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SECURITY DESIGN PATTERNS
Ofer Rivlin
Product Security Architecture Lead
1
5TH ISRAELI CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
Product security architecture lead at CyberArk
10 years as a cybersecurity architect and researcher
10 years as a software & system architect & developer
(not overlapping )
Passionate about innovative technology and cybersecurity
OFER RIVLIN
2
Review of 4 security design patterns
Covering description & standard, examples, threats and risks of fixing after the fact
• Clear separation between layers
• Segregate components
• Centralized security controls
• Fail securely
• Minimize attack surface area
• Separation of concerns (duties)
• Principle of defense in depth
AGENDA
3
• Avoid security by obscurity
• Principle of least privilege
• Zero trust
• Establish secure defaults
• Use a low-privilege account for app components
• Keep sensitive data out of client-side code
• Keep security simple
• . . .
Review of 4 security design patterns
Covering description & standard, examples, threats and risks of fixing after the fact
• Clear separation between layers
• Segregate components
• Centralized security controls
• Fail securely
• Minimize attack surface area
• Separation of concerns (duties)
• Principle of defense in depth
AGENDA
4
• Avoid security by obscurity
• Principle of least privilege
• Zero trust
• Establish secure defaults
• Use a low-privilege account for app components
• Keep sensitive data out of client-side code
• Keep security simple
• . . .
• Security layer
• Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there
are vulnerabilities
WHY DESIGN PATTERNS
5
• Security layer
• Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there
are vulnerabilities
• Must be part of any architecture
WHY DESIGN PATTERNS
6
• Security layer
• Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there
are vulnerabilities
• Must be part of any architecture from day #1
WHY DESIGN PATTERNS
7
8
CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN LAYERS
Ensure there is a clear separation between the
data - controller – display
layers
such that security decisions can be enforced on
trusted systems
CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN LAYERS
9
10
• Malicious code injected as ‘Data’ and executed by the Controller
• Malicious code execution and affects Data Confidentiality and Integrity
• Confidential data exposed by Presentation layer
THREATS
11
12
• Very high effort
• Redesign and re-implementing big parts of the solution
RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT
13
14
SEGREGATE COMPONENTS
Ensure that components are
segregated
via a defined security control such as
network segmentation
firewall rules
etc.
SEGREGATE COMPONENTS WITH SECURITY CONTROLS
15
16
• Adversaries and malicious code travel between components
• No authorization control between the different components
THREATS
17
18
Server SK
Server PK
• Potential for a very high effort
• May require redesign and reimplementation due to dependencies
• May require redesign of the authorization model
RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT
19
20
CENTRALIZED SECURITY CONTROLS
Verify that all security controls
(including libraries that call external security services)
have a
Centralized
implementation
CENTRALIZED IMPLEMENTATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS
21
22
• Authentication
• Authorization
• Input validation
• Output validation (XSS, errors, etc.)
• Audit logging
• APIs and pages
• Anti CSRF
EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED CONTROLS
23
• Missing Controls (forgotten)
• Not updated Controls
THREATS
24
• Very high effort
• Rewiring of every object to this control, sometimes in several places.
• Risk of forgetting to connect objects or different places
• Similar to implementing non-centralized controls
RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT
25
26
FAIL SECURELY
The solution should always
stay secure
also in a failure
FAIL SECURELY
27
28
29
Android debug bridge daemon
Android Host
30
31
32
33
Android Host
Android debug bridge daemon
34
Android Host
Android debug bridge daemon
35
36
37
38
39
SUMMARY
• Security layer
• Must be part of any architecture from day #1
SUMMARY
40
SUMMARY
41
We reviewed these patterns
• Clear separation between layers
• Segregate components
• Centralized security controls
• Fail securely
We reviewed these patterns
• Clear separation between layers
• Segregate components
• Centralized security controls
• Fail securely
SUMMARY
42
Not covered patterns in this talk
• Minimize attack surface area
• Separation of concerns (duties)
• Principle of defense in depth
• Avoid security by obscurity
• Principle of least privilege
• Zero trust
• Establish secure defaults
• Use a low-privilege account for app components
• Keep sensitive data out of client-side code
• Keep security simple
• . . .
THANK YOU!
Ofer Rivlin
Product Security Architecture Lead
ofer.rivlin@cyberark.com
43

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Security architecture design patterns iltam 2018 - ofer rivlin

  • 1. SECURITY DESIGN PATTERNS Ofer Rivlin Product Security Architecture Lead 1 5TH ISRAELI CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
  • 2. Product security architecture lead at CyberArk 10 years as a cybersecurity architect and researcher 10 years as a software & system architect & developer (not overlapping ) Passionate about innovative technology and cybersecurity OFER RIVLIN 2
  • 3. Review of 4 security design patterns Covering description & standard, examples, threats and risks of fixing after the fact • Clear separation between layers • Segregate components • Centralized security controls • Fail securely • Minimize attack surface area • Separation of concerns (duties) • Principle of defense in depth AGENDA 3 • Avoid security by obscurity • Principle of least privilege • Zero trust • Establish secure defaults • Use a low-privilege account for app components • Keep sensitive data out of client-side code • Keep security simple • . . .
  • 4. Review of 4 security design patterns Covering description & standard, examples, threats and risks of fixing after the fact • Clear separation between layers • Segregate components • Centralized security controls • Fail securely • Minimize attack surface area • Separation of concerns (duties) • Principle of defense in depth AGENDA 4 • Avoid security by obscurity • Principle of least privilege • Zero trust • Establish secure defaults • Use a low-privilege account for app components • Keep sensitive data out of client-side code • Keep security simple • . . .
  • 5. • Security layer • Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there are vulnerabilities WHY DESIGN PATTERNS 5
  • 6. • Security layer • Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there are vulnerabilities • Must be part of any architecture WHY DESIGN PATTERNS 6
  • 7. • Security layer • Well designed architecture can prevent attacks even if there are vulnerabilities • Must be part of any architecture from day #1 WHY DESIGN PATTERNS 7
  • 9. Ensure there is a clear separation between the data - controller – display layers such that security decisions can be enforced on trusted systems CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN LAYERS 9
  • 10. 10
  • 11. • Malicious code injected as ‘Data’ and executed by the Controller • Malicious code execution and affects Data Confidentiality and Integrity • Confidential data exposed by Presentation layer THREATS 11
  • 12. 12
  • 13. • Very high effort • Redesign and re-implementing big parts of the solution RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT 13
  • 15. Ensure that components are segregated via a defined security control such as network segmentation firewall rules etc. SEGREGATE COMPONENTS WITH SECURITY CONTROLS 15
  • 16. 16
  • 17. • Adversaries and malicious code travel between components • No authorization control between the different components THREATS 17
  • 19. • Potential for a very high effort • May require redesign and reimplementation due to dependencies • May require redesign of the authorization model RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT 19
  • 21. Verify that all security controls (including libraries that call external security services) have a Centralized implementation CENTRALIZED IMPLEMENTATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS 21
  • 22. 22
  • 23. • Authentication • Authorization • Input validation • Output validation (XSS, errors, etc.) • Audit logging • APIs and pages • Anti CSRF EXAMPLES OF AFFECTED CONTROLS 23
  • 24. • Missing Controls (forgotten) • Not updated Controls THREATS 24
  • 25. • Very high effort • Rewiring of every object to this control, sometimes in several places. • Risk of forgetting to connect objects or different places • Similar to implementing non-centralized controls RISKS OF FIXING AFTER THE FACT 25
  • 27. The solution should always stay secure also in a failure FAIL SECURELY 27
  • 28. 28
  • 29. 29 Android debug bridge daemon Android Host
  • 30. 30
  • 31. 31
  • 32. 32
  • 35. 35
  • 36. 36
  • 37. 37
  • 38. 38
  • 40. • Security layer • Must be part of any architecture from day #1 SUMMARY 40
  • 41. SUMMARY 41 We reviewed these patterns • Clear separation between layers • Segregate components • Centralized security controls • Fail securely
  • 42. We reviewed these patterns • Clear separation between layers • Segregate components • Centralized security controls • Fail securely SUMMARY 42 Not covered patterns in this talk • Minimize attack surface area • Separation of concerns (duties) • Principle of defense in depth • Avoid security by obscurity • Principle of least privilege • Zero trust • Establish secure defaults • Use a low-privilege account for app components • Keep sensitive data out of client-side code • Keep security simple • . . .
  • 43. THANK YOU! Ofer Rivlin Product Security Architecture Lead ofer.rivlin@cyberark.com 43