PAGE 1Technophobia = Poisoned Fruit by Henry MillerFear-Mongering About Recombinant DNA-Modified Crops Hurts Farmers and Consumers Most people are familiar with the unappetizing browning of apples shortly after they’re cut or bitten into. The good news is that molecular biologists have devised a clever way to prevent it. The bad news is that organizations that represent apple growers are implacably opposed to the improved fruit. And therein lies a cautionary tale. The biology of apples is complicated but fascinating. Almost all commercial apple varieties are grafted onto hardy root stocks that have dwarfing genes to keep the trees on apple plantations short and easier to harvest. Therefore, the DNA of the roots is different from the DNA of the fruit tree. Apples’ blossoms are self-incompatible with respect to fertilization so they must be cross-pollinated by insects (primarily bees) in order to develop fruit. Special pollinating trees are found in most orchards as a source of pollen for the fruit tree blossoms. These pollinating trees (often crab apples) have still different DNA. Once the pollen fertilizes the apple blossom the fruit can develop. The pollen DNA mixes with the flower ovum DNA and the resulting hybrid seed embryo grows and produces a hormone that directs other parts of the flower (which contains only flower DNA) to develop into the fruit. Thus, the DNA in the fruit itself is different from the DNA in the seeds. This difference in DNA between the fruit and the seeds is why different varieties of apples can be grown in close proximity and yet maintain their differences. Because the DNA in the fruit is only from the flower, not the pollen, Granny Smith apples growing next to Golden Delicious growing next to Red Delicious all produce apples with their own unique DNA. Arctic Apple A Canadian company has petitioned both the U.S. and Canadian federal regulatory authorities to permit the sale of a new variety called Arctic® Apple that contains a commercially significant trait. It is highly resistant to the unappetizing browning that occurs when an apple is cut or bruised. The biology that made this possible is elegant and intriguing. Enzymatic browning is caused by the apple’s chemical reaction to cell injury, such as when the fruit is bitten or sliced, which ruptures the cells and triggers a chemical reaction between an enzyme called polyphenol oxidase (PPO) and chemicals in the apple that cause the apple flesh to turn brown. A family of four genes controls the majority of PPO production, so scientists turned off those genes—and lo and behold, Arctic Apples don’t manifest enzymatic browning. Ordinarily, this development of another new apple variety would be a nonevent—except, perhaps, for apple growers and retailers who would, one would expect, relish a new product with additional appeal to consumers—but the seeds of discontent have sprouted: Because the shutoff of the four genes was done with recombinant DNA technology,.

1. PAGE
1Technophobia = Poisoned Fruit by Henry MillerFear-
Mongering About Recombinant DNA-Modified Crops Hurts
Farmers and Consumers
Most people are familiar with the unappetizing browning of
apples shortly after they’re cut or bitten into. The good news is
that molecular biologists have devised a clever way to prevent
it. The bad news is that organizations that represent apple
growers are implacably opposed to the improved fruit.
And therein lies a cautionary tale.
The biology of apples is complicated but fascinating. Almost all
commercial apple varieties are grafted onto hardy root stocks
that have dwarfing genes to keep the trees on apple plantations
short and easier to harvest. Therefore, the DNA of the roots is
different from the DNA of the fruit tree. Apples’ blossoms are
self-incompatible with respect to fertilization so they must be
cross-pollinated by insects (primarily bees) in order to develop
fruit. Special pollinating trees are found in most orchards as a
source of pollen for the fruit tree blossoms. These pollinating
trees (often crab apples) have still different DNA. Once the
pollen fertilizes the apple blossom the fruit can develop.
The pollen DNA mixes with the flower ovum DNA and the
resulting hybrid seed embryo grows and produces a hormone
that directs other parts of the flower (which contains only
flower DNA) to develop into the fruit. Thus, the DNA in the
fruit itself is different from the DNA in the seeds. This
difference in DNA between the fruit and the seeds is why
different varieties of apples can be grown in close proximity
and yet maintain their differences. Because the DNA in the fruit

2. is only from the flower, not the pollen, Granny Smith apples
growing next to Golden Delicious growing next to Red
Delicious all produce apples with their own unique DNA.
Arctic Apple
A Canadian company has petitioned both the U.S. and Canadian
federal regulatory authorities to permit the sale of a new variety
called Arctic® Apple that contains a commercially significant
trait. It is highly resistant to the unappetizing browning that
occurs when an apple is cut or bruised. The biology that made
this possible is elegant and intriguing.
Enzymatic browning is caused by the apple’s chemical reaction
to cell injury, such as when the fruit is bitten or sliced, which
ruptures the cells and triggers a chemical reaction between an
enzyme called polyphenol oxidase (PPO) and chemicals in the
apple that cause the apple flesh to turn brown. A family of four
genes controls the majority of PPO production, so scientists
turned off those genes—and lo and behold, Arctic Apples don’t
manifest enzymatic browning.
Ordinarily, this development of another new apple variety
would be a nonevent—except, perhaps, for apple growers and
retailers who would, one would expect, relish a new product
with additional appeal to consumers—but the seeds of
discontent have sprouted: Because the shutoff of the four genes
was done with recombinant DNA technology, there have been
objections and consternation.
Simply because this highly precise and predictable methodology
was used, some apple growers are worried that this new variety
could constitute a threat to other apple crops. The U.S. Apple
Association (USApple), the industry’s trade group, says that it
“supports advancements from technology and genetics and

3. genomics research,” and that “benefits can include attributes
such as quality…”—which would certainly include nonbrowning
apples—but, paradoxically, USApple has also come out firmly
against the introduction of the Arctic Apple.
USApple has emphasized that its objections are “not based on
any concern about human health and safety,” but “consumers
like their apples and are not calling for these new
‘nonbrowning’ cultivars.” How lame. Are consumers clamoring
for apple cultivars that are more resistant to predation by
insects, viruses, or fungi?
There are several reasons why their concerns are unfounded.
First, as described, farmers and plant breeders have been
creating new varieties of apples for millennia. The new
molecular techniques for accomplishing this are far more
precise, predictable, and conservative.
Second, there is vast experience in both cultivation and in our
diets with recombinant DNA-modified varieties of various
crops. Farmers in three dozen countries have cumulatively
cultivated more than 1.25 billion hectares (about 3.75 billion
acres) of them, and North Americans alone have consumed more
than 3 trillion servings of food or ingredients from recombinant
DNA-modified plants. There has never been a single
documented case of disruption of an ecosystem or harm to a
person.
Extensive global scientific research has identified no unique
health risks associated with recombinant DNA-modified crops
or food, and the apple growers associations (except perhaps the
organic growers, who often seem to reside in a parallel
universe) have no concerns about the safety of this nonbrowning
apple.

4. Could the new apple “contaminate” other varieties? Research
has shown that the cross-pollination potential of apples is
limited to about 150 feet. Beyond that distance, cross
pollination of apples is virtually nil. The DNA in fruit comes
from the parental tree, not the pollen that fertilizes the apple
blossom. When someone eats a Golden Delicious apple, 100%
of the DNA (and protein, carbohydrates, and other compounds)
is from Golden Delicious trees.
The entire apple industry owes the diversity of varieties to
different gene expression patterns. A Golden Delicious apple
looks and tastes different from a Red Delicious because
different apple genes are expressed. Recent genomic sequencing
shows there are about 57,000 genes in the Golden Delicious
apple. One must look beyond the science to understand how the
apple growers’ associations can be against new varieties of
apples simply because four of the 57,000 apple genes have been
turned off.
The reason is short-sighted economics. A spokesperson for the
Northwest Horticultural Council ascribed the apple industry’s
opposition to the potential for “severe adverse marketing issues
to confront both organic and traditional apple growers” if the
Arctic Apple were to be introduced.
The organic fruit industry is especially antagonistic to the
Arctic Apple. They claim that the organic status of their fruit is
threatened by cross-pollination from any recombinant DNA-
modified apple and are calling for a ban on all such varieties.
However, no organic grower has ever lost organic certification
from exposure to trace amounts of recombinant DNA-modified
seed or pollen, just as pesticide wafting onto organic crops from
neighboring fields does not jeopardize organic status.
“Organic” status is conferred if the grower agrees to use only a
restricted set of techniques and practices but has nothing at all

5. to do with the quality, safety, or characteristics of the product
itself.
Fear-mongering about recombinant DNA-modified crops has
become the stock-in-trade of some antitechnology
environmental organizations and the organic food industry.
Therefore, apple growers and their trade groups fear the
possibility that their products will no longer be the “apple of
the consumer’s eye” because of negative propaganda from the
organic food and antibiotechnology organizations.
There are even more compelling reasons than pleasing their
customers for apple growers and their trade groups to embrace
the new technology: the experiences, both positive and
negative, of other farming sectors in the recent past.
Recombinant DNA Technology
Consider, for example, the cautionary tale of the Kona coffee
industry in Hawaii, which in 2008 pushed the Hawaii County
Council to ban the growing of recombinant DNA-modified
beans on the Big Island. The growers felt that the use of the
new technology would risk decades of building the reputation of
Kona coffee as a brand. Beans developed using recombinant
DNA technology may not qualify as “specialty coffee,” and
therefore, it was feared that they would command a lower
market price.
The industry may now be singing a different tune. Big Island
coffee growers are facing a dire threat to their crops that didn’t
exist four years ago: Infestations of the Coffee Berry Borer
beetle, which evolves resistance to pesticidal sprays, were first
discovered in Kona in 2010 and have now been confirmed in all
parts of west Hawaii and in some other areas as well. Faced
with the threat of devastation of their crops, the industry is now

6. desperate for any measures to combat the beetle. Recombinant
DNA technology has been widely and successfully used in corn,
cotton, papaya, and other crops to introduce resistance to pests.
Hawaiian coffee farmers and their organizations should have
heeded the positive example of the Rainbow variety of papaya,
Hawaii’s fifth largest crop. By inserting a single gene from a
virus into papayas, scientists have made them virus-resistant.
Although the biological mechanism is different, the effect is
similar to vaccination of people and animals using weakened or
killed viruses. The recombinant DNA-modified Rainbow papaya
has resurrected Hawaii’s $64 million-a-year industry, which was
moribund 15 years ago because of the predations of papaya
ringspot virus.
Wheat farming offers yet another example. By 2004, Monsanto,
the world’s leader in the production of seeds for genetically
engineered crops, had made substantial progress in the
development of genetically engineered wheat varieties for North
America. But suddenly in that year, the company scrapped its
wheat program in large part because of opposition from North
American grain merchants and growers.
European countries and Japan, which have traditionally
imported about 45% of U.S. wheat exports, have been resistant
to recombinant DNA-modified crops and food derived from
them.
However, American growers and millers have had a change of
heart. Wheat farming is a struggling industry in the United
States, in large part because it has not received the
technological boost from recombinant DNA technology that has
hugely benefited the corn and soybean sectors. U.S. wheat
acreage is down about one-third from its peak in the early
1980s, due to reduced profitability compared with alternative
crops. Therefore, in 2006, a coalition of U.S. wheat industry

7. organizations called for access to recombinant DNA-modified
wheat varieties with enhanced traits, and a survey released in
2009 by the U.S. national association of wheat growers found
that more than three-quarters of U.S. farmers wanted access to
genetically improved varieties with resistance to pests, disease,
drought, and frost.
Such varieties are important as plant scientists and farmers
continue to battle diseases such as leaf rust, the world’s most
common wheat disease, which can lead to yield loss of up to
20%. In Kansas, the heart of the U.S. wheat belt, for example,
leaf rust destroyed a shocking 14% of the wheat crop in 2007.
Apple growers should take note of the lessons learned by others
the hard way. There is little doubt consumers will like and even
pay a premium for the nonbrowning trait in apples. Instead of
fighting the introduction of this improved, consumer-friendly
product (as well as others that could follow), the apple growers’
associations should sow the seeds of greater sales and security
of their harvest by mounting a truthful, positive ad campaign to
trumpet the new advances in molecular biology applied to their
products. They should bear in mind that technophobia often
breeds poisoned fruit.
Work Cited
Miller, Henry. “Technophobia = Poisoned Fruit.”
Genengnews.com. Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology, 1 Oct.
2012. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
PAGE
4Technology & the Future of Violence
by Gabriella Blum

8. How should our defense strategy evolve in a world of easily
accessible mini-drones, lethal nanobots, and DIY warfare?
You walk into your shower and find a spider. You are not an
arachnologist. You do, however, know that one of the following
options is possible:
The spider is real and harmless. The spider is real and
venomous.
Your next-door neighbor, who dislikes your noisy dog, has
turned her personal surveillance spider (purchased from
“Drones ‘R Us” for $49.95) loose and is monitoring it on her
iPhone from her seat at a sports bar downtown. The pictures of
you, undressed, are now being relayed on several screens during
the break of an NFL game, to the mirth of the entire
neighborhood.
Your business competitor has sent his drone assassin spider,
which he purchased from a bankrupt military contractor, to take
you out. Upon spotting you with its sensors, and before you
have any time to weigh your options, the spider shoots an
infinitesimal needle into a vein in your left leg and takes a
blood sample.
As you beat a retreat out of the shower, your blood sample is
being run on your competitor’s smartphone for a DNA match.
The match is made against a DNA sample of you that is already
on file at EVER.com (Everything about Everybody), an
international DNA database (with access available for $179.99).
Once the match is confirmed (a matter of seconds), the assassin
spider outruns you with incredible speed into your bedroom,
pausing only long enough to dart another needle, this time
containing a lethal dose of a synthetically produced,
undetectable poison, into your bloodstream. Your assassin, who

9. is on a summer vacation in Provence, then withdraws his spider
under the crack of your bedroom door and out of the house, and
presses its self-destruct button. No trace of the spider or the
poison it carried will ever be found by law enforcement
authorities.
Smaller, Cheaper Weapons & DIY Drones
This is the future. According to some uncertain estimates,
insect-sized drones will become operational by 2030. These
drones will be able to not only conduct surveillance, but to act
on it with lethal effect. Over time, it is likely that miniaturized
weapons platforms will evolve to be able to carry not merely the
quantum of lethal material needed to execute individuals, but
also weapons of mass destruction sufficient to kill thousands.
Political scientist James Fearon has even speculated that at
some more distant point in time, individuals will be able to
carry something akin to a nuclear device in their pockets.
Assessing the full potential of technology as it expands (and
shrinks) requires a scientific expertise beyond my ken. The
spider in the shower is merely an inkling of what probably lies
in store. But even a cursory glance at ongoing projects tells us
that the mind-bending speed at which robotics and nanobotics
are developing means that a whole range of weapons is growing
smaller, cheaper, and easier to produce, operate, and deploy
from great distances. If the mis-en-scene above seems unduly
alarmist or too futuristic, consider the following: Drones the
size of a cereal box are already widely available, can be
controlled by an untrained user with an iPhone, cost roughly
$300, and come equipped with cameras. Palm-sized drones are
commercially available as toys (such as the Hexbug), although
they are not quite insect-sized and their sensory input is limited
to primitive perception of light and sound.
True minidrones are still in the developmental stages, but the
technology is progressing quickly. The technological challenges

10. seem to be not in making the minidrones fly, but in making
them do so for long periods of time while also carrying some
payload (surveillance or lethal capacity). The flagship effort in
this area appears to be the Micro Autonomous Systems and
Technology (MAST) Collaborative Technological Alliance,
which is funded by the U.S. Army and led by BAE Systems and
U.C. Berkeley, among others. The Alliance’s most recent
creations are the Octoroach and the BOLT (Bipedal Ornithopter
for Locomotion Transitioning). The Octoroach is an extremely
small robot with a camera and radio transmitter that can cover
up to 100 meters on the ground, and the BOLT is a winged robot
designed to increase speed and range on the ground.
Scientists at Cornell University, meanwhile, recently developed
a hand-sized drone that uses flapping wings to hover in flight,
although its stability is still quite limited and battery weight
remains a problem. A highly significant element of the Cornell
effort, however, is that the wing components were made with a
3-D printer. This heralds a not-too-distant future in which a
person at home can simply download the design of a drone,
print many of the component parts, assemble them with a
camera, transmitter, battery, etc., and build themselves a fully
functioning, insect-sized surveillance drone.
Crawling minidrones have clearly passed the feasibility
threshold and merely await improvements in range and speed to
attain utility on the battlefield and viability in the private
sector. Swarms of minidrones are also being developed to
operate with a unified goal in diffuse command and control
structures. Robotics researchers
at the University of Pennsylvania recently released a video of
what they call “nano quadrotors”—flying mini-helicopter robots
that engage in complex movements and pattern formation.
A still more futuristic technology is that of nanobots or
nanodrones. The technology for manufacturing microscopic

11. robots has been around for a few years, but recent research has
advanced to the point of microscopic robots that can assemble
themselves and even perform basic tasks. The robotics industry,
both governmental and private, is also exerting great efforts to
enhance the autonomous capabilities of robots, that is, to be
able to program a robot to perform complex tasks with only a
few initial commands and no continuous control. Human testing
for a microrobot that can be injected into the eye to perform
certain surgical tasks is now on the horizon. Similar
developments have been made toward nanobots that will clear
blocked arteries and perform other procedures.
Now, situate the robotics technology alongside other
technological and scientific advancements—the Internet,
telecommunications, and biological engineering—all of which
empower individuals to do both good and terrible things to
others. From here, it is not hard to conceptualize a world rife
with miniature, possibly molecule-sized, means of inflicting
harm on others, from great distances and under clandestine
conditions.
When invisible remote weapons become ubiquitous, neither
national boundaries nor the lock on our front door will
guarantee us an effective line of defense. As the means to inflict
violence from afar become more widely available, both
individual threat and individual vulnerability increase to a
hitherto unknown degree. When the risk of being detected or
held accountable diminishes, inhibitions regarding violence
decrease. Whether political or criminal, violence of every kind
becomes easier to inflict and harder to prevent or account for.
Ultimately, modern technology makes individuals at once
vulnerable and threatening to all other individuals to
unprecedented degrees: we are all vulnerable—and all
menacing.
The Future of War

12. In this essay I take on some of the possible ramifications of
these technological advances for the potential incidence of
violence and its future effects on the existing legal and political
order. I first consider the special features of new weapons
technologies that, in my mind, are likely to make violence more
possible and more attractive; these are proliferation,
remoteness, and concealment. All in all, I argue that technology
has found a way to create “perfect weapons”—altogether
distant, invisible, and untraceable, essentially generating a more
leveled playing field among individuals, groups, and states.
I then reflect on the implications of this development for the
traditional legal and political categories—national and
international, private and public, citizen and alien, war and
crime—that still serve as the basis for much of existing
regulation of violence, and argue that these juxtapositions are
becoming increasingly vague and inapplicable as rationales for
regulation of new threats. Finally, I venture to imagine some
broader themes of the future defense against the threat of new
weapons, both on the international level (a move to global
policing) and on the domestic level (privatization of defense).
I argue that as threats increasingly ignore conventional
boundaries or nationalities and become more individualized, the
traditional division of labor between government and citizens
and between domestic and international becomes impractical.
National defense will require a different mix of unilateralism
and international cooperation. Personal defense will have to rely
more on diffuse, private, person-to-person mechanisms of
protection, as well as concede more power to the government.
The very concept of state sovereignty—what it means
domestically and what it means externally—would have to be
reimagined, given the new strategic environment.
Several preliminary observations are in order. The first is a
caveat: To a significant degree, my essay focuses on the

13. technological threat side of the equation. It does not envisage
the full line of possible complementary defenses. This
discrepancy inevitably produces a somewhat myopic picture of
the consequences of new technology. Most technological
innovations relating to weapons, biology, or the cyber world are
closely followed by apprehensions of Armageddon—so much so
that in some cases, there have been preemptive efforts to ban
the use of these technologies.
Take, for instance, the 1899 treaty to ban balloon air warfare,
which is still in force for its signatories (among them the United
States). Genetic and biological engineering, which can save and
improve lives on a mass scale, has also been met with criticism
about the impropriety of “Man playing God” and predictions of
the end of the human race as we know it. And yet the world still
stands, despite the existence of destructive capabilities that can
blow up Planet Earth hundreds of times over. In fact, some
credit the very existence of nuclear weapons and the
accompanying nuclear arms race for a reduction in overall
violence.
Still, history has proven that offensive capabilities, at least for
a space in time, usually outrun defensive capabilities. In the
robotic context especially, as costs go down, availability grows
and global threat grows with it. Even if defensive technologies
catch up with present threats and many of the concerns raised in
this essay could be set aside, it is always useful to continue to
think about defense as it should evolve vis-à-vis the micro-
world in comparison with more traditional modes of defense.
Moreover, it is unclear that the case of meeting threats with
equal threats—as in the case of nuclear weapons—would yield a
similar outcome of mutual deterrence when it comes to
personalized weapons of the kind I imagine here. For all these
reasons, I find it appropriate, for the purposes of this essay and
with the caveat described in mind, to focus on the threat/offense
side of the equation.

14. A second observation is a variation on the first, and has to do
with the different roles and functions of technology in general
and robots specifically. Like all machines, robots can be put to
good or bad use, and the “good” or “bad” often depends on
where one stands. On today’s battlefields, robots serve many
functions, ranging from sweeping for Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs), to medical evacuation, supply chain
management, surveillance, targeting, and more. In this essay, I
focus on technology’s “life-taking,” rather than “life-saving,”
functions, while keeping in mind that the same systems can be
put to use to save victims of atrocities just as easily as they can
be deployed for more pernicious purposes.
From among all types of robots available, I focus mostly on
robots that are miniaturized, potentially invisible, which make
detection and accountability a great deal more difficult. This is
what also situates the “spiders” within the broader technological
developments of the Internet, bioengineering, and the like,
which, together, constitute an environment in which the threat is
largely invisible. Again, although their full scientific and
operational potential is unknown as of yet, I assume that some
version of miniaturized drones—whether independently
operated or deployed off of larger structures that carry them to
their target—is a real possibility.
Socialization has always been essential for survival. The
Internet, media, telecommunications, travel, and commerce have
all made the world smaller and strengthened global
interconnectedness and socialization. In his recent eloquent and
wide-ranging book, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker argues
that our present society is the least violent in recorded history,
in part, because technology, trade, and globalization have made
us more reasoned, and in turn, more averse to violence.
Notwithstanding Pinker’s powerful account, the very same
technology that brings people closer—computers,

15. telecommunications, robotics, biological engineering, and so
on—now also threatens to enable people to do infinitely greater
to each other.
Whether advanced technology really threatens single-handedly
to reverse our trajectory toward a less violent world is
impossible to predict, precisely because the threat that derives
from technological advances is only one manifestation of a sea-
change in social and cultural relations which technology as a
whole brings about.
Put differently, threats derive from the combination of
capabilities and motivations to engage in harmful activities.
Technology influences both capabilities and motivations, but
not in a single trajectory; the technology to inflict harm is
countered by the technology to prevent or correct against it, and
motivations to inflict harm are constantly shaped and reshaped
by the local and global environments. Any assessment of the
future level of threat brought about by new weapons
technologies must thus engage with predictions about the
growth of capabilities to inflict violence on the one hand, and
the growth of or decline in motivations to inflict violent harm,
on the other.
As I earlier noted, I am focusing here on the capabilities to
inflict harm and their effects on the possible motivations to
harm, but only in the narrow context in which some underlying
motivation to injure others exists. Of course, if political,
ideological, or personal motivations for harm are significantly
reduced, for instance, because interconnectivity and
interdependence diminish violent hatred, demonization of
others, or the attractiveness of violence as the means of
promoting ideological goals, we have less to worry about.
With all their uncertainties, however, it seems to me that the
lethal capabilities of miniaturized technologies will spread well

16. before what has been assumed to be pacifying social forces,
whether the Internet or reason, will have operated to turn much
more of our world into a peaceful place. Even if they do not,
considering those features of new weapons technologies that
enhance the capability—and perhaps, therefore, the
motivation—for violence warrant special attention.
Violence, of course, does not require fancy weapons. Even in
our present age, it took mostly machetes for Hutus to kill
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the course of only 100
days. Individuals everywhere are already vulnerable to the
proliferation of weapons. According to some estimates, there
are 90 guns for every 100 people in the United States, and more
than 800 million firearms worldwide. Between 10,000 and
20,000 people are killed annually in gun-related homicides in
the United States. These homicides account for two-thirds of all
murder cases. When people want to kill other people, they can.
And yet, three features of new weapons technology—
proliferation, remoteness, and concealment—make violence
more likely. All three are already present to some degree in
existing weapons, but new technology integrates and intensifies
them in a way that significantly enhances their potential threat.
In what follows I discuss these three features in greater detail.
Work Cited
Blum, Gabriela. “ Technology & the Future of Violence.”
Hoover.org. Leland Stanford Junior University,
17 Aug. 2012. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
What are the Consequences of Being
Disconnected in a Broadband-
Connected World?

17. John B. Horrigan
© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
JOHNB. HORRIGAN is Vice Pres-
ident of Policy and Research at
TechNet, where he leads research
on technology, innovation, and
telecommunications policy. Previ-
ously, he was part of an fcc team
that developed the National Broad-
band Plan (nbp), designing and
conducting the fcc’s ½rst national
survey on broadband adoption
and usage. The survey ½ndings
were highlighted in the nbp’s ½rst
working paper, Broadband Adoption
and Use in America. He also served
as Associate Director of Research
for the Pew Internet & American
Life Project.
Ten years ago, the debate over the digital divide
was mainly a binary one about access: some people
had a computer (and therefore dial-up access to the
Internet), and some did not. This disparity was
widely thought to be unfair because not all mem-
bers of society could take advantage of the brave
new world of the Internet–that is, the easy con-
nectivity to other people and a wealth of informa-
tion. Those without access were cut off from the
bene½ts of communicating with others (for the
most part via email and sometimes on more orga-
nized many-to-many groups, such as Listservs).

18. Stakeholders should embrace a different framing
of the digital divide, one that acknowledges the
need for a broader range of policy measures to
address imbalance in the adoption of broadband
Internet. While the digital divide debate should not
abandon equity arguments, it should also consider
17
Abstract: The evolution of the Internet in the past decade–from
a slow, stationary, and primarily com-
munications-based technology to a mobile, fast technology that
supports a range of communication,
participatory, and transactional applications–has made access
more valuable, and disconnection more
consequential, for individuals. This evolution means that
stakeholders should embrace a different fram-
ing of the digital divide, focusing on the costs of digital
exclusion. These costs can fall on an individual,
if the Internet is the only way to carry out some tasks, and on
society, if expensive and less-ef½cient lega-
cy systems must be maintained to serve a shrinking minority
without access. Whereas the digital divide
debate concerns technology scarcity for certain population
segments, addressing the costs ofdigital exclu-
sion is about developing people’s capacity to manage today’s
abundance of digital resources. This essay
offers suggestions on a framework to develop tools that will
enable individuals to take advantage of the
affordances of broadband.
the costs to individuals and to society of
having a sizable portion of the popula-
tion offline. The high and rising cost of

19. digital exclusion makes a lack of Internet
access more disadvantageous today than
a decade ago. Furthermore, lower levels
of engagement with online resources
among those who are online are more
consequential than a few years ago.
Policy measures to address the inequi-
ties of the digital divide have rightly fo-
cused on providing access to necessary
hardware and giving users the computer
skills to negotiate the basics of an online
session. Some initiatives refurbished old
computers and either gave them to peo-
ple who could not otherwise afford them
or sold them at a cut rate. Grant pro-
grams–funded by the federal govern-
ment, states, or localities–were under-
taken to support hardware and training
for low-income people. Nonpro½t orga-
nizations also seized the opportunity to
bring access to less well-off Americans;
some managed to scale their initiatives
regionally or nationally.
Given the importance of broadband in
carrying out everyday tasks, such mea-
sures are still crucial, but alone are not
suf½cient to fully support online adop-
tion and use. In addition, policy-makers
and other stakeholders must give people
the resources to cultivate a wider set of
digital skills, such as media literacy, the
ability to access civic information, and
pro½ciency in managing personal priva-
cy. Users must also understand that they

20. have an obligation to educate themselves
on the skills needed to participate in an
increasingly broadband-mediated world.
The Internet’s expanding role as a con-
duit to performing important daily func-
tions has increased the need for tools to
help users negotiate an ever more com-
plex online environment.
This essay begins with a data-driven
discussion of how online access has
changed in the past decade. It reviews
trends in Internet and broadband adop-
tion, as well as mobile adoption, while
also examining the varying levels of
engagement with digital tools across the
user population. Second, the essay re-
views the literature on technology adop-
tion and user behavior, focusing on the
role of skills in user engagement with on-
line resources as well as factors that en-
courage or inhibit skill development.
Finally, after arguing that user support sys-
tems are necessary in today’s online world,
the essay offers suggestions to stakeholders
on how to create such systems.
As surveys from the Pew Research Cen-
ter’s Internet & American Life Project
have documented, online access and use
in the United States have evolved over the
past decade. Notwithstanding a recent
slowdown in the growth of broadband
adoption, far more Americans today con-
nect to the Internet using an “always on”

21. high-speed connection than was the case
just a few years ago (see Figure 1).
Data gathered at the end of 2009 and in
the ½rst quarter of 2010 show that some
two-thirds of Americans have broadband
access at home. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (fcc) survey con-
ducted in connection with the National
Broadband Plan (nbp) found in Novem-
ber 2009 that 65 percent of Americans
had broadband; a Pew survey conducted
in April 2010 found that 66 percent of
Americans had broadband at home. Data
gathered by the National Telecommuni-
cations & Information Administration
(ntia) in 2009 and 2010 census surveys
show similar trends. In 2009, the ntia
reported that 63.5 percent of households
had high-speed Internet access, a ½gure
that had grown to 68 percent by October
2010.1 More Americans are Internet users
than home broadband users, as some
Internet users have access at a place other
18
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22. Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
Sciences
than home (such as work or a library),
and some still use dial-up Internet con-
nections. Overall, according to the ntia ,
72 percent of Americans were Internet
users in October 2010.
Many U.S. policy-makers have become
particularly focused on how broadband
adoption in the United States compares
with other countries. According to a June
2010 survey by the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development
(oecd), the United States places four-
teenth in the world for ½xed broadband
subscriptions per one hundred inhabi-
tants, trailing the Netherlands, Den-
mark, Switzerland, and Korea (the top
four countries), but also France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
This middling rank, roughly the position
the United States has maintained for the
past several years, contrasts with the U.S.
standing a decade ago. In 2001, the oecd
placed the United States at fourth in the
world (using the metric of the number of
lines per one hundred people).2
Some observers have criticized the way
the oecd develops its ranking and the
wisdom of policy-makers who pay so

23. much attention to this metric.3 Nonethe-
less, these ratings help policy-makers
frame broadband policy as both urgent
and relevant to America’s economic com-
petitiveness. Although competitiveness is
not the focus of this essay, it plays a sig-
ni½cant part in U.S. broadband policy.
The growth in broadband adoption has
been accompanied by any number of
innovations that have made online life
more useful, fun, satisfying, and conse-
quential for users. People sent email mes-
sages from a desktop computer a decade
19
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
Figure 1
Trends in Home Broadband and Dial-Up Adoption, June 2000 to
December 2009
Source: Based on the author’s calculations using data available
from the Pew Internet & American Life Project,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Data-Tools/Download-Data.aspx.
ago, and although many of us still do,
many also send text messages from a
smartphone, tweet on the go, and rou-
tinely share information on Facebook.

24. People purchase items online, rate what
they buy, gather news and analysis, seek
out health and medical information, edu-
cate themselves, and engage in many oth-
er activities. Figure 2 presents snapshots
of what people do online and how use has
changed in the past decade.
A greater share of Americans perform a
wider range of online activities than a
decade ago. About twice as many people
get political news and information online
today than in 2000, and more than twice
as many adult Americans have bought
something online and banked online.
Activities that were unheard of in 1999,
such as blogging or social networking,
are mainstays in the daily routines of
large numbers of Americans. People also
access the Internet in more varied ways
than a decade ago.
Access is no longer stationary and teth-
ered. With the advent of laptops, net-
books, tablets, and smartphones–in con-
junction with the development of wire-
less networks–access is also portable and
ubiquitous. In 2000, slightly more than
half (53 percent) of Americans had cell
phones, a number that had grown to 86
percent at the beginning of 2010. The
capabilities of these devices have in-
creased dramatically: two-thirds of cell
phone users send text messages, and 40
percent use their phones to access the
Internet.4 Today, more than half (52 per-

25. cent) of Americans have laptop comput-
ers; many use them to access the Inter-
net through wireless connections.5 Finally,
tablets and e-book readers are beginning
to gain a foothold among early adopters.
Some 5 percent of adults report having an
e-book reader (such as a Kindle or Sony
Digital Reader) and 5 percent report hav-
ing a tablet computer (such as an iPad).6
However, individuals still have qualms
about online life. A 2008 Pew survey
showed that online users had substantial
reservations when asked about how com-
panies might use personal information
gathered from people using cloud com-
puting applications. The survey found
that 68 percent of those who use online
applications and storage services would be
very concerned about companies using
information gathered in the course of
such activities to serve targeted ads.7 The
fcc survey conducted for the nbp (men-
tioned above) found that many Ameri-
cans–especially those without home
broadband access–reported concerns
about the security of personal informa-
tion online. Some 45 percent of all Amer-
icans said they strongly agreed with the
proposition that it is too easy for their
personal information to be stolen online
–a ½gure that stood at 57 percent among
those without broadband at home. The
survey also found a link between fears
about the security of personal informa-
tion and lower levels of use of online re-

26. sources.8
Notwithstanding user worries about
some aspects of online life, the Internet
has evolved, in ten years’ time, from a
slow access technology used by a minori-
ty of the population to a technology that,
for most of the nation’s households, is
fast and mobile. It is no longer merely a
new way to communicate. A broadband-
driven Internet is more consequential
than the dial-up Internet–and in some
ways is more complex to use–but it also
affords collaboration, creativity, and par-
ticipation in ways unimaginable a gener-
ation ago.9
These data on access and use help illu-
minate the cost of digital exclusion, which
is reinforced in academic literature. Com-
puter scientist Rahul Tongia and commu-
nications scholar Ernest Wilson have ar-
20
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27. 21
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
Figure 2
Percentage of American Adults, including Internet Users and
Non-Users, who have Engaged in
Various Online Activities, 2000 to 200910
Use the Internet
Send or read email
Use a search engine
Research a product or service
Check the weather
Buy a product
Get news
Buy or make a travel reservation
Visit a government website
Watch a video
Look for news or information about

28. politics or upcoming campaigns
Do any banking online
Look for information about a job
Use online classi½ed ads
Send instant messages
Download music
Use a social networking site
Play online games
Read someone else’s blog
Rate a product, service, or person
Participate in an online auction
Make a donation to a charity
Download a podcast
Download or share ½les using peer-
to-peer ½le-sharing networks
Create or work on your own blog
Use Twitter or another status-
update service

29. gued that the costs of not being online
rise faster than the growth of the net-
work. Tongia and Wilson’s formulation
accomplishes in a model the reframing
that I am arguing stakeholders must fold
into their narratives. As more people use
broadband-connected networks, the cost
to those not on the network rises at more
than exponential rates when even a few
people are excluded.11
According to the nbp, the cost of digi-
tal exclusion is characterized by a decline
in offline alternatives as online ones take
precedence.12 Job searching is a good ex-
ample. When home broadband penetra-
tion was at half its current level, people
typically had plenty of ways to search for
jobs. Online ads were certainly one way,
but ads in the print edition of newspapers
were a viable alternative; job networking
could be conducted online as well as in
person; and job searchers could submit
applications online or by traditional
means. Today, print newspaper ads are
less useful sources than in the past,
and–importantly–it is often impossible
to apply for a job unless one applies
online. Some 80 percent of Fortune 500
companies accepted only online applica-
tions for jobs in 2010.13 Evidence also
suggests that home broadband access can
lessen the incidence of “job discourage-
ment” in the labor market, as Internet
access may spur some people to stick
with a job search rather than exit the

30. labor market.14
The basic act of getting the daily news
is another example. A decade ago, online
news websites were certainly popular,
but the daily newspaper was still a robust
source of news. More recently, changes
in the economics of the news business
have resulted in the downsizing of news-
rooms. In 2009, the daily newspaper had
27 percent fewer newsroom employees
than in the beginning of the decade; in
fact, 25 percent of the loss in newsroom
employment has occurred since 2006.15
News is still very much available offline
but has, in important ways, migrated to
the Internet; traditional media outlets
provide additional content online, and
the advent of pure play websites (wheth-
er independent blogs or news aggrega-
tion websites, such as the Huf½ngton
Post or the Drudge Report) has supplied
new ways to obtain information and
opinion. A recent Pew Research Center
report found that in a typical day, 36 per-
cent of Americans use both digital and tra-
ditional sources of news, and 39 percent
use only traditional sources. Although
Pew considers online sources as a supple-
ment to Americans’ news diets, the easy
availability of online news, whether on a
computer or a handheld device, has re-
sulted in Americans spending more time
getting news in 2010 than at any point in
the past decade.16

31. Interacting with government is also
different than a decade ago. With more
government services provided online,
more people are taking advantage of
them. It is often cheaper and easier for all
parties to carry out government-citizen
transactions online rather than via tradi-
tional outlets. For means-tested bene½ts
programs (such as food stamps, school
lunches, or Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families), a family might have to
½ll out between six and eight applica-
tions, often at the cost of hours away
from work. Agencies can save on pro-
curement costs using cloud computing,
with procurement savings of up to 50 per-
cent.17 Renewing a license online is easi-
er than going to a government agency. If
fewer citizens go in-person to an agency
for a particular type of transaction, it may
also be cheaper for government–and ulti-
mately taxpayers–to support fewer physi-
cal locations for certain types of services.
A ½nal example–online health and
medical information–shows the cost of
22
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32. Connected
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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
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digital exclusion with respect to partici-
pation in important decisions. Offline
sources for health care information have
not gone away in the past decade, but
there has been an explosion in online
forums by which patients share with one
another information about their condi-
tions. This type of networking, along
with other online sources of medical and
health information, helps patients be-
come more actively engaged in health
care choices. The upshot of this dynamic
is that more people look online for health
and medical information today than a
decade ago. In 2000, 25 percent of Amer-
icans had used the Internet for such
information, a ½gure that rose to 61 per-
cent by 2009.18 A lack of access to infor-
mation means that people lose out on an
opportunity to be more empowered and
participatory in health care decisions.
There is also evidence that broadband
can improve the ef½ciency with which
health care providers deliver care to
patients.19
In the above examples, the cost of digi-
tal exclusion is twofold:

33. 1) For individuals, those without access
to broadband either miss out on infor-
mation (such as job opportunities) or
must use more costly means to accom-
plish certain tasks.
2) For society, institutions have to support
the costs of legacy (and often more ex-
pensive) means of delivering services
in order to meet the needs of a shrink-
ing minority of people who do not have
access to broadband, or who have ac-
cess but lack the skills to use it.
Although there have been attempts to
quantify the costs of digital exclusion,
those estimates (derived in the United
States and the United Kingdom) are best
understood as a springboard for further
research.20 Yet digital exclusion and its
costs are important conceptual handles
for the ongoing debate about equity in
the digital age. Mark Cooper, director of
research for the Consumer Federation of
America, notes that because broadband
networks and functionalities continue to
advance, and therefore “raise the level of
skill necessary to use the network,” the
disconnected may become “even worse
off” than they are today.21 The link be-
tween the evolution of the broadband
environment and skills acquisition sug-
gests that stakeholders interested in ac-
cess gaps must take skills into account

34. when developing programs.
As consequential as having broadband
access is (or seems to be) these days, it is
important to resist the temptation to
think about broadband as something
everyone has to have. A necessity is not a
requirement. Broadband is often–with
reason–viewed as a necessity equivalent
to electricity; this comparison, in turn, is
frequently used to justify interventions
to promote broadband. The discourse,
however, often conflates access and use.
Do we want everyone to have access to
the infrastructure that provides service?
Although the answer is clearly “yes,” we
must acknowledge that as a practical mat-
ter we mean “nearly everyone,” as there
are some places where the cost of deploy-
ing infrastructure would be exorbitant.
Do we want everyone to use broad-
band? However well crafted policies to
increase access may be, attaining 100 per-
cent home-broadband adoption is not a
realistic goal. Even the telephone–widely
accepted as indispensable in modern life–
does not reach everyone; the fcc reports
that in 2010, 96 percent of Americans had
telephones, a ½gure that accounts for a
small minority without this apparently
indispensable tool.22 Research that exam-
ines this issue shows challenges in having
everyone adopt broadband. The fcc’s
November 2009 survey shows that 10 per-

35. 23
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
cent of the adult population is “digitally
distant,” meaning they have neither the
½nancial means nor skills and attitudes
about computers that might draw them
to online use. Another 7 percent are “dig-
itally uncomfortable”; despite the fact that
many have computers, most people in
this group question the relevance of on-
line access.
Although projections of future adop-
tion prospects of non-users are inherent-
ly uncertain, the data suggest that some
17 percent of Americans–about half of
current non-adopters–face signi½cant
hurdles to adoption. Thus, in the medi-
um term, a U.S. adoption rate above 85
percent is unlikely.23
Even with the real and potential bene-
½ts of broadband use, not everyone will
embrace it; among those who do, not
everyone will prefer to use broadband in
the ways favored by planners and vision-
aries. It is imperative, therefore, to keep
in mind user preferences and abilities in
thinking about how to take advantage of

36. broadband’s economic and social bene-
½ts. Encouraging broadband use should
be about “demand pull” (devising ways to
lure people to use) as opposed to “tech-
nology push” (making broadband use
effectively required).
Despite anticipated challenges to attain-
ing ubiquitous deployment and universal
adoption of broadband, Congress charged
the fcc to develop the nbp and to devise
strategies for increasing broadband adop-
tion. Partly driven by this objective, re-
searchers have sought to understand not
only who is not online, but why those
without high-speed access at home choose
not to have service.24 A plurality of the 35
percent of U.S. adults who do not have
broadband at home cites cost as the main
reason they do not have broadband at
home. Close to two-thirds of non-
adopters point to factors other than the
monthly fee or cost of hardware as the rea-
son they are not home-broadband users.
According to the fcc, the barriers to
home-broadband use include:
• Cost: 36 percent of non-adopters named
cost as the main barrier, with 15 percent
citing the monthly price for service and
10 percent citing the cost of a computer.
• Digital literacy: 22 percent cited factors
that indicate digital literacy problems,

37. such as unfamiliarity with a computer
or worries about bad things that could
happen to them online.
• Lack of relevance: 19 percent said they did
not need additional speed (that is, to
upgrade from dial-up) or that online
content was not relevant to them.
• Lack of available infrastructure: 5 percent
said they could not get broadband
where they live.
• Other reasons: 18 percent said they could
use the Internet all they wanted at work
(3 percent), identi½ed a combination of
reasons (4 percent), or cited reasons
that did not fall into a discrete category
(11 percent).
Though cost looms large as a barrier to
adoption, it is not an isolated factor; non-
adopters’ expressed concern over their
level of digital skills clearly is signi½cant.
When given the chance to identify more
than one reason for not having broad-
band at home, half of non-adopters pick
more than one. Speci½cally:
• 66 percent cite cost (that is, monthly ac-
cess fee or cost of computer);
• 52 percent cite relevance (that is, the In-
ternet is a waste of time or they do not
think there is relevant content online
for them); and

38. • 47 percent cite digital literacy (that is,
they worry about bad things that can
24
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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
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happen online or they are not comfort-
able with computers).25 More speci½-
cally, 46 percent of non-Internet users
cite lack of comfort with computers as a
reason why they are not online, and a
similar number (45 percent) say they do
not use the Internet because they worry
about “all the bad things that can hap-
pen online.”
It is worth noting that the fcc’s ½ndings
about barriers to broadband differ from
those found by the ntia. When asked to
identify the main reason they do not have
broadband, respondents in the ntia sur-
vey cited the following reasons:

39. • 38 percent: don’t need it–not interested;
• 26 percent: too expensive;
• 18 percent: no computer or inadequate
computer;
• 6 percent: other reasons;
• 4 percent: can use it somewhere else;
• 4 percent : not available in area; and
• 3 percent: lack of con½dence or skills.26
These discrepancies have to do with
how each survey framed its questions.
The fcc survey had a different set of cat-
egories and undertook a two-step process
in which respondents were asked ½rst to
list barriers they face and then to identify
the main one. The ntia survey asked a
single question. However the question is
framed, barriers to broadband adoption
clearly have a cost component, but the
overlapping concepts of digital skills or
literacy and perceived lack of relevance
are signi½cant parts of the picture.
Also at issue are barriers that inhibit
use of broadband among those who have
service. Communications scholar Eszter
Hargittai has found variation in levels of
online skills that, among young adults,
predict the kinds of activities they engage

40. in online. Other research that has devel-
oped typologies of Internet users ½nds,
among other things, that a variety of fac-
tors–skills, attitudes about information
technology, demography–shape how
intensively people use information and
communications technologies (icts).27
This variation in online usage patterns is
to be expected; not everyone needs to be
(or wants to be) a ½ber-to-the-home/
iPad-toting tech gear head. Pew’s 2009
report classifying the technology usage
patterns in the general population found
that 61 percent of adult Americans–
many with broadband and cell phones–
are not heavy tech users. Some are happy
that way, while many have tepid usage
patterns due to lack of digital skills.28
Finally, adapting a method Hargittai de-
veloped to measure user skills, the 2009
fcc survey for the nbp found that 29 per-
cent of broadband users had low levels of
computer and Internet skills.29 If users’
skill levels or worries about Internet use
cause them to turn away from the worth-
while affordances of online life, then de-
veloping tools to address these issues may
be socially bene½cial.
Although cost is most often cited as the
main reason for non-adoption, other fac-
tors matter: namely, limited digital skills
and the perception among non-adopters
that access is irrelevant to them. A com-
bination of these reasons often con-

41. tributes to the decision not to adopt. The
following two sections explore the barri-
ers of digital skill and literacy and users’
perception that the Internet is not rele-
vant to them. Alleviating cost pressures is
obviously important but will not be dis-
cussed here; addressing this issue would
mean delving into the complex area of re-
forming the Universal Service Fund and
the Lifeline/Link-up programs, which
currently provide cost relief for tele-
phone service. The nbp recommends that
these programs be updated to reflect the
25
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
reality of broadband, and proposals have
been advanced on how to proceed.30
It is hardly novel to suggest that online
engagement is underpinned by the requi-
site literacy and skills to use icts. Digital
skills refer to the basic competencies of
knowing how to operate a computer or
initiate an online session. These capabili-
ties do not necessarily require a high level
of expertise, but they do demand suf-
½cient knowledge to communicate to
others the nature of tech problems when

42. users cannot resolve technical dif½culties
themselves. Digital literacy is a multidi-
mensional concept describing higher-
order faculties that, according to media
literacy scholar Renee Hobbs, “encom-
pass the full range of cognitive, emotion-
al and social competencies that include
the use of texts, tools and technologies;
the skills of critical thinking and analy-
sis; the practice of message composition
and creativity; the ability to engage in
reflection and ethical thinking; as well as
active participation through teamwork
and collaboration.” This level of pro½-
ciency extends beyond knowing how to
use technology to knowing how to use it
to carry out important tasks in everyday
life, whether that is reading the news,
obtaining information about a medical
condition, or making a purchase. Many
strategies to promote digital literacy try
to make the value proposition to broad-
band adoption more attractive by open-
ing people up to the “pleasures and
power” of using the Internet to become
better informed, while recognizing that
“people cannot be forced to engage with
the public life of the community.”31
The process of conveying to people the
usefulness of broadband typically has a
social dimension. Classic studies on tech-
nology diffusion explicitly highlight how
the social system helps spur technolo-
gy adoption.32 People learn about a new

43. product from the people around them;
their social networks, in other words,
play a key role in helping people discover
the utility and usability of an innovation.
In an empirical study of computer adop-
tion using 1997 data, economists Austan
Goolsbee and Peter Klenow found that
the presence of learning externalities
influenced the decision to have a com-
puter at home. People were more likely to
have a computer if they lived in areas
where others had computers and if a
large share of family and friends had one.
Moreover, email users, as distinct from
users of speci½c types of software, were
the most likely to have computers; this
fact suggests the manner in which com-
municative features of the technology
motivated adoption.33 Eszter Hargittai
has found that online skills are not even-
ly distributed among young adults–a
cohort often thought to be uniformly
tech savvy–and that socioeconomic
background is a predictor of digital skill
levels for this group.34 Finally, in a nation-
ally representative sample in the United
States, I found that measures of online
skills are correlated with the number of
online activities that people engage in.35
Non-adopters’ perceptions about broad-
band’s lack of relevance are also an impor-
tant factor in their decision not to pro-
cure home high-speed service. The notion
of broadband’s relevance is embedded in
a user’s context. A non-broadband-using

44. senior citizen may have traditional media
habits and not ½nd online news worth-
while. It is possible that being made aware
of distinctive characteristics of online
news content might make broadband
access more appealing. Similarly, a His-
panic individual with limited English-
language skills may not have broadband–
but may choose to get it if she is intro-
duced to Spanish-language online content
that is compelling. Finally, others might
26
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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
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buy broadband if they discovered various
economic upsides: namely, the money-
saving potential of online comparison
shopping or the convenience of carrying
out transactions online.
Whereas promoting digital literacy is
very much a social process, conveying

45. broadband’s relevance to people has a
greater emphasis on imparting informa-
tion. The distinction means that promot-
ing broadband’s relevance requires a tra-
ditional marketing-campaign approach.
Simply learning about the existence of
Spanish-language content or the money-
saving possibilities of online shopping
might be the catalyst that draws people to
use. Effective means of conveying the
value of broadband to those who ques-
tion its relevance are likely to emphasize
“targeted partnerships that understand
both the needs of and the distribution
channels relied on” by these non-adopt-
ers.36 Because people’s perception about
relevance depends on context, these part-
nerships are likely to be successful if they
work from the ground up, that is, if they
are local in nature and are embedded in
non-adopters’ communities.
Strategies for linking the promotion of
digital skills and relevance to policy ini-
tiatives are not well developed. Programs
to bolster broadband adoption–some
publicly funded, others spearheaded by
nonpro½t organizations, and many part-
nering with the private sector–have
existed for more than a decade. Although
many have been subject to review, a rig-
orous assessment of methodologies used
would shed light on the difference the
programs have made, compared to what
might have occurred in their absence. In
an exhaustive examination of adoption-

46. promotion efforts, economists Janice
Hauge and James Prieger conclude that
apparently successful programs take a
comprehensive approach to training.37
Such initiatives provide discounts on
access and equipment, but also training
on how to use the Internet, with a focus
on demonstrating the relevance of spe-
ci½c online activities and guidance on
how to carry out certain online tasks.
An assessment of existing training and
promotion efforts based on rigorous
social-scienti½c study would be useful in
designing policy initiatives. Even in its
absence, the above discussion highlights
the set of digital skills and literacies indi-
viduals need to take part in a broadband-
connected world:
• Computer skills. This category includes
the ability to use a computer–whether
it is a desktop, laptop, or handheld de-
vice–as well as the capacity to upgrade
one’s skills. The hardware for modern
connectivity is continually evolving,
and users must be capable of learning
and understanding access technologies.
• Media literacy. Media literacy refers to
the ability to ½nd trustworthy informa-
tion online about issues that matter to
the user personally or to his community.
According to the Knight Commission
report Informing Communities, media lit-

47. eracy enhances the information capac-
ity of individuals, enabling them to sort
through the wide range of choices for
news and information in today’s media
environment.38
• Civic engagement. The ability to ½nd reli-
able information about elections and
government online is arguably an out-
come or goal of media literacy, but it is
worthy of special attention nonethe-
less. Data show that a large share of
Americans not only use the Internet for
news about politics, but also use online
tools to carry out transactions with
government agencies. Such tools can
be particularly bene½cial for low-
income Americans, who may be more
27
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
time pressed in dealing with necessary
government transactions than other
people.
• Managing personal information online.
Users need to understand the policies
on personal privacy that govern web-
sites and the ever-shifting rules in this

48. realm. Given that concerns about the
privacy and security of personal infor-
mation–for both broadband users and
non-users–inhibit the adoption and
use of broadband, more information
on how websites use the information
people share online may help alleviate
user concerns.
In each of these examples, what it means
to be “media literate” or what it takes to
effectively manage one’s personal infor-
mation will evolve over time.
If these skills are necessary for partici-
pation in a digital society, how should the
gaps in skills provision be addressed?
What initiatives should various stake-
holders–government, the media, non-
pro½t organizations, and individuals–
undertake? It is impossible to draw bright
lines on these questions. Legislation will
not outline what it means to be computer
literate, but government–as well as other
actors, such as libraries–may have a part
in supporting training initiatives. Govern-
ment is also likely to take a lead role in
thinking about people’s privacy rights in
the digital age. Private news media com-
panies may promote online media literacy,
although public media and foundations
could undoubtedly play a strong part here
as well. Civic engagement cuts across all
four categories. Given that good citizen-
ship is a worthwhile social norm, the in-
dividual has an obligation to engage with

49. his community, whether by voting, volun-
teering, or giving to charity. The media–
public or private–may also provide infor-
mation that promotes civic engagement,
and government can play a role in design-
ing applications that permit users to con-
nect with government effectively. Person-
al information online is another area
where all stakeholders may contribute.
It is worth emphasizing that individuals
have an important obligation in each of
these areas. The character of the Inter-
net–interactive, collaborative, participa-
tory–gives individuals opportunities for
autonomy in the online commons, which
in turn suggests a responsibility to culti-
vate the commons. That means main-
taining one’s own skills, but also, argu-
ably, supporting efforts to help others
develop their skills.
Work remains to be done to turn ideas
about digital literacy and promoting rele-
vance into policy and practice. As a start-
ing point, the nbp recommends the
development of an online portal that
would allow users to look for informa-
tion on how to upgrade their online skills
and even follow lessons there on skills
development.39 Nonpro½ts already play
a role in this space, as entities such as
Common Sense Media, One Economy,
and Computers for Youth either promote
online skills or provide information

50. about the nature of online content. Such
initiatives typically have limited geo-
graphic scope, meaning that, as valuable
as they may be, they do not scale nation-
ally. Furthermore, there is no clearing-
house for best practices for access and
training programs–a gap the nbp rec-
ommends be ½lled. With the resources
for broadband provided in the 2009 eco-
nomic stimulus bill, as well as the atten-
tion that the nbp has drawn to issues per-
taining to broadband adoption and de-
ployment, the time may be ripe for stake-
holders in the policy community to con-
sider, in a systematic way, how to meet
the training needs of broadband users.
That said, coordinating the different
stakeholders–companies, new entities
28
Being
Discon-
nected in a
Broadband-
Connected
World
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
Sciences
devoted to expanding broadband access

51. in communities, long-standing commu-
nity-based organizations that have rela-
tionships with underserved populations–
remains a signi½cant challenge.
A central theme of this essay is how to
make a technology that is currently not
part of some people’s lives both available
and attractive to them. But the context
for this discussion is digital abundance.
When something is abundant–as means
of online access and quantity of appli-
cations are–those without it become
more at risk of falling outside the social,
cultural, and economic mainstream. The
accelerating pace of innovation in broad-
band will only exacerbate this risk. The
issues discussed in this essay–develop-
ing ict skills and promoting relevance
–are not going away. As the “Internet of
things” ushers in an era of home-energy
management, and with advances in the
electronic delivery of health care servic-
es, the bene½ts of connectivity will grow
over time. Today’s digital abundance will
seem like light fare in a few years, and
those left behind will forgo a range of
bene½ts.
As the pace of change quickens, pro-
moting access and managing abundance
will become different sides of the same
coin. To engage with the Internet at even
a moderate level, an individual transi-
tioning from non-user to user may quickly

52. ½nd himself with a host of new hardware
with which to cope: a computer, displays
in the house for smart meters, and per-
haps a mobile app on a smartphone that
helps manage a medical condition. Un-
derstanding how to use these technolo-
gies, why they are relevant, what the
tools are to protect personal information,
and how to avoid being overwhelmed
will challenge newcomers to broadband.
Moreover, these questions will confront
many who already use Internet devices
and services. For these reasons, provid-
ing resources for the development of skills
to negotiate cyberspace–for new and cur-
rent users alike–is a challenge for all par-
ticipants in the broadband ecosystem.
29
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
endnotes
1 National Telecommunications & Information Administration,
Digital Nation: Expanding Inter-
net Usage, ntia Research Preview (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce, Feb-
ruary 2011),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2011/NTIA_Internet_Use_Repo
rt_February_
2011.pdf.

53. 2 Daniel K. Correa, “Assessing Broadband in America: oecd
and itif Broadband Rankings”
(Washington, D.C.: The Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, April 2007),
http://www.itif.org/½les/BroadbandRankings.pdf.
3 For the former point, see Scott Wallsten, Understanding
International Broadband Comparisons
(Washington, D.C.: Technology Policy Institute, May 2008),
http://www.techpolicyinstitute
.org/½les/wallsten_international_broadband_comparisons.pdf.
On the latter point, see John
B. Horrigan, “Why It Will Be Hard to Close the Broadband
Divide,” Pew Internet & Ameri-
can Life Project (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center,
August 2007), http://pewresearch
.org/pubs/556/why-it-will-be-hard-to-close-the-broadband-
divide.
4 Aaron Smith, “Mobile Access 2010,” Pew Internet &
American Life Project (Washington,
D.C.: Pew Research Center, July 2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Mobile
-Access-2010.aspx.
5 Aaron Smith, “Americans and Their Gadgets,” Pew Internet &
American Life Project (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, October 2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2010/Gadgets/Overview.aspx.
30
Being

54. Discon-
nected in a
Broadband-
Connected
World
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts &
Sciences
6 Kathryn Zickuhr, “Generations and Their Gadgets,” Pew
Internet & American Life Project
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, February 2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2011/Generations-and-gadgets.aspx.
7 John B. Horrigan, “Use of Cloud Computing Applications and
Services,” Pew Internet &
American Life Project (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research
Center, September 2008), http://
www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Use-of-Cloud-Computing-
Applications-and-Services
.aspx.
8 John B. Horrigan, “Broadband Adoption and Use in America,”
Omnibus Broadband Initia-
tive (obi) Working Paper Series No. 1, Federal Communications
Commission, February
2010, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
296442A1.pdf.
9 See, for example, Henry Jenkins, Confronting the Challenges
of Participatory Culture: Media Edu-
cation for the 21st Century, MacArthur Foundation White Paper
(Chicago: John D. and Cath-

55. erine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2006).
10 Pew Internet & American Life Project surveys, 2000–2009.
These data represent the aver-
age total participation in each activity over each two-year
period. Therefore, they may not
exactly reflect the combined yearly tracking numbers. In
addition, the wording of some sur-
vey questions may have changed slightly over time.
11 Rahul Tongia and Ernest Wilson, “Turning Metcalfe on His
Head: The Multiple Costs of
Network Exclusion,” paper presented at the 35th
Telecommunications Policy Research Con-
ference, Vienna, Virginia, September 2007,
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/772/
TPRC-07-Exclusion-Tongia&Wilson.pdf.
12 See Brian David, “The Cost of Digital Exclusion,” The
Of½cial Blog of the National Broad-
band Plan, March 9, 2010,
http://blog.broadband.gov/?entryId=236662.
13 Digital Impact Group and Econsult Corporation, “The
Economic Impact of Digital Exclusion,”
March 2010,
http://www.digitalimpactgroup.org/costofexclusion.pdf.
14 George S. Ford, “Internet Use and Job Search: More
Evidence,” Phoenix Center Perspective
No. 10-02 (Washington, D.C.: Phoenix Center for Advanced
Legal & Economic Public Policy
Studies, January 2010), http://www.phoenix-
center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-01½nal.pdf.
15 “State of the News Media 2010,” a report of the Pew Project

56. on Excellence in Journalism,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/newspapers-summary-
essay.
16 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Americans
Spending More Time Following
the News” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September
2010), http://pewresearch
.org/pubs/1725/where-people-get-news-print-online-readership-
cable-news-viewers.
17 Federal Communications Commission, Connecting America:
The National Broadband Plan
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Communications Commission,
2010), 286, 290, http://www
.broadband.gov/download-plan.
18 Susannah Fox, “The Social Life of Health Information,” Pew
Internet & American Life Proj-
ect (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, June 2009),
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/
2009/8-The-Social-Life-of-Health-Information.aspx.
19 Federal Communications Commission, Connecting America,
202, box 10-3.
20 The $55 billion cost of digital exclusion in the United States,
derived by Econsult and the
Digital Impact Group, often focuses on gross costs, not net
costs. That is, the estimates con-
centrate on savings to using digital means for, say, health care
information, without fully
accounting for costs that may arise.
21 Mark Cooper, “The Challenge of Digital Exclusion in
America: A Review of the Social Sci-

57. ence Literature and Its Implications for the National Broadband
Plan” (Washington, D.C.:
Consumer Federation of America, January 2010), 2,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=7020384062.
31
John B.
Horrigan
140 (4) Fall 2011
22 Federal Communications Commission, “Telephone
Subscribership in the United States: Data
Through March 2010” (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Communications Commission, August
2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
301241A1.pdf.
23 Horrigan, “Broadband Adoption and Use in America,” 32.
24 See ibid. for data reported in the following two paragraphs.
25 Ibid., 31.
26 National Telecommunications & Information Administration,
“Exploring the Digital Na-
tion: Home Broadband Internet Adoption in the United States”
(Washington, D.C.: ntia,
November 2010), 17.
27 Charlene Li and Josh Bernoff, Groundswell: Winning in a
World Transformed by Social Technologies
(Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2008). See also John B.
Horrigan, “The Mobile Difference,”

58. Pew Internet & American Life Project (Washington, D.C.: Pew
Research Center, March 2009),
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/5-The-Mobile-Difference--
Typology.aspx.
28 Horrigan, “The Mobile Difference.”
29 Eszter Hargittai, “An Update on Survey Measures of Web-
Oriented Digital Literacy,” Social
Science Computer Review 27 (1) (February 2009): 130–137. See
also Horrigan, “Broadband
Adoption and Use in America,” 18.
30 Blair Levin, Universal Broadband: Targeting Investments to
Deliver Broadband Services to All
Americans (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 2010).
31 Renee Hobbs, Digital and Media Literacy: A Plan of Action
(Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute,
2010), xi.
32 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 4th ed. (New York:
The Free Press, 1995).
33 Austan Goolsbee and Peter J. Klenow, “Evidence on
Learning and Network Externalities in the
Diffusion of Home Computers,” Journal of Law and Economics
45 (October 2002): 317–343.
34 Eszter Hargittai, “Digital Na(t)ives? Variation in Internet
Skills and Uses among Members
of the ‘Net Generation,’” Sociological Inquiry 80 (1) (2010):
92–113.
35 Horrigan, “Broadband Adoption and Use in America.”
36 Levin, Universal Broadband, 24.
37 Janice A. Hauge and James E. Prieger, “Demand-Side

59. Programs to Stimulate Adoption of
Broadband: What Works?” Review of Network Economics 9 (3)
(2010): article 4.
38 Knight Commission, Informing Communities: Sustaining
Democracy in the Digital Age, April
2010, http://www.knightcomm.org/read-the-report-and-
comment.
39 Federal Communications Commission, Connecting America,
177.
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/ITA (Utilizzare queste impostazioni per creare documenti
Adobe PDF che devono essere conformi o verificati in base a
PDF/X-1a:2001, uno standard ISO per lo scambio di contenuto
grafico. Per ulteriori informazioni sulla creazione di documenti
PDF compatibili con PDF/X-1a, consultare la Guida dell'utente
di Acrobat. I documenti PDF creati possono essere aperti con
Acrobat e Adobe Reader 4.0 e versioni successive.)
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/NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten
te maken die moeten worden gecontroleerd of moeten voldoen
aan PDF/X-1a:2001, een ISO-standaard voor het uitwisselen van
grafische gegevens. Raadpleeg de gebruikershandleiding van
Acrobat voor meer informatie over het maken van PDF-
documenten die compatibel zijn met PDF/X-1a. De gemaakte
PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en
Adobe Reader 4.0 en hoger.)
/NOR
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/ENU (Cadmus MediaWorks settings for Acrobat Distiller 8.)
>>
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(Common)
(1.0)
]
/OtherNamespaces [
<<

73. /AsReaderSpreads false
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/ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue
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/IncludeGuidesGrids false
/IncludeNonPrinting false
/IncludeSlug false
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(InDesign)
(4.0)
]
/OmitPlacedBitmaps false
/OmitPlacedEPS false
/OmitPlacedPDF false
/SimulateOverprint /Legacy
>>
<<
/AddBleedMarks false
/AddColorBars false
/AddCropMarks false
/AddPageInfo false
/AddRegMarks false
/ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK
/DestinationProfileName ()
/DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK
/Downsample16BitImages true
/FlattenerPreset <<
/PresetSelector /HighResolution
>>
/FormElements false
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74. /IncludeProfiles false
/MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings
/Namespace [
(Adobe)
(CreativeSuite)
(2.0)
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK
/PreserveEditing true
/UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged
/UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile
/UseDocumentBleed false
>>
]
>> setdistillerparams
<<
/HWResolution [2400 2400]
/PageSize [612.000 792.000]
>> setpagedevice
© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Safety in Cyberspace
Vinton G. Cerf
VINTONG. CERF, a Fellow of the
American Academy since 1995, is
Vice President and Chief Internet
Evangelist for Google Inc. Previ-
ously, he served at mci, the Cor-
poration for National Research Ini-