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SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks Authors: Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen,David Culler and J.D.Tygar Presented By :c.manohar babu (Some slides have been taken from authors’ sites)

Outline ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Sensor Networks are emerging ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Security for Sensor Networks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Challenge: Resource Constraints ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Contributions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

System Assumptions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],A B D E F G C Base Station

Notation A, B Principals( nodes) N A Nonce generated by A C A Counter generated by A χ AB Master secret key between A and B ( no direction information) K AB Secret encryption key between A and B (depends on direction) K’ AB Secret MAC key between A and B (depends on direction) {M} KAB Encryption of message M with K AB {M} <KAB,IV> Encryption of message M using key KAB and initialization vector IV MAC(K’ AB ,M) Message authentication code (MAC) of M

SNEP ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Key Generation /Setup ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Counter RC5 Block Cipher Key Master Key MAC Key Encryption Key random

Authentication, Confidentiality ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Node A M, MAC(K’ AB , M) {M} <KAB, CA> , MAC(K’ AB , C A || {M} <KAB, CA> ) Node B

Strong Freshness ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Node A Request, N A {Response} <KBA, CB) , MAC(K’ BA , N A || C B || {Response} <KBA, CB> ) Node B

Counter Exchange Protocol ,[object Object],Node A C A C B , MAC(K’ BA , C A ||C B ) Node B MAC(K’ AB , C A ||C B ) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

µTESLA : Authenticated Broadcast ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Key Setup ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],K n K n-1 K 1 K 0 X …… . F(Kn) F(K1) F(K2)

 TESLA Quick Overview I ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],K4 K5 K6 K7 t Time 4 Time 5 Time 6 Time 7 K3 P1 K3 P2 K5 F F Authenticate K5 Verify MAC F K6 F K5

 TESLA Quick Overview II ,[object Object],K4 K5 K6 K7 t Time 4 Time 5 Time 6 Time 7 K3 P5 K5 P3 K3 P2 K2 P1 K2 Verify MACs P4 K4 F F Authenticate K5

 TESLA Properties ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Applications ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Related Work in Broadcast Authentication ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Discussion: Drawbacks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Discussion: Risks Un-addressed ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Conclusion ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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