1. PUBLIC OFFENCE
Considering the Application ofMill’sHarm Principle
Morgan Lanier
796501

2. 1
Table of Contents
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................................2
Literature Review ..................................................................................................................................................3
Table of Figures.......................................................................................................................................................3
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................4
Chapter 1: Defining the Debate............................................................................................................5
Section 1.1: Public Offence..................................................................................................................5
Section 1.2: A Shared Morality.........................................................................................................6
Section 1.3: Society....................................................................................................................................7
Chapter 2: Mill and the Harm Principle.......................................................................................9
Section 2.1: Deciphering the Harm Principle........................................................................9
Section 2.2: Mill on Public Offence...............................................................................................9
Chapter 3: Considering Harm and Offence...........................................................................10
Section 3.1: Harm vs. Offence.........................................................................................................10
Section 3.2: Feinberg and the Offense Principle.............................................................11
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................................12
Bibliography...............................................................................................................................................................13

3. 2
Executive Summary
The purpose of this report is to examine John Stuart Mill’s harm principle (which is outlined
in his seminal text, On Liberty) and to explore the question of whether or not the concept of
‘public offence’ is a legitimate application of it.
 Mill’s harm principle can be summarized as the belief that the only time a person’s
freedom should or can be restricted is if his actions can be reasonably expected to
cause harm to another person or persons.
 Public offence can be defined a number of different ways but for the purposes of this
report it is defined as occurring when a person has made a choice to publicly engage
in an activity of which society disapproves (such as begging for money, noisy
neighbours, public nudity).
There are many acts which are permissible in the privacy of one’s own home that only
become a ‘public offence’ because society disapproves of these acts taking place in public.
And when a society disapproves of something it means that the opinion of the majority or
the opinion of the person or persons who are in power is one of disapproval or disgust.
Harm is when a person is directly and adversely affected against his or her wishes, while
offence is being adversely affected in an emotional or mental sense. Mill does not believe
that acts that are considered a public offence should be regulated because they cause harm
– but, instead, because society disapproves and society finds them offensive.
The concept of ‘public offence’ is not compatible with Mill’s harm principle because 1) harm
and offence are not the same thing, and 2) although Mill states that the only acceptable
reason to restrict a man’s freedom is if his actions can be expected to cause or incite harm,
he then contradicts himself by saying that acts of public offence should be regulated
because they violate the shared morality of society.

4. 3
Literature Review
There are many social and legal philosophers who consider,
explore, and debate the concepts of public offence and the
harm principle. The research in this report is informed
primarily by literature from John Stuart Mill and from the
three main legal philosophers who debated applications of
his harm principle (and the debates they inspired).
John Stuart Mill was a political philosopher who wrote in the 1800s
and offered many substantial contributions to both social and political
theory. His essay On Liberty, originally published in 1859,was written in
an attempt to providea guidelineas to how free we should be – and,
specifically,howto tell when itis permissiblefor our freedoms to be
limited.Mill outlines,as an answer, the harm principle which says that
the only justifiablereason for limitinga person’s freedom is to prevent
harm from being caused to others.
Patrick Devlinwas a British lawyer,judgeand juristwho wrote
extensively about various legal philosophersand philosophies,with a
focus on the lawand moral philosophy and how(if at all) the two should
intersect. In his text The Enforcement of Morals (1965) he explores the
idea of whether or not the government has any placeregulating
morality and determines that individualswho deviate from the ‘shared
morality’do not harm other individualsbut do harm society by causing
a decay in its moral structure.
H. L. A. Hart,who is widely considered to be one of the world’s
foremost legal philosophersin thetwentieth century, published Law,
Liberty, and Morality (1963), which is a collection of three lectures he
gave at Stanford University in 1962 in responseto his famous debate
with Devlin on Mill’s harmprincipleand its application in enforcing
moral law.
Joel Feinbergwas an American political and legal philosopher who
wrote extensively about individual rights,the authority of the state, and
the relationship between the two. This report will focus primarily on the
second volume of his work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. In
volume two, Offense to Others (1985), Feinberg discusses howto
distinguish between harm and offence and declares that preventing
shock,disgust,or revulsion is a perfectly acceptableapplication of the
law.His work is crucial in distinguishingbetween ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ –
a vital partof the debate covered in this report.
Figure 1: Comparingand
contrasting‘harm’ vs.
‘offence’
TABLE OF FIGURES

5. 4
Introduction
These daysit seemsthatforeveryword,actionor expressionthere issomeone inthe worldwilling
to claimthat saidword,actionor expressionisoffensiveand/orharmful (Harcourt,1999 vonHirsch,
2000). ‘Claimsof harm have become sopervasive thatthe harmprinciple hasbecome meaningless:
the harm principle nolongerservesthe functionof acritical principle because non-trivialharm
argumentspermeate the debate’ (Harcourt,1999:113). Or, inother words,JohnStuartMill’sharm
principle hasbecome suchanoft-referencedideaindebatessurroundingpublicoffence –with
‘harm arguments…beingmade aboutpracticallyeverymoral offense [sic]’(Ibid:114) – that it isnow
essentiallyimpossible totell the trulybad (orharmful) fromthe onlymildlyinconvenientorirritating
(Harcourt,1999).
Further,itseemsthat in the lastcouple of decades,bothpublicopinionandthe law inmany
countries,Westerndemocraciesinparticular, have beentrendingtowardbecominglesstolerantof
and more oppressive towardwhat‘society’deemstobe ‘offensive behaviour’(vonHirsch,2000).
From Mayor RudolphGiuliani’s1996 ban on ‘aggressive begging’inpublicspaces(Toy,1996) to
France’s2004 ban onthe Muslimheadscarf inpublicschoolsandother institutions(DaleyandRubin,
2015) tothe jailingof Britain’s‘NakedRambler’(BBCNews,2003),it seemsthatwhena personor
groupof personsfindssomethingoffensive,insteadof simplyavoidingthe offendingactor person –
or, evenlesscommon,practicingtolerance –theyare far more likelytotryand have the offending
actionbannedor, at the veryleast,restricted(vonHirsch,2000). Andthisis,withouta doubt,a
trendwiththe potential to impactanyone andeveryone.
As such,thisreportwill examineJohnStuartMill’sharmprinciple(laidoutinhis1859 text, On
Liberty) – whichdeclaresthatthe onlyreasona person’sactionscanbe regulatedorrestrictedisif
theyare reasonablyexpectedtocause harm to anotherpersonorpersons – and itsapplicationsto
the notionof publicoffence.Thistopicisextremelybroad,surroundedbymanyextremelynuanced
debates,andpossessesalarge numberof potential applications;assuch,thisreportwill notbe able
to coverthe entiretyof the available materials.However,by focusingprimarilyonMill’stextitself
and the variousargumentsaboutthe harm principle andpublicoffence made bylegal philosophers
H.L.A.Hart, Patrick Devlin,andJoel Feinberg,thisreportwillexplore the debatesthatsurroundthe
followingissues andquestions:
1. Who or what is meant by ‘society’? When something is described as being
offensive to ‘society’ whom exactly are we talking about?
2. How is ‘offence’ to be defined? How is ‘harm’ to be defined?
3. Can ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ truly be distinguished?
4. With the goal of ultimately considering whetheror not the concept of
‘public offence’, which is accepted by Mill as being able to legitimately be
restrained by the law, is compatible with his own harm principle?

6. 5
Chapter 1: Defining the Debate
1.1 Public Offence
Before thisreportcan adequatelyaddressthe issue of whetherornotpublicoffence isalegitimate
applicationof Mill’sharmprinciple,itisfirstnecessary todefinewhatismeantbythe notionof
‘publicoffence’.
Laws againstpublicobscenity andpublicoffences are rootednotinattemptingtopreventharmto
citizensbut,rather,ina historyof prohibitingblasphemyand/orheresy–tendingtomake the
definitionof obscenityamatterof contemporarycommunitystandards (Henkin, 1963). Or, as both
DevlinandHart referto it: a shared morality. A phenomenonwhich leadstocompellingindividuals
to conformto the moralityof the majorityor of those whoare inpower (because whilethe majority
can be the group thathas powerthisisnot alwaysthe case) and causingthese same individualsto
be punishedwhen/if theydeviate fromthe moral standardsorexpectationsof society –evenif
those deviationsdonotactuallycause harm to others(Hart,1963). And whenlookingatthe
literature anddebateson whatconstitutesapublicoffence itispossibletodeduce fourmain
definitions:
Or, in summary, and the definition that will be used for the purposes of this report: A ‘public offence’is
when a person hasmadethechoiceto publiclyengagein an activityof which
societydisapprovesbecauseof their(society’s) shared morality.
1. Expressions or acts which are permissible in private but prohibited or
restricted in public.
2. Apparently non-harmful conduct that offends or violates public sensibilities or
standards.
(Wherein ‘non-harmful conduct’ usually refers to physical harm.)
3. Behaviour that has been deemed to be criminal because it goes against
socially accepted or socially shared norms, values, customs, and/or morals.
4. An act or behaviour that may not cause physical harm to an individual or
individuals but which, cumulatively, causes the society to suffer.

7. 6
Begging for money
Noisy neighbours
Prostitution
Public drunkenness
Public nudity
Public sex acts
Public urination
Homosexuality
Graffiti spraying
Hate speech
1.2 A Shared Morality
Many actionsthat are outlawedorrestrictedunderthe headingof ‘publicoffence’are regulatedin
an attemptto enforce asharedmorality – or the beliefof societythatthese actionsare morally
wrong(i.e.homosexuality,asmentionedabove) (Conway,1974; Devlin,1965; Hart, 1963). But who,
exactly,determinesthissharedmorality? Indeed,thisisone of the issuesoverwhichDevlinandHart
have beenknowntodebate quite fiercely –especiallyinregardstothe issue of homosexuality:What
exactlyisa ‘sharedmorality’?Andisitsufficientreasonforsocietytoban,outlaw,orregulate a
particularbehaviouroraction?
Devlinconsidered ‘shared morality’to be the
popular morality – that which is the commonly
held moral belief(s) of the majority.And he held
that the morality of the majority should be allowed
to influencelawmaking because a shared morality
is necessary for a society’s continued existence
and flourishing –and that if a society’s shared
morality is violated (by, for example, acts of public
offence) then that society is in jeopardy of decay
or disintegration.Heargued that homosexuality,
for example, was inherently immoral and that this
made itsubjectto public scrutiny and legal
regulation – even if ittook placein private –
because its inherently immoral nature made it an
attack upon society’s shared morality and,thus,a
threat to society itself.
(Devlin,1965)
Hart,too, believed that the ‘shared morality’
referred to the morality of the majority.But unlike
Devlin,he argued that private acts were justthat –
private. And that becausethey were privatethey
did no harm to anyone which meant the lawhad
no right to interfere. For example, on the topic of
homosexuality,Hart maintained that even if many
– or most – members of society finds homosexual
actions to be morally reprehensiblethat neither
the lawnor social pressurehas any authority to
regulate homosexual acts unless evidence can be
presented which proves that such actions are
harmful.One of Hart’s biggest concerns was that if
society was to prohibiteverything that offends the
shared morality and leaveindividualswith a liberty
which only allows them to do the things to which
no one seriously objects then everything (or nearly
everything) would be outlawed. And, really,would
that be any sort of liberty at all?
(Hart, 1963)
Examples of things that have been considered or are currently considered to be a public
offence include, but are not limited to:

8. 7
1.3 Society
One thingthe precedingdefiningsections(Sections1.1 and 1.2) have in commonisthat theyall
focuson the conceptof society:society’s sharedmorality,thatwhichoffendssociety,thatof which
societydisapproves,thatwhichsocietywishestoregulateoroutlaw,etc. Most of the acts listedas
examplesof publicoffence inSection1.1are bothpermissible andlegal whentheytake place inthe
privacyof one’sownhome andonlybecome offensive and,thus,subjecttoregulationwhenthey
move outside of the home (oranotherprivate sphere) totake place underthe watchful eye of
‘society’ (Hart,1963). Thus, itis necessarytodiscusswhat precisely ismeantwhen‘society’is
referredto.
Whenexperts,intheirdebate onreasonable legalapplicationsof Mill’sharmprinciple,referto
‘society’theirdefinitionsgive the impressionthattheyare referringtoagroup which isat consensus
– that isto say that everyone inthatgroup sharesthe same beliefs,values,morals,etc. Hart,for
example,whendiscussingsocietyandhow todetermine whatshouldandshouldnotbe classifiedas
a publicoffence describesitasbeingdeterminedby‘the morality actually acceptedand shared bya
givensocial group’(Hart,1963:20). Devlin,too,seemstotake asimilarapproachto definingsociety,
as he appealsto thatnotionof a sharedmoralityclaimingbyconsideringthe judgmentof the
reasonable man:
‘Howis the law-maker- to ascertain the moraljudgements
of society? …It is that of the reasonableman. He is not to
be confused with the rationalman. He is not expected to
reason about anything and his judgementmay be largely a
matter of feeling. It is the viewpoint of the man in the
street – or to use an archaism familiar to all lawyers – the
man in the Clapham omnibus.
(Devlin, 1965:15)
Devlinalsosaysthat‘[t]he moral judgmentof societymustbe somethingaboutwhichanytwelve
menor women drawnat randommightafter discussionbe expectedtobe unanimous’(Ibid:21-22).
However,althoughtheyseemtoclaimto preferto use ‘society’insucha wayas to meanthat moral
judgmentwhichisacceptedby all membersinvolvedandaffectedbythe judgementthisisnotquite
the way inwhichthe term ‘society’isemployedinthe debate aboutpublicoffence.Because right-
mindedpeoplecan,infact,have differingopinionsonwhatisandisnot immoral or offensive andso
the same opinionmaynotbe sharedby everyonewithinagivengroupof people.
So whatis actuallymeantwhenitissaidthat publicoffence iswhenapersonhasmade a choice to
publiclyengage inanactivityof which society disapprovesisthattheyhave chosentoengage inan
act of whichthe majorityor those whoare in powerdisapproves.(Becausealthoughthe majority
and the group thatholdspower can be the same,thatis notalwaysthe case.) Or, inotherwords,

9. 8
whensocietydisapprovesof anactionitmeansthat the common opinion orthe opinion of the
person or personswho arein power isone of disapproval ordisgust.

10. 9
Chapter 2: Mill and The Harm Principle
2.1 Deciphering the Harm Principle
In On Liberty, Mill declaresthat‘the sole endforwhichmankindare warranted,individuallyor
collectively,ininterferingwiththe libertyof actionof anyof theirnumber,isself-protection.That
the onlypurpose forwhichpowercan be rightfullyexercisedoveranymemberof a civilized
community,againsthiswill,istopreventharmto others.Hisowngood,eitherphysical ormoral,is
not a sufficientwarrant’(Mill,1991:14). Or, inotherwords,in orderto ensure protectionagainstthe
tyrannyof the government,tyrannyof institutions,and/ortyrannyof society,apersonshouldbe
free todo or say whatevertheywantsolongas theydo not cause any harmto or incite anyharm
againstothers(Mill,1991). And,further,thatthe onlytime a person’sfreedomshouldorcan be
restrictedisif hisaction(s) canbe reasonablyexpectedtocause harmto anotherpersonor persons
(Ibid).Nootherreason,notevenfindingaperson’sactionsoffensiveordistasteful,issufficientfor
limitingaperson’sfreedomof action orfreedomof expression (Ibid).
Mill alsoarguesfor allowingdissentanddisagreementamongpeople.He didnotbelieve lawsor
restrictionsshouldbe enactedbasedonwhatsociety – or themajority – thinksbecause he believed
that people hadbecome too comfortable withthe ideathateverybodyshouldbe requiredtoactand
behave ashe,and those withwhomhe sharedthe same opinionsandmorals,believedtheyshould
act (Mill,1991; Riley,1998).Further,Mill believedthattocontinue alongthe pathof simplyallowing
the majorityto impose theirviews,opinions,andmoralsonthe restwouldbe to runthe riskof
endingupwitha worldthat doesnotevergrow or improve butthat is,instead,stuckdue tothe
majoritybeingsoconvincedof theirowninfallibilityandthe ideathattheiropinionis
unquestionablythe correctopinion(Ibid).Thiswouldbe,toMill’smind,togive ourlives,laws,and
customsoverto the tyrannyof the majority – somethingtowhichMill wasstaunchlyopposed.
2.2 Mill on Public Offence
However,whenspecificallyconsideringwhetherornotpublicoffence can,thus,reasonablybe
restricted,Mill contradictshimself.He declaresthat‘there are manyacts which,beingdirectly
injuriousonlytothe agentsthemselves,oughtnottobe legallyinterdicted,butwhich,if done
publicly,are aviolationof goodmannersandcomingthuswithinthe categoryof offencesagainst
othersmay rightfullybe prohibited’(Mill,1991:108-109). Or, inotherwords,that acts such as
walkingaroundnakedorengaginginsex,whichare perfectlyacceptable withinthe confinesof one’s
ownhome become offensivewhentheytake place inpublic becausethey violatecommonly
accepted standardsof decency (Mill,1991; Riley,1998).
Mill doesnotbelieve thatactswhichare consideredapublicoffence shouldbe regulatedbythe law
because theycause harmbut, rather,because theyare acts which,if done publicly,are considered
by the majorityof opinion-holderstobe indecent –and that because thisisthe commonlyheld
opinionitistherefore permissible forsuchactsto be prohibitedorregulatedbythe state or other
institutions(Ibid).These acts,Mill claims,are notharmful and,thus,cannottrulybe regulatedunder
the listedapplicationsof hisharmprinciple –butbecause societydisapprovesandsocietyfindsthem
offensive itis,therefore,still permissible toregulatethem.

11. 10
Chapter 3: Considering Harm and Offence
3.1 Harm vs. Offence
How,then,isone meantto distinguishbetween‘harm’ and ‘offence’?Because,althoughthe two
phrasestendto be treatedas synonymousorusedinterchangeably,theyare,infact,twovery
differentconcepts.Consider:
a. The topic of thisreport isto explore the notionof publicoffence andwhetherornotitis a
legitimate applicationof Mill’sharmprinciple.
b. Mill was determined,incraftinghisharmprincipleanddiscussinglegitimate applicationsof
it,to distinguishbetweenbeinglegitimatelyharmedandsimplybeingoffended(Mill,1991;
Riley,1998).
As such,itis Mill’sconceptionof harmthat will be usedforthe purposesof thisdiscussion.And
while both‘harm’and‘offence’involve beingadverselyaffectedorwrongedinsome way – that is
where the similaritiesbetweenthe twoconceptsend.(Please seeFigure 1)
(Figure 1)
In On Liberty, Mill subscribestoa veryphysical ortangible conceptof harm(Ibid).He declaresthat
harm occurs whena personisdirectlyandadverselyaffectedagainsthisorherwishes.He believes
that harm involvesviolence againstapersonor a settingbackof theirinterests,suchasbeing
robbedor havingtheirpropertystolen(Ibid).Offence,however,isnotphysical.Instead, offence has
to do withbeingadverselyaffectedinanemotionalormental sense.
Further,harmis objective whileoffence issubjective (Feinberg,1985; Harcourt, 1999; Shoemaker,
2000; vonHirsch, 2000), whichmeans:

12. 11
1. Harm can be reliablymeasuredwhilst offence cannot.
2. Harm is observable byotherswhereasoffenseisamental/emotional state and,thus,noone
knowsa personhasbeenoffendedunlessthatpersonsomehow makesitcleartoobservers.
(Thiscan be done viabody language,averbal declaration, etc.)
Finally,one mustconsiderthatsomeone canbe harmedwithoutbeingaware of it – for example,if
someone stealsall of the moneyoutof yourbankaccount withoutyourknowledgeyou havebeen
harmedbut youare,as of yet,unaware of it (Shoemaker, 2000; von Hirsch,2000). However,noone
can be offendedwithoutbeingaware of itbecause tobe offendedisastate of mind(Harcourt,1999;
vonHirsch, 2000).
3.2 Feinberg and the Offense Principle
Whenlayingoutlimitationsof Mill’sharmprinciple,Feinbergdeterminesthatthe harmprinciple
alone isnot a sufficientprinciple onwhichtobase a rightto free speechorfreedomof expression
(Feinberg,1984).Andwhendiscussingthe notionof offence,he decidesthatcertaindisliked
conditionsorstates(annoyance,embarrassment,anxiety,etc.)cannotbe considered,inandof
themselves,tobe harmful –however,he determinesthatwe can reasonablyprohibitsome formsof
expressionbecause theyare legitimatelyharmful(Feinberg,1985).What is neededindetermining
whatsort of offence canreasonablybe outlawedisan‘offense[sic] principle’,whichhe outlinesas
follows:‘itisalwaysagoodreasonin supportof a proposedcriminal prohibitionthatitwould
probablybe an effective wayof preventingseriousoffense...topersonsotherthanthe actor,and
that itis probablya necessarymeanstothatend...The principle asserts,ineffect,thatthe
preventionof offensiveconductisproperlythe state'sbusiness’(Ibid:1).The basicideabeingthat
the harm principle,withMill’sclaimthatwe shouldbe free toexpressourselvestothe utmostlimit
(solongas no harm iscausedor incited) allowsindividualstoomuchfreedomandthatwe can,
instead,legallyrestrictorregulate some formsof expressionbecausetheyare offensive.
However,applyingthe offense principle to law makingandinstitutional rule-makingisincredibly
difficultbecausemanypeople are simplyoverlysensitiveorlookingtobe offended(Harcourt,1999
vonHirsch, 2000). Or, alternatively,someone mighttake offence tosomethingbecauseof prejudice
or bigotry,which,if suchoffence isappliedtothe makingof laws,couldleadtoharm beingcaused
to those groupsagainstwhich the offendedisprejudiced(Ibid).Finally,there are those whoclaim
that a ban on offensive behaviourwouldbe whatisharmful –not the offensive actionorbehaviour
itself –because simplybeingoffendeddoesnotharmor limitaperson’sinterestsinanysignificant
way.Whereasthe restrictingof offensive behaviourwould limitaperson’sinterestsinthatitwould
limithisabilitytolive hislife inthe waythathe wanted.

13. 12
Conclusion
Thus, is the concept of ‘public offence’, which is categorized by Mill as
something which can legitimately be restrained by the law, compatiblewith his
own harm principle?
An act of ‘publicoffence’occurswhenanindividual orgroupof individualsmakesthe choice to
publiclyengage inanact of whichthe majority (orthose inpower) disapproves.Andthe trend,these
days,as discussedinthe beginningof the report,seemstobe thatan act, whichisconsideredan
acceptable form of expressionwhendone inprivate,issuddenlysubjecttoregulationbythe
governmentand/orsocietybecausesomeone findsitoffensive.These regulationsandmoves
towardrestrictiontendtobe basedon or rootedina sharedmorality(the moralityof the majorityor
of those whoare in power) –meaningthatas opposedtosuch actionsbeingrestrictedbecause they
are causingan individual orindividualslegitimate harmorinjurytheyare,instead,beingrestricted
because theyare offendingsomeone’ssense of decency.
Thus,no, the conceptof ‘publicoffence’isnotcompatiblewithMill’sharmprinciple.Firstly,because
harm and offence are notthe same thing– the formeris physical andobjectivewhilstthe latteris
mental/emotional andsubjective.Andsecondly,because Mill contradictshimself whendiscussing
publicoffence.He saysthatwe shouldnotbe ruledbythe opinionof the majority –of society –
whenwe are consideringwhetherornotto outlaw or regulate behavioursandthatthe only
acceptable reasontorestricta man’s freedomisif hisactionscanreasonablybe considered or
expectedtocause harmto others(or to incite harmagainstthem),butthenimmediatelynegates
that whenconsidering‘publicoffence’.Instead,he saysthatacts thatare consideredapublic
offence –despite notcausingharm – should be regulatedand outlawedbecause itisaviolationof
the sharedmoralityof society.
So while there mayverywell be othergroundsforregulatingorprohibitingactswhichare
consideredtobe a publicoffence,itisnotan acceptable applicationtooutlaw suchactson the basis
of Mill’sharmprinciple alone.

14. 13
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