SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 27
“Super
Phreak”
Modems: The Forgotten
     Backdoor
A Day in the Life
Remember the 80’s ?


      1980




John Lennon shot
Pac-Man
Super Trouper
Empire Strikes
Back
Remember the 80’s ?


      1980              1981




John Lennon shot   JR Ewing shot
Pac-Man            Rubik's Cube
Super Trouper      Super Freak
Empire Strikes     Raiders Lost Ark
Back
Remember the 80’s ?


      1980              1981                 1982




John Lennon shot   JR Ewing shot      Reagan shot
Pac-Man            Rubik's Cube       Trivial Pursuit
Super Trouper      Super Freak        Don’t You Want
                                      Me
Empire Strikes     Raiders Lost Ark
Back                                  Tootsie
Remember the 80’s ?


      1980              1981                 1982                  1983




John Lennon shot   JR Ewing shot      Reagan shot       My knees shot

Pac-Man            Rubik's Cube       Trivial Pursuit   Cabbage Patch
                                                        Kids
Super Trouper      Super Freak        Don’t You Want
                                      Me                Thriller
Empire Strikes     Raiders Lost Ark
Back                                  Tootsie           War Games
Spark That Lit The Fire


Sales of modems
increased by a factor
of 500 within 3
                          Public
months of the release
of the film “War
Games”
                          Private
Remember When?

Our biggest vulnerability   Our biggest threat




                                       Public




                                       Private
Super Phreaky – Yoaw!

Phreak = "phone" + "freak".

"Phreak", "phreaker“= names for people
who participate in phreaking

Phreaking = studying, experimenting with,
or exploring telecoms systems,
equipment or systems connected to
telephone networks. Linked to hacking
when networks went computerised.

Now called the H/P culture
(Hacking and Phreaking).
War Dialer Process

1. Obtain exchanges
2. Configure & run dialer
3. Analyse carriers &   identify
  devices
4. Connect to carriers identified
5. Brute force if prompted
6. Access granted
Functions of a Modem

• Dial-Out access – allows
  someone to subvert the
  firewall to get out

• Dial-In access – allows
  remote access to an internal
  system via the PBX
Dial-Out Access

 Desktop devices, faxes, scanners, PCs
 Primarily user internet-related activity
 Use of unauthorised modems to circumvent firewall
  rules - access blocked internet material
 Risk exposure is user-dependent and localised
 Think data leakage
 Risk commensurate with access privileges
 Most organisations do not have a requirement for it
Dial-Out Risks

                                            Firewall



  Unauthorised
     Material               Your Organisation

                                                                              Network

  Trojan Horses &                                                           Configuration
                                                       Server
                    Modem
      Viruses                 Workstation

                                                                              Business

       Data
                                                                Databases
                                                                             Information
                                              Server
     Leakage
Dial-In Access

 Business systems – servers - not PC-based
 Think 3rd party managed devices
 Increased likelihood business-critical system
 Permits targeted rather than opportunistic attack
 Time to map & exploit the system
 System can remain compromised after the hacker
  disconnects
 Likely to be untraceable
 Most organisations have at least some requirement
  for dial-in access
Your View

1.    Bandwidth Manager

2.    Exterior Router

3.    Bastion Host (Firewall)

4.    Interior Router

5.    Network Switch

6.    Application Servers

7.    Network Storage

8.    PBX

9.    Voicemail

10.   Modem Bank

11.   RAS Server

12.   Authentication Server

13.   UPS

14.   Air Conditioning

15.   Building Access Control System
Phreaker’s View
 1.    Bandwidth Manager

 2.    Exterior Router

 3.    Bastion Host (Firewall)

 4.    Interior Router

 5.    Network Switch

 6.    Application Servers

 7.    Network Storage

 8.    PBX

 9.    Voicemail

 10.   Modem Bank

 11.   RAS Server

 12.   Authentication Server

 13.   UPS

 14.   Air Conditioning

 15.   Building Access Control System
Scale of Dial-In Threat

 Large organisations: 1.5% – 2.5% of all
  telephone extensions provide dial-in access
  (up to 25 extensions per 1000 )

 Small organisations: 2% - 3% of telephone
  extensions provide dial-in connectivity (up
  to 15 extensions per 500)
Prevailing Opinion…

      "...most large companies are more vulnerable
    through poorly inventoried modem lines than via
           firewall-protected Internet gateways"
  Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets and Solutions. McClure,
                                  Scambray & Kurtz. Osborne,2008



     “While remote access is not the only route that
   hackers use to attack networks, they often cite it as
                  the easiest route in”
         Information Security Breaches Survey 2010: Remote Access.
                                   UK Department of Trade & Industry
And yet….

DTI’s Information Security Breaches Survey
cited it in 2004 by stating that …

• Less than 2% surveyed checked for unauthorised modem
  access




 …but not since
Managing Dial-Out Risk

Non-PC based:
• Configure dial-out under application control
• Modem configured for “dial-out” only
PC-based:
• PBX monitoring – outbound call logging (restricted to
  DDI line logging)
• Host-based solutions – anti-virus / host monitoring /
  configuration lockdown
General:
• Effective policy – user education, policing &
  enforcement
Managing Dial-In Risk

Managed through:
• Review & confirm 3rd party access requirements
• Change vendor defaults
• SLA’s should address breach responsibilities
• Implement appropriate controls (access restriction,
  authentication, dial-back)
• Monitor – inbound call logging / alerting / read logs!
• Effective policy – user education, policing &
  enforcement
25 th Anniversary
Todays’ War Dialer

• WarVOX, Linux-based freeware available on
  Dark-Hack
• Uses VoIP services to make up to 10,000
  calls in an 8 hour period
• Spoofs caller ID
• IDs admin interfaces to PABX and IP based
  devices
• Finds and copies/strips stored audio files
  and archives
Test This
Some things never die,
they just go out of
fashion…

Phreaking is the founding
methodology of hackers.
What makes you think its
dead?

Still the most dependable
backdoor into a system.
26 Dover Street,
London , W1S 4LY,
   United Kingdom

+44 (0) 203 586 1025
    www.orthusirm.com
    info@ orthusirm.com

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013
MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013
MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013MongoDB
 
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme complet
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme completFinale FSCF Basket : le programme complet
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme completGuyon Jacky
 
Widgets And Apps / A Strategic Meta View
Widgets And Apps  / A Strategic Meta ViewWidgets And Apps  / A Strategic Meta View
Widgets And Apps / A Strategic Meta ViewMehrdad Piroozram
 
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016Corum Group
 
Gaza under the Assyrian Empire
Gaza under the Assyrian EmpireGaza under the Assyrian Empire
Gaza under the Assyrian Empirejhgbb
 
(607966021) ciencias 1
(607966021) ciencias 1(607966021) ciencias 1
(607966021) ciencias 1Lino Cambrón
 
Ruiz barrera (1)
Ruiz barrera  (1)Ruiz barrera  (1)
Ruiz barrera (1)fjgn1972
 
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La Bauhaus
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La BauhausClasicismo, Concreto Amado y La Bauhaus
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La BauhausBryan Reyes
 
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30Frans Candila
 
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDACEddian Méndez
 
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.JAIRO AMAYA
 

Viewers also liked (18)

MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013
MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013
MongoDB Partner Program Update - November 2013
 
Cadete grupo 2 1516
Cadete grupo 2 1516Cadete grupo 2 1516
Cadete grupo 2 1516
 
Catalogo conceptronic
Catalogo conceptronicCatalogo conceptronic
Catalogo conceptronic
 
Manual Dental System
Manual Dental SystemManual Dental System
Manual Dental System
 
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme complet
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme completFinale FSCF Basket : le programme complet
Finale FSCF Basket : le programme complet
 
Calendario enero
Calendario eneroCalendario enero
Calendario enero
 
17 30h-vas-jorge
17 30h-vas-jorge17 30h-vas-jorge
17 30h-vas-jorge
 
Widgets And Apps / A Strategic Meta View
Widgets And Apps  / A Strategic Meta ViewWidgets And Apps  / A Strategic Meta View
Widgets And Apps / A Strategic Meta View
 
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016
Tech M&A Monthly: Q1 Report 2016
 
Gaza under the Assyrian Empire
Gaza under the Assyrian EmpireGaza under the Assyrian Empire
Gaza under the Assyrian Empire
 
Solo para jovencitas
Solo para jovencitasSolo para jovencitas
Solo para jovencitas
 
(607966021) ciencias 1
(607966021) ciencias 1(607966021) ciencias 1
(607966021) ciencias 1
 
Ruiz barrera (1)
Ruiz barrera  (1)Ruiz barrera  (1)
Ruiz barrera (1)
 
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La Bauhaus
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La BauhausClasicismo, Concreto Amado y La Bauhaus
Clasicismo, Concreto Amado y La Bauhaus
 
CSSM Certification: The Next Step for Surgical Services Managers
CSSM Certification: The Next Step for Surgical Services Managers CSSM Certification: The Next Step for Surgical Services Managers
CSSM Certification: The Next Step for Surgical Services Managers
 
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30
Preguntas de-repaso-capitulo-30
 
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC
2da Edicion Boletin Seguridad Operacional del IDAC
 
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.
LinkedIn, como crear un perfil profesional.
 

Similar to Risk Factory: Modems the Forgotten Back Door

Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security PerimetersEvent - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security PerimetersSomyos U.
 
NULL Mumbai NewsBytes
NULL Mumbai NewsBytesNULL Mumbai NewsBytes
NULL Mumbai NewsBytesVirajThakkar4
 
Cyper security & Ethical hacking
Cyper security & Ethical hackingCyper security & Ethical hacking
Cyper security & Ethical hackingCmano Kar
 
Hacking 1224807880385377-9
Hacking 1224807880385377-9Hacking 1224807880385377-9
Hacking 1224807880385377-9Geoff Pesimo
 
Security Assessment
Security AssessmentSecurity Assessment
Security AssessmentAnil Nayak
 
Module 3 (scanning)
Module 3 (scanning)Module 3 (scanning)
Module 3 (scanning)Wail Hassan
 
Security threats facing SA businessess
Security threats facing SA businessessSecurity threats facing SA businessess
Security threats facing SA businessessSensePost
 
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay Alive
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay AliveHow to Hack a Telecom and Stay Alive
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay AlivePositive Hack Days
 
Chapter 3 Computer Crimes
Chapter 3 Computer  CrimesChapter 3 Computer  Crimes
Chapter 3 Computer CrimesMar Soriano
 
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESSBASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESSMd Abu Syeem Dipu
 
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security ProfessionalIT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security Professionalciso_insights
 
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons Bulgaria
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons BulgariaInformation Security Fundamentals - New Horizons Bulgaria
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons BulgariaNew Horizons Bulgaria
 
Generic Voice Security Issues
Generic Voice Security IssuesGeneric Voice Security Issues
Generic Voice Security Issuesjasondewar
 
Keynote fx try harder 2 be yourself
Keynote fx   try harder 2 be yourselfKeynote fx   try harder 2 be yourself
Keynote fx try harder 2 be yourselfDefconRussia
 
How to hack a telecom and stay alive
How to hack a telecom and stay aliveHow to hack a telecom and stay alive
How to hack a telecom and stay aliveqqlan
 
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay aliveSergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay aliveDefconRussia
 

Similar to Risk Factory: Modems the Forgotten Back Door (20)

Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security PerimetersEvent - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
 
News bytes null 200314121904
News bytes null 200314121904News bytes null 200314121904
News bytes null 200314121904
 
NULL Mumbai NewsBytes
NULL Mumbai NewsBytesNULL Mumbai NewsBytes
NULL Mumbai NewsBytes
 
Cyper security & Ethical hacking
Cyper security & Ethical hackingCyper security & Ethical hacking
Cyper security & Ethical hacking
 
Hacking 1224807880385377-9
Hacking 1224807880385377-9Hacking 1224807880385377-9
Hacking 1224807880385377-9
 
Security Assessment
Security AssessmentSecurity Assessment
Security Assessment
 
Module 3 (scanning)
Module 3 (scanning)Module 3 (scanning)
Module 3 (scanning)
 
Security threats facing SA businessess
Security threats facing SA businessessSecurity threats facing SA businessess
Security threats facing SA businessess
 
Hacking by Pratyush Gupta
Hacking by Pratyush GuptaHacking by Pratyush Gupta
Hacking by Pratyush Gupta
 
Ratzan2
Ratzan2Ratzan2
Ratzan2
 
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay Alive
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay AliveHow to Hack a Telecom and Stay Alive
How to Hack a Telecom and Stay Alive
 
Chapter 3 Computer Crimes
Chapter 3 Computer  CrimesChapter 3 Computer  Crimes
Chapter 3 Computer Crimes
 
Ratzan2
Ratzan2Ratzan2
Ratzan2
 
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESSBASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
BASIC IT AND CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS
 
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security ProfessionalIT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
 
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons Bulgaria
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons BulgariaInformation Security Fundamentals - New Horizons Bulgaria
Information Security Fundamentals - New Horizons Bulgaria
 
Generic Voice Security Issues
Generic Voice Security IssuesGeneric Voice Security Issues
Generic Voice Security Issues
 
Keynote fx try harder 2 be yourself
Keynote fx   try harder 2 be yourselfKeynote fx   try harder 2 be yourself
Keynote fx try harder 2 be yourself
 
How to hack a telecom and stay alive
How to hack a telecom and stay aliveHow to hack a telecom and stay alive
How to hack a telecom and stay alive
 
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay aliveSergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
Sergey Gordeychik - How to hack a telecom and stay alive
 

More from Risk Crew

Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892
Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892
Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892Risk Crew
 
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891Risk Crew
 
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891Risk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a Hacker
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a HackerRisk Factory: Inside the Mind of a Hacker
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a HackerRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory The 2014 Numbers
Risk Factory The 2014 NumbersRisk Factory The 2014 Numbers
Risk Factory The 2014 NumbersRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best Practice
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best PracticeRisk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best Practice
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best PracticeRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big Data
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big DataRisk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big Data
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big DataRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013Risk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile Devices
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile DevicesRisk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile Devices
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile DevicesRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: PCI - The Essentials
Risk Factory: PCI - The EssentialsRisk Factory: PCI - The Essentials
Risk Factory: PCI - The EssentialsRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response Programme
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response ProgrammeRisk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response Programme
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response ProgrammeRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Beyond Data Leakage
Risk Factory: Beyond Data LeakageRisk Factory: Beyond Data Leakage
Risk Factory: Beyond Data LeakageRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment Industry
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment IndustryRisk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment Industry
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment IndustryRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Let's Get Physical
Risk Factory: Let's Get PhysicalRisk Factory: Let's Get Physical
Risk Factory: Let's Get PhysicalRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to Fit
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to FitRisk Factory: PCI Shrink to Fit
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to FitRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the Cloud
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the CloudRisk Factory: PCI Compliance in the Cloud
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the CloudRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron?
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron? Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron?
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron? Risk Crew
 
Risk Factory How to Steal an Identity
Risk Factory How to Steal an IdentityRisk Factory How to Steal an Identity
Risk Factory How to Steal an IdentityRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic Eavesdropping
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic EavesdroppingRisk Factory: The State of Electronic Eavesdropping
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic EavesdroppingRisk Crew
 
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best Practices
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best PracticesRisk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best Practices
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best PracticesRisk Crew
 

More from Risk Crew (20)

Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892
Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892
Riskfactorypcitheessentials 151125164111-lva1-app6892
 
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891
Pcishrinktofitpresentation 151125162550-lva1-app6891
 
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891
Databasetheft 151120161435-lva1-app6891
 
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a Hacker
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a HackerRisk Factory: Inside the Mind of a Hacker
Risk Factory: Inside the Mind of a Hacker
 
Risk Factory The 2014 Numbers
Risk Factory The 2014 NumbersRisk Factory The 2014 Numbers
Risk Factory The 2014 Numbers
 
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best Practice
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best PracticeRisk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best Practice
Risk Factory Information Security Coordination Challenges & Best Practice
 
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big Data
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big DataRisk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big Data
Risk Factory Big Daddy Digs Big Data
 
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013
Risk Factory: Top 10 Risks 2013
 
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile Devices
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile DevicesRisk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile Devices
Risk Factory: Getting a Grip on Mobile Devices
 
Risk Factory: PCI - The Essentials
Risk Factory: PCI - The EssentialsRisk Factory: PCI - The Essentials
Risk Factory: PCI - The Essentials
 
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response Programme
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response ProgrammeRisk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response Programme
Risk Factory: How to Implement an Effective Incident Response Programme
 
Risk Factory: Beyond Data Leakage
Risk Factory: Beyond Data LeakageRisk Factory: Beyond Data Leakage
Risk Factory: Beyond Data Leakage
 
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment Industry
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment IndustryRisk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment Industry
Risk Factory: Security Lessons From the Online Adult Entertainment Industry
 
Risk Factory: Let's Get Physical
Risk Factory: Let's Get PhysicalRisk Factory: Let's Get Physical
Risk Factory: Let's Get Physical
 
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to Fit
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to FitRisk Factory: PCI Shrink to Fit
Risk Factory: PCI Shrink to Fit
 
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the Cloud
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the CloudRisk Factory: PCI Compliance in the Cloud
Risk Factory: PCI Compliance in the Cloud
 
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron?
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron? Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron?
Risk Factory: Database Security: Oxymoron?
 
Risk Factory How to Steal an Identity
Risk Factory How to Steal an IdentityRisk Factory How to Steal an Identity
Risk Factory How to Steal an Identity
 
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic Eavesdropping
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic EavesdroppingRisk Factory: The State of Electronic Eavesdropping
Risk Factory: The State of Electronic Eavesdropping
 
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best Practices
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best PracticesRisk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best Practices
Risk Factory Geo-location Security Issues & Best Practices
 

Recently uploaded

Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdfhans926745
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsJoaquim Jorge
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...Martijn de Jong
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Servicegiselly40
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Scriptwesley chun
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...Neo4j
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityPrincipled Technologies
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Igalia
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreternaman860154
 
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxFactors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxKatpro Technologies
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessPixlogix Infotech
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slidespraypatel2
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsEnterprise Knowledge
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Drew Madelung
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024Rafal Los
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)Gabriella Davis
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
 
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxFactors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
 
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 SlidesSlack Application Development 101 Slides
Slack Application Development 101 Slides
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 

Risk Factory: Modems the Forgotten Back Door

  • 2. A Day in the Life
  • 3. Remember the 80’s ? 1980 John Lennon shot Pac-Man Super Trouper Empire Strikes Back
  • 4. Remember the 80’s ? 1980 1981 John Lennon shot JR Ewing shot Pac-Man Rubik's Cube Super Trouper Super Freak Empire Strikes Raiders Lost Ark Back
  • 5. Remember the 80’s ? 1980 1981 1982 John Lennon shot JR Ewing shot Reagan shot Pac-Man Rubik's Cube Trivial Pursuit Super Trouper Super Freak Don’t You Want Me Empire Strikes Raiders Lost Ark Back Tootsie
  • 6. Remember the 80’s ? 1980 1981 1982 1983 John Lennon shot JR Ewing shot Reagan shot My knees shot Pac-Man Rubik's Cube Trivial Pursuit Cabbage Patch Kids Super Trouper Super Freak Don’t You Want Me Thriller Empire Strikes Raiders Lost Ark Back Tootsie War Games
  • 7.
  • 8. Spark That Lit The Fire Sales of modems increased by a factor of 500 within 3 Public months of the release of the film “War Games” Private
  • 9. Remember When? Our biggest vulnerability Our biggest threat Public Private
  • 10. Super Phreaky – Yoaw! Phreak = "phone" + "freak". "Phreak", "phreaker“= names for people who participate in phreaking Phreaking = studying, experimenting with, or exploring telecoms systems, equipment or systems connected to telephone networks. Linked to hacking when networks went computerised. Now called the H/P culture (Hacking and Phreaking).
  • 11. War Dialer Process 1. Obtain exchanges 2. Configure & run dialer 3. Analyse carriers & identify devices 4. Connect to carriers identified 5. Brute force if prompted 6. Access granted
  • 12. Functions of a Modem • Dial-Out access – allows someone to subvert the firewall to get out • Dial-In access – allows remote access to an internal system via the PBX
  • 13. Dial-Out Access  Desktop devices, faxes, scanners, PCs  Primarily user internet-related activity  Use of unauthorised modems to circumvent firewall rules - access blocked internet material  Risk exposure is user-dependent and localised  Think data leakage  Risk commensurate with access privileges  Most organisations do not have a requirement for it
  • 14. Dial-Out Risks Firewall Unauthorised Material Your Organisation Network Trojan Horses & Configuration Server Modem Viruses Workstation Business Data Databases Information Server Leakage
  • 15. Dial-In Access  Business systems – servers - not PC-based  Think 3rd party managed devices  Increased likelihood business-critical system  Permits targeted rather than opportunistic attack  Time to map & exploit the system  System can remain compromised after the hacker disconnects  Likely to be untraceable  Most organisations have at least some requirement for dial-in access
  • 16. Your View 1. Bandwidth Manager 2. Exterior Router 3. Bastion Host (Firewall) 4. Interior Router 5. Network Switch 6. Application Servers 7. Network Storage 8. PBX 9. Voicemail 10. Modem Bank 11. RAS Server 12. Authentication Server 13. UPS 14. Air Conditioning 15. Building Access Control System
  • 17. Phreaker’s View 1. Bandwidth Manager 2. Exterior Router 3. Bastion Host (Firewall) 4. Interior Router 5. Network Switch 6. Application Servers 7. Network Storage 8. PBX 9. Voicemail 10. Modem Bank 11. RAS Server 12. Authentication Server 13. UPS 14. Air Conditioning 15. Building Access Control System
  • 18. Scale of Dial-In Threat  Large organisations: 1.5% – 2.5% of all telephone extensions provide dial-in access (up to 25 extensions per 1000 )  Small organisations: 2% - 3% of telephone extensions provide dial-in connectivity (up to 15 extensions per 500)
  • 19. Prevailing Opinion… "...most large companies are more vulnerable through poorly inventoried modem lines than via firewall-protected Internet gateways" Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets and Solutions. McClure, Scambray & Kurtz. Osborne,2008 “While remote access is not the only route that hackers use to attack networks, they often cite it as the easiest route in” Information Security Breaches Survey 2010: Remote Access. UK Department of Trade & Industry
  • 20. And yet…. DTI’s Information Security Breaches Survey cited it in 2004 by stating that … • Less than 2% surveyed checked for unauthorised modem access …but not since
  • 21. Managing Dial-Out Risk Non-PC based: • Configure dial-out under application control • Modem configured for “dial-out” only PC-based: • PBX monitoring – outbound call logging (restricted to DDI line logging) • Host-based solutions – anti-virus / host monitoring / configuration lockdown General: • Effective policy – user education, policing & enforcement
  • 22. Managing Dial-In Risk Managed through: • Review & confirm 3rd party access requirements • Change vendor defaults • SLA’s should address breach responsibilities • Implement appropriate controls (access restriction, authentication, dial-back) • Monitor – inbound call logging / alerting / read logs! • Effective policy – user education, policing & enforcement
  • 24. Todays’ War Dialer • WarVOX, Linux-based freeware available on Dark-Hack • Uses VoIP services to make up to 10,000 calls in an 8 hour period • Spoofs caller ID • IDs admin interfaces to PABX and IP based devices • Finds and copies/strips stored audio files and archives
  • 26. Some things never die, they just go out of fashion… Phreaking is the founding methodology of hackers. What makes you think its dead? Still the most dependable backdoor into a system.
  • 27. 26 Dover Street, London , W1S 4LY, United Kingdom +44 (0) 203 586 1025 www.orthusirm.com info@ orthusirm.com

Editor's Notes

  1. First hacker movie – set the mould. Established the archetype Based on a true story 16 year old broke into Pentagon systems Original screen play written in 1979 Stephen Falken = Stephen Hawking To have been played by John Lennon Made it cool to be a geek
  2. War dialer = term coined from movie
  3. War dialer = term coined from movie
  4. Old news Like …… never fades away – gets re-worked
  5. This is why you should be concerned