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Final Dm0512


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Final Dm0512

  1. 1. Decision Making Presentation<br />2010<br />Here you can enter<br />your own personal message. Just select all of this existing text and start typing your own message.<br />
  2. 2. Threat-Rigidity Effects in<br />Organizational Behavior<br />A Multilevel Analysis<br />Luke Chiu<br />
  3. 3. Frame of Article<br />
  4. 4. 2010/5/12<br />4<br />Intensification of Threat (Radical Change)<br /> ***↑Maladaptive Cycles↑<br />Environmental Change<br />Information Restriction <br />Threats<br />(Lost / Cost)<br />Rigidity in Response <br />(well-learned /<br /> dominant response)<br />Constriction in Control <br />↓Functional Adaption↓<br />Reducing of Threat (Incremental Change)<br />***Conclusion mentioned that when adversity results from radical change, organizational control and press efficiency may be dysfunction due to [Resource Scarcity]. (page 519)<br />
  5. 5. Single-Level & Multilevel Analysis<br /> Pressure<br />Uniformity<br />
  6. 6. INDIVIDUAL<br />GROUP<br />(3)<br />(1)<br />(2)<br />ORGANIZATION<br />
  7. 7. 2010/5/12<br />7<br />Individual Level Effects<br />(1). Three Manipulated Variables-- SAA<br />(2). Two Key-point for research on SAA <br />(3). Three Aspects for Summary Model<br />
  8. 8. 2010/5/12<br />8<br />Stress, Anxiety, Physiological Arousal<br />Psychological Stress is manipulated by experimental context to test “Performance-Failure” feedback.<br />3 Variables-<br />❶Perception Arena: Visual vs. Stimuli.<br />❷Problem Solving & Learning<br />❸Motor Performance : Stress vs. Training<br />☑support “Hull-Spence Theory of Motivation”.<br />☑Dominant response are irrelevant.<br />STRESS<br />
  9. 9. 2010/5/12<br />9<br />Trained<br />TS<br />STRESS<br />≽<br />NON-STRESS<br />≽<br />uTS<br />uTnS<br />Motor Performance<br />Untrained<br />
  10. 10. 2010/5/12<br />10<br />Stress, Anxiety, Physiological Arousal<br />2 Sub stream Studies-<br />❶Correlation [Anxiety] vs. [Performance Indicator]<br />Anxiety↑; Visual Stimulation ↓<br />❷ [ Experimental Manipulations ] <br />≋[ Stress Study]<br />ANXIETY<br />
  11. 11. 2010/5/12<br />11<br />Stress, Anxiety, Physiological Arousal<br />❶Effect of Arousal on Perception<br />❷ Learning<br />❸Motor Performance<br />[ Psychological ] [ Physical]<br />Complementary<br />Stress & Anxiety<br />AROUSAL<br />AROUSAL<br />
  12. 12. Model of Individual Threat-Response <br />STRESS <br />ANXIETY<br />AROUSAL<br />Natural Cognitive Indicates SAA<br />Threat Situation<br />Link<br /> Properties of Individual Behaviors<br />[Psychological] STRESS & ANXIETY<br />[Physical]<br />
  13. 13. GROUP Level Effects<br />
  14. 14. Outside Threats <br />Intergroup<br />Ties ⤵<br />Inside Threats<br />Sociometric Choices<br />Sociometric Choices<br />Intergroup Hostility<br />Group1<br />Group 2<br />Manipulated<br /> Intragroup Bases<br />Intragroup<br />Relations ⤴<br />Outside Threats <br />
  15. 15. Receive Failure Information (Cont’ next in ORG )<br />Failure➞ Leader’s Influence ⤵⤵⤵<br /> Leadership Replacement <br />Decentralized Power <br />Centralized Authority <br />Collective Achievements<br />External Threats Preexisting <br />
  16. 16. Collective Goals<br />Individuals<br />Pressure on opinions / Belief<br />Individuals perceive uniformity as necessary to reach collective goals<br />Group Syndrome:<br />Pressure toward uniformity,<br /> self-censorship of deviant beliefs by other members (individuals)<br />Dependent on Group ⤴⤴<br />
  17. 17. Outside Threats <br />Internal Attribution<br />Information Restriction & Control<br />Cohesiveness⤴<br />Leadership ⤴<br />➵Uniformity<br />Likelihood of Success⤴<br />External Attribution<br />Outside Threats <br />
  18. 18. 2010/5/12<br />18<br />Organizational Level Effects <br />1. The Effects of Threat on Information Process.<br />2. The Effects of Threat in Control (Mechanistic Shift) <br />
  19. 19. 2010/5/12<br />19<br />Information Process<br />Detect Threats information<br />Found Reality-Threat<br />Received Failure information <br /> Decision Made<br />Coz Overload Communication Channels <br />INF Search Decreased<br />INF Search<br />Reintensify <br />ONLY to confirmdecision Outcomes<br />Subordinates solicited Advices <br />
  20. 20. 2010/5/12<br />20<br />Mechanistic Shift <br />1. Organizational Hierarchy<br />2. Formation; Standardized; Centralized<br />Exception:<br />Natural Disasters<br />
  21. 21. 2010/5/12<br />21<br />Model of Organization Response Threats<br />
  22. 22. 2010/5/12<br />22<br />LEVEL<br />ANALYSIS<br />ORGANIZATION<br />(Mechanistic Shift)<br />1.Restricting INF<br />2. Move control to higher level <br />GROUP<br />Expectation of successfully <br />Resisting Threats <br />INDIVIDUAL<br />Information Processing<br />Behavior Response<br />Multilevel TRE Theory <br />
  23. 23. 2010/5/12<br />23<br />Individual-Level Effect in Group Settings<br /> Individual<br />Organization<br />Group<br />May be explained by [ Cognitive Changes] in the individuals who compose the group.<br />
  24. 24. 2010/5/12<br />24<br /> Individuals<br />ORG<br />Group<br />Group Effects in Org <br />Any rigidity generated by [ Groupthink] process under threats may be manifested or regarded as [Organizational Actions].<br />
  25. 25. 2010/5/12<br />25<br /> Individual<br /> ORG<br />Individual Effects in ORG <br />Decision originates with administrator acting alone, so regarded as “Individual”<br />Organizational challenges usually cover [ interests of individual actors].<br />Individual may exacerbate the power differential between subunits and administrators.<br />
  26. 26. Individual in Organizations<br />Center<br />TOP-Level<br />Administrators<br />*Individuals in organization may be central or peripheral interests. <br />Middle-Level<br />Administrator<br />*Middle-level administrators express loyalty to subunits or groups.<br />Peripheral<br />
  27. 27. Conclusion<br />Extinction-Survival 2-Edged Mechanism Amplified.<br />
  28. 28. Supplementary Case <br />The Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajokull is a vivid and latest evidence to challenge the conclusion of TRT. The initial position of Europe’s regulators was that the safe level of volcanic ash was zero, thus grounding all flights in the broad swathes of sky which computer models said could be tainted. The fact that this regulatory stance changed in the face of an affluent cadre of displaced people, airlines feeling pinch, a looming threat to some supply chains and an election (constituency in Britain), makes it all the more suspicious.<br />
  29. 29. TRT in Organization Behavior<br />In the field of organization behavior, there are two conflict theories in explaining the risk-taking-driven behaviors. Threat-rigidity theory asserts that organizations will behave conservatively under threat conditions; meanwhile, “Prospect theory”argues that organizations will behave in a risk-taking manner when they is below a specific self-perceived reference point.<br />
  30. 30. Thank you!<br />