SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 35
Insider Threats Detection in
Cloud using UEBA
Cloud Threat Analyzer
Lucas Ko, Taiwan
lucasko@iii.org.tw
2
Lucas Ko
3
» National Taiwan University of Science and Technology
• Master’s degree in Computer Science
» Institute for Information Industry
• Project Manager
• Responsibilities:
- Penetration test of bank, gov
- Detection system development
- Log analysis
» Zero-day Finder, such as : CVE-2017-5481
Outline
» Insider Threats in Cloud
» User and Entity Behavior Analytics
» Anomaly Detection System
» Case Study
4
Insider Threats in Cloud
5
Data Stored in the Cloud
6
44% Email
32% Customer Data
31%
30% Employee Data
26%
Sales &
Marketing Data
Contract, Invoices,
Orders
[1] “Cloud Security 2016 Spotlight Report”, CloudPassage
Cloud Management is Hard
7
Work
at home
Mobile
Google Drive
insecure
Company
Office 365
» Cloud storage is more convenient, but
risk.
• Insider could easily collect data who is
not in company.
Security Threats in Cloud
8
53% 44% 39% 33%
Unauthorized
Access
Hijacking of
Accounts
Insecure
Interfaces/APIs
External Sharing
of Data
[1] “Cloud Security 2016 Spotlight Report”, CloudPassage
Most concerned about insider threats
9
71%
Inadvertent
data leak
[2] “Insider Threat 2016 Spotlight Report”
68%
Ignore
policy
61%
Malicious
data leak
How to protect cloud data from
insider threats?
User and Entity Behavior Analytics
10
11
What is UEBA ?
» Expands the definition from UBA. Such as
devices, applications, data, anything
» Integrates machine learning, behavior of
user and entity features
» UEBA is used for insider threat detection.
How UEBA protected us ?
12
User Behaviors
Entity Features
Log
Collection
Machine
Learning
Risk
Assessment
Behavior
Model
Clustering
Predict
Anomalies
Risk
Estimator
13
Detection is based on UEBA
» Integrated recommendation system
( collaborative filtering ) with entity.
• Directory Tree Structure
Users access logs
Detect Insider
Threats
Collaborative filtering from
file access behaviors
Drive file proximity score
measuring
Past access
behavior matrix
Structure-oriented risk
propagation
Current access
behavior vector
Anomaly Detection System
14
Anomaly Detection System
» Using recommendation system to detect
abnormal behavior.
15
Users
Items
Highly Recommend
Not Recommended
(Abnormal Behavior)
Access Matrix
(Binary Matrix)
Recommendation System
Recommend additional items with similar properties.
Abnormal Access Behavior
» Detected cross-group abnormal access behavior.
16
Cross-group
abnormal access
A team’s files
Similar user
Read Recommend
File
B team’s files
Similar user
Read Recommend
File
Recommendation
System
Detect
17
Recommendation System is not
great at all
» Cold Start Problem:
• There is no access behavior in past for
new file.
- Can not predict for current behaviors of
new file.
Users
Item
Access Matrix Cold Start Problem
New file log
Insiders New file
Integrated Recommendation System
with entity
» Directory Tree Structure
• Members in the the same project
will have similar behavior and
directory tree structure.
• Averages the nearby similarity
scores to be the new file’s
similarity score .
18
Old files
Highly Similarity Score
New files
Steps in the Anomaly Detection
19
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
» Google Drive
• Access Log
• Directory Tree
Structure
» 150 employees
» Last 6 months logs
» Collaborative
Filtering
• Alternating Least
Squares
» Risk Estimator
• File proximity
score measuring.
Log Collection
20
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
» Collected access logs from Google Drive
Types of Access Log
21
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
change_acl_editors
ACL
Change
Create Trash Remove from folder
Edit View Add to folder
Delete Download Preview rename
Move
Upload
Pint
Access
change_doc_access_scope
change_doc_visbility
change_user_access
Data Pre-Processing
22
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
Google Drive
Access Matrix
» Access Log
» Directory Tree
Structure
Directory Tree Structure
To Solved the Sparse Problem
23
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
Users
Files
Users
Directories
11%
89%
Directories Files
» Accessed different files in the same directory
• They were considered to be the same
behavior.
» According to our statistics:
» Files account for 89% .
» Directories account for 11%
Types of Recommendation System
24
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
Recommendation
System
Content-based
Hybrid-based
(CF + Cotent)
Model-based
Collaborative
Filtering
Neighborhood
-based
User-based
Item-based
Collaborative Filtering
» A method of making predictions
about the interests of a user by
collecting preferences.
» Types of preference
• Explicit:Users rate for items.
• Implicit:Observation of user’s
behavior.
- Access Behavior on file.
25
Alternating Least Squares
26
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
Users
Items
Users
latent factors
Item
latent
factors
U IR
» ALS Features:
• Model-based.
• Easy to parallelize.
• Quick to converge.
» Steps:
• Start with random U & I matrix.
• Optimize user vectors based on files.
• Optimize file vectors based on users.
• Repeat until converged.
Prediction
Entity
27
» File proximity score measuring.
» User and Entity Behavior
Analytics
• Structure-oriented risk
propagation.
» Measuring Strategy:
• Straight parents.
• All children.
A
B C
D E F
G H
I J
K L M
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
Risk Estimator
28
Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
» Reversed score from prediction
• High score means more risk.
Case Study
29
Case:Cross-Group Access
» File link was shared in communication APP.
• Every one clicked link from APP.
30
Insi
er
File Link
Administrator
click
click
Shared
APP
Case:High-risk Employee
» We found out the high-risk employee who collects
data before quitting job.
» Collected other teams’ documents on Google Drive.
31
Team A Team B
Abnornal
Access
Case:Shared Account
» Using shared account to access the file
document. (Privileged account abused)
32
Shared Account Employee B
No
permission
Frequently used file Infrequently used file
Login to
shared
account
Abnornal
Access
Case:Compromised Account
» A account was compromised
• collected documents in secret.
33
Compromised
Account
Abnornal
Access
Insi
er Hacker
Frequently used file Infrequently used file
Login to
compromised
account
CloudOrion:Cloud Threat Analyzer
» Demo Site
• https://cloudorion.cyber00rn.org/
» Logs Collection
• Google Drive Audit
» One-Click Authorization
• Google Sign in
» Find Out Insider Threats
• Abnormal behavior detection
» File Permission Management
• Remove all permissions at once
» Third-Party Apps Management
• Identify high-risk applications
34
Google Drive
Insider
G Suite
Administrator
NotificationAbnormal
Behavior
Logs Collection
Thanks for your listening
Institute for Information Industry
Lucas Ko
lucasko@iii.org.tw
lucasko.tw@gmail.com
CloudOrion:Cloud Threat Analyzer
https://cloudorion.cyber00rn.org/
35

More Related Content

What's hot

Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber Threat Intelligencemohamed nasri
 
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOC
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOCSOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOC
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOCPriyanka Aash
 
Big Data Architecture and Design Patterns
Big Data Architecture and Design PatternsBig Data Architecture and Design Patterns
Big Data Architecture and Design PatternsJohn Yeung
 
introduction to Azure Sentinel
introduction to Azure Sentinelintroduction to Azure Sentinel
introduction to Azure SentinelRobert Crane
 
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptxSEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptxAmrMousa51
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonBen Boyd
 
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the Basics
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the BasicsWhat is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the Basics
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the BasicsSagar Joshi
 
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management Suite
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management SuiteHitachi ID Identity and Access Management Suite
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management SuiteHitachi ID Systems, Inc.
 
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine Learning
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine LearningUser Behavior Analytics Using Machine Learning
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine LearningDNIF
 
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingCrowdStrike
 
Cyber Security Incident Response
Cyber Security Incident ResponseCyber Security Incident Response
Cyber Security Incident ResponsePECB
 
Container Security Using Microsoft Defender
Container Security Using Microsoft DefenderContainer Security Using Microsoft Defender
Container Security Using Microsoft DefenderRahul Khengare
 
Extended Detection and Response (XDR) An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...
Extended Detection and Response (XDR)An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...Extended Detection and Response (XDR)An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...
Extended Detection and Response (XDR) An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...Raffael Marty
 
Siem solutions R&E
Siem solutions R&ESiem solutions R&E
Siem solutions R&EOwais Ahmad
 
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEM
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEMMcAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEM
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEMIftikhar Ali Iqbal
 

What's hot (20)

Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber Threat Intelligence
 
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOC
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOCSOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOC
SOC Architecture - Building the NextGen SOC
 
Big Data Architecture and Design Patterns
Big Data Architecture and Design PatternsBig Data Architecture and Design Patterns
Big Data Architecture and Design Patterns
 
introduction to Azure Sentinel
introduction to Azure Sentinelintroduction to Azure Sentinel
introduction to Azure Sentinel
 
CLOUD NATIVE SECURITY
CLOUD NATIVE SECURITYCLOUD NATIVE SECURITY
CLOUD NATIVE SECURITY
 
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptxSEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
 
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the Basics
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the BasicsWhat is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the Basics
What is SIEM? A Brilliant Guide to the Basics
 
SOAR and SIEM.pptx
SOAR and SIEM.pptxSOAR and SIEM.pptx
SOAR and SIEM.pptx
 
Microsoft Azure Sentinel
Microsoft Azure SentinelMicrosoft Azure Sentinel
Microsoft Azure Sentinel
 
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management Suite
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management SuiteHitachi ID Identity and Access Management Suite
Hitachi ID Identity and Access Management Suite
 
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine Learning
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine LearningUser Behavior Analytics Using Machine Learning
User Behavior Analytics Using Machine Learning
 
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
 
A case for Managed Detection and Response
A case for Managed Detection and ResponseA case for Managed Detection and Response
A case for Managed Detection and Response
 
Cyber Security Incident Response
Cyber Security Incident ResponseCyber Security Incident Response
Cyber Security Incident Response
 
Container Security Using Microsoft Defender
Container Security Using Microsoft DefenderContainer Security Using Microsoft Defender
Container Security Using Microsoft Defender
 
Azure Sentinel.pptx
Azure Sentinel.pptxAzure Sentinel.pptx
Azure Sentinel.pptx
 
Extended Detection and Response (XDR) An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...
Extended Detection and Response (XDR)An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...Extended Detection and Response (XDR)An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...
Extended Detection and Response (XDR) An Overhyped Product Category With Ulti...
 
Siem solutions R&E
Siem solutions R&ESiem solutions R&E
Siem solutions R&E
 
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEM
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEMMcAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEM
McAfee - Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - SIEM
 

Similar to Insider Threats Detection in Cloud using UEBA

Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016
Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016
Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016Paul Bailey
 
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat Analysis
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat AnalysisTowards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat Analysis
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat AnalysisRosa Romero Gómez, PhD
 
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security Breach
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security BreachReducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security Breach
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security BreachQuest
 
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen Presentation
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen PresentationNeo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen Presentation
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen PresentationTamikaTannis
 
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für Security
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für SecuritySplunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für Security
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für SecuritySplunk
 
Software Ecosystems = Big Data
Software Ecosystems = Big DataSoftware Ecosystems = Big Data
Software Ecosystems = Big DataTom Mens
 
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide Deck
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide DeckNISI Agile Software Architecture Slide Deck
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide DeckUtrecht University
 
Applying Systems Thinking to Software Architecture
Applying Systems Thinking to Software ArchitectureApplying Systems Thinking to Software Architecture
Applying Systems Thinking to Software ArchitectureMatt McLarty
 
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National ScaleDeploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scalemwebbjisc
 
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National ScaleDeploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scalemichaeldwebb
 
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project - Sept 2015
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project  - Sept 2015Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project  - Sept 2015
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project - Sept 2015mwebbjisc
 
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and Tracing
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and TracingAutomation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and Tracing
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and TracingMarkus Borg
 
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinar
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinarMarch 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinar
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinarDavid Kearney
 
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and Numbers
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and NumbersApplication Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and Numbers
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and NumbersDenim Group
 
How Lyft Drives Data Discovery
How Lyft Drives Data DiscoveryHow Lyft Drives Data Discovery
How Lyft Drives Data DiscoveryNeo4j
 
Software Analytics: Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)
Software Analytics:Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)Software Analytics:Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)
Software Analytics: Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)Tao Xie
 
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agile
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agilenaveed-kamran-software-architecture-agile
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agileNaveed Kamran
 

Similar to Insider Threats Detection in Cloud using UEBA (20)

Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016
Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016
Jisc learning analytics service oct 2016
 
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat Analysis
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat AnalysisTowards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat Analysis
Towards Designing Effective Visualizations for DNS-based Network Threat Analysis
 
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security Breach
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security BreachReducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security Breach
Reducing the Chance of an Office 365 Security Breach
 
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen Presentation
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen PresentationNeo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen Presentation
Neo4j GraphTour Santa Monica 2019 - Amundsen Presentation
 
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für Security
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für SecuritySplunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für Security
Splunk Discovery Day Düsseldorf 2016 - Splunk für Security
 
Software Ecosystems = Big Data
Software Ecosystems = Big DataSoftware Ecosystems = Big Data
Software Ecosystems = Big Data
 
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide Deck
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide DeckNISI Agile Software Architecture Slide Deck
NISI Agile Software Architecture Slide Deck
 
Applying Systems Thinking to Software Architecture
Applying Systems Thinking to Software ArchitectureApplying Systems Thinking to Software Architecture
Applying Systems Thinking to Software Architecture
 
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National ScaleDeploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
 
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National ScaleDeploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
Deploying Open Learning Analytics at a National Scale
 
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project - Sept 2015
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project  - Sept 2015Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project  - Sept 2015
Introduction to Jisc's Learning Analytics project - Sept 2015
 
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and Tracing
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and TracingAutomation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and Tracing
Automation in the Bug Flow - Machine Learning for Triaging and Tracing
 
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinar
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinarMarch 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinar
March 2014 aceds portfolio c&g kroll webinar
 
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and Numbers
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and NumbersApplication Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and Numbers
Application Portfolio Risk Ranking: Banishing FUD With Structure and Numbers
 
How Lyft Drives Data Discovery
How Lyft Drives Data DiscoveryHow Lyft Drives Data Discovery
How Lyft Drives Data Discovery
 
16NTC Session - Beyond the File Server
16NTC Session - Beyond the File Server16NTC Session - Beyond the File Server
16NTC Session - Beyond the File Server
 
Software Development Life Cycle
Software Development Life CycleSoftware Development Life Cycle
Software Development Life Cycle
 
Sdlc 4
Sdlc 4Sdlc 4
Sdlc 4
 
Software Analytics: Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)
Software Analytics:Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)Software Analytics:Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)
Software Analytics: Towards Software Mining that Matters (2014)
 
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agile
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agilenaveed-kamran-software-architecture-agile
naveed-kamran-software-architecture-agile
 

Recently uploaded

{Pooja: 9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...
{Pooja:  9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...{Pooja:  9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...
{Pooja: 9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...Pooja Nehwal
 
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptx
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM  TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptxEMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM  TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptx
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptxthyngster
 
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data Storytelling
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data StorytellingBrighton SEO | April 2024 | Data Storytelling
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data StorytellingNeil Barnes
 
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Call
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip CallDelhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Call
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Callshivangimorya083
 
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdf
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdfIndustrialised data - the key to AI success.pdf
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdfLars Albertsson
 
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptxAnupama Kate
 
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdf
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdfMarket Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdf
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdfRachmat Ramadhan H
 
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111 Escorts Service
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111  Escorts ServiceCall Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111  Escorts Service
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111 Escorts ServiceSapana Sha
 
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdf
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdfSchema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdf
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdfLars Albertsson
 
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptx
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptxPKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptx
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptxPramod Kumar Srivastava
 
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...shivangimorya083
 
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data Analyst
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data AnalystUnveiling Insights: The Role of a Data Analyst
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data AnalystSamantha Rae Coolbeth
 
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改atducpo
 
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICS
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICSUkraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICS
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICSAishani27
 
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Serviceranjana rawat
 
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdf
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdfKantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdf
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdfSocial Samosa
 
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdfHuman37
 
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998YohFuh
 

Recently uploaded (20)

{Pooja: 9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...
{Pooja:  9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...{Pooja:  9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...
{Pooja: 9892124323 } Call Girl in Mumbai | Jas Kaur Rate 4500 Free Hotel Del...
 
E-Commerce Order PredictionShraddha Kamble.pptx
E-Commerce Order PredictionShraddha Kamble.pptxE-Commerce Order PredictionShraddha Kamble.pptx
E-Commerce Order PredictionShraddha Kamble.pptx
 
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptx
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM  TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptxEMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM  TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptx
EMERCE - 2024 - AMSTERDAM - CROSS-PLATFORM TRACKING WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS.pptx
 
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data Storytelling
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data StorytellingBrighton SEO | April 2024 | Data Storytelling
Brighton SEO | April 2024 | Data Storytelling
 
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Call
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip CallDelhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Call
Delhi Call Girls Punjabi Bagh 9711199171 ☎✔👌✔ Whatsapp Hard And Sexy Vip Call
 
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdf
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdfIndustrialised data - the key to AI success.pdf
Industrialised data - the key to AI success.pdf
 
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx
100-Concepts-of-AI by Anupama Kate .pptx
 
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdf
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdfMarket Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdf
Market Analysis in the 5 Largest Economic Countries in Southeast Asia.pdf
 
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111 Escorts Service
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111  Escorts ServiceCall Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111  Escorts Service
Call Girls In Mahipalpur O9654467111 Escorts Service
 
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdf
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdfSchema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdf
Schema on read is obsolete. Welcome metaprogramming..pdf
 
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptx
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptxPKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptx
PKS-TGC-1084-630 - Stage 1 Proposal.pptx
 
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...
Full night 🥵 Call Girls Delhi New Friends Colony {9711199171} Sanya Reddy ✌️o...
 
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data Analyst
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data AnalystUnveiling Insights: The Role of a Data Analyst
Unveiling Insights: The Role of a Data Analyst
 
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改
代办国外大学文凭《原版美国UCLA文凭证书》加州大学洛杉矶分校毕业证制作成绩单修改
 
꧁❤ Aerocity Call Girls Service Aerocity Delhi ❤꧂ 9999965857 ☎️ Hard And Sexy ...
꧁❤ Aerocity Call Girls Service Aerocity Delhi ❤꧂ 9999965857 ☎️ Hard And Sexy ...꧁❤ Aerocity Call Girls Service Aerocity Delhi ❤꧂ 9999965857 ☎️ Hard And Sexy ...
꧁❤ Aerocity Call Girls Service Aerocity Delhi ❤꧂ 9999965857 ☎️ Hard And Sexy ...
 
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICS
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICSUkraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICS
Ukraine War presentation: KNOW THE BASICS
 
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
(PARI) Call Girls Wanowrie ( 7001035870 ) HI-Fi Pune Escorts Service
 
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdf
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdfKantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdf
Kantar AI Summit- Under Embargo till Wednesday, 24th April 2024, 4 PM, IST.pdf
 
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf
20240419 - Measurecamp Amsterdam - SAM.pdf
 
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998
RA-11058_IRR-COMPRESS Do 198 series of 1998
 

Insider Threats Detection in Cloud using UEBA

  • 1.
  • 2. Insider Threats Detection in Cloud using UEBA Cloud Threat Analyzer Lucas Ko, Taiwan lucasko@iii.org.tw 2
  • 3. Lucas Ko 3 » National Taiwan University of Science and Technology • Master’s degree in Computer Science » Institute for Information Industry • Project Manager • Responsibilities: - Penetration test of bank, gov - Detection system development - Log analysis » Zero-day Finder, such as : CVE-2017-5481
  • 4. Outline » Insider Threats in Cloud » User and Entity Behavior Analytics » Anomaly Detection System » Case Study 4
  • 6. Data Stored in the Cloud 6 44% Email 32% Customer Data 31% 30% Employee Data 26% Sales & Marketing Data Contract, Invoices, Orders [1] “Cloud Security 2016 Spotlight Report”, CloudPassage
  • 7. Cloud Management is Hard 7 Work at home Mobile Google Drive insecure Company Office 365 » Cloud storage is more convenient, but risk. • Insider could easily collect data who is not in company.
  • 8. Security Threats in Cloud 8 53% 44% 39% 33% Unauthorized Access Hijacking of Accounts Insecure Interfaces/APIs External Sharing of Data [1] “Cloud Security 2016 Spotlight Report”, CloudPassage
  • 9. Most concerned about insider threats 9 71% Inadvertent data leak [2] “Insider Threat 2016 Spotlight Report” 68% Ignore policy 61% Malicious data leak
  • 10. How to protect cloud data from insider threats? User and Entity Behavior Analytics 10
  • 11. 11 What is UEBA ? » Expands the definition from UBA. Such as devices, applications, data, anything » Integrates machine learning, behavior of user and entity features » UEBA is used for insider threat detection.
  • 12. How UEBA protected us ? 12 User Behaviors Entity Features Log Collection Machine Learning Risk Assessment Behavior Model Clustering Predict Anomalies Risk Estimator
  • 13. 13 Detection is based on UEBA » Integrated recommendation system ( collaborative filtering ) with entity. • Directory Tree Structure Users access logs Detect Insider Threats Collaborative filtering from file access behaviors Drive file proximity score measuring Past access behavior matrix Structure-oriented risk propagation Current access behavior vector
  • 15. Anomaly Detection System » Using recommendation system to detect abnormal behavior. 15 Users Items Highly Recommend Not Recommended (Abnormal Behavior) Access Matrix (Binary Matrix) Recommendation System Recommend additional items with similar properties.
  • 16. Abnormal Access Behavior » Detected cross-group abnormal access behavior. 16 Cross-group abnormal access A team’s files Similar user Read Recommend File B team’s files Similar user Read Recommend File Recommendation System Detect
  • 17. 17 Recommendation System is not great at all » Cold Start Problem: • There is no access behavior in past for new file. - Can not predict for current behaviors of new file. Users Item Access Matrix Cold Start Problem New file log Insiders New file
  • 18. Integrated Recommendation System with entity » Directory Tree Structure • Members in the the same project will have similar behavior and directory tree structure. • Averages the nearby similarity scores to be the new file’s similarity score . 18 Old files Highly Similarity Score New files
  • 19. Steps in the Anomaly Detection 19 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment » Google Drive • Access Log • Directory Tree Structure » 150 employees » Last 6 months logs » Collaborative Filtering • Alternating Least Squares » Risk Estimator • File proximity score measuring.
  • 20. Log Collection 20 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment » Collected access logs from Google Drive
  • 21. Types of Access Log 21 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment change_acl_editors ACL Change Create Trash Remove from folder Edit View Add to folder Delete Download Preview rename Move Upload Pint Access change_doc_access_scope change_doc_visbility change_user_access
  • 22. Data Pre-Processing 22 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment Google Drive Access Matrix » Access Log » Directory Tree Structure Directory Tree Structure
  • 23. To Solved the Sparse Problem 23 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment Users Files Users Directories 11% 89% Directories Files » Accessed different files in the same directory • They were considered to be the same behavior. » According to our statistics: » Files account for 89% . » Directories account for 11%
  • 24. Types of Recommendation System 24 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment Recommendation System Content-based Hybrid-based (CF + Cotent) Model-based Collaborative Filtering Neighborhood -based User-based Item-based
  • 25. Collaborative Filtering » A method of making predictions about the interests of a user by collecting preferences. » Types of preference • Explicit:Users rate for items. • Implicit:Observation of user’s behavior. - Access Behavior on file. 25
  • 26. Alternating Least Squares 26 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment Users Items Users latent factors Item latent factors U IR » ALS Features: • Model-based. • Easy to parallelize. • Quick to converge. » Steps: • Start with random U & I matrix. • Optimize user vectors based on files. • Optimize file vectors based on users. • Repeat until converged. Prediction
  • 27. Entity 27 » File proximity score measuring. » User and Entity Behavior Analytics • Structure-oriented risk propagation. » Measuring Strategy: • Straight parents. • All children. A B C D E F G H I J K L M Log Collection Model Risk Assessment
  • 28. Risk Estimator 28 Log Collection Model Risk Assessment » Reversed score from prediction • High score means more risk.
  • 30. Case:Cross-Group Access » File link was shared in communication APP. • Every one clicked link from APP. 30 Insi er File Link Administrator click click Shared APP
  • 31. Case:High-risk Employee » We found out the high-risk employee who collects data before quitting job. » Collected other teams’ documents on Google Drive. 31 Team A Team B Abnornal Access
  • 32. Case:Shared Account » Using shared account to access the file document. (Privileged account abused) 32 Shared Account Employee B No permission Frequently used file Infrequently used file Login to shared account Abnornal Access
  • 33. Case:Compromised Account » A account was compromised • collected documents in secret. 33 Compromised Account Abnornal Access Insi er Hacker Frequently used file Infrequently used file Login to compromised account
  • 34. CloudOrion:Cloud Threat Analyzer » Demo Site • https://cloudorion.cyber00rn.org/ » Logs Collection • Google Drive Audit » One-Click Authorization • Google Sign in » Find Out Insider Threats • Abnormal behavior detection » File Permission Management • Remove all permissions at once » Third-Party Apps Management • Identify high-risk applications 34 Google Drive Insider G Suite Administrator NotificationAbnormal Behavior Logs Collection
  • 35. Thanks for your listening Institute for Information Industry Lucas Ko lucasko@iii.org.tw lucasko.tw@gmail.com CloudOrion:Cloud Threat Analyzer https://cloudorion.cyber00rn.org/ 35

Editor's Notes

  1. 1. An increasing number of companies are beginning to use cloud service 2. There are many cloud service : such as Google Drive, Dropbox , Office365 3. Using cloud service is good for Collaborative working. 4. However ,it is threat to company
  2. 1.What types of information do you store in the cloud? 2. According to Cloud Security 2016 Spotlight Report,
  3. why are there many threats in cloud
  4. The reason why unauthorized access is number one is that it was caused by misuse of credentials , improper access controls
  5. 1. In addition, Most concerned about insider threats 2. insider threats in cyber security are often associated with malicious users 3. Insider threats is big risk for enterprise 4.1 Insider threats can go undetected for years  4.2 It is hard to distinguish harmful actions from regular work 4.3 It is easy for employees to cover their actions 4.4 It is hard to prove guilt
  6. Risk Assessment is a module to calculate risk.
  7. collaborative filtering is a method of making automatic predictions (filtering) about the interests of a user by collecting preferences similar user will be grouped together similar users will access similar files / folders It is similar if distance between two folders is close
  8. Binary Matrix What kind of products are you also interested. Not recommended means that it is not similar between users.
  9. It is a common problem in recommendation system.
  10. 1. The members in the the same project will have similar behaviors and similar directory tree structure. 2. The score of new file was averaged by nearby similarity score
  11. 1. Focus on google drive
  12. in most situations acl change,when a new account was joined, acl change will be lanuched in each file
  13. Files were decreased 90% . It is very helpful in performance
  14. User-based and item-based are common for recommendation system.
  15. Parallelize [ˋpærəlelaiz]
  16. How it happened