2. Have the positive effects of airline deregulation
outweighed the negative effects?
The role of government in economic affairs is
continuously debated
◦ Trade-offs between freer markets and government
intervention
3. The federal government contracted with private
carriers to supplement military airmail carriage
starting in 1918 (Borenstein and Rose, 2007)
Airlines started emerging in the 1920s
Airlines became increasingly regulated during the
Great Depression
◦ 1938: Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established
marking the official beginning of airline regulation
(Borenstein and Rose, 2007)
4. High Barriers to entry into the marketplace
◦ Carriers established after the CAB had the most difficulty
entering the market
Competition was largely absent
◦ Competition was based less on price and more on non-
price determinants (e.g. legroom, seat quality, in-flight
amenities, flight frequencies)
◦ Carriers needed approval from the CAB to expand
Price controls were put into place to ensure
profitability and kept prices high (Borenstein and
Rose, 2011)
5. Major carriers like American, Delta, and United
competed in the interstate market
Smaller, local carriers like Pacific Southwest and
Texas International flew in the intrastate market
(Borenstein and Rose, 2007)
◦ Competed based on price, charged lower fares, and
turned higher profits than the major carriers
◦ Not subject to federal regulation
◦ Provided a glimpse of a deregulated airline market
6. Regulated airlines turned lackluster profits
(Borenstein and Rose, 2011)
High prices prompted consumer groups to support
deregulation
High oil prices and stagflation in the 1970s further
pushed opinion towards deregulation (Eisner,
2008)
The appointment of pro-deregulation officials such
as Alfred Kahn paved the way starting with
discount price experimentation (Winston, 1998)
7. In 1978, the Airline
Deregulation Act was signed
into law
Gradually lifted CAB price,
route, entry, and exit controls
The CAB disbanded in 1985
marking the official end of
deregulation (Borenstein and
Rose, 2007)
The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) would
continue to regulate safety as
it had done since 1958
8. Overall lowered prices
◦ Fares are approximately 40% lower than prior to
deregulation even when adjusted for inflation (Borenstein,
2011)
9. Barriers to entry and exit were lowered
◦ Many existing airlines either have went bankrupt,
liquidated, or merged with other airlines while many new
airlines entered the market
10. Labor saw a 10% decline
in earnings following
deregulation (Card, 1996)
Aggressive cost-cutting
measures amid financial
losses and bankruptcies
have had a toll on labor-
management relations
and customer service
(Gittell et al., 2004)
11. Lowered prices and
barriers to entry were
expected to lead to traffic
growth and higher load
factors
Airport congestion was
not seen as a predictable
outcome
◦ Traffic growth outpaces
infrastructure development
(Savage, 1996)
13. Financial performance is tied to
the performance of the national
economy
Propensity to over invest during
economic booms which then
lead to drastic cuts in capacity,
scheduling, and the workforce
during economic downturns
Reluctance to raise fares
Exogenous demand shocks
such as 9/11 (Borenstein, 2011)
Exogenous cost drivers like jet
fuel (Borenstein, 2011)
14. Rise of the hub-and-spoke
system (Borenstein and Rose,
2011)
◦ Centralizing operations in one
or more select cities
Establishment of airline
alliances (Borenstein and
Rose, 2011)
◦ Brought about codesharing—an
agreement where two or more
airlines share the same flight
Resulted in concentrations of
market power in select cities
(Borenstein and Rose, 2011)
15. Deregulation was successful in lowering prices
and barriers to entry and exit
The Airline Industry has nonetheless suffered
financially. To ensure financial sustainability,
airlines must:
◦ Invest more moderately
◦ Work on improving relationships with labor
Labor productivity is tied to customer service quality more
than cost-cutting measures (Gittell et al., 2004)
◦ Raise their price premiums (Borenstein and Rose, 2007)
Raising quality and fares to cover operational costs
16. Borenstein, Severin (2011). On the Persistent Financial Losses of U.S. Airlines: A
Preliminary Explanation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1-17.
Borenstein, Severin and Nancy L. Rose. How Airline Markets Work…Or Do They?
Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry. National Bureau of Economic
Research. 1-82.
Card, David (1996). Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline Industry. National
Bureau of Economic Research. 1-58.
Eisner, Marc Allen (2008). Markets in the Shadow of the State: An Appraisal of
Deregulation and Implications for Future Research. Tobin Project Conference. 1-28.
Gittell, Jody Hoffer et al. (2004). Mutual Gains or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and
Firm Performance in the Airline Industry. Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
Vol. 57, No. 2. 163-80.
Savage, Ian (1999). Aviation Deregulation and Safety in the United States: The
Evidence After Twenty Years. Taking Stock of Air Liberalization. 93-114.
Winston, Clifford (1998). U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation. Journal
of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 12, No. 3. 89-110.
Editor's Notes
Severin Borenstein: UC Berkeley professor, CAB staff economist, and DOT Future of Aviation Advisory Committee member
Nancy Rose: MIT economics professor
Alfred Kahn was an economist appointed to the CAB and pushed for reforms
Marc Eisner: Wesleyan Univ. Chair of Public Policy
Clifford Winston: Brookings Institute Senior Research Fellow
David Card: UC Berkeley economics professor
Jody Gittell: Brandeis Univ. management professor
Ian Savage: Northwestern Univ. economics professor