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JOHN COTTINGHAMWESTERNPH ILOSOPHYAN ANTHOLOGYM Bla
1. JOHN COTTINGHAM
WESTERN
PH ILOSOPHY
AN ANTHOLOGY
M Blackwell
Publishing
Western Philosophy
BLACKWELL PHILOSOPHY ANTHOLOGIES
Each volume in this outstanding series provides an authoritative
and comprehensive collection of
the essential primary readings from philosophy’s main fields of
study. Designed to complement the
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, each volume
represents an unparalleled resource in its
2. own right, and will provide the ideal platform for course use.
1 Cottingham: Western Philosophy: An Anthology (second
edition)
2 Cahoone: From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology
(expanded second edition)
3 LaFollette: Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (third edition)
4 Goodin and Pettit: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An
Anthology (second edition)
5 Eze: African Philosophy: An Anthology
6 McNeill and Feldman: Continental Philosophy: An Anthology
7 Kim and Sosa: Metaphysics: An Anthology
8 Lycan and Prinz: Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (third
edition)
9 Kuhse and Singer: Bioethics: An Anthology (second edition)
10 Cummins and Cummins: Minds, Brains, and Computers - The
Foundations ofCognitive Science:
An Anthology
11 Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath: Epistemology: An
Anthology (second edition)
12 Kearney and Rasmussen: Continental Aesthetics -
Romanticism to Postmodernism: An Anthology
13 Martinich and Sosa: Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology
3. 14 facquette: Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology
15 Jacquette: Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology
16 Harris, Pratt, and Waters: American Philosophies: An
Anthology
17 Emmanuel and Goold: Modern Philosophy - From Descartes
to Nietzsche: An Anthology
18 Scharff and Dusek: Philosophy of Technology - The
Technological Condition: An Anthology
19 Light and Rolston: Environmental Ethics: An Anthology
20 Taliaferro and Griffiths: Philosophy of Religion: An
Anthology
2 1 Lamarque and Olsen: Aesthetics and the Philosophy ofArt -
The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology
22 John and Lopes: Philosophy of Literature - Contemporary
and Classic Readings: An Anthology
23 Cudd and Andreasen: Feminist Theory: A Philosophical
Anthology
24 Carroll and Choi: Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures:
An Anthology
25 Lange: Philosophy of Science: An Anthology
26 Shafer-Landau and Cuneo: Foundations of Ethics: An
Anthology
27 Curren: Philosophy of Education: An Anthology
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6. First edition published 1996 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Second edition published 2008 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
1 2008
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Western philosophy : an anthology / edited by John Cottingham.
- 2nd ed.
p. cm. - (Blackwell philosophy anthologies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4051-2477-5 (hardcover : alk. paper) - ISBN 978-
1-4051-2478-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Philosophy-Introductions. I. Cottingham, John, 1943-
BD21.W43 2008
190-dc22
2007025829
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John Cottingham’s
Western Philosophy: An Anthology
Praise for the first edition
‘It is difficult to imagine how this volume could be improved
upon as the very best historically based
anthology of the essential philosophical writings. Cottingham’s
commentary and introductions are
extremely clear and helpful. It will provide an ideal text for an
excellent introductory course in
8. philosophy’. Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield
‘This volume is a superb resource for beginning students and
their teachers. Not only is it an
excellent anthology - a comprehensive, well-chosen, well-edited
collection of classic texts, from
Plato to Sartre, Aristotle to Rawls - it is also a perspicuous
systematic presentation of the subject,
owing to the editor’s skilful provision of introductory material
and notes. Judiciously annotated lists
of supplementary readings further enhance the value of this
outstanding volume.’ Vere Chappell,
University of Massachusetts
‘In this anthology the highly respected philosopher John
Cottingham has assembled 100 classic
selections from Plato to Parfit. Done with care and considerable
expertise the result is arguably the
best single-volume introduction to the writings of Western
philosophy.’ John Haldane, University
of St Andrews
‘A truly outstanding collection. An excellent course book which
doubles as a solid reference volume.
The clarity of the commentary makes these classic readings
vivid and accessible to students.’
9. George Graham, University of Alabama
‘By providing the means to appreciate philosophy as the great
historical odyssey of the human
intellect, this ambitious anthology makes philosophy come alive
for students and general readers
alike.’ David Cooper, University of Durham
For JCC and family,
and In Memoriam VXG
Contents
Preface xvii
Acknowledgements xxii
Advice to Readers and Format of the Volume xxx
Part I Knowledge and Certainty 1
1 Innate Knowledge
Plato, Meno 3
2 Knowledge versus Opinion
Plato, Republic 12
3 Demonstrative Knowledge and its Starting-points
10. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 18
4 New Foundations for Knowledge
Rene Descartes, Meditations 21
5 The Senses as the Basis of Knowledge
John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 25
6 Innate Knowledge Defended
Gottfried Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding 3
1
7 Scepticism versus Human Nature
David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 35
8 Experience and Understanding
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 40
9 From Sense-certainty to Self-consciousness
Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 43
10
Against Scepticism
G. E. Moore, A Defence of Common Sense 48
Vlll CONTENTS
11. 1 1 Does Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?
Wilfrid Sellars, The Myth of the Given 54
12 The Conditions for Knowledge
Edmund Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? 60
Specimen Questions
63
Suggestions for Further Reading
64
Part II Being and Reality 67
1 The Allegory of the Cave
Plato, Republic
gg
2 Individual Substance
Aristotle, Categories
7g
3 Supreme Being and Created Things
Rene Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 80
4 Qualities and Ideas
John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 86
5 Substance, Life and Activity
Gottfried Leibniz, New System 9j
6 Nothing Outside the Mind
12. George Berkeley, Principles ofHuman Knowledge 97
7 The Limits of Metaphysical Speculation
David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 102
8 Metaphysics, Old and New
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena 108
9 Being and Involvement
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
1 15
10 The End of Metaphysics?
Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination ofMetaphysics 121
1 1 The Problem of Ontology
W. V. O. Quine, On What There Is 127
12 Why is There Anything?
Derek Parfit, The Puzzle ofReality 132
Specimen Questions
1 37
Suggestions for Further Reading
1 38
Part III Language and Meaning 141
1 The Meanings of Words
Plato, Cratylus
1 43
13. CONTENTS IX
2 Language and its Acquisition
Augustine, Confessions 150
3 Thought, Language and its Components
William of Ockham, Writings on Logic 152
4 Language, Reason and Animal Utterance
Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method 155
5 Abstract General Ideas
John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 157
6 Particular Ideas and General Meaning
George Berkeley, Principles ofHuman Knowledge 161
7 Denotation versus Connotation
John Stuart Mill, A System ofLogic 165
8 Names and their Meaning
Gottlob Frege, Sense and Reference 170
9 Definite and Indefinite Descriptions
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy 174
10 Non-descriptive Uses of Language
14. J. L. Austin, Performative Utterances 180
11 Language, Meaning and Context
Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation 185
12 How the Reference of Terms is Fixed
Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity 191
Specimen Questions 197
Suggestions for Further Reading 197
Part IV Mind and Body 201
1 The Immortal Soul
Plato, Phaedo 203
2 Soul and Body, Form and Matter
Aristotle, De Anima 210
3 The Human Soul
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 214
4 The Incorporeal Mind
Rene Descartes, Meditations 221
5 The Identity of Mind and Body
Benedict Spinoza, Ethics 227
6 Mind-Body Correlations
Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics 230
15. X CONTENTS
7 Body and Mind as Manifestations of Will
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea 236
8 The Problem of Other Minds ^
John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s
Philosophy 240
9 The Hallmarks of Mental Phenomena
Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 244
10 The Myth of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept ofMind 251
1 1 Mental States as Functional States
Hilary Putnam, Psychological Predicates 256
12 The Subjective Dimension of Consciousness
Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat? 263
Specimen Questions 268
Suggestions for Further Reading 269
Part V The Self and Freedom 273
(a) The Self 275
1 The Self and Consciousness
16. John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 275
2 The Self as Primitive Concept
Joseph Butler, Of Personal Identity 280
3 The Self as Bundle
David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature 285
4 The Partly Hidden Self
Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 290
5 Liberation from the Self
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 296
Selfhood and Narrative Understanding
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self 302
(b) Freedom 307
7 Human Freedom and Divine Providence
Augustine, The City of God 307
8 Freedom to Do What We Want
Thomas Hobbes, Liberty, Necessity and Chance 312
9 Absolute Determinism
Pierre Simon de Laplace, Philosophical Essay on Probability
318
10
17. Condemned to be Free
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 320
11
CONTENTS XI
Determinism and our Attitudes to Others
Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment 326
12 Freedom, Responsibility and the Ability to do Otherwise
Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility 332
Specimen Questions 339
Suggestions for Further Reading 340
Part
J 1
2
3
v/ 4
5
18. 6
7
8
9
10
11
12
VI God and Religion
The Existence of God
Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion
The Five Proofs of God
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
God and the Idea of Perfection
Rene Descartes, Meditations
The Wager
Blaise Pascal, Pensees
The Problem of Evil
Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy
The Argument from Design
David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
19. Against Miracles
David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
Faith and Subjectivity
Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Reason, Passion and the Religious Hypothesis
William James, The Will to Believe
The Meaning of Religious Language
John Wisdom, Gods
God’s Commands as the Foundation for Morality
Robert M. Adams, Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief
Against Evidentialism
Alvin Plantinga, Is Belief in God Properly Basic?
Specimen Questions
Suggestions for Further Reading
343
345
348
351
20. 356
359
365
370
376
382
387
394
399
406
407
Part VII Science and Method 411
1 Four Types of Explanation
Aristotle, Physics 413
xii CONTENTS
2 Experimental Methods and True Causes
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum 415
3 Mathematical Science and the Control of Nature
21. Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method 422
4 The Limits of Scientific Explanation
George Berkeley, On Motion 427
5 The Problem of Induction
David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 433
6 The Relation between Cause and Effect
David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 438
7 Causality and our Experience of Events
Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason 443
8 The Uniformity of Nature
John Stuart Mill, System of Logic 447
9 Science and Falsifiability
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations 453
10 How Explaining Works
Carl G. Hempel, Explanation in Science and History 460
1 1 Scientific Realism versus Instrumentalism
Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities
469
12 Change and Crisis in Science
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 475
Specimen Questions
481
22. Suggestions for Further Reading 432
Part VIII Morality and the Good Life 485
1 Morality and Happiness
Plato, Republic 437
2 Ethical Virtue
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 492
3 Virtue, Reason and the Passions
Benedict Spinoza, Ethics 495
4 Human Feeling as the Source of Ethics
David Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles ofMorals 500
5 Duty and Reason as the Ultimate Principle
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals 506
6 Happiness as the Foundation of Morality
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 512
CONTENTS Xiii
7 Utility and Common-sense Morality
Henry Sidgwick, Methods ofEthics 517
8 Against Conventional Morality
23. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 524
9 Duty and Intuition
W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good 529
10 Rational Choice and Fairness
John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 534
1 1 Ethics as Rooted in History and Culture
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 540
12 Could Ethics be Objective?
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 546
Specimen Questions 55
1
Suggestions for Further Reading 552
Part IX Problems in Ethics 555
1 Inequality, Freedom and Slavery
Aristotle, Politics 557
2 War and Justice
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 561
3 Taking One’s Own Life
David Hume, On Suicide 563
24. 4 Gender, Liberty and Equality
Mary Wollstonecraff, A Vindication of the Rights of Women
569
5 Partiality and Favouritism
William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice 574
6 The Status of Non-human Animals
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics 576
7 The Purpose of Punishment
Jeremy Bentham, Principles ofMorals and Legislation 579
8 Our Relationship to the Environment
Aldo Leopold, The Land Ethic 585
9 Abortion and Rights
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion 590
10 The Relief of Global Suffering
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality 596
1 1 Medical Ethics and the Termination of Life
James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia 602
XIV CONTENTS
12 Cloning, Sexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering
25. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom ofRepugnance 608
Specimen Questions 616
Suggestions for Further Reading 617
Part X Authority and the State 621
1 Our Obligation to Respect the Laws of the State
Plato, Crito 623
2 The Just Ruler
Thomas Aquinas, On Princely Government 627
3 Sovereignty and Security
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 631
4 Consent and Political Obligation
John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government 636
5 Against Contractarianism
David Hume, Of the Original Contract 642
6 Society and the Individual
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 647
7 The Unified State - From Individual Desire to Rational
Self-determination
Georg Hegel, The Philosophy of Right 653
26. 8 Property, Labour and Alienation
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology 659
9 The Limits of Majority Rule
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 665
10 The Minimal State
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 671
1 1 Social Co-operation and Rational Self-interest
David Gauthier, Why Contractarianism? 677
12 Liberalism, Resources and Equal Worth
Ronald Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Care about Equality 683
Specimen Questions 690
Suggestions for Further Reading 691
Part XI Beauty and Art 693
1 Art and Imitation
Plato, Republic 695
CONTENTS XV
1
27. 2 The Nature and Function of Dramatic Art
Aristotle, Poetics 701
3 The Idea of Beauty
Francis Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order,
Harmony, Design 706
4 Aesthetic Appreciation
David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste 711
5 The Concept of the Beautiful
Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgement 716
6 The Metaphysics of Beauty
Arthur Schopenhauer, On Aesthetics 723
7 The Two Faces of Art
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 728
8 The Value of Art
Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? 734
9 Imagination and Art
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination 739
10 What is Aesthetics?
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on Aesthetics 744
28. 1 1 The Basis of Judgements of Taste
Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts 750
12 Artistic Representation and Reality
Nelson Goodman, The Languages ofArt 756
Specimen Questions 761
Suggestions for Further Reading 762
Part XII Human Life and its Meaning 763
1 How to Accept Reality and Avoid Fear
Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe 765
2 Life Guided by Stoic Philosophy
Seneca, Moral Letters 768
3 Meaning through Service to Others
Augustine, Confessions 771
4 Contentment with the Human Lot
Michel de Montaigne, On Experience 774
5 The Human Condition, Wretched yet Redeemable
Blaise Pascal, Pensees 778
XVI CONTENTS
6 Human Life as a Meaningless Struggle
29. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Vanity of Existence 782
7 The Death of God and the Ascendancy of the Will
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra 786
8 Idealism in a Godless Universe
Bertrand Russell, A Free Man’s Worship 790
9 Futility and Defiance
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 797
10 Involvement versus Detachment
Thomas Nagel, The Absurd 800
1 1 Religious Belief as Necessary for Meaning
William Lane Craig, The Absurdity of Life without God 809
12 Seeing our Lives as Part of the Process
Robert Nozick, Philosophy’s Life 815
Specimen Questions 820
Suggestions for Further Reading 821
Notes on the Philosophers 823
Index 842
Preface
30. An anthology can serve many different purposes. Anthologies of
poetry usually leave
readers to make their own way, sampling the flowers arranged
for their delight. With
philosophy things are rather different. Many of the arguments of
the great philo-
sophers rest on a daunting array of presuppositions and
concealed premises, and
careful guidance is needed if many readers are not to be
overwhelmed. The texts
included in this volume, and the linking passages of
introduction and commentary,
offer a guided tour through the main branches of the subject,
introducing the ideas in
sequence, and uncovering the main outlines of that complex
interplay of arguments
which forms the Western philosophical tradition. The central
aim, as with all an-
thologies, is to put the reader in touch with the texts
themselves. Those embarking on
the subject can sometimes find it hard even to grasp just what
philosophy is, and there
is no better way of discovering than to read the writings of the
great philosophers at
first hand. This volume is designed to present some of the most
important extracts
31. from those writings in a way that will enable the individual to
achieve a clear overview
of how the subject developed, and how the most important
theories fit into the overall
picture. It is, I hope, a book which individuals will be able to
keep by them, for
pleasure and profit, as they set out on the quest for
philosophical understanding.
The book also has the more specific aim of being serviceable to
university students
undertaking a formal course of study in philosophy. Philosophy
is a wide-ranging
subject, and there is no single template for an ideal introductory
course (and even if
there were, philosophy departments worth their salt would not
wish to grind out
exactly the same syllabus year after year). There are many ways
into philosophy, and
no good reason why one particular branch of the subject should
always form the
chosen route. One of the objects of this book is to provide,
within the compass of a
single volume, a set of key introductory materials for the widest
possible range of
courses, covering all the main branches of the subject (or at
least all those suitable
for teaching at a basic undergraduate level). Fundamental issues
in epistemology are
32. dealt with in Part I (‘Knowledge and Certainty’). Part II (‘Being
and Reality’) is con-
cerned with general metaphysics and ontology, and Part III
(‘Language and Meaning’)
deals with central philosophical concerns about how language is
related to thought
and to the world. The philosophy of mind is covered in Part IV
(‘Mind and Body’),
XV111 PREFACE
and the important issues of personal identity and the freedom of
the will receive
separate treatment in Part V (‘The Self and Freedom’). The
philosophy of religion and
the philosophy of science are dealt with in Part VI (‘God and
Religion’) and Part VII
(‘Science and Method’) respectively. The next two parts deal
with moral philosophy:
Part VIII (‘Morality and the Good Life’) tackles theoretical and
systematic issues in
normative ethics, while Part IX (‘Problems in Ethics’) covers a
selection of key issues
in applied moral philosophy. Part X (‘Authority and the State’)
and Part XI (‘Beauty
and Art’) deal respectively with political philosophy and
aesthetics, and, to conclude
the volume, Part XII (‘Human Life and its Meaning’) covers
some of the various ways
in which great thinkers, ancient and modern, have tackled the
old puzzle of what
33. significance, if any, attaches to human existence.
Although the first three parts of the volume are devoted to
epistemology, meta-
physics and philosophy of language, traditionally considered as
having a ‘founda-
tional’ role in philosophy, the issues raised here are among the
most demanding in the
book, and there is no compelling reason why any given
introductory course should
have to begin with them. Each part of the volume is intended to
be self-contained, and
students and teachers are invited to work on the various parts of
the book in any order
they see fit, or indeed to concentrate on any particular part or
parts in isolation. That
said, given the nature of philosophy there is inevitably a fair
amount of overlap
between the topics raised in various parts; where this happens
footnotes are provided
to draw attention to connections with relevant texts or
commentary in other parts of
the volume.
The passages of introduction and commentary which link the
extracts have been
kept as concise and clear as possible. They are, of course, no
substitute for the
interpretations and evaluations which lecturers and instructors
will themselves wish
to provide. This book is designed to be serviceable for both
teachers and students, not
to eliminate the need for hard work by either group. So what is
provided here is a
basic scaffolding on which courses can be constructed, and a
supportive framework
34. for those coming to the texts for the first time. There is always
a danger of oversim-
plification when writing with the principal aim of helping the
student reader. Phil-
osophy is not an easy subject, and spoon-feeding is often
counterproductive; in the
end there is no alternative to readers wrestling with the
arguments for themselves. But
without a clear initial overview, the whole philosophical
enterprise can seem daunt-
ingly obscure. Qualifications, objections, reinterpretations -
these can always be
added later; but if there is no initial understanding, the
enthusiasm for making
these further efforts will simply ebb away before any progress
has been made.
These points notwithstanding, there may still be some who may
have certain
reservations about the very idea of introducing students to
philosophy by way of an
anthology, as opposed to through the intensive study of
complete texts. Those who
(like the present writer) were taught by this latter method will
know that it has a very
great deal to recommend it. Nevertheless, the vast expansion in
numbers in tertiary
education during the late twentieth century has required many
philosophy teachers to
rethink their approach. This has been particularly true in the
United Kingdom. A
typical annual philosophy intake in most British universities
used to comprise a
relatively small number of students who, even in their first year,
could be taught in
specialized classes and tutorials. But nowadays introductory
35. classes can run to
hundreds, and for groups of this size no library, however well
equipped, can furnish
PREFACE XIX
enough copies of books and articles to support the traditional
tutorial system based
on the weekly reading list. Many teachers in Britain have thus
had to accept what their
counterparts in North America and elsewhere have long taken as
given: the need for a
single compendious volume of readings which will supply the
materials for an entire
introductory course in philosophy. Such volumes do not, of
course, preclude students
from reading more widely (as every good teacher will want to
encourage them to do);
but they at least ensure that some of the basic textual materials
are to hand.
Although the volume is a stout one, the constraints of space are
nevertheless such
that many hard choices have been necessary. To begin with, this
is a collection based
on ‘classic’ texts, and this means that only a relatively small
percentage of the extracts
are taken from the work of philosophers from the recent past.
36. To have given a
representative selection of today’s proliferating philosophical
theories and debates
would have required virtually an entire volume corresponding to
each of the divisions
of the present book. The classic materials featured here are
nevertheless designed to
provide a good base for understanding more recent
developments, and the commen-
tary accompanying each part of the volume often includes brief
glances forward to
later theories. Even within the terms of its chosen framework,
however, the selection
presented here cannot make any claim to completeness: the
schema of twelve extracts
in each of the twelve parts yields that pleasingly duodecimal
aggregate traditionally
termed a ‘gross’ (which gives the book a considerably wider
scope than most recent
anthologies); but I am well aware of the very many candidates
for inclusion that have
had to be omitted. If specialists, turning to their chosen authors,
are shocked by the
brevity of the extracts, or the severity of the abridgements, I
can only plead that they
bear in mind that nothing in the present project is designed to
stop students going on
to make a more detailed and thorough study of the authors
37. represented here. On the
contrary, it is my earnest hope that students who might have
been overwhelmed by
stern injunctions to read ‘all or nothing’ will be sufficiently
excited by some of the
extracts here to turn to the full texts, and to the suggestions for
further reading which
are provided at the end of each Part.
As well as the abridging noted in the previous paragraph, in
preparing the extracts
for inclusion in this volume I have not hesitated to modify
spelling, punctuation and
layout to make the material more readily accessible to the
modern reader. It is of
course vital that critical editions should preserve the original
texts for scholarly use,
but the aims of an anthology such as this are rather different;
and since so many long-
dead Greek, Latin, French and German writers are in any case
presented here in
modern English translations, it seemed over-exacting to insist
on antiquated spelling
and grammar just for those philosophers who wrote in English. I
did indeed at one
point consider ‘translating’ the extracts from such writers as
Locke and Hume (that is,
providing completely new modern English versions), but in the
end (despite the
urgings of some colleagues) resisted this radical measure,
38. contenting myself instead
with a few minor modifications of phrasing in places where the
original was so
antique that it might pose a major obstacle to the modern
student reader. Some
will feel I have not gone far enough; others will no doubt
express outrage that a single
comma has been altered. Bearing in mind, as always, the
readership for whom this
book is intended, I have tried to follow an Aristotelian mean
between opposing
culinary vices: my aim has been to avoid making the fare either
blandly over-
processed or harshly indigestible.
XX PREFACE
As for the principles of selection, since it would be impossibly
ponderous to defend
each decision, chapter and verse, I will simply observe that one
overarching aim has
been to try to make sure that the materials within each Part of
the volume hang
together as far as possible; rather than leaving readers to sink or
swim, as is often
done, I have tried to guide them through the extracts, linking
the ideas together, so
that by the end of each Part they should be able to move
towards achieving a coherent,
if necessarily schematic, overview of the relevant branch of the
subject. Further details
of the plan of the book may be found in the ‘Advice to Readers
39. and Format of the
Volume’ (pp. xxxiv-xxxvi, below).
I am very grateful to the publishers and individual authors and
translators named
in the footnotes at the start of each extract for permission to
reproduce the materials
indicated. Further details are given in the Acknowledgements
(pp. xxii-xxxiii, below).
(In a number of cases, the translations from the original Greek,
Latin, French and
German texts are my own.) As noted above, for the purposes of
the present volume it
has been necessary to abridge some of the extracts, and in the
interests of clarity or
consistency I have sometimes modified the original spelling and
punctuation, and
made occasional minor changes in phrasing. Further details may
be found in the
footnotes accompanying each extract. Finally, I should like to
acknowledge here the
wealth of helpful advice I have received from friends and
colleagues in the course of
preparing this volume. I am especially grateful to John Ackrill,
John Andrews, Doug
Buchanan, Edmund Burke, Flarley Cahen, Enrique Chavez-
Arvizo, Max de Gaynes-
ford, Hanjo Glock, John Haldane, Brad Hooker, Andrew Mason,
Richard Norman,
David Oderberg, Derek Parfit, Harry Parkinson, John Preston,
Michael Proudfoot,
Steve Smith, Sandy Stewart, Jim Stone, Mark Tebbit and
Rosemary Wright. I am
greatly indebted to Enrique Chavez-Arvizo for checking the
‘Notes on the Philo-
40. sophers’, and for preparing the index.
Preface to the second edition
The original edition of 1996 contained ten Parts of ten extracts
each. All the material
that appeared in the first edition has been retained in full, but
the volume has been
substantially enlarged for this second edition.
In the first place, each of the existing Parts now contains two
additional extracts,
bringing the total number of extracts per Part to twelve instead
of ten. The decision to
use more modern material for these further extracts was
relatively easy, not just
because many philosophers and students find a special
excitement in more recent
developments, but also because philosophy is a living and
constantly evolving subject,
and it is important for those studying the Western philosophical
tradition to be aware
that it continues to develop. The roots and trunk of the old plant
are immensely
valuable in themselves, but also because they put forth fresh
shoots. That said, the
selection of the new, more recent, materials was far from easy,
since unlike the great
classics of the past, they have yet to prove their enduring worth;
what is more, today’s
philosophers are notoriously at odds about the relative
importance of the proliferat-
ing current trends in the subject. I cannot hope to please
everyone, but I have tried to
select pieces that, firstly, will give some sense of where each of
the respective branches
41. of the subject is going, and, secondly, will stand some
comparison with their august
PREFACE XXI
predecessors - either because since publication they have
already achieved something
of the status of instant classics, or else because they are at least
worthy representatives
of distinctive strands of philosophical inquiry that seem likely
to endure.
As well as augmenting the existing Parts of the volume, I have
also included two
completely new Parts, each of twelve items, which (as noted
above in the main
Preface) brings the total number of extracts in the book as a
whole to 144, in place
of the original hundred. Dividing the spoils equally between
‘theoretical’ and ‘prac-
tical’ philosophy (to use a classification commonly employed in
Philosophy depart-
ments in continental Europe), I have devoted these two new
sections of the book to
Philosophy of Language, and to the Meaning of Life
respectively. The former is a
42. subject that forms a vitally important part of the Western
philosophical tradition, and
one that many readers of the first edition expressed a strong
interest in seeing
included in any revised volume; the latter relates to one of
philosophy’s oldest and
most weighty preoccupations, eclipsed under the restrictive
conception of philosoph-
ical inquiry that became fashionable around the middle of the
twentieth century, but
now happily reinstated.
I am most grateful to those many philosophical colleagues from
around the world
who were kind enough to let me know that they found the first
edition of the book
useful, and I am heavily indebted to a large number of friends
and colleagues
for invaluable suggestions about the composition of this new
edition, and/or for
comments on the new material. Particular thanks are due to
Michaela Baker, Jonathan
Dancy, Max de Gaynesford, Brian Feltham, Philip Goff, Brad
Hooker, John Hyman,
Ward Jones, Sean MacGiollarnath, David Oderberg, John
Preston, Severin Schroeder,
Philip Stratton-Lake, Daniel Whiting and Andrew Williams.
43. Emma Borg was kind
enough to cast an expert eye over the draff of Part III, and made
many valuable
suggestions for improvement, and Joseph Jedwab kindly did the
same for Part VI, and
Andrew Williams for Part X. I have a special debt to Javier
Kalhat, whose judicious
advice was an enormous help to me, and who also provided
unstinting assistance
in hunting down the relevant materials and making suggestions
for abridgement.
Bryan Weaver provided much appreciated help with the
additions to Part IX. Finally,
I should like to express my thanks to Nick Bellorini, the
Commissioning Editor at
Blackwell Publishers, for encouraging me to produce this
second edition, and to all
the members of the editorial and production team for their hard
work and efficiency.
JC
Reading, England
April 2007
Acknowledgements
The editor and publishers wish to thank the following who have
kindly given
permission for the use of copyright material.
65. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders,
but if any have been
inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make
the necessary ar-
rangement at the first opportunity.
Advice to Readers and Format
of the Volume
Socrates of Athens famously declared that ‘the unexamined life
is not worth living’,
and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize.
Taking nothing for granted,
philosophy probes and questions the fundamental
presuppositions of every area of
human inquiry. Although, in the modern academic world, it is
studied in courses put
on by professionalized departments, and although many of its
contemporary practi-
tioners employ a daunting array of technical terminology,
philosophy can never quite
fit the model of a tightly specialized discipline, like
biochemistry or musicology. For
part of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical
distance from current
doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine
instead how the various
elements in our worldview clash, or fit together. Some
philosophers have tried to
incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic
view of the nature of
reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted
system-building, and
66. seen their primary role as one of clarification, or the removal of
obstacles along the
road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using
the human intellect to
challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every
aspect of human theory
and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny.
There are many ways of approaching philosophy, but sooner or
later every student
will have to come to terms with the great canonical classics by
the founding fathers of
the subject, including Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Locke,
Hume and Kant -
works in which the fundamental problems of philosophy were
defined and shaped.
The main subject matter of the present volume consists in
carefully chosen extracts
from the writings of these and other ‘classic’ philosophical
authors. Though most of
the texts included here predate the twentieth century, it would
be quite wrong to
pigeonhole them as belonging merely to the ‘history’ of the
subject. For philosophy
has a unique relationship to its past. On the one hand it does not
entirely match the
pattern of ‘progressive’ scientific disciplines, which ruthlessly
abandon old theories as
new discoveries are made and better systems are developed; but
on the other hand it is
quite different from those antiquarian disciplines which aim to
immerse themselves in
the ideas of the past ‘for their own sake’. Rather, philosophers
conduct their researches
67. ADVICE TO READERS AND FORMAT OF THE VOLUME
XXXI
in a kind of perpetual living dialogue with the protagonists of
the past; each new
philosophical movement gains vitality and meaning by drawing
on, and reacting
against, previous approaches. In presenting the views of the
great canonical thinkers
this volume aims to serve not just as an introduction to the
‘history’ of the subject,
but as an introduction to philosophy itself.
Though this is a collection based on extracts from philosophical
‘classics’, it should
certainly not be treated as an anthology of ‘sacred texts’, or
definitive pronouncements
by unquestioned authorities. It is integral to the very idea of
philosophy that every
philosophical doctrine, without exception, is there to be
scrutinized and challenged. A
good philosophy student will never rest content with knowing
what the great philo-
sophers said, but will want to form a considered and critical
view of whether their
arguments are justified, and what issues, if any, they illuminate.
68. Most of the ideas
contained in this book have been subject to endless analysis and
discussion by
generations of commentators, but they still have power to speak
to us afresh, provided
we approach them open-mindedly, and without undue reverence.
Though it raises
problems of its own, there is a lot to be said for Descartes’s
famous observation that in
philosophy the natural light of reason within each of us is a
better guide to the truth
than past authority. Philosophy is, of course, part of a
continuing tradition, and there
is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated
and developed. But
the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not
to pay homage to past
genius, but to enrich one’s understanding of central problems
that are as pressing
today as they have always been - problems about knowledge,
truth and reality, the
nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to
live. These questions
help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic
discipline, but in a wider
69. sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely
continue to be with us
for as long as humanity endures.
Format of the volume
• The book is divided into twelve Parts, each covering a
principal branch of
philosophy.
• Each of the twelve main Parts of the book is intended to be
more or less self-
contained, so they do not have to be studied in any particular
order (indeed many
readers may decide, depending on their interests, to focus on a
particular Part or
Parts, and perhaps to skip some Parts entirely).
• Each of the twelve Parts presents, in chronological order, a
selection of twelve
extracts from key texts which have shaped the nature and
development of the
relevant branch of philosophical thinking.
• The extracts are introduced and linked together by a concise
philosophical
commentary which sets out to explain the principal issues raised
in the readings,
70. and to focus attention on the most important concepts and
arguments involved.
• Within each Part of the volume, the passages of linking
commentary form a
continuous narrative designed to guide the reader through the
texts. The reader
will find that philosophical issues arising from a particular text
are often picked
up in the introduction to a subsequent text.
ADVICE TO READERS AND FORMAT OF THE VOLUME
In each Part of the volume, after the extracts and commentary,
specimen ques-
tions are provided to help readers assess their philosophical
grasp of the materials.
etailed suggestions for further reading are provided in special
annotated bibli-
ographies to be found at the end of each Part of the volume.
Biographical and philosophical information on the authors of
the extracts is
contained in a separate table (‘Notes on the Philosophers’) at
the end of the
volume.
When each new extract is introduced, a footnote is provided
giving details of the
source from which it is taken. The original title and date of
publication or
71. composition are always indicated [in square brackets].
Explanatory footnotes have been added at various points,
elucidating possibly
obscure references or terminology, or providing cross-
references to other parts of
t e volume. All such footnotes are by the Editor, except where
they are preceded
y an asterisk (*), in which case they appeared in the original
work from which the
extract is taken.
PART I
Knowledge and Certainty
Knowledge and Certainty
Introduction
Philosophy has always aimed to go beyond our ordinary,
unreflective awareness of
things. The philosopher typically subjects our everyday
convictions to careful logical
scrutiny, exposing inconsistencies and misconceptions, and
attempting to arrive at a
critical standpoint which will enable us to discard what is
confused, and to supply a
solid rational justification for what is retained. Using the tools
of reason, of logical
analysis and conceptual clarification, philosophy tries to replace
what is doubtful and
uncertain with something more coherent and stable. The goal, in
72. short, is to move
beyond mere belief, towards systematic knowledge and
understanding.
We all realize, in our reflective moments, that many of our
beliefs are liable to be
mistaken. And even when our beliefs happen to be true, we can
often appreciate that
this is not much more than a lucky accident - we could equally
well have been wrong.
But what is the difference between mere belief, and the more
stable and reliable kind
of cognition that is entitled to be called knowledge, or true
understanding? What do
we mean by such understanding: how can it be defined, what are
its origins, and how
is it to be achieved? This fundamental set of questions forms the
subject matter of that
branch of philosophy known as the theory of knowledge, or
epistemology (from the
Greek word episteme, meaning ‘knowledge’ or
‘understanding’). From the seventeenth
century onwards, epistemology has been at or near the centre of
philosophical
inquiry. But, as with so many other areas of philosophy, much
of the framework for
subsequent developments comes from the ideas of the classical
Greek thinkers, and of
Plato in particular.
1 Innate Knowledge: Plato, Meno*
Our first extract, from the Meno (c. 385 bc),
begins with Meno taunting Socrates for his role
73. as a stingray or ‘torpedo-fish’, paralysing his vic-
tims by relentlessly attacking their confused and
inconsistent beliefs. But it ends showing Socrates
in a more positive role, more like that of the
‘midwife’,
1
using careful and systematic ques-
tioning to draw out, from the minds of his pu-
pils, the seeds of true and reliable knowledge.
From its own inner resources, the mind, suitably
guided, can reach a genuine understanding of
the truth. We have within us ‘true thoughts
which only need to be awakened into knowledge
by putting questions’. This notion is graphically
expressed in terms of the poetic idea of the soul’s
immortality: it ‘remembers’ or ‘recollects’ truths
it knew in a previous existence. The point is
made through a detailed mathematical example.
By careful questioning Socrates is able to get the
slave boy to recognize that the way to construct a
square double in area to a given square is to use
74. the diagonal of the given square as a base.
Though readers may feel that Socrates is ‘lead-
ing’ the boy in the direction he wants, it should
be clear that the result of the exchange is quite
different from what happens in ‘spoon-feeding’,
where the learner simply accepts what the
teacher imparts. For after his exchange with Soc-
rates, once the areas have been drawn in, and
various attempted solutions discarded as wrong,
the boy is able to ‘see for himself’ that the square
drawn on the diagonal does, and indeed must,
produce the right answer. The choice of a math-
ematical example to illustrate the theory of the
mind’s innate cognitive powers is no accident.
For Plato, mathematical understanding is an ex-
ample of the kind of reliable cognition which
takes us beyond the unsatisfactory world of
everyday appearances towards a realm of more
permanent and secure truths. As will become
75. apparent, this notion, together with the doctrine
of innate knowledge, plays a key role in the
subsequent development of the philosophy of
knowledge.
Meno: Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you
were always doubting
yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your
spells over me,
and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my
wits’ end. And if I
may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in
your appearance and
in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish,
who torpifies those
who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified
me, I think. For my
soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to
answer you; and
though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches
about virtue before
now, and to many persons - and very good ones they were, as I
thought - at this
moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you
are very wise in not
voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other
places as you do in
Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
Socrates: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
Meno: What do you mean, Socrates?
76. Socrates: I can tell why you made a simile about me.
Meno: Why?
Socrates: In order that I might make another simile about you.
For I know that
all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made
about them - as well
they may - but I shall not return the compliment. As to my
being a torpedo, if the
Plato, Meno [ Menon, c.380 bc], 79e-86c. Trans. B. Jowett, in
The Dialogues ofPlato (Oxford: Clarendon,
1892), vol. II, pp. 39-47; diagrams added for this anthology.
The comparison is found in a later Platonic dialogue, the
Theaetetus.
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then
indeed I am a
torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I
am clear, but because
I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue
is, and you seem to
be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before
you touched me.
However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.
Meno: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you
do not know?
What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you
find what you want,
how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not
77. know?
Socrates: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a
tiresome dispute you
are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either
about that which he
knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows,
he has no need to
enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very
subject about which
he is to enquire?
Meno: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
Socrates: I think not.
Meno: Why not?
Socrates: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise
men and women who
spoke of things divine that -
Meno: What did they say?
Socrates: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.
Meno: What was it? and who were they?
Socrates: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had
studied how they
might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have
been poets also, who
spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many
others who were
inspired. And they say - mark, now, and see whether their words
are true - they
say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end,
which is termed
dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed.
And the moral is,
78. that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. ‘For in the
ninth year Perse-
phone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the
penalty of ancient
crimes back again from beneath into the light of the sun above,
and these are they
who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom
and are called
saintly heroes in after ages.’ The soul, then, as being immortal,
and having been
born again many times, and having seen all things that exist,
whether in this world
or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no
wonder that she
should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew
about virtue, and
about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has
learned all things, there
is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a
single recollection all
the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry
and all learning is
but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this
sophistical argument
about the impossibility of enquiry for it will make us idle, and
is sweet only to the
sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and
inquisitive. In that confiding,
I will gladly enquire with you, into the nature of virtue.
Meno: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we
do not learn, and that
what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you
teach me how this is?
Socrates: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and
79. now you ask
whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no
teaching, but only
recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a
contradiction.
INNATE KNOWLEDGE: PLATO 5
Meno: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I
only asked the
question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you
say is true, I wish
that you would.
Socrates: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you
to the utmost of my
power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants,
that I may
demonstrate on him.
Meno: Certainly. Come hither, boy.
Socrates: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
Meno: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.
Socrates: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and
observe whether he
learns of me or only remembers.
Meno: I will.
Socrates: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a
square [figure 1]?
Boy: I do.
Socrates: And you know that a square figure has these four lines
equal?
80. Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And these lines which I have drawn through the
middle of the square
are also equal?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: A square may be any size?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the
other side be of two
feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one
direction the space was
of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole
would be of two feet
taken once?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice
two feet?
Boy: There are.
Socrates: Then the square is of twice two feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.
Boy: Four, Socrates.
Socrates: And might there not be another square twice as large
as this, and having
81. like this the lines equal?
Figure 1
6 KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And of how many feet will that be?
Boy: Of eight feet.
Socrates: And now try and tell me the length of the line which
forms the side of
that double square: this is two feet - what will that be?
Boy: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Socrates: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy
anything, but
only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows
how long a line is
necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does
he not?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And does he really know?
Meno: Certainly not.
Socrates: He only guesses that because the square is double, the
line is double.
Meno: True.
Socrates: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular
order. [To the Boy] Tell
me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double
line? Remember
82. that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every
way, and twice the
size of this - that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know
whether you still say that
a double square comes from a double line?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: But does not this line become doubled if we add
another such line here
[figure 2]?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And four such lines will make a space containing
eight feet?
Boy: Yes.
Figure 2
INNATE KNOWLEDGE: PLATO 7
Socrates: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that
this is the figure of
eight feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And are there not these four divisions in the figure,
each of which is
equal to the figure of four feet?
83. Boy: True.
Socrates: And is not that four times four?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And four times is not double?
Boy: No, indeed.
Socrates: But how much?
Boy: Four times as much.
Socrates: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not
twice, but four
times as much.
Boy: True.
Socrates: Four times four are sixteen - are they not?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this
gives one of
sixteen feet; - do you see?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of
84. this, and half the
size of the other?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater
than this one, and
less than that one?
Boy: Yes; I think so.
Socrates: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And
now tell me, is
not this a line of two feet and that of four?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet now
ought to be more
than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
Boy: It ought.
Socrates: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.
Boy: Three feet.
Socrates: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be
the line of three.
Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are
two also and there is
85. one: and that makes the figure of which you speak [figure 3]?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that
way, the whole
space will be three times three feet?
Boy: That is evident.
Socrates: And how much are three times three feet?
Boy: Nine.
Socrates: And how much is the double of four?
Boy: Eight.
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Figure 3
Socrates: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of
three?
Boy: No.
Socrates: But from what line? - tell me exactly; and if you
would rather not
reckon, try and show me the line.
Boy: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.
Socrates: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his
power of recol-
86. lection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now,
what is the side of a
figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and
answered confidently as
if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and
neither knows nor
fancies that he knows.
Meno: True.
Socrates: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
Meno: I think that he is.
Socrates: If we have made him doubt, and given him the
‘torpedo’s shock’, have
we done him any harm?
Meno: I think not.
Socrates: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in
some degree to the
discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his
ignorance, but then he
would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that
the double space
should have a double side.
Meno: True.
Socrates. But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired
into or learned
what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of
it, until he had fallen
into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had
desired to know?
Meno: I think not, Socrates.
87. Socrates: Then he was the better for the torpedo’s touch?
Meno: I think so.
Socrates: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask
him, and not teach
him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch
and see if you find
me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his
opinion. Tell me,
boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn [figure
4]?
INNATE KNOWLEDGE: PLATO 9
Figure 4
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And now I add another square equal to the former
one?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And a third, which is equal to either of them?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?
Boy: Very good.
Socrates: Here, then, there are four equal spaces [figure 5]?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And how many times larger is this space than this
other?
Boy: Four times.
88. Socrates: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will
remember.
Boy: True.
Figure 5
10 KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Socrates: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner,
bisect each of
these spaces [figure 6]?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And are there not here four equal lines which contain
this space?
Boy: There are.
Socrates: Look and see how much this space is.
Boy: I do not understand.
Socrates: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four
spaces?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And how many such spaces are there in this section
[the section marked
out by the diagonal lines] ?
Boy: Four.
Socrates: And how many in this? [the original shaded square]
89. Boy: Two.
Socrates: And four is how many times two?
Boy: Twice.
Socrates: And this space is of how many feet?
Boy: Of eight feet.
Socrates: And from what line do you get this figure?
Boy: From this.
Socrates: That is, from the line which extends from corner to
corner of the figure
of four feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And that is the line which the learned call the
diagonal. And if this is the
proper name, then you, Meno’s slave, are prepared to affirm
that the double space is
the square of the diagonal?
Figure 6
INNATE KNOWLEDGE: PLATO 11
Boy: Certainly, Socrates.
Socrates: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these
answers given out of
his own head?
Meno: Yes, they were all his own.
Socrates: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not
90. know?
Meno: True.
Socrates: But still he had in him those notions of his - had he
not?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Then he who does not know may still have true
notions of that which
he does not know?
Meno: He has.
Socrates: And at present these notions have just been stirred up
in him, as in a
dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in
different forms, he
would know as well as anyone at last?
Meno: I dare say.
Socrates: Without anyone teaching him he will recover his
knowledge for himself
if he is only asked questions?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is
recollection?
Meno: True.
Socrates: And this knowledge which he now has must he not
either have acquired
or always possessed?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would
91. always have known;
or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired
it in this life, unless
he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the
same with all geometry
and every other branch of knowledge? Now, has anyone ever
taught him all this?
You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred
in your house.
Meno: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.
Socrates: And yet he has the knowledge?
Meno: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.
Socrates: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life,
then he must have
had and learned it at some other time?
Meno: Clearly he must.
Socrates: Which must have been the time when he was not a
man?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And if there have been always true thoughts in him,
both at the time
when he was and was not a man, which only need to be
awakened into knowledge
by putting questions to him, his soul must have always
possessed this knowledge,
for he always either was or was not a man?
Meno: Obviously.
Socrates: And if the truth of all things always existed in the
soul, then the soul is
92. immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what
you do not know,
or rather what you do not remember.
Meno: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.
Socrates: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I
have said of which I
am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and
braver and less helpless
12 KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been
if we indulged in
the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking
to know what we do
not know; - that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in
word and deed, to
the utmost of my power.
2 Knowledge versus Opinion: Plato, Republic*
The distinction between knowledge and mere
true belief (or opinion) has already emerged in
the previous extract. Socrates there talked of
‘true opinions which can be aroused by ques-
tioning and turned into knowledge’. But what is
the difference between the two? As Socrates
points out later in the Meno
, it does not seem
to lie in degree of usefulness, for the person who
93. has a correct belief about the way to get to
Larissa is just as good a guide as one who has
knowledge. But knowledge, he goes on to ex-
plain, confers a plus: ‘True opinions are fine
and useful as long as they stay with us; but they
do not stay, and they depart from the mind. So
they are not of great value until you fasten them
down by working out the reason why. This pro-
cess, Meno my friend, is recollection, as we
agreed earlier. Once they are fastened, they
become knowledge and then they are more per-
manent. Hence knowledge is a finer and better
thing than true opinion, since it is secured by a
chain’ (Meno, 98a 1-5). What is suggested here is
that one who has knowledge is able to back up
his opinion by providing a justification, or an
explanatory account. Only when opinion is
secured by a rational account, only when one
can explain why a given belief is correct, is that
belief entitled to the accolade ‘knowledge’.
So far the Platonic account of knowledge
seems straightforward enough. But elsewhere
the distinction between knowledge and belief is
explained in a way which seems to carry far more
complex implications about the nature of reality.
The most famous of these passages is in Plato’s
best-known work, the Republic (c.380 bc), where
he gives an account of the true philosophers, the
lovers of knowledge and wisdom (who alone,
Plato maintains, are fitted to rule the state). In
the course of the argument, knowledge and
opinion are said to be different powers or facul-
94. ties, from which the (questionable) inference is
drawn that they must have different objects. The
ordinary everyday objects of opinion can be said
to be what they are (beautiful, or large, or heavy
or whatever) only in a qualified sense; Plato puts
this by saying that such objects are somewhere in
between what is and what is not. But true know-
ledge, being more stable and permanent, must
relate to what really is - to objects that count as
beautiful or large or heavy in an utterly unquali-
fied and unrestricted way. Thus Plato introduces
what have come to be known as the Forms -
eternal, unchanging, absolute realities, which are
the true objects of knowledge. These absolute
realities cannot be grasped via the senses, but
are objects of pure understanding: the contrast
throughout the following passage is between
particular visible manifestations or examples of
beauty (or justice or whatever), and the abstract
notion of ‘the Beautiful itself’ which belongs to a
higher order of reality and which is apprehended
by the intellect alone. As Plato puts it, ‘those who
are able to see the many beautiful [objects], and
who yet neither see absolute beauty... who see
the many just [objects] and not absolute justice
. . . may be said to have opinion but not know-
ledge . As with all of the Republic, the argument is
presented as a dialogue between Socrates and a
sparring partner (in this case, Glaucon). Socra-
tes, talking in the first person, speaks first.
* Plato, Republic [Politeia, c.380 bc], Bk V, 474b-483e. Trans.
95. B. Jowett, in The Dialogues ofPlato (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1892), vol. Ill, pp. 171-9.
KNOWLEDGE VERSUS OPINION: PLATO
I think we must explain whom we mean when we say that
philosophers are to rule the
State . . Some natures ought to study philosophy and to be
leaders in the State, and
others who are not born to be philosophers are meant to be
followers rather than
leaders.
Then now for a definition, he said.
Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other
be able to give you a
satisfactory explanation.
Proceed.
I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind
you, that a lover, if
he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love not to some
one part of that which
he loves, but to the whole.
I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my
memory.
Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man
of pleasure like
yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth
96. do somehow or other
raise a pang or emotion in a lover’s breast, and are thought by
him to be worthy of his
affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the
fair: one has a snub
nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of
another has, you say, a royal
look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of
regularity: the dark
visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the
sweet ‘honey pale’, as
they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a
lover who talks in
diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the
cheek of youth? In a
word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing
which you will not say,
in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-
time of youth.
Ifyou make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of
the argument, I assent.
And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them
doing the same? They
are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.
Very good.
And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command
an army, they are
willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by
97. really great and
important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and
meaner people, -
but honour of some kind they must have.
Exactly.
Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods,
desire the whole
class or a part only?
The whole.
And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of
a part of wisdom
only, but of the whole?
Yes, of the whole.
And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has
no power of judging
what is good and what is not, such a one we maintain not to be a
philosopher or a
lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not
hungry, and may be said to
have a bad appetite and not a good one?
Very true, he said.
Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge, and
who is curious to learn
and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I
not right?
Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find
98. many a strange being
will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a
delight in learning, and
14 KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk
strangely out of place
among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world
who would come to
anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help,
while they run about at
the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear
every chorus; whether
the performance is in town or country — that makes no
difference — they are there.
Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar
tastes, as well as the
professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?
Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.
He said: Who then are the true philosophers?
Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.
That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you
mean.
To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining;
but I am sure that you
will admit a proposition which I am about to make.
What is the proposition?
That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?
Certainly.
And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?
99. True again.
And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class,
the same remark
holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various
combinations of them
with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in
all sorts of lights and
appear many?
Very true.
And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-
loving, art-loving,
practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are
alone worthy of the
name of philosophers.
How do you distinguish them? he said.
The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive,
fond of fine tones and
colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made
out of them, but their
mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.
True, he replied.
Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.
Very true.
And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of
absolute beauty, or
who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable
to follow - of such a
one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the
dreamer, sleeping or
100. waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in
the place of the real
object?
I should certainly say that such a one was dreaming.
But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence of
absolute beauty and
is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate
in the idea, neither
putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the
place of the objects - is
he a dreamer, or is he awake?
He is wide awake.
And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has
knowledge, and that
the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?
Certainly.
KNOWLEDGE VERSUS OPINION: PLATO 15
But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute
our statement, can
we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without
revealing to him that
there is sad disorder in his wits?
We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.
Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall
we begin by assuring
101. him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have,
and that we are rejoiced
at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does
he who has knowledge
know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)
I answer that he knows something.
Something that is or is not?
Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?
And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many
points of view, that
absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the
utterly non-existent is
utterly unknown?
Nothing can be more certain.
Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be
and not to be, that
will have a place intermediate between pure being and the
absolute negation of being?
Yes, between them.
And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of
necessity to not-being,
for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to
be discovered a
corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge,
if there be such?
102. Certainly.
Do we admit the existence of opinion?
Undoubtedly.
As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?
Another faculty.
Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of
matter correspond-
ing to this difference of faculties?
Yes.
And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before
I proceed further I
will make a division.
What division?
I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they
are powers in us, and
in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing,
for example, I should
call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?
Yes, I quite understand.
Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and
therefore the
distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to
discern the differences
103. of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I
think only of its sphere
and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same
result I call the same
faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I
call different. Would
that be your way of speaking?
Yes.
And will you be so very good as to answer one more question?
Would you say that
knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?
Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all
faculties.
And is opinion also a faculty?
16 KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to
form an opinion.
And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that
knowledge is not the same
as opinion?
Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify
that which is infallible
with that which errs?
104. An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite
conscious of a distinction
between them.
Yes.
Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also
distinct spheres or
subject-matters?
That is certain.
Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and
knowledge is to know the
nature of being?
Yes.
And opinion is to have an opinion?
Yes.
And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of
opinion the same as the
subject-matter of knowledge?
Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference
in faculty implies
difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were
saying, opinion and
knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge
and of opinion cannot
be the same.
Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something
else must be the
