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To what extent did the Cold War considerations help in
shaping the political relation of the United States with Iran
(1949-1989)?
Mohamad Ghamlouch
Student ID: 1531709
Dissertation
Module Code: PP5500
Dissertation presented for Masters program in International
Relations
Department of politics, history, and law
September 2016
Supervisor: Professor Martin Folly
Word Count: 14600

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Table of content:
Abstract............................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgments..............................................................................4
Introduction....................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1............................................................................................ 7
Operation TP AJAX...............................................................................12
Trajectory of America policy with Iran............................................... 15
Chapter 2...........................................................................................18
Intelligence Failure 1979.......................................................................... 21
Khomeini’s Movement.............................................................................. 23
The Military Failure of Iranian army..................................................... 26
US reaction during the revolution........................................................... 28
Chapter 3............................................................................................ 30
Iraq Declared War (1980): Reasons and Early Implications.................. 31
American position in the war....................................................................34
Iranian Army Fights back.......................................................................... 36
The Iran-Contra Affair.............................................................................. 38
Conclusion..........................................................................................40
Bibliography....................................................................................... 43

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Abstract:
_______________________________________________
This dissertation will examine the extent to which the multi-dimensional factors of
the cold war helped in shaping the relation between the United States and its biggest
rival Iran from 1949-1989. The purpose of this study is to explore the history of the
developing relationship between the two states. This subject is considered salient due
to the recent and unprecedented nuclear agreement between Iran and the West. Iran’s
contemporary role in world politics became fundamental especially in the Syrian
conflict. In order to fully understand the history of such a relationship, this paper will
not only study post revolutionary Iran, but it will also analyse the incentives and
events implicit in the diverse facets of international relations since 1953 and the coup
of Mohamad Mossadeq. This paper provides important insights into the rich and
diverse literature on the relations between the two states, like Micheal Auxworthy,
Richard W. Cottam, Daruish Zahedi, and multiple more, the intelligence perspective
of the CIA failure in 1979 by Robert Jervis. Eventually, the conflict between the
United States and Iran reached its peak in the Cold War, while the Anti-American
view in Iran became a cultural narrative for the Iranian mass. But the evolution of
world politics leading to a historical agreement between the two states opens up a
crucial opportunity to trace and discern the complex history of this relevant subject in
the field of international relations.

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Acknowledgments:
I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Martin Folly, for providing a deeply informative
module “the United States in World Affairs, (1945-2001)”which have helped me to
develop both a passion and a motivation for working on this subject for my
dissertation. Dr. Folly was completely supportive even before I chose this topic for my
dissertation, as he encouraged me throughout the year to undertake further research in
the United States' foreign policy in the Cold War. This topic has left a great impact on
my academic perspective. I am completely convinced of the feasibility of such a
choice for my PhD research. This area of study which Dr. Folly assisted me to
understand in a well-structured and thorough manner, stimulated a shift in the way I
viewed and became to view the foreign policy of great powers. I would like to thank
the helpful staff of Chatham House, and the cooperative staff of Brunel University
Library for providing a great variety of sources and a perfect research atmosphere.

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Introduction:
This paper will examine the linkage between the Cold War considerations and the
United States’ political relations with Iran. Through primary and secondary sources,
and comparative literature this paper will try to evaluate the extent in which the Cold
War influence shaping the political relation between the two states. Furthermore, by
comparing the incident of Mohamad Mossadeq coup in 1953 and the failure of
predicting Khomeini’s revolution in 1979 we can see how the relation was shaped and
affected throughout the Cold War. The Importance of this study is that the relations
between the two states today escalated. Iran and the United States reached a nuclear
agreement that changed the course of their relation. In addition, Iran as a state holds
today a major role in world politics especially in the Middle East and is considered as
one of the major sides intervening in Syria. But in order to understand the present
status of Iran, a historical study on its trajectory of relations with the west should be
done. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran and the United States have been in a
relatively strict and closed rivalry. For decades, the two states stood firmly in conflict
with one another drawing upon a variety of means in media, economic strategies, soft
power tools, cultural discourses, military power, and diplomatic agency. The Iranian
revolution was probably the most attractive and genuine revolution of the century.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had changed the world (Iran and the west, BBC,2012,
YouTube) . On January 9th 1978, citizens marched in the streets of the Iranian city of
Qom, to protest against a newspaper article that disrespected Khomeini and accused
him of working with British intelligence. This was the major large-scale protest that
later led to the fall of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the last monarch of Iran and a major
ally of the United States and Britain in that region. Since then Iran had evolved as an
Islamic republic, with a clear and systemized devotion to Islamic nationalism in
governance and foreign policy. The United States as a core ally of the Shah rejected
Iran’s new political reality under different pretexts and justifications related to world
order, fundamentalism, and human rights. Iran was recognized by the US as an “evil”
aider of “international terrorism”. The United States' relations with Iran were in the
process of being re-formulated as a result of rapidly changing domestic circumstances
in Iran. America's direct contact with Iran became politically salient after Mossadeq’s
coup. The Shah considered as an American Ally in the Cold War, failed to maintain
his power.
But, before the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. had gained extensive control over Iran by
propelling Mohammad Reza Shah to exercise hegemonic power over Mohammad
Mossadeq, a charismatic Iranian Premier (Kinzer, 1953). The US-Iranian relations
flourished in Mossadeq’s Post-coupera. After his power was restoredby the US and

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Britain, the Shah became known as an “American Puppy”. These countries felt they
had control over the Shah’s administration. As a result, the U.S. propelled the Shah,
who was also known as the “American puppet,” into a domineering model of
leadership over the Iranian government and masses, as Dariush Zahedi argues
(Zahedi, 2000, 53, 152). The Shah’s political agenda during his time was shaped by
the motives and interests of his relations with the United States, rather than by the will
of the Iranian citizens. Therefore, the key objective of this paper is to deliver a
comprehensive and critical analysis of the historical relations between the United
States and Iran, by examining the effects of the Cold War elements on the major
events in the timeline of both States. Through comparative research of literature, and
declassified documents of CIA operations in Iran, the adopted mode of analysis in this
thesis will work on demonstrating a clear view of the gradual development of the
United States' relations with Iran and the scope to which it was influenced by the
factors of the Cold War.
As the Cold War out developed with the Soviet Union, the United States sought
further Iranian cooperation to contain communism in Asia. Meanwhile, Iran received
full military, economic, and technological support from the US at that phase. In this
context, Iran was witnessing the turnovers of the Cold War, from the military conflicts
and indirect wars between the two superpowers, to the days of American-Soviet
dialogues of the 1960s. The American policy makers realised after the Vietnam War
that “an era of negotiations rapprochement with the Soviet Union has been entered”.
Iran remained a strict ally of the US, but this portends of the conflict between the US
and the Soviet Union “will not influence very significantly Iran’s internal affairs”.
(Cottam,2, 1970). The American acts and policies in the Cold War era were
considered as imperial in some regions for this will be explained through relevant
evidence. One of America’s extraordinary influences of the Cold War was evident in
Iran. This influence shifted after the revolution into a rivalry between the two
countries. Iran’s nuclear program and support for international terrorism, which the
US considers to be one of the prime obstacles to the resumption of US-Iran relations.
(State Department, 2010 release). “What are you guys going to advise me to do if they
overturn our embassy and take our people hostage” (president carter to aids 1979)
(Hamilton, 1982). President Jimmy Carter’s fear became a fact when Iranian Students
overturned the American Embassy and took all its employers as hostages. But the
future of the relation held common interests for both states. As Khomeini settled his
power in Iran, Saddam Hussein declared war on him and in the late years of the war
Iran and the United States got involved in one of the biggest illegal affairs in
president’s Ronald Reagan’s era. Scholars didn’t agree on whether Reagan’s act was
legitimate but they consider the affair as a core point in history of both states’ relation.

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Chapetr 1.
Mossadeq, The United States, And Great Britain (1949-1953)
One of the critical impacts that affected the evolution of a promising alliance at the
time of the Cold War between the United States and monarchical Iran was the
changing domestic politics in the latter. In the spring of 1951, Iran nationalized the
British owned Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC) thus opening a new page in the
historical long term agreement between the Shah of Iran and Washington. The
sentiments resulting from the tendencies of nationalizing the oil industry started in
early 1948, and could be described as part of an emerging national spark. Despite the
fact that an agreement raising the Iranian revenue was reached in 1949, Iran’s
parliament refused to ratify it. In this context, the United States took a firm position in
refusing any attempt for oil nationalization in Iran. This triggered US threat from oil
companies warning that the elimination of AIOC will deprive Iran from transportation
and marketing facilities.
Local dynamics in Iran played a key role in shaping the American stance in relation to
the Shah. Since 1941 the Shah tried to convince the west that he represented the ideal
leader for a “westernized Iran”. The crisis resulting from oil nationalization intensified
this tendency of the west to identify the Shah and his respected monarchy as a tool of
internal stability. As Michael Axworthy (2013: 47), puts it: “The monarchy was still
relatively weak under the young Shah, and once the occupying foreign power had left
the country the interlude of political freedom was sustained. The central figure to
emerge out of this new ferment was Mohammad Mossadeq.” Mossadeq’s history of
opposition to Reza Shah goes back to the 1920’s and 1930’s. A great deal of
Mossadeq’s influential power was rootedin his charismatic character, best embodied
in his attractive speeches by employing modern media networks. Such a beginning
allowed Mossadeq to voice his ideas and convictions in an effective manner with one
of its positive effects seenin his rising reputation among his supporters. His ideology
for anti-colonialism and commitment to national independence further increased
Mossadeq’s prospects for future leadership. In April 1951 Mossadeq became the
official prime minister of Iran creating a powerful political reality in which he led the
Iranian Parliament (Majlis) to successfully legislate the nationalization of the oil
industry (Painter, 1993). The useful implications of Mossadeq’s achievement of
nationalization policies rendered the unification of national parties in Iran, which was
distinctively empowered by the support of religious clergy, such as Ayatollah
Kashani. However, it is also important to note here, that Mossadeq had expected the

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United States to help in transforming the absolute Monarchy into a Constitutional
Monarch as part of a reformist attempt to regulate the power of Reza Shah. From here
Hiro (1990: 45) argues that: “Mossadeq intended to limit the power of the Shah and
establish the country on a permanent basis as a modern constitutional monarchy. He
thought that the US would help.” In essence, one cannot resist highlighting
Mossadeq’s relative success in striking a moderate example of balancing internal
reform with openness to external relations with the United States. However,
Mossadeq’s growing popularity and power led to a series of political riots, motivating
the United States to intervene. An example of such popularity was evident in the mass
rage in the summer of 1952, which followed the Shah’s refusal to appoint Mossadeq’s
candidate for the Ministry of Defence, in which Mossadeq resigned for three days,
pressuring the Shah to revise his decision.
On the other hand, the external considerations of Mossadeq’s era were largely marked
by the constructed fear of Soviet influence on Iran, as part and parcel of the Soviet’s
ideological and economic struggle with the United States. Although Truman’s
administration seemed to sympathize with Iran’s progressive nationalist aspirations,
this was quickly overturned with the administration of President Eisenhower. The
latter’s caution over Mossadeq’s project was fuelled by a conviction often held by
Britain that Mossadeq was planning and re-making a new political order defined by
communist-inspired ambitions. Mossadeq continued with a series of hammer blows to
the monarchic authority in Iran. He cut the military budget by 15 percent, transferred
the royal estate back to the state, and placed royal charities under government
supervision. In his analysis of modern Iran, Ervand Abrahamian described the
American intervention in Mossadeq’s coup as “a joint British–American ventureto
preserve the international oil cartel.”. This can’t be considered as the only reason of
the coup. The United States considered the Shah as one of its major allies in the
region. The American administration was aware of the great strategic importance of
Iran in the Cold War. Iran was the gate of the Middle East to the Soviets. The United
States wanted to make sure that the domestic situations in Iran will remain stable
because losing Iran for the communists will cause the US to lose monitoring the whole
region there. For this reason, it becomes increasingly pressing to critique the
mainstream reductionist interpretation of the US intervention in Iran, which was
mainly viewed as a reaction to the local nationalist movement assumed to be a cultural
offshoot of Soviet communism. However, a closer look at the complexity of the Cold
war atmosphere will uncover the fact that there were multiple rather than single, and
diverse rather than one-dimensional, reasons behind the Anglo-American intervention
in Iran (Abrahmian, 2008). In June of 1953 the toppling of Mossadeq’s administration
was eventually achieved due to internal and external factors. For Washington, as well

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as for London, full Iranian control of its own oil resources would have far-reaching
disastrous consequences. It would not only strike a direct blow at the British but it
would also give control to Iran. It could inspire others, especially Indonesia,
Venezuela, and Iraq to follow suit, and thus drastically shifting control over the
international petroleum market away from Western oil companies and towards the oil-
producing countries.
One assumption consider that the United States rushed towards Britain’s side as they
both showed an interest in maintaining western control over Iranian oil. However, it
was much more political motive to the US. The United States wanted to make sure
that the Shah will stay in power. Officials of the CIA were convinced that in a certain
level keeping the Shah in power and getting rid of Mossadeq will make Iran a Pro-
American state more and less pro-British. This justifies Allen Dulles actions later on.
In March of 1953 the CIA’s Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had
approached the U.S. embassy regarding support for an army-led coup. It reported that
support for Mossadeq was crumbling and that the influence of Iran’s Communist Party
(Tudeh) was increasing. Tudeh called for elections and urged Mossadeq to form a
coalition government which would assure a position for Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlevi. As a result, the CIA stepped up its timetable. CIA Director Allen Dulles
approved $1 million on April 4. Wilber’s account said that the funds could be used “in
any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh.” He continued: “The aim was
to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement,
enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would
vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.” It also read: “A Shah-
General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing,
would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadegh particularly if this
combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable
portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadegh’s orders.The United
States feared a Soviet intervention and take over in Iran. It was a core tenet of the
American foreign policy to sustain Iran’s politics under western supervision and thus
the NSC approved a new statement of U.S policy atthe time. The statement outlined,
“It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remains an independent state
and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its strategic importance
and key petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the
USSR.”. This statement clears out that the United States had a broader view than only
oil interests. The American concern was mainly for the USSR taking advantage of
Iran’s importance. The Soviets could have taken advantage of the Shah’s fall. And this
was the broad concern of the United States in which oil can be included like

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Abrahmian considered but not on the same level as it is a minor factor in the broad
concern.
Mossadeq being greeted by his supporter after nationalizing oil industry
By the end of 1952 it was clear that Mossadeq’s government would not reach, or was
incapable, of reaching a settlement with western oil companies because he was strict
on his nationalist view. Mossadeq gained his popularity as a man of loyalty to his
country his view was based on giving Iran back to its people with its resources. If
Mossadeq was to compromise with the West and agree on giving up Iranian claims
people would lose faith in him. The west was reaching a high level of illegal, deficit
financing and was disregarding the Iranian constitution by prolonging Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadeq’s term. Furthermore, Mossadeq established a close relation and
cooperation with the communist party in Iran (Tudeh). These factors created a
probability of Iran falling behind the Iron Curtain. And the best action was to set a
plan for the full removal of Mossadeq’s government. It was the aim of the TPAJAX
project to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government, to re-establish the prestige and
power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadeq government with one that would
govern Iran according to constructive policies. Specifically, the aim was to bring to
power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to
become economically sound and financially solvent and this would vigorously
prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party (Wilber, 1969). An equitable

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settlement for Mossadeq was an agreement that will secure that Iranians will get most
of their oil profits opposite to the situation that was before. Despite the failure of the
operation in the early stages, and although the Shah left Iran, which let the CIA down
and motivated newspapers that supported Mossadeq to write that the Shah’s dynasty
had come to an end. Tehran Newspaper, at the same time, wrote an article that hit the
streets of Iran with story of the Shah’s decrees. An Iranian Army colonel involved in
the plot suddenly appeared outside Parliament with a tank, while members of the
disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. Over 100,000
people took to the streets. According to the CIA, the Pro-Shah military personnel were
in every square. In hours, police stations fell, along with Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
newspapers seized and the news of the coup’s success and the Shah’s decrees were
announced. The United State approached failure in removing Mossadeq. To a point,
the coup succeeded mainly because of internal factors. However, the United States’
major role was backing up the Shah’s decisions and military plans. The coup couldn’t
succeed with pure American acts only, Mossadeq failed to gain the trust of the clerics
in Iran. Unlike the revolution of 1979, the Shah had a green light from the American
administration to do whatever it takes to retain control of the government.
The coup of 1953 left a great impact and legacy. The Shah destroyed Mossadeq but
his mystique followed the Shah, and in many ways can be compared to great national
heroes such as Gandhi and Nasser. The coup itself initiated one of the core factors that
influenced the emergence of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Moassadeq’s removal
along with the national front and the Tudeh Party, established a long-term alliance of
Iran with the US which by this time had replaced Britain in Iran. With nationalist and
socialist movements dispatched after the Shah whose leaders were murdered and
arrested, paving the way for the emergence of religious movements. Liberalism was
replaced with Islamic fundamentalism. The Shah’s gamble on this was based on the
fact that Islamic fundamentalism was not related in any aspect to the Soviets, and that
religious clerics in Iran showed no attempts to reach power. he tried to maintain his
relation with Islamic clerics as he knew that the culture of his population is linked to
Islam. This is why the Shah’s plan to westernize Iran failed and caused him loads of
criticism. Abrahmian described the monarchic system of Iran after 1953 as
“inseparably and fatally identified with imperialism, corporate capitalism, and close
alignment with the West. One can argue that the real roots of the 1979 revolution go
back to 1953.”(Abrahmian, 122, 2008).

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Operation TPAJAX
Despite the American qualms concerning a military intervention in Iran, Britain
showed a complete support for using military force in Iran. This sentiment is best
captured in a cabinet meeting in July 1951, when Morrison discouraged Sir Francis
Shepherd, British ambassador to Iran, from meeting with director of the Mutual
Security Agency which was giving aid to US allies after the end of Marshall Aid W.
Averell Harriman because a meeting might cause harmful speculation in the press and
among Persians. If Harriman helped mediate the dispute, Morrison argued, the Persian
government might be led to believe that he was acquiring more favourable terms for
Persia.(Cabinet Papers, National Archive, 2010). The American involvement in a way
violated the Truman Doctrine. The shift in the American foreign policy especially in
the Persian Gulf was clear from P. Truman’s era to P. Eisenhower. The fear of a
communist takeover in Iran was a major factor of the Anglo-American intervention of
1953. The CIA’s chief operative in Iran, Kermit Roosevelt, captured that spirit when
he titled his memoir Countercoup, implying that the communist Tudeh Party or
Islamic fundamentalists would have toppled Mossadeq if the CIA had not
interceded.(Roosevelt, 1979, 210). Others on the contrary hold an argument that the
coup was totally a result of Iranian politics; a change of government would have taken
place without the CIA.(Takeyh, 2014, 2). Others even considered the coup as a core
reason of the three and a half decades of strife between the US and Iran, with some
going even further in relating events like the Gulf war of 1991 to the coup. (Elm,
1992, 343, Kinzer, 2003, 203).
The story of Operation Ajax perhaps started years before the coup. The history of “oil
relations” between Britain and Iran occupies a pivotal position in understanding the
operation. Britain first entered the Iranian oil industry in 1901 when William Knox
D’Arcy purchased a concessionto drill for oil from the bankrupt Shah. In 1913, First
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill convinced Parliament to purchase a majority
stake in D’Arcy’s Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which became the AIOC, in
preparation for converting the Royal Navy’s ships to oil fuel.(Yergin, 1991; Ferrier,
1982). Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran in the Second World War. After the
war ended, Britain left Iran but the Soviets stayed even after the deadline of the
withdrawal. In reaction of the Soviet attempt to force an oil concessionagreement on
Iran and instigate the independence of the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan,
Secretary of State James Byrnes protested the Soviet aggression, warning, “[T]he
United States...cannot [sic] remain indifferent.” (FRUS, 339-341, 1946). Events in
Iran in 1951, laid the groundwork for the National Front-Dominated Majlis, to take
over the situation. They “rapidly rejectedthe supplemental agreement, and elected

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Mossadegh Prime Minister, and nationalize the AIOC’s properties by may 1951”
(Bill, 1988, 61). All American attempts done by President Truman failed to recognise
a common ground between the English and the Iranians. Mossadeq’s threatening tone
lead to Britain sending more destroyers to the region, and Mossadeq progressed with
his policy by calling Britain to withdraw all workers from Iran. Mossadeq had a visit
in October 1951 to New York for the meeting of the United Nations, he then met with
American Officials, who received him as Acheson described it “warily”(Acheson,509,
1969) .
In 1952 Mossadeq resigned as the Prime Minister as the Shah refused to extend his
power to include the ministry of war. The public’s reaction rapidly obliged the Shah to
assign him just five days later and extend his powers. Mossadeq then cut Iranian
diplomatic relations with the UK. The British reaction to Mossadeq’s foreign policy,
led to what can be considered as the only remaining solution. In November 1952, the
British SIS approached American CIA Middle East chief Kermit Roosevelt with a
plan, code-named “Operation Boot,” to topple Mossadegh.(Roosevelt, 1979, 107).
The United States administration rejectedthe proposal then. When President
Eisenhower took office, American administration kept on trying to reach an agreement
with Mossadeq, but the strict Prime Minister rejectedevery settlement proposed by
the United States. The final rejectionin March 1953 led President Eisenhower
revisiting the coup plans that was suggested by Britain. President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Director of the CIA Allen Dulles approved
Operation Ajax on July 11, 1953 after Allen Dulles had authorized funding for it on
April 6 (Wilber, 2015,18). The coup was almost a failure. Mossadeq’s government
arrested the men who had delivered an order from the Shah to resign the Prime
Minister. The man who was chosen to replace Mossadeq as a Prime Minister, General
Fazlollah Zahedi escaped to a nearby hiding place while the Shah left to Baghdad and
then Rome. Despite this setback, Roosevelt continued with his plan, and arranged for
the transfer of funds to pro-Shah groups and Iranian agents who could increase their
propaganda output against Mossadegh. (Takeyh,2014, 8-10). According to the
agreement of October 1954, Iran continued to own its oil industry by name, but in fact
an international association engaged the industry and distributed the Iranian oil. But
the major result of the operation was not in the economical loss of Iran, or the British
gaining their income back. It was a new era in the US-Iran relations, the United States
had gained a compliant ally in the government of Prime Minister Zahedi and the
increasingly dictatorial Shah. (Yergin, 1991, 476-478). As mentioned before though,
President Eisenhower’s main concerns were that Mossadeq was inclining to the USSR
and was not suppressing the communist party in Iran (Tudeh). As a part of the
changing American policy towards communism, Eisenhower had to act strict to

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prevent Soviet takeover in Iran. The broad concern was to stop communist expand to
Iran, and a minor factor of this broad concern was the oil.

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Trajectory of American policy with Iran
Previous literature that discussed the US-Iranian relations came with what can be
classified into four major schools of understanding the trajectory of American policy
with Iran. The first is what I call the presidential composition, the second is
constitutional, third appraoch is semi-centralized, and the last one is what I can call
opportunists. Although historians or some of them tried to combine different
understandings, I shall explain the adoption of every single school.
Presidential composition:
The principle of this school is simple. The policy of every American president differs
from that of their predecessors. The case of operation AJAX was used as clear
evidence as it happened in the first year of President Eisenhower reaching office.
Historians that approved with this principle obtained four major differences between
the Truman and Eisenhower policies. First, they confirmed that Eisenhower
approached the cold war much more aggressively than Truman did to limit the threat
of communism. Second, the fear that Mossadeq’s government will fall in the hand of
communists or radical Islamists in Iran. The third difference is the influence of the
President’s advisors that was more pointed towards covert operations in Eisenhower’s
era. The last difference that was adopted by a number of historians is that the
Eisenhower administration was influenced more by Britain and the oil companies.
(Gasiorowski, 1991,82,72: Rubin, 1980, 55-57) .
Constitutional:
Unlike the presidential composition, historians that linked the American policy
towards Iran with structural and constitutional composition focused more on the Cold
War considerations. Francis J. Gavin asserted that the principle of balance of power
was a core tenet in the American actions in Iran. During the early stages of the crisis,
the United States experiencedmilitary weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; by 1953, a
dramatic arms buildup had resulted in a position of strength and created the
confidence for bold measures such as Operation Ajax.(Gavin, 59, 2014). However, a
different assumption was considered on the constitutional level by H.W. Brands. He
argued that the American quest for creating a defence organisation in the Middle East
was the motive of American policy in Iran, after failures to get Egypt in Middle East
Defence Organisation (MEDO). The US viewed Iran as a defence strategy against
Soviet aggression in the Middle East. (Brands, 1989, 434-456). Despite all previous

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analysis, Steve Marsh simply linked the US actions to the desperate solution for the
conflict and as the last resort of the United States. (Marsh,2003,90).
Semi centralised:
The third analysis, blame the British influence on the American decision makers.
Researchers that represented this paradigm claimed that the British intelligence led the
CIA to participate in operation AJAX. This thesis is supported by Tony Smith’s
pericentric theory. This theory assumes that during the Cold War, small states or
smaller states in this case had a significant influence on the super powers. (Smith, 582,
2000). Smith held the idea of historical British influence on America. They argue that
the American policy in Iran was made by an imperial British influence that
Eisenhower’s administration adopted.
Opportunists:
The fourth group of thinkers link the American intervention directly to the oil
industry. They argued that America and Britain saw an opportunity to take advantage
of what is considered as the most important resource that men ever discovered on
earth. Like the semi-centralised group, those who highlight the role of the oil
companies often see the Eisenhower administration as cozier with corporations than
the Truman administration. In Iran, these historians argue, Cold War concerns were
secondary to opening Iran to American producers.(Kinzer, 2003,206;Abrahamian,
2004,4).
Evaluation of Chapter:
The American intervention in Iran helped in a way the Shah and Zahedi in removing
Mossadeq from power. as mentioned ahead it was mainly internal powers that brought
the American operation to success. This created a new era in the US-Iran relations.
Iran became the core ally of the United States in the Middle East. As a matter of fact,
Iran under the Shah governed the north strategic borders to prevent soviet aggression
against that area. The Shah served the benefits and interests of the United States
perfectly. The American influence on Iran was not only on the political sector. Iran
became what I call an Eastern US. People in Iran gradually realised that the American
influence is demolishing the religious culture of the country which was mainly
Muslim. Although the Shah was Muslim, but his life style was clear to Iranians. The
Shah was affected by the Western culture. The Shah attempted to secularize Iran
because this would have fall in his own interest. The Shah didn’t want religious clerics

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to intervene in the politics of the country. And he knew best that secularization will
keep his government stable. Moreover, the role of the clergy in understanding what
happened laid the ground base for the Iranian revolution of 1979 when secularization
started to demolish.

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Chapter 2.
The Islamic Revolution: American Failure to predict the fall of the Shah
Following the phase of the major coup, Iran became a US client state. The Shah’s
administration received American support to secure his position in power. The
Monarchy of Iran structurally exiled, persecuted, and imprisoned all Soviet figures in
the country and all nationalists. The Eisenhower administration viewed Iran as a
crucial link in the ‘northern tier’ of countries stretching from Turkey to Afghanistan
that separated the USSR from the oil-richPersian Gulf. One cannot overlook the
economic imperative in this instance which was occupying a geopolitical position in
the region. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, firmly aligning itself to the West in
the Cold War.( Ramazani, 1966). The people of one of the oldest civilizations in the
world suddenly started relinquishing their cultural identity. The Shah’s reforms
included for example extending women’s right to vote and participate in political life.
This caused a lot of criticism among clergy. The Iranian streets were full of
advertisements with pictures of women that didn’t suit Islamic culture. In addition to
this, the reforms reduced the religious influence on the society. For example, the rents
from an estimated 10000 villages whose rents helped financing the clerical
establishments, which was a part of the Iranian culture were eligible for
redistribution.(Mackey, 1996,221). Such a cultural identity of Iran was mostly
Islamic. The American influence was not reduced to the military dimension but the
Shah’s administration adopted the American lifestyle into the Iranian society. These
cultural considerations in my view lie at the core of the Islamic revolution in 1979. It
was one of the main reasons of the American failure to predict the fall of the shah.
Therefore, this chapter will cover the other factors of the American intelligence
failure, and the trajectory of the revolution.
On behalf of the American intelligence community the revolution of 1979 was a major
failure. I linked the prediction failure to four major factors as follow; lack of
resources, focusing on external priorities, the analytical failure, and the
communication issues. The Shah’s administration ruled Iran from 1949-1979, his
government was supported by both the US and the UK. Over the years following the
coup of Mossadeq, the Shah’s administration instigated a number of reforms that
modernized Iran. Known as the white revolution, the modification in the Iranian laws
wasn’t accepted by the clergy in Iran. They saw the modernised laws as a threat to the
Shi’ite Islamic ideology of the country. Ayatollah Khomeini in particular was a big
protestor against the Shah, and he managed to gain the support of the working class in
Iran and from the unemployed which led to his exile in 1964. (Axworthy, 62, 2014).
As the Shah proceeded to promote his arrangements, Iranians became extremely

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discontent about the monarchical policies. Protest movements started, and they were
motivated by the increasing number of people that joined them. Unemployment to
new graduates, farmers losing their jobs and similar factors led to the growth of the
urban working class which caused the Shah most troubles. The Shah’s domestic
policy was building the ground for the upcoming revolution as he dissolved all the
political parties of Iran in on one party that supported the Monarchic system. Those
who refused to join Rastakhiz Party were considered traitors. This way the Shah not
only contributed to an increase in the number of those who’d traditionally opposed
him, but also pushed moderates into making extreme choices. (Axworthy, 89). The
religious student movement was growing much faster than the communist nationalist
movement. By the time protests in the City of Qom took place, the number of students
that joined the religious movement was considerably high. The Shah hesitated to
employ power against the protests and eventually he didn’t. (lucas,420, 2009). The
Shah left Iran on January 1979, and it was his last trip from Tehran Airport. The
Monarchic government dissolved and Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to start
a new administration, the revolution succeeded in removing one of the US core allies
in the region.

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Khomeini’s arrival to Tehran’s Airport declaring the success of his revolution

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The United States' ineffectiveness in Iran (The Intelligence Failure)
The United States was surprised by the fact that the Shah actually left Iran. This was a
clear evidence of the United States' ineffectiveness in its policy in Iran. The American
expectations were totally in contrast to the reality of the situations in Iran. Policy
makers depending on the US DIA intelligence reports, expected in the late 1978 that
the Shah will stay in power for at least another decade.(Defense intelligence
Assessment, 1978). In comparison with 1953, the Unites States, and specifically the
State Department failed in analyzing the situation of Iran. The lack of American
analysts in the American Embassy of Tehran was clear until the fall of the Shah. Only
five analysts were in action in the Embassy by the 1960s and even less in the years
after. (Sullivan, 39,2010). The situation was dissimilar in Mossadeq’s coup of 1953.
Operation AJAX recorded a major work from the State Department by training
Persian speaking analysts were sent to Iran to collect intelligence information on the
National Front and to secure the Shah's continuity in power.(Daugherty, 2001,456) .
On the contrary, the years that followed witnessed a shift in the American intelligence
policy in Iran. The focus was more on the Shah as a leading personality and less on
the Iranian political landscape.(CIA FOCUS,1976). A final factor in the intelligence
was the process of staff cut in the Embassy. The CIA reduced its operational analysts
by 1960s who held the responsibility of the Iranian file. Proceeding with the same
policy, the State Department went into budget cuts in 1970s including the reduction of
the embassy staff worldwide. The United States had faith, and confidence that the
Shah will stay in power and due to this faith the US took a decision to close consulates
in the outer cities and reduce staff in Tehran. (Daugherty, 2001,454).
This chain of decisions taken by the State Department including reduction of staff in
the Embassy, lack of analysts that knew Persian language, and focusing on the Shah as
a leader while ignoring the domestic situation had a negative impact on the reporting
within Iran. Despite the fact that Iran was a total ally of the US in the region, budget
cuts and staff reduction and the focusing in monitoring external threats outside Iran
rather than focusing on the internal threats rising in the horizon especially from the
clergy and the student movement that showed total support for Khomeini all decreased
the efficiencyof intelligence work in the country which essentially led to the total
failure of the operations. Another factor of a similar argument is that the American
government had no engagement what so ever with the Shah’s enemies. The State
Department suffered a major lack of information about the Khomeini’s movement.
Daugherty argued that the lack of information was not the only factor in failing to
predict the Islamic Revolution, quoting a French ex-DGSE official who mentions that
CIA officers had someone to give them information. Their reports were not taken

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seriously enough to land on the desks of decision makers. A telegram from Tehran
supports this argument reported ahead of the Qom events in 1978. The telegram stated
that “religious leaders are becoming involved in politics” (Daugherty, 2001, 465). It
was clear that the American policy makers were ignorant concerning the religious role
in the Iranian politics up to that point.

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Opposition to the Monarchy in the1960s: Khomeini’s movement
The Shah maintained power for thirty-eight years. The United States endorsed, aided,
and adopted the regime of the Shah. His repressive regime led to the growth of
opposition groups. Despite the fact that the Shah managed to crush most of the
movements, Ayatollah Khomeini succeeded in over passing all the attempts by the
Shah to stop him. Khomeini was an Islamic scholar who received his religious
education in Qom, which is the primary centre for the Shi’a scholarship in the world.
(Moin,1999, 25). Khomeini’s movement according to Nikki Keddie was based on two
major reasons: American influence and secularization of Iranian society. (Keddie,
2006, 146). One of the core allies for the Unites States in the Cold War was Israel.
This fact was the justification for Khomeini’s position from the United States, hence
he considered Israel as major enemy for Iran and a centre of Western imperialism in
the region that persecuted Muslims. Khomeini believed that Israelis and Americans
are in war against Muslims. (Ismael and Ismael, 1980, 616.) The Shah’s policy in Iran
helped in motivating Khomeini towards increasing revolt. The Iranian administration
had a lean policy with the Americans. In 1962 the Shah gave Americans in Iran
protection from prosecution in Iranian courts. Khomeini saw this as an American
influence that intended to corrupt Iran. The Ayatollah made it clear stating what
Thiery Brun quoted:
If any of them commits a crime in Iran, they are immune. If an
American servant or cook terrorizes your source of religious authority in the
middle of the bazaar, the Iranian police does not have the right to stop him. The
Iranian courts cannot put him on trial or interrogate him. He should go to
America where the masters would decide what to do. . . . We do not consider
this government a government. These are traitors. They are traitors to the
country.(Brun, 1978, 17)
Khomeini’s firm agenda against the Monarchy in Iran led eventually the Shah
imprisoning him for two years. He kept on attacking what he called America’s Puppet
despite the fact that he was in jail. The Shah then exiled him to Iraq in 1964. From his
exile, Khomeini managed to eventually spark an Islamic Revolution in Iran that will
change his country forever. In order to understand Khomeini’s position from the
Shah’s policy it is important to demonstrate how Americanization took place in Iran.
The Iranian administration plans required a relevant foreign presence in Iran. These
plans included 9000 US military operators, in addition to 60,000 foreign workers and
business men most of them were Americans. The existence of this number of foreign
workers who even owned and gained higher salaries than Iranians, offended the
religious sensibilities of Iranians.(Clawson and Rubin 2005,82). The revolution had a

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pre-ground set. A number of factors on the domestic level of Iran helped in preparing
things for Khomeini. As the process of modernization failed to match the economy in
Iran, the working middle class had no proper political voice. Clawson and Rubin
argued on a level which I consider credible that an economic down-turn in the mid
1970s led to inflation, a tighter job market, and falling real income, contributed to
widespread dissatisfaction at a time of rising expectations, setting the stage for the
revolution.(Clawson and Rubin, 2005,64). All these factors resulted in one major
revolution that succeeded in taking over the power in Iran in 1979. However, the core
question revolves around how such a revolution evolved into the peak of 1979?What
set off the revolution was the publication of an editorial in a government newspaper
that insulted Ayatollah Khomeini on the 7th of January 1978. Few days later protests
started in the holy city of Qom, and the Shah’s police officers suppressed the protests
killing 6 people and wounding a large number of protestors. It is at this level of the
event that the United States didn’t deal with the events properly. Both the Iranian and
American administrations considered these protests as normal protests that the Shah
will be able to stop and limit. In fact things were different as previous protests didn’t
hold this support as I mentioned earlier especially from students and the working
middle class. The sense of confidence that the Americans and the Monarchy in Iran
had goes back to the earlier success of the Shah in handling Khomeini’s protests in
early 1960s. (Rubin,1980,109-110). The Shah’s violent policy against the protestors
didn’t stop other cities from joining the city of Qom. A mass protest in the city of
Tabriz in February 1978 led the Iranian administration to call the army for the first
time during the protests. The armed forces used crucial power against the people of
Tabriz killing six and wounding over a 100 more. It was normal for such events to
create a repeated demonstration all around Iran reaching the year of 1979 when the
revolution succeeded. The large protests which were transformed into an influential
subversive act of change led the army to overreact and more killing took place, which
started yet another cycle of violence. (Sick, 1985, 34-35). On September 7 1978 the
Shah of Iran declared martial laws. His decision was due to the frequent
demonstrations, increasing series of strikes by state employees, and the lack of control
on security levels. The Iranian armed forces killed hundreds of protestors during that
week. The media, parliament, and even the Shah harshly criticized the armed forces
for their heavy handed response, striking a blow at flagging military morale.(Ward,
2009, 217). Events known as Black Friday led to more violence and motivated
protestors to stay on the streets. The Shah declared a military government in
November 1978 and maintained the same repressive policy against demonstrators.
The crisis escalated to its peak in December 1978, specifically in the holy month of
Moharam the month when Shia’a Muslims commemorate the iconic martyrdom of the
Prophet Mohammad’s Grandson in a ceremony known as Ashouraa. Millions

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gathered to demonstrate their stance in Tehran where the first major attack on the
Iranian military took place: attack on December 11 1978 on Tehran’s Lavisans
Barracks by army commanders who killed more than ten pro-Shah officers and
wounded hundreds. The Shah asked the opposition politician Shahpour Bakhtiar to
form a government in the midst of such chaos the country was experiencing at these
moments, in an attempt to settle the situation. Despite the Shah’s attempts to fix the
situation, he eventually assigned a “regency council” and left Iran to Egypt on the 16th
of January then to Morocco, and eventually to the US to get medical treatment and
moved to panama where he eventually died. With the Shah leaving Iran, it meant the
end of the monarchy that ruled the country for decades. Iran remained a failed state
until Ayatollah Khomeini left his exile and came back from France on the 1st of
February 1979 to Tehran’s airport. No police officer could stand facing Khomeini
with three million supporters waiting for him to declare the new era in Iran’s history.

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The military failure of the Iranian army:
The failure of the Iranian army to stop the Islamic Revolution is related to a number
of factors. The Shah himself is a separate factor, the gap between the army and
civilians, the Islamic propaganda, the weakness of the Iranian forces, and the
confusing position of the US. (Hashim 140-168, 199; Roberts, 5-28, 1996;
Schahgaldian, 12–34, 1987).
1. The Shah:
From the former case of Mossadeq it can be noticed that the Shah was in a weak
position. He wasn’t able to take core decisions by himself without external influence.
The criticism of the Iranian policy concerning human rights violations made the Shah
hesitate before taking any measures to keep his power sustained as he always
remained in a situation awaiting American orders. His suspicion and weak personality
led him to doubt the American loyalty to his alliance, despite the fact that President
Carter’s administration kept on supporting and supplying the Shah with arms. The
Shah’s dependence on foreign intervention in the past left a huge impact on his
decision making abilities. In 1973 the Shah was diagnosed with cancer and his illness
was rising to its peak with the revolution which made him weaker.
2. The military insufficiency and ineffectiveness:
The Iranian military was totally insufficient after the Shah left Iran. The opposition
constantly accused the military of violating human rights. For more than a year the
military had to confront opposition, as they were not well trained and not ready to
stand against such demonstrations. The Iranian armed forces were not given the
permission to use the means needed to stop the protests. Eventually, officers in the
Iranian army demanded a permission to use force against the opposition, while the
Shah conducted restrictive rules concerning engagement. Even when the Shah
assigned Bakhtiar as a prime minister he failed to manage the army in convincing
them to follow his commands and the Iranian administration was obliged to
compromise with protestors.
3. The Islamic propaganda:
The opposition attracted young conscripts and junior midlevel officers. This
propaganda that Khomeini had constructed is considered as a major factor for his
success. The agency of the protestors with the army was not eventually harsh all the
time. Demonstrators gave flowers to the soldiers, and the revolution in Iran today is
known as the “Flowers Revolution” due to this incident. The soldiers in the lower

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sectors of the Iranian army were promised to be treated well if they joined the
opposition. The ideological charismatic effect of Khomeini was essential armed forces
were always reminded by Khomeini’s decrees to create a convincing propaganda that
it is a sin to disobey his will. Khomeini’s supporters also promised a firm punishment
for those who keep on killing protesters and get their hands blooded with the souls of
the innocents.
4. The Confusion of the United States:
The American position in 1953 was clear. The American had a major role in the coup
that brought the Shah back to power. Carter’s administration constantly criticized the
human rights violations that took place in Iran. The West accused the Shah of non-
humanitarian acts against protestors. The Shah took this position as an American shift
in the alliance agenda. Whilst Carter’s administration kept its clear support for the
Shah, he believed that Americans are conspiring with the opposition to take him
down. On the day the Shah left Iran, the US sent General Robert Huyser to Iran in
order to show and confirm the American support for the Shah’s regime. However, his
mission “seemed to have been misperceived by all Iranians. The generals wanted
Huyser to tell them what to do, the Shah came to believe that the American general
was responsible for arranging a deal between the revolutionaries and the military to
end the monarchy, and the revolutionaries were convinced Huyser was in Iran to
promote a coup.” (Ward, 2009, 221).
Academics that argued these points managed to reflect the Iranian domestic situation
during the revolution. But critics ignored a major factor which can be more important
than any other factor especially on the domestic level of Iran. What I term the
Khomeini Social Factor which had its influence on both the army and the civilians.
Considering the fact that Khomeini himself showed total loyalty to his Iranian society
when he sustained his protest even when he was exiled he continued in his
commitment to motivate his supporters more. An Iranian man knowing what the
Iranian society was demanding, he represented an Islamic Shi’a symbol and a scholar,
and he stood against Israel firmly. This list of features gave Khomeini the upper hand
in gaining the huge support and in paralyzing the Shah’s power even inside the Iranian
armed forces.

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The reaction of the United States during the revolution escalation
1979
One year ahead of the revolution’s peak in 1979 the United States maintained its
military aid for the Shah as mentioned earlier. After General Huyser landed in Iran, he
set up a direct communication line with the State Department and the White House. (
Moens, 1980, 230). Huyser spent his visit to Iran in official meetings. The United
States wanted to make a clear point that it will keep on supporting the Shah’s
government. The State Department through Huyser showed straight support for the
Iranian military action in hope that this will stabilize the situation and keep the Shah
in power. (U.S. House, General Huyser’s Mission, 15-16)
General Huyser’s visit didn’t manage to achieve a change. On the contrary, the
situation became more corrupted during his visit. The opposition had cause huge
chaos around Iranian cities at that moment. The United States represented by General
Huyser was required to reinstall stability to the crisis in Iran. But eventually, and
before he left Iran, Huyser realized that the Iranian government will fall and
Khomeini’s revolution will succeed. The declaration of the fall of the Shah took place
when Huyser returned to the United States as he was concerned about his personal
safety and he advised his leaders to start positive communication with Khomeini.
(U.S. House, General Huyser’s Mission, 16). The Department of State Desk Officer
Henry Precht agreed with Huyser’s proposal. He kept on advising Carter and his
cabinet to initiate peaceful links with Khomeini’s forces. Precht's argument was based
on a gamble that Khomeini’s forces will eventually stop their radical agenda and they
will move to a moderate vision and a stable government, which was eventually proved
true as Iran went to evolve especially after the war with Iraq reaching present time. A
number of politicians sided with Precht and Huyser, including Ambassador William
Sullivan who urged Carter to do what Precht proposed, but Carter’s administration
insisted on opposing Khomeini and his radical view. (Moens, 226-228, 1980). The
American policy didn’t manage to save the Shah’s government. Huyser’s fears came
true as the Shah administration was falling apart day by day. Eventually on the 16th of
January 1979 the Shah left Iran, millions of Iranians were celebrating on the streets.
One week later, millions of people marched in the streets of Iranian cities embodying
their support for Khomeini. In response to his supporters, Khomeini announced his
return to Iran. On the 31st of January, Khomeini landed in Iran after more than ten
years in exile. Khomeini was ready to start a new era in the history of the country on
the 12th of February when he officially reached power.( Mosely, Chicago Tribune,
1979).

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The American-Iranian relations got worse after the revolution. Khomeini’s radical
agenda against the West remained unchanged as he supported the terrorist attacks that
took place in Kuwait in 1983 after bombings occurred in Western Embassies. Tension
between the two states escalated after Khomeini took American hostages for more
than 400 days. On November 4th the Iranians seized the American Embassy in Tehran
and took tens of US citizens as hostages. (The Presidential Timeline of the 20th
Century, 1979). Rubin considered Khomeini’s support for the hostage crisis directly
related to keeping the Iranian public support for the revolution. Rubin mentioned that
“since American opposition to the Islamic revolution was deemed to be an immutable
fact, any easing of relations by Iranian leaders would show them to be traitors to the
cause.”(Rubin, 316, 1980). This argument in fact reflects the situation in Iran back
then. The motivations of those who supported Khomeini’s movement were mainly
emergent from his Anti-Western attitude and as a result of his commitment to an Anti-
Israeli position, since for the Iranian population especially the Shi’a Muslims Israel is
an American state in the Middle East and they directly placed both states in a single
category which Khomeini described as the Great Satin. Khomeini didn’t show any
readiness to compromise with the United States. The Iranian demands to construct a
new political discourse based on peace and diplomacy with the US can be considered
humiliating. Khomeini asked the US for an apology for past actions, to hand over the
Shah, and to give back Iran’s money. The American Administration including Carter
refused Khomeini’s demands.(Rubin, 319, 1980). Agreement concerning the hostage
crisis was never reached in Carter’s era. After the US attempted to rescue the hostages
and failed eventually, an agreement was settledthat required the US giving back 11$
billion to Iran, and freezing the Royal Family’s money in addition to making a
promise not to intervene in the domestic Iranian politics. The Islamic Revolution went
into another crisis this time with Iraq. In the Early 1980s Saddam Hussein declared
war over Iran and invaded cities on the Iran-Iraq border. The war was devastating for
Iran as it went on for 9 years. This war was a reason of a small ray of light to embrace
peace between the US and Iran which will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.

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Chapter3.
The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988)
The Islamic revolution in Iran succeeded in achieving its goals. Khomeini formed a
new political system in Iran, and maintained his radical view towards the West
describing the United States as The Great Satin. The new government in Iran had not
expected that one year later Saddam Hussein will start a devastating war on their land.
Despite the fact that in the early 1979 Iraq invited Mehdi Bazargan the first Prime
Minister of Islamic Iran to visit Iraq, Saddam declared that he is willing to stop the
rise of superpowers in the region. In response to constant attacks on their oil facilities
by Iraq, Iran declared full military alert on its borders in April 1980. A day later
Khomeini called on the Iraqi people to topple their dictatorship regime. Signs of
warfare between Iraq and Iran started to emerge when Saddam Hussein ordered the
execution of Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, a major Shi’ite Symbol and religious scholar
in Iraq. The shift which eradicated the relation between Iran and Iraq was initially
traced back to the variations in the political view for the future of the region. The Iraqi
government welcomed the Islamic Revolution in February 1979. But when Iranian
clerics started urging the Shi’ite communities to revolt against their governments, the
Iraqi perspective changed and relations between the two states rapidly deteriorated.
Events escalated when the possibility of negotiations vanished especially after the
Revolutionary Guards of Iran attacked the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran. According to
Claudia Wright, two events can be considered as the trigger point for the countdown
of the war. The first event was the American attempt by military forces to rescue the
hostages taken in the American Embassy five months earlier on the 24th of April. The
attempt indicated for the Iraqis that the US will try again with much more forces, or
negotiate the release of the hostages on conditions that will restore the American
support for the Iranian armed forces. The second event lies in the failed coup plot in
Iran. On the 10th of July 1980 the Iranian government seemed to have stopped an
planned coup by elements of the Air Force and other military forces that aimed to
bring Bakhtiar to power. The Iraqi role in this conspiracy was unclear but Bakhtiar
had good relations with the government in Iraq, and even the broadcasts which he had
were conducted from there. (Wright, 280, 1980). Therefore, this chapter will discuss
the long Iraq-Iran war in terms of the reasons, consequences, and the American
position in that war especially focusing on the Iran-Contra scandal.

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Iraq Declared War (1980): Reasons and Early Implications
Many thought that Saddam Hussein underwent a risk upon declaring war on Iran . The
Iranian army was equipped by American weaponry from the Shah’s era. But, Iraq
considered Iran's military power as weaker than ever before. Most likely Saddam took
into account the Western hostility to Iran building his confidence to attack a
neighbourly country on such a fact. One additional factor that motivated Saddam to
declare war is that he wasn’t hindered by any contradictory view by his allies towards
launching war on Iran. I will consider discussing the background of the war in the era
of Islamic Iran, though some factors relating to the hostility between the two states go
back to earlier years. One worth mentioning is the incident of 1971 when Iraq broke
diplomatic relations with Iran due to a conflict related to the islands of Abu Musa,
Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Persian Gulf, following the withdrawal of the
British. (Fendereski, 2005). The different cultural perspective of the two nations is a
major factor of the war I would say, or at least a reason for the conflict. Iran had a
Shi’aa Muslim radicalism, while Iraq was an Arab-Nationalist although both states
had a common enemy which was the Shah and this was a core reason for Iraq
welcoming the revolution in the early days. (Karsh,2002,13). Karsh also mentions that
Baghdad received Khomeini’s call to overthrow the Baath regime in a
hock.(Karsh,2003,13). The threat that Khomeini showed to the Baath regime in Iraq,
alarmed Saddam’s government. One more cultural factor is that despite the secular
view of the Iraqi regime, the majority in Baath were from Sunni Muslims and
considered Khomeini’s threat as a Shi’ee Muslim to their stability in Iraq. If it wasn’t
for reasons related to both states, Saddam Hussein had a self interest in extending his
authoritative ambitions to Iran. Saddam Hussein was a realist leader, he believed that
going into Iran would enhance and enlarge Iraq’s petroleum reserves and will make
Iraq the most powerful state in the region. (Brogan, 1989,261). Saddam planned a pre-
war propaganda for both people and soldiers. In 1980, a couple of months ahead of the
war, Saddam Hussein visited Al-Mustansiriyya University in Baghdad and publicly
presenting a propaganda speech reminding his people of the Persian defeats in the
Early Islam era. He declared:
“In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we
tell those Persian cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the
spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-
Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their
attempts.” (Saddam Hussein Speech, Baghdad Voice, 1980,E2 E3).
Even though the Iraqis showed no diplomacy, and Saddam’s speech cleared that their
position from Khomeini will escalate into greater hostility, Khomeini refused to

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compromise. On the Iranian side, Khomeini insisted on motivating Muslims in the
Gulf region and in Lebanon to rise and take the Iranian revolution as an example, he
even talked about a unity in one Islamic State. (Hamid, 1981, 122). The political
discourse of both states continued to increase in hostility. In the Cold War Saddam
Hussein’s weaponry was mostly supplied by Czechoslovakia. His position towards the
USSR was not a total alliance like the Shah was with the US. In fact, the stereotypical
view of Khomeini toward Saddam is that he was far from Islam, describing him often
as the Puppet of Satan. (Mackey, 1996, 317). It is also important to understand the
limited Soviet influence on Iraq. As Francis Fukuyama described it, a weakness of
Soviet influence shaped the relation with Iraq. Fukuyama considered that the
weaponry support by the Soviets to Iraqis was not enough for the Soviet to influence
Saddam’s administration. (Fukuyama, 1980, 2-3). Saddam’s quest in Iraq was mostly
not related to a Soviet agenda in Iran. Events escalated rapidly in 1980, as in April of
that year twenty Ba’ath officials were assassinated by Shia’a militants. On April 1st,
an attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Tareq Azizi failed. The Minister of
Information Latif Nusseif al-Jasim also survived an assassination attempt by Shia’a
militants. (Karsh, 2002, 19). The war was an ultimate destiny for both states. Events
didn’t stop on assassination only, Iraq executed one of the prominent shia’a scholars
Mohamad Baqer al-Sader alongside his sister. The hatred between the two states could
wait no more as by the late 1980s Saddam’s forces had already launched attacks on
the Iranian borders. In 1991 the UN Secretary General report described Iraq’s actions
as the “starting of the war”. The report stated “Iraq’s aggression against Iran in
starting the war and breaching international security and peace.”(UN Report,
(S/23273), 1991).
Eventually in early 1980 and in a statement addressed to the Iraqi Parliament,
Saddam Hussein declared that:
“The frequent and blatant Iranian violations of Iraqi sovereignty...have
rendered the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void... This river...must have its
Iraqi-Arab identity restoredas it was throughout history in name and in reality
with all the disposal rights emanating from full sovereignty over the river”
(Karsh, 2002, 22).
The Iraqi invasion’s goals were far beyond a cultural and political hostility with Iran.
Iraq wanted to gain control over Shatt al-Arab waterway because of its strategic
geopolitical importance in the region. Iraq also targeted and aimed for annexation of
Khuzestan. And the most important goal was to limit and stop the spread of the
Islamic Shia’a revolution to Iraq and the region. The Iraqi forces initiated a surprise
airstrikes on Iranian air bases aiming to destroy the Iranian air forces

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completely.(Cruze, 1988). The invasion of Iran started on the 22nd of September 1980
by the Iraqi military forces.

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The American position in the War
After Saddam Hussein initiated the war on Iran the reaction of the US on this war
was monitored by both states. The US expected the war as Saddam Hussein was
known for this kind of decision making. In fact, Dilip Hiro in his description of
Hussein said that he was best motivated by fear, opportunism, and over confidence “a
mixture of defensive and offensive calculations...Iraq’s decision to resort to force was
a compound of preventive war, ambition, and punishment for a regional rival”(Hiro,
1989,39). Most scholars that analysed the war stated that Saddam Hussein represented
the aggressive side in the conflict between both states. Ahead of talking about the
American position in that war it is important to understand the history of the relation
between Iraq and the US until the revolution as discussed earlier. The relations
between Iraq and the United States were eradicated by the Iraqis in 1967, after the end
of the Six Days War. The diplomatic relations remained the same until November
1984.(US State Department, US-Iraq Rel). The American position as the war outbroke
between Iraq and Iran remained unclear during the conflict. The American policy
could be described as neutral in the beginning of the war. Despite this analysis,
documentations show that the US leaned towards the Iraqis in the early years of the
war. In March of 1981 the US State Department lifted a freeze that was applied on
Iraqi aircrafts. (Timmerman, 1991,80). The US leaned also to the political sector
towards Iraq as in 1982 it excluded the latter from its list of terrorist-sponsoringstate.
(Karsh, 1989, 80-81). It can be assumed that the American position and leaning
towards Iraq in the early years is due to the military success that Iraq achieved which
is politically realistic by virtue of its status as a powerful state in the region.
Moreover, and in the affidavit of Howard Teicher it was declassified that a National
Security Decision Directive was produced and authorized “whatever was necessary
and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran”. (Affidavit of Howard
Teicher, Case No 93-241). The United States clearly exposed a supportive position to
the Iraqis as in 1983 the US sent Donald Rumsfeld as a special presidential
representative to meet Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld proceeded to meet a number of
Iraqi officials including the Prime Minister Tariq Azizi and in Rumsfeld’s notes he
mentioned that “the US had no interest in an Iranian victory; to the contrary, we would
not want Iran’s influence expanded at the expanse of Iraq”(Rumsfeld’s personal
notes,1983). The United States provided Iraq with economic relief as well. Through a
food credits program the State Department supplied Iraq with a huge amount of cash.
The Program was not actually a food credit program, as Timmerman described it but,
“an elegant way of helping Baghdad without dipping into the State Department’s
foreign aid budget”(Timmerman, 1991, 126).

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The US support to Iraq, or at least sympathy for Iraq as I would put it was clear to
Iranians who were sighting the American reaction on this war. It is politically
justifiable for the United State to adopt a supportive position to Iraq for multiple
reasons. First, the Iraqis were winning the war in the early years as they went into
Iranian lands and showed no retreat concerning their plan. Second, Saddam Hussein
didn’t show any hostility towards the Americans and he wasn’t a full scale Soviet ally
despite the fact that his weaponry was mostly from communist states. Third and most
important, the American administration didn’t forget the hostage crisis in Iran. The
United Sates clearly saw Khomeini as a symbol of American hatred due to the way he
addressed his people in what concerns the United States, describing it consequently as
the greatest evil. So it was in the realistic benefit of the US in the early years to lean
towards Saddam Hussein, although Saddam’s actions were anti-democratic, the US
was the symbol of democracy at that time. The Iraq-Iran war had the United States to
take actions and not only in words against Iran, one core action was emplacing a strict
arm embargo on Iran (Operation Staunch) (Cordesman,1987,79). After the fall of the
Shah the US stopped weaponry supply for Iran. These factors played a major role in
putting the Iranian military forces in a great disadvantage at that time. Iran was
actually using black market’s weaponry for combat. Things didn’t turn better for Iran
in its relations with the US. On April 1983 the US embassy in Beirut was bombed.
This was the biggest abroad attack on the United States. More than 200 Americans
were killed. The US intelligence determined shortly after the attack that the
perpetrators of the incident had links to Iran.(Timmerman, 1991, 129). The Islamic
Resistance in Lebanon was responsible for this attack, a group founded by Iran
secretlyand then declassified and declared under the name of Hizbollah (Party of
God) in 1985. This incident escalated the American will to take revenge from Iran.
The United States launched a huge effort with the involvement of different sectors like
the CIA to support Iraq.(Timmerman, 1991, 130). The United States sustained its
support for Iraq at least the gamble for Iran not to win the war, hoping that if Saddam
won he will appreciate the American aid and support the American agenda against the
Soviets.

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The Iranian Army Fights back: Repelling Iraqis, the Chemical
weapon and shift of American position (1984)
In the early days of year 1984 the Iranian military forces or so called Revolutionary
Guards pushed back the Iraqi forces and proceeded to enter Iraqi territories. The rapid
change in balance in that year attracted the Cold War’s superpowers. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union calculated their moves with both Iraq and Iran according
to that war. But the biggest import to this war by the Iranian progress was the Iraqis
using and deploying Chemical Weapons. The US intelligence sector had information
dating back to 1979 such that Iraq was preparing chemical weapons to be produced
and used in warfare. An intercepted Iraqi message by the American intelligence in
1984 stated the following: “The invaders should know that for every harmful insect
there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq
possesses this annihilation insecticide.”. (US Cable from William Eagleton, Doc41).
This makes it doubtless regarding if the Iraqis were using any means necessary to
defeat the Iranians to which they were proudly announcing their usage of a chemical
weapon. The Superpowers of the Cold war eventually had no interest in the usage of
Chemical weapons more than their interest in the calculation of the war. Both the
Soviet Union and the United States had their interest in following the trajectoryof
winning. Reagan’s administration’s concerns were about Iran not to spread its
revolution’s influence to countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.(Tyler, 2002, New
York Times,8). The US attempted to politically aid Iraq in the crisis of using
Chemical weapons. The case should have been considered more seriously looking to
the fact that the United States itself went to war with Iraq in 2003 under the
motivation of looking for WMDs (Weapons Of Mass Destruction). Ironically things
escalated again towards the worst for Iran in their relation with the United States. In
June 1985 Hezbollah and Amal Movement hijacked TWA 847 in the hopes of
retaining Shia’a prisoners. Both movements were supported by Iran. Hezbollah a
movement mentioned before is directly linked to Iran. This group received training by
Iranian army in the early 1980s at camps in north Lebanon. The major aim of this
group was mainly to extend the Iranian power into the of the Mediterranean Sea.
Second aim was to create a threat for Israel’s north borders given the fact that South
Lebanon is mostly occupied by Shia’a population adopting the ideology of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. This incident created a chance for Iran to fix situations with
the United States. Iran declared its readiness to help in this situation, but the United
States refused to even acknowledge this proposal. Eventually Rafsanjani sent an
Iranian official and derived Hezbollah to release the kidnapped hostages. (Parsi, 2007,
115). Despite this attempt by the Iranians the hostility between the two states was not
resolved. The United States didn’t even give the least percentage of greetings or

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appreciation to Iran in resolving this incident. Iran was not stated in the official
documents about the incident that year. President Ronald Reagan in his speech
addressed the crisis of the TWA in 1985 and did not approach Iran, and didn’t even
mention Iran once in his speech. In fact this situation will not last for long. The United
States will eventually come across a common interest with the Iranian state. That
period of time was ruled by political realism. The United States was in a state of war
with the Soviet Union and had to calculate all its decisions depending on the outcomes
and interests. The case of Iran was slightly different as the country itself showed a
great hostility to the US, but despite this fact the United States' considerations were
always focused on the communist threat as the a priori danger. The scandal of Iran
Contra will clearly show how this analysis is justified.
Iraq usage of chemical weapons against Iran.

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The Iran-Contra Arms Transfer (1986-1987)
The Iran-Contra arms transfer is a turning point in both the trajectory of the war and
in the US-Iran relations. In addition, this scandal had its major impact on Iran’s
position in the Cold War. The misunderstanding in this incident is that it creates an
image of direct US weapon sales to Iran. In fact, the arms transfer was an operation of
a third-party deal. Israel is considered as the third party in this incident. It was an
agreement between Israel and a number of moderate Iranians which included several
conditions. President Ronald Reagan’s administration hesitated before accepting the
operation with scepticism. In his personal diary, Secretary Of Defence Weinberger
mentioned the plan stating: “I met with Collin Powell and Richard Armitage re: NSC
plan to let Israelis to give Iranians 50 HAWKS missiles and 330 TOWs missiles in
return of five hostages.”(Weinberger personal Diary, 1985, Doc 14). The Americans
were afraid of Iranian betrayal of the plan. The United States after years of hostility
with Iran is actually having a deal with its government. After the hostage crisis in
Carter’s era, America had no trust at all with the new administration of Iran. This
justifies the Americans stating in the Presidential Finding 1-17: “if all of the hostages
are not released after the first shipment of 1000 weapons, further transfers would
cease.”(Presidential Finding 1-17, 1985,Doc 13).
Iran-Contra was, or could have been a turning point in the US-Iran relations. The
Cold War had to be thought of by the United States as a main concern, thus leading
the latter to rethink about is hostility to the new Islamic Republic. Shimon Peres, the
Prime Minister of Israel at that time favoured improving the United States’ relation
with Iran. Peres tried to explain to Reagan the importance of reconsidering a broader
strategic relation with Iran.(Parsi, 2007, 1). Israel’s concerns are justified by its view.
The country was surrounded by Arab nations that refused its existence. The Israelis
thought about Iran as a gamble despite the Iranian hostile perception towards them as
well. The core motive of Israel to adopt this approach with Iran was to secure a
balance of power.(Karsh, 1989,156). The misconception of both the United States and
Israel goes back to the ambition of better relations after the war. Israel’s assumption
after the Iran-Contra plan was that if Iran won the war, Khomeini won’t forget the
helping hand that aided his victory. This gamble was inaccurate. The problem was that
both the United States and Israel and even the Soviet Union had no experience in
dealing with this kind of regimes. The Iranian administration constituted a new shape
of governance, a realistic power ruling a strong nation but with firm principles
accommodated with cultural beliefs. This plan’s costs were not easy on the United
States. Laurence Walsh a long time member of the Republican Party and the
independent counsel who handled the investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal in his

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final report concerning the case (Walsh,1994) argued that top officials of the Reagan
administration with the President himself and Vice-President Bush violated the Arms
Export Control Act. And what is even worse is that the United States violated the
Boland Amendment that prohibited the American Government to the Nicaraguan
contra-revolucionarios that were attempting to revolt and over throw the ruling power
that was linked to the USSR. The Nicaragua arrangement is the second initiative in the
Iran-Contra affair after the hostage initiative. It is still unclear whether the United
States officials assumed this plan or not. As mentioned before it was clear that Reagan
didn’t trust the Iranian administration at all. But, Koh argued that the United States
officials actually asserted the plan and at some points they did it illegally with
Reagan’s knowledge.(Koh,1988,1-2). Reagan’s administration was strict in its policy
with communism. The United States back then even provoked some communist states.
His presidency was a turning point of the Cold War, despite the noticeable dichotomy
in his policy. His view of Iran was a careful view in which he kept his sceptical
policy. The two essential motives of the United States to involve in the Iran-Contra
plan I would say were the hostage crisis in Lebanon, and the Nicaragua incidents. The
American policy or plan for Nicaragua supported Reagan’s firm policy with the Soviet
Union and communist states. The fear of re-stimulating the hostage crisis of Iran made
Reagan consider freeing the American hostages in Beirut with no harm a major
goal.(Mayer and McManus, 1988,90-108). The policy in Nicaragua was a case of fear
from Anti-American nationalism. The government in Nicaragua was not communist.
It was a nationalist regime, but it triggered the fear and concern of Reagan over Anti-
American ideologies spreading across Central America. This was a motive of the US
to support the Contras who planned to over throw the leftist and Anti-American
Sandinista Government.( Burns, Siracusa and Flanagan, n.d.1987, 29-39). Eventually
Reagan had to agree on the plan with Iran to serve his anti-communist agenda. Iran
was the second rival of the United States after the Soviet Union, and the relation
between the two states was not improved after the affair was reviewed from the
American administration to meet its struggle objectives in the Cold War.

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Conclusion:
Despite the fact that the complex yet interconnected factors of the Cold War had a
core influence on shaping or directing the trajectory of relations between the United
States and Iran, such a paradigm of international relations is different from other
foreign policies of the United States. The Islamic Revolution introduced the United
States to a totally different rivalry. This dissertation focused on analysing the United
States’ foreign policy with Iran in light of the major historical incidents that took place
between the two states. This relation shifted from a total alliance into total rivalry in
25 years. For example, the Mossadeq coup opened the gate of alliance between the
two states. Even in the three year period when the coup was applied, the United States
policy differed between administrations. Many scholars have queried if there was a
huge break between Truman and Eisenhower on the level of administration policy? It
is clear that the Eisenhower administration was more realistic and assertive as it was
committed to applying operation AJAX with the United Kingdom. Questions like
regarding the policy of the United States in both administrations towards Mossadeq
motivated by oil interests were increasingly difficult to ignore. In addition to questions
about the diverse implications of the Cold War on all parties, alongside the question of
the rising strategic importance of Iran. Throughout the first chapter different
assumptions have been discussed, inviting those who considered the coup as an
attempt by the United States to keep its oil interests to reconsider this analysis. The
creation of the alliance with the Shah allowed the United States to have the upper
hand on the southern gate to the Soviet Union. The regions extending from Iran to the
Arab Gulf and to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea were all guarded by Iran.
The Shah was viewed as the United States major ally in the region given the fact that
his power and influence exceeded that of Israel. The major common ground between
the administration of both Truman and Eisenhower is found in the respected policies
driven by the Cold War concerns. The importance of understanding the policy shift
during Mossadeq’s coup is due to the fact that it reflects the US perception of the Cold
War as well. Although the Iranian case was unique due to different factors especially
the cultural dimension as it uncovered the extent to which the Cold War influenced the
foreign policy of the United States. The balance of power played a key role in that era,
and even throughout the history of US-Iran relations. Ignoring this fact will lead to an
incomplete understanding of the Cold War particularly with regards to the highly
contested nature of the changing relations between the two states.
Despite the recent method employed between the two states concerning the nuclear
file, the relations between the United States and Iran continued to be unstable since
the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini and his supporters kept on motivating attacks

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against American facilities in the 1980s. The revolution was a shock to the United
States. The Iranians failed to show any readiness for diplomacy, as they showed little
interest in compromise even with the hostage crisis in Tehran. The American failure to
predict the revolution as mentioned in the second chapter clearly showed the lack of
serious account by the United States to the domestic politics in Iran. In addition, the
historical trajectory of the Cold War’s foreign relations is full of critical incidents and
events. However, the year 1979 can be marked as symbolizing the greatest shift in
economic and political exchange between the United States and one of its allies.
Khomeini’s success was not exclusively in his revolution but equally significant is his
influence as a revolutionary figure who changed the world by causing political defeat
against the strongest power in the world of his time. The leaders that followed him
looked up to him as the model of strong leadership. The United States participated in a
continuing embargo against Iran. Sanctions affected the Iranian economy and political
system. (US Treasury Department, Order 13553,1-2,5). Chapter two also highlighted
the American failure in the Islamic Revolution as a major platform in the Cold War.
The failure as mentioned is linked to four major factors; lack of resources, focusing on
external priorities, the analytical failure, and communication issues. In fact, the United
States was crushed by its extending unilateral responsibilities across the globe. The
American administration had to handle in addition to the revolution, the Vietnam War,
revolts in South America, and the continued threat that surrounded Israel. As a matter
of fact, the Cold War left the United States administration overwhelmed with
incidents across the world. Iran was conscious of such a position of the US and took
advantage of it. Khomeini knew that the United States won’t initiate a war against his
country after over throwing the Shah. This essay fleshed out how the United States'
allies had to shift their policy after the revolution as well. The United States made it
clear that its administration will not attempt any war for any ally reluctant to show
self-agency and self-effort inthe first place. This was described above as one of the
Shah’s weaknesses as he depended fully on the American administrative decision
making upon making a firm stance. The solid foreign policy of Iran against the United
States proceeded even after the conclusion of the Cold War. Iran will not recognize
Israel as a state, nor will it reveal substantial information concerning their nuclear
program, neither will it raise human rights standards. (US Treasury Department, Order
13553,1). This is the reason why president Obama applied sanctions on certain
individuals in Iran ahead of the nuclear agreement. (US Department of State,
Background Note: Iran).
The situation in which the Cold War considerations shaped the United States policy
with Iran was in the Iraq war againsy Iran in 1980. The third chapter revealed the
shifting trajectory of the United States throughout the war. Reagan’s policy with Iran

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was an example of extreme realism. The American administration supported Saddam
Hussein, or at least leaned to his side in the early years of the war. But when the
Iranians showed their ability to defend their lands while creating real danger to Iraqi
landscape, the United States then shifted its policy. The Iran-Contra with its twofold
motives, the hostage crisis in Lebanon, and supporting the Contras in Nicaragua is
also linked to the US administration analysis of the war. Reagan’s administration
approved two illegal covert operations in an affair later known as Iran-Contra.
Although Reagan’s step was illegal, but as Theodore Draper observes, “once the
diversion was discovered, it swept everything else aside. . . . Whatever else was wrong
with Reagan’s policy no longer mattered.”(Draper,1991,524). However, this argument
is drawn not to prove the legal aspects of the Iran-Contra or to examine whether
President Reagan was aware of its details. The core point here is that the United States
risked a lot to actually proceed with this affair. Supporting Iran was a prerequisite to
prevent the Soviet influence on Khomeini’s administration. The United States was far
from thinking of reaching an alliance with Khomeini, but preventing the Soviets from
creating a partial alliance with Islamic Iran was enough. Reagan’s policy eventually
succeeded in leading the Cold War to an end. Whether it was Reagan’s policy or the
Soviet Presidency Weakness, the Cold War ended and the history of it will keep Iran
as a key player on the dynamic stage of international relations. From 1953 till 1989
the relationship between the United States and Iran took shape, but not fully
completed by the Cold War factors since these factors will remain historically specific
to a particular context of international relations in the 20th century. The present
relations between the two states after the Cold War were always subject to negative
outcomes due to two primary factors; the first emergent from the consequences of the
political foreign policies as shaped by the cold war, and second, lies in the long lasting
rivalry caused by Khomeini’s firm policy and stance against the US and Israel. Things
recently have changed though. The common interests of both states after 2000 shifted
the pure hostile perspective towards each other. The recent nuclear agreement shows
that Iran’s policy towards the West in general is no more compromiseless. After all
Iran have entered world politics after the Iraq war as an example of a powerful state
with a firm government and leadership and today Iran’s realism is standing as a core
player in world politics especially in situations in the Middle East.

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