The document provides an analysis of the failures of German intelligence during World War II. It argues that the failures were due to longstanding institutional weaknesses within the German intelligence apparatus rather than direct influence of Nazi ideology. Some of the key institutional weaknesses that hindered German intelligence included a rigid military structure with little civilian oversight, lack of coordination between intelligence branches, failure to detect that the Enigma code had been cracked, and the underestimation of the Soviet Union's military capabilities. While Nazi ideology exacerbated some of these existing issues, the fundamental failures were embedded in the intelligence system before and independently of the rise of the Nazi party.

1. Excerpt for Application Consideration
Essay Submitted to the London School of Economics by Krystal Norman
Submitted March 2015
1
‘The underperformance of German intelligence services in the Second World War can
be explained by the impact of Nazi ideology.’ Discuss.
A recorded exchange (summarised below) between two German prisoners of war in
1942 is incredibly indicative of the level of hubris (and therefore weakness) evident
throughout the German ranks regarding intelligence during the Second World War. Whilst
discussing the German naval code with an Abwehr (the German military intelligence
organisation) commando, a German radio operator stated the following: “It's absolutely
impossible to crack.” When challenged by the commando about the vulnerability of the
German codes, the radio operator insisted an additional three times on the codes infallibility,
despite the commando’s suggestion that perhaps such a thought was silly one.1 It was this
brand of intransigence that permeated the German military and intelligence services that left
it vulnerable and resoundingly weak during the Second World War; this point cannot be
argued strongly enough. When evaluating the issues present in the Second World War,
reliance on a rigid military structure within the intelligence community with little to no actual
intelligence training for military officials, an institutional lack of coordination or cooperation,
an unsuccessful spy network, failures in estimation of enemy capability, and failure to detect
Allied decryption of Enigma communication, were all glaring examples. While leadership
had perhaps learned some lessons from intelligence failures during the First World War (to be
fair, all of the major powers had experienced failures during the First World War which they
would later learn lessons from, with varying degrees of success), the German intelligence
apparatus had, for the most part, underperformed greatly during the Second World War for
the aforementioned reasons, among others. The question however is why the apparatus
continued to perform to such an underwhelming degree? Were Germany's institutional
intelligence failures during the Second World War merely mirror images of those from the
previous war, or was there more of an ideological component to its failings? With the rise of
the Nazi Party in Germany, it was inevitable that Nazi ideology would have some degree of
impact on the intelligence apparatus; however, it can be argued that the failings of said
apparatus were not caused directly by this ideology. German intelligence failings were
institutionalised, and had been for quite some time; intrinsic in its military structure was an
atmosphere of unconditional obedience and high level of confidence (almost to the point of
arrogance) in its estimations of both its own abilities and the capabilities of its enemies were
the proverbial Achilles heel of the German intelligence community and were the source of its
underperformance. What can be said about the contribution of the Nazi ideology to said
failings is that the Nazi focus on German superiority and Hitler’s view on espionage
exacerbated the existing faults in the intelligence apparatus, but were not their sole cause. As
a matter of fact, Hitler actually consolidated the Abwehr into a much smaller organisation in
1944 due to (among other things) an ‘antiparty tinge;’2 therefore to suggest that the effects of
Nazi ideology alone were the cause of German intelligence underperformance would be
disingenuous. The existing institutional weaknesses were buttressed by Nazi ideology,
however they were existent long before the onset of the Nazi party and therefore could not be
caused directly by the party’s doctrine.
1 Mulligan, Timothy. "The German Navy Evaluates Its Cryptographic Security, October 1941." Military
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1985): 75.
2 Kahn, David. "Intelligence in World War II: A Survey." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 1 (2001): 15.

2. Excerpt for Application Consideration
Essay Submitted to the London School of Economics by Krystal Norman
Submitted March 2015
2
It is clear when evaluating the performance of German intelligence during World War
I that there was an institutional deficiency in intelligence operations. Primarily, the
dominance of military operations severely hindered the abilities of the intelligence apparatus;
additionally, a lack of personnel and resources severely detracted from operations.
Considering Germany’s resounding loss of World War I, it may have been assumed that
lessons learned would have encouraged changes in the intelligence apparatus, however many
of the institutional deficiencies that existed during World War I carried over through the
interwar period and into World War II. Despite two reorganisations (chief among them being
the creation of the Abwehr in 1920 as an answer to the castration of German intelligence
services by the Treaty of Versailles), there was little change to the operational foundation of
the intelligence services, nor was there much attention paid to peacetime preparation, which
effectively hindered intelligence work once World War II started. The persistent friction
between civilian and military authorities (with the latter generally dominating the discourse)
continued throughout the interwar period despite the reorganisations, and effectively took the
wind out of the proverbial sails of the intelligence apparatus, rendering them arguably
ineffectual.3 A consistent advantage that Allied intelligence had over the Germans
(irrespective of Nazi influence) was a generally more enlightened outlook regarding the
operation of its intelligence officers; as such officers were often civilians, they were more
comfortable both speaking their minds as well as introducing what could be considered
contrarian viewpoints to superiors, whereas in the rigid military structure of the German
intelligence operations the chain of command prevented any such contrarianism, or at the
very least discouraged staff officers from being completely honest in their assessments (this
problem was only exacerbated by the ascension of Adolf Hitler, who famously help little
regard for intelligence and was also notorious for being heavy handed in both what he wanted
to hear and how he responded to hearing things he was critical of).4 This continuation of
intelligence issues occurred before the rise of the Nazi party and then continued concurrently
throughout its rise to power and thereafter and was therefore a reality irrespective of Nazi
ideological influence.
Additionally, the lack of coordination or cooperation between the intelligence
branches greatly hindered any intelligence gathering activity; there were a large number of
competing organisations at this time (the Abwehr and SS chief among them), which led to not
only bureaucratic bungling but considerable resource squandering, hostility between the
branches, and fragmentation, resulting in a clear string of failures (the largest being the
failure to discern the landing operations of the D-Day).5 Additionally, because Hitler had
direct access to all of the intelligence services (fragmentation notwithstanding), he was able
to discern everything he needed for military purposes, yet there remained little to no
cooperation between branches. This proprietary nature of information for military purposes
and the permeation of military culture throughout the intelligence apparatus was again a
symptom of German military culture which happened to carry through to the Third Reich, but
was not caused directly by it. Additionally, it can be argued that the anti-regime tendencies of
the Abwehr during the war as well as the willingness of its head (Wilhelm Canaris) to speak
to the idea of Germany not winning the war speak directly against the idea of Nazi ideology
lending to the underperformance of Germany’s intelligence apparatus; several sources
suggest that Canaris was actually anti-Nazi and actively worked to subvert German
3 Richter, Ludwig. "Military and Civil Intelligence Services in Germany from World War I to the End of the
Weimar Republic." Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (2004): 15.
4 Kahn, David. "Intelligence in World War II: A Survey." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 1 (2001): 20.
5 George, Roger Z. Intelligence and the National Security Strategist:Enduring Issues and Challenges.Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006: 386.

3. Excerpt for Application Consideration
Essay Submitted to the London School of Economics by Krystal Norman
Submitted March 2015
3
intelligence successes.6 Had Nazi ideology perfectly permeated the German intelligence
apparatus (specifically the Abwehr), perhaps its failures could be squarely placed on the
shoulders of Nazism, however that is not the case in Canaris’ Abwehr.
The ineptitude of German spies that had been prominent throughout World War I
continued through World War II, with a somewhat understated and flaccid attempt at
clandestine activities in Latin America, which seems fairly counterintuitive as continental
Europe, the British Isles, the Middle East and Northern Africa would have seemed more
fertile areas for intelligence gathering. While there were high numbers of German expatriates
in Latin America (which provided a good foothold for both the Abwehr and the Reich
Security Administration to plant espionage networks), the quality of intelligence gathered in
these areas was neutral at best.7 Added to this was the fact that the networks were not set up
during peacetime and therefore had a slapdash quality to them; with the lack of intelligence
training in the German apparatus, the quality of human intelligence was poor. Additionally,
the Germans suffered from the deception of the Allies in the form of double agents; the MI5
ran an extensive double cross operation using double agents against the Germans, which
Germany never successfully caught on to; as a matter of fact, two of the double agents were
so thoroughly successful that they both received German military decoration in recognition of
their espionage services.8 The failure of German spies was not directly caused by the Nazi
regime, however it can be argued that Hitler’s viewpoints on espionage did not help the
matter; hindering the pre-war efficacy of any existing spy efforts, Hitler actually banned
espionage against Britain for fear of diplomatic and political embarrassment until 1937.9
While the Reich’s (especially Hitler’s) views on espionage did not help, the inherent issues
and the lack of success in the German human intelligence efforts were institutionalised long
before the ascension of the Nazi party.
Perhaps one of the most glaring failures of German intelligence during World War II
was again a matter of operational failure, not ideological influence. The underestimation of
the Soviet Union (its troop numbers, its weaponry capabilities, and its movements) in the lead
up to (and following the initial shortcomings) of Operation Barbarossa, was a fundamental
failure in German intelligence gathering. Prior to the invasion, German intelligence firstly
failed to properly assess the number of available aircraft, tanks and equipment at the Soviet’s
disposal10, and additionally underestimated the Red Army’s ability to mobilise its troops; the
Abwehr’s estimates of troop numbers were grossly lower than what had actually been the
case. Even after the initial failure of the invasion, German intelligence continued to be short
sighted regarding both the Red Army’s mobilisation capabilities and its ability to quickly
relocate its factories in strategic efforts to assists its troop movements, which obviously led to
German failures in its eastern front operations.11 As a measure of concession, it can certainly
be argued that a tertiary cause of the German intelligence failure in its estimation of the
Soviet Union was an outgrowth of Nazi ideology and “ethnic contempt” in that the abilities,
motivations and commitment of Soviet soldiers were grossly underestimated (and the
negative effects of Stalin’s purges grossly overestimated) by the Nazi hierarchy and therefore
6 Bryden, John. Fighting to Lose: How the German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second World War.
Toronto: Dundern, 2014: 93-94.
7
Mowry, David P. “German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II.” United States Cryptologic History, Series IV
World War II Vol. 3. Office of Archives and History, National Security Agency/Central Security Service (1989): v, 1-3.
8
West, Nigel. "Double Cross - MI5 in WorldWar Two." BBC News. February 17, 2011. Accessed February 1, 2015.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/mi5_ww2_01.shtml.
9 West,Nigel. Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence.New York: Scarecrow Press, 2007: 41.
10 Vego, Milan N. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College,
2009: 174-175.
11 Handel, Michael I. Intelligence and Military Operations.London: F. Cass, 1990: 387.

4. Excerpt for Application Consideration
Essay Submitted to the London School of Economics by Krystal Norman
Submitted March 2015
4
dismissed as inferior to the German military juggernaut.12 Tangentially, it can certainly be
argued that Nazi ideology contributed toward the German intelligence failures of Soviet
underestimation, however the causes were more complicated than mere ideological prejudice.
The German failure to detect weaknesses (and Allied decrypts) of its Enigma machine
ciphers is perhaps the most glaring example of intelligence failure during World War II, and it
is clear that failures in signal intelligence carried over from World War I. While it is true that
merely its possession and usage of the Enigma cipher machine is certainly considered a
success for the German intelligence apparatus, however the failure (to the point of
intransigence) to detect weaknesses in the cipher system is a major one. World War I saw
issues with German code books not being updated for several months at a time, being
captured by enemy personnel, and short-sightedness on the usage of open and or enemy cable
lines (in the case of the infamous Zimmerman Telegram). Germany appeared to learn at least
one lesson from these failures in the form of its determination to consistently change the
settings and add additional rotors to its Enigma machines, however its issues grew
exponentially regarding the ciphers. Firstly, even before the outbreak of World War II, Polish
codebreakers had cracked the initial iteration of the basic military Enigma, and shared its
findings with British and French intelligence services13. Second, British cryptanalysts at
Bletchley Park cracked the Enigma codes in 1941, garnering intelligence hence forth
codenamed ULTRA that was in turn shared with the United States and tangentially with the
Soviet Union; information such as orders of operation and U-boat locations were used by the
Allies strategically, and the Germans caught on, especially to the latter. The issue remained
however (this is indicative of the circular reasoning of the German intelligence services) that
officials refused to believe that decrypts of the Enigma machine were viable culprits of the
intelligence breaches. While German high command readily admitted that somehow the
Allies were aware of U-boat movements, it was operating on two central assumptions: first,
somehow the enemy radar and locational abilities were superior enough to allow their
detection of U-boat positions, and second, Enigma could not be at the centre of the breach
since Germany believed that in order to crack Enigma the enemy would need to both
physically compromise it and have access to the accompanying key settings. To the first
point, even when a German U-boat 570 was compromised and sensitive material was
recovered by Allied personnel, upon investigation German officials determined that Enigma
had still not been cracked, despite the majority of the requisite materials having been
recovered. Their reasoning was that without every single component, the possibility of
cracking Enigma was close to nil, and even if it were possible, any decrypt would come far
too late to have any strategic value. Because of this stubborn assumption, the Allied
knowledge of U-boat positioning was attributed to superior British location technology, not
cryptanalysts.14 Second, the Germans refused to believe that the Enigma settings were
mechanical as opposed to intellectual, and as such did not believe that Allied codebreakers
would attempt to crack Enigma via any other means than statistical (e.g. mechanically), and
therefore in their own internal tests of Enigma’s infallibility chose to adhere to possible
vulnerability to statistical attacks and neglected to attempt any of the more straightforward
methods that the Allied personnel had been using. Furthermore, German tests and
investigations into Enigma’s continued viability against enemy incursion were flawed from
12 Black, Jeremy. Warfare in the Western World, 1882-1975.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002: 101.
13 Ratcliff, R. A. "Searching For Security: The German Investigations Into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 1 (1999): 147.
14 Ratcliff, R. A. "Searching For Security: The German Investigations Into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 1 (1999): 152.

5. Excerpt for Application Consideration
Essay Submitted to the London School of Economics by Krystal Norman
Submitted March 2015
5
the start, as each test and investigation was predicated on the assumption that any breach of
German intelligence could not have come from a decrypt of Enigma as the Germans believed
it to be statistically impossible without a complete physical capture. Therefore each
investigation was geared toward supporting a preconceived notion that was empirically
flawed. This intransigent assumption was consistent throughout the investigations of all of
the branches, and even when their existed an admittance that Enigma could possibly be
decrypted, high command ignored this intuition and placed its faith in intelligence experts
who insisted Enigma was unbreakable.15 It is also in these multiple investigations that both
the aforementioned lack of cooperation/coordination and the high degree of military
centralisation (both inherently German traits) proved problematic; vexed by ‘unexplained
losses,’ each branch launched its own investigations into breaches yet did not coordinate, and
were therefore investigating a different set of ‘suspicious circumstances’ with no measure of
concerted response. Additionally, with what could possibly be seen as a lesson learned from
World War I, Germany installed a multiple cipher system into Enigma as a way to further
complicate any decrypt attempts, however the high level of military centralisation made the
multiple ciphers almost a moot point, as most of the communication was coming from one
central source anyway.16 Exacerbating the existing stubbornness of belief in Enigma’s
infallibility was the German confidence in its own intellectual superiority as compared to its
Allied counterparts, which could be construed as a Nazi ideological trait; this only made the
intransigence of infallibility further entrenched17; obviously the Allies decrypted Enigma and
the ensuing intelligence gathered was instrumental in Allied victory and conversely in
German defeat.
While it can be argued that the existence of Nazi ideology as the foundation of
German leadership throughout World War II exacerbated existing weaknesses in German
intelligence apparatus throughout World War II, it is clear that the underperformance of the
German intelligence services was the result of entrenched institutional issues attributed to
either existing foundational issues from World War I or inherent issues in the German
structure that inhibited intelligence operations, not the ideological machinations of the Nazi
regime.
15 Ratcliff, R. A. "Searching For Security: The German Investigations Into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 1 (1999): 162-163.
16 Ratcliff, R. A. "Searching For Security: The German Investigations Into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 1 (1999): 148; 150.
17 Ratcliff, R. A. "Searching For Security: The German Investigations Into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 1 (1999): 163.