The paper offers a critical discussion of resource use in a national park, Baluran, in Indonesia. In general, an increasing accept of the need for livelihood security, also for people living in or near natural conservation areas, are challenging traditional systems of national park governance. Finding ways to balance the needs of local populations against the necessity to secure biodiversity and environmental sustainability becomes important, and the main question in our research is how to accommodate an existing society in Baluran without a further negative impact on endangered mammals. Based on common pool resource management and co-management theories and thorough empirical investigations among the population living in Baluran, we conclude that alternative solutions exist for combining the interests of livelihood and conservation, but that resolute restrictions must be set by central government authorities, and that local institutions and livelihood practices must be developed based on experiences gained in the region through the last decades. Our findings may have relevance for solving similar problems of coexistence in other conservation areas

1. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Forest Policy and Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol
Towards sustainable coexistence: People and wild mammals in Baluran
National Park, Indonesia
Satyawan Pudyatmokoa,⁎
, Arief Budimana
, Stein Kristiansenb
a
Faculty of Forestry, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia
b
School of Business and Law, University of Agder, Norway
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Indonesia
National parks
Livelihoods
Collective action
Common pool resources
Commons
Governance
Institutions
Community-based conservation
A B S T R A C T
The paper offers a critical discussion of resource use in a national park, Baluran, in Indonesia. In general, an
increasing accept of the need for livelihood security, also for people living in or near natural conservation areas,
are challenging traditional systems of national park governance. Finding ways to balance the needs of local
populations against the necessity to secure biodiversity and environmental sustainability becomes important,
and the main question in our research is how to accommodate an existing society in Baluran without a further
negative impact on endangered mammals. Based on common pool resource management and co-management
theories and thorough empirical investigations among the population living in Baluran, we conclude that al-
ternative solutions exist for combining the interests of livelihood and conservation, but that resolute restrictions
must be set by central government authorities, and that local institutions and livelihood practices must be
developed based on experiences gained in the region through the last decades. Our findings may have relevance
for solving similar problems of coexistence in other conservation areas.
1. Introduction
Baluran National Park in East Java, Indonesia, represents an inter-
esting case study of the relation between local people, central and re-
gional government, and national park authorities in balancing the
conflicting interests of livelihood and conservation. An illegal settle-
ment of nearly 1000 people (our count) exists within the park borders.
Inhabitants use a relatively small area for crops cultivation, but cattle
are pasturing in larger areas of the park, with a proven negative impact
on endangered mammals, especially the banteng (Bos javanicus). Other
species that are characterized as endangered or vulnerable by the IUCN
(International Union for Conservation of Nature) include the Javan
leopard and the Javan rusa deer.
Worldwide, the establishment of protected natural areas has been
the most popular strategy to safeguard the existence of world biodi-
versity. Restrictions on human activities and displacement of people
have been common in protected areas, aiming to isolate plants and
animal species, ecosystems and landscapes from human influence
(Redford and Fearn, 2007). The practice of “fortress conservation” in-
volves the preservation of wildlife and their habitat through the crea-
tion of protected areas that exclude people (Brockington, 2002).
Over the last decades, however, the paradigm of protected area
management has gradually shifted from top-down protectionist to
bottom-up participatory, which accommodates the aspirations and
rights of local people. Conservationists increasingly recognize that if
conservation initiatives are to succeed in the long term, they need the
support and cooperation of those people living in and near protected
areas. Local organizations supported by international NGOs have
strongly pushed for community-based conservation (Dressler and Roth,
2011). The change means moving beyond biodiversity and wildlife
conservation as the sole goal, towards an integration with local eco-
nomic development and the use of protected areas as means for poverty
alleviation (Gurney et al., 2014; Pelser et al., 2013). According to this
paradigm, the success of protected area management depends on the
ability of managers to integrate the conservation goals and socio-eco-
nomic issues and to promote greater compliance of local community
activities with the protected area goals (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012). To
support this change of management, more empirical research is needed
to understand the socioeconomics benefits of people utilizing park
areas, the impacts of human activity on biodiversity conservation, and
the reasoning and practices of agents, such as community groups,
business interests, and local governments.
This paper discusses how the current land-use conflict can be solved
and aims to offer suggestions for sustainable coexistence of people and
wild mammals in Baluran National Park, and possibly also in similar
protected areas. More specifically, we want to identify sustainable
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.02.006
Received 10 April 2017; Received in revised form 28 November 2017; Accepted 16 February 2018
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: spudyatmoko@ugm.ac.id (S. Pudyatmoko), stein.kristiansen@uia.no (S. Kristiansen).
Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
1389-9341/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
T

2. livelihood strategies for park residents, discuss preconditions for suc-
cessful common pool resource management, and assess the socio-poli-
tical organization of the local society and conflicting overall goals of
park management. Based on theory and previous research findings on
common pool resource management (CPRM) and community-based
conservation, we analyse the potentials of collective action for im-
plementing best-practice livelihoods and discuss how local and national
institutions and governance can be improved to utilize existing re-
sources for the best of people and nature. The study is based on re-
peated visits to the park, a survey of socio-economic factors covering all
303 settlement households, in-depth interview with 50 key re-
spondents, and a focus group discussion.
After this introduction follow discussions of relevant theories and
previous findings. Section 3 gives an overview of natural conservation
paradigms in Indonesia, combined with a description of the Baluran
National Park. Section 4 presents our research methodology. We reveal
our findings in Section 5, followed by the analytical discussion in
Section 6, and finally a brief section with conclusion and policy re-
commendations.
2. Theory and previous research findings
As discussed earlier, there is a tendency to accepting and paying
more respect to local peoples' use of natural resources in national parks
and protected areas, in Indonesia as elsewhere. Conclusions from stu-
dies of common pool resource management (CPRM) are often used to
support arguments for the capability of native populations to undertake
collective action for combining household livelihoods and environ-
mental sustainability. In this section we shall briefly introduce recent
livelihood discourses in economic development theory, then challenge
the “community homogeneity assumption” in much of CPRM theory,
touch the issue of local elites as potential free riders in the use of
commons, and finally discuss contributions from co-management
theory.
The sustainable livelihoods idea was firstly introduced by the
Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 and
taken into use by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in advocating the achievement of sustainable livelihoods
as a broad goal for poverty eradication. Livelihood security means
adequate access of households to income and resources to meet their
basic needs (Chambers and Conway, 1992). It concerns people's
chances to achieve not only economic, but also social and ecological
sustainability. A livelihood is regarded sustainable when it can cope
with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its
capabilities and assets and secure necessary income for the next gen-
eration without undermining the natural resource base. Strong argu-
ments have been raised in defense of livelihood diversification strate-
gies, especially in rural areas of poor countries (Ellis, 2000). From
Africa, empirical findings indicate that program interventions com-
bining livelihood diversification and income generating activities with
environmental protection may really improve rural households' wel-
fare, while also ensuring improved environmental protection (Kebebe
and Shibru, 2017).
Measuring the “carrying capacity” becomes important when dis-
cussing sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction versus wildlife
and biodiversity conservation in protected areas. The concept of car-
rying capacity assumes that plants and animals are in a state of equi-
librium and that certain limits mark the maximum use, e.g. the number
of livestock utilizing pastoral resources in a certain area. However,
measuring capacities and setting limits are difficult and open for
ideological assumptions and socio-political priorities (Benjaminsen
et al., 2006), and for disputes among various economic interest groups
and government layers (Haller, 2010). Conservation has been and still
is very much about issues of political power and environmental justice
(Dahlberg et al., 2010).
Much of theoretical contributions and empirical research on
collective action for securing livelihoods while protecting nature is
based on Garrett Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons thesis and
Elinor Ostrom's work to prove that communities with certain non-
market and non-state institutions can manage shared resources sus-
tainably and economically efficient. Ostrom's theory on common pool
resource (CPR) management has gained iconic status, not least after the
Memorial Nobel Prize award in 2009, and the influence of her work also
in non-academic circles is strengthened by her respect for and concern
with praxis. Thus, since the 1990s, CPR projects have become promi-
nent in rural development strategies, especially in poor countries. The
theory assumes that rural communities are motivated by opportunities
in cooperation, and that they are the best placed organizations to de-
cide, control and make sanctions regarding the use of common re-
sources. In practice, however, such projects have generated dis-
appointing outcomes and are extensively criticized from both ecological
and sociological perspectives (Shackleton et al., 2010). CPR theory may
in fact ‘have contributed to the poor performance of commons projects’
(Saunders, 2014).
The following points represent the major preconditions for suc-
cessful CPR management in Ostrom (1990, 2005): 1) physically and
organizationally well-defined units of resource use; 2) correspondence
between benefits and costs for individual users based on rules for re-
source allocation that are in congruence with local conditions; 3) col-
lective choice arrangements, so that individuals affected can participate
in discussing and modifying user and operational rules; 4) monitoring,
including full accountability of the monitors to the resource users; 5)
graduated sanctions applied to appropriators that deviate from the re-
gime or violate the rules; 6) easy and low-cost mechanisms for the re-
solution of conflicts among resource users; 7) users have the rights to
organize and make autonomous decisions, which are recognized by
external government authorities; 8) authority is allocated to allow for
adaptive governance at multiple levels, from the local through the re-
gional and national, to the global level, when resources are parts of
larger social and ecological systems. The last point calls for a poly-
centric governance structure, as also discussed in more detail by Ostrom
(2010). We shall return to these eight points in our discussion of find-
ings in Section 6.
Instead of blaming the CPR theory, reasons for poor performance of
commons projects should rather be sought in the social, economic and
political complexity of even small communities, in the limited under-
standing of community contexts, and in elite interests and patterns of
exchange between community members and outsiders (Haller, 2010;
Saunders, 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). That also leads us to revisit co-
management theory and into discussing how responsible resource users
may take constructive roles in environmental management systems
(Jentoft et al., 1998).
Assumptions of community homogeneity are implicated in much of
the CPR theory (Tsing et al., 2005), although many societies given CPR
management responsibilities are not social groupings with the neces-
sary cohesion and incentives, demarcation lines, legitimacy, and resi-
lience to organize themselves and act independently (Murphree and
Hulme, 2009). Research clearly indicates that group compliance and
cooperative behaviour depend on close communication, shared social
norms, and the legitimacy of common rules (Baerlein et al., 2015).
Community-based natural resource management and conservation are
clearly vulnerable to elite capture at local levels (Ostrom and Nagendra,
2006), especially when ‘the poor are not empowered enough to with-
stand the pressures and influence of the local elite’ (Platteau, 2004).
Many rural communities, not least in poor parts of Asia, are highly
differentiated and stratified in terms of power, income and wealth, and
social status (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). Platteau and Abraham (2002)
observe a tendency to downplay community imperfections while
stressing market and state failures. Community-based projects run a
high risk of causing undue appropriation of resources by local elites
operating within the logic of patronage (Fritzen, 2007; Platteau and
Abraham, 2002). Saunders (2014) finds that some commons projects
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
152

3. have obtained acceptable results by cooperating with local elites, but
that often means compromising with principles and goals of common
pool resource management. A shift towards decentralized and partici-
patory forms of decision-making does not mean that the enforcement of
rules set on higher political layers becomes unnecessary or can be left to
local resource users (Henley, 2008).
On the other side, numerous studies conclude that when the state is
solely responsible for the management of common-pool resources, an
open access may be created, because the state ‘lacks the financial means
to enforce laws and is not able to monitor or exclude immigrant users’
(Haller, 2010), and state-induced official conservation rules may be
ineffective because they lack the basis of local knowledge and support
(Mehring et al., 2011). Blair (1996) finds that government units at the
local level tend to be more interested in consuming than conserving or
preserving resources, while Haller (2010) identifies a problem due to
loss of central state control, because immigrants may use the ideology
of citizenship to gain free access to common-pool resources and hin-
dering local collective action. Migrants may lack the spiritual ties to
nature, resulting in the negligence of sustainability matters (Mehring
et al., 2011). Evidence clearly challenges the presumption that a single
governance arrangement will avoid over-harvesting of commons, either
the governance is by a local community or a central state unit (Ostrom
and Nagendra, 2006).
Especially from Indonesia, Henley (2008) finds that there is ‘no
detour around a capable state’ when it comes to nature conservation,
and that sustainable solutions will involve political hierarchy, where
the central state serves public interests of conservation and livelihoods,
with the “powers of coercion” when needed. Likewise based on research
in Indonesia, Mehring et al. (2011) point to the importance of estab-
lishing formal conservation agreements between centrally controlled
national park authorities and local communities. Sustainable resource
use is dependent on a co-management strategy between local users and
central controllers (Mehring et al., 2011) and on viewing ecological and
social systems as intimately linked (Shackleton et al., 2010). However,
recent findings indicate that successful co-management with local
agents requires knowledge and transparency at the local level and
systems of accountability between local and central levels (Fauchald
and Gulbrandsen, 2012), which clearly represent a huge challenge in
the Indonesian context. Roslinda et al. (2012) and Nurrochmat et al.
(2017) also emphasize the importance of stakeholder analyses for im-
proving strategies of natural conservation in Indonesia. According to
these authors, the relationships between stakeholders may be classified
as conflicting, complementary, or cooperating. More generally, Berkes
(2009) claims that co-management is a creative process of problem
solving, which involves negotiations and joint learning.
3. Natural conservation in Indonesia
3.1. Practices and challenges
Indonesia has a huge reservoir of biodiversity, and parts of it are
alarmingly threatened by degradation and destruction (Hansen et al.,
2013; Margono et al., 2014; Myers et al., 2000; Tsujino et al., 2016).
There are 556 “protected areas”, covering around 15% of the landmass,
or near 30 million hectares. 54 of these areas are now classified as
national parks, which is a remarkable growth since the first five, Ba-
luran among them, were established in 1980. Six of the parks are re-
cognized as World Heritage Sites, and 11 are parts of the World Net-
work of Biosphere Reserves (Directorate General of Natural Resources
Conservation and Ecosystem, 2015). The following are among the
stated objectives for national park management: 1) To maintain viable
and ecologically functional populations and assemblages of native
species at densities sufficient to conserve ecosystem integrity and resi-
lience in the long term; 2) To take into account the needs of indigenous
people and local communities, including subsistence resource use, in so
far as these will not adversely affect the primary management objective;
and 3) To contribute to local economies through tourism (Dudley,
2008).
As a contribution to harmonize contradicting objectives in national
park management, the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and
Forestry, who oversees national park management, is now using a
zoning system, including “core zone”, “wilderness zone”, “utilization
zone”, and “other zones”, which can be “special zone”, “rehabilitation
zone”, “traditional zone”, “protected marine zone”, and “religious,
cultural and historical zone” (Ministry Decree 76, 2015). In practice, it
is obviously difficult to balance the objectives of development for local
people and conservation for public interest (Mcshane et al., 2011;
Mulyana et al., 2010). National parks often fail in balancing interests
and avoiding conflicts between local livelihoods and wildlife and bio-
diversity protection. Park management is often blamed for this (Vedeld
et al., 2012), but reasons behind and solutions to conflicts must be
sought by taking motives and actions of influential actors into account.
Nurrochmat et al. (2017) emphasize the importance of promoting the
participation of various stakeholders for sustainable management. In
the case of Baluran National Park, the local communities, local and
central government institutions, and commercial interests may all play
important roles.
3.2. Baluran National Park
The park, often called “Little Africa in Java”, covers 25,000 ha on
the north coast of East Java. Mount Baluran, a dormant volcano, is at
the center of the park, which is otherwise dominated by savannah grass
and acacia trees inland, and monsoon forest with mangroves along the
coast (see Fig. 1).
Eleven species of larger wild mammals are observed in the national
park. Among them, two species are classified as endangered by the
IUCN, namely the banteng (Bos javanicus), whose population has dra-
matically decreased over the last decades, and the Asiatic wild dog
(Cuon alpinus). IUCN also categorizes three of the mammal species in
the park as vulnerable, namely the Javan lutung monkey
(Trachypithecus auratus), the leopard (Panthera pardus), and the Javan
rusa deer (Rusa timorensis). Three of the 11 larger mammal species are
absent in the areas occupied by livestock, namely the banteng, Water
Fig. 1. Map of Baluran National Park. Source: Indonesia National Map and Baluran National Park Work Map. The black spots in the Baluran National Park are the settlement area.
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
153

4. buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) and the Leopard. Free-ranging livestock affect
most wild mammals by reducing their numbers and probability of oc-
cupancy (Pudyatmoko, 2017).
In addition to conservation and wildlife protection values, the area
represents economic resources in the form of fertile farm land, pasture,
fisheries, and tourism. The settlement along the coast at the northern
edge of the park was gradually built up by migrants from other parts of
Java and Madura from the mid-1970s (Wianti, 2014), while the Na-
tional Park was formally established in 1980. However, the area was a
protected Game Reserve since colonial times and gained the national
status as Wildlife Sanctuary in 1962. The Ministry of Home Affairs thus
made an illegitimate decision1
when issuing a licence in 1975 to a
company for commercial use of parts of the park, which initiated the
inflow of migrant workers. The licence expired in 2000, but the settlers
have not been willing to leave, and this leads to a lasting conflict with
the National Park authorities, who still claim that the settlements are
illegal. No formal ownership or land-use rights have ever been given to
the settlers. After the licence expired, the farmers have claimed private
rights to the parcels of land they cultivated under the control of the
enterprise, which comprise most of the land suitable for agriculture.
Later migrants are therefore landless. The settlers are currently living in
nine neighbourhoods, separated by natural barriers. Relocation claims
are upheld by the National Park authorities, the on-going conflict is
characterized by a deadlock, and people still don't know their status,
rights and obligations. Local authorities, from the village to the pro-
vince level, have taken the side of the park settlers to find a solution to
the conflict, so far unsuccessfully.
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry currently allocates ap-
proximately 8% of the park area to “special” and “traditional” zones,
comprising the existing settlements and their intensively utilized agri-
cultural land (Director General of Forest Protection and Nature
Conservation Decree 228, 2012). The new regulations are apparently
not made known to the settlers, however. Furthermore, the new zoning
regulation is still in sharp contradiction with the current practices in the
area, where a crucial element of local livelihoods is the pasture of
thousands of cows and goats in a huge part of the protected wilderness
zone.
In our survey, we found 303 households with 921 people living in
settlements within the national park borders. The area occupied by li-
vestock owned or herded by these people is 5600 ha, which is 22% of
the total terrestrial area of the park. Approximately 300 ha of land is
used for settlements and agriculture. The total number of cows is 2170,
of which 72% are owned by people living outside the park. The total
number of goats is 1156, and 51% of them are owned by people living
outside. The clear majority of cows, 84%, and most of the goats are free-
ranging, while the remaining are kept in captivity or grazing in the
neighbourhoods. In addition, people living outside the park also let
around 1700 cows use other parts of the Baluran territory as their
grazing land.
4. Methodology
4.1. Data collection
Our study area within the park is the ground occupied by the settler
neighbourhoods and the land used for pasture by the people living
there. Household livelihood strategies include crop farming, livestock
raising, fishing, and local service provision, mainly motorbike or boat
transport and assistance in agriculture and fishing. Our survey covers
all the 303 households in the nine neighbourhoods within the park.
Interviews with adults in all households were made in the period from
August 2015 to March 2016. Information given by respondents on land
size is checked with our own measurements using roller meter and GPS.
Income data are calculated by the researchers using local prices and are
based on the obtained information on types of crops and harvests and
numbers of sold animals, poultry, fishes and other commodities or
services. Much time was spent with each household to gain trust and
build an atmosphere of sociability. The openness also created the basis
for obtaining qualitative data through the interviews, like family origin,
economic progress, and perspectives on governance and sustainability.
We also collected qualitative data from in-depth interviews with a
sample of 50 key respondents, a representative selection including
households in all nine settlements. Finally, we held a focus group dis-
cussion with around 20 participants including all main stakeholders,
like various local citizen groups, government representatives, and na-
tional park rangers and managers. A systematic data triangulation is
also supported by participatory observation during more than six
months research in the study area.
4.2. Data analysis
We did a cluster analysis to identify characteristics of, and differ-
ences among, livelihood strategies of the surveyed households. The aim
is to classify a large sample of heterogeneous practices into a smaller
number of more homogenous sets of socio-economic conditions and
livelihood customs. In general, cluster analysis aims to construct a
grouping of objects with a maximum of homogeneity and separability,
and is applied in a wide range of disciplines like biology, psychology,
earth science, marketing, psychiatry, and natural resources manage-
ment (Everitt et al., 2011; McPherson and DeStefano, 2003). PAM is
one statistical method of cluster analysis.
In our findings, each cluster represents a specific livelihood strategy
distinguishable from the other groups. Before performing cluster ana-
lysis with R Statistical Software Environment, we made a matrix of data
consisting of household's identity and all corresponding variables.
Because variables are both on nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio
scales, we made data standardization by the Daisy Function before
computing (Struyf et al., 1996). Clustering tendency is evaluated using
the Hopkins Statistic. We use gap analysis to estimate the optimal
number of clusters by comparing the change in within-cluster disper-
sion with that expected under an appropriate reference nil distribution
(Tibshirani et al., 2001).
To select the appropriate clustering algorithm for our data, we
conduct internal validation and stability tests, and the next step is
performing rank aggregation to produce a top five optimal list of al-
gorithm clustering methods. To determine the optimal method and the
number of clusters, a range of clustering algorithms, including hier-
archical, k-means and Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) are selected
and validated by Package clValid in R program. For internal validation
test, three measures of connectedness, compactness and separation are
applied (Handl et al., 2005). The Dunn index (Dunn, 1974) and sil-
houette width are non-linear combinations of compactness and se-
paration (Rousseeuw, 1987). The connectedness is measured by con-
nectivity (Brock, 2008). The next step is the validation of cluster
stability (Handl et al., 2005). From the results of internal validity and
stability tests, we select the optimal method by using cross-entropy with
weighted Spearman's footrule (Pihur et al., 2009). The Hopkins test
value is 0.102, far below 0.5, which strongly indicates an inherent
grouping structure of the data set. Although an internal validation test
with two clusters performed best results, indicated by lowest con-
nectivity value (2.5230) and highest Dunn Index (0.2171) and Silhou-
ette Width (0.5436), we exclude the hierarchical alternative for the
clustering analysis because it is not suitable for a large number of en-
tities and would produce a complex and unreadable picture of den-
drogram. Then, we evaluated k-means and PAM both for internal va-
lidity and stability. In terms of connectivity, k-means with six clusters is
better than PAM with six clusters with the respective values of 41.19
and 64.91. However, in terms of the Dunn Index (0.196 vs 0.052) and
Silhouette Width (0.401 vs 0.337), the PAM is better. Further analysis1
Against Government Regulation 33, 1970, regarding Forest Planning.
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
154

5. of stability by measuring average distance (AD), PAM with six clusters
outperforms the other alternatives. Finally, we perform a rank ag-
gregation using the default cross-entropy method with weighted
Spearman's footrule.
The results of the overall test showed that the non-hierarchical PAM
method is most suitable for the data. The method is also more robust
than k-means clustering in handling outliers (Neri et al., 2017; Orsi,
2017). We use a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a Tukey
post-hoc test to describe the difference between cluster on the basis of
the mean value and variance of each variable. Comparing clusters using
ANOVA detects differences determined by mean values of some socio-
economic conditions and household asset attributes, which are highly
significant. These attributes include house size (F5,297 = 5.26,
P < 0.001), number of households members (F5,297 = 16.3,
P < 0.001), size of available agricultural land (F5,297 = 25.26,
P < 0.001), number of motorcycles (F5,297 = 11.1, P < 0.001), size of
intensive agricultural land (F5,297 = 55.3, P < 0.001), size of non-in-
tensive agricultural land (F5,297 = 7.28, P < 0.001), number of cattle
(F5,297 = 91.53, P < 0.001), number own cattle (F5,297 = 20.35,
P < 0.001), number of shared cattle (F5,297 = 64, P < 0.001), number
of captive cattle (F5,297 = 20.6, P < 0.001), and number of free-range
cattle (F5,297 = 105, P < 0.001). These are all valid variables de-
scribing the livelihood strategies of the households.
5. Findings
People living in Baluran National Park are generally characterized
by poverty and livelihood insecurity. Calculated daily income per ca-
pital is USD 1.87, which is under the global 2 USD poverty line, but the
double of the income level used to classify poor people by the
Indonesian government, which is a monthly per capita income of IDR
354,386 (BPS, 2015).2
There are, however, huge variations among the
alternative livelihood strategies, their sustainability, and financial re-
sults. Average monthly family income is six times higher in the
wealthiest cluster (3416,000 IDR) than in the poorest, as can be seen in
Table 1. Most family heads have only basic education, with an average
of six years. One fourth of households don't have access to agricultural
land. Our remaining presentation of findings is divided into three sec-
tions: livelihoods, resources, and socio-political organization.
5.1. Livelihoods
The 96 households in Cluster 1 have the highest average income and
the biggest disposable agricultural land. Land cultivation is intensive,
and more than half of land is under irrigation. All households have a
well with reliable and sufficient water supply. The numbers of cows and
goats per household are at a reasonable level, and they have the lowest
shares of animals owned by people outside the park and also the lowest
shares of free-ranging cattle. Most cows are kept and fed in captivity.
There is a small average number of scavenger chickens per household
(3), while the motorcycle density is the highest among the clusters (1.4
per family). Motorcycles give additional transportation income for
several families.
In Cluster 2, the 50 households have similar sizes of land at disposal
as those in cluster 1, and monthly income is also at the same level. They
also have wells located on the land they use, which give the basis for a
share of irrigated land equal to in Cluster 1. The main difference be-
tween the two is in the keeping of cattle. The average number of cows
per household is much higher (19.4 vs 2.2), and almost all of them are
free-ranging. Remarkably, as much as 71% of the cows are owned by
people not living in the park. Similarly, for goats, Cluster 2 households
have a bigger number per household, a larger share that is free-ranging,
and a higher percentage of animals owned by non-residents. Cluster 2
households have more chickens, but an average of six per household is
still a low number.
The 41 families in Cluster 3 have a significantly lower average in-
come, around half of those in Clusters 1 and 2. Agricultural land at
disposal is also less than half, but most households have a well on their
land, and more than half of the land at disposal is irrigated. The
numbers of cattle are limited, 2.4 cows and 3.7 goats per family, but
77% of cows are owned by non-residents, and free-ranging is widely
practiced.
In Clusters 4 and 5, we find higher numbers of cattle, large shares of
free-ranging animals, and high percentages owned by non-residents.
Income is < 30% compared with households in the two wealthiest
clusters. When we compare Clusters 3 and 4, we see that land at dis-
posal is similar but that land-use efficiency in Cluster 4 is much lower
since only four of the 42 households have a well on their land. The
lower intensity of agriculture in Cluster 4 cannot be economically
compensated by a higher number of cattle. As seen from Table 1, most
of the cattle are free-ranging and owned by non-locals. The 29 house-
holds in Cluster 5 can compensate economically for the lack of agri-
cultural land by keeping a much higher number of cattle compared with
Cluster 4. People in Cluster 5 are mostly non-farming pastoralists,
herding 16.4 free-ranging cows per household, but only owning 18% of
them themselves.
The 45 households in Cluster 6 are clearly the poorest of all settlers
in Baluran, falling far below the Indonesian poverty line. They don't
have access to agricultural land, have few cattle, and mostly earn a
living from selling services as farm or pastoralist workers, earning
around 40,000 IDR per day but depending on seasons. Some also make
an income from collecting non-wood forest products.
There is no clear correlation between clusters and settlement sites.
The various livelihood strategies of households can be found in most of
the nine neighbourhoods.
5.2. Resources
The available agricultural land is limited, with an average of size of
cultivated land at 0.6 ha per household. This makes up around two
thirds of the 300-ha land area occupied by the settlers, which is less
than the 360 ha for which concession for commercial use was given in
1975. As we can see from the livelihood strategies that are practiced in
the park, the access to water from wells makes a significant difference
on welfare and sustainability. By allowing more wells, agricultural
productivity can be substantially increased, and cow feed can be grown
for keeping cattle in captivity and avoiding the destructive free-ranging
practice. Basic calculations of rainfall in the area indicate that the
groundwater level will not be influenced by allowing more wells and
irrigation of the available agricultural land. Existing wells, which are all
illegally made, are 5–10 m deep and contain sufficient water for dry-
season irrigation of parts of the respective plots. Typically, farmers
grow chili in the dry season, and additionally maize, green beans, and
sesame. Harvests and local prices fluctuate, as everywhere, but a typical
mix of growing chili in the dry and maize in the wet season on 1 ha of
land, normally will generate an income above 30 million IDR, in ad-
dition to grass for animal feed for 1–2 cows. With more irrigation and
increased agricultural intensity, monetary earnings and grass produc-
tion can be higher.
The land used for free-ranging pasture in the park is around
5300 ha, and this area represents the major problem in the conflict of
interests between biodiversity and wildlife conservation and local li-
velihoods, because the pasture clearly limits the space for endangered
and threatened mammal species. Nearly 4000 cows and a high number
of goats take a great toll on the carrying capacity of the savannah
ecosystem. People keep moving with their grazing animals during
daytime and return them to a stock post each night. The fact that most
of the cattle are owned by people not living in the park makes the land
an open access resource more than a common pool resource. Settlers in2
http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/148.
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
155

6. the park are given cattle from outsiders and do the herding under a
gaduh system, where the only benefit for the herders are the calves or
kids born while on pasture, which may represent a value for the local
herders of < 750,000 IDR (55 USD) per cow per year. The outside
owners take the full price when the cow is sold for slaughtering, which
can be 8–9 million IDR (750 USD) after 6–7 years of herding. For
comparison, well-fed cows kept in stall or captivity sell at double price,
typically around 18 million IDR. We estimate that a majority of the free-
ranging cattle is owned by only a few local elite people living outside
but not far from the national park.
Remarkably, poultry is not used as a source of income in the area.
An average of only one scavenger chicken per capita indicates that the
population are not utilizing the potentials. Also, very few settlers
combine agriculture or animal husbandry with fisheries. The total
number of boats among the 303 households is only 16, while fishery
resources in nearby waters are abundant.
Furthermore, tourism potentials are underutilized, even though the
number of visitors in the national park has nearly tripled over the last
five years and is now close to 100,000 per year. More than 95% are
domestic tourists, however, paying a very low entrance fee and only
quickly passing through the park, without any positive economic im-
pacts. Only a few visitors make use of the simple park lodging. We
calculate the national park earnings per year to be at the lower edge of
2 billion IDR (150,000 USD), and the local population may only have
some minimal earnings from motorcycle taxis or offering simple ac-
commodation. The easy access from Bali, only a few hours' drive from
the core tourist destinations, and the proximity to large Javanese urban
populations, make the park an obvious potential for improved eco-
nomic utilization of resources.
5.3. Socio-political organization
Physical infrastructure in the settlement areas is poorly developed.
There are no permanent roads, and electricity and sewage systems are
missing. There is one primary school (SDN, class 1–6), which is not
reachable for kids from most of the nine scattered settlements on a daily
basis, and they normally live with relatives in the Merak area, if they go
to school at all (Fig. 2). For the continuation to junior high school (SMP,
class 7–9), which is also compulsory in Indonesia, kids must live away
from home, and they mostly stay in Muslim boarding schools, pesantren,
somewhere in East Java.
The people living in the settlements call themselves ngampung,
which means people not living on their own land but on the state's,
clearly indicating their awareness of the lack of formal rights to land.
The current distribution of land user rights among the population is
based on the inheritance of households' land cultivation from the time
of the commercial company's plantation concession. People who came
first and started cultivating land, still hold the informal rights in the
community to use that land and succeed it to descendants, without any
conflicts so far. There are also examples of land that has been sold to
newcomers from the well-established households.
Since settlers still live illegally in the park, they cannot be given
citizens status (KTP) based on their place of living, but are instead
registered as inhabitants of Desa Sumberwaru, the nearest village out-
side the park, in Kecamatan Banyuputih in the district of Situbondo,
East Java province. In spite of their illegal status, park settlers have
been included in government poverty reduction programs, like cash and
rice distribution (BLT and Raskin) (Wianti, 2014).
There are no reports on direct conflicts between the settlers and
park authorities caused by logging, poaching or hunting, and the in-
habitants are unison in stating their willingness to obey rules of the
national park and cooperate with park officers in securing the wildlife.
Furthermore, inhabitants are determined to restrain from killing wild
animals, like the leopards, even though they devour their livestock or
raid their crops. Through the in-depth interviews, we found that all
respondents are ready to cooperate with the park managers in terms of
poacher control and the securing of wildlife in a broad sense. Still, they
are unison in rejecting the option of removal from the land without
some form of compensation.
A series of negotiations between the central government, local
government, and the people living in the park have been unsuccessful,
and no acceptable solution has so far been found. To reduce the esca-
lating conflict, the East Java Governor created a special taskforce in
2013 with the main mission to search for a best solution regarding the
settlement, including a possible economic compensation for the loss of
land by a relocation of people. However, the option of relocating people
from the national park to outside areas has been strongly rejected by
the local inhabitants. Therefore, the settlers united and sent a letter to
the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR) in 2014
for getting support to secure their rights to living in the park. In 2014,
the local people even mobilized and sent a group of delegates to Jakarta
for meetings with the DPR and the Ministry of Forestry, still without
any solution. In their efforts to maintain their rights to live within the
park area, the settlers have been supported by local government agents,
from the village level (Desa) through the Camat of Banyuputih, the
Bupati of Situbondo, and even the governor of East Java.
6. Discussion
In this section, we systematically utilize survey data and findings
from in-depth interviews, focus group discussion and participatory
observation to deal with the four main issues of this research as pre-
sented in the Introduction, namely potential sustainable livelihood
strategies for park residents, preconditions for successful common pool
resource management, socio-political organization of the local society,
and conflicting overall goals of park management.
6.1. Alternative livelihood strategies and the carrying capacity
There is currently a severe conflict of interests within the park area
between the continued livelihood practices of illegal dwellers and the
conservation of wildlife, especially of the endangered and vulnerable
big mammal species. The dry savannah landscape doesn't have the
carrying capacity for combining the extensive free-ranging pasture of
cows and goats with upholding an acceptable population of threatened,
wild mammals.
Table 1
Socio-economic data.
Cluster #
(number of
house-holds)
Cows per
house-
hold
% of cows
free ranging
% of cows
owned by
non-locals
Goats per
house-
hold
% of goats
free ranging
% of goats
owned by
non-locals
Cultivated land
per household
(ha)
% with a
well on
their land
Non-farmers
(% of house-
holds)
Average family
income (000 rp
per month)
1 (96) 2.2 1 43 3.0 39 41 1.25 100 0 3416
2 (50) 19.4 100 71 3.4 81 53 1.20 100 0 3385
3 (41) 2.4 44 77 3.7 49 47 0.56 98 0 1787
4 (42) 9.2 88 80 4.6 72 59 0.61 9 0 978
5 (29) 16.4 100 82 7.4 86 58 0.09 0 90 959
6 (45) 0.6 0 68 3.0 60 57 0.03 0 98 551
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
156

7. There are, however, significant differences among livelihood stra-
tegies of the illegal settlers in the nine neighbourhoods. The access to
water for irrigation, cash crop farming and the growing of animal feed,
makes a huge difference in possibilities to create livelihood security and
sustain an acceptable living standard. Much can be learned from the
practices of the 96 households in Cluster 1, especially about the agri-
cultural efficiency and the way of feeding only a few cows per family in
captivity. The environmental threats of the practices of the 50 house-
holds in Cluster 2, with about the same size of agricultural land at
disposal, are very much bigger. They keep > 19 cows per household, all
of them free-ranging and mostly owned by outsiders. Despite the huge
difference in numbers of animals per household, income is still higher
in Cluster 1, where the few cows and goats are mostly owned by the
families themselves and can be sold at a high slaughtering value. Even
the current livelihood practices of the 41 households in Cluster 3, with
only around 0.5 ha of agricultural land at disposal but half of it being
irrigated, can support an income that is not under the Indonesian
poverty line. With only 1–2 cows per family, owned by them and fed in
captivity, income would be enough to keep above the poverty line, and
there would be no conflict with conservation interests. For the 42 poor
households in Cluster 4, gaining access to water by permits to dig wells
could make a substantial improvement in family income and environ-
mental sustainability. For the remaining 74 poor and landless house-
holds in Clusters 5 and 6, alternative livelihood strategies could be
sought in fisheries, tourism and transport services, especially if people
were given the necessary security for developing suitable competence
and investing in profitable assets.
6.2. Preconditions for successful common pool resource management
Generally, the preconditions normally set for successful local gov-
ernance of common pool resources, as discussed in Section 2, are
currently not met in the Baluran neighbourhoods. Since the settlements
are illegal, no clear boundaries can be set for the land at disposal for the
community. Also, there is no accepted definition of membership and
user rights, meaning that outsiders can claim the same rights to use the
pasture resources as those living within the park. It is also difficult to
agree on internal rules for the allocation of resources, which would be
in congruence with local conditions. All park inhabitants are migrants,
with no common understanding of local ecology or spiritual values.
Resources in the form of agricultural land are also very unevenly dis-
tributed among the illegal dwellers. The variety of backgrounds and
geographical spread of settlements also contribute to the lack of col-
lective choice arrangements, institutions for discussing and modifying
user rules, and agreed mechanisms for monitoring, sanctions, and
conflict resolution. Dwellers in the nine neighbourhoods may organize
informally, but they cannot establish formal government units, like a
village (desa) or hamlets (dusun). They are not allowed to take decisions
on digging wells or raising permanent houses, for instance. We see how
the conditions in these societies are in contradiction with the eight
points of Ostrom's requirements to a well-functioning CPRM.
6.3. Socio-political organization and risks of local elite capture
The biggest threat to a sustainable coexistence of wild mammals and
people in Baluran National Park is the extensive use of pasture re-
sources within the park by citizens living outside the park. As we have
seen, nearly three fourths of the cows held and raised by the dwellers in
the park are owned by outsiders, most of them by only a few people
with economic resources and political connections. These people are
also the owners of a similar number of cows, around 1700, grazing on
the savannah outside the area used by the illegal dwellers. Nearly 3300
cows, pasturing in the park and owned by outsiders, are a huge en-
vironmental hazard but also represent a substantial economic resource
Fig. 2. The location of elementary school in Merak and two alternative routes for the settlers to go outside park during the dry season as well as the only one route during the wet season.
S. Pudyatmoko et al. Forest Policy and Economics 90 (2018) 151–159
157

8. for local elites. We can clearly see an informal alliance between the
illegal dwellers in the park, gaining political support from neighbouring
villages and political units, and the local district elite, using the sub-
sistence of park tenants as a shield against government intervention for
environmental protection.
Our environmental and socio-economic analyses clearly indicate
that the established neighbourhoods in the park could continue to exist
without any significant disturbance of the unique wildlife if given the
opportunity to be formally established, with the rights to organize and
make decisions regarding livelihood alternatives, investments, and
improved agricultural efficiency. Much can be learned from best-prac-
tices within the neighbourhoods, and the households in Cluster 1 stand
out as good examples. Many potential resources in the area are clearly
under-utilized, like tourism and fisheries, and only by a formal permit
to stay, organize and invest can new opportunities be exploited. A new
policy that firmly implements the restrictions against free-ranging
cattle by government agencies would likely break the informal alliance
between local political elites and the park dwellers and would require a
new co-operation and formal agreements between inhabitants and park
authorities, necessarily backed and checked by the central Ministry of
Environment and Forestry in a multilevel or polycentric management
model.
6.4. Goal and strategy dimensions
We can observe two dimensions of alternative interests and ways of
organizing the use of park resources: one is between conserving and
consuming; the other is between commanding and co-managing. We
have seen that communities within the park have united with local and
regional political and economic interests in livelihood strategies that
clearly conflict with conservation interests. We have also observed how
a park management based on command and control mechanisms have
failed in implementing necessary measures to protect endangered
wildlife. Alternatively, a balance can most likely be found between
conserving and consuming interests, if more responsibility is given to
local dwellers for practising the best possible livelihood strategies and
making optimal use of available resources. That would require a change
of park governance towards co-management together with responsible
inhabitants in a process of negotiations and joint learning.
7. Conclusion and policy recommendations
Our study has shown that the current use of resources by humans
and their cattle in Baluran National Park is clearly in conflict with
conservation interests and truly threatening the survival of vulnerable
big mammal species. Our cluster analysis reveals, however, that the
around 300 households living within the park borders practice very
different livelihood strategies, and that much can be learnt from best-
practices among the dwellers. Our main conclusion is that local people
and wild mammals can sustainably coexist within the park, if the best
alternative livelihood strategies are followed.
Expelling the approximately 1000 people living in the park is not a
viable solution. Most families have been living there for > 40 years and
have lost livelihood opportunities and social relations elsewhere. The
long-lasting conflict between park authorities and settlers is the result
of a legal immigration of people working for a commercial company
with a government-granted concession to utilize 360 ha of agricultural
land along the north coast of the national park. Rather than treating the
dwellers as enemies of the park, they should be used as caretakers and
given the opportunity to make sustainable use of available resources,
including water for irrigation, fisheries and tourism.
By implementing a co-management strategy by the park authorities
and utilizing the existing zoning plan, the foundation could be laid for a
harmonious coexistence of humans and mammals and a fruitful balance
of conservation and consumption interests. As much as 8% of the park
area has already been earmarked as “special and traditional zones”,
designated for settlements and natural resource harvesting by com-
munity groups. This allocated land (2000 ha) is quite generous com-
pared to the commercial licence area, but much smaller than the land
utilized by the local population and their cattle today (5600 ha). A re-
duced number of free-ranging cattle would lessen the need for grazing
land, and our cluster analysis clearly shows that alternative livelihood
strategies could be used by the dwellers for a more efficient and less
damaging use of resources.
Supported by CPRM and co-management theory, our findings
clearly point towards the needs to recognize, learn from, and be willing
to negotiate with responsible park dwellers in a transparent manner.
Simply giving the dwellers the right to organize and have a say would
open for a creative process of knowledge sharing and also reduce the
space for local elite capture and maneuver. This lesson could be useful
for natural reserve management in other areas where the coexistence of
people and animals is an issue, especially in contexts characterized by
weak formal institutions and limited accountability in public govern-
ance.
Acknowledgement
This research is a part of the institutional collaboration between
Gadjah Mada University and the University of Agder, Norway (Grant
Number: 013/Senior Researcher/ISB/UGM-UiA/IV/2015). The authors
wish to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financially
supporting this study through its embassy in Jakarta.
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