Age, equality, and cultural oppression An argument against ageism.pdf

Age, Equality, and Cultural Oppression: An Argument against Ageism
A thesissubmittedfor the degreeof Doctor of Philosophy
Richard Wagland
Politics Division, Brunel University
September2004

Age, Equality and Cultural Oppression: An Argument against Ageism
RichardWagland
Brunel University, Politics Division
Abstract
The concept of 'ageism' has often been thought to be of limited moral concern,
especiallyin comparisonto other forms of discrimination suchasracism and sexism.
Nevertheless,there arealso thosewho believethat ageismis morally significant, and
there are diametrically opposed views within liberal and egalitarian theory as to
whetheragediscrimination is or is not just.
This thesishastwo objectives.Firstly, it seeksto overcomethe apparentvagueness
of
the concept that has given rise to such diametrically opposed views concerning
ageism by examining exactly what the phenomenon involves. It defines the
wrongfulness of much age discrimination as originating in either the nature of the
reasons for which people discriminate against the old or the nature of the
consequences
for the individuals affected. In the courseof the thesisI make several
important distinctions, the most important of which are betweenthe social and moral
worth of a person,and betweenthe synchronic and diachronic interestsof a person.
Thesedistinctions allow us to distinguish betweena culturally oppressiveageismand
ageism that is justified by reasons of equality and efficiency. The former is
intrinsically morally wrong, the latter extrinsically wrong.
The secondaim of the thesis is to developan anti-ageistethical principle capableof
challenging both forms of ageism in a comprehensiveway, and which is consistent
with a broaderliberal egalitarianpolitical theory. This is achievedby drawing on the
distinction betweenthe irreducible natureof eachperson'ssynchronicanddiachronic
interests.I haveidentified the principle that we shouldprotect the synchronicinterests
of older personswith a democratic social egalitarianism that seeksto equalisethe
social relations between citizens rather than concentrating upon an equality of
distribution. It is in this way that I also connect the debateabout the morality (or
otherwise)of agediscrimination with debateswithin contemporaryliberal egalitarian
philosophy.
September2004
ii

Age, Equality, and Cultural Oppression: An Argument against
Ageism
Abstract
............................................................................................
i
Introduction
.................................................................................... ..
4
Chapter One: Ageism asa concern of social justice
.....................................
14
1.1The conceptsof discrimination andageism:Somepreliminary remarks...........
14
1.2Ageism: The emergence
of a concept...................................................
19
1.3Ageism in context.......................................................................... .
22
(i) Healthcare...........................................................................
23
(ii) Incomesupport..........................
*................................................ 28
(iii) Voting rights...................................................................... .
35
(iv)
1.4The emergence
of anti-ageistlegislation
................................................
46
1.5The challengefor anti-ageists
............................................................ .
50
Chapter two: Categorising agediscrimination
..........................................
55
2.1 The moral andsocialworth of persons
............................................................
56
2.2 The synchronicanddiachronic interestsof persons
..............................................
.
63
2.3 Ageism andyouthism..................................................................... .
74
2.4 Is ageismthe problemor just poverty?..................................................................
80
2.6 The ageismtaxonomy
.....................................................................
82
(i) Cultural ageism.................................................................... .
83
(ii) Idiosynchratic ageism........................................................... .
86
(iii) Egalitarian ageism...............................................................
88
(iv) Ageism basedon reasonsof efficiency .......................................
89
(v) Positiveagediscrimination
...................................................... .
89
(vi) Egalitarianbasedagediscrimination
......................................... .
90
2.7 Concluding remarks......................................................................
91
Chapter three: The nature and combat of cultural ageism......................... ..
92
3.1 Cultural ageismasan oppressiveideology
.............................................
93
3.2 Cultural ageismandpolitical philosophy ............................................... .
99

3.3 Cultural ageismandthe elderly asa socialgroup.....................................
103
3.4 Why anti-ageistsshouldnot portraythe old asa socialgroup .....................
112
3.5 Cultural ageismandthe role of stereotypes..........................................
114
3.6 Why Cultural ageismis neithereconomicor political oppression.................
119
3.7 Is it appropriateto baseageismon modelsof sexismandracism?................
121
3.8 The culpability of cultural ageism......................................................
130
3.9 Challengingcultural ageism............................................................
132
(i) Positiveagediscrimination
......................................................
132
(ii) Cultural combatandthe advocacystrategy..................................
139
(iii) Is the advocacystrategycompatiblewith mainstreamliberal theories?.
145
3.10 Concludingremarks....................................................................
150
Chapter four.- Ageism, Equality and the CLV
.........................................
154
4.1 Socialequality or distributive equality?...............................................
155
4.2 DE, luck, andegalitarianageism........................................................
166
4.3 Initial questionsfor egalitarians........................................................
168
(i) Equality, Priority, or sufficiency? ..............................................
169
(ii) Equality of What?
...............................................................
172
(iii) The unit of egalitarianconcern:synchronicor diachronic?
...................
179
4.4 Egalitarianmetrics,capabilitiesandthe needsof the old ...........................
185
4.5 The CLV andpolitical philosophy .....................................................
188
4.6 The anti-ageistchallengeto the CLV
...................................................
194
4.7 Concludingremarks......................................................................
199
Chapter 5: Ageism and the unit of egalitarian concern..............................
201
5.1 A 'fair innings' or a completelife?
.....................................................................
201
5.2 The 'responsibility-constrainedFIA' asa 'tiebreaker.
..............................
212
5.3 Daniel Callahanandthe FIA
............................................................ 214
5.3UtilitarianismandtheQALY
........................................................... 216
5.4 Synchronicaltemativesto the CLV: the SSV andCSV
.............................
224
2

5.5 The synchronicpriority view (SPV)
...................................................
229
5.6 The hybrid modelof distributive justice
.............................................
234
5.7 Synchronicdistribution and(dis)continuouspersonalidentity
.....................
236
242
Chapter six: Egalitarian ageismand the prudential analogy (PA)
...............
244
6.1 The PA asanadjunctto the CLV
......................................................
244
6.2 RonaldDworkin anda 'just' diachronicdistribution of healthcare
...............
247
6.3 Norman Danielsandthe PLA
..........................................................
251
(i) The CLV andthe PLA
...........................................................
252
(ii) Would prudentialdeliberatorsrejectthe IPP?
........................................
260
(iii) Would prudentialdeliberatorsrejectthe CLV?
............................
265
(iv) Is the PLA impractical?
.......................................................
268
(v) Is the PLA incompatiblewith Rawls' theory ofjustice? ..................
272
6.4 Concludingremarks.....................................................................
280
Chapter 7: Towards a non-ageist social equality ......................................
281
7.1 DE, 'faimess', andthe anti-ageistethic................................................
281
7.2 DE andeconomicdistribution
...........................................................
287
7.3 DE, capabilitiesandsynchronicwell-being............................................
289
7.4 DE, anti-ageisrn,andpersonalresponsibility .........................................
292
7.5 DE, capabilitiesandcultural ageism...................................................
298
7.6 DE andpositive discrimination
.........................................................
300
7.7 Anti-ageist DE in context ...............................................................
301
(i) Healthcare
.........................................................................
301
(ii) Income support ..................................................................
304
(iii) Voting rights ....................................................................
307
(vi)Employment
......................................................................
308
309
Conclusionto thesis
...........................................................................
311
Works cited....................................................................................
312
3

Introduction
As with any other issueof political morality there area rangeof positions that might
be taken on the issueof ageism.However, unlike other forms of discrimination, age
discrimination seemsto illicit diametrically opposedviewpoints within mainstream
political thinking. Many writers, particularly those involved in medical ethics and
healthcareeconomics,justify adversediscrimination againstthe old asa necessary,if
unfortunate,consequence
of pursuingjustice betweenthe complete lives of separate
individuals. Others,however, expressthe view that ageismis 'no lessvicious a form
of discrimination than racism and sexism, and there can be nothing 'fair' in its
application to resourceapplication." The fact that agediscrimination may be either
wholly justified or wholly unjustified makes it an interesting subject of study.
Moreover, part of the reasonfor this disagreementmay be that thinkers eitherjustify
or condemnagediscrimination without really examiningwhat it involves.
My own thinking about the morality or otherwise of age discrimination was first
arousedby reading an article by Geoffrey Cupit which tries to make intelligible the
intuition held by somethat agediscrimination is unjUSt.
2Cupit notesthat 'the alleged
injustice of age discrimination presentsa puzzle' becausethe 'Standardargument
againstdiscrimination- the argumentfrom equalizingbenefits- seemsnot to apply. 3
It doesn't apply becauseequalizing benefits over the complete lives of separate
'Oliver Leaman,'Justifying ageism,' in A. Harry Lesser(ed.),, 4geing,.4utonomyandResources
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 180-187,p187.
2GeoffireyCupit, 'Justice,Age, andVeneration,' Ethics 108(1998): 702-718.
3lbid, p702.
4

personsmight actuallyjustify agediscrimination rather than challengeit. It doesthis
for the obvious fact that eachof us has a turn to be old, and, by taking turns to be
well-off or badly-off, temporal or synchronic inequalities will even out over the
courseof people's lives. Thus, as Cupit notes, to say something is wrong with age
discrimination seemsto suggestthereis somethingwrong with taking turns.
The argumentthat Cupit developsin order to expressthe anti-ageistintuition is that of
status.He claims that eachof us has an equal moral status,and the injustice of age
discrimination hasits real sourcein that equal statusnot being respectedthroughout
one's life. Thus, agediscrimination is not a comparativeinjustice in the sameway as
sexism or racism are, and the injustice it involves is 'not in the inappropriate
treatmentof somepeople in comparisonto others,but as far as it is comparative,in
the inappropriatetreatmentof peoplein comparisonto their earlier (or later) selves.
A
%ile defming statusis a complex issue,what Cupit's argumentimplies is that age
discrimination is wrong becauseit treatspersonsdifferently at onepoint in their lives
to the way they aretreatedat anotherpoint.
However, Cupit, along with almost every other writer on the subject, assumesthat
there is only one form of ageism, and that it is either defensible or indefensible
dependingupon the force of the argumentsprovided. However, it seemsto me that
thereareat leasttwo very different categoriesof ageismwhich arewrong for different
reasons.One category of ageism is similar to sexismand racism in that it involves
negativecultural judgementsregardingthe moral and social worth of the old, just as
racismandsexismdo for blacksor women.I will arguethat this form of 'cultural
lbid, p709.
5

ageism' is intrinsically morally wrong. The second category of ageism does not
involve thesejudgements. Instead, it justifies age discrimination on the basisthat it
either ensuresa greater diachronic equality of benefits over the complete lives of
separate persons, or a greater efficiency of distribution of scarce resources.
Discrimination motivated by both efficiency and diachronic equality are not
intrinsically wrong becausethey do not involve negativemoraljudgementsregarding
those discriminated against. Nevertheless, as I will argue, these forms of age
discrimination may still be wrong for extrinsic moral reasons:i.e. that they treat
people inappropriately in comparisonwith their earlier selves.What it meansto be
treated inappropriately will be explained below. Nevertheless, once it has been
establishedwhat ageism is, we need to show how it can be challenged within
egalitarian political theory, bearing in mind Cupit's insight that the ahn to equalise
benefitsendorsedby most contemporaryegalitarianswill actually condonethat form
of discrimination. I shouldalsonote herethat the thesisfocusesmainly upon wrongful
discrimination motivated by normative egalitarian reasons,or 'egalitarian ageism',
ratherthanefficiencyreasons.
The purposeof the thesis,therefore,is twofold. Firstly, following the efforts of Cupit,
it seeksto makemore intelligible the intuition that someforms of agediscrimination
aremorally wrong. Onecaveatthat shouldbenoted is that I understandthe term age-
discrimination to involve any discrimination againsteitherthe old or young,while the
term ageism refers to the two wrongful forms of discrimination against the old
outlined above.Oncean anti-ageistethical view hasbeenstructuredanddefendedthe
secondaim of the thesis is to situatethat view within an egalitarianpolitical theory,
6

one that would both defend anti-ageist social policies and challenge the age
discrimination that otheregalitariantheoriesjustify.
Chapter one begins by discussing some of the social contexts in which age
discrimination is often thought to eithercurrently exist or to betheoreticallyjustified,
and it aims to show how cultural ageism and egalitarian reasoningmotivate ageist
policies. The chapter then reviews the recent emergenceof anti-ageist legislation,
identifies the inadequacyof that legislation, and finally outlines the challengethat
anti-ageistsfacein the light of this discussion.That anti-ageistchallengeis to develop
an ethical argumentthat can achievethree things: It must suggesta strategythat can
challenge negative cultural stereotypeswhile not impinging upon the liberty of
individuals; it must suggestprinciples that constrain egalitarian distributions to the
extent that they justify age discrimination as a consequenceof diachronic equality;
andthosesameprinciples would needto constrainconsiderationsof efficiency.
Chaptertwo attemptsto clarify the debateover thejustnessof agediscrimination by
first investigating the particular interests of individuals that are harmed by ageist
policies. This project is at the heartof constructingan anti-ageistethical position, and
it makestwo important distinctions: firstly, betweenjudgementsof moral and social
worth; and secondly, betweenthe synchronic and diachronic intereststhat a person
has. The difference between moral and social worth is the difference betweenthe
intrinsic worth of a person and the perceived instrumental worth of a citizen to
society. Someonemay posseseither one without the other. Liberals would always
refute judgements that certain citizens embodied negative moral worth merely on
account of their age. I would argue, however, that both negative moral and social
7

one that would both defend anti-ageist social policies and challenge the age
discrimination that other egalitariantheoriesjustify.
Chapter one begins by discussing some of the social contexts in which age
discrimination is often thought to eithercurrently exist or to betheoreticallyjustified,
and it aims to show how cultural ageism and egalitarian reasoningmotivate ageist
policies. The chapter then reviews the recent emergenceof anti-ageist legislation,
identifies the inadequacyof that legislation, and finally outlines the challengethat
anti-ageistsfacein the light of this discussion.That anti-ageistchallengeis to develop
an ethical argumentthat canachievethree things: It must suggesta strategythat can
challenge negative cultural stereotypeswhile not impinging upon the liberty of
individuals; it must suggestprinciples that constrain egalitarian distributions to the
extent that they justify age discrimination as a consequenceof diachronic equality;
andthosesameprinciples would needto constrainconsiderationsof efficiency.
Chaptertwo attemptsto clarify the debateover thejustnessof agediscrimination by
first investigating the particular interests of individuals that are harmed by ageist
policies. This project is at the heartof constructingananti-ageistethical position, and
it makestwo important distinctions: firstly, betweenjudgementsof moral and social
worth; and secondly, betweenthe synchronic and diachronic intereststhat a person
has. The difference between moral and social worth is the difference betweenthe
intrinsic worth of a person and the perceived instrumental worth of a citizen to
society. Someonemay posseseither one without the other. Liberals would always
refute judgements that certain citizens embodied negative moral worth merely on
account of their age. I would argue, however, that both negative moral and social
7

judgements constitute wrongful cultural ageism, and that anti-ageistsmust make a
casefor challengingthemboth asdistinctive elementsof the samephenomenon.
The distinction I make betweenthe diachronic and synchronic;interestsof persons
draws on the work of severalcontemporaryphilosophers.
5 Thesethinkers claim that
on the onehand individuals havelong-term, life-time projects andgoalsthat we each
have diachronic interestsin pursuing, and that those interestsinclude suchthings as
having accessto as wide a range of opportunities as possibleto follow careersand
developrelationships, and in having the material benefits to facilitate the pursuit of
those opportunities. On the other hand, however, individuals also have synchronic
interests, and a certain class of these are fundamental in the sensethat they have
specialmoral concern.Thesearethe interestswe haveat anytemporal momentof our
lives to havesufficientresources
to ensureour basicneedsare met,to be at least
minimally autonomous,and to enjoy the social conditions of self-respect.I follow
David Velleman and Elizabeth Anderson in claiming that these diachronic and
synchronic;interestsare not reducible to one another, and in some casesmay even
conflict. It is my claim that most contemporaryegalitarian theories give exclusive
concern to a diachronic equality of opportunity, and that as a consequencethe
fundamentalsynchronic interestsof older individuals are often neglected.The final
part of the chapterstructuresa classification or taxonomy of the various forms of age
discrimination, which is grounded on both the reasonsthat motivate them and the
degreeto which their consequences
areharmful.
5J. David Velleman, 'Well-Being andTime,' in his ThePossibility ofPractical Reason(Oxford:
ClarendonPress,2000): 56-84; Alasdair Macintyre, After Virute:A Studyin Moral VirtueSecond
Edition (London, Duckworth, 1985),chapter15;ElizabethAnderson, Valuein Ethics and Economics
(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press,1993).
8

It is this ideathat individuals haveboth synchronicand diachronic interests,andthat
eachperson's fundamentalsynchronic interestshavean equal claim of justice, that I
think makessenseof Cupit's claim that the injustice of agediscrimination lies 'in the
mappropriatetreatmentof peoplein comparisonto their earlier (or later) selves.
' The
sourceof injustice is found in the degreeto which the synchronic interestsof the
young are respectedwhile the sameinterestsof the old are not. If thesesynchronic
interests are equally important for all persons irrespective of their age, then it is
morally wrong to neglect the interestsof somepeople and not others on accountof
their age.And this would be the caseevenif the ultimate aim wasto either ensurean
equal diachronic shareof benefits for eachpersonor a more efficient use of scarce
resources.This, then, is the ethical principle that I believe supportsthe anti-ageist
intuition: that there are moral reasonsto give equal concern to the fundamental
synchronicinterestsof personsirrespectiveof their age.
Chapter three examines cultural ageism in greater detail, and it defines it as an
oppressiveideology which involves a dynamic betweensocially constructedgroups
and cultural stereotypes.I arguethat ageiststereotypesexist prior to the assumption
that the elderly constitute a social group, and that to effectively challenge cultural
ageismwe must challengethe accuracyand rationality of thesestereotypesaboutthe
old. It is in this part of the thesisthat the analogybetweenageismon the onehandand
racism and sexism on the other is analysed in greater detail, and while there are
similarities and parallels betweencultural ageism and those other forms of cultural
oppressionthere are also significant differences. The chapter examines the actual
responseof much liberal egalitarian theory to the existence of cultural oppression
generally, and I describeAndrew Kernohan's advocacy strategythat I believe anti-
9

ageistsshould adopt if they areto effectively challengethis categoryof ageismeven
within an egalitariansociety.6This strategyseeksto persuadepeopleof the fallacy of
ageistcultural stereotypesby using the economic,educationaland ideological power
of the liberal statewithout resorting to censorship.The advocacystrategytherefore
differs from both perfectionism and the traditional laissezfaire attitude that liberals
haveto cultural values.
Chapters4 to 6 examinethe egalitarianforms of ageism and its justification in much
contemporary liberal philosophy. As noted, ageism motivated by a concern for
efficiency will be extrinsically wrong. for the same reasonsas that motivated by
equality. Chapter 4 starts by outlining the difference between a purely distributive
economic egalitarianism and a broader social and political egalitarian ideal. I claim
that it is within the former that egalitarianageismis condonedandthat only within the
latter can it be effectively challenged.Distributive egalitarianism focusesupon the
completelives of citizens andaimsto ensurethat eachpersonhasan equaldiachronic,
shareof benefits over her complete life. This has beencalled the complete life view
(CLV), and it embodiesthe problem identified by Cupit that 'the argument form
equalisingbenefitsis a poor basison which to try to accountfor any intuition that age
discrimination is unjust.)7The CLV itself is justified by two fundamentalvalues. It
views diachronic equality asthe fairest systemof economicdistribution and it claims
to enforcethe independentmoral principle that individuals should be responsiblefor
the success
of their own lives.
6Andrew Kernohan,Liberalism, Equality and Cultural Oppression(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1998).Although Kernohanhimself doesnot discusscultural ageismhe doesallude to the old as
a groupthat is subjectto cultural oppression(seepp5O-51),andI expandon this below.
' Cupit, 'Justice,Age, andVeneration,' p705.
10

The social ideal of equality, a recent version of which has been described as
democratic egalitarianism (DE), has the fundamental goal of promoting and
maintaining relations of social equality between citizens, and it views economic
distribution as a secondary or derivative issue.
8 DE would challenge egalitarian
ageism becausesuch discrimination would invariably involve social relations of
inequality betweencitizensevenif their diachronic sharesof benefitswere equal.It is
thuswithin DE that I believethe anti-ageistethical view canbe bestrepresented.
Chapter5 examinesthe CLV and its ageistimplications in more detail andcompares
it with various alternative views about possiblesynchronicdistributions of resources
or welfare between citizens. It also comparesthese views with the 'fair innings
argument' (FIA) that claims that people are only entitled to a certain (and perhaps
equal)length of life, andwith the conceptof the QALY. The chapterarguesthat both
the CLV and the synchronic alternativeshave implausible implications, and that the
best possibledistributive view is a hybrid of the two. Unfortumtely, this too suffers
from difficulties, thoughthesearewith practicality ratherthanmoral plausibility.
Chapter 6 argues that the CLV logically adopts a prudential analogy (PA) to
detennine the rational way that a finite diachronic share of benefits would be
distributed over the course of one life. This thought experiment would then be
replicatedwithin society in order to structurethe tax and welfare institutions of ajust
state.The chapterexamineshow the PA functions within the work of two of the most
prominent contemporaryliberal thinkers. Part of the force of the PA is that it views
3Elizabeth S.Anderson,'What Is thePoint of Equality?' Ethics 109(1999): 287-337; Samuel
Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism?' Philosophyand Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39.
11

the different age-groupsasdifferent stageswithin the samelife, andconsequentlythe
interests the young and old no longer need to be viewed as being in conflict.
However, we canonly do this by denyingthe importanceof synchronicinterests,and
therefore,the chapterclaims, the PA provides further justification of discrimination
againstthe old in waysthat frustratetheir fundamentalsynchronicinterests.
Finally, in chapter7,1 return to the social ideal of democraticegalitarianismand the
principle of equalisingsocialrelations(ESR) that I first describedin chapter4. Within
this concluding chapter I show how the hybrid model of economic distribution
outlined in chapter5 might be implementedwithin that social ideal. By incorporating
this model the social ideal canprotect both the diachronic and synchronicinterestsof
personsas defined in chapter 2. And, by protecting both forms of interest, DE can
both avoid egalitarian ageism as well as embrace the advocacy strategy that
challengesthe cultural ageismoutlined in chapter3. DE underminesintuitive support
for the CLV both by refuting the ideathat diachronic equality is the fairest systemof
economicdistribution, andby simultaneouslyincorporatingthe principle of individual
responsibility. Finally, the chapter returns to the four social contexts discussedin
chapterI andbriefly examineshow DE andthe principle of ESR would challengethe
agediscrimination found within thosecontexts.
What this thesisachieves,therefore, is not only a greaterunderstandingof the nature
of ageism and what makes it wrongful, or that the anti-ageist ethical principle is
compatible with a broader egalitarian philosophy. The thesis also links the
discrimination of the practical ethical problem of how we shouldtreat the old with a
wider contemporarydebatewithin egalitarian political philosophy. By showing that
12

DE canrefute or incorporatethejustifications of the CLV the theory is shownto bean
important and morally plausible alternativeto the mainstreamdistributive egalitarian
views.
13

Chapter One: Ageism asa concern of socialjustice
The purposeof this chapteris to outline both the defencesand challengesto ageism
and age discrimination that have developed over recent years, and to do so in a
number of social contexts including health care, income distribution, citizenship
rights, and employment. The chapter will also note the emergenceof anti-ageist
legislation and critique the reasonsfor that emergence.Any discussionof ageism,
however,shouldbeginwith an analysisof the natureof discrimination per se.
1.1The conceptsof discrimination and ageism: Somepreliminary remarks
In his entry for the Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Harry Lesser notes that the
conceptof ageism is of 'recent coinage', that it is generally basedon the models of
'racism' and 'sexism', and can be defined 'as wrongfiil or unjustified adverse
discrimination on the groundsof age'.9 One aim of this thesis is to go beyondthat
definition anddeterminewhat makesdiscrimination on groundsof agewrongful. Any
form of discrimination may be 'adverse' to the interestsof the individuals affected,
but it is a further question as to whether that discrimination is also 'wrongful'.
Discrimination per se hasvery much becomea morally ladenterm. As Peter Singer
notes, 'discrimination' is a term that hasthe dual function of being both descriptive
and evaluative and these terms are often conflated.10If a public policy or social
practice is describedas discriminatory it can automatically bring with it evaluative
implications that may not be justified. These evaluative implications mean that to
Harry Lesser,'Ageism,' EncyclopediaofApplied Ethics, VolumeI (AcademicPress,1998),p87.
10
PeterSinger,'Equality- Is RacialDiscrimination Arbitrarý' in JanNarveson(ed.), Moral issues
(Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press,1983):308-324,p309.
14

accusesomeoneor something of being discriminatory is often seenas a term of
attack, though, at the sametime, to call someonean ageist doesnot have the same
resonanceas calling someonea racist. As Oliver Leamannotes, 'while many people
feel guilty at admitting to racist or sexistattitudes,ageistattitudesdo not tendto gain
the sameopprobrium'."
We thereforeneedto be carefulwith the specificationof terms,and we needto
distancethe term discriminationfrom its emotiveuse and to understand
it in a
dispassionatesense.To discriminate means only to make a distinction between
personson the basisof reasons,andit is thesereasons,andthe consequences
that flow
from discrimination based upon them, that determine whether a form of
discrimination is morally wrong or morally benign. Even if social institutions and
officials discriminate againstpeopleof a certain race,genderor agein the allocation
of goods and services,the practice simply involves the favouring of one categoryof
person over another. There is nothing integral to the term that makes such
discrimination necessarilywrong.
When someoneexperiences'adverse' discrimination, then, there are certain interests
of that agent that are either neglected or thwarted as a consequenceof a
discriminatory practice. But again,this definition in itself doesnot meanthat adverse
discrimination is wrong, andpeoplein fact suffer legitimate adversediscrimination all
the time within the contexts of job recruitment and in the allocation of university
places.If I amanunsuccessful
candidate
for eitherof thesegoods,andtheselection
"Oliver Leaman,'Justifying Ageism,' in A. Harry Lesser(ed.) Ageing,AutonomyandResources
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 180-188,p182.
15

processhasbeenfair, then I havebeenlegitimately discriminatedagainston the basis
of my merit, qualifications and experience.Although my interestsin having the job
that I want or the university place of my choice have beenadverselyaffected these
forms of adversediscrimination are not wrong. They are not wrongful so long asthe
discriminatory decision was based upon criteria aimed at determining expected
performancewithin either thejob or on the university course.Adversediscrimination
that is basedpartly upon what are often thought to be non-performancecriteria, like
race and gender,are more problematic. Nevertheless,as many who support various
forms of positive discrimination might argue, such discrimination is not always
obviously wrong eventhen.
We are also not helped in our attempt to define the wrongfulness of any
discrimination to simply label the trait on which individuals arediscriminatedagainst
as 'irrelevant'. As Larry Alexander argues,that merely begs the question of what
makesit irrelevant:the trait is obviously relevantto thosewho wish to discriminateon
its basis.12Moreover, asGeoffrey Cupit points out, '[t]he merefact that a distribution
is madeon the basisof an 'irrelevant' considerationdoesnot makethat distribution
unfair.' 13The streetnumber of one's house may seeman irrelevant ground for the
distribution of water for gardening,but that doesnot make it unjust for the council to
imposea hosepipebanon even-numbered
houseson alternativedaysof the week.
It might be suggestedthat it is wrong to use the mere fact of chronological age as
grounds for adversediscrimination because,as with any other form of wrongful
12Larry Alexander, 'What MakesWrongful Discrimination Wrong?Biases,Preferences,
Stereotypes,
and Proxies,' University qfPennsylvania Review141(1992): pp149-219.
13Geoffrey Cupit, 'Justice,Age, andVeneration,' Dhics 108(1998): 702-718,p7O4.
16

discrimination, it arbitrarily defmesindividuals as membersof a social group, in this
casethe 'elderly', and it thereforedoesnot treat them as individuals. However, this
also fails to define the wrongfulnessof ageismbecauseif we look at discrimination
per se we find that simply categorizing people according to a particular defming
featureand discriminating againstthem on that basisdoesnot necessarilyconstitute
an immoral action. For example,if I were a passengerin a particular train carriagein
which a violent crime hadtakenplace,then it is not immoral that I am inconvenienced
as a consequence
by being held back and interviewed by the authorities seekingthe
culprit. The defming featurethat puts me in to the arbitrary group of 'crime suspects'
is the fact that I was in the train carriageat thetime.
It might be arguedthat it is wrong to discriminateon the basisof an immutable trait
for which one is not responsible.Old age may be thought of as an immutable trait
because,althougha personhasnot always beenold, oncethey are it is a featurethey
canonly escapewith death.Naturally, discrimination on the basisof immutabletraits
is not always adverse,and discrimination on the basisof chronological ageis in fact
often favourable to older people. A current example of such favourable age
discrimination within health careis the provision of free influenza injections to older
people who are more likely to become seriously ill and develop pneumonia.
14
However, if it is not wrong to defmethe old on the basisof their immutable trait in
the casethat the discrimination is beneficial, then why should it be wrong if the
discriminationshould be adverse?In any case,someexamplesof unfavourable
discrimination on the basisof an immutable trait do seemacceptable.For example,
"A cynic might saythat the primary reasonthe governmentoffers free influenza injectionsto older
peopleis not simply to preventunnecessary
suffering, but because
it is agreatdealcheaperto inoculate
the elderly againstthe diseasethan to pay for the careof numerousold peopleeachyear beingadmitted
to acutehospitalswith pneumonia.Nevertheless,the elderly directly benefit from the policy.
17

blindness is an immutable trait but there seems nothing obviously wrong with
discriminating againstblind people who wish to becomebus drivers. Moreover, the
categorizationof personson the basis of an immutable trait could not exclusively
defme the wrongfulness of discrimination becausediscrimination on the basis of
many mutable traits is also thought to be wrong. Discrimination on the basis of
religious affiliation is anobviousexample.
A more subtle approachto determiningthe wrongnessof discrimination generally is
to look at the historical andcontemporarysocio-economicposition of the individuals
that comprisethe social groupsdiscriminatedagainst.Blacks will earnrelatively less
than whites on the whole, and women earn lessthan men. However, the social and
economicposition of victims of discrimination in fact merelyrepresentsa symptomof
the discrimination, andalthoughthe fact that suchconsequences
occur may be part of
what is wrong with wrongful discrimination, suchan approachdoesnot explain why
the discrimination occurs in the first place.Moreover, although there are many very
poor older personsin the real world of contemporarysociety, there are also a large
number who are very well off. But the existenceof wealthy old people, as with the
existenceof wealthy blacks, does not at the sametime discount the existenceof
wrongful discrimination.
It would appear,therefore,that we cannotdeterminethat a form of discrimination in
generalor ageismin particular is wrong simply becauseit hasadverseeffects, or that
it is arbitrary, or that it is basedupon an 'irrelevant' or 'immutable' feature,or that
those discriminated against are members of a socio-economic group that has
historically faredbadly. The primary focus of this thesisis agediscrimination, and,as
18

noted in the Introduction, I am arguing that there is not just one categoryof ageism
but two; cultural ageism and egalitarian ageism. Most anti-ageistshave described
ageismonly in terms of negativecultural assumptions,and, like SteveScrutton,they
merely argue that ageism 'creates and fosters prejudices about the nature and
experienceof old age.' 15Although the attitudesand stereotypes
that dominatesociety
are not shared by all they are unquestioned by most. This understanding is
undoubtedlytrue of 'cultural ageism', but if ageisminvolved only negativeattitudes
then all mainstream liberal political theories would reject any ageist policies that
adversely affected older people. This is not the case, however, and the issue is
complicated by the fact that many liberal egalitarianseither explicitly or implicitly
justify someagediscrimination. In responseto this complexity I arguethat there are
two elementsthat determinethe wrongfulnessof discrimination in general,which are
firstly, the natureof the reasonsfor which we discriminate, and secondly,the degree
to which the consequences
that flow from that discrimination are harmful to certain
fundamental intereststhat all personshave. In the context of age I define the term
6ageism'to constitute only urongful age discrimination, which meansthat not all
discrimination on the basisof agewould count asageism.
1.2Ageism: The emergenceof a concept
Having made some preliminary definitions we should set the sceneof the current
ageist debate.We have noted that the conceptof ageismis very recent. The earliest
useof the conceptof ageismwas by the psychiatrist Robert Butler who sawparallels
15SteveScrutton,'Ageism: The Foundationsof Age Discrimination,' in Evelyn McEwen, The
UnrecognisedDiscrimination, (London: Age ConcernEngland, 1990),p13.
19

betweenthe generationalconflict betweenstudentsandpolice on American campuses
in the 1960swith thosebetweenthe middle agedandthe elderly in residentialhousing
projects.Ageism was seenby Butler to haveclose parallels with racism and sexism,
and he defmed the former 'as a process of systematic stereotyping of and
discrimination against people becausethey are old, just as racism and sexism
accomplishthis for skin colour andgender'.16As we will seebelow there are several
reasonswhy the parallels betweenageismon the onehandand racism and sexismon
the other havebeenchallenged,but it is important to note that Butler's coining of the
term, and the recognition of the existence of the phenomenon,had its roots in a
societyseekingto promotewider civil rights for what wereperceivedasthe oppressed
membersof certainsocialgroups.
'Ageism' was then used as an evaluative term to challenge the dominance of
'disengagementtheory' within gerontologyand sociology in the 1950sand 1960s,
17a
theory that some believe continues to have strong influence on most people's
thinking.18The theory was thought to be ageist becauseit uncritically accepted
negative stereotypesof the elderly and even soughtto justify them. Disengagement
theory explains the condition of old ageas a processof role adaptationand suggests
that ageing involves gradual and progressivewithdrawal by older individuals from
social roles and obligations, and a corresponding lowering of the expectationsthat
othershaveof them. This processof disengagementsupposedlytakesplace on three
levels; social, individual, and psychological. On the social level older people are
" RobertButler, 'Ageism: a forward,' Journal ofSocial Issues36 (1980): 8-11,p9.
17SeeE. Cuumming
& W. Henry, Growing Old.- 7heProcessof Disengagement
(New York: Basic
Books, 1961).
'a JohnA. Vincent, Inequality and Old,4ge(London: UCL Press,1995),p154.
20

easedout of roles in which they areno longer able to function effectively (perhapsas
paid employees),andtheir place is takenby youngerpersonsin order that societycan
continueto work efficiently. On the individual level older personscan conservetheir
diminishing energies by fulfilling fewer and less demanding roles, perhaps as
grandparents.And at the psychological level disengagementallows an emotional
a ustment rt preparation r eat .
The assumptionsthat underlie disengagementtheory, that older people are in an
inevitable processof progressivephysical and intellectual decline, that the older a
personis the lessadaptableand capablethey are, and the idea that it is beneficial to
society that they are marginalised, are all in fact cultural stereotypes. The
incorporation of thesestereotypesin to a theory designedto explain the condition of
the elderly today fails to questionwhether this degenerativecondition is a necessary
one for all old people even if it may be for some,and it doesnot questionwhether
justice might require that people have the opportunity to remain productive and
socially included membersof society irrespective of age. Some sociologists have
more recentlycriticised,much gerontologicaltheory alongtheselines andhaveargued
that the discipline hastendedto explain 'the problemsof the agedasconsequences
of
theindividual'sdeterioration
anddecline',19
ratherthanto challenge
theassumptions
that lie behindthoseproblems.
However, despite the charge that establishedtheory and many social practices are
ageist the phenomenonhas rarely beenseenas a serious social, political and moral
" J. Levin & W.C. Levin, Ageism:Prejudice and Discrimination Against the Elderly (BelmontýCA:
Wadsworth, 1980),pix.
21

issue.In 1980 Bill Bytheway, one of the few to attempt to develop and clarify the
concept,recognisedthe fact that ageismwas generallyperceivedto be little morethan
ajoke
.
20Tenyearslaterthetitle of acollectionof essays
onageism
published
by Age
Concern acknowledged the fact that this form of discrimination continued to be
largely 'unrecognised
%2
1However, while the idea of anti-ageismwas dismissedas a
joke by many, the use of chronological age as a basis on which to treat people
differently and unfavourably was increasingly justified in several contexts. There
have, for example, beenan increasingnumber of health economists,and writers on
medicalethics,whohaveviewedagediscrimination
thatadversely
affectedtheoldas
an unfortunate but necessaryconsequenceof pursuing a particular conception of
fairness:that is fairness betweenthe complete separatelives of personsrather than
just between the young and old. There have also beenjustifications presentedfor
discriminating against the old in the distribution of income, the distribution of
electoralrights andin employment,andeachof thesewill beexaminedin more detail
in the next sectionbelow.
1.3 Ageism in context
The aim of this section is to examine the various sourcesof motivation for ageist
policies within four social contexts. These contexts will be returned to briefly in
chapter7 to showhow the argumentspresentedin the thesiscanbeusedin practiceto
supportnon-ageistor anti-ageistpositionswithin them.
20Bill Byetheway,'Is Ageismjust ajoke?'New. 4ge 12(1980): 29-30.
" EvelynMcEwen(ed.
),Age:TheUnrecognised
Discrimination
(London:AgeConcem
England,
1990).
22

(i) Healthcare
Thereis evidencethat the negativeculturaljudgementsregardingolder peoplethat are
prevalent in society are also sharedby some hospital stafý and this manifests as a
reluctanceto work with the elderly and in the patronising ways in which they often
communicatewith them.22Alison Norman arguesthat within the professionalmedical
field of gerontology '[w]ork with old peopleis not a prestigiousoccupationandthere
is a vicious circle in that jobs with low prestige tend to attract unambitious or less
skilled workers, or thosewho becauseof racial or social discrimination or competing
domesticresponsibilitiescannotget work elsewhere.23This suggeststhat becausean
underlying ageist ideology devaluesold age, and older citizens, it also devaluesthe
work of professionalschargedwith caring for them.
The consequence
of this ageistideology is that, at the very least,older individuals will
receive less than equal care from medical and social service professionals and
auxiliary staff. ne Kings Fund has identified the existence of similar negative
attitudes towards the elderly among residential and nursing home staff 24 One
investigation in to the Nye Bevan Lodge Residential home in 1988 found that
residentshad been illegally deprived of their money, madeto queuenaked for the
baths,andsufferedregularphysical andsexualassault.
25
22
S.Lookinland
& K. Anson,'Perpetuation
of AgeistAttitudesamong
Present
andFutureHealthcare
Personnel:
Implications
for ElderCare,
'Journal ofAdývancedNursing
21(1995):47-56.
23
AlisonNorman,.
4spects
of,4geism:.
4Discussion
Paper(London:Centrefor Policyin Ageing,
1987),
p5.
24S.Farrell,J.Robinson
& P.Fletcher,.
4NewErafor Community
Care?WhatPeople
wantfrom
health;housing
andsocialcareservices
(London:KingsFund,1999).
25Scrutton,
'Ageism:TheFoundations
ofAgeDiscrimination',p22.
23

In such instances individual care staff have acted in a vicious way towards the
vulnerablepersonsin their care and it might be suggestedthat thesecare staff were
merely sadistic bullies; the fact that the victims were old not necessarily having
anything to do with the abuse.Certainly there will always be bullies and sadiststo
prey upon the vulnerable.However, what the authorsof thesereportsargueis that the
abuse is secondary to socially held beliefs that stereotype the older person as
meaningless,expendable,andultimately of lessintrinsic moral worth. Indeed,Margot
Jeffriesargues
that'elderabuse'suchasthis 'is probablymorecommonthanthefew
caseswhich receive publicity would indicate'.26This sort of clahn is supportedby
Mike Brogden who arguesthat there is in fact a widespread illegal killing of the
elderly that goesunchecked(mostly by medical andnursing staff or other carers),and
that such 'geronticide
... could not occur without the dominanceof an ideology of
ageism'.
27Suchan ageistideology is clearly as destructivefor older personsasracist
ideology canbe for membersof particular racial andethnic groups.
Nevertheless,even if cultural ageism within the health service does not lead to
humiliation, physical violence, and death, it often leadsto discrimination that most
peoplewould find unfair. The most obvious forms of direct discrimination involve the
arbitrary useof upper agelimits to control accessto healthcareservices,and a study
by Age Concern found that GPs operated such age limits for older patients when
26Margot Jeffries, 'Aged People:Social Attitudes Towards,' in Encyclopediaoppplied Ethics,
VolumeI (Academic Press,1998):p84.
27Mike Brogden,Geronticide.,Killing theElderly (London: JessicaKingsley Publishers,2001): p187.
24

arranging referrals for knee replacements, kidney dialysis, and heart byo-pass
operations.
28
There is, however, a difficulty in determining whether suchdiscrimination in access
to servicesreflects a judgement by the doctors responsiblethat older personsare
either morally or socially inferior, or whether it reflects the quite different idea that
we should discriminate against the elderly on the basis of either efficiency or
'fairness'. Dan Brock hasnotedthat on the conventionalview, held by physiciansand
public alike, the allocationof healthcare
in conditionsof scarcityshouldbe on the
basis of need alone. Although both healthcareneedsand the expectedbenefits of
treatment will differ between younger and older patients it is neverthelessthese
differences,and not the differencesof chronological age,that should be of relevance
in determining their claims to social resources for treatment. Thus, '[i]n the
conventionalview, differential treatmentbasedon ageitself is unjust ageism'.
29And,
'in responseto any proposals to limit the availability to the elderly of resources
generally, and healthcare in particular, their advocateshave added the charge of
6ageism'to the more familiar chargesof racism andsexism'.
30Thus,the conventional
view involves adhering to the idea that needs alone should dictate allocation of
resources,
andthis conventionalview is onefor anti-ageists
to continueto defend.
Nevertheless,for different reasonsmany contemporarypolitical and moral thinkers
reject this conventionalview andjustify discrimination on the basisof age.
211
Age Concern,NewSurveyofGPs CconfinnsAgeism in theNHS (Age ConcernEnglandPress
Release,17May 2000).
29Dan Brock, 'Justice,healthcare,andthe elderly,, Philosophyandpublic Affairs 18(1989): 297-312,
p299.
30
Ibid,p388.
25

Many of the defencesof agediscrimination in health carehavebeenutilitarian. A.B.
Shawhasarguedthat 'utilitarianism is necessaryif not sufficient for ethical rationing
decisions' in healthcare,and that therefore 'ft]he casefor ageism is moral.931
It is
utilitarian in this context in the sensethat utility is acceptedasthe primary good, and
that most utility would be produced as a consequenceof age discrimination in this
context. Utility might be measuredin the numberof extra yearslived by the younger
peoplefavouredwith medicaltreatmentthanwould havebeenenjoyedby the old had
theybeentreated.
Theconcept
of theQualityAdjustedLife-Year(QALY), developed
by health economistslike Alan Williams, is arguably an example of the utilitarian
socialchoicetheory that aimsto ensuremaximal efficiency in order to, in turn, ensure
maximal welfare for society asa whole. QALYs are a way of prioritising patientsfor
treatment
by ensuring
thatscarce
healthcare
resources
aredistributedin suchawayas
to maximise aggregatebenefit. As the concept ostensibly involves only the use of
medicalcriteria in deciding which treatmentsor patientsit would be most efficient for
societyto financeit is supposedto bevalue neutral.Nevertheless,the economiststhat
usethe conceptmay implicitly look at the elderly as 'nearly dead', whoseproductive
years are behind them, and for this reason the practical use of the QALY would
inevitably discriminate againstthe old. It hastherefore beenclaimed by John Harris
that 'the ageism of the QALY is inescapable',
32and even if such ageism is not
31A.B. Shaw,'In Defence
of Ageism,
'Journal qfMedicalEthics20(1994):188-9
1,p9O.
It is
noteworthy
thatShawdefines
whathethinksisjustifiableagediscrimination
as'ageism',whilemy
owndefinitionof ageism
constitutes
onlyunjustifiable
agediscrimination.
Nevertheless,
I wouldagree
with Shawthathisdefence
of agediscrimination
isageist,
thedifference
beingthatI believeit to be
unjust
32JohnHarris, 'More and BetterJustice,
' in Bell & Mendus,PhilosophyandMedical WeIrare
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1988):75-96;p 79.
A
26

motivated by age bias it may neverthelessreinforce it. I discuss the concept of
QALYs, its relation to utilitarianism and its ageistimplications in chapter5.
However, defencesof age-differentiatedtreatment in healthcareare not confined to
utilitarians anda moral casefor ageismmay also be madeon reasonsof fairness.It is
often thought that in circumstancesof scarceresources,where rationing is necessary,
that those resourcesshould be used for the benefit of the young rather than the old
who canbe saidto alreadyhavehada 'fair innings' of life. The classicexplication of
the FIA is that of JohnHarris, thoughhedoesnot himself supportit, andhe suggestsa
number of responsesto it that I will analysein more depth in chapter 5.33Briefly,
however,what the FIA tries to do 'is captureandexpressin a workable form the truth
that while it is always a misfortune to die when one wants to go on living, it is not a
tragedy to die in old age; but it is
...
both a tragedy and a misfortune to be cut off
prematurely'.
34A reasonableform of the FIA, therefore,would hold 'that peoplewho
had achievedold ageor who were closely approachingit would not havetheir lives
prolongedwhen this could only beachievedat the costof the lives of thosewho were
not nearingold age.35Consequently,the basisof the FIA 'points to the fact that the
injustice done to someonewho has not had a bad innings when they lose out to
someonewho hasis significantly greaterthan in the reversecircumstances'.
36
33
JohnHarris,7heValueofLife.AnIntroductiontoMedicalEthics(London:Routledge,
1985),
chapter
5.
34
Ibid,p93.
35
Ibid,p94.
36
Ibid.
27

The FIA is a philosophical argumentthat hasobvious advantages
for thosewho must
make rationing decisions in the distribution of health services and other casesof
intergenerational justice involving the distribution of benefits between the
generations,and it is unsurprisingly onethat is often used.
37Moreover, as in the case
of QALYs, it is difficult to assessthe degree to which those who defend age
discrimination on the basis of moral reasonslike fairnessmay in fact be motivated
primarily by cultural ageist prejudice. To have a moral reasonfor doing something
that one would like to do for immoral reasonsis of obvious benefit to thosewho are
prejudiced.However, in the courseof this thesisI will examinethe moral reasonsfor
agediscrimination and challengethem solely on their own terms rather than because
they may maskcultural ageism.
(ii) Income support
There are severalsourcesof ageismactive within the context of income distribution,
andtogetherthey havegenerateda fierce debatein the last two decadesover what has
becomeknown as 'generationalequity'. The origins of this debatepartly derive from
what Bill Bytheway has called a 'moral panic', which has developed from recent
demographicforecastsabout an unsustainablegrowth in the numbersof the elderly
and a correspondingdecline in the number of young adults of working age.
38The
projectionsby the Office of PopularCensusandSurveys(OPCS)on populationtrends
37
AlanWilliams,'Intergenerational
equity:anexploration
of the'fair innings,
' argument'
Health
Economics
6 (1997):117-32.
31
Bill Bytheway,
Ageism(Buckingham,
Philadelphia:
OpenUniversityPress,1995),
pp524.The
natureof thispanicisnotmoralin thesense
thatmoralityitselfisendangered
bytheactivitiesof older
citizens.Rather,
it isamoralpanicin thesense
thattakingcareof oldercitizensisamoralissue
and
currentdemographic
trendsarearguably
creating
acrisisforthemoralquestion
of whatlevelof a
society'sresources
shouldberedistributed
to theold.
28

estimatethat between 1991 and 2031 the number of people between65 and 75 will
rise by nearly 52%, while the numbersof thoseover 75 will increaseby 70%.39These
changeswill supposedlylead to an increaseof the dependencyratio with ever fewer
young people having to support ever more old people. What this allegedly meansis
that younger people will have to forego more of their income and provide more
resourcesto the growing numberof idle old people.
This view has been allied to a secondwidely held belief that the old are in fact
currently consumingmore than their fair shareof society's resourcesto the detriment
of the young, and especially of children. The generationalequity debate has been
fuelled by organisationslike Americans for GenerationalEquity (AGE) that claim
that the elderly benefit disproportionately from current public spending programs
while the young aredeprived.
At the sametime that this equity debatehasdevelopedthere hasalso beensomething
of a changein the popular perceptionof the elderly, and while in the 1960sandearly
1970selderly peoplewere generally stereotypedaspoor anddeserving,by the 1980s
they were more likely to'be portrayed as a powerful and financially securesocial
group usingthat power to further their selfish interestsatthe expenseof others.
40Both
popular perceptionsare of coursestereotypes,andthey are equally mistakenbecause
they both assumethat all elderly peoplehavethe samecharacteristics.Nevertheless,it
is interesting to note that while they were stereotypedas part of the deservingpoor
they benefited from benevolentand universal policies to assistthem, but during the
39
OfficeofPopulation
Census
andSurveys,
Population
Trends
72(London:
HMSO,1993).
40
K Farlie,
'Greedy
Geezers:
Talkin'BoutMyGeneration,
'NewRepublic
28March1988,
pig.
29

1980s,when the forecastsof a demographictime-bomb becameprevalent,Britain and
other 'Western' countriesunderwent far-reachingretrenchingof their welfare states.
Integral to a debateon generationalequity, therefore, is the issue of how cultural
imagesand stereotypesare usedby political leadersto ftirther their desiredpolicies.
But a numberof important points can be identified here,andthe basicpremisesof the
intergenerationalequity debatequestioned.
Firstly, we canquestionthe validity of the forecastsof a demographictime bomb and
the fears that go with it of huge numbers of economically dependent,and even
questionthe assumptionthat an ageingpopulation is actually a social problem at all.
Population ageinghas in fact beengoing on for generationsandwe are not now in a
new demographicsituation. The averageage of the population in Britain startedto
increase in the first decadeof the Twentieth century and peaked in the 1930s.
41
Moreover, it was at the time when Britain's population was ageingmost rapidly that
the pensionsystemwas establishedandexpanded,andwhen it had its widest popular
support. Margot Jeffreys arguesthat 'the moral panic of the 'burden of the aged'
actually reflects 'a deepseatedambivalencetowards older people,which can lead to
an exaggerationof the sizeandnatureof the resourcesrequiredto meettheir needsor
of the sacrifice required of younger people'.42Other commentatorshave arguedthat
the demographic time bomb is imaginary and that, if society removes mandatory
retirementrequirementsandencourages
activepeopleto work until later in their lives,
41F. Laczko & C. Phillipson, Changing WorkandRetirement(Buckingliam: OpenUniversity Press,
1991),p107.
42Margot Jeffries,Growing Old in the TwentiethCentury(London: Routledge,1989),pxiii.
30

the economic growth that would result would be more than sufficient to provide
supportfor the ageingpopulation.43
Finally, asJohnVincent points out, the issueof population ageingis rarely considered
in the context of other population issuessuchas immigration. Vincent insiststhat the
demographictime-bomb thesis is built upon the assumptionthat the citizens of a
society are only those who are born in to it, and excludes the possibility of
immigration to easethe dependencyratios. Therearea largenumberof young people
from developing countries that are desperate for the opportunity to work in
industrialised economies, and yet ever more elaborate procedures are being
implemented to stem the tide of people seeking new opportunities in the very
countriesthat areidentified ashaving a 'problem' of ageing.
44
We can also questionthe extent to which the elderly are indeeda relatively affluent
age group and whether Paul Johnson is right in characterizingpublic policy as an
'increasingly bitter competition for resourcesbetweenworkers andpensioners'.
45As
noted, in recent yearsthe acceptedstereotypesconcerningthe old have focussedless
on their being a part of the deservingpoor and more on them being parasitic to the
well-being of society generally and to the young in particular. This change has
correspondedwith a changein the political culture from social democraticto the new
43Phil Mullan, TheImaginary TimeBomb(London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2002). This argumenthas
beenstrenuouslychallengedby otherwriters, because
economicgrowth ratesalter the absolutelevel of
both wagesandpensionsbut not therelative value betweenthetwo.
44
JohnA. Vincent,InequalityandOldAge,p38-39.
" PaulJohnson,'Introduction,' in P.Johnson,C. Conrad,& D. Thomson(eds.
) Workrs versus
Pensioners:IntergenerationalJustice in an ageinguvrld (Manchester:ManchesterUniversity Press,
1989),p2. Oneinterestingpoint that I do not considerhereis thetendencyof older peoplein Western
societiesto bewhite, while the incidenceof poverty amongchildren is disproportionatelyamongracial
minorities.
31

right, and from state controlled public policies to a reliance on the market. As a result
some commentators like Alan Walker perceive the moral panic concerning an
increasingly large and dependent older population as having been largely invented by
46
governments seeking to retrench public spending. He argues that the 'political
concern about the cost of ageing has been amplified artificially in order to legitimate
policies aimed at diminishing the state's role in financial and social support for older
47
people'. Moreover, governments'have usedthe conceptof intergenerationalequity
to legitimate those actions; the result will be to widen the division betweenmarket
basedaffluenceandpublicly administratedpoverty in old age.48
In an early critique of the generationalequity debateR. H. Binstock arguedthat the
claims of those who saw the old as socially parasitic was built upon three basic
components:the demographicchangesin Western societyresulting in an increasein
their numbers,the economic well-being of the elderly relative to other age groups,
and the political behaviour of the elderly in supporting their self-interest as an age
groUp.
49Binstock arguesthat eachof thesecomponentscanbe refuted. I havealready
briefly shown how the first hasbeencontestedby academics,andI will deal with the
political behaviour of the elderly in the next subsection.However, the rest of this
subsectionwill examine the economic well-being of the elderly relative to younger
agegroups.
46Alan Walker, 'The Economic 'Burden' of Ageing andthe Prospectof IntergenerationalConflict,,
,
4geingandSociety 10(1990): 377-396.
47lbid, p378.
48lbid, p393-3.
49FLIL Binstock, 'The Aged asScapegoat,
' TheGerontologist23: 136-143.
32

The assumptionthat the old aretaking more of their fair shareof available resources
cannot be easily assessed
from simply comparing the number of children in poverty
with the number of elderly.50The relatively higher and increasinglevels of poverty
amongchildren are related to other social trends like the fact that more children are
now beingbrought up by single mothers(exacerbated
by the fact that divorce ratesare
increasing,and that more children are bom outside stablerelationships), and single
women have a decreasedearning capability due to their own societaldiscrimination
and lack of affordable child care. Therefore, Binstock arguesthat 'the elderly have
become scapegoatsfor the economic deprivation of children with the result of
increasinglyhostile attitudestowardsthe old. 51However, what the views of Binstock
and Walker suggestis that negativecultural stereotypesareused by political leaders
in order to supportpublic policy changesthat they favour.
But cultural ageismandcultural stereotypesarenot the only sourceoflustification for
political agendasdesignedto reducepublic spending.The debateover generational
equity would also suggestthat age discrimination may be justified on the moral
groundsof 'fairness'. If the old are thought to be enjoying more than their fair share
of the available benefitsof societythen it may bejust to restrict their accessto them,
especiallyif it is to the detriment of the young. Again, aswith the FIA in health care,
these moral arguments about fairness may also be used as a way of masking
intrinsically ageistjudgementsaboutthe old. Indeed,advocatesof egalitarianageism
may themselves be influenced more by cultural ageism than a desire to ensure
fairness.
50In 1990
thepercentage
of children(under18years)living underthepovertylinein theUSwas
20.6%,whilethenumber
of elderly(65yearsandolder)was12.2%
(U.S.Bureau
of theCensus).
31Binstock, 'The Aged asScapegoat,
' p139.
33

As we shall seein chapterfour, many thinkers either implicitly or explicitly assume
what has been called the complete life view (CLV), which extends the ageist
52
implications of the FIA outlined in the last subsectionto the distribution of income.
If we acceptthat an egalitarian distribution of benefits should be equal betweenthe
complete separatelives of persons,then any less well off part of one's life may be
legitimately compensatedfor, either before or afterwards, by another period of
affluence.
In contrast
to theFIA, theCLV isrelevantto materialgoodsratherthanthe
length of one's life, so it doesnot by itself justify discrimination againstthe old any
more than it doesthe young. Only if it can be shown that the old have already had
their approximate fair shareof life-time benefits does it justify age discrimination
againstthe old.
However, therehasbeena largenumberof writers involved in the generationalequity
debatewho have soughtto identify the presentold age-groupas privileged, not just
relative to previous generationsof the old, or evenjust relative to many younger
peopletoday, but that they areprivileged relative to how well off the next generation
of old will be in a couple of decadestime. Even if the young of today are not as
poorly off astoday's old were when they were young it is possiblethat the CLV may
justify agediscrimination againstthe latter because
the old of tomorrow will beworse
off than the old of today. I will savefurther discussionof the CLV until chapter4 in
thethesis,sufficeto saythat anobviousimplicationof the CLV is thattheold can,
and even perhapsought, to be allowed to suffer destitution if they have in the past
For discussionsof the CLV seeLarry Temkin, Inequality (New York & Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1993),ch 8; Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality andTime,' Ethics 99(1989): 492-502; Mckerlie,
'Equality BetweenAge-Groups,' PhilosophyandPublic, 4ffairs 21 (1992): 275-95.
34

enjoyed significantly greater wealth than the young do today, or if they currently
enjoy greaterwealththanthe old will tomorrow.
(iii) Voting rights
This subsection examines the justifications that have been presented by some
commentatorsand political philosophers for the introduction of age-differentiated
political rights, the aim of which is to reducethe electoralpower of the elderly.53ne
sourceofjustification lies in the underlying fear that, becausedemographictrendsare
steadily increasingthe median age of the voter, and becauseolder voters tend to be
more active, older voters will use their electoral strengthto finther their own short-
term self-interestat the expenseof younger citizens. They may vote for increasesin
public expenditureto benefit themselves,and will leavethe long-term consequences
of their selfishnessto youngeragegroupsto pay after they are dead.Suchfearsseem
to be given credenceby the figures of politically active elderly. As Matthew Price
points out, the American Associationof Retired Persons(AARP) is the secondlargest
organization in the Unitcd Statcs aftcr the Catholic Church, with over 33 million
members;onein four of registeredvoters is a memberof it.54This then representspart
of thewiderconcernaboutgenerational
equityexamined
in the lastsubsection,
and
the worry is that in a democracywhere political parties and leadersare hungry for
power, policies that favour the elderly will be pursuedin order to securethe support
of that largeelectorallobby.
5' Phillippe Van Parijs, 'The Disenfranchisementof the Elderly, andOtherAttempts to secure
IntergenerationalJustice,
' Philosophyand PublicAffairs 27 (1999): pp292-333.DouglasJ. Stewart,
'Disenfianchise the Old,'New Republic29 (1970): 20-22.
54
MatthewC.Price,JusticeBetween
Generations:
TheGrowingPoliticalPowerof theElderlyin
America(NewYork: Praeger,
1997)88-9.
35

PhiHippeVan Parijs gives expressionto these fears, though he does not attempt to
assess
the extentto which they arejustified, andhe examinesinsteada wide rangeof
possibleinstitutional methodsto limit the electoralpower of the elderly.55Van parijS
adopts what he calls a 'Rawls-Machiavelli' strategy, which combines a Rawlsian
componentthat claimswe candeterminea publicly defensiblevision of socialjustice,
and a Machiavellian component that shapesinstitutions in such a way that those
acting within society will end up generatingthe necessaryconditions of that social
justice. He claims that althoughwe can know what socialjustice requires,the
electoralpower of oneparticular agegroup,the 'elderly', who vote mainly out of self-
interest, means that our current democratic arrangements will not deliver the
conditionsfor thatvision.
Van Parijs discussesa numberof possibleinstitutional changesthat would reducethe
age of the median voter and balance the electoral power between different age
categories.We might simply disenfranchiseolder citizens at perhaps70 yearsof age,
or reducethe voting ageto 16or even 14.Otherpossibilities include: plural voting, by
which we might give more weight to the votes of younger voters, or increasethe
number of votes that they have; asymmetrical compulsory voting, which is to say
eitheryoung peoplearelegally requiredto vote while the old areexempt,or a poll tax
may be introducedto discouragethe older voters from exercisingtheir rights, or else
we could require each age-group to elect its own representatives in separate
constituencies.Alternatively, parentsn-ýight
be given a proxy vote for eachchild they
have, or society rnight appoint 'guardians' to representthe interestsof younger and
55Van Pariis, 'The Disenfi-anchisement of the Elderly. '
36

unborn generationsin the legislative assembly and thereby challenge any policy
proposalsthat significantly harmthe interestsof youth.
Thereseemsto be a prima facie casefor thinking thesefearsare legitimate becauseit
is in the nature of democracythat the more people with the sameinterest the more
politically powerful that group will become.Eachvote countsequally so the majority
interestsare the onesthat prevail. However, that power is crucially dependentupon
the membersof the group actually identifying with one another and voting for the
interestof the group. I think we can showthat in the caseof the elderly that theseare
wrongly assumed.In fact, I would saythat the argumentsthatjustify the withholding
of the franchisefrom the old are themselvesbasedupon two falsifilable stereotypes.
Firstly, the assumption that the elderly as an age-group is comparatively more
homogenousthan other age groups, and secondly, the assumptionthat the old are
more selfishandshortterm in the political decisionsthey make.
We have accessto empirical evidenceconcerningthe extent of older people's power
as a political pressuregroup in the work of Exeter University's Older People and
Politics Project (OPPOL), which conducteda study of how older people voted in the
1997 GeneralElection
.
5' OPPOL investigatedthree main concernswithin the study:
firstly, to determinehow effective pressuregroupsarefor older people;secondly,how
the power of andinfluence of older peopleis perceivedby themselvesandthe general
public; and thirdly, the extent to which politicians have respondedto the supposed
increasedpower of older people.
"' Thestudyisreported
andanalysed
in JohnA. Vincent,GuyPatterson
& KarenWale,Politicsand
old, 4ge:older Citizens
andPoliticalProcesses
in Britain(Aldershot:
Ashgate,
2001).
37

With referenceto the supposedhomogeneity of the elderly OPPOL identified three
key obstaclesthat inhibit the old from acting as a coherentpolitical force. Firstly, of
course, their interestsare in fact quite diverse, as diverse in fact as any other age
group. If we think of the single issueof the statepension,which would seemto beone
central concernaround which all elderly could unite, we find that even in this most
central issueself-interestsactually differ widely. There is extensive diversity in the
levels and sourcesof older people's incomes,and the impact of the statepensionon
many of their householdbudgetswould not be a strong motivation in the senseof
self-interest.Nevertheless,the pensionis a potent symbol of the society's recognition
of a life-time contribution, and it is actually thought of by many pensionersas a
universal right of citizenship rather than a benefit for the old per se. Indeed, many
within the pensionermovementhavesoughtto prevent it from becomingexclusively
organized by and for older people, and prominent members like the late Barbara
Castle and Bruce Kent (among others) have expressedconcernsthat the movement
should not only be about senior citizens but about the rights of all citizens and of
citizenship itself
Thus, far from being purely interestedin pursuing sectarianself-interests,as the old
are often stereotyped, older people often seek to strengthen the ties between
themselvesand younger citizens by pointing out that suchuniversal rights as a state
pension is in everyone's interests,and is a fundamentalaspectof what it meansto be
a citizen. Moreover, Vincent et al. found that older people themselves 'usually
justified their political actions in terms of an ideology of the greatergood',57and far
57lbid, p154.
38

from being inherentlyselfishthey were often found to vote on issueswith the interests
of their children andgrandchildrenin mind. Indeed,one important way in which older
peoplefind meaningin their lives after their careersand long-term life plans are near
completion is within concernsthat transcendthe individual ego and embrace the
health of the community as a whole.
58Such transcendingconcernswill differ from
thoseof the young and middle agedwhose concernswill tend to be more immediate
and material in nature. It is these age groups, after all, who are involved with
developing careersand bringing up children. If the ideal of an inclusive citizenship
was strengthened
then the political voting power of the elderly might be somethingto
bewelcomedratherthan feared.
However, in addition to the diversity of the membership there are several other
obstaclesthat mitigate against the old age group from being able to mobilize as a
coherentand formidable political force. Firstly, there are the negativecultural issues
that concernthe old, and what was found to be particularly important by OPPOL's
researchwasthe negativecultural evaluationsof old ageitself Becausethe dominant
culture of the 'West' devaluesageit is difficult to createa positive identity for old age
as a symbol that older peoplewish to internalize, and to which they want to commit
themselves.This, in turn, meansthat '[t]here is a reluctanceamongstolder peopleto
defme themselvesas old, and it is possible that this preventsthem from identifying
with the age-groupissues.59The cultural devaluation of old age also makesit more
difficult for old peopleto organize,becauseaccessto the media,which is necessary
to
Is Seefor exampleRobertC. Peck,'PsychologicalDevelopmentsin the SecondHalf of Life, ' in B.
Neugarten(ed.), MiddleAge andAging (Chicago,11:ChicagoUniversity Press,1965):88-92.
59vincent et a], Politics and OldAge, p151.
39

conveytheir message,
is restrictedanddistortedby the negativeimagesthat aboundin
our society,which meansthe mediadoesnottakethem seriously.
Secondly, while there may be some truth to the claim that political parties and
political leadersmight airnto further the interestsof the old in orderto gettheir votes
in the short-term,political partiesareat leastasinterestedin attractingyoungervoters
who will have the franchisefor four or five decadesto come. Thirdly, as political
campaignmanagersadmittedduring interviewswith OPPOL,the older a personis the
lesslikely sheis to bea 'swing' voter, andevidencefrom the British Election Survey
(BES) shows that people over 60 years are less likely to changetheir vote mid-
campaignthan youngerpeople.
60For this reasonpolitical parties will not target the
old to the sameextentandwill consequentlynot showasmuch interestin their views.
Finally, asVincent et al point out, an examinationof the major political studiesof the
1997GeneralElection revealsthat the issueof an ageingelectorateandits interestsis
totally absentfrom their discussions.For example,while the studiesof Dunleavy et
al61and Evans & Norris62provide exhaustiveanalysis about the influence of the
numeroussectionalinterestsin the country in the leadup to the election,noneof them
mention the old in any detail. The obvious point being that if leading academicsare
unable to identify an increasing level of political power being wielded by an
organizedlobby of older votersthen it probablydoesnot exist.
"' lbid, p75.
61P.Dunleavy,
A. Gamble,
I. Holliday,& G.Peele
(eds.
), Developments
in BritishPolitics
(Basingstoke:
Macmillan,1997).
62G.Evans&P Norris(eds-),
CriticalElections
(London:Sage
Publishers,
1999).
40

(iv) Employment
The context in which the ageistdebatehasbeenperhapsmost prominent is within the
field of employment,and it hasbeenwithin this field that therehasbeenmuch recent
anti-ageistlegislation. There aretwo reasonsfor this recent emergenceof anti-ageist
legislation in employment, one of which is concernedwith efficiency and the other
with ethics. The efficiency reasonfor anti-ageist legislation derives from a growing
awarenessamongst governmentsand industry of the macro-economic issue of an
ageingworkforce.
63If the economiesof Westernnationsareto remainefficient in the
face of current demographictrendsgovernmentsneedto overcomeentrenchedageist
ideas and encourage older workers back to work and to prevent the ageist
employmentpracticeswhich undoubtedlytake place.
The idea that ageism is bad for businessis the central messageof the Employers
Forum on Age that was set up in May 1996 to combat age discrimination in
employment. This efficiency reasonfor anti-ageist policy is known as the 'business
casefor agediversity', and in the prefaceto the voluntary Code on Age Diversity in
Employment (1999) the governmentminister Patricia Hodge recognisedthat to base
employment decisions on pre-conceived ideas about age rather than on skills and
abilities is to wastethe talentsof a large part of the population'.64But what is being
judged wrong here is not the fact that employershaveactedon ageistprinciples, but
I Onethird of the British workforce is now over forty yearsof age.SeeColin Duncan,'Ageism, early
exit, andtherationality of age-based
discrimination,' in Ageismin Workand Employmeta(Aldershot:
Ashgate,2001).
64CodeonAge Diversity in Employmera(1999), quotedin Bob Hepple, 'Age Discrimination in
Employment: Implementingthe FrameworkDirective 2000/78/EC,' in SandraFredman& Sarah
Spencer(eds.
),, 4geas an Equality Issue(Oxford andPortland,Oregon:Hart Publishing,2003): 71-96,
p73.
41

that by doing so they waste a valuable resource.Thus, the UK goverment (along
with a numberof otheradvancedindustrial states)hascometo realisethat the demand
for skills in the labour marketoutstripssupply,andthis, combinedwith the direct cost
to the exchequerof paying various benefits to people under the age of retirement,
means that both indirect and direct discrimination may be detrimental to macro-
economic growth.
65 Government initiatives are therefore thought necessary to
counteractthis collective action problem presentedby private individuals and firms.
Consequently,the government'semploymentpolicy objectivestowardsolder workers
seem to convergewith the objectives of Age Concern.and the general anti-ageist
lobby, but, aswe shall see,this convergenceis only contingent.
This, then, is the efficiency case for anti-ageism in employment. It may also be
describedin utilitarian terms in the sensethat the greaterwealth createdby a more
efficient economy will, in turn, produce a greater sum of utility among members of
the population. We therefore have a utilitarian reason to support legislation that
challenges ageism in the field of employment to match the utilitarian argument that
Shaw presents which defends ageist policies in healthcare. In 1997 this
efficiency/utilitarian justification of anti-ageism in the work environment prompted
the English Law Society to recommend that legislation should be introduced as 'a
matter of urgency'.
66 However, the efficiency reason for anti-ageism is only
concerned with the consequencesof discrimination for business, and this suggests that
65
Directdiscrimination
mightinvolvenotemploying
acandidate
ortraininganemployee
onthebasis
of heragealone.Non-direct
discrimination
mightinvolvethesame
practice
butonthebasisthatthe
individualisperceived
to belessadaptable
asaproxytraitof theirbeingolder.
66LawSociety,
'AgeDiscrimination
andEmployment
LawReport,
' (LawSociety,1997).
42

the wrongnessof agediscrimination in employment is only contingently wrong. This
of course has nothing to do with morality or the particular harms done to the
disfavoured individuals. Indeed, if it were rational to so discriminate then logical
consistency would mean that it would no longer be wrong, and the concern for
efficiency would instead defend ageism in employment as well as in healthcare.
Moreover, if it could be shown that productivity would be higher within an ageist
employmentsector,andthe additional wealth increasedthe utility of a majority within
the economy,then this would further strengthenthe utilitarian defenceof ageism in
employment.Therearethosewho arguethat, asolder workers usually earnmorethan
a comparableyoungerworker, andasthey will tendto be lesseasyto move aroundor
sack as the interestsof the company change,it is therefore individually rational for
firms to indirectly discriminate against older workers becausethey representhigher
transactioncosts.
67
S
However, thereis a second,lesscynical, reasonfor the rise in interestin ananti-ageist
legal framework in employment. The ethical argument for anti-ageism views it as
morally right for older citizens to have as much accessto employment as younger
citizens. Bernard Boxill arguesthat 'the interests of the aged in finding rewarding
employment areroutinely treatedasbeing intrinsically lessimportant thanthe similar
interests of younger people, and for this reason they are often denied rewarding
employment, even when they are the best qualified."68 Boxill argues that age-
67Colin Duncan, 'Ageism, early exit, andthe rationality of age-based
discrimination.'
68Bernard PLBloxill, 'Equality, discrimination andpreferentialtreatment,
' in PeterSinger(ed.) A
Companionto Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,1993):333-342, p335.
43

discrimination in employmentpracticesviolates the moral principle of showing equal
concernfor the interestsof older persons.
69
Boxill's claim is important becauseit capturesthe first part of two distinctionsthat are
fundamentalto this thesis.Firstly, he capturespart of the idea behind cultural ageism
(in the sensethat the interestsof the old are seento be intrinsically less important),
but it does not acknowledgethat there might be an egalitarian argument for age
discrimination. It would, in fact, bequite possibleto constructanegalitarianargument
for age discrimination in employment along the same lines as with other social
contexts. According to the CLV it might be suggestedthat older personshave had
their fair or equalshareof employmentopportunitiesand that it is now time for them
to makeway for youngerpersons.This egalitarian argumentfor agediscrimination is
separatefrom the cultural one, identified by Boxill, which views the interestsof the
old asintrinsically lessimportant.
Secondly,Boxill's claim recognisesthe importanceof the synchronic interestsof the
agedthat can be harmedby agediscrimination, but it is silent on the possibility that
personsmight havediachronic intereststhat would benefit from agediscrimination. It
might bearguedthat it is in the diachronic interestsof personsthat ageistemployment
policies prevail if that discrimination meantthat eachpersonhadanequalor fair share
of thoseopportunitiesover their completelives.
I believe that the emergenceof an ethical concern for an anti-ageistlegal framework
partly reflects a growing appreciationof the synchronic interestsof older workers, as
69
Ibid.
44

opposed to their diachronic; interests, and their moral right to the protection of their
dignity and self-respect. As Sandra Fredman notes, increased poverty, ill health and
depression, as well as low self-esteem and social isolation are themselves strong
justifications for legal interventions against age discrimination. 70 This ethical
justification, which of course is not contingent upon questions of demographic trends
or macro-economic efficiency, is reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights. This Charter proclaims the right of all elderly persons 'to lead a life of dignity
Cultural lif 9.71
and independence
andto participatein social and e
The ethical argumentemphasises
the view that, within a liberal society,the law ought
to embody the community's sense of fairness. Moreover, the law may have a
powerful symbolic function and,asLawrenceFriedmansuggests,'the law often gives
both culture and behaviour a good swift shovein a certain direction. 72It is possible
over time for laws to changethe negative cultural biasesand inaccurate, irrational
stereotypesthat some people hold and which can be quite resilient to individual
personal reflection. The law has already done this to some degree for racial
minorities, women andthe physically handicapped,andthere is no questionthat there
is less racial and sexual discrimination now than there was before the advent of
legislation that outlawed suchpractices.
73Therefore, as the Director of the Camegie
Third Age Programmepointed out in 1995,therewould be a "dangerthat if ageis left
70SandraFredman,Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2002), p62.
71EuropeanCharterof FundamentalRights 1950,(Art 25).
72LawrenceM. Friedman,'Age Discrimination Law: SomeRemarkson the American Experience,
' in
Age asan Equality Issue(eds.
) Fredman& Spencer,p189.
73SexDiscrimination Act (1975); RaceRelationsAct (1976); Disability Discrimination Act (1995).
45

asthe only major causeof discrimination not regulatedby law, peoplewill think that
it doesn'tmatter"'
.
74
1.4 The emergeneeof anti-ageist legislation
The first country to introduce anti-ageistlegislation was the United States,which did
so only three years after the 1964 Civil Rights laws were enacted.The 1967 Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is confmed to age discrimination in
employment while the civil rights laws againstracism and sexism also cover public
accommodations,housingandeducationaswell. Casesof agediscrimination aredealt
with by the Equal Employment OpportunitiesCommission(EEOC) asarecasesof all
other forms of discrimination in employmentincluding racism andsexism.To give an
impressionof the extent of the problem of ageismin employment, out of the 80 840
casesthat were filed with the EEOC between2000 to 2001 some21.5% were related
to discrimination on the basis of age, while 35.8% were on the basis of race and
31.1% on gender.
75It should be noted, however, that the ADEA has been heavily
criticised and it has been claimed that it cannot be defendedon the grounds that it
protectsa disfavouredandrelatively powerlessminority group. The reasonfor this, as
George Rutherglen has shown, is that an examination of the empirical data reveals
that claims under the ADEA are predominantly brought by white males who hold
relatively high-statusandhigh-payingjobs.76
' RichardWorsley,'Carnegie
ThirdAgeProgramme,,
EqualOpportunities
Review
60,(1993).
75Public EmploymentLaw Report,May 2002.
76GeorgeRutherglen,'From Raceto Age: The ExpandingScopeof EmploYmentDiscrimination Law,'
Journal oftegal Studies,24 (1995): 491-521.
46

There havebeensimilar anti-ageist legal developmentsin many Europeanand other
Western countries with Australia's Workplace Relations Act 1996; New Zealand's
Human Rights CommissionAmendmentAct (HRCA) of 1992;Finland's Contract of
Employment Act 2001; and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. While most of these
national laws make the dismissal of an employee on the basis of age unlawful, they
often permit age discrimination. for 'acceptable' reasons, and this leaves the
implementation of the law vague and ambiguous. The Northern Ireland Act goes
further than the others in that it actually gives public authorities a positive duty to
promote equality of opportunity on the grounds of age, rather than simply the negative
duty to not discriminate against thenL77
However, while most of the national political and legal responses to age
discrimination have beendriven by the utilitarian casefor efficiency rather than for
ethical reasons,there is one exception to this trend. The Republic of Ireland has
recently introduced new comprehensive age equality legislation which extends
coveragebeyondthe employmentsectorto the distribution of goodsandservices,and
there is a single equality commission (the Equality Authority) that has overlapping
responsibilities for the multiple listed illegitimate grounds for discrimination. This
'single equality' legislation lists eight illegitimate grounds of discrimination
(including age)eachof which is equally covered.There aretwo actsthat apply to the
single equality legislation, the Employment Equality Act (EEA) of 1998, which
prohibits discrimination in the employment context, and the Equal StatusAct (ESA)
2000 which prohibits discrimination in the provision of such goods and servicesas
77
Foradiscussion
onthecomparative
approaches
to structuring
legislation
against
agediscrimination
seeColmO'Cinneide,'Comparative
European
Perspectives
onAgeDiscrimination
Legislation,
' in
Fredman
& Spencer,,
4geasanEqualityIssue.
47

housing,educationandadmissionto private clubs. This equality legislation therefore
representsa combination of both efficiency and ethical reasons for anti-ageist
legislation.
On top of thesenationalresponses
to agediscrimination, there hasnow beena recent
EU Council Directive that requires all EuropeanUnion member statesto introduce
legislation outlawing age-discriminationin employmentby 2006.78
In orderto comply
with this requirement each state must introduce legislation outlawing direct and
indirect discrimination in employment, including recruitment, promotion, terms and
conditions of employment, pay and dismissal, and compulsory retirement must be
prohibited unless it is 'objectively justified'
.
79 However, this initiative is again
confined to agediscrimination in the workplace, andthe primary aim of the Directive
is to improve businessefficiency. The Directive only views age stereotyping and
prejudice as wrong to the extent that it is inefficient for businessrather than any
unfairnessit may causethe individual.
A consequenceof the contingency of this anti-ageist legislation being based on
inefficiency is reflectedby the biggestpractical challengeit faces,which is to saythe
kinds of justification that are consideredacceptablein order for statesandemployers
to ignorethe law. Justasthe national laws allow exceptionsthat arevaguesotoo does
the Directive, which permits memberstatesto treat peopledifferently on groundsof
78Council Directive 2000/78/ECEstablishing A GeneralFrameworkfor Equal Treatmentin
Employment andOccupation.The Directives provisions in respectof discrimination on groundsof
religion and sexualorientation areto beimplementedby December2003,andby 2006 for Disability
and Age.
79objectivejustification'wouldbewherebecause
of thenatureof ajob it isthoughtreasonable
and
rationalto requireacompulsory
retirement
age,i.e.thatairlinepilotsshould
retireat55years.,
48

age if such policies are 'objectively and reasonablyjustified by a legitimate aim,
including legitimate employment policy.'80 This phraseology is of course quite
ambiguous,andat leastoneeminent lawyer hasconfessedthat he has'no idea [what]
legitimate employment policy is supposedto mean.
'81The conditions of legitimacy
are not explicitly expressed,and what constitutes 'reasonablejustification' must
surely besubjective.
However, it has been arguedthat even if the aim were only to achieveequality in
employmentit could not beachievedwithout legislating on a far wider rangeof social
contexts, and the reasonfor this is that many aspectsof age discrimination interact
and reinforce one another.This meansthat in practice both the ethical and efficiency
approachesimply broadly the same wide coverage. If older people enjoyed better
healthcare then their employability would be enhanced,and while people are in
constructiveemploymenttheir health is often betterthan if they were idle andboredat
home. Better social housing and accessto public transport for older people would
make it easierfor them to participateactively in society whether in paid employment
or the volunteer sector,andbetter educationand training facilities would enhancere-
employment. In addition, SandraFredmanbelievesthat in order to facilitate effective
changethere must also be promotional and educational measuresto help dispel the
image of older people as dependentor inferior.92Therefore, legislation focussingon
employmentwill be ineffective unlessit is alsoableto addressthesewider issues,and
Fredman proposes a 'proactive' approach that would facilitate a systematic and
80
Quotedin Friedman,
'AgeDiscrimination
Law:Some
Remarks
ontheAmerican
Experience,
' p177.
" Ibid. onepossible
justificationmightbepositivediscrimination
whichwill belookedat in chapter
2.
" SandraFredman,The Age of Equality,' in Fredman& Spencer(eds.
),, 4geasan Equ,
71ityIssue.
49

strategicapproachin which employers,the state,andother bodiesparticipate actively
in resolving theproblem of ageism.
83
1.5 The chaHengefor anti-ageists
Throughout this chapter we have reviewed some of the arguments for and against
ageist policies, particularly within the contexts of health care provision, income
support, voting rights, and employment practices. What we have found is that there
are three broad sourcesof justification for agediscrimination and it is often difficult
to determine whether certain discriminatory policies are motivated by negative
cultural stereotypes,by a concern for efficiency, or normative moral reasons of
equality andfairness.Indeed,most of thesepolicies could be driven by at leasttwo of
thesesources.
Within healthcare provisions we have seen that negative cultural stereotypes
concerningthe moral value of older personsis often assumedto mitigate againstthe
seriousnessof violence andphysical harm perpetratedagainstthe old, andthat it can
evenjustify this activity in the minds of the perpetrators.Negativecultural stereotypes
about older peoplebeing obsoletealso underlie much of the useof chronological age
asa meansto control accessof personsto healthcareoptions. Moreover, the negative
value inherent in thesestereotypesis evenprojected on to thosewho work with older
people,devaluingthe worth of their work aswell. We haveseenthat unexamined,and
thus contestable,negativecultural stereotypes,which portray the old as taking more
than their fair shareof public resources,and imply that older voters are inherently
13
lbid, p23.
50

selfish and short term in their thinking, have beenpresentedby both academicsand
political leadersasreasonsto restrict income distribution to the old and evento strip
them of their right to vote. On closer examination thesestereotypesare found to be
fallacious, but, asWalker hasnoted,suchstereotypespresenta readytool for political
leadersto manipulatethe thinking of the public and to rally support for undemocratic
andunjustpublic policies, andthat they thereforeneedto bechallenged.
84
The stereotypesthemselvesare bolstered by equally contestabledemographic and
social assumptionsthat on the onehandthere is a demographictime-bomb andon the
other that the old constitute an homogenoussocial group, and the implications of
these assumptionsis that the ever growing numbers of old can and will act in a
coherentpolitical fashion in order to further their short-term, selfish interests.Again
the fact that theseassumptionsare so often acceptedas facts, and that they are so
rarely challenged,give credenceto both the ageist stereotypesthey support and the
necessityfor radically discriminatory practices.
However, as we have seen, cultural ageist prejudice is not the only source of
discrimination the old face, and the argumentsof liberal academicsoften justify the
samepolicies ascultural ageists,though they basethem insteadupon either utilitarian
principles or an ethical concernfor fairness.As noted above,utilitarian principles can
both justify ageistpolicies in healthcarewhile at the sametime challenging them in
employment practices,provided that in eachcaseeither aggregateor total utility can
be calculated to result from them. On the one hand, what underlies the utilitarian
ageistdefencein health is the calculation that becausethe old are 'nearly dead', they
"Alan Walker, 'The Economic 'Burden' of Aging andthe Prospectof IntergenerationalConflict. -
51

Age, equality, and cultural oppression An argument against ageism.pdf

Age, equality, and cultural oppression An argument against ageism.pdf

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Age, equality, and cultural oppression An argument against ageism.pdf