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Catching up with today's malicious actors
Current security posture and future possible actions
OWASP EEE Bucharest Event 2015
Adrian Ifrim
Disclaimer
The content of this presentation does not reflect the official
opinion of the my current employer or former employers.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in
the presentation lies entirely with the author.
id -un
Adrian Ifrim
cat .bash_history | grep jobs
- Helpdesk/Network Administrator
- Junior System Administrator
- Support Engineer
- IS Analyst
- IT Auditor
- Tech Security Lead
uname -a
• cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep hobbies
- Information Security
- Information Security
- Information Security
- Information Security
Chapter 1
Current state
Who are we dealing with?
• State sponsored attacks
• Organized Hacking Teams
• State-sponsored hackers: hybrid armies
• Terrorist organizations
• One-man-show
• Internal disgruntled employees
• Malicious vendors – Software/Hardware
• Trusted Third Party
What are their strengths?
• Time
• Unlimited budget
• Open source tools
• Open Knowledge base (the Internet)
• No bureaucratic approvals
• New tricks up their sleeves (0days)
• Strong Motive (financial, political, patriotic, fun)
Who do we usually have?
• Small teams of security professionals
• Limited time
• Limited budgets
• Limited tools (if you don't have support you cant use it)
• Bureaucratic approvals
• Security testing requirements
Losing the war - Tools
• Anti-Virus
 veil framework
 backdoor factory
 mitmf
 metasploit
 powershell
 wmic
 vbscript
• Cost to make an undetected virus ~ 0
Losing the war – More tools
• Maintained by people for the people
 Firewalls/Routers/Switches )
 Web Site filtering
 Data Leakage Protection
 Web Application Firewalls
 Database Activity Monitoring
 SIEMs
 Vulnerability scanners
 IDS/IPS
 Anti Malware
 etc
Losing the war: Monitoring those tools
• Maintained by people for the people
• Various time formats
• Various log formats
• Alert/parsing configuration
• Huge number of events
The hype:
• Stagefright bug
 Scary but not working on latest version of Android
 Other countries may be affected :)
• Heartbleed
 http://siui.casan.ro/cnas/ is protected btw (no certificate)
 introduced in 2012 and publicly disclosed in 2014
• Various 0days: flash,adobe reader, windows, osx, android, php, anti-virus
Start being afraid of the right things
Your real problems:
• Your assets. The inventory
• Personnel
• ~6000days
• Everyone's a coder
• Availability
• Did you know you use IPv6? Yeah you do
• Tools
• Old mindsets
• Credentials everywhere
• No two factor
• No encryption
• Wireless
• Monitoring
• APT (Antivirus Fail)
• Unauthorized tools
Various questions and answers
received over the years
• Why would I need security advisory in change management?
• I know all my systems
• But we do vulnerability scanning
• If its internal they can't get in and we should not use encryption
• Our anti-virus definitions are up-to-date
Chapter 2
Future State of Security
It's over
• Traditional ways of protecting our networks are not working anymore
• The victory of 300 Spartans is a not quite true:
• 300 Spartans
• 700 Thespians
• 400 Thebans
• and perhaps a few hundred others
• most of whom were killed.
But people say
• Waving the white flag means you've lost
• You're compromised and you don't even know it.
Are you a target?
Start being afraid of the right things
• 80%+ percent of you problems come from 20% of you issues
• Exploiting the 20% problems left would require some skills
• It's OK to fail.
• It's NOT OK not to know that you have failed or failing over and over again
Understand what you are trying to protect
Next steps
• Artificial intelligence
• Self-protecting mechanism just like the human immune system
• Shape-shifting networks
• Big Data
• Advanced Honeypots
• On the fly patching
Next steps
• Listening
• Learning
• Doing
The future is here
• Checkout DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge
The challenge:
Systems will autonomously create network defenses, deploy patches and
mitigations, monitor the network, and evaluate the defenses of competitors.
• Sounds like something the US would do 
What we will need to do
• Gather all information
• From all devices
• Process that information
• Identify malicious events and patterns
• Establish automated alerts
• Establish automated decisions and actions
What we will need to do
• Establish correct incident response plans
• Create production like environments
• Add this layer on top of the old layers
• Automate as much as you can
Q&A
Wait, what are you trying to say?

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[Bucharest] Catching up with today's malicious actors

  • 1. Catching up with today's malicious actors Current security posture and future possible actions OWASP EEE Bucharest Event 2015 Adrian Ifrim
  • 2. Disclaimer The content of this presentation does not reflect the official opinion of the my current employer or former employers. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the presentation lies entirely with the author.
  • 3. id -un Adrian Ifrim cat .bash_history | grep jobs - Helpdesk/Network Administrator - Junior System Administrator - Support Engineer - IS Analyst - IT Auditor - Tech Security Lead
  • 4. uname -a • cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep hobbies - Information Security - Information Security - Information Security - Information Security
  • 6. Who are we dealing with? • State sponsored attacks • Organized Hacking Teams • State-sponsored hackers: hybrid armies • Terrorist organizations • One-man-show • Internal disgruntled employees • Malicious vendors – Software/Hardware • Trusted Third Party
  • 7. What are their strengths? • Time • Unlimited budget • Open source tools • Open Knowledge base (the Internet) • No bureaucratic approvals • New tricks up their sleeves (0days) • Strong Motive (financial, political, patriotic, fun)
  • 8. Who do we usually have? • Small teams of security professionals • Limited time • Limited budgets • Limited tools (if you don't have support you cant use it) • Bureaucratic approvals • Security testing requirements
  • 9. Losing the war - Tools • Anti-Virus  veil framework  backdoor factory  mitmf  metasploit  powershell  wmic  vbscript • Cost to make an undetected virus ~ 0
  • 10. Losing the war – More tools • Maintained by people for the people  Firewalls/Routers/Switches )  Web Site filtering  Data Leakage Protection  Web Application Firewalls  Database Activity Monitoring  SIEMs  Vulnerability scanners  IDS/IPS  Anti Malware  etc
  • 11. Losing the war: Monitoring those tools • Maintained by people for the people • Various time formats • Various log formats • Alert/parsing configuration • Huge number of events
  • 12. The hype: • Stagefright bug  Scary but not working on latest version of Android  Other countries may be affected :) • Heartbleed  http://siui.casan.ro/cnas/ is protected btw (no certificate)  introduced in 2012 and publicly disclosed in 2014 • Various 0days: flash,adobe reader, windows, osx, android, php, anti-virus
  • 13. Start being afraid of the right things Your real problems: • Your assets. The inventory • Personnel • ~6000days • Everyone's a coder • Availability • Did you know you use IPv6? Yeah you do • Tools • Old mindsets • Credentials everywhere • No two factor • No encryption • Wireless • Monitoring • APT (Antivirus Fail) • Unauthorized tools
  • 14. Various questions and answers received over the years • Why would I need security advisory in change management? • I know all my systems • But we do vulnerability scanning • If its internal they can't get in and we should not use encryption • Our anti-virus definitions are up-to-date
  • 15. Chapter 2 Future State of Security
  • 16. It's over • Traditional ways of protecting our networks are not working anymore • The victory of 300 Spartans is a not quite true: • 300 Spartans • 700 Thespians • 400 Thebans • and perhaps a few hundred others • most of whom were killed.
  • 17. But people say • Waving the white flag means you've lost • You're compromised and you don't even know it. Are you a target?
  • 18. Start being afraid of the right things • 80%+ percent of you problems come from 20% of you issues • Exploiting the 20% problems left would require some skills • It's OK to fail. • It's NOT OK not to know that you have failed or failing over and over again
  • 19. Understand what you are trying to protect
  • 20. Next steps • Artificial intelligence • Self-protecting mechanism just like the human immune system • Shape-shifting networks • Big Data • Advanced Honeypots • On the fly patching
  • 21. Next steps • Listening • Learning • Doing
  • 22. The future is here • Checkout DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge The challenge: Systems will autonomously create network defenses, deploy patches and mitigations, monitor the network, and evaluate the defenses of competitors. • Sounds like something the US would do 
  • 23. What we will need to do • Gather all information • From all devices • Process that information • Identify malicious events and patterns • Establish automated alerts • Establish automated decisions and actions
  • 24. What we will need to do • Establish correct incident response plans • Create production like environments • Add this layer on top of the old layers • Automate as much as you can
  • 25. Q&A Wait, what are you trying to say?