This is a presentation delivered by Mr Roberto Zadra, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014

1. Challenges and Opportunities Ahead of the NATO 2014 Summit
RUSI, 18 March 2014
• Thanks, good to be back. Start with 2 observations:
• First, in preparing for this year’s, I used title of this session as source of inspiration
and therefore asked the question: as we move towards Summit, do we face any
challenges or do we rather have opportunities?
• Since opportunity is the softer word I believe it is also the better word, because
Wales won’t be another milestone in development of BMD capability (after Lisbon
and Chicago). However looking beyond Wales we will still face some challenges.
• Second, preparing for today I also looked at what I said last year. I spoke a lot
about Russia and cooperation in the NRC@29. Well not again. This year I will
focus on NATO@28, for the simple reason that our dialogue with Russia has
stalled. Reasons:
o last autumn Russia called for a “pause” on BMD;
o this spring, following the most recent crisis over the Crimea, NATO asked for
a “suspension” of all activities;
o the “window of opportunity” I talked about last year appears to be gone. Look
forward to hear what my colleagues in the panel will have to say on this.
• Let me now comment on challenges and opportunities ahead for NATO, before
Wales but also after Wales.
Opportunities for Wales
• Two points. First, current NATO BMD Interim Capability relies heavily on US
contributing and paying for it (radar in TU, AEGIS ship in Mediterranean, EPAA
phases).
o Wales could be an opportunity to show that we aim to make the capability
“more robust” also from a transatlantic perspective, through additional
European contributions. This would also demonstrate a somewhat more
‘equal’ transatlantic burden sharing.

2. o This could be done e.g. through (list not exhaustive):
additional voluntary national contributions (sensors, interceptors)
additional joint training and exercises
contribute to BMD force protection
multinational cooperative projects under SD umbrella
o As said before, for NATO BMD Wales will be more of an opportunity than a
challenge. There will be more opportunities to make Interim Capability more
robust, also after Wales.
o NATO BMD will continue to rely on voluntary national contributions, only C2
is financed by all 28 together.
• Second, as said earlier, Wales won’t be another BMD milestone after Lisbon and
Chicago. Next milestones will most likely be reaching and declaring IOC and FOC.
o Details and timelines for declaring IOC and FOC are not yet defined, but this
reflection has started.
o If I had to look into crystal ball, my guess would be IOC hopefully in a couple
of years from now, FOC will take longer.
o Wales could be an opportunity to decide by when we should aim to reach
and declare IOC. But am speculating.
o Wales would in any case be too soon to declare IOC. What we can do
between now and Wales is continue to refine what we have - the BMD
Interim Capability and the existing arrangements for its use if required.
Challenges after Wales
• You could ask: what about Russia?
o As Chair of the WG and as a bridge-builder by nature I was fully committed
to the dialogue and attempt to achieve NRC MD cooperation.
o However, personal disappointments aside and looking at the current climate,
I have a hard time imagining that we will pick this up again at 29 any time
soon, if at all. However hope to be corrected. We shall see.
o While this was a challenge since 2009 and particularly since Lisbon NRC
Summit, is it still the case? I personally have my doubts. But I have no
doubts that NATO BMD will move forward.

3. • Challenge 1: make NATO BMD capability more robust, by having Europeans
contributing more (on a voluntary basis) and ameliorate burden sharing. Currently
the bulk in terms of capability and financial contribution is being offered by the
United States.
• Challenge 2: have all conditions met to allow us to declare BMD IOC.
o What are these conditions? Cannot list them all as discussions still ongoing,
however will likely include
capability development (implementation of EPAA + hopefully
additional voluntary national contributions)
further elaborated command and control arrangements
• agreement on C2 arrangements (incl. defence design + ROE)
was key prior to Chicago. Interim Capability would not have
been declared without prior agreement on such arrangements
• we have to do it, many European Allies never tire to point out
that political control over military action is a must
progress in the programmatic domain – continue developing
necessary BMC3I functionalities enabling truly integrated IAMD
operations planning and execution
consideration of evolution of threat posed by BM proliferation
considerations on the wider political setting, including consequence
management, legal aspects, relations with third states
o It is one thing to announce a goal, and another to reach it on time. This
should be feasible, however previous experience indicates it could also be
challenging – hence the word challenge here is probably appropriate.
• In conclusion, the collective learning curve has been and is still steep, on a
number of issues. But record so far has been encouraging, if it continues we
should be able to get there.