mr. Legere supports the merger, and could emerge as
the leader of a combined company. Dan Hesse, Sprint's
chief executive, has previously signaled his willingness to step
down.
Despite turning around T-Mobile, Mr. Legere has said publicly
that his smaller company lacks the financial firepower to battle
Verizon and AT&T over the long term.
"When you play this game over five years or so, there are
capital requirements and there are multiple ways to continue to

play aggressively and to close the gap on the big guys," he
said in a recent earnings call. "We've always said that we think,
ultimately in the industry, it's a consolidation game. That's a
matter of when and not if."
Bloomberg and The Wall Street Journal earlier reported that the
companies had agreed on deal terms.
Craig Moffett, the senior research analyst for
MoffettNathanson, said that the timing of the potential takeover
stems in part because Mr. Son is eager to use Sprint's stock as
deal
currency while it remains relatively highly valued.
But Mr. Moffett cited the likelihood of strong opposition by the
Justice Department's antitrust division and the Federal
Communications Commission in both private and public
comments.
"I don't think you can put more than a 10 percent chance of
success for this deal," he said.
Among the three proposed deals that the F.C.C. and the Justice
Department will weigh, Mr. Moffett considers that the Comcast
and AT&T proposals will be the ones to pass, since either
approving all three or rejecting them all would be politically
untenable. "They will have to find at least one acquisition to be
the sacrificial lamb," he said.
This is a more complete version of the story than the one that
appeared in print.
Photograph
Masayoshi Son of Softbank, Parent of Sprint, Wants to Change
the United States Wireless Sector. (Photograph by Kazuhiro
Nogi/Agence France-Presse -- Getty Images) (B9)

Copyright New York Times Company Jun 5, 2014
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Author Gelles, David; Michael J. De La Merced
Publication title New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast);
New York, N.Y.
Pages B.1
Publication date Jun 5, 2014
Year 2014
column Dealbook
Section B
Publisher New York Times Company

Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Country of publication United States
Publication subject General Interest Periodicals--United States
ISSN 03624331
CODEN NYTIAO
Source type Newspapers
Document type News
Document URL
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__MACOSX/422 mod 4/._Gelles 422 Tm and Sprint.pdf
422 mod 4/Mod4Background.htmlModule 4 - Background
Leadership and Decision-Making StylesRequired Reading
The Vroom-Yetton model can be difficult to follow and
understand at first, so be sure to go carefully through these
three readings to develop a solid understanding of the model
before you begin your assignments:
Stanford, N. (2007). Decision making. Guide to Organisation
Design: Creating High-Performing and Adaptable Enterprises.
Profile Books/The Economist, London, GBR, pp. 225-231.
[eBook Business Collection]
Rigolosi, E. (2005). Chapter 6: Diagnosing the task.
Management and Leadership in Nursing and Health Care : An
Experiential Approach. New York, NY, USA: Springer
Publishing Company, 2005. [eBook Academic Collection.]
Vroom, V. (1976). Can leaders learn to lead? Organizational
Dynamics, 4(3), 17-28. [ProQuest]Case Assignment Reading
Gelles, D., & Michael J De La, M. (2014, Jun 05). T-Mobile and
Sprint zeroing in on merger. New York Times [ProQuest]
Yao, D. (2014). Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces
negative free cash flow until at least 2018. SNL Kagan Media &
Communications Report [ProQuest]
De La Merced, M. (2014, Aug 07). Sprint ends its attempt to
purchase T-Mobile. International New York Times
[ProQuest]Optional Reading
For an example of how the Vroom-Yetton model has been

applied to a military setting see this following paper:
Duncan, W. J., LaFrance, K. G., & Ginter, P. M. (2003).
Leadership and decision making: A retrospective application
and assessment. Journal of Leadership & Organizational
Studies, 9(4), 1 [ProQuest]
Muczyk, J. P., & Steel, R. P. (1998). Leadership style and the
turnaround executive. Business horizons, 41(2), 39-46. [Science
Direct]Privacy Policy | Contact
__MACOSX/422 mod 4/._Mod4Background.html
422 mod 4/Mod4Case.htmlModule 4 - Case
Leadership and Decision-Making StylesCase Assignment
Since 2013 there has been on-and-off talk of Sprint purchasing
T-Mobile. (They are the third- and fourth-largest mobile phone
carriers in the United States.) This move is led by Masayoshi
Son, the chair of Japanese conglomerate SoftBank, which owns
Sprint. Mr. Son is a bold entrepreneur who is known for his
penchant for risk taking and desire to be a global leader in the
telecommunications industry. If the merger ever goes through it
would result in a merger of the third and fourth largest mobile
phone carriers in the United States.
Most recently, it appears that the merger will not go through.
But the fact that talk of this merger has been rumored for quite
a long time suggests it must have been a very difficult decision
for Masayoshi Son. Such a large-scale merger brings great
benefits in allowing a combined Sprint/T-Mobile to compete
with industry leaders AT&T and Verizon. But mergers are
always very risky and require a huge amount of debt to finance,
not to mention overcoming numerous regulatory hurdles.
For this assignment, thoroughly review the background
materials on the Vroom-Yetton decision-making style model.
This involves answering seven questions relating to a decision
and using the results from the model to determine your
decision-making style. Make sure you understand the model,

including the seven questions and the path diagram that you
follow in order to find the preferred leadership style. The
Vroom-Yetton model allows you to choose between different
levels of autocratic, consulting, or group decision-making
styles.
After you have reviewed the required background materials
including Stanford(2007), Vroom (1976), and Rigolosi (2005),
do some research on Sprint’s decision whether or not to
purchase T-Mobile and think about what kind of answers you
would give to the seven questions involved in the Vroom-Yetton
model. Here are some articles on the rumored Sprint/T-Mobile
merger to get you started:
Gelles, D., & De La Merced, M. J. (2014, Jun 05). T-Mobile and
Sprint zeroing in on merger. New York Times [ProQuest]
Yao, D. (2014). Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces
negative free cash flow until at least 2018. SNL Kagan Media &
Communications Report [ProQuest]
De La Merced, M. (2014, Aug 07). Sprint ends its attempt to
purchase T-Mobile. International New York Times [ProQuest]
Once you have finished your research on the Vroom-Yetton
model and on the merger, write a 4- to 5-page paper addressing
the following issues:Imagine you are Masayoshi Son and have
to decide on which decision-making style to use. Go through the
seven questions from the Vroom-Yetton model and give your
answers based on what you think the main issues are in the
decision of whether or not to purchase T-Mobile. Explain your
reasoning behind each answerGo through the diagram in the
Vroom-Yetton model and, based on your answers to the seven
questions from Question 1, see what kind of decision-making
style is recommended for Masayoshi Son. Use the diagram
(Figure 6.2) on page 118 of Rigolosi (2005). Are you surprised
by this answer? Is it the kind of decision-making style you
would personally recommend based on your own
research?Conclude your paper with a discussion of your own
opinion as to the usefulness of the Vroom-Yetton model for
choosing your decision-making style. Would you recommend

that corporate executives receive training in this model? Is there
any ways in which you think the model could be improved?
Explain your reasoning.Assignment ExpectationsFollow the
assignment instructions closely and follow all steps listed in the
instructions.Stay focused on the precise assignment questions;
don’t go off on tangents or devote a lot of space to summarizing
general background materials.Make sure to cite readings from
the background materials page. Rely primarily on the required
background readings as your sources of information.Include
both a bibliography and in-text citations. See the Student Guide
to Writing a High-Quality Academic Paper, including pages 13
and 14 on in-text citations.Privacy Policy | Contact
__MACOSX/422 mod 4/._Mod4Case.html
422 mod 4/Mod4SLP.htmlModule 4 - SLP
Leadership and Decision-Making Styles
For this assignment think about a specific decision that was
made by your supervisor in the organization you currently work
for or have worked for in the past. Review the background
materials carefully on the Vroom-Yetton model and think about
how this model applies to this decision that you experienced.
Then write a 2- to 3-page paper applying the Vroom-Yetton
model to this decision:Describe the decision that management
had to make, and also whether their decision-making style was
autocratic, consultative, or group-based. Explain your
reasoning.Go through Vroom-Yetton’s seven questions and
apply these questions to their diagram to see what decision-
making style their model suggests. Briefly explain the reasoning
behind your answers to the seven questions.Conclude your
paper with a discussion of whether or not you would recommend
this model to your supervisor and whether or not you were
surprised by the recommendation given by this model regarding
decision-making style.SLP Assignment ExpectationsFollow the
assignment instructions closely and follow all steps listed in the

instructions.Stay focused on the precise assignment questions;
don’t go off on tangents or devote a lot of space to summarizing
general background materials.Make sure to cite readings from
the background materials page. Rely primarily on the required
background readings as your sources of information.Include
both a bibliography and in-text citations. See the Student Guide
to Writing a High-Quality Academic Paper, including pages 13
and 14 on in-text citations.Privacy Policy | Contact
__MACOSX/422 mod 4/._Mod4SLP.html
422 mod 4/Rigolosi 422.pdf
102
6
Diagnosing the Task
OUTLINE
THE VROOM, YETTON, AND JAGO MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING MODEL
APPLICATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL
DISCUSSION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL
A FINAL NOTE
SUMMARY
REVIEW CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS
SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS
REFERENCES
EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES
To gain knowledge of a decision-making theory that can be
used to diagnose the task
To understand six major types of decision-making styles

To blend the diagnosis of followers and selection of
appropriate beginning leader behavior with diagnosis
of the task
Part II of this book is devoted to identifying the appropriate
leader behavior to use in beginning the
process of motivating and educating people in a system to
accomplish an identified goal. This process
involves diagnosing the environment—self, system, and task—
and then applying leader behavior theory, as
presented in Chapter 5.
Diagnosing self, presented in , is necessary in identifying the
leader’s personal point of view onChapter 3
the problem or goal and on the environment. Further,
diagnosing one’s personal leader behavior style is
helpful to fit behavioral intent with what is generally automatic
behavior that stems from one’s own
personality. Diagnosing self is a consciousness-raising
experience with an intent of reducing leader bias and
matching needed leader behavior with what is actually given to
and perceived by followers.
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of theories that can be used to
diagnose a system. Once a diagnosis is
made, leader behavior theory is applied to determine the leader
behavior style that has the highest probability
for motivating and educating people to accomplish a task. This
leader behavior style is the umbrella or pivot
upon which problem solutions and actions should be based.
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AN: 477403 ; Rigolosi, Elaine La Monica.; Management and
Leadership in Nursing and Health Care : An Experiential
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Account: s3642728
103
Chapter 5 contains a discussion about matching a system’s
diagnosis to a leader behavior theory of choice
to know the theoretically best leader behavior style that should
be used to begin the process of goal
accomplishment. The reader should be aware that leader
behavior preferably should always be on target with
what followers need. There is, however, another variable that
adds to the overall diagnosis, as shown in the
following equation, which was presented earlier and is worthy
of reinforcement:
Manager Behavior =
Diagnosing the Organizational Environment
— Self
— Task
— Situational Variables
— Material Resources
Plus Applying Leader Behavior Theory
Diagnosis of the task is the last segment of leader
responsibilities that will be discussed in of thisPart II
book. It completed the equation that forms the basis for the core
of how managers work. Remember, as stated
previously in situational variables and material resources are
considered in the overall developingChapter 4,
action plan and are thought of as an awareness of what a leader
has in an environment—they are what has

been given and what must be worked with at a particular point
in time. Situational variables and material
resources do not require a diagnosis as do self, human
resources, and the task.
The task is an addition to a leader’s diagnosis. The nature of
tasks may require different leader behavior
styles to have the most effective outcomes. Ideally, the
suggested best leader behavior style of a task should
match the selected best beginning leader behavior style for the
followers who will be doing the task. So,
please place aside what has presented so far and continue to
hold it as your theoretically bestPart II
suggestions for how managers work. Then study the contents in
this chapter and blend everything when you
understand what is presented. Diagnosing the task is another
important piece of information that can be
placed in the leader’s picture of information—it purports to
increase your batting average for success in
leading others to accomplish goals.
THE VROOM, YETTON, AND JAGO MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING MODEL
The conceptual framework for diagnosing the task is the Vroom,
Yetton, and Jago (VYJ) managerial
decision-making model ( ; ; ). ThisVroom, 1973 Vroom & Jago,
1978, 1988 Vroom & Yetton, 1973
decision-making model is another theory destroying the myth
that managers who use democratic styles are
“good” and those who do not are “bad.” The decision process
used by a manager in a situation should depend
on the nature of the unique situation—the diagnosis of the
environment (Donnelly, Gibson, & Ivancevich,
; ; ).1998 Gatewood, Taylor, & Ferrell, 1995 Kreitner &

Kinicki, 2010
The VYJ model provides a means to diagnose tasks in
determining the most appropriate leader behavior
style for the manager to use in getting something accomplished.
Although diagnosing the nature of the task
should be only one of three determinants of leader behavior, the
VYJ decision-making model is a powerful
one that reports validity for its purpose ( ; ; ) and hasField,
1982 Jago & Vroom, 1978 Vroom & Jago, 1978
been widely evident in the literature ( ; ; Hersey, Blanchard, &
Johnson, 2008 Lord, Hanges, & Godfrey, 2003
; ; ).Marquis & Huston, 2012 Newstrom, 2011 Vroom, 2000,
2001, 2002
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Account: s3642728
104
A general guide for diagnosing the task can be depicted by the
following equation (La Monica & Finch,
):1977
Effective decisions = a function of (quality + acceptance +
time)
Quality refers to whether there are a number of possible
solutions to the problem and some alternatives could
result in better outcomes than others—a qualitative judgment on

the best solution must be made. Acceptance
is concerned with whether staff members must accept the
problem’s solution to eliminate the problem or
achieve the goal—must the staff do anything? relates to how
much time is available to work on theTime
problem or accomplish the goal. The VYJ managerial decision-
making model integrates answers to these
three variables and suggests a decision-making style that has the
highest probability for effectiveness. These
results will be combined with other diagnoses from previous
chapters in determining leader behavior.
Table 6.1 contains six different managerial decision styles.
Read each one and then study the case in Box
. Select the decision-making style that you would use if you
were the manager in the case. Write your6.1
response in the space provided after the case.
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Account: s3642728

106
BOX 6.1
Case Example
You are an assistant director of nursing in a large city hospital.
The management has recently put into
effect, at your request and consultation, the [newly organized
and computerized] unit manager system
on two floors. This was expected to relieve the nurses of
administrative responsibility, increase their
abilities to provide quality care to clients, ensure that health
assessments and care plans could be
accomplished for every client, and lower the nursing budget.
Quality health care and nursing care
plans reflected the suggestions made by the hospital accreditors.
To the surprise of everyone, yourself
included, little of the plan has been realized. In fact, nurses are
sitting in the conference room more,
quality has maintained a status quo, and employees and patients
are complaining more than ever.
You do not believe that there is anything wrong with the new
system. You have had reports from
other hospitals using it and they confirm this opinion. You . . .
[also have] had representatives from
institutions using the system talk with your nursing personnel,
and the representatives report that your
nurses have full knowledge of the system and their altered
responsibilities.
You suspect that a few people may be responsible for the
situation, but this view is not widely
shared among your two supervisors and four head nurses. The

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