NKIF eJournal Oct 2014

NORSK KINESISK
INGENIØRFORENING
10.2014
Editor: Min Shi

Introduction
About NKIF
Norsk Kinesisk Ingeniørforening (NKIF) is a non-profit, professional
association dedicated to providing professional networking
opportunities and promoting technology application. It is officially
founded and registered in Oslo in 2014 and is open to all professions
in Oil & Gas, Maritime and other relevant industries. The NKIF
members include engineers, professors, research scientists,
university postgraduate and undergraduate students etc. from both
China and Norway.
NKIF is organized by a Board with board members elected every
second year by all NKIF individual and corporate members. The
board members are unpaid volunteers with supports from all the
members. The operation of NKIF will be open and transparent.
NKIF is committed to:
 Promoting the professional network and collaboration both
within NKIF and with other associations
 Encouraging experience and knowledge sharing
 Supporting professional development
 Strengthening cooperation between industries and academia
world widely
 Being the bridge between the industries in China and Norway
I

NKIF provides:
 Technical seminar and lectures
 Career development forum
 Continuously updated latest industry events
 Publication of NKIF newsletter
 NKIF journal with technical and overview articles for relevant
engineering disciplines
 Posting of job opportunities from NKIF corporate members
Benefits as a NKIF Member:
 Free to all NKIF organized events, e.g. technical
seminars/workshops
 Free subscription to NKIF newsletters and journals
 Informed with job opportunities in both Norway and China
 Expanded professional network towards companies and
engineers
II

分享，坚持，收获 – 创刊词
时序中秋，金风送爽，正值挪威王国宪法颁布 200 年庆，在广
大旅挪华人的关怀下，挪威华人工程师协会在挪威王国的首都奥斯
陆初始创立。
挪威，人口虽然只有区区五百万之数，但是许多科技确实站立
在世界的前列，如众所周知的，海洋学，石油，船舶，桥梁，渔业，
等等。在这诸多的领域中，优秀华人工程师的身影屡见不鲜。随着
华人工程师人群的不断扩大，华人工程师内部的技术信息交流变得
越来越迫切。同时，随着中国国力的不断增强，挪威工业界对中国
广阔市场的兴趣也变得越发强烈，未来两国间科技合作的范围也将
势必越来越广阔。NKIF 正是在这种情况下成立，正可谓是生逢其时。
作为 NKIF 向外界传播声音的渠道。NKIF 期刊也同时创刊了。
分享，坚持，收获！作为 NKIF 创立之初的理念，也是我们这个期
刊将要秉承的理念。通过分享，我们交互信息，汲取营养；坚持，
则是我们达成目标必有的决心；有过分享，有过坚持，从中获得事
业的成功正是我们这份期刊希望最终带给每位会员的最终收获！
“海纳百川取则行远”。NKIF 期刊虽然刚刚诞生，起步，尚是
一株幼苗，但是，从诞生之日她便被寄望怀有“海纳百川”的胸怀和气
魄，真诚希望大家都来关心她、爱护她、支持她，诚望各个学界的
会员，积极支持期刊的工作，使她在所有成员的努力关怀中，健康
成长，发展壮大。愿她既成为 NKIF 的窗口和阵地，更成为联系各
学界同仁的桥梁和纽带，真正为所有在挪华人的工作和事业的发展
做出贡献。
今天是我们的第一次见面，希望在很久以后，这份期刊依旧陪
伴在你的左右！
III

Share, Insistence and Harvest
– in front of the Journal
Coincided with the promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Norway celebrate 200 years, under the care from all communities, the
Norwegian Association of Chinese engineers is founded in Oslo, Norway.
Norway, a country with only around five million populations, but with
many science and technologies did stand in the forefront of the world,
such as, maritime, petroleum, fishing, and so on. There are many
outstanding Chinese engineers involved in those industry areas. With the
expanding of Chinese engineers in Norway, technical information
exchange between the Chinese engineers become more and more urgent.
Meanwhile, with China economy growing, the interest for Chinese vast
market has become more intense in the Norwegian industry; the scientific
and technological cooperation between the two countries will also be
bound to increasingly broad. NKIF is established based on the goal of
networking and communication.
As NKIF sound communication channels to the outside world. NKIF also
founded its own journal. Share, Persistence and Harvest! As a concept
NKIF inception, but also we will be adhering to this journal of
philosophy. By sharing, we interact with information, absorb knowledge;
Insistence, it is our determination to achieve our goals; to drive career
success is what we hope to bring to each member the final Harvest!
Today is our first meeting, in the hope, long long after, the journal will
still accompany you around!
Haifeng Wu
2014-10-24
IV

Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………I
Preface………………………………………………………III
Marine Hydrodynamics with Applications on Ships and
Offshore Structures – A Brief Introduction ………………..1
Norway – a shipping nation ………………………………..9
SCADA Security: Vital for a country………………………12
ASSETS FULL LIFE CYCLE RISK MANAGEMENT…………...19
Introduction of offshore pipeline– (I) the status overview in
NCS…………………………………………………………25
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Marine Hydrodynamics with Applications on Ships and Offshore
Structures – A Brief Introduction
Yanlin Shao
shao.yanlin1981@gmail.com
Introduction
A brief overview is made to some of the important marine hydrodynamic problems related to
maritime transportation and offshore oil and gas exploration. Seakeeping dealing with global
motions and loads on ships, maneuvering dealing with the control of ships and resistance &
propulsion associated with energy efficiency are the most relevant hydrodynamic topics in the
shipping industry. Most of the offshore structures are exposed to the environmental condition
without possibility of avoiding the heavy weather as the ships can do. Related hydrodynamics
challenges are discussed in relation to offshore structures operating in shallow, intermediate
and deep water areas.
Only a few of the important marine hydrodynamic problems are introduced, with many other
important hydrodynamics-related topics not touched upon in this article. Examples are deep
water marine operations, offshore wind and wave energy devices and sloshing in LNG tanks.
Maritime industry
Within the maritime industry, marine hydrodynamics is traditionally divided into three sub-topics,
e.g. seakeeping, maneuvering and resistance & propulsion.
Seakeeping related problems
Seakeeping deals with the motions responses and global wave loads of the ship in waves, which
may have a direct consequence on for example capsizing of ships, the structural damage of ship
hull and comfortableness of crew on board.
The famous Norwegian Viking ship Saga Siglar which travelled around the world during 1983-
1984 capsized outside Barcelona in a storm. Recently seakeeping study based on model tests in
Marintek for Saga Siglar showed that this vessel could not survive in waves with maximum
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wave height 12 meters. Saga Siglar was 16.5 meters long and has a 0.6 meters draft in ballast
condition and 1.3 meters draft when loaded with cargo. Figure 1 shows the artist impression of
Saga Siglar.
Figure 1 Artist impression of Saga Siglar
Structural dynamic response of the ship when travelling in waves occurs due to the dynamic loading.
This phenomenon is referred as springing and whipping in the literature. Springing and whipping
introduce significant fatigue damage to the ship hull and contribute to the maximum stress in the ship
hull structures. This is of particular interests for larger ships which tend to be more and more flexible
from a structural dynamics point of view. The lengths of new-building increase dramatically year by year.
The world-largest container ship is 398 meters long and 58 meter in width (based on data until 2013).
On 17 June 2013, the Japanese container ship MOL Comfort suffered a crack amidships in bad weather
about 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) off the coast of Yemen and eventually broke into two. See
Figure 2. It is believed by researchers that springing and whipping have been part of the important
reasons for the failure of the ship structure of MOL Comfort.
Figure 2 Mol Comfort broken in progress
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Ship motions also limit the comfortableness of crew and passengers on board. People on board of a ship
may feel seasick when the acceleration of the ship exceeds certain values. This occurs for ships travelling
in bad weather, accompanied by large amplitude ship motions.
Maneuvering related problems
Maneuvering means that a ship master is operating the ship by turning, course-keeping, accelerating,
decelerating or backing the ship. We can make analogy of ship maneuvering to a driver operating the car.
One example of maneuvering is replenishment between two ships. Replenishment is a method of
transferring fuel, munitions, and stores from one ship to another while under way. Replenishment
operation in open sea is considered “the most dangerous naval operation in peacetime”. The two ships
tend to pull each other together due to the hydrodynamic interaction effects. Similar phenomenon
occurs when for vessel moving in ports is due to ship-ship interactions or ship-port structure interactions,
the last being, for instance, bank suction effects where banks can also be submerged structures or local
water depth changes. As consequence, ship collision or grounding may occur.
Figure 3 Bird view of a craft carrier under replenishment operation
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Resistance and propulsion
The power of the installed propulsion machinery on board of the ships should be enough to overcome
the possible maximum resistance from the water applied on the ship and maintain the speed at
specified speed. In case of insufficient power, the ship may lose its planned speed when travelling in
waves leading to delays of cargo delivery. On the other hand, unnecessarily larger propulsion system is
costly and not energy efficient. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has developed the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) to measure the level of energy efficiency of a ship. This has been
adopted and entered into force from January 1st, 2013 as a mandatory requirement, requiring a
minimum energy efficiency level for all the new ships.
The increased awareness from the shipping industry to reduce the environmental impact by aggressively
lowering its emissions to air combined with uncertainties in volatile fuel costs, has resulted in the need
for highly optimized hull forms and propulsion systems. The ship resistance can be improving the hull
efficiency (e.g. optimized streamline hull form design + Trim and draft optimization), propulsion
efficiency and the power plant efficiency on board the ship. Taking a fuel saving of 2% for example, the
fuel saves for a handy-size bulk carrier is about 80 tonnes with cost saving about 50,000 USD per year.
With a fuel saving of 2%, a cape-size bulk carrier saves around 200 tonnes corresponding to
approximately 120,000 USD per year.
Offshore oil and gas industry
From hydrodynamic points of view, one of the essential differences between the ships and the offshore
structures is that most of the production offshore units are permanently positioned (by for example
mooring system or dynamic positioning system; or the combination of both) at the oil field and thus not
able to avoid the heavy weather as the ship can do by escaping from the area of the storms. The design
of offshore structures and positioning system should be robust enough to survive in extreme
environmental conditions.
Looking back to the offshore oil & gas industry, the activities moves gradually from near shore area with
shallow water depth to deeper waters. Depending on the water depth, different concepts apply. It has
been popular to use the bottom-fixed concepts, e.g. Jacket and Jack-up platforms in the shallow water.
For intermediate water depths, both the bottom-fixed platforms and the floating systems (such as
FPSOs, semi-submersibles and TLPs) are in use. With even deeper water depths, it is more economical to
use floating system. See Figure 4 for different offshore platform concepts in different water areas.
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Figure 4 Concepts of offshore structures in shallow-, intermediate- and deep water depth.
Shallow water challenging
Since most of the offshore structures in the shallow water region are fixed to or sitting on the sea floor.
The wave induced motions of the structures are not a concern. From hydrodynamics point of view , one
of the major challenges for the offshore oil & gas activities in near shore area is the highly nonlinear
shallow water waves and the resulting extreme wave loading on the structures, e.g. the bottom-fixed
offshore platform. The same challenges apply for the offshore wind industry, where wave impacts
introduce significant structural dynamics of the wind turbines.
As a physics process, when the waves from deep wave enter the shallow water region, they slow down,
grow taller, change shape and eventually break. See an example of a plugging breaking wave in Figure 5.
The velocity of the water on the tip of a breaking wave is very high, which can potentially lead to very
large impact forces and damage on the offshore structures. Breaking waves passing through a jacket oil
platform is depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 5 Large horizontal velocity on the tip of a breaking wave.
Figure 6 Breaking wave passing by a jacket platform
Challenges related to offshore floating system
The floating offshore systems are normally positioned by mooring lines, dynamic positioning system or
the combination of both. To understand the physics in the simplest way, one may consider offshore
floating system as sketched in Figure 7. The offshore floating unit is modeled by a large mass exposed to
wind, current and waves. The large mass is connected to seafloor by mooring lines and risers. Due to the
soft stiffness of the mooring lines, most of the floating system has large natural period in order of 100
seconds for the horizontal motions. The ocean waves do not have significant energy to directly excite
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the resonant horizontal motion of the moored offshore structures. However, due to the complex
nonlinear evolution the waves themselves and their nonlinear interactions with the floating structures,
the resonant motions still occur in reality. Since both the stiffness and damping are small, even a small
excitation force can results in large horizontal motions of the floating structures. This motion is often
referred as ‘slow-drift’ motion which is very important in the mooring system design. As a consequence
of large ‘slow-drift’ motions, the mooring lines suffer large dynamic loading which potentially lead to
damage of mooring system.
Mooring system failure incidents with line breakage have been experienced on several rigs and FPSO's in
the Norwegian and UK offshore sectors during recent years. Most of them are related to moderate-to-heavy
sea states, typically estimated to correspond to around 1-year storms. A direct cause is believed
to be overload from extreme and steep waves or wave groups that could lead to larger slowly varying
wave forces and larger resulting offsets than was expected from use of standard prediction tools.
Figure 7 Simplified model for offshore floating system connected to seafloor with mooring lines/risers while exposed to
environmental condition including wind, current and waves.
In principal, the mooring system and the floating system (modeled as large mass) are fully coupled.
When the weights of the mooring lines and risers are much smaller relative to the ‘large mass’ alone,
the system can be de-coupled. However, for deep water facilities, the mooring system and risers are
heavier which makes the coupling effects more and more important.
New challenges in deep and ultra-deep water challenges
Oil and gas production moves into increasingly deeper water towards 3000m depth. The fact that about
80% of oceans are deeper than 3km opens for challenging explorations, mappings and industrial
developments in a long-term perspective. The floating offshore structures are easily exposed to harsh
environmental conditions when they are far away from the shore. One example is the Freak waves
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characterized by an unusual large ratio between maximum wave height and significant wave height
were measured at Draupner.
Current and internal waves are of more concern than free-surface waves for ultra-deep structures.
Internal waves are gravity waves that oscillate within, rather than on the surface of, a fluid medium. To
exist, the fluid must be stratified meaning that the density decreases continuously or discontinuously
with height due to changes. Internal waves were governing in the design of APL loading buoy at Lufeng,
South China Sea. Since the characteristic time of the considered internal waves are 20 minutes, they act
as a steady current with strong variations over a depth of about 300m. The maximum horizontal velocity
is around 3m/s in a 100-year return period.
Disclaimer
All the pictures adopted in this article were found and downloaded from internet. If you own rights to
any of the images and do not want them to appear here, please contact the author and they will be
promptly removed.
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Norway – a shipping nation
Xiaogang Tao
VP of NKIF
9
General
Norway is among the largest and most advanced maritime nations in the world. Norway is one of the
few countries with an effectively complete maritime cluster, with shipping companies, shipyards,
equipment manufacturers, classification societies, shipbrokers, insurers and financial institutions among
the world’s best. Competence and technology have made the Norwegian maritime industry a global
leader.
The maritime industry in Norway employs 100,000 people and creates value of some NOK 150 billion
per annum. Norwegian shipping companies operate advanced industrial shipping, including chemical
tankers, ro-ro vessels, gas freighters and bulk carriers, and are enjoying particularly strong growth in
offshore-related activities. The Norwegian maritime industry has demonstrated its ability to create a
world-leading maritime cluster based on knowledge and innovation. Two areas are particularly
important for Norwegian Maritime Industry: Artic Shipping and Offshore.
The Arctic – New opportunities for Norwegian industry
The US Geological Survey has maintained its estimate indicating that 23 per cent of the world’s
undiscovered petroleum resources will be found north of the Arctic Circle. The majority of these are
assumed to lie offshore. If extraction were to accelerate in earnest, this would generate a considerable
level of activity in the Arctic, especially for the maritime industry. Polar transit traffic to Asia also has
significant potential. The increase in the last three years has been large, even though the 46 transits in
2012 remain a modest overall total. There is also a large growth potential for mineral extraction. Year-round
operations in the Arctic are extremely difficult and will remain so; they place high demands on
both equipment and crews. The negotiations in the IMO under Norway’s leadership for a binding Polar
Code are very important for ensuring that maritime operations in the Arctic are subject to controls that
safeguard life, the environment and the climate. Maritime transport and mineral and energy extraction
depend on both local and global acceptance of increased industrial activity in the Arctic. This makes it
essential to prevent accidents that may damage confidence in the operations. A broad focus on
knowledge and research is also crucial for increasing industrial activities in the Arctic. Norway has a
strategic location in the region, with a unique Arctic centre of excellence. Petroleum extraction in the

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Arctic is already taking place on the Norwegian side of the Barents Sea, which will further strengthen
Norwegian expertise. Developments on the Russian side and elsewhere in the Arctic will probably
happen at a rather slower pace. But once these developments have been set in motion, there will be
huge tasks to take on and actors with experience of the region should have excellent business
opportunities open to them. With increasing interest for arctic area, China need to work more closely
with Norway to foster both the technology and experience.
10
The offshore market is looking up
In many ways, 2001 was a turning point for the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).After a number of
years of low oil production and small discoveries, the gigantic Johan Sverdrup field was discovered in the
North Sea and Skrugard/Havis in the Barents Sea. The Sverdrup find was the largest in the world in 2011
and it is estimated that between 1.7 and 3.3 billion barrels of oil can be extracted from this field. This
makes it one of the four largest ever in Norway. While Johan Sverdrup generated new optimism in this
mature area of the NCS, the Skrugard and Havis finds offered new confidence in the potential of the
Barents Sea. Before Skrugard and Havis, it was assumed that, by and large, only gas would be found in
the Barents Sea. One challenge concerning gas finds in the North is that the infrastructure for the
pipeline transport of gas does not stretch further north than Haltenbanken. Skrugard was discovered in
2011, and Havis in January 2012. The finds are around 7 km apart and are now largely treated as a single
find. They are between 350 and 400 metres below the surface and located about 200 km from the coast
of Finnmark and a similar distance from Bear Island (Bjørnøya). Statoil estimates that there are between
400 and 600 million barrels of oil in the fields, making the find the second largest in Norway in 2011.
Statoil aims to begin production as early as at the end of 2018. This will be the world’s most northerly
development of an oil field. Before Skrugard/Havis was discovered, there was not widespread
confidence that finds would be made in the area, not least because Hydro had drilled a dry well only 14
km away 26 years earlier. In February of this year, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)
produced new estimates for undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea and Norwegian sea areas around
the island of Jan Mayen. In the open areas of the Barents Sea and in the North of the Barents Sea, there
are expected to be undiscovered resources of 960 million Sm3 o.e. This is equivalent to 37 per cent of
the undiscovered resources on the NCS. These new estimates point to an increase in undiscovered
resources on the NCS of a full 15 per cent. There is consequently much interest in oil activities in the
Barents Sea. This was clearly apparent in December 2012 when the application deadline for the 22nd
licensing round for the NCS expired. Statoil has stepped up exploration and technological development
in the North and in 2013 will drill nine wells in the northern part of the Barents Sea. The company has
also tripled its budget for technological development in the North to NOK 250 million i 2012. There is

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great optimism for the Hop area in the far North of the Barents Sea. The Barents Sea is still an immature
area and it may yet hold great surprises.
Strong growth in the Norwegian rig market
In 2012, there were 32 rigs on assignment on the NCS. This number is expected to rise strongly in the
years ahead, with 14 new rigs expected on the Norwegian market before 2015. All 14 are already under
contract, half of them with Statoil. 9 of the 14 are semi-submersibles. There is a widespread skills deficit
on the NCS. Within just the short period up to 2020, the number of rigs is set to grow by 50 per cent. As
a result, there will be a requirement for increased access to personnel in the rig sector of around 4,500
people in the next few years. Many of the jobs that need to be filled require long training. Combined
with the existing rotation scheme, this means that there will be major challenges in terms of recruiting
sufficient personnel. At the same time, we will be moving activities and skills northwards. Access to
competence will take on increasing significance and the high level of activity will result in intense
competition for qualified labour. Skills drain is a major problem throughout the entire industry; from
fisheries, domestic shipping and offshore vessels, via mobile units, and through to the operating
companies. The lack of qualified labour is exacerbated by the fact that we are currently unable to offer a
sufficient number of training places. A long-term strategy is therefore required for dealing with the
competence challenges in the industry. A lack of measures for securing access to competent personnel
will push prices in the sector even higher. The issue requires the social partners, together with the
authorities, to sit down and discuss the challenges and solutions in a binding tripartite cooperation. This
might create an opportunity for cooperation between China and Norway.
11
Reference:
Norges Rederiforbund
DNV GL AS

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SCADA Security: Vital for a country
Yihui Xu
yihui.xu@nkif.org
12
What is SCADA
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), are defined as networks or collections of networks that consist of
elements that control and provide telemetry data on electromechanical components such as valves,
regulators, switches, and other electromechanical devices that may be found in various industries.
Among those are oil and gas production, water processing, environmental control, electrical power
generation and distribution, manufacturing, transportation, and many other industrial infrastructures.
Without getting into detail for each particular industry segment, each of these ICS environments shares
a common trait – they are not “traditional” IT network environments and should not be treated as such.
Most ICS networks share similar security challenges because of the uniqueness. These challenges are
made more complex by the interaction of ICS elements with physical industrial components. Failure to
properly supervise or malicious control of these elements can lead to catastrophic accidents. Many of
the industrial systems managed by ICS elements are considered “critical infrastructure” and require
much more specialized security architecture than traditional IT environments [1].
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition(SCADA) networks can be defined as the network layer that
immediately interfaces with ICS networks as well as host systems that control and monitor elements of
ICS networks [1].
New Trends in Cyber Security
Over the past several years, a hot topic in cyber security is attacking the critical infrastructure network.
Industry experts believe that this is a very realistic problem. The most famous example is probably
Stuxnet. It shows that the cyber war has entered a new historical stage: conduct a devastating attack
with malicious code to the hostile countries’ military and civilian infrastructure.
“Stuxnet” was the first cyber weapon against the government, and was specifically designed for SCADA
systems. SCADA systems are used to monitor and control industrial process systems. They are widely
used in various fields of manufacturing, power, energy, transportation and communication systems.
Now the question is: do the governments have the ability to protect these critical infrastructures against
cyber attack?

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For the internet squad, SCADA components are the best targets. In fact, the “Stuxnet” led to
a paralysis of Iran’s uranium enrichment plant by attacking Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant SCADA system.
Although western countries have begun to use a network weapon to attack critical infrastructure for a
long time, the protection is still relatively weak. United States Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano warned that a "cyber 9/11" could happen "imminently" and that critical infrastructure –
including water, electricity and gas – was very vulnerable to such a strike. "We shouldn't wait until there
is a 9/11 in the cyber world. There are things we can and should be doing right now that, if not prevent,
would mitigate the extent of damage" said Napolitano[2].
Governments have realized the destructive potential of network attacks is not smaller than military
operations, but it is more difficult to establish early warning system for cyber attacks. And such cyber
attacks can destroy communications and financial systems, leading to instability of a country.
In fact, the attacks on SCADA systems may come from many sides, such as terrorist organizations,
hackers and more. But now, main source of attacks is government-backed.
13
Old Technology, New World
Since the “Stuxnet” virus was discovered, SCADA systems’ vulnerability research became more active.
Vulnerabilities of SCADA systems are valuable for both hackers and SCADA system owners, according to
NSS Labs Threat Report, since 2010, number of vulnerabilities related to critical infrastructure such as
power supply systems, water supply systems, telecommunications systems, transportation systems,
grew by 600% [3]. In addition, the report also shown that a large number of SCADA systems use
outdated technology.
Another related research is about the complexity of attacks. The results showed the low-complexity
vulnerabilities attacks dropped from 90% in 2000 to 48% in 2013, medium-complexity vulnerabilities
rose from 5% to 47%. The proportions of high-complexity vulnerabilities are stable at around 4% [3].

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Dale Peterson’s research project has exposed a number of significant vulnerabilities in PLCs – which are
SCADA components that provide on-site process control – manufactured by General Electric, Rockwell,
Schneider, and other major vendors. According to Peterson “they were embarrassingly easy to
compromise” and “it was pretty trivial to cause serious damage. And this is 10 years after 9/11”. The
project provided the results of the testing to the manufacturers, but most of them did not respond.
Peterson concluded that “they have gone years without having to fix these problems. Some of them
think they can go another 10 years without fixing anything”.
14
SCADA Attack Surfaces
In order to have a better understanding of SCADA security and attacks, it is necessary to take a look at
the various components of SCADA system.
Depending on the end use, there are many different SCADA systems on the market. In general,
a SCADA system consists of following parts [1]:
 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): connects to sensors in the process and converts sensor
signals to digital data. It has telemetry hardware capable of sending digital data to the
supervisory system, as well as receiving digital commands from the supervisory system.
RTUs often have embedded control capabilities such as ladder logic in order to accomplish
Boolean logic operations.
 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): connects to sensors in the process and converts
sensor signals to digital data. PLCs have more sophisticated embedded control capabilities,
typically one or more IEC61131-3 programming languages, than RTUs. PLCs do not have
telemetry hardware, although this functionality is typically installed alongside them. PLCs
are sometimes used in place of RTUs as field devices because they are more economical,
versatile, flexible, and configurable.

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 Human Machine Interface (HMI): the apparatus or device which presents processed data
to a human operator, and through this, the human operator monitors and interacts with
the process. The HMI is a client that requests data from a data acquisition server.
 A data acquisition server: a software server which uses industrial protocols to connect
software services, via telemetry, with field devices such as RTUs and PLCs. It allows clients
to access data from these field devices using standard protocols.
 A supervisory system: gathers (acquires) data on the process and sending commands
15
(control) to the SCADA system.
 Communication infrastructure: connects the supervisory system to the remote terminal
units.
 Additional: various process and analytical instrumentation.
For the attackers, there are several attack surfaces. For example: malicious software can be used to
infect monitoring and control system. Monitoring and control system often uses commercial operating
systems (many companies are still using Windows XP). These commercial operation systems might be
exploited by 0-day, or other well-known vulnerabilities. In many cases, hackers can easily attack by using
some existing tools. There are many other ways to infect a SCADA system, for example, the virus can be
deployed into the system through USB drive or network (maintenance of many industrial control system
is done by third-party companies, and their engineers store the maintenance and inspection tools on
their own USB drive). Therefore, these interfaces should be properly protected, should ensure that
unauthorized users cannot use these interfaces.
In many industries, especially in the energy sector, security of critical infrastructure is more and more
important. According to a Frost & Sullivan report, the critical infrastructure security market in 2011 was
$18.3billion. It will be $31.3billion in 2021. The growth mainly comes from the physical and cyber
security of critical infrastructure. According to Anshul Sharma’s (Senior Analyst at Frost & Sullivan)
analysis[4]: “Oil companies are investing huge capital for security of their infrastructure. With the
understanding of cyber threats, the companies are taking security risk management approach. For these
companies, the security risks cover a big range from information leakage to terrorist attacks. Cyber
attacks caused economic losses are enormous. It of course depends on the attacker’s motive. For
example, losses caused by attack on SCADA system are much greater than the losses caused by
information leakage.”

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SCADA in different industries
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) published the “ENISA, Threat Report”
summarizing some of the major network security threats. Security of important information system has
become a new trend in cyber attacks.
In fact, each industry is likely to suffer cyber attack: public health, energy production and
telecommunications industries are the focus of network threats. The hackers are increasingly interested
in the country’s critical infrastructure. In 2012, the energy sector suffered 41% cyber attacks, the water
supply industry suffered 15%.

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SCADA vulnerabilities Discovery
For the security of critical infrastructure, one important factor is that hackers understand more clearly
the impact of cyber attacks. Before “Stuxnet” virus, hackers and security experts have underestimated
the impact of cyber attacks, they don’t admit existence of the so-called “cyber-war”. After the “Stuxnet”
virus, to every country, “cyber-war” has become a reality, the governments have to develop an effective
network strategy in varying degrees.
Another factor is the level of attacks. Surprisingly, the SCADA system is not very difficult to attack. There
are many techniques that can be used to attack Industrial Control Systems. In many cases, lack of
protection, not properly configured, 0-day vulnerabilities and lack of patch systems can lead to attack.
The most important is that: any professional hackers, even without expertise in industrial control
systems, through a simple information collection, are able to attack the target by using existing tools.
In June 2012, the United State Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and McAfee released a report
“Dramatic Increase in Cyber Threats and Sabotage on Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources”. This
report describes the security status of critical infrastructure and method of patching security
vulnerabilities, and analyzes the value and effectiveness of use of holistic security solutions to promote
industrial control system security.
In the report, PNNL and the DOE have identified the following vulnerabilities to control systems
environments:[4]
 Increased Exposure: communication networks linking smart grid devices and systems will
create many more access points to these devices, resulting in an increased exposure to
potential attacks.
 Interconnectivity: communication networks will be more interconnected, further exposing
the system to possible failures and attacks.
 Complexity: the electric system will become significantly more complex as more
subsystems are linked together.
 Common Computing Technologies: smart grid systems will increasingly use common,
commercially available computing technologies and will be subject to their weaknesses.
 Increased Automation: communication networks will generate, gather, and use data in
new and innovative ways as smart grid technologies will automate many functions.
Improper use of this data presents new risks to national security and our economy.

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SCADA Security: Preventing disease is better than treating disease
For SCADA systems of the critical infrastructure, once the attack occurred, losses may be incalculable.
Therefore, for SCADA security, the remedy is important, but prevention is even more critical.
The following are some recommendations to increase the security level of industrial control systems:[5]
 Dynamic Whitelisting: provides the ability to deny unauthorized applications and code on
servers, corporate desktops, and fixed-function devices.
 Memory Protection: unauthorized execution is denied and vulnerabilities are blocked and
18
reported.
 File Integrity Monitoring: any file change, addition, deletion, renaming, attribute changes,
ACL modification, and owner modification is reported. This includes network shares.
 Write Protection: writing to hard disks are only authorized to the operating system,
application configuration, and log files. All others are denied.
 Read Protection: read are only authorized for specified files, directories, volumes and
scripts. All others are denied.
SCADA security is a new trend in cyber security, due to historical reasons, SCADA system did not
consider the network security factors. More and more critical infrastructures get exposed to the internet
or can be accessed, as well as the increased automation. The network attacks are becoming reality.
Destruction caused by cyber attacks is not smaller than the loss caused by military combat. Therefore,
the protection of critical infrastructure, must be a necessary component in the future infrastructure
project. For the large number of existing SCADA systems, new overall security solutions are needed. It
will undoubtedly provide new market opportunities to the security vendors.
References:
[1]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA#Systems_concepts
[2]http://www.rad.com/21/Cyber-Security-for-Power-Utilities-White-
Paper/30757/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=utilities-firewall
[3] https://www.nsslabs.com/reports
[4] http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/improving-scada-system-security/
[5] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazine-features

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ASSETS FULL LIFE CYCLE RISK MANAGEMENT
Li Zhang
19
Abstract
Risk Management is an effective method to mitigate or
avoid the hazard to safety and environment, and it is
also an important decision making tool to optimise cost
with safety, environment requirements. However the
assets full life cylcle risk management is not an easy
target to achieve. The paper describes the methods can
be used for assets full life cycle risk management. The
infulence factors to achieve the full life cyle risk
management are analyzed. The solution to sucessful
attain the asset full life cycle risk management is
suggested.
Introduction
It is imperative that the companies have become more
and more involved on risk management due to
compliance towards governmental requirements or
regulations, increased demands for safety,
environment, and sustainability. Handling risk on a
strategic and on the operational level is a key factor for
building a competitive advantage.
The physical assets may have inherent risks from
design or manufacture, and also have the potential to
failure during operation that could result in poor
product quality, safety and/or environment accidents,
and production shutdown. These risks must be clearly
understood and managed through assets full life cycle
to assure business continuation and social
responsibility of companies.
However, experience shows that the companies are
struggling to adapt to the concept of risk management
and the risk management is often not understood and
applied correctly. The paper describes the risk
assessment techniques which can be used for assets full
life cycle risk management. The influence factors to
achieve the full life cycle risk management are
analyzed. The management solution to successfully
attain the asset full life cycle risk management is
suggested.
Risk Assessment Techniques for Asset
Life Cycle Application
The international Organization for Standardization
(ISO) published ISO31000:2009, Risk Management—
Principles and Guidelines, intended to help companies
manage risk across the enterprise. The standard
provides a generic and process oriented risk
management framework for all industries. Here based
on the frame work, the specific approaches on the life
cycle risk management of assets are discussed in detail.
The risk management process is shown as in Figure
1[1].
Figure 1 Risk Management Process
Risk assessment is the core processes of risk
management. Effective risk management need a
systematic risk assessment approach to identify risk ,
analysis and evaluate the associated risk in order to
provide information to aid decision-making on risk
treatment measures. ISO/IEC 31010 provides guidance
on risk assessment techniques as shown in the Table

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20
A.1 of ISO/IEC 31010. On the context of assets, the
techniques can be used will have some difference. The
examples of Asset Risk Assessment techniques are as
shown in Table 1.
From the asset inception through to the disposal is
called an Asset Life Cycle. Physical Assets life cycle
can be divided to the 5 phases as shown in Figure 2.
For the above Techniques used for Asset Risk
Management, some techniques are suitable to be used
for the full life cycle and some are only be applicable
for some phases. The techniques used for asset life
cycle are as shown in Table 2.
For the Risk Assessment Techniques used in full life
cycle, the method and deliverable in different phases
will be different. Using FMEA as an example, the
deliverable and the link in each phase is shown in
Figure 3.
In Design, Design (or product) FMEA is used for
components, products or systems. Design
recommendations are given to improve the design and
assist in selecting design alternatives. Some failure
modes which may be caused by manufacture and
installation will be identified through Design FMEA.
The recommendations to these failure modes related to
manufacture and installation are given to be as input
for FMEA in manufacture and installation.
Process FMEA can be used for manufacture and
installation processes, which can be used as the basic
input to make the manufacture and installation plan.
The updated design, final manufacture and installation
document will be used as input to update the Design
FMEA in Operation phase. So the previous design
FMEA in design phase can be used as the base
document. The deliverable from the update Design
FMEA will be the input to develop operation and
maintenance plan. So the focus point and the detail
level in Design FMEA may be changed, which will
depend on how the previous Design FMEA study fits
the purpose for the operation phase.
If life extension is needed, the operation and
maintenance procedure will need to be updated based
on the operation experience and operation conditions
in the life extension time. The LFE Design FMEA can
be used to be as the input for the updating to operation
and maintenance procedure. However the operation
experience and new operation condition should be
reflected in LFE Design FMEA. The Operation Update
Design FMEA can be a basis for the updating.
In decommission, Process FMEA can be used as the
input for the decommissioning plan.
Seen from the FMEA assessment example, the
assessment in each phase are related each other. It is
important to have a clear plan for the risk assessment
on the life cycle view on the data management, the
result application and updating, and interface
management in each phase. Keeping the data and the
risk assessment results through all phases, having a
good interface management to avoid the overlap and
conflict on individual phases will be a good practice
for life cycle asset risk management.
Challenge and solutions on full life cycle
asset risk management
The full life cycle assets risk management is not an
easy target to achieve. The main challenges for that are
as following:
 Miss planning on full life cycle risk
management
So far, in most situations, risk management
exists on each phase. Companies lack of a
comprehensive plan to management risk
through total life cycle.
 Lack of systematic and integrative
management methods
Individual risk management on each phase
will have overlaps in each other, which may
lead conflict results if performed individually.
Use the systematic and integrative methods to
manage the risk from full life cycle can avoid
the resource waste and conflicts on the results.
 Improper risk management approaches used
If approach used in risk management is a
failure, then the risk management effort will
be a waste of time and resources and the
worse may lead to other issues.
 Without Continuous Data Management and
Data exchange from the total life cycle
Data will loss during hand over from each
phase. People don’t know what are the main
data needed for the next phase or full life
cycle.

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21
On the top of the above issues is lacking of high level
policy or commitment to full life cycle risk
management.
The following suggestions are given to solve these
challenges:
1) Establish Risk Policy and Risk Philosophy
Document
A high level company risk policy and
philosophy document about asset life cycle risk
management should be established. The
document should define the risk management
goals and the strategy to manage risk through
assets full life cycle. The systematic and
integrative risk management strategy should be
adopted and reflected in the document.
The systematic approach requires with due
consideration for assets necessary for the entire
life of the field. Therefore, design,
manufacture, installation, commissioning,
operation, life extension and finally
decommission should be part of the systematic
risk management.
The level of integrative in the risk management
means that the interface catalogue covering all
phases in full life cycle of assets must be
established.
2) Set Risk Assessment Technique Practice or
Guideline
In order to ensure that the risk assessment is
done consistently, a common set of guidelines
and principles should be used for managing
risk. Best practice documents for selected risk
assessment techniques shall be established. The
best practice should give advice on the
selection of risk assessment techniques,
detailed description of the assessment methods
used in each phase of life cycle, and set the
requirements on the result application and
updating, interface management in each phase
and the data management requirements.
3) Plan full life Cycle Asset Risk Management
from Start
The plan on full life cycle asset risk
management should be made from the asset
inception. As a minimum, the plans should
include:
 a detailed definition of the work scope
 philosophy and strategy
 if necessary, detailed specification of
selected method needed
 the application of risk management
approaches for full life cycle
 carry out risk management activities
 establishment of responsibilities and
communication lines between involved
parties
 documentation management
 data and information handover
4) Data Management through full life cycle
A system for collection, application and
transfer of data shall be established and
maintained for the whole service life. This
system will typically consist of documents,
data files and databases.
The key information and the decisions made in
the identification and assessment of risk should
be documented in an ordered and
comprehensive manner. The documentation
should not only record the various decisions
made during the assessment process, but
should also detail the basis for the decisions,
i.e. the base data and assumptions used.
Summary
The objectives of risk management for asset full life
cycle are to mitigate and avoid the hazards to safety,
environment and costs from the assets during its
inception to decommission, and to decrease the system
deviation from asset risk management approaches and
implementation. Asset risk management for the full
life cycle will lower the waste of resources and time,
and the most important it will improve the accurateness
and effectiveness of risk management.
References
[1] ISO31000, 2009. Risk management — Principles
and guidelines. The international Organization for
Standardization (ISO)

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22
[2] ISO/IEC 31010, 2011. Risk management— Risk
assessment techniques. The international Organization
for Standardization (ISO)
[3] ISO17776, 2000. - Petroleum and natural gas
industries — Offshore production installations —
Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard
identification and risk assessment. The international
Organization for Standardization (ISO)
[4] PAS55, 2008. Asset Management. British
Standards Institution's (BSI)

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Tables & Figures
Table 1 Asset Risk Assessment techniques Examples
Risk
Identification
Consequence
Analysis
Probability
Analysis
Level of
risk
Risk
Evaluation
Example Techniques for Asset
Risk Assessment
Reliability centred maintenance SA SA SA SA SA
Risk Based Inspection* SA SA SA SA SA
SIL Study* SA SA SA SA SA
Bow tie analysis A* A A* A* A
Cause and consequence analysis A SA A* A A
Failure mode effect analysis SA SA SA SA SA
Hazard and operability studies
(HAZOP)
SA SA A* A A
Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP)
SA SA NA NA SA
Supporting Methods
Fault tree analysis A NA SA NA* NA*
Event tree analysis A SA NA* NA* NA
Cause-and-effect analysis A* SA NA NA NA
Root cause analysis NA A* A* NA* NA*
Risk indices NA* NA* NA* SA* SA
Consequence/probability matrix NA* NA* NA* SA SA*
SA: Strongly applicable. NA: Not applicable. A: Applicable. *: Not covered in or different from ISO31010.
Design Manufacture
Installation &
Commission
Operation
Life Extension
or
Decommission
Figure 2 Asset Life Cycle

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Table 2 Example Techniques used in Asset Life Cycle
Design Manufacture
Installation
&
Commission
Operation
De-commission
LFE
Example Techniques for Asset
Risk Assessment
Reliability Centred maintenance A NA NA SA NA SA
Risk Based Inspection A NA NA SA NA SA
SIL Study SA A A A A SA
Bow tie analysis A A A A A A
Cause and consequence analysis SA SA SA A SA SA
Failure mode effect analysis SA SA SA SA SA SA
Hazard and operability studies
(HAZOP)
SA A SA A A A
Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP)
NA SA SA NA A NA
SA: Strongly applicable. NA: Not applicable. A: Applicable.
Design
Design FMEA
Manufacture Installation Operation
Design
Recommendation
Recommendation
to other Phase
Process
FMEA
Manufacture
Quality Plan
Process
FMEA
Installation
Quality Plan
Update
Design FMEA
Operation,
Maintenance
Procedure
Updated Design
Final Manufacture Final Installation
Life Extension
Operation &
Maintenance
LFE Design
FMEA
Decommission
Process
FMEA
Decommissioning
Plan
Update
Operation,
Maintenance
Procedure
Operation &
Maintenance
Figure 3 FMEA used in Asset Life Cycle

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Introduction of offshore pipeline– (I) the status overview in NCS
Jun Liu
25
Introduction
When the Norwegian Chinese Engineer Association (www.NKIF.org) was established in Oslo, Norway, we
started a magazine named “the NKIF Journal”, which aims to provide a platform that the members could
make communications and professional discussions on relevant engineering topics. I was asked to think
about if I could write something about offshore pipeline in Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). I was
very excited about this idea and consider this as a very good opportunity to make an introduction to the
offshore pipeline in NCS for those who are not professionals in this field, or just started their careers on
offshore pipeline. At the same time it is a very good opportunity for me to review the knowledge and
initiate discussions with peers. Considering to fit the requirements of the magazine, the main contents
will be presented as a series in the coming 3 issues of the magazine. The first part is the following essay
which mainly focuses on giving an overview about offshore pipeline status in NCS. In the second part, an
introduction on offshore pipeline technology is planned. And in the last part specific technical topics and
new developments will be discussed.
The data and pictures are from public resource with references, if you own rights to any of the
information and do not want them to appear here, please contact the author and they will be promptly
removed.
Historical background of pipeline
It has been long history since humankind invents pipe and implemented into their activities for instance
transporting water, beer, oil and gas. There are many kinds of pipe systems in the industry, while not all
pipe system in the industry should be called pipeline system. In the Webster’s 1913 Dictionary, pipeline
is defined as “A line of pipe with pumping machinery and apparatus for conveying liquids, gases, or
finely divided solids, such as petroleum or natural gas, between distant points.” This still creates
confusions even in the same offshore segment for instance when we talk about piping and pipeline. In
this essay, pipeline refers to those in the petroleum industry transporting liquids, gases outside the
offshore structures such as terminals, stations, platform, subsea manifolds and other offshore vessels,

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with transportation distance between a few kilometers and above, either laying on the surface of the
ground or buried. In places, a pipeline may have to cross water expanses, such as small seas, straits and
rivers. In many instances, they lie entirely on the seabed. These pipelines are referred to as "marine"
pipelines (also, "submarine" or "offshore" pipelines).
It is uncertain when the first crude oil pipeline was built. The first installation was most probably in the
1860s when the pipeline for oil transport from an oil field in Pennsylvania to a railroad station in Oil
Creek[1]. After one and a half decade industry practice, pipeline has been considered by far the most
economical means of long distance transportation for crude oil, natural gas, and other products, clearly
superior to rail, truck and vessel transportation over competing routes, given large quantities to be
moved on a regular basis. Transporting petroleum fluids with pipelines is a continuous and reliable
operation. Onshore pipelines have demonstrated an ability to adapt to a wide variety of environments
including remote areas and hostile environments. Pipelines have been adopted as the transportation
system for most refineries due to their superior flexibility to the alternatives, with very minor exceptions,
largely due to local peculiarities.
The offshore petroleum industry is relatively recent historically. The earliest offshore petroleum pipeline
probably are used as short loading and unloading lines constructed by building them on shore and
winching them into the water, which somehow in our definition might not be a formal “offshore
pipeline”. It has been documented in the literature that the first offshore pipeline was installed at Kerr
McGee to a field off Louisiana in 1947 with 6m water depth [2]. Now offshore pipeline has become one
of the most important transportation systems for offshore industry after more than 60 years industrial
practice and technology development.
Offshore exploration in the North Sea led to the discovery of gas fields off southern England by 1970,
and oil at Ekofisk in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. It is a technical challenge in 1970s to
overcome for crossing the Norwegian Trench, which leads Ekofisk to a UK destination. The requirement
for long-distance pipelines appears in the North Sea. Since offshore pipeline design and construction had
already come of age in many other places in the Gulf of Mexico, off Southeast Asia, and in the Persian
Gulf, it is a nature extension of the technology into a different world for the offshore pipeline industry to
attack the North Sea.
There are different ways to categorize offshore pipeline. One of the common ways is based on their
function and location in the system, for instance shown in Figure 1, with explanations as follows:
 Flowlines transporting oil and/or gas from satellite subsea wells to subsea manifolds;
 Flowlines transporting oil and/or gas from subsea manifolds to production facility platforms;
 Infield flowlines transporting oil and/or gas between production facility platforms;
 Export pipelines transporting oil and/or gas from production facility platforms to shore; and
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 Flowlines transporting water or chemicals from production facility platforms, through subsea
27
injection manifolds, to injection wellheads.
Figure 1. Offshore pipelines examples. [4]
It is also possible to classify the pipelines by their material and/or structure characteristics, for instance
as follow:
 Rigid pipeline: normally a pipeline jointly welded by rigid tubes, which does not have deflection
under bending condition except the elastic and plastic deformation from the structure. The are
many kinds of rigid pipelines in the offshore industry, for instance:
o Bundled Line: comprise several export flowlines, injection and umbilical control lines of
varying configurations.
o Piggy-Back pipeline: an export line from the field carrying an externally attached import
injection flowline to the wellhead.
o Pipe-in-Pipe pipeline: an external pipeline carrying an internal flowline. Pipe-in-Pipe
systems are used for protection near the shore and for insulation in deeper waters.
o Clad pipeline: Pipeline consists of pipes with internal corrosion resistance alloy (CRA)
liner where the bond between backing steel and CRA material is metallurgical.
o Lined pipeline: pipeline consists of pipes with internal CRA liner where the bound
between backing steel and CRA material is mechanical.
o Composite pipeline: pipeline is made of composite material tubes.
 Flexible pipeline: normally a pipeline with capacity of deflection under bending condition due to
its specific structure of the pipeline components.

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Norway Oil & Gas Profile
All of Norway's oil reserves are located offshore on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), which is
divided into three sections: the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea, see in Figure 2.
Norway’s offshore activities started from the North Sea in 1970, and extended to Norwegian Sea in last
2 decades. New exploration and production activity is occurring in the Barents Sea in recent years.
Figure 2. Map of the NCS.
Norway has been considered as the largest holder of oil and natural gas reserves in Europe and provides
much of the oil and natural gas consumed on the continent. According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ),
Norway had 5.83 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves as of January 1, 2014. The U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) estimates that Norway was the 3rd largest exporter of natural gas in
the world after Russia and Qatar, and the 12th largest net exporter of oil in 2013[3].
It has been long time increase before Norway reaches its maximum production rate in NCS. Norway's oil
production peaked in 2001 at 3.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) and declined to 1.8 million bbl/d in 2013.
According to Statistics Norway, Norway exported an estimated 1.19 million bbl/d (around 66% of its
total oil production) of crude oil in 2013, of which 92% went to European Organization for Economic

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Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The top five importers of Norwegian crude in 2013
were the United Kingdom (42%), the Netherlands (21%), Germany (10%), Sweden (6%), and the United
States (5%).
Figure 3. Norway oil production and consumption, 1992-2013, source: EIA.
On the other hand, natural gas production increased continuously since 1993, see in Figure 4 except a
slight decline in 2013 to 3.97 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) from 4.16 Tcf in 2012. EIA estimates Norway
exported an estimated 3.8 Tcf of natural gas in 2013, around 96% of its production. Most of the natural
gas was transported to other European countries via its extensive export pipeline infrastructure, and a
small fraction was exported via LNG tanker. Norway is the 2nd largest supplier of natural gas to the EU,
behind Russia, supplying about 21% of Europe's total gas demand in 2013. According to preliminary data
from Statistics Norway, the largest importers of Norway's natural gas exports, as of 2013, were the UK,
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.
Figure 4. Norway natural gas production and consumption, 1992-2013, source: EIA.
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), crude oil, natural gas, and pipeline transport
services accounted for 52% of Norway's exports revenues, 23% of gross domestic product (GDP), and 30%
of government revenues ), in 2012.
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30
Offshore pipeline in NCS
With more than 40 years development on offshore industry, offshore pipeline has become an essential
part of Norway’s offshore transportation system. Norway has an extensive network of subsea oil
pipelines. The pipelines connect offshore oilfields with onshore processing terminals, according to the
NPD. There are also many smaller pipelines that connect North Sea fields to either the Oseberg
Transport System or the Troll I and II pipeline systems. Figure 5 shows the main pipeline network system
in the NCS. Table 1 shows the main offshore pipelines for oil transportation in NCS.

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Figure 5. Existing and projected pipelines in the NCS (source: NPD)
Table 1. Main offshore pipelines for oil transportation in NCS. Source: NPD (2011, 2014).
31
Pipeline
Operator
From – to
Start-up
(year)
Capacity Dimensions
(Inches)
Length
(km)
Investment cost
(billion NOK
2010)
Grane
Oil Pipeline
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Grane–Sture
Terminal
2003 34 000
scm/d oil
29 220 1.7
Kvitebjørn
Oil Pipeline
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Kvitebjørn–Mongstad
(connected to the
Y-connection on Troll
Oil Pipeline II)
2004 10 000
scm/d oil
16 90 0,5
Norpipe
Oil Pipeline
Norpipe Oil AS Ekofisk–Teeside
in the UK
1975 53 million
scm/year oil
34 354 17.8
Oseberg Transport
System
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Oseberg A–Sture
Terminal
1988 121 000
scm/d oil
28 115 10.5
Sleipner Øst con-densate
pipeline
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Sleipner A–Kårstø 1993 32 000
scm/d oil
20 245 1.7
Troll Oil Pipeline I Statoil
Petroleum AS
Troll B–Mongstad 1995 42 500
scm/d oil
16 86 1.3
Troll Oil Pipeline II Statoil
Petroleum AS
Troll C–Mongstad 1999 40 000
scm/d oil
20 80 1.2
Huldra condensate Statoil
Petroleum AS
Huldra-Veslefrikk 2001 7900
scm/d
8 16 0,35
Gjøa Oil Pipeline GDF SUEZ E&P
Norway AS
Gjøa – TOR
(Troll Oil Pipeline) II
(Mongstad)
2010 5,4 million
scm/year oil
16 55 km
Norway operates several important natural gas pipelines that connect directly with other European
countries, specifically France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. These pipelines are all
operated by Gassco. Some pipelines run directly from Norway's major North Sea production facilities to
Gassco-owned processing facilities in the receiving country. Other pipelines connect Norway's onshore
processing facilities to other European markets. Table 2 shows the main offshore pipelines for gas
transportation in NCS covered by Gassled. The transport capacities are based on standard assumptions
for the pressure conditions and energy content of the gas, maintenance days and flexibility in operation.
Table 3 shows the main offshore pipelines for gas transportation in NCS which are not covered by
Gassled.
(Gassled is a joint venture for the owners of the gas transport system linked to the Norwegian
continental shelf. The gas transport system consists of pipelines, platforms and onshore process facilities
and gas terminals abroad. The system is used by all parties needing to transport Norwegian gas. The
receiving terminals for Norwegian gas in Germany, Belgium, France and the UK are wholly or partially
owned by Gassled. Gassled is organized in different access zones with different tariff levels.)
Table 2. Main offshore pipelines for gas transportation in NCS covered by Gassled. Source: NPD (2011, 2014).
Pipeline
From – to
Start-up
(year)
Capacity
(million
scm/d)
Dimensions
(inches)
Length
(km)
Investment cost
(billion NOK
2010)

NORSK KINESISK
INGENIØRFORENING
Europipe Draupner E*–Emden in Germany 1995 45–54 40 620 23.3
Europipe II Kårstø–Dornum in Germany 1999 74 42 658 10.5
Franpipe Draupner E*–Dunkerque in France 1998 54 42 840 10.9
Norpipe Ekofisk–Norsea Gas Terminal
32
in Germany
1977 32–44 36 440 28.9
Oseberg Gas Transport
(OGT)
Oseberg–Heimdal* 2000 40 36 109 2.2
Statpipe (rich gas) Statfjord–Kårstø 24 30 308
Statpipe (dry gas) Kårstø–Draupner S* 20 28 228
Statpipe (dry gas) Heimdal*–Draupner S* 30 36 155
Statpipe (dry gas) Draupner S*–Ekofisk Y 30 36 203
Statpipe
1985 49.9
(all pipelines) Tampen Link Statfjord–FLAGS pipeline in the UK 2007 9–25 32 23 2.2
Vesterled Heimdal*–St. Fergus in Scotlandv 1978 38 32 360 35.3
Zeepipe Sleipner*–Draupner S* 55 30 30
Zeepipe Sleipner*–Zeebrugge in Belgium 1993 42 40 813
Zeepipe IIA Kollsnes–Sleipner* 1996 72 40 299
Zeepipe IIB Kollsnes–Draupner E* 1997 71 40 301
Zeepipe
26.3
(all pipelines)
Åsgard Transport Åsgard–Kårstø 2000 69 42 707 11.5
Langeled
Nyhamna–Sleipner* 2007 80 42 627
(northern pipeline)
Langeled
(southern pipeline)
Sleipner*–Easington i England 2006 72 44 543
Langeled
(both pipelines)
18.6
Norne Gas Transport
System (NGTS)
Norne–Åsgard Transport 2001 4 16 128 1.3
Kvitebjørn gas pipeline Kvitebjørn–Kollsnes 2004 27 30 147 1.2
Gjøa gas pipeline Gjøa–FLAGS in the UK 2010 17 29 131 1.9
*Riser facility
Table 3. Main offshore pipelines for gas transportation in NCS not covered by Gassled. Source: NPD (2011, 2014).
Pipeline
Operator
From – to
Start-up
(year)
Capacity Dimensions
(Inches)
Length
(km)
Investment cost
(billion NOK
2010)
Draugen
Gas Export
AS Norske Shell Draugen–Åsgard
Transport
2000 2 billion
scm/year
16 78 1.2
Grane
Gas Pipeline
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Heimdal–Grane 2003 3.6 billion
scm/year
18 50 0.3
Haltenpipe Gassco AS Heidrun–Tjeldberg-odden
1996 2 billion
scm/year
16 250 3.2
Heidrun
Gas Export
Statoil
Petroleum AS
Heidrun–Åsgard
Transport
2001 4 billion
scm/year
16 37 1
Going toward North
The world demand of oil and gas is growing, and as a result, there is a demand to explore new areas for
more petroleum production. Going north towards the arctic region, where the remaining unexplored

NORSK KINESISK
INGENIØRFORENING
areas are available, is the only choice for Norwegian government. According to the US Geological Survey
estimates, the arctic region, mostly offshore, holds as much as 25% of the world’s untapped reserve of
hydrocarbons where much of the reserve is lying under seasonal or year-round sea ice. The exploitation
of these remaining reserves, however, will depend upon meeting the technical challenges of design,
construction, and operation of offshore installations.
There have been limited activities towards the arctic areas in NCS in last 15 years. But recent break
through from the political side brought much stronger moment to drive the development in this area
further along. Defining their maritime boundaries in the Barents and Arctic Seas has been a 40-year old
dispute between Norway and Russia. An agreement has been ratified by both governments in early 2011
and went into effect in July 2011. The agreement requires the two countries to jointly develop oil and
gas deposits that cross over their boundaries, a 109,360 square mile maritime area that straddles their
economic zones in the Barents and Arctic Seas
The growing focus on artic oil and gas has raised the need for new regulations and standards in many
areas as the international offshore industry has limited experience with offshore exploration and
development in arctic and cold climate areas. In addition, proved technology and solutions for oil and
gas industry in other world areas, may have to be re assessed and modified for reliable use in the arctic.
This imposes additional challenges for design, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance,
such as, leak detection, monitoring, inspection pigging, pipeline repair, and flow assurance. These
challenges determine the system reliability, operability, as well as its profitability.
All the above brings the future for offshore pipeline in NCS with new challenges and opportunities.
33
References
[1] Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/
[2] Andrew C. Palmer and Roger A. King, "Subsea Pipeline Engineering, 2nd Edition", 2008.
[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Countries Overview - Norway,
2014. http://www.eia.gov/
[4] Guo, Boyun etc., Book “Offshore pipelines, Design, Installation, and Maintenance,
2nd Edition”, 2013.

NKIF eJournal Oct 2014

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