DIVERS ASSOCIATION UI 2015 Presentation, the complete package.

1. MYTH BUSTING SAFETY
ATTITUDES IN
COMMERCIAL DIVING
A PRESENTATION BY KYRA RICHTER IN ASSOCIATION WITH
THE DIVERS ASSOCIATION
FOR UNDERWATER INTERVENTION 2015
B

2. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
1
Whether you are or were a diver, or are running a business or working for one which employs or contracts divers, I am sure you
did not pick this job because you wanted an easy job.
You did not pick this job because you wanted to be part of an average. You knew it would be hard at times, you knew it would
present challenges and that you’d likely have to sacrifice a lot more than “the average Joe”.
But I certainly hope you did not pick this career because you wanted to be placed in unnecessarily risky situations, or because
you wanted to be the one putting people in unnecessary danger.
In the nuclear industry we often use the term “Special and Unique” to refer to our chosen field of work, but we are not the only
ones out there. It takes an uncommon personality to take on certain professions like commercial diving. To take on the jobs that
most people think you’d have to be crazy to do. There are plenty of “odd jobs” out there and plenty of “Top ten most dangerous
jobs” lists. But I find only two can be compared. And I will tell you why:
Though logging continues to rate as the number one most dangerous job, it’s not comparable to commercial diving. For starters
the rating, of course, is based on the fatalities which occur in one year and then a calculated fatality rate per 100,000 full time
equivalent workers. Note: the CDC gave logging a fatality rate of 73.7 deaths for 100K workers… tell me- what exactly is .7 dead?
In addition, logging statistics include more than just the loggers or “fallers”; they include supervisors and managers, drivers,
equipment operators and the wood tenders among others. That is like including every person in a commercial diving operation;
in which case I am sure our own statistics would take a leap as well. So let’s just stick to the guys I’m calling “A BREED APART”
and compare those.
How many astronauts are out in space right now?
Yes, there’s an app for that.
SLIDE 1
How many divers are underwater right now, do you think? Not just here in the gulf, but globally?
Definiteey a ayteaoteeaea niait. anni a ee,aeaeieaewtatccup titniiaa veatfteniabeeniactop e bye

3. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
2
A BREED APART
3600
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Total Divers
Underwater
Total Divers in US Total Divers to Date
Definitely
more than
66
43
547
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Total Astronauts in
Space
Total Astronauts in
US
Total Astronauts to
Date
SLIDE 2
Twta tffeeenieaytfeap eai,abueaniteaquteeaita tffeeenie anieetni ueactoeiafetoaeaeaGeeeka ni aoe niia
“Sp ceai tyte” anieetni ueia eeaoenia ni awtoeniatfao ni aiktyyi,a eeatfeeniaa veatnieaipect ye aTae a eea
niteajuiea“ aettfee”a( niteaeeaetpaeeniaotieaa z e tuiajtb) aTae a eeaictenietiei,aEnigtnieeei,ajeeaptytei a
Mucaaytkea agtt a tveeawtyya yitaa vea aouyeteu eatfaiktyyi,abueaa vea aipect ye afetoaeaeaoeca nitc ya
etaeaeaoe tc y
Tatugaaeae a eeabteaaatgay aipect ytze atccup ettniiawteaa aytotee aniuobeeatfapetpyeafetoa7bnia
wtey aptpuy ettni,aeaeieaewtaitoty eatccup ettniiabegtniaetaiatwa agy etniga tffeeenice aLeeaoeaiatwa
tuawa eateati:
Taea otunieatfaetoea ni aotnie apueatnietaeeie ecaapetjeceiaetabenieftea ieetni uei,aetaeniiueea ni a
ctniie niey atopetveaeaeteaae yeaa ni ai fee ati,aweyy,a ieetnitotc yactop ee aetaea eaipenieaieu tniga
ctooeect ya tveei aTaeeea eeao ni atni tvt u yiatueaeaeeea e tc ee aetaeaeaweyy-betnigatfa tveei aBuea
otiea eeaceee tniy aniteabetnigafuni e afteaeaeteawtek aa
Tatugaactooeect ya tvtnigaa iabenieftee afetoaotyte e aR&D,aweatfeeniaa veaetaw teaunietyateatia
ecy iitfte anni ,atveeaeaea e eiaeaeaotyte e aa ia tnieayeiia tvtniga ni aoteeaROVa ppytc ettnii,a ia
ctop ee aeta ec eiap ie aIeatiacye eaea eaeae awtyyaa veayeiia ni ayeiiatfa niatnicytni ettniaetactnietniuea
ctopye.aeeie eca

4. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
3
A BREED APART, INDEED
NASA and private industry
• Spend millions on current
research to improve
health and minimize risks
to astronauts.
• Ongoing Lifetime
Surveillance of Astronaut
Health (LSAH), to monitor
occupational related
injury and disease.
Instead, this is our history
• In 1972 the Norwegian
government sent two
highly trained naval
divers to professor Ruff in
Germany to establish
decompression tables for
the Norwegian oil
industry.
• The former Nazi scientist’s
experiments ended with
both being injured for life.
Disclaimer: Yes, we have concerned and dedicated doctors and a medical
community which continues to make great advances in diver health. But are they
as well funded?
SLIDE 3
Onieatfaeaeay ieapubytcy a v ty byeaieu teiatniactooeect ya tveeia ni atccup ettni ya tvtnigaf e yteteiaw ia tnieatnia
1998 a16a e eia gt
16
neaea eaetoeaOSHnaeieto ee aeaeaptpuy ettniatfactooeect ya tveeiaetabea btuea3000 aBueaIa ika tu:aHtwa
ctuy aeae aeieto eea aptpuy ettniatfapetfeiittni yiafteawatcaa niatccup ettnia t aniteae.tieatniaeaeteabttki?
16a e eia gtaeaeaCDC,abteetwtnigaeaeieaniuobeeia ni af e yte aeecte iafetoaOSHnaeaeniapubytiae aeaeteatwnia
ieu ai tniga tveeia e eaae eeaw ia40Xaea eatfaeaeani ettni ya vee ge
Iniaeueni,aOSHnatiiue a atnieap geaNOWanRCHIVEDa tcuoenieaie etnigaea eaeae aniee e aetapettetetzeaeeguy ettnia
topetveoeniea ni aenifteceoenieatniaCtooeect yaDtvtnig
Inia1998aNnSna yitapeefteoe a aieu atfaeaeaeffeceiatfactiotcae t ettniatnia ieetni ueia ni aeaeteaetikatfa
c niceeaotee yte aTae aup ee atea2000a ni aeaenia g tniatnia2011
Inia2005aeae a t a ac e t caae yeaaieu ae tytee aeta ieetni uei
Inia2005aeae a t aBea vtte yaae yeaaieu teia yitae tytee aetanieetni ueia( tuaknitw,aeae aipeni a ayteatfaetoea
cttpe aupatniaetni apeeiiuetze ac piuyei-aituni af otyt e?)
Inia2013aeae aieu te aeaeaeffeceiatfaee uce age vte atniaouicyeao iia ni abtniea eniite
nni aeae aa veawa eatiac yye aeaeaLtfeetoeaSuevetyy niceatfanieetni ueaHe yeaa(LSnH),aetaotniteteaftea
tccup ettni yaeey ee atnijue a ni a tie ie
Yei,awea taa vea e tc ee a tceteia ni ae.peetenice atni tvt u yia ttnigatnigttnigaieu teiatniaeaeaeffeceiatfa
a peeb etcactni tettniiatnia tveei aBueaeatiatiaitoeatfatueaatiete :
Inia1972aeaeaNtewegt niagtveenioenieaw niee aetageea ae atfaeaeattya ni ag iabtto,aeae aw niee aetacee eea
eaeteatwnia tveae byeiaeae aw niee aeatiaqutcky a ni acae py aitaeae abeg niawtektnigawteaa agetupatfaictenietieia

5. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
4
ye ab aPetfeiiteaStegfete aRuff aTaeaNtewegt niagtveenioenieaienieaewtaatgay aee tnie ani v a tveeiaeta
wtekawteaaato aTae aeni e aupatnijuee afteaytfe aPetfeiiteaRuffaw ia afteoeeaN ztaictenietieawataa a
o eaotieatfaatiapeeiiueeae.peetoenieia eaD ca u a
Ieae keiaotnie aeta tapetpeea ni aeeatc yaeeie eca,a tu’aotgaeai a
Stayee’iae ykaotnie :
TaeaNnSnabu gee,aftea2015atiaoteeaea niaeaeabu geeafteaee niiptee ettniatfa14BNa ea18 1BN,abueatea
p yeiatniactop etitniaetaeaeaftyytwtnigae. opyei:
IniaNtew ,aeaeagtveenioenieapetvt eiaiubit teiafteattya ni ag iae.pyte ettniawatcaaeefuni aupaeta78%atfa
ctieiaetactop nitei aIniveieoenieiatniaOtya ni aG iatnia2014aweeea btuea28 7BNaDtyy ei aIniaeaeaUSaeaea
e.peni teueeaftea2013-2017awtyyabea etuni a106BNaftea eepaw eeea eveytpoenieia ytnie a
2013aw ia aeecte aipeni tniga e eawteaa678Btyyttniaptuni i a160BNatfateaw iaUKatniveieoenieatniatffiateea
wtni
Dteiateaniee aetabeaie ee aea eaeaeao jtete atfactooeect ya tveeiawtekafteaeaeattya ni ag iatni uiee ,a
ni anitwatffiateeawtni …a ni anitatnieatiatnieeeeiee atniaeaeaae yeaa ni ai fee atfaeaeieagu i?
PAR·A·DIGM SHIFT
NOUN
A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN
APPROACH OR UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS.
SLIDE 4
Iai ateatiaetoeaftea ap e tgoaiatfe aIe’iaetoeaetaie eeaeatniktniga btueatopetvtnigaeaeai fee atfaeaea
petpyeawata taitoeatfaeaeaa e eieawtekatniaitoeatfaeaeaotieaa z e tuiaenivtetnioenieiafteaitoeatfa
eaeaotieapetfte byeactop niteiatniaeaeawtey
Iabeyteveatnieatfaeaeao tniaee itniiawe’veabeeniaiytwaetao keaeatiaiatfeatiabec uieaweaee ty a ccepeatea
eveniabeyteveaitoeab itcao eai aI’oaaeeeaetae yka btuea5atfaeaeo

6. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
5
Fteieayeeaoeaeeyya tuawa eaIa t aIacee ee a avee ab itc,avee aitopyea15aqueiettniaiueve aIaw niee afteauiaetaa vea
aie eetnigapttnie;aetaieeatfaweaweeeaettaf eatffafetoawa ea tveeiatueaeaeeeaeatnik ania tuaknitw,aeaeaDnaa ia
beeniavee avtc ya ni a cetveatniaeaeapuiaafteabeeeeeaeeguy ettni,afteatopetve a cctunie btyte ,a ni ae uc ettni aa
Ytuactuy ai aea eaeaeaDnatiaotiey ao eaupatfa abunicaatfaty ageuop agu i-a ni awa eawtuy aweaknitwa
btueawa ea tveeiaw niea ni aeatnik?aaOueagt yatia yitaetatopetveai fee a ni actoounitc ettniiawteaa tveeia yya
etuni aeaeawtey anfeeea yy,a150afeeeatfaw eeeaaeeeatiaeaeai oea ia150afeeeatfaw eeeatffaeaeact ieatfanfetc aa
Iaia ee aeatiaiueve atniaEnigytiaa ni atniaSp nitia,atnia yyaeaeaitct yaoe t aca ninieyiaptiitbye aF ceBttk,afteuoi,a
Twteeee,aIaeo tye ateaetaicattyi,afeteni i,actop nitei,aicattyi;aeaeaDnaptiee atea ni ao eaiueeateaeeiaeeptiee a
te
Iaeecetve a aete yatfa462aeeiptniieiafteaeatiapeeienie ettniabueaeta eeaweaa veaeecetve atveea500aeeiptniiei a
357aeepyteiatniaEnigytiaa ni a105atniaSp nitia aTaea niiweeiac oeafetoa yya etuni aeaeawtey ,aUS,aMe.tct,aStueaa
noeetc ,anuiee yt ,aOce nit ,anit ,anfetc ,aEuetpe
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#1& #2
• We’ve reduced diving fatalities to near zero.
• “Diving is inherently dangerous.”
SLIDEa5
Heeea eeaewtawatcaa teecey actniee tceae caateaeea eeaweaa vea yyaae e atnieateabteaabeftee aIaiupptieatea yya
epeni iatniaatwa tuayttka eate aaOea teiate?
Stayee’iaie eeab ae ktniga abeeeeeayttka ea“We’veaee uce af e yteteiaetanie eazeet ”
Tatiatiawa eateayttkiaytkeafteaeaeap iea14a e ei aI’ aytveaetaknitwatfa ni tnieaa iat e ia iaetawa ,a feeeaitao ni a
e ei,awe’ aietyyaa veaiucaa niaupw e aeeeni atniaeaea21
ie
acenieue ,ateaeveniaoteeatnieeeeietnig,awa eac uie aeaea
ieeepa etpatniaeaeay ieaewta e ei?aTatugaateati,atni ee a av ieatopetveoenie,aeatiatianite,anie eazeet aTeyyaea eaeta
eaeaf otyteiatfaeaeieagu i
Ntee:awe’eea btueaetaie eeageeetnigatnietaeaeaeatckatfaeatia ni a tuawtyyaieea ayteatfaniuobeei aStoeatfaeaeiea eea
niteae. ceatniaea eaeae ao abeaotee-abueanieveeayeii aIatnicyu eaaeeeatniy awa eaIac niav yt ee

7. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
6
GLOBAL FATALITIES*
21
17
12
15
17
20 21
27
33
27
44
58
46
12
13
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Looking good, but still nowhere “near zero”.
* These numbers are still NOT accurate but every fatality counted here has been
verified. Ex: The forum in the DA had the 2013 fatalities at 36, 2012 at 63 and 2011
with 74.
SLIDEa6
WE’VE REDUCED FATALITIES TO NEAR
ZERO
Offshore Fatalities Inland/Inshore
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0
1
2
3
4
5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OSHA
DA
SLIDE 7
Wa ea tuajuieai watniaiyt ea6aw iagytb yaniuobeei aTaeiea eeafteaeaeaUS aaTatiatianiteanie eazeet anni a
eaea tip ete abeeweeniatffiateea ni atniy ni /tniiateeaf e yteteiatiatbvttui aniatiaeaeatnieabeeweenia
OSHn’ia e a ni atuei aaniagtt a iateao ayttk-aeatnika btuea2007-awteaa aete yatfa10af e yteteiaaeee-a
eaeaUSaw iaeeiptniitbyeaftea37%atfaeaea2007af e ytetei!a

8. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
7
IS THIS THE TREND OF A STRONG
SAFETY CULTURE?
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
YES NO SKIPPED
HAVE YOU LOST A COWORKER OR FRIEND ?
SLIDE 8
Ia ike a aitopyeabueaa e aqueiettni a“H vea tuaeveeaytiea actwtekeeateafeteni aeta actooeect ya tvtniga
cct enie ”aIaknitwaIaa ve aTaea niiweeaaeeeafueeaeea etveiaeaeapttnieaea eawea eeaniteanitwaeeeanie eazeet a152a
petpyea niiweee aYES a(Ntee,a iatfaeaea aweao eaeatiapeeienie ettni,aweanitee aea eaeaeapeecenieatfaeatiea
wata niiweee a eiaa anitwajuope aeta82%!)
FOR EVERY FATALITY, HOW MANY MORE
UNREPORTED INJURIES OR NEAR MISSES?
SLIDE 9
Bueaeatiatiajuieaeaeaetpatfaeaeatcebeeg aWeaknitwaea eateatiavee a tfftcuyeaetapetpeey aee cka ni ageea nia ccue eea
niuobeeafteaf e ytetei aHtwaoucaaoteea tfftcuyeatiateaetaeieto eeatnijueteia ni anie eaotiiei?a

9. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
8
Oniceatfaeaeagt yiatfaeaeaDnatiaetacee eea a e b ieatfatpee etnigae.peetenicea ni ayeiitniiaye enie a
watcaac niabea cceiie ab a ni tniea feeea yy,a iatnieaeeiptni enieai t a“Weaa veaniteaa a ni aniewa
cct enieiatniaewenie a e ei,aweatniy akeepaeepe etnigaeaeai oeaotie kei” a
Stao bea tua eeaeteaeeatnia geeeoenieaea eawe’eeaniteanie eazeet-atea tua eeatniaeaea“Dtvtnigatia
tniaeeeniey a nigeetui”ait eatfaeaeafenice
DIVING IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
YES NO SKIPPED
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN OR WITNESSED AN
ACCIDENT?
SLIDE 10
Fteaeati,aweafteiea ike a aitopyeaqueiettni:a“H vea tuaeveeabeeniatniateawtenieiie a ni a cct enie ”aOfa
watcaaeaeaeeiptniieatiaaeee aTati,atnicea g tniaeeotni iauiaea eawea eea aytnigaw a w afetoa“nie ea
zeet” aBuea yitabegiaeaeaqueiettniatiaeatieatniaeaeaftey apeea pia ccepeatea iap eafteaeaeactueieawaeniatea
ctoeiaetaeaeteacatieniac eeee aIa tni’eaknitwa btuea tu,abueaIaa veaae e aeaea“Taeee’ianiteatniga tuac nia
taetaietpaitoeaeatnigiafetoaa ppenitnig ”
Iawtekatniaeaeaniucye eatni uiee a ni atnieatfatueapetnictpyeiatia“ncct enieia ni aauo niaeeeteaevenieia eea
peevenie bye” aIfa tua tni’eawatyeaae eee y abeyteveaeatia ni awtekawteaaeatiapetnictpyeatniaotni a tuac nia
e.pecea avee aiateeac eeeeatnianiucye e
Staeaeanie.eaqueiettniaIa ike aw ia“Ifa ei,actuy ateaa veabeeniae ity apeeveniee ?”a

10. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
9
COULD IT HAVE BEEN EASILY
PREVENTED?
SLIDE 11
IS THIS THE TREND OF A STRONG
SAFETY CULTURE ?
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
YES NO NO* SKIPPED
COULD IT HAVE BEEN EASILY
PREVENTED?
SLIDE 12
Taeagu iatniaeaeaftey ,aeaea tveeiawata niiweee aeati?aTae ao jtete abeyteveaea ea“YES”ateactuy aa veabeenia
peeveniee aWeaa veaetaeaenia iiuoeaea eaeaeao jtete atfaeaeagu iatueaeaeeeagtaetawtekawtyytniga ni aw nietniga
eta tawa eateae keiaetapeevenieaeaeoafetoatnijuetnigateaktyytnigaeaeoieyveiatea actwtekee
Nteeaeaeanitawteaa nia ieeetik aTa eaeepeeienieiaeaeatnieiawata niiweee a“Nt abec uiea tvtnigatiatniaeeeniey a
nigeetuia ni aeaeaetikatiawa aIaytkeao ajtb ”aSta tuaknitwaea eaeaeeea eea ppet.to eey a13actwbt iatuea
eaeeea tuaniee aetaw ecaatueafte!a

11. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
10
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#3
• It’s always the diver’s fault.
SUPERVISOR
22%
DIVER
21%
CONTRACTOR
14%
OTHER
7%
CLIENT
4%
SKIPPED
32%
SLIDE 13
Sta a tveeageeiaaueeateaktyye aIa tni’eaknitwa btuea tuabueaIaa veaee af eaettao ni atnict enieaeepteeia
watcaapttnieaityey aetaeaea tveea iaeaeatniy aeeiptniitbyeap ee aTaeeeatia ayteatfa eb eea btueawatatia
eeiptniitbyeatniceaeaea cct enieaa iaa ppenie aIaa a aetugaaetoeawteaaeaeaeeiuyeiaetaeaeaqueiettniaIa
ptie :
“Inia tueatptnittni,awataw iaotiea cctunie byeatniaeaea cct enie?”aI e yy a yyaeatieawata niiweee a eiaeta
wtenieiitniga niatnict enieateaytitniga afeteni aiatuy aa veaa a aeeiptniieaetaeati,abuea ayteatfapetpyea
iktppe aeatiafteaitoeaee itni a
Tatugaaeaea niiweeaietyyaiuppteeiaeaeatptnittniaea eaeaea tveeateaiupeevtiteatiauiu yy aotiey aetaby oe,a
eaeeeaw ia aieetnigaiuppteeaftea cctunie btyte atfaeaeactniee cetea ni acyteniea iaweyy anni aeatiatia aetugaa
queiettni,abec uieaIakepeateaitopyeaita t aniteaa veawetgaee a niiweeiawaeeeaweactuy a iitgniap eeatfa
eaeaby oeaetatniea ni ap eeaeta niteaeea ia tuawtyyaieeatnia niteaeeaqueiettniaiateey anni aIa oteaIaw ia
eaf uyeaaeeeabec uieawea yyaknitwaea eatnia nia cct enieateaevenieajuieaytkeaeaeeea eea yw ia afewa
ctnieetbuetnigac uiei,aeaeeea eea yita actobtni ettniatfapetpyeawatac niabea cctunie bye,a ni aeaea
ctooenieiaiecettni,aia ee avee aptweefuya ni actopeyytnigae. opyeiatfa cct enieiawatcaacye ey a
eotniiee eea actobtni ettniatfaf cetei a
Taeaeeueaatiawaenia nia cct enieatccueiaeaeeeatiauiu yy anitatnieaitnigyeaeyeoenieawatcaac niabeaityey a
by oe anni aeatiage paa eotniiee eeiaea e,a iaoucaa iawea taeeni aetai a“teaw iaeaea tvee’iaf uye”,atea
tiauiu yy a actobtni ettniatfaewtateaotee aNtee auni eeateaeeaweeeaequtpoenieaf tyueei,a ni a a
eeituni tnigacetetqueatniaptteactoounitc ettni a

12. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
11
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#4
Accidents mostly happen to young, untrained,
inexperienced divers.
SLIDE 14
Taeaqueiettniatfaee tnitniga ni ae.peetenicea yitactoeiaupa ayte aaWea eeiie aeatia“o ea”awteaaitoeab itca
eotge patc yaqueiettnii
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#4
Accidents mostly happen to young divers.
A random sample (40)of
(251)fatalities from 2002-
2014 yielded an average
age of 37.
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
21-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ SKIPPED
WHAT IS YOUR AGE RANGE?
SLIDE 15
Nteeaea eaweaa veaitoty eteteiabeeweeniaeaea geatfaeeiptni enieia ni aeaea geatfaotieaf e ytetei aFteaeatia
vee ge,aIaettka ae ni toai opyeatfaeaea geiatfa40atueatfa251agytb yaf e ytetei aTaeaoe nia geafteaf e yteteia
w ia37 aTaeaoe nia geatfaeatieawata niiweee aeaeaiueve aw ia43

13. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
12
TRAINING
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
YES NO SKIPPED
DID YOU ATTEND A DIVE SCHOOL?
SLIDE 16
nike atfaeae a eeeni e a a tveaicattyaeaea niiweeaw ia yitaptitetvey a ei
Bueajuieaknitwtnigaeae awenieaetaicattyatini’eaenituga aWea taeeni aetaoeniettniay ckatfaee tnitnigatfeeniatnia
ticuiittniatfaeveniei aneea tveeiaeveniagttnigaetapetpeeaicattyia ni aeecetvtnigapetpeeaee tnitnig?
TRAINING
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
YES NO OTHER SKIPPED
COMMERCIAL DIVING ACCREDITATION
SLIDE 17
nccte tnigaetaeati,a ei aTaeaicattyiaa veaitoeaiteeatfab cktniga ni aeectgnitettniafetoaanDCI,aIMCn,a
nDnS,aHSE,aDCBCa otnigateaeei a

14. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
13
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
25% of these
are Military
trained.
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
YES NO SKIPPED
DID YOU HAVE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE?
SLIDE 18
nni aniteeaea ea ayteatfaeaeateaeeia ni anitiafetoaeaeapeevttuiaiyt eaweeeaNnVY,aROYnLaNnVYa ni aotyte e a
tveei,aitaeae aietyyaeecetve aee tnitniga ni aa apeevttuiae.peetenice aania t ao ni ateaeeaeeiptni enieiawataa a
e.peetenicea iaeeni eeia ni a ppeenietceiafteae. opye,atniac ieao ni atfa tuaietyya tni’eaeatnikaSCUBnae.peetenicea
ctunieia iapeevttuiae.peetenicea
EXPERIENCE
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
1-5 5-8 8-10 10-15 20+ SKIPPED
YEARS
How long have you been a diver?
SLIDE 19
Inieeeeietnigy ,aeaeao jtete atfaeaeaeeiptni enieiaa vea ayteatfae.peetenicea iactooeect ya tveei aaIniaeatiac ie,aIa
w iavee aa pp aetaieeaea eaweaietyyagtea ayteatfa niiweeiafetoaeaeanieweeagu i aI’ aytkeaetaeatnikaea eaeatieawat

15. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
14
aettkaeaeaetoeaeta niiweeaeatiaiueve awtuy a yitabeaoteeaytkey aetaipe kaupawaeniaeae aieeaitoeeatniga
niteabetniga tnieaetgae a
EXPERIENCE VS. TRAINING
SLIDE 20
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#5
The last thing Divers want is more regulations.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Main cause Contributed
strongly
Partly the
cause
Did not
contribute at
all
Did not
matter
All Regions
Lack of Training
Lack of Experience
Lack of Supervision
Poor Safety
Poor Regulations
“#1 problem in Commercial Diving: weak regulations with no enforcement.
#2, Poor communications skill throughout the industry.”
SLIDE 21
Ntwafteatnieatfaeaeaotieatoptee nieaqueiettnii aIatfeeniaae ea eb eeia btueaeeguy ettni aIaa veaae e a
ni aee atptnittniapteceiawatcaai aea eaeaeay ieaeatnigaweaniee atiaoteeaeeguy ettni aIaee yy awtni eee a
tfaotieapetpyeafeeyaeatiaw a

16. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
15
Iafteatniea oanitea af niatfa ueatete aIa tni’eaee yy aytkeabetnigactniiee tnie ateawtektnigatnia aiufftc etniga
enivtetnioenie,a ni aIa tni’eaoe niauni eew eee aTatugaaIawtekatniaeaeaniucye eatni uiee ,aIafeeyaeaeaeeguy ettnii,a
petce ueeia ni apetceiieiaIawtekab a eeaeiieniet yafteactniitieenic ,afteactnietniute atfapetceiieia ni aqu yte a
wteka ni afteaee ce btyte atfa ee iafteatopetveoenie aStatniaeeg e aetaeaeaqueiettniatfaeaeawtenieiie a cct enie,aIa
ike awa eaeaeao tnia ni actnieetbuetnigac uieiawaeeea ni awatcaa t aniteaa veaeeyev nice
Taea niiweeiaweeeavee atnieeeeietnig aIaeni e aupaa vtnigaetacee eea niatni tvt u yage paafteaeaea niiweeiawatcaa
c oeatniaSp nitiaafetoaeaeaEU aBueaFteieaeaeagytb yaiueve
Taeaeeituni tnigao tniac uieaw iaptteai fee aSeetnigy actnieetbuetnigaw iay ckatfaiupeevtittni anap eet yac uiea
w iay ckatfae.peetenice aInieeeeietnigy ,aee tnitniga ni aeeguy ettnia t aniteaeveniaenieeeaeaeaptceueeafteaeaeiea
eeiptni eei a
(Ntee,atniaeaeaftyytwtnigage paiaeaea1-5a tuaieeatia ia niae i avtiu yaeefeeenicea iawaenia ike a“Onia aic yeafetoa
1-5awteaa5abetnigaotieatoptee niea ni a1abetnigaye ieatoptee nie”)
5 MYTHS THE INDUSTRY BELIEVES
ABOUT ITSELF
#5
The last thing Divers want is more regulations.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Main cause Contributed
strongly
Partly the cause Did not
contribute at all
Did not matter
EU RESULTS
Lack of Training
Lack of Experience
Lack of Supervision
Poor Safety
Poor Regulations
SLIDEa22
Bec uieaeaeatnieenieatfaeaeaDtveeianiitct ettniatiaetatnicyu eactooeect ya tvtniga etuni aeaeawtey ,aeaeiea
eeiptniieiafetoa aeegttniateaeeaea niaeaeaSe eeia eeatoptee nieaenitugaaeta eieevea eeeniettni
IniaEUaeaea niiweeiaweeea tffeeenie aSupeevtittnia ni aS fee aweeeaete a iaeaeao tniac uie abueaTaeaieetniga
ctnieetbueteaw iaptteaeeguy ettnii aL ckatfaee tnitnigaw iaeteaeea ap eet yac uieateatea t aniteao eeeeaL ckatfa
e.peetenicea t aniteao kea a tffeeenice

17. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
16
SUPERVISION AND SAFETY
* Except Spanish speaking EU
0
1
2
3
4
5
5 Main cause
4 Contributed strongly
3 Partly the cause
2 Did not contribute
at all
1 Did not matter
0
1
2
3
4
5
5 Main cause
4 Contributed strongly
3 Partly the cause
2 Did not contribute
at all
1 Did not matter
All Regions*
Spanish Speaking EU
SLIDE 23
OUR GOALS
1.Regulation
2.Education
3.Communication
SLIDE 24
Peea piaeatiatiawaeeeaweaniee aetaftcuiatueaeffteei aBueaeatia teiatnicyu eaee tnitnig aTe tnitniga
Supeevtitei,aDtveei,aCytenieia ni aCtniee ceteiaetapetvt ea ai feawtekaenivtetnioenieaftea tvtnig aTe tnitniga
eatieatniaeaeatni uiee aeta taeaeaetgaeaeatnig,aetaknitwai fee aeeguy ettniia ni aftyytwaeaeo,abec uieatea
tini’eaea eawea tni’eaniee aoteeaeeguy ettniate’iaea ea yyaeaeaeeguy ettniaeevtittniia ni aup eeiawtni’ea
o eeeeatfapetpyea eeaniteatnifteoe atfaeaeo,aee tnie aetaknitwaeaeoa ni aftyytwaeaeo anni aea eatnivtyveia
niteatniy aee tnitnig,abueactoounitc ettni a

18. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
17
TIME TO BREAK THE PARADIGM!
The most dangerous phrase in the language: “We’ve
always done it this way.” Rear Admiral Grace Hopper
SLIDE 25
THANK YOU
KYRA RICHTER, BOARD MEMBER, DIVERS ASSOCIATION
PARTNER, NEDCON INTERNATIONAL
SLIDE 26

19. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
18
Commercial Diving Safety Survey
Comments from respondents
#1 problem in Commercial Diving: weak regulations with no enforcement. #2 Poor communications skill
throughout the industry.
There is always room for improvement where safety is concerned, we have had close calls but
thankfully no Fatalities.
We need minimum 4 man teams on all dive sites in the US. Please, please, please.
North sea incident diver died coming back to bell after reporting breathing difficulties. Old tired
system/bell that was too small/inadequate. Lack of proper fitting neck damns and lack of saturation
experience all contributing factors. Although safety culture was present, major and basic safety factors
were overlooked with: 'that's the way it’s always been done' attitude from management.
Contractors have concealed incidents, often with the clients’ assistance. This practice appears to allow
them to celebrate longer periods without lost time incidents. This appears on their Corporate Resume to
their benefit.
The incident was why I became a commercial diving instructor so that no one else would make the
same mistakes.
Regardless of the fact that this particular accident was not related to regulations, 1910 subpar To is so
narrowly focused and unhelpful to real issues requiring guidance it is almost laughable
Sometimes I believe you can have so many safety rules, it makes the job impossible or more
dangerous.
Before commencing operation dive, always carry out risk assessment or job safety analysis as a
mandatory in details and specific as a prevent from injury, incident or accident.
Diving safety is still of no priority to most contractors, clients or divers. What are regulations for if
following them is an option, but not a must? Example IMCA. Incompetent supervisors, superintendents,
and clients seems to be normal. The lowest bidder gets the job; the result is death and injuries.
There is a lot of "brave" behavior amongst divers. Besides, dive supervisors rarely interfere if they see
anything wrong or that could get wrong. Or maybe they just don't see?
The closest I've come was a diver that panicked and we brought him up, all was good. Most of my
diving is in Canada working for reputable companies and feel quite safe in how operations are done. If
only it was like this everywhere.
Too much rests on the supervisor. Even project related issues not directly under his control. While the
client who is generally a sub, sub, sub-contractor is bullet proof and easily removed from
accountability.
I think a lot of accidents happen because for the lack of experience of the dive personnel, improper
planning and pressure from dive companies to finish the job.
Here is no international authority to report incidents to, the falling oil price will increase pressure on
contractors to cut corners.
Accident was a failure of third party. Failure of pillar valve.
The boss decided to go in, he got bent, he didn't need to go in, it was all very silly, but he paid the price
for thinking we're rubbish!
Three of the incidents were working on SCUBA back in the day when this was permitted.

20. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
19
The main contributing factor was the yard hired sport divers. The victim had convinced the yard that he
was a "master" diver. Due to the yard being near a Navy base, it was assumed that the victim was a
Navy Master Diver. The truth is that he was a PADI divemaster. He selected to dive in a Desco "jack
brown" facemask with no comms. He could not find his weight belt so he had his tender place him in an
old Mark V weight belt that requires someone to don for the diver. The cradle rolled back and cut his
airhose/lifeline and without comms, he stood in 7 feet of water and drowned because he could not get
himself out of the weightbelt.
Myself due to following procedures and strong work ethics also very thankful for excellent training and
Instructors I have never had an incident or my teams. However our trade needs strong control from
someone like HSE but a separate organization with legislative powers and enforcement etc. but
managed by Diving experienced professionals.
ADC dive supervisors are considered capable since they study and pass a written test. But the younger
dive sups are supervising because they don't want to be in the water. Their knowledge is limiting and
they don't really have enough in water experience to know if that junior diver is in a bad spot, since they
never dove enough. I actually had a Sat supervisor ask me how long a joint of pipe was while I was
walking pipe. I had plenty of experience, so he was never a factor in my safety. I know the magic word
to safely, "NO". But it would seem pretty clear that inept supervisors and the lack of tenders being able
to get in the water to have some real experience is a contributor to unsafe conditions.
Most accidents are caused by not following the plan.
We need to do more to recognize that divers (especially inshore divers) will not reach the pensionable
age of 67. Offshore divers are not the only divers with high (work or diving) pressures on their bodies,
This is a pretty basic questionnaire of questionable value. Lack of training? Really? You allow people to
work for you that have not been properly trained and assessed? I would also take issue with the "Diving
is inherently dangerous etc." First of all if done properly Diving is not inherently dangerous and second
of all anyone who answers that question should not be part of a dive team.
I have seen more than a few accidents and one death. In most cases it was always the contractor or
client putting money or time constraint on the workers to get the job done over following safety
protocols.
In this incident; the diver had little experience; but personal physical underlying health issues that had
not been picked up during his Dive Medical gave rise to the event. Therefore I can't even justify saying
that it was mainly the diver that was responsible. All systems was in place and all regulations well
adhered to. This in the end was what saved his life.
Your reliant so much on supervisors in this business...it never cease to amaze me that if he can't be a
good tender let's make him a diver if he can't dive let's make him a supervisor and when he can't
supervise let make him a project manager or operations manager.
The diving industry has developed new techniques and practices for various tasks and associated
rigors of diving, some being good and some have been taken to far. Proper training, standards, policies
and task check off lists are necessary control measures to mitigate and communicate the risks.
in short , every dive is different with what you did in past. what more important is to avoid any incident
is communication & understanding of job by both diver & supervisor and follow mutually agreed
procedure as per situation on site. not the cut copy paste method statement written in office.
Need rigorous training to become a commercial diver.
It's time the diving community as a whole took back our craft from big business.
survey fails to allow for poor communication as a cause. Poor communication is in my opinion the most
frequent cause.
SINCE THE RISK ASSESSMENT STARTED COMMERCIAL DIVING ACCIDENTS ARE ALMOST
CONTROLLED
We have not had a new' diving accident in 30 years, we just keep repeating the same mistakes.
The only safety issue with diving in the gulf is mother nature and Dive Company Management. I can
control the Cheap Diver or friend of whomever as much as I can control a manta ray or rogue wave.
Safety cost (life or money) Their chose not mine. So I say to the penny pinchers 30-50k extra or

21. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
20
whatever it cost for the right man. Or pay with the wrong man life and millions in law suit and your
company losing business.
So many times saftey goes out the window when deadlines have to be met or a job is hard bid and we
get behind. Yes ultimately anyone can call an all stop but it's my belief many guys are scared of the
backlash that would cause their careers.
I start my career as a freediver collector on the fishing industry and them I jump to surface supplied on
huka system, every diver has their own gear at the time. That kind of diving was safer than more
companies now at days, as they have the appropriate gear but they don´t know how or they don´t want
to use it.
A friend was killed in a trench collapse.
In 1981, when this fatality occurred, the same regulations that are mostly still in place today were not
generally known and enforcement was nonexistent (in the port of L.A. and L.B. CA). But no amount of
regulation would have prevented the death.
I have been lucky in not witnessing any real accident, but I have seen and been involved I plenty of near
misses, most due to lack of experience, but some due to supervisor, contractor and also crane operator
The diver is the Job-Boss, and if he isn't, he'd better think like he is. All the accidents I've seen, are
Diver Fault.... not keeping the entire scene under scrutiny. I look at everyone, guy mixing gas smoking a
cigarette, the tender who's been assigned to me, the vessel, the skipper, the condition of the gear, from
fuel, compressor, air lines, all of it. If you don't... it's your fault.
IMCA needs to accept ADCI, just like ADCI recognizes IMCA, furthermore there are far too many no
skilled "divers" working in the industry, especially here in Florida, lastly the cheapest bid is not the
right way, clients and contractors are making big bucks on the backs of those in the water when in fact
those folks in power have no idea what it takes to do the job let alone the risks.
In 30+ years as a commercial diver I have witnessed far too many accidents and even a number of
diving fatalities. In my humble opinion, the main causes of the accidents that resulted in fatalities that I
know about has been due to completely overriding, overlooking or ignoring proper safety measures by
the contractor or client and also the lack of proper supervision and planning for the dives that
unfortunately ended in death to the divers.
Ignoring safety measures and a lack of safety measures in place before, during and after the dives has
been the direct cause of the diver fatalities in the cases I can think of. It had nothing to do with the
diver's lack of training or experience or even any existing regulations that are, or were, in place.
The divers were killed by the contractor or client or supervisors who forced the diver to work under
dangerous situations and questionable conditions, totally ignoring proper safety measures and safety
regulations in order to get the work finished and the job done on time.
It is my opinion that the only way the divers could have prevented these accidents and deaths from
happening is by refusing to have dived in the first place under those conditions. But then another diver
would have been "obliged" or coerced into going down to complete the work and then that diver would
have been killed instead.
I'm not saying this because I'm still alive and still active and just an angry diver wanting to defend the
divers who got hurt or lost their lives. But simply because nearly all of the diving accidents that I can
think of were caused by either rushing to get the job done too quickly and the subsequent underlying
lack of safety measures employed by the contractor or client, or the lack of proper supervision and
planning to get the job done safely, as well as quickly and on time.
Diving jobs very often have to be done quickly under difficult circumstances and rushing to get the
work done quickly means that the safety aspect of the dive is all too often overlooked or ignored. There
have been some minor accidents where the diver's lack of experience and training may have partly
contributed to an accident, but in my opinion the vast majority of accidents and deaths have been down
to cutting safety procedures and cutting safety corners and trying to rush to get the diving work done to
save the client or contractor time and money.
Diving to get the work done under pressure from the contractor or client or supervisor in order to get
the work done quickly and without proper safety measures in place and without proper planning has led
to so many accidents and caused so much injury and death to the divers.
In the past 30 years I have often been coerced or been forced and "obliged" to dive in unacceptable and
questionable, dangerous situations and conditions, cutting safety corners in order to save the
contractor time and money. But in recent years I have just learnt to say NO. Perhaps that's why I'm still
alive when so many of my friends are not.

22. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
21
Companies like Dulam Int are flagrantly ignoring safety both in working conditions & the state of their
equipment & no-one seems to want to do anything about it.
Thanks to all who give to help keep the industry safe. I am also a company president. With that said, in
the 8 years we have been in business we have had 0 hours lost or any safety issues due to the training
that we conduct even while on dive station.
Worked in Ireland, nobody cares about the divers, no ACOPS, no inspectors and safety is a joke.
In many parts of the world Regulation is not enforced so Clients & Contractors want Supervisor &
Divers that will play fast and loose with basic diving safety.
While Safety is everyone’s responsibility sups and Divers Need to know when to say No without fear of
repercussions and without having to worry about the young guys coming up behind and "volunteering"
to do things that are not being done with ALL of the dangers mitigated to the best possible way of
safely getting the job done.
I love diving and the work. It's the politics, brown nosing and lack of work ethic is the reason I left
There´s too much lack of commercial diving laws around the world.

23. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
22
COMMENTS FROM SPANISH SURVEY
En España la situación del buceo comercial y su enseñanza es
caótica y responde interés privados por lo que difícilmente
tiene un standard que considero que es la primera cosa que
debe cambiar También es de señalar la legislación anticuada
en las normas de seguridad y el mapa de pseudo empresas
que actúan sin ninguna norma amparadas por las propias
administraciones. En España también existe otro problema
muy grave en materia de legislación pues cada Autonomía o
pequeño estado tiene normas propias haciendo muy difícil su
control
In Spain the situation with commercial diving and
training is chaotic and answers to private interests, for
this reason it hardly has a standard, which I consider is
the first thing which has to change. Also bears pointing
out that safety regulations are antiquated and that
companies do not follow the law and are protected by
the regulators. In Spain we also have the added problem
that each state has its own laws, making it difficult to
control.
Tiene que estar más controlada la seguridad en el momento de
bucear.
Safety must be more controlled during diving.
En Chile, tenemos un grupo grande de buzos profesionales y
deportivos y no es primera vez que suceden accidentes
descompresivos aunque se efectúe un correcto uso de las
tablas US Navy, creo que el biotipo es distinto, la alimentación,
horas de descanso, tipo de trabajo, temperatura del agua, etc.
son diferentes a las condiciones que generaron las tablas USN
We have a large number of professional and sport
divers in Chile and this is not the first time we have DCS
accidents even when the US NAVY dive tables were
used correctly. I believe the biotype is different, as are
nutrition, hours of rest, type of work, water
temperature etc. which were used in generating the
USN dive tables.
Es grandioso ver que en otros países el buceo es tomado en
cuento con la seriedad que se mérese y es triste que en mi
país nos traten como un simple obrero
Ie’iawtni eefuyaetaieeaea eatniateaeeactunieetes diving is
taken with the gravity it deserves, whereas it is sad that
in my country we are treated as mere labor.
Falta de legislación en gran parte de parte de Sudamérica por
ende explotación abusiva
Lack of regulations in most of South America results in
abusive exploitation.
En los casos que he tenido conocimiento, los accidentes son
por falta de experiencia del supervisor y presiones del
contratista por sacar lo más rápido el trabajo ojala tuvieran
más conocimientos antes de presionar y más perspicacia de
los supervisores.
In the cases I know of, accidents have occurred due to
lack of experience of the supervisor and pressure from
the contractor to finish the job quickly. I wish they had
better knowledge before pressuring and more input
from the supervisors.
En España hay una normativa obsoleta, una formación
deficiente y un gran desamparo por parte de la administración.
In Spain, regulation is obsolete; training is deficient and
abandonment from the administration.
Más responsabilidad por todas las partes y unificación del
sector.
More responsibility from all, and unification of the
industry.

24. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
23
No hay que permitir que los empresarios recorten en
seguridad. hay que supervisar las operaciones de buceo y hay
que poner en manos de los que las efectúan los conocimientos
y el equipo adecuados para cada ocasión.
We must not allow corporations to cut back on safety.
We have to supervise diving operations and we have to
give the right tools and knowledge to those who
perform the work.
Muchas empresas están trabajando incumpliendo los
protocolos y mínimos de seguridad
A lot of companies perform work without adhering to
protocols and the bare minimum in safety.
Hay q unificar titulaciones y hacer cumplir la normativa vigente
así como el convenio....y no interpretarla cada cual a su antojo.
Escueto pero sincero. Gracias.
We must integrate degrees and enforce current
regulations and agreement, and not allow it to be
interpreted by each to fit his desires. Short but sincere.
Thank you.
Falta mucho control por parte d la administración Better control from the government is lacking.
Si se refiere a quien sufrió daño.. el buzo ósea yo, si es quien
cargo con la responsabilidad.. amigos en España NADIE es
responsable.
If you mean who suffered the injury (question 13), I was
diver and I was saddled with the responsibility. Friends,
in Spain, NO ONE is responsible.
Tablas de buceo actualizadas a la más moderna. More modern dive tables.
Fallas en la aplicación de la regulación, uso de equipos sin
mantenimiento apropiado, desdén del comitente e imprevisión
de la empresa de buceo.
Failures in the enforcement of regulation, use of
equipment lacking in maintenance, disdain from the
committee, and lack of foresight from the dive
company.
En mi opinión, la falta de una formación adecuada es la mayor
causa de accidentes de buceo en España.
In my opinion, lack of proper training is the major cause
of dive accidents in Spain.

25. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
24
EXAMPLES OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE
DESCRIPTION:
On December 8, 1999, during day shift the diver was in the 2C circulating water pump bay in the crib house as
part of the biannual cleaning and inspection. The bay was isolated, and OOS (out of service) from the
circulating water system and the service water system. Clamtrol had been placed in the water for the zebra
mussel kill. The injury occurred after the bay drain valve was slowly opened .The bay drainpipe is a 14"
diameter pipe which leads to the screen refuse pit. The diver was to observe adequate flow through this
drainpipe to ensure that Clamtrol is coursing through the pipe to the refuse pit. This distributes the Clamtrol to all
areas of the piping to kill zebra mussels in the drain pipe area, flushing them to the refuse pit. This pipe is part of
the station's Ultimate Heat Sink and moves needed flow during plant accident conditions.
The manpower set-up is one diver in the water with one tender on top of the bay with headset communications
with the diver. A mechanical maintenance safety watch, with radio, is stationed with the tender. An operator
with radio contact with the safety watch is staged at the bay drain valve located in the crib house. In this
instance, the valve was slowly opened to the fully open position by Operations. The diver reported flow through
the drainpipe. Several minutes later, the drain pipe flow took a step jump to apparent full flow which drew the
diver, who was at the pipe opening, against the pipe opening. The diver's knee, with hand placed on top, was
drawn into the opening and banged against the interior of the pipe, causing him to break his finger tip. The
diver communicated to the attendant to close the drain valve, and this was rapidly accomplished by the operator
staged by the valve. Once the valve was closed, the diver exited the pipe area and the bay.
CAUSES:
It is speculated that we had a partial plug of zebra mussels in the pipe which subsequently let loose as a result
of the Clamtrol addition, resulting in the unexpected rapid rush of flow through the drainpipe
The incorrect assumptions used by the original 1998 team assembled by environmental engineering which
determined that the maximum flow relative to the diver would not cause injury.
Analysis:
Further background is:
1. This bay drain evolution began in 1998 and this was the second time for this bay. No previous bay has seen
this type of flow volume. It is believed that the previous cleaning, while allowing flow, did not adequately
break or clean the crud from the pipe internals.
2. The pre-job briefing covered the potential hi flow conditions of the pipe with the valve open, with all
individuals aware of the corrective action to close the drain valve.
3. The dive supervisor and MMD supervisor were present at the job site during the evolution
[OE NUCLEAR DIVING]
Diver Injured by Opened Valve and Flow Through Drain Pipe- 1999

26. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
25
The drain valve is slowly opened so that the diver is not pulled towards the pipe. In this case, the diver reported
flow through the 14" drain pipe after the valve was opened and then debris broke loose from the pipe which caused
a surge of flow through the line, pulling the diver towards the suction of the pipe. This is the second evolution of this
type on this bay, the first being in 1998, which did not create a flow volume of this magnitude.
The diver, and the other workers involved, knew the potential existed for a large suction into the drain line after the
isolation valve was opened, but did not anticipate a surge from the pipe due to debris breaking loose. As a result,
the diver and other workers were not prepared for a surge into the pipe. All other bay cleanings in both
1998 and 1999 did not exhibit such a surge in flow volume through the drain pipe. Further background: when the
original game plan was developed in 1998 for drain line cleaning, the expected drain flow through this open pipe
was determined to be minimal in relation to diver harm.
Similar OE Events:
On November 21, 1998, a diver vacuuming the intake well was injured when his arm was pulled into a vacuum hose
being used to remove growth from the sides and bottoms of the well. The station attributed this event to
communication failures between the diver and tender, and the tender and vacuum pump operator.
On February 24, 1999, during work to replace ECCS suction strainers, unanticipated movement of the reaction arm
of a hydraulic torque wrench removed the tip of right index finger of the diver using the wrench. Hydraulic pressure
was applied before the wrench was properly positioned. The cause of this event was the failure of the tender to use
repeat back communication techniques.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate corrective actions were to:
1. Terminate all diving activities and interview all personnel involved.
2. Further use of the diver in the bay during bay draining evolutions is prohibited and bay cleaning work
packages are being revised. Alternate methods for observing adequate flow through the piping are being
used.
3. The bay drain valve will be taken OOS as a precaution during diver bay entries.
Additional Corrective Actions:
1.Coached and counseled the environmental engineer on the incorrect assumptions regarding the determination of
potentially hazardous flow in the bay via the drain pipe. (Also performed a thorough review of all diving activities in
the crib house with interviews of divers, maintenance, and environmental engineering--no other incorrect
assumptions or similar situations exist)
2.Communicated the event to all MMD personnel, divers, and managers in MMD. Discussed the event about the
potential for serious injuries, and the need to question such evolutions.
3.Revise all pertinent work packages, including the model WR, for all Circ bays cleaning PMs such that the isolation
valve is closed and OOS whenever there is a diver in the bay.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
There was no nuclear safety significance related to this event. The injured diver was taken to a local hospital and
returned to work the following day

27. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
26
DESCRIPTION:
On October 5, 1998 with the unit in cold shutdown, the lead diver of a two-man team, working on residual
heat removal (RHR) suppression pool suction strainer replacement, lost his air supply and was pulled
unconscious from the pool. The diver communicated that he had lost his air supply and was pulled
unconscious from the water by a rescue team using an electric chain hoist. The diver was unable to drop his
weight belt because the dosimetry antenna had been taped to the belt and the emergency suit inflation
system was inoperable due to loss of supplied air. The diver was rolled over onto his side, and regained
consciousness shortly after his head was tilted. During resuscitation activities the diver received low level
contamination to his hair. The diver was transported to the hospital where he was decontaminated and
admitted for observation due to conditions related to oxygen deprivation.
The event investigation determined that while in the suppression pool, the diver backed into a support beam,
striking his helmet and shearing off the brass nipple which attached the air supply hose to the two-way valve
on his helmet. After the diver was pulled from the suppression pool, all equipment was secured and diving
activities were suspended pending completion of a root cause investigation.
CAUSES:
The root cause of the event has been determined to be material failure of the tee fitting, which supplied air to the
diver's helmet. The final determination for the failure of the tee fitting cannot be completed because the helmet is
unavailable for inspection and testing. The cause of the actual equipment failure cannot be determined.
Contributing factors to this event included the issue that the tee fitting that was used on the helmet was not a
tested configuration by the manufacturer. The manufacturer identified that the configuration was never tested
because it was never requested by a user. The dive company confirmed that they have used this
configuration for years and indicated that the configuration was appropriate.
During the rescue effort a worker was sent to the site nurse's office in the service building to get an oxygen
bottle. The worker crossed the 4-inch line boundary without using the radiation monitors. The worker
informed the radiation technician on duty of the emergency and the need to expedite the oxygen. Radiation
protection took smears of the areas traveled by the worker and no spread of contamination was identified.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate corrective actions included reconfiguring the helmets so that they meet the manufacturer tested
condition. A second air line was supplied to each diver to be used to inflate the suit. A method of connecting
dosimetry antenna to diver was devised that will not limit the release of the weight belt.
The noted areas where improvements were needed included reducing ambulance response time, which was
over one half hour, performing a review of utility procedures, and providing recommended revisions based on
lessons learned in from the root cause report. Diver bid specifications will be reviewed and upgraded as
necessary. Enhancements to the diving activities included adding a second electric hoist to the lower dive
station platform to facilitate retrieving a diver from either side of the platform, and improving communications
[OE NUCLEAR DIVING]
Diver Loss of Breathing Air- 1998

28. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
27
including a dedicated telephone line and a site radio. Rescue team members were shown the arrangement of
the dive stations both inside and outside of the suppression pool. An emergency response plan was
established for the dive station to include individual responsibilities.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
This event is SIGNIFICANT To The PLANT because it resulted in a near miss/fatality.

29. MythBustingSafetyAttitudesUI2015
28
DESCRIPTION:
Whilst conducting dive Number 16 as part of the Reactor 2 Outage work, the diver was working on the
silt removal when he asked for a pull to check his umbilical was clear to surface, which is good
standard and practice for umbilical management. When the tender came up on the diver’s slack and
pulled the umbilical to make sure it was free from obstructions or entanglement, it is believed that a
loop in the umbilical was pulled closed and caused a kink.
The diver calmly reported the loss of primary gas and had switched to “bailout” supply and was
returning to the surface.
The Supervisor opened the secondary supply from the surface and instructed the basket operator to
lower the basket. As per procedures the diver had already begun his return to the surface upon the
opening his bailout supply. Upon reaching the surface the basket was brought down so the diver could
enter and was recovered to the land surface.
CAUSES:
Apparent Cause:- 0407 – Diving Operation in a confined area
Following discussions it was concluded the likely cause of the event was due to the amount of turns in
the divers umbilical built up over the course of the diving operation in the confined area were work was
being carried out . When the slack umbilical was retrieved by the divers tender the loops which had
built up pulled tight and formed a kink enough to lower the air pressure to the diver
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
1. Safety Stand down held with contract partner – Contract Partner Safety Advisor
2. Contract Partner to carry out full investigation into all aspects of the event and file a report to the
Supply Chain Contract Manager and EDF Safety Engineer - Contract Partner Safety Advisor
3. Disseminate Initial OPEX Event Brief to fleet – OPEX Coordinator.
4. Complete Reporting of Injuries Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) return
form and notify Contract Partner Safety Advisor & EDF Industrial Safety Engineer.
5. Carry out investigation on Material Condition of umbilical cord including any supporting
documentation - Contract Partner Safety Advisor
6. Carry out task observation of diving operations are carried out on site include OPEX from this event
in the pre- job brief – EDF Field Supervisor.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
This event is NOT SIGNIFICANT. But had diver/crew not had experience, could have resulted in a near
miss or event.
[OE NUCLEAR DIVING]
Loss of Diver Air Due to kinked Umbilical- 2012