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Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis
Marcus Botacin1, Andr´e Gr´egio3, Paulo L´ıcio de Geus2
1Msc. Computer Science
Institute of Computing - UNICAMP
marcus@lasca.ic.unicamp.br
2Advisor
Institute of Computing - UNICAMP
paulo@lasca.ic.unicamp.br
3Co-Advisor
Federal University of Paran´a (UFPR)
gregio@inf.ufpr.br
CTD - SBSEG
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Problem
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Problem
Malware Threats.
Figure: Washington Post: https://tinyurl.com/ljo7ekm
Figure: BBC: https://tinyurl.com/mfogjhe
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Solution
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Solution
Malware Analysis.
Figure: Imperva: https://tinyurl.com/zkbsnl2
Figure: Enigma: https://tinyurl.com/kydgwve
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Challenges
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Challenges
The Challenges.
Figure: Themerkle: https://tinyurl.com/kasuxcr
Figure: Forbes: https://tinyurl.com/l7ecrex
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Challenges
How to stop analysis?
Table: Anti-Analysis: Tricks summary. Malware samples may employ
multiple techniques to evade distinct analysis procedures.
Technique Description Reason Implementation
Anti Check if running Blocks reverse
Fingerprinting
Debug inside a debugger engineering attempts
Anti Check if running Analysts use VMs Execution
VM inside a VM for scalability Side-effect
Anti Fool disassemblers AV signatures may Undecidable
Disassembly to generate wrong opcodes be based on opcodes Constructions
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Challenges
And then...
Figure: Commercial solution armored with anti-debug technique.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Challenges
And then...
Figure: Real malware impersonating a secure solution which cannot run
under an hypervisor.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Benefits
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
The Benefits
Transparency
1 Higher privileged.
2 No non-privileged side-effects.
3 Identical Basic Instruction Semantics.
4 Transparent Exception Handling.
5 Identical Measurement of Time.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
A Summary
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
A Summary
A Survey
Table: Hardware features.
Technique PROS CONS Gaps
HVM Ring -1
Hypervisor High
development overhead
SMM Ring -2
BIOS High
development implementation cost
AMT Ring -3
Chipset No malware
code change analysis solution
HPCs Lightweight
Context-limited No malware
information analysis solution
GPU Easy to program
No register No introspection
data procedures
TSX Commit-based
Store only Overcome the
few KB KB barrier
SGX Isolates goodware
Also isolates No enclave
malware inspection
SOCs Tamper-proof
Passive
Raise alarms
components
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Background
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Background
Branch Monitors
Figure: Branch Stack.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Proposed Framework
Figure: Proposed framework architecture.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Could I isolate processes’ actions?
Figure: Data Storage (DS) AREA.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Table: ASLR - Library placement after two consecutive reboots.
Library NTDLL KERNEL32 KERNELBASE
Address 1 0xBAF80000 0xB9610000 0xB8190000
Address 2 0x987B0000 0x98670000 0x958C0000
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Table: Function Offsets from ntdll.dll library.
Function Offset
NtCreateProcess 0x3691
NtCreateProcessEx 0x30B0
NtCreateProfile 0x36A1
NtCreateResourceManager 0x36C1
NtCreateSemaphore 0x36D1
NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject 0x36E1
NtCreateThread 0x30C0
NtCreateThreadEx 0x36F1
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
Figure: Introspection Mechanism.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware
analyzer?
Is CG reconstruction possible?
_lock_file+0x90printf+0xe3__iob_funcprintf+0xcaprintfNewToy
Figure: Step Into.
scanf+0x3f NewToy printf
Figure: Step Over.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I retrieve all executed functions ?
Is CFG reconstruction possible?
Figure: Code block identification.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I retrieve all executed functions ?
Is CFG reconstruction possible?
Figure: it is possible to reconstruct the whole execution flow.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Is the final solution transparent?
Deviating Behavior
Figure: Deviating behavior identification.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Is the final solution transparent?
Deviating Behavior
Figure: Divergence: True Positive. Figure: Divergence: False Positive.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a Debugger?
Inverted I/O
Figure: Debugger’s working mechanism.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Could I develop a Debugger?
Integration
Figure: GDB integration.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
ROP Attacks
Figure: ROP chain example.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
CALL-RET Policy
Figure: CALL-RET CFI policy.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
Exploit Analysis
Table: Excerpt of the branch window of the ROP payload.
FROM TO
—- 0x7c346c0a
0x7c346c0b 0x7c37a140
0x7c37a141 —-
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Developments
Does the solution handle ROP attacks?
Exploit Analysis
Listing 1: Static disassembly of the MSVCR71.dll library.
1 7 c346c08 : f2 0 f 58 c3 addsd %xmm3,%xmm0
2 7 c346c0c : 66 0 f 13 44 24 04 movlpd %xmm0,0 x4(%esp )
Listing 2: Dynamic disassembly of the
MSVC71.dll executed code.
1 0x1000 ( s i z e =1) pop rax
2 0x1001 ( s i z e =1) r e t
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Remarks
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Remarks
Lessons learned
Transparency is essential.
Hardware-assisted approaches may fulfill transparency
requirements.
There are open problems on hardware monitoring.
Security, performance, and development efforts as trade-offs
(really?).
Performance monitors as lightweight alternatives.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Future Work
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Future Work
And now?
Multi-core monitor.
Linux Monitor.
Malware clustering.
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Publications
Topics
1 Introduction
The Problem
The Solution
The Challenges
2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions
The Benefits
A Summary
3 My Proposal
Background
Developments
4 Conclusions
Remarks
Future Work
Publications
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Publications
Main Papers
Who watches the watchmen: A security-focused review on
current state-of-the-art techniques, tools and methods for
systems and binary analysis on modern platforms—ACM
Computing Surveys (A1).
Enhancing Branch Monitoring for Security Purposes: From
Control Flow Integrity to Malware Analysis and
Debugging—ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (A2).
The other guys: automated analysis of marginalized
malware—Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking
techniques (B1).
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Publications
Solution’s Availability
Figure: Solution’s Availability. Solution is public on github.
https://github.com/marcusbotacin/BranchMonitoringProject
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions
Publications
Questions ?
Contact
marcus@lasca.ic.unicamp.br
mfbotacin@inf.ufpr.br
Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP

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Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis

  • 1. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis Marcus Botacin1, Andr´e Gr´egio3, Paulo L´ıcio de Geus2 1Msc. Computer Science Institute of Computing - UNICAMP marcus@lasca.ic.unicamp.br 2Advisor Institute of Computing - UNICAMP paulo@lasca.ic.unicamp.br 3Co-Advisor Federal University of Paran´a (UFPR) gregio@inf.ufpr.br CTD - SBSEG Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 2. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 3. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Problem Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 4. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Problem Malware Threats. Figure: Washington Post: https://tinyurl.com/ljo7ekm Figure: BBC: https://tinyurl.com/mfogjhe Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 5. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Solution Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 6. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Solution Malware Analysis. Figure: Imperva: https://tinyurl.com/zkbsnl2 Figure: Enigma: https://tinyurl.com/kydgwve Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 7. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Challenges Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 8. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Challenges The Challenges. Figure: Themerkle: https://tinyurl.com/kasuxcr Figure: Forbes: https://tinyurl.com/l7ecrex Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 9. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Challenges How to stop analysis? Table: Anti-Analysis: Tricks summary. Malware samples may employ multiple techniques to evade distinct analysis procedures. Technique Description Reason Implementation Anti Check if running Blocks reverse Fingerprinting Debug inside a debugger engineering attempts Anti Check if running Analysts use VMs Execution VM inside a VM for scalability Side-effect Anti Fool disassemblers AV signatures may Undecidable Disassembly to generate wrong opcodes be based on opcodes Constructions Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 10. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Challenges And then... Figure: Commercial solution armored with anti-debug technique. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 11. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Challenges And then... Figure: Real malware impersonating a secure solution which cannot run under an hypervisor. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 12. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Benefits Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 13. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions The Benefits Transparency 1 Higher privileged. 2 No non-privileged side-effects. 3 Identical Basic Instruction Semantics. 4 Transparent Exception Handling. 5 Identical Measurement of Time. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 14. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions A Summary Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 15. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions A Summary A Survey Table: Hardware features. Technique PROS CONS Gaps HVM Ring -1 Hypervisor High development overhead SMM Ring -2 BIOS High development implementation cost AMT Ring -3 Chipset No malware code change analysis solution HPCs Lightweight Context-limited No malware information analysis solution GPU Easy to program No register No introspection data procedures TSX Commit-based Store only Overcome the few KB KB barrier SGX Isolates goodware Also isolates No enclave malware inspection SOCs Tamper-proof Passive Raise alarms components Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 16. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Background Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 17. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Background Branch Monitors Figure: Branch Stack. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 18. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 19. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Proposed Framework Figure: Proposed framework architecture. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 20. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Could I isolate processes’ actions? Figure: Data Storage (DS) AREA. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 21. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Table: ASLR - Library placement after two consecutive reboots. Library NTDLL KERNEL32 KERNELBASE Address 1 0xBAF80000 0xB9610000 0xB8190000 Address 2 0x987B0000 0x98670000 0x958C0000 Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 22. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Table: Function Offsets from ntdll.dll library. Function Offset NtCreateProcess 0x3691 NtCreateProcessEx 0x30B0 NtCreateProfile 0x36A1 NtCreateResourceManager 0x36C1 NtCreateSemaphore 0x36D1 NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject 0x36E1 NtCreateThread 0x30C0 NtCreateThreadEx 0x36F1 Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 23. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? Figure: Introspection Mechanism. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 24. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a performance-counter-based malware analyzer? Is CG reconstruction possible? _lock_file+0x90printf+0xe3__iob_funcprintf+0xcaprintfNewToy Figure: Step Into. scanf+0x3f NewToy printf Figure: Step Over. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 25. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I retrieve all executed functions ? Is CFG reconstruction possible? Figure: Code block identification. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 26. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I retrieve all executed functions ? Is CFG reconstruction possible? Figure: it is possible to reconstruct the whole execution flow. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 27. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Is the final solution transparent? Deviating Behavior Figure: Deviating behavior identification. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 28. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Is the final solution transparent? Deviating Behavior Figure: Divergence: True Positive. Figure: Divergence: False Positive. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 29. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a Debugger? Inverted I/O Figure: Debugger’s working mechanism. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 30. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Could I develop a Debugger? Integration Figure: GDB integration. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 31. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Does the solution handle ROP attacks? ROP Attacks Figure: ROP chain example. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 32. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Does the solution handle ROP attacks? CALL-RET Policy Figure: CALL-RET CFI policy. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 33. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Does the solution handle ROP attacks? Exploit Analysis Table: Excerpt of the branch window of the ROP payload. FROM TO —- 0x7c346c0a 0x7c346c0b 0x7c37a140 0x7c37a141 —- Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 34. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Developments Does the solution handle ROP attacks? Exploit Analysis Listing 1: Static disassembly of the MSVCR71.dll library. 1 7 c346c08 : f2 0 f 58 c3 addsd %xmm3,%xmm0 2 7 c346c0c : 66 0 f 13 44 24 04 movlpd %xmm0,0 x4(%esp ) Listing 2: Dynamic disassembly of the MSVC71.dll executed code. 1 0x1000 ( s i z e =1) pop rax 2 0x1001 ( s i z e =1) r e t Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 35. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Remarks Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 36. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Remarks Lessons learned Transparency is essential. Hardware-assisted approaches may fulfill transparency requirements. There are open problems on hardware monitoring. Security, performance, and development efforts as trade-offs (really?). Performance monitors as lightweight alternatives. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 37. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Future Work Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 38. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Future Work And now? Multi-core monitor. Linux Monitor. Malware clustering. Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 39. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Publications Topics 1 Introduction The Problem The Solution The Challenges 2 Hardware-Assisted Solutions The Benefits A Summary 3 My Proposal Background Developments 4 Conclusions Remarks Future Work Publications Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 40. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Publications Main Papers Who watches the watchmen: A security-focused review on current state-of-the-art techniques, tools and methods for systems and binary analysis on modern platforms—ACM Computing Surveys (A1). Enhancing Branch Monitoring for Security Purposes: From Control Flow Integrity to Malware Analysis and Debugging—ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (A2). The other guys: automated analysis of marginalized malware—Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking techniques (B1). Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 41. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Publications Solution’s Availability Figure: Solution’s Availability. Solution is public on github. https://github.com/marcusbotacin/BranchMonitoringProject Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP
  • 42. Introduction Hardware-Assisted Solutions My Proposal Conclusions Publications Questions ? Contact marcus@lasca.ic.unicamp.br mfbotacin@inf.ufpr.br Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis IC-UNICAMP