Close Quarter Battle
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Dogma – Prescribed doctrine proclaimed as unquestionably true by a
particular group; a specific tenet or doctrine authoritatively laid down,
i.e. by the Military; a settled or established opinion, belief, or principle…
What is this shit?
I’ve compiled dogmatic argument lines I’ve came across over my time. I’ve talked with many, many people
about CQB. Some who agree with me, some who disagree with me. But here are the common argument lines I
have come across. I then dissect them, telling you what I think of these arguments. The comments range from
people with backgrounds such as Youtubers, airsofters, paintballers, gamers to Law Enforcement Patrol
Officers, SWAT members and Military Infantry, Special Forces and Military Police. A whole range of people.
• Some are silly.
• Some are downright dumb.
• Some are pure fallacies.
• Some are fucking hilarious.
• Some are fucking retarded.
• Some viewpoints are persuasive, motivating and understand the concepts.
• Some viewpoints have challenged my way of thinking.
I hope you can learn from this PowerPoint. By the way, a warning: THIS IS NOTHING BUT WALL OF TEXT.
And… this is not meant to offend anyone. And if it does, oh well!
“There’s more than one way to do it…”
“There’s a million ways to skin a cat…” “…Come on dude we can do it a thousand ways.”
…Sure but which way is better?
Better – more survivable, quicker, more aggressive, better angles, less known risk, less latent or actual errors, smoother, easier to
learn/teach, better for this population, works better for this terrain/layout, etc. Whatever your mission defines as better.
This argument is more often than not used by people who have not examined and chosen a particular way to do it against a specific
threat, environment, team, mission or layout. They often just go by the approach taught to them. It’s a tuck-tail approach to
questioning practices often used to avoid discussion.
“There’s more than one way to do it, I prefer this way because…” or “I prefer adjusting it this way because” is a better argument. No
broad, silly statement. It is more an argument with points to back it up meaning it can be wrong but hopefully it has logical and
tactical reasoning behind it that understands the concepts of CQB. Hopefully it is a persuasive argument another can agree with.
If you would examine why you are doing this action and if there are other ways, then sure there’s more thanone way. So make a
decision on which one you would rather use. Do not just go to a default because it was taught to you or because there are too many
options out there. Educate yourself and find better ways to do it! Do not put too many tools In the toolbox. Have your favourites.
DEFINITELY do not go to one method because it’s taught universally. That’s jumping on the bandwagon. A huge fallacy. Even if
they’re super top secret squirrels or Special Horses (Neiiigh!) doing it that way. “Whenever you find yourself on the side of the
majority, it’s time to pause and reflect” ― Mark Twain. “There comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor
politic, nor popular, but he must take it because conscience tells him it is right” ― Martin Luther King Jr.
THINK: Worse-case context is an immediate prepared threat. Would your action stand up against it? Therefore is your way to do it
worse or better than other ways to do it against that scenario? Permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive environments.
“There is no right way…” “…no better ways…”
“It changes so much there’s really no set way to do it…” “…it doesn’t really matter.”
That sounds like a quitter. If there is no right or better way then I could moonwalk backwards with my weapon down and be just as
safe compared to if I went in forwards with my weapon up. See the problem?
There may not be an absolute “right” way, as the world is often grey and contextual, but there are definitely BETTER ways. Better
usually means increased survivability. This usually requires a grip on the concepts and some unique real-world breadth of experience
helps. Transferring it to others. Creating better methods. Better ways. Not necessarily the “right” way. That’s what gets you ahead.
You own the powercurve. This is reality, you may get injured doing a “better way”. It does not mean you should not have doneit.
These methods may not apply to your theatre or operation, or they may end up with casualties even when using a ‘better’ method, it
depends how you judge the tactical situation. Be a tactician. Think critically.
Weapon up is better than weapon down when entering a room for the most part. Right? You react quicker, you shoot quicker, you still
have good visual into the room, etc. It’s better.
If you put a standard on this because it just makes fucking tactical sense then it is the “RIGHT” way.
If the standard is ever wrong then there has to be good reason to adjust it or configure special circumstance criteria into it. This
becomes an exception to the rule or exception to the standard (i.e. a rule of thumb, “if” scenarios, or observation within context).
This allows you to not become hesitant when what you have planned to work does not work, or what you are trained to do is
impossible without fatal repercussions. Just remember to adjust. Do not trust the standard, just live up to it the best you can.
For example “pushing through” the fatal funnel is an accepted standard. Special circumstance such as a large volume of fire into the
fatal funnel would get people hurt if they tried “pushing through” it. Exception to the rule. Don’t go into it. You’ll be dead-ed.
“Everybody, every unit does it differently…”
I laugh. Well actually I cringe. “We’re all different and we all do it differently, there is no perfect way…”
Although true in context to modifications and different configurations we can use, we tend to it similarly at
bare minimum. The way we gain access to and enter a room for the most part is very similar.
Differently you say? You’re still buttonhooking, right? If it’s done differently then ask yourself why? Why is it
done differently? Is it quicker to do it that way or this way? Is it more survivable? So on.
This line of “differently” is often used when they’re doing it not “differently”, but more they’re doing it arse-
ways around and now trying to cover their tracks. They’ve done it wrong but claim it was just “different.”
Every individual has human differences (i.e. anatomical) that might make them do it differently. That is innate,
unchangeable. I’m talking human factors. Doing an entry wrong because of your thinking and actions.
Often in these arguments, they’re doing it better than the person and their defence is some concoction of
sourcing out the blame and failed reasoning upon others. “Err… well yeah… they’re just doing it differently!”.
No mate, they’re doing it better than you. Ego aside. You buttonhooked with the wrong leading foot for this
angle and layout, your weapon didn’t come up in sufficient time. “Differently” doesn’t negate the mistake.
This defence to sum up is… baaaaaaaaaaaad. Ask yourself what does differently mean? Better or worse?
It’s the same argument of “Well, around here we do it this way”…why?! Give some meaning to your words.
Never stop in the door. Never stop in the fatal funnel. Never flag your buddies. It’s all relative.
NEVER stop in the door does not mean NEVER fight from the door before moving in. Never stop in the door
does not mean never backtrack. Sometimes you just have to. Example? GRENADE. And it happens. It can
create a clusterfuck but it can also save your arse. Entries aren’t meant to be perfect or look as nice as they’re
done in a shoot-house against paper targets. They’re meant to be flexible for fighting in close combat.
NEVER stop in the fatal funnel does not mean it does not happen. It happens. Therefore have contingencies in
case it does. Sometimes it has to happen for you to survive, i.e. shooting an immediate threat and pulling back
into concealment or fighting from the doorjamb, seeing a grenade or IED/SV. As I have explained previously,
“pushing through” is an example of this. There are exceptions to the rule. Not a rule-based error.
Concepts related to “never do this” or “that” are usually tailored to immediate/surprise-driven entries where
your purpose is to fill or flood a room. Never is not contextual towards limited entries or covert entries for
example against prepared threats. Or against barricaded threats. Because continuing to enter against this is
bad news. You continue to push into a muzzle, into an active engagement, and into a door ambush/kill zone.
Ask yourself when does it apply? Why is that even a rule? Is it of use as an absolute rule or is it a relative rule?
Never is often situational or purely for potentials, i.e. safety, training, paper targets or team coordination.
Get yourself into the habit of not just saying it. Explain it instead. Do not use the N-word! Never say never?!
“Always… …go right… …go left… …go to the opposite side as pointman…”
Always go left? In a heavy right corner-fed I’d walk into the wall and not clear the biggest area of the
room. I’d plant my fucking face INTO the wall if I took you literally. Always go left. Bollocks. I would prefer
to run the wall than run into it. And I much prefer to clear the bigger side first as that’s more tactically
proficient. Opposite side as pointman? Not really. You may go same-side rather than alternating.
Therefore give context for ALWAYS. In a corner-fed you always try to take the path towards the left side,
i.e. the straight common/strong wall. It does not HAVE to be full left. That’s a better compromise. Right?
If you’re saying always in all cases you may make situations worse. For example causing people to
buttonhook INTO a threat and create a one-on-one fight. This is putting odds in the enemies favour.
Therefore think before you say always. Give some examples of where it’s not actually always all the time.
Present these as samples as exceptions to the rule. This prevents dogmatic rule-based thought-processes.
Even more importantly… Students should not be punished for going against the rule when it makes sense
to. Tactical consideration is the foundation of these “rules”, so if the student uses good tactical
consideration to avoid the rule, which may or does save their butt then they’ve done the right thing!
A good tactician thinks outside of the box.
“The First Man is NEVER Wrong…”
Of course he fucking is.
The point they are often trying to make is that in an immediate entry you need to keep moving, and keep flowing/traversing through.
Often the enemy will be fixated on the first man in the room, usually the man he just shot, and you pushing through createssplit
targets. Triangulation of fire. Multiple weapons on one threat (Multi-weapon engagements). Yadda yadda ya.
Often it also means if he goes left by “accident”, you go right. Fill a gap. That doesn’t mean he’s NOT wrong for going the wrong way.
He might’ve hit the “lightest” side of the room – bad tactics, it puts the odds against you. This excuse is not something to dismiss
wrong-doing. Sometimes this just happens and is situational but remember this!
The Paris Hypercache Kosher supermarket hostage rescue. The first man made a mistake, his Commander claims in an interview that
it was WRONG. His team noted this, adjusted and “edged”, engaging from the doorway with the bunkers. The team did not follow the
wrong-doing individual. If they did imagine what could’ve happened – a threat with explosives, a gun and suicidal mindset. Not good!
Do NOT follow someone into their death. One man dead is not greater than two UNLESS in special circumstance following them has a
good likelihood of still saving them or killing the threat. Sometimes you just have no significant chance. They’re already gone.
So think now – do you follow or do you adjust? If you follow, do so quickly and engage from the doorjamb if you can. If you adjust
then think about your approach to a known threat area. Decide based off your mission objective though, not your personal beliefs.
See this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0s-A9oEJKQ.
You watch the video? Second man must’ve been thinking holy fuck what did I walk into. Third and fourth definitely were if they
pulled out. These guys are Delta Force. It can happen to anyone. Don’t get me started on all the “superman” complex arguments I’ve
heard. Anyone can get hurt in these entries and by anyone on the other side pulling the trigger, even if those people are useless.
“This technique vs that – it doesn’t matter”
“Who cares? You’re going to die anyway in CQB…” “…This entry, that, doesn’t matter…”
You fucking dumbarse.
I can tell you’re not a critical thinking, never mind the fact that you’re not an instructor. That’s a brain-dead
zombie approach to room entries. What are you – a robot?
This is the thinking of a failed tactician. It is not somebody I want to enter a room with. It is somebody I do not
want to be in combat with. I want to be there with someone who thinks about survival and team.
If you want to be lenient on tactical concepts because you’ve been in the game too long, you have plenty of
experience, you know your AO and you already understand both the concepts and consequences then fine,
your life. I’ve done it myself. I’ve known I should’ve technically cleared the hardcorner but fuck it I was already
leaning towards “this place is empty” – I’m not denying the risk. I’m accepting it. It does fucking matter.
Although the place was empty. It should not become a habit. It could cost other lives, not just your own.
Did someone say hindsight bias? Or cleared-to-many-empty-rooms-today-itis? Maybe.
Either way the techniques used are important. Some techniques are faster than others, more survivable than
others, better than others. You end up with less paint on you after Force-on-Force. That should say something.
Technique and application matters. So do the fundamental tactics.
“Triangulation of Fire…”
Most of the time you do not have the time or space to bring to bear all the arms of the entry team.
Triangulation of fire (ToF) as often taught is a rare occurrence in a tight or barricaded room entry against resistance. This
usually is taught as four-plus people having their weapon against a singular threat. In reality you usually get one to two
guys on threat. Three men becomes even rarer, four is lucky and the guy has probably already dropped.
This means that one man, sometimes two man, is effectively in a one-on-one fight until backed up.
Getting multiple arcs on a threat is good but often the employment of our tactics does not allow this. Think:high-threat
situations, barricaded situations, deep angles of the room, exposing angles and through-door engagements. To employ
multiple people in the room against one threat is sometimes unnecessary or, conversely, impossible.
You first have to get your guys in the room – which may be unable to with the volume of fire at the entrypoint. This may
be unnecessary as first man has already took them out. If you have a denied entry then you need another plan.
Think about using loopholes, explosive ports, shields, snipers, designated marksmen, grenades, windows, rooftops and
other ways to gain access to the threat from multiple people and multiple angles.
ToF is often taught to get multiple rounds into a singular threat in quick time, enough to stop the threat. You know wound
ballistics, this can be hard to do in extremely short-duration so the more people shooting, the merrier.
It is then taught to get good observation of the room with arcs covering the whole room. So think about what it was
made for and know the limitations. Overall this is not a bad argument. It is a positive you look for in any entry!
“Well, it works…”
Sorry what? You know what works do you? What are you basing this off?
You know what works in context to what? In what situation? What lead the tactic to work – what were the
fundamental flaws that might lead it not to work in the same or a similar situation again?
Do not assume a tactic does work just because it’s used and successful once. It depends on the purpose and
context of how it was utilized, when and against who. The same may not work with one simple change, i.e. a
If training – was it Force-on-Force or paper targets? Because you can do anything against paper targets. Was it
an empty room or full? Was it the first run through or had they been shooting all day?
If experience – what experience? Where were you? What was the room like? What were the combatants
doing? See the slide, “I’ve done this and it worked.”
If history-orientated. “It worked in Fallujah”, fine. Let’s look at the times that it didn’t work in Fallujah or why
the tactics were changed. Fallujah is a good place to analyse though, when you want some eye-openers.
Learn to differentiate when it does, when it doesn’t. In what CONTEXT. Were you running into a room in
Fallujah where the enemy were not prepared? If so, I can see how that would work anywhere in the world –
never mind Fallujah. Now if you can replicate it to your current AO then good! But remember…
Some things work some of the time. Some things work most of the time.
“But the Military and Police teach it…”
And specific units do, too. “SPECIAL FORCES DO THIS GUYS.” Don’t forget Delta and the SAS thrown in there somewhere. Ugh…
Differentiate the units. What are their purpose? How do they train? What is their funding? It all impacts on how they do things.
This does not mean they are in the right for doing them. Testing these “theories” is usually done in paper target, empty rooms.
Let’s not forget that the Military and Police used to teach things that have changed. How do you think change occurs? They realize
what works and what doesn’t. What works sometimes and what doesn’t sometimes, and develop SOP/IOPs around it. Duh!
Simple answer: Force-on-Force it. Do not appeal to authority.
NATO use different techniques to the Israelis. They’re both Military. So… they both teach different concepts. Different forced learning.
IDF may say the way others do it is bollocks, and NATO armies visa versa. Teaching is different to doing in training is different to doing
against real people in combat.
Long answer: It’s a revolving door community. The same old usually gets regurgitated and taught to the next in the door revolution. It
goes around in a circle. It takes LONG for the big ship to turn. Test every theory. Theories are all good and true but are made around
specific units, specific objectives and mission profiles. Just because one unit does it does not mean you should, same goes with one
persons opinion or experience. Some regurgitated methods might be acceptable with new technology, thinking or equipment, i.e.
treejumping. It does not mean, however, that it can be practiced by every unit or is applicable to all environments or situations.
An example is hostage rescue. You have leeway on “acceptable losses” (suicidal or Excalibur/Knight in Shining Armour mindset),
you’re there to rescue hostages and sustain the firefight/amount of people within the room at almost any cost. This means flooding is
acceptable. Compare that to being behind enemy lines, non-hostage rescue, with a small team where entering the room might not
even come into your mind, or will be done in a fashion that presents the least risk. See the difference? It’s all in the same Military.
“You should keep your opinion to yourself, you’re not even… you’re…”
• You’re not in the Military.
• You’re not in the Police Force.
• You’re not in this specific unit (I laugh when they say Delta Force for no reason – what the fuck? I’m not even American!).
• You haven’t attended this course (Including courses that are no longer offered, unrelated).
• It’s a matter of your own personal opinion (Circular logic and a half).
• You weren’t trained in X, Y, Z (Including a whole other fucking country).
This is all BOLLOCKS… complete fallacy. You can criticize, and your points may still be legitimate, no matter your background. Oh and
they just assume your background. I’ve seen people tell an SF dude that he was wrong, even though he went through SFAUCs (atthe
time it was called that). The cheek of some of these wankers. Assuming based upon their ego. Personality-driven. Bad, bad, bad!
Let me repeat again.
BOLLOCKS. People who cannot accept criticism find any potential avenue to stop it. This is one. It creates boundaries to discussion.
One-upping the situation. The same goes when regular infantry discuss an armoured approach in urban terrain. They can do that!
“You can’t criticize if…”
“I’ve done this and it worked!!!”
“I trained in…” “…in X, Y, Z DEPLOYMENT we came across… and…” “…it works!”
Dead men tell no tales. So, in what context did you do it?
Against a prepared and armed threat? Was the enemy trained?
Was he or she trained/aiming against the door? Did they shoot?
In an immediate room entry? Did you use a grenade or other device prior to entry?
In warfare situation, domestic counter-terrorism, Law Enforcement operation?
An example of this was an ex-Ranger I was talking to who did a room entry in Iraq against militants shooting
down on Humvees from a rooftop and balcony. It didn’t matter the entry. He could’ve moonwalked in
backwards then spun and shot these militants, they were fixated on the engagement. Target fixation.
Therefore of course a certain tactic worked, it was in the correct context to work. This does not negate its
limitations and the possibility of being used against prepared defenders in the same entry and it failing.
FAILURE happens because of X, Y, Z. SUCCESS happens because of X, Y, Z. Do not extrapolate failure/success.
Remember: Somethings work some of the time. Somethings are more likely to work in certain circumstances.
THINK about when it’s not going to work and when it is. CONTEXT.
“Just use a…” or “…Just do…”
Often is a fallacy. For example “just use a flashbang.”
And I have to say “just do a limited entry is the same”, it has limitations and is contextual.
You come against a barricaded room with deep angle threats and multiple defenders. “Lol guys just use a
flashbang.” Yep. Fuck you, that is the most stupid shit I have ever heard.
They do not understand the limitations of these devices, tactics or techniques.
NFDDs are limited. CS gas and smoke is limited. As is your supply line to having the luxury!
You may be out of flashzone, flashie “trapped” in a corner or under furniture, against someone who turns
away, against someone with earplugs, against someone who shoots anyway. Countless scenarios.
Even with these effects against a bad guy, this does not make an entry successful.
They can still operate the trigger. You get the point? Their boobytrap is still waiting for you. Ouch.
People can still kill you. Disorientation is not an absolute human-stopper. SWAT operations where SWAT
members have become injured or have died show this over and over. Do not become reliant on them.
Same goes with fragmentation grenades. There are cases of small outbuildings with enemy inside taking six
plus grenades to clear! Do not rely on these devices OR at minimum do not rely on just one of them to do the
job. They, like all other things I’ve talked about, do not “fix” an entry.
“You’re arguing one entry over the other!”
“This guy just hates what we’re doing, he’s a hater…” “…He just prefers that over the way we do it around here.”
In specific circumstances this is true, I am arguing one thing over another, however, I am NOT ADVOCATING one over the
other AT ALL TIMES.
Some things tend to work at certain times, others tend to work better in other moments. I.e. gaining immediate entry for
speed against a sleeping, surprised threat.
There are places for immediate entry and places for limited entries.
I argue that the “default” entry should be limited as it creates less risk and has less limitations in the Contemporary
Operational Environment we have today. COIN, counter/anti-terrorism and urban warfare/operations are our future. So…
Think: saving more lives (less risk, utilizing other means before entering, deciding not to enter at all).
Consider if we were fighting a major power such as China, in a Chinese City with bunkered-down houses. I ain’t entering
against a bunch of prepared threats. I’m gaining intel before considering entry. I’m also considering more “break in”
techniques and stand-off attacks and calls for support/assets/backup OVER a limited entry. What are you thinking?
I do NOT argue that there is no room for immediate entries. I say we do these in specific context, to specific stimuli. An
example is mentioned above. There’s more to entering rooms than relying on the overstated speed, surprise and violence.
Comprehende? If you’re still saying I advocate only one form of entry, you’re a dickhead. An unreasonable dickhead.
“By the book” or “By experience” Accounts
Now both count for something.
Yes METT-TC, OODA loop and OCOKA factors apply in the big picture. Remember to be human behaviour and human factors based!
By the book accounts for mostly common scenarios, previous experience and what has been taught before (traditionally). By the book
might be taught primarily during training scenarios against paper targets to build confidence, be careful with this.
By the book has limitations therefore and may not account for the “grey” of real-life. If you’ve learnt to take down U-shaped rooms
with paper targets and you come across a U-shaped room with spontaneous open doors, oddities and a scared-the-shit-out-of-you
combatant, it is probably not going to flow the way it did in training. In fact I almost guarantee it won’t.
By experience is usually based on one or more accounts of a lived-in/historical situation. It is important to acknowledge the situation
and the dynamic, real-time unpredictable adjustments of real-life. It is also important to stay away from groupthink and loafing.
This said experience can be iffy. It might not apply to another theatre, another battle or against another enemy even if it is within
similar context, for example a well-equipped, well-trained fireteam versus a single combatant in a single room…
• In a COIN context this might be a poorly trained militant with an AK.
• In an open war context this might be against a prepared and trained soldier who has booby-trapped the door, has his gun to the
window, radioed for backup and has a grenade ready to throw down the corridor.
• The prepared and trained soldier – do lean more towards a dangerous scenario in this case? Does entering now intimidate you?
And if you taught what worked against the guy with the AK, it might not work against this guy. He’s “tougher”, right?
• Remember context when considering experience. Remember dogma – black and white – when considering by the book.
Some of the personalities I’ve came across:
Personality emphasis on tactical discussion. What have I noted?
He just goes on and on about bullshit, usually insulting you and trying to get a rise. He tends to be young,
immature and inexperienced. What a wanker!
He negotiates usually aiming for his way, more so than being level-headed or taking a neutral stance, he just
acts that way for his own benefit. He doesn’t really take it on board. He also forgets the conversation in a week.
He negotiates and argues with good tactical consideration only after analysing the topic and the content. He
then makes a reasonable decision from this. They tend to be instructors or experienced dudes. He’s far from
sensitive and wants to put his best foot forward at all times. Biggest reward for least risk.
He understands the practical concepts, he’s been there and done it countless times. He’s so used to the game
he’s willing to take calculated risks. He knows when to do something, when not to and when he’s being risky.
He accepts the consequences.
He asks what boots that guy is wearing then never talks again.
He says that speed, aggression and surprise OR slow is smooth, smooth is fast is the way to do it. Oh and his
Uncle is in the SAS. He has no idea what you’re talking about when you say limited entry or buttonhook even
though he’s an apparent CQB SME. He’ll also want you to prove yourself. 1v1 m8? U avin’ a chuckle?
The Dogmatic Reservist
He tells you that in his unit they do it differently and that’s just the way things are. Even though he’s never
actually attended a proper CQB course or has real grasp on what he’s on about.
The Sunday Shooter and Geardo
He tells you that you need a certain weapon to do it. The SAS used MP5s and gasmasks or something, right?
Use them! They see things as a “hardware” or “equipment solution.”
He’s really offended, will you please stop talking loud around him about these things, it’s hurting his poor little
civvy ears. He really doesn’t see the tactical purpose in anything.
The Martial Artist
He tells you that only if you worked on your rolls, arm bars and man-hugging, that you would’ve
cleared the room and dealt with the threat just fine. He also calls things “CQB” when they don’t
actually mean CQB.
The Book/Movie Nerd
He tells you that when he read a 1990 manual, that “Battle Drill Six” told him that… and “No Easy
Day” told him that… and… in “SWAT” they…
He tells you that when he was in the “unit” he was taught by people with black strips over their
faces, top secret stuff that is better than what is conventionally seen out there today. What is the
colour of the boathouse at Hereford?
He really just doesn’t care, he tells you it doesn’t matter. He’s so intellectually lazy he’s not even
worth talking to. How is he even allowed to hold a rifle?!
The Tactical Con Artist
He will give a bunch of information that seems credible but is actually fraudulent. He was “in the Military”
which is his excuse for telling you about all this stuff, even though he was a bogeyed clerk for three years. Trust
him he’s “in the Military.” Even worse he’s in “CIA GRS” and runs nothing but temple index at all times! Eek.
Tells you to just push through the fatal funnel, it’ll be alright. Double tap them in their face with a pistol.
Buttonhook while wearing jeans, a T-shirt, balaclava and battle rig. That’s how he does it.
He calculates his next sentence. Aims it right at your earhole and says, “Why even enter in the first place? Just
wait for them to come out and shoot them. Or even better just pop them through an opening.” I chuckle.
The Rambo Warrior
He doesn’t care, he knows how to do things. Now where’s my knife and grenade? Oh and he thinks that one
grenade =/= problem solved. Because boom-boom. He is big on crazy unnecessary firepower to get small jobs
He tells you that he was in Delta Force and they did it differently. Then doesn’t listen to any alternatives
or give any reasoning. It’s top secret stuff he tells you! He thinks he’s right no matter what. But even if he
wasn’t in a select unit, he still thinks he knows better and has baffling ways of reasoning that. Narcissism.
Oh and finally…
The CQB Guy
He thinks he knows it all about CQB, has studied it for way too long, looks at alternatives but still
realizes that in this environment you’re pretty much fucked against a prepared threat. Blowing up
buildings takes a lot off his mind. Internally and now and forever always… pissed off.
That’s me by the way!
Hope you enjoyed it.
Don’t let dogma rule and shitbags like above argue bullshit! #operatorslivesmatter
Counter their baloney and put them in their place! It’s time for a change when it comes to CQB.
FEEL FREE TO POST THIS ANYWHERE AND EVERYWHERE. CREDITS AND COMPLAINTS GO TO RYAN AT CQB-TEAM. THANK YOU!