Msc PHDE, Pokhara University, School of engineering, Cse study onBhopal Disaster in INDIA

1. Pokhara University
School of Engineering
M.Sc. In public health and disaster engineering
Case study on Union Carbide pesticide factory India disaster
Presenter:
Madhav karki
Manisha Paneru

2. Union Carbide
Pesticide factory
disaster India
(Bhopal Disaster)

3. Introduction
• The Union carbide pesticide factory India disaster is commonly known as Bhopal
Disaster.
• The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak
incident on the night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India.
• It is considered to be the world's worst industrial disaster.
• Over 500,000 people were exposed to leakage of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas.
• The official immediate death toll was 2,259 and another 8,000 or more have since
died from gas-related diseases.

5. Background
• UCIL(Union Carbide India Limited) was built in 1969, Which was the Indian
subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), with Indian Government
controlled banks and the Indian public.
• The UCIL factory was built to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCCs brand name for
carbaryl) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate. Methylamine (1)
reacts with phosgene producing methyl isocyanate which reacts with 1- naphthol
to yield carbaryl .
• After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers (including Bayer) produced
carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost.
• Ten years later, a 5000 ton methyl isocyanate (MIC) production unit was installed,
primarily to manufacture an effective and inexpensive carbaryl pesticide
marketed as 'Sevin’.
• In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen, but production
continued regardless, leading to an accumulation of unused MIC.

6. How methyl isocyanate leakage happened?
• Union Carbide India's Bhopal facility housed three 68,000-litre liquid MIC storage
tanks: E610, E611, and E619.
• The tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. The pressurization allowed liquid
MIC to be pumped out of each tank.
• One of the tanks (E610) lost the ability to contain nitrogen gas pressure, hence
liquid MIC could not be pumped out of it. As per the rules, each of the tanks could
not be filled with more than 30 tons of liquid MIC. But this tank had 42 tons.
• This failure forced UCIL to stop methyl isocyanate production in Bhopal and the
plant was partly shut for maintenance.
• An attempt was made to make the defective tank functional again on December 1,
however the attempt failed.
• According to reports, by December 2 eve, water had entered the malfunctioning
tank, which resulted in runaway chemical reaction. The pressure in the tank
increased five times by night.
• By midnight, the workers in the MIC area started feeling the effects of MIC gas.
The decision to address the leak was to be made a couple of minutes later.
However, by then the chemical reaction in the tank had reached a critical state.
• About 30 tons of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere within an hour.

7. Factors leading to the gas leak
• Plant management deficiencies:
- lack of skilled operators
- reduction of safety management
- insufficient maintenance
- inadequate emergency action plans
• Storing MIC in large tanks and filling beyond recommended levels
• Failure of several safety systems
• Safety systems being switched off to save money—including the MIC tank refrigeration
system which could have mitigated the disaster severity
• Plant location close to a densely populated area
• Undersized safety devices
• Use of a more dangerous pesticide manufacturing method, or “ROUTE”, where same raw
materials are combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacted
with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which is then reacted with methyl amine.
• The dependence on manual operations

9. Safety system of plant
• In November 1984, most of the Safety Systems were not functioning and many
valves and lines were in poor condition.
• In addition to this, several vent Gas Scrubbers had been out of service as well as
the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes was not operational.
• A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in
January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984.
• A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe
removed for maintenance.
• Another issue was that, Tank 610 contained 42 tons of MIC which was much
more than what safety rules allowed.
• The reaction accelerated up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless
steel pipeline which resulted in the exothermic reaction.

10. State Of safety Features of UCIL plant at Bhopal

11. Earlier leakage
• In 1981, a worker was accidentally splashed with phosgene as he was carrying out a
maintenance job of the plant's pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a
large amount of toxic phosgene gas, leading to his demise 72 hours later.
• In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a
hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective equipment.
• One month later, in February 1982, a MIC leak affected 18 workers.
• In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in
burns over 30 percent of his body.
• Later that same year, in October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to
stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers
were severely exposed to the gases.

12. Aftermath of the leakage
• The health care system immediately became overloaded. Medical staff were unprepared for
the thousands of casualties.
• Doctors and hospitals were not informed of proper treatment methods for MIC gas
inhalation. They were told to simply give cough medicine and eye drops to their patients.
• In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian
government.
• The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation.
• Union Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as supplies and
equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and the UCC technical team
began assessing the cause of the gas leak.
• The gases immediately caused visible damage to the trees. Within a few days, all the leaves
fell off.
• 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo,
goats, and other animals were collected and buried.
• Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears

13. Health impact
The initial effects:
• coughing,
• severe eye irritation,
• suffocation,
• burning in the respiratory tract,
• breathlessness,
• stomach pain
• Vomiting
long term health effects :
• Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataracts.
• Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB
and chronic bronchitis.
• Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness etc.
• Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
• Perinatal and neonatal death rates increased, failure to grow, intellectual impairment etc.
• Cancer, immune deficiency, neurological problems, tuberculosis e.t.c

14. Government response towards Bhopal tragedy
• Until then, the Indian government had never dealt with a disaster like this. Legal
proceedings between India, UCC and the Warren Anderson(CEO at that time) began right
after the catastrophe.
• The government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, which allowed it to act
as the legal representative for victims.
• While the UCC initially offered a $5 million relief fund to India, the government turned
down the offer and demanded $3.3 billion. Eventually, an out-of-court settlement was
reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay $470 million for damages caused.
• The Supreme Court of India also laid down guidelines for the money—the family of the
dead were to be given Rs 100,000-300,000.
• In addition, fully or partially disabled were to get Rs 50,000-500,000 and those with a
temporary injury, Rs 25,000-100,000.
• The apex court asked UCIL to "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal to treat victims of
the tragedy.
• In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, who were all Indian nationals, were
convicted of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years of imprisonment.
However, they were later released on bail.

15. Economic rehabilitation
• Immediate relief was decided two days after the tragedy.
• Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short
period and ration cards were distributed.
• Madhya Pradesh governments finance department allocated Rs 874 million for
victim relief in July 1985.
• Widow pension of Rs 200/per month (later Rs 750) was provided.
• One-time ex-gratia payment of Rs 1,500 to families with monthly income Rs 500
or less was decided.
• Each claimant was to be categorized by a doctor.
• In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that
death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure.
• From 1990 interim relief of Rs 200 was paid to everyone in the family who was
born before the disaster.
• For death claim, the average sum paid out was Rs 62,000.

16. Risk documentation and management
• Various acts and rules were passed after the Bhopal disaster in most of the countries.
• The major rules which were passed in India after the Bhopal disaster to ensure safety and to
control disasters:
a)Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act (1985),
b)The Environment (Protection) Act (1986),
c)Criminal liability provisions of the Environment Protection Act, (1986),
d)Factories Act (1987)
e)The National Environment Appellate Authority Act (1987)
f) Hazardous Wastes rules (1989),
g)Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MSIHC) rules (1989),
h)The Public Liability Insurance Act (1991), i)The National Environment Tribunal Act(1995),
j)Chemical Accidents rules (1996),
k)Provision in Chemical Accidents Rules (1996) and National Green Tribunal Act (2010).

17. The Second Poisoning of Bhopal
• For fifteen years before the gas disaster Union Carbide had routinely dumped
highly toxic chemical wastes inside and outside its factory site. Some were buried,
some simply lay heaped on the soil, open to the elements.
• Thousands of tons of pesticides, solvents, chemical catalysts and by-products lay
strewn across 16 acres inside the site. Huge ‘evaporation ponds’ covering an area
of 35 acres outside the factory received thousands of gallons of virulent liquid
wastes.

18. contd
• After the catastrophic gas leak, the factory was locked up and left to rot, with all the
chemicals and wastes still there. Union Carbide left the factory and its surrounds
without cleaning them.
• As each year’s monsoon battered the decaying plant and rain overflowed the huge
‘ponds’, the toxins seeped down through the soil, and filtered into underground
channels and pools.
Toxic element left behind by Union Carbide

19. Contd…
• Just five years after the gassing of Bhopal Union Carbide conducted secret tests
and learned that its factory site was lethally contaminated. Water from the site,
and water in which soil had been soaked produced instant 100% mortality in fish.
• Carbide did not notify local communities of the risks to drinking water. Nor did it
lift a finger to clean up the contamination. Instead it attacked as “troublemakers”
those in the community who voiced their worries that the factory was poisoning
their water. The contaminated water crisis was not exposed to the world until
Greenpeace ran a series of tests in 1999.

20. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
• Various institutes and organisations were working towards collecting information to have a critical review of the event.
• Indian Council of Medical research was set up in Bhopal for a period of 10 years by Ministry of Gas Relief. They did 24
research projects till 1994 on areas like fertility, immune deficiency. The research was later handed over to Centre for
Rehabilitation Studies.
• The Bhopal Cancer Registry was established by ICMR in 1986, to ascertain if there are any cancer cases arising out of
exposure to gases.
• Sambhavna trust is a NGO set up by Satinath Sarangi which works for the gas affected. Surveys on status of health and
health care are done during home visits in most affected areas.
• Bhopal Memorial Trust Hospital and Research centre was set up to provide clinical and technical care for all the
patients.
• The special training and employment programme for the urban poor was used for occupational rehabilitation of the
affected.
• Vocational training in form of handicrafts etc was also provided.

21. Environmental Rehabilitation
• In 1985-86, the factory was closed down. Pipes, drums and tanks were cleaned with water and
chemical decontaminant and then sold off.
• However, the MIC plant, sevin unit, the tanks and storages of different residues.
• Between 1969-77, all effluents were dumped in an open pits thereafter they went to the
evaporation ponds. In rainy season, the effluents would overflow and enter the sewage.
• Carbide’s tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples in the vicinity of the factory had
high toxicity.
• In 1996, CBI directed MPCB, NEERI and HCT to clean up the premises.
• As per the agreement, UCC was supposed to clean up the site before handing it over to the Govt. It
abandoned the factory immediately after the disaster and tonnes of toxic waste is still lying
around in the premises.
• In 2009, CSE, New Delhi released test results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to
three kilometres from the factory. Also in 2009, the BBC took a water sample from a frequently
used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain
1,000 times the WHO's recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, a carcinogenic
toxin.
• As reported by Hindustan Times on Aug 14, 2015, a trial run to burn the toxic was done at
Pithampur Industrial area near Indore. The plans are to burn the remaining 340 tonnes of waste.

22. Mitigation
• After the gas leak, many new acts were created and some were amended.
• The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, was enacted to provide prompt relief to non worker victims.
• The National Environments Tribunal Act, 1995, fixes liability and provides compensation for cases on
environmental damage.
• The Environmental Protection Ac, 1986, provides better zoning of industrial locations, a more intensive
system of inspections and development of prevention guidelines and emergency response systems.
• An emergency preparedness plan has to be prepared both by occupiers and the district authorities.

23. Conclusion
TheBhopal disaster has gone
down in history as one of the
worse industrial accidents to ever
occur.Thousandsof people have
loss their lives, countless others
have been injured, and the
environment hasbeen
contaminated all due to
numerous bad decisions among
those who owned the plant.

24. • Contd
The tragedy of Bhopal contin ues to be a warning sign at once ignored and have
attention. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization,
for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human,
environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government,
including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the
public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry
and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant
development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant
cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies
throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for
public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the
countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been on attention.

25. Bhopal Gas plant after 35 years

26. References
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster
• https://www.business-standard.com (Business standard e-paper)
• https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rhyddhi_Chakraborty
• Rajkumar S. Safety security and risk management - aftermath bhopal disaster.
• https://medcraveonline.com/IJBSBE/safety-security-and-risk-management---aftermath-bhopal-
disaster.html
• "The Bhopal Disaster (India's Environment 1984-85)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on
28 May 2016