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Home Automation Benchmarking
Project Scope
Cameras Thermostats Smoke / CO
Home Automation
Controllers
Dlink DCS-2132L Ecobee First Alert SC9120B Control4 HC-250
Dropcam Pro Hive Kidde i2010S Lowes Iris
Foscam FI9826W Honeywell Lyric Nest Protect Revolv
Simplicam Nest Thermostat SmartThings
Withings
Baby Monitor
Cameras
• All communications
encrypted
• No public services
• Automatic firmware
updates
• No default credentials
• Hardwired connection
available
• Public firmware is
encrypted to some
extent
• Credential change
required on first boot
• Encrypted automatic
updates
• Lost communications
alerting
• Automatic firmware
updates
• No hardwired
connection
• No SSL pinning in
mobile app
• Communications default
to unencrypted
• Obfuscates, rather than
secures data in transit
• Publicly available
firmware
• Maximum 12 character
passwords
• Communications default
to unencrypted
• Obfuscates, rather than
secures data in transit
• Weak password policy
• No certificate
validation
• Multiple
communications are
unencrypted
• Credentials easily
pulled from backups
• Hard-coded shared
password
• Considerable
network footprint
BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES
WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES
*The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
Thermostats
• All communications
encrypted
• Automatic firmware
updates
• Proper SSL usage /
encrypted traffic
• Public firmware is
encrypted to some
extent
• Credential change
required on first boot
• Built on widely used
platform
• Automatic firmware
updates
• Encrypted communication
• Weak password policy • Weak password policy
• Easily guessable
configuration token used
• Lack of SSL pinning in
mobile app
• Insecure initial configuration
• History of vulnerabilities
across product lines
• Not all traffic is encrypted
• Moderate password
policy
BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES
WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES
*The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
Smoke and CO Detectors
• Audible power loss notification
• Encrypted network
communication
• Difficult to tamper with
• Impossible to remotely hack,
because it lacks connectivity
• Impossible to remotely hack,
because it lacks connectivity
• Weak password policy
• Custom configuration
protocol / short pairing codes
• Not applicable because this is
not a “smart” device
• Not applicable because this is
not a “smart” device
BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES
WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES
*The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
Home Automation Controllers
• Encrypted
communications
• Strong pairing
mechanics
• Encrypted
communications
• Notified if goes offline
• Strong password policy • Encrypted communications
• Automatic firmware
updates
• Unsigned firmware
• Custom remote
management feature
• Open ports
• Hardcoded API keys
• Weak password policy
• Exposed telnet service
• History of unpatched
security issues
• Built-in unauthenticated
remote management
feature
• Moderate password
policy
BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES
WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES
*The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
Takeaways
• Overall, IoT security is poor, with cameras scoring the lowest
• With few exceptions, Nest leads the industry in security practices
• A sinking tide incident will likely hit home automation
• The industry needs some basic standards to set the bar
Areas to Watch
Wi-Fi Jamming
• With few exceptions, all Wi-Fi devices are susceptible to jamming
• Diversification of used spectrum (2.5Ghz + 5 Ghz, etc.) reduces risk
• Hardwired Ethernet options also reduce the risk
• Jamming/network down incidents should result in a proactive alert to the user
Password strength, Reuse, and Attack Resistance
• Basic Password strength requirements should be enforced
• Horizontal and vertical password guessing countermeasures should be
implemented at application and network layers
Areas to Watch
Unencrypted and unauthenticated communications
• All communications should use bidirectional encryption
• Unauthenticated servers, communications and services should not be allowed
Misconfiguration of Encryption
• Independent encryption architecture reviews should always be performed. There are
thousands of ways to get it wrong, and only a handful of ways to get it right
• SSL pinning should be used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
• Certificate validation should always be performed against a 3rd party
• Self-signed certificates should never be used

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Home Automation Benchmarking Report

  • 2. Project Scope Cameras Thermostats Smoke / CO Home Automation Controllers Dlink DCS-2132L Ecobee First Alert SC9120B Control4 HC-250 Dropcam Pro Hive Kidde i2010S Lowes Iris Foscam FI9826W Honeywell Lyric Nest Protect Revolv Simplicam Nest Thermostat SmartThings Withings Baby Monitor
  • 3. Cameras • All communications encrypted • No public services • Automatic firmware updates • No default credentials • Hardwired connection available • Public firmware is encrypted to some extent • Credential change required on first boot • Encrypted automatic updates • Lost communications alerting • Automatic firmware updates • No hardwired connection • No SSL pinning in mobile app • Communications default to unencrypted • Obfuscates, rather than secures data in transit • Publicly available firmware • Maximum 12 character passwords • Communications default to unencrypted • Obfuscates, rather than secures data in transit • Weak password policy • No certificate validation • Multiple communications are unencrypted • Credentials easily pulled from backups • Hard-coded shared password • Considerable network footprint BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES *The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
  • 4. Thermostats • All communications encrypted • Automatic firmware updates • Proper SSL usage / encrypted traffic • Public firmware is encrypted to some extent • Credential change required on first boot • Built on widely used platform • Automatic firmware updates • Encrypted communication • Weak password policy • Weak password policy • Easily guessable configuration token used • Lack of SSL pinning in mobile app • Insecure initial configuration • History of vulnerabilities across product lines • Not all traffic is encrypted • Moderate password policy BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES *The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
  • 5. Smoke and CO Detectors • Audible power loss notification • Encrypted network communication • Difficult to tamper with • Impossible to remotely hack, because it lacks connectivity • Impossible to remotely hack, because it lacks connectivity • Weak password policy • Custom configuration protocol / short pairing codes • Not applicable because this is not a “smart” device • Not applicable because this is not a “smart” device BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES *The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
  • 6. Home Automation Controllers • Encrypted communications • Strong pairing mechanics • Encrypted communications • Notified if goes offline • Strong password policy • Encrypted communications • Automatic firmware updates • Unsigned firmware • Custom remote management feature • Open ports • Hardcoded API keys • Weak password policy • Exposed telnet service • History of unpatched security issues • Built-in unauthenticated remote management feature • Moderate password policy BEST PRODUCT QUALITIES WORST PRODUCT QUALITIES *The qualities outlined for each product are a result of individual product analysis conducted in isolation from other products examined in this research.
  • 7. Takeaways • Overall, IoT security is poor, with cameras scoring the lowest • With few exceptions, Nest leads the industry in security practices • A sinking tide incident will likely hit home automation • The industry needs some basic standards to set the bar
  • 8. Areas to Watch Wi-Fi Jamming • With few exceptions, all Wi-Fi devices are susceptible to jamming • Diversification of used spectrum (2.5Ghz + 5 Ghz, etc.) reduces risk • Hardwired Ethernet options also reduce the risk • Jamming/network down incidents should result in a proactive alert to the user Password strength, Reuse, and Attack Resistance • Basic Password strength requirements should be enforced • Horizontal and vertical password guessing countermeasures should be implemented at application and network layers
  • 9. Areas to Watch Unencrypted and unauthenticated communications • All communications should use bidirectional encryption • Unauthenticated servers, communications and services should not be allowed Misconfiguration of Encryption • Independent encryption architecture reviews should always be performed. There are thousands of ways to get it wrong, and only a handful of ways to get it right • SSL pinning should be used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks • Certificate validation should always be performed against a 3rd party • Self-signed certificates should never be used