The document discusses the background and causes of conflicts in Kafanchan, Kaduna State, Nigeria. It notes that conflicts are often linked to poverty, political and economic issues. The 1987 conflict in Kafanchan arose from student disagreements but had deeper roots in socioeconomic differences between ethnic groups. Recent conflicts in 2011 were also examined, with religious and political tensions playing a role. The purpose of the study is to assess the human and economic impact of conflicts in Kafanchan and identify their underlying causes, in order to reduce future conflicts and support development.

1. 1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Societies accommodate various tendencies, interests and identities which often result in
conflict. Conflict is a global phenomenon which is not peculiar to Nigeria; the results of
violent conflicts in many parts of Nigeria have degenerated to a worrisome phenomenon.
Conflict has become the biggest Challenge to sustainable development. Even though
debatable, poverty is continuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible
for instability as a result of conflict in many parts of Africa and Nigeria in
particular.
According to Draman (2003), West Africa contains eleven of the world’s poorest
countries and is currently one of the unstable regions of the world due to political strife,
religious conflict and ethnic or indigenous crises.
Conflicts are unavoidable aspects of human interaction. They arise from the pursuit of
divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals or groups. Changes in the socio–
political environment provide fertile grounds for conflicts involving individuals and
groups probably interested in using these conflicts to achieve their selfish goals.
Therefore, the negative exploitation of ethnicity and religion results in ethno-religious
conflicts. These often arise out of suspicion, aggression, polarization of relations among
groups and at times in a competitive setting. All conflicts, according to Elaigwu
(2004), which start with bringing division among identities of a group in a competitive
relation with other groups are regarded as ethno–religious conflicts. The history of
conflicts in the northern part of Nigeria clearly illustrates the above point. Some
writers have also observed that religion which has become an inextricable reality
of the Nigerian society, be it (Christianity, Islam or the African Traditional
Religion), and is supposed to encourage peaceful co–existence, unity, morality and a

2. 2
sanitized society. Rather, religion has become the vehicle for transportation of envy,
strife and the resultant physical conflicts between and among relations. Religion, the
expected unifying force of the Kafanchan society is now used as a force that is tearing it
apart. Therefore, like it has been rightly observed above, the increasing rate of ethno–
religious conflicts in Nigeria in the past and in the recent years shows that the
advocates of the two major religions (Christianity and Islam) are not in good terms.
Nigeria has witnessed several ethno–religious conflicts.
Kure (2011) a prominent pastor and founder of the Throne Room Trust Ministry,
observed that religious violence was capable of destabilizing not only the north, but the
entire country. As one who witnessed the April 19 and 20 post-election violence in
Kafanchan, Kure said he was disturbed after listening to a tape which was produced in
Zaria between April 29, and 30, 2011, with the intention of mobilizing Islamic
fundamentalists to unleash another round of violence on the state. Kure therefore
advised the security agencies not to dismiss its content as empty threat because the
producers of the tape were determined to actualize everything they said in it. The
tape was specific on individuals and groups whose lives were at stake. Even students of
some higher institutions were also mentioned as targets.
Kure (2011) further revealed that apart from the April 19 and 20 Kaduna mayhem, he
has survived so many of such violence which claimed the lives of some members of his
close family. He remarked that, “having experienced this recent violence in Kafanchan,
my fear is another plan was being hatched to destabilize the state. He also said that
the failure of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) to win the presidential election
was just an answered prayer for some Muslim fundamentalists who were anxiously
waiting for any opportunity to settle old scores.

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Therefore, Kure (2011) just like other people is of the belief that the problem is
not the type that has defied logical solution as long as both sides would agree to
tell the truth. A meeting of stakeholders should be constituted to address the situation
in order to find a solution to the problem of incessant conflicts in the state.
April 18, 2011 witnessed one of the worst conflict and senseless destruction on
humanity in northern Nigeria which took place after the presidential election results
were announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declaring
the then incumbent Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) winner
over his rival from the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Muhamadu Buhari.
Supporters of Buhari went on rampage demonstrating against the pronouncement of the
Electoral Commission. The protest was turned to full blown carnage in most Northern
States like Kano, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi and Kaduna; the
crisis became more serious and devastating in Kaduna State than any other state in the
north. There was large scale destruction in Zonkwa, Kafanchan, Birnin Gwari, Zaria,
Soba and other small communities across the state. The impact of this conflict is still
being felt till date.
The Kafanchan riots and those that occurred in other parts of Kaduna State in April
2011 and the conflicts in the Kaduna metropolis left all well meaning Nigerians
restless. The socio-political and economic problems associated with inter-group and
intra-group conflict is immediately evident and has far reaching consequences on the
security, properties and social co-existence of the people.
The rise in poverty which appears to be the sole causes of unrest and conflict in Nigeria
and particularly the North is assuming a worrisome dimension as empirical studies have
shown. Nigeria, a sub-Saharan African country has at least half of its populations
living in abject poverty (Ojo, 2008). Similarly, the publication from the National Bureau

4. 4
of Statistics (1996) reveals that poverty has been massive, pervasive and has engulfed a
large proportion of the Nigerian society. It is said to be mainly responsible for most
of the conflicts in the country, be they ethnic, religious or political. Abiola and
Olaopa (2008) state that the scourge of poverty in Nigeria is an incontrovertible
fact, which results in hunger, ignorance, malnutrition, disease, unemployment, poor
access to credit facilities, and low life expectancy. This general level of human
hopelessness leads to conflicts, though not only a Nigerian problem, poverty and
conflict are perhaps, the major problem confronting the Third World Countries
today and seem to be on the increase in spite of government’s efforts at reducing and
alleviating/eradicating it. (Joseph, 2006:89).
Several studies confirmed the popular perception that conflicts exacerbate poverty and
hunger. Messer and Cohen (2004, p. 3) argue that “conflict causes food insecurity” and
that civil conflicts in Africa since the mid-1960s until 2000 cost the region more
than“$120 billion worth of agricultural production.”
Country studies carried out in post-conflict countries also find a marked increase in
poverty and hunger during conflict. The increasing rate of poverty has sparked off
different forms of conflicts, including youth restiveness, inter-ethnic conflicts, religious
conflicts, communal, political and social conflicts (Ekpenyong, Ukommi and Agha,
2010).
Nwaobi (2003) asserts that Nigeria presents a paradox; the country is rich, but
the people are poor. As noted by (Omotola, 2008), Nigeria is richly endowed and
the country’s wealth potentials manifest in the form of natural, geographical, and
human potentials. With this endowment, Nigeria should rank among the richest
countries of the world but the reverse seems to be the case, with poverty at the
extreme and political rivalry. Okpe and Abu (2009), observed clearly that Nigeria

5. 5
has witnessed an enormous increase in the intensity of poverty and conflict. According
to them, the poverty level stood at 73.9 per cent in the year 2000. Which
according to the United Nation Human Development Index (UNHDI, 2010), also
observed Nigeria was ranked the 142nd poorest country in the world with 64.4% of the
population living below the poverty line.
Kaduna State has from the 1980s occupied a volatile position in the history of sectarian
tension and conflicts in Northern Nigeria. From the early 1980s, tensions and sectarian
conflicts intensified in Kaduna State. In the broader Nigerian context, several
groups have stired up the mobilization of ethno-religious, and all sorts of identities as
vital in the struggle for survival. According to Kazah-Toure (2003), the Babangida
years in power, 1985-1993, witnessed the growth of sectarian conflicts. Sectarian
conflicts were heightened by the economic crisis that started in 1982, and worsened
with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as from 1986.
This brought about the dwindling of people’s fortunes,(explosion of poverty which
is said by observers to have resulted in the incessant conflicts being witness in Kaduna
State), as the poor tend to perceived their enemies as those who belong to the other
ethno-religious group rather than the rich who oppress them using the scourge of
politics. Structural Adjustment Programme brought about retrenchment of civil
servants from their means of livelihood, inflation, and increase in the cost of living,
unemployment and general economic downturn. The poor people during this period
were further enmeshed in poverty making the possibility of coming out of poverty
very difficult. The resultant effect was increase in conflicts, one of which is the 1987
conflict which started in Kafanchan and later spread to other parts of the state.
Usman (1987) maintained that there was a massive retirement in the military which has
been a major employer since the late 1960s. The return of former soldiers back into the

6. 6
peasantry contributed to their being restive in the communities and the growing ethno-
religious and other sectarian conflicts. He further argued that local battles were now
fought in the typical military style.
Incessant inter-ethno-religious and communal conflicts accompanied the hard times
brought about by SAP. Some analysts argue that the military was to some extent,
responsible for triggering sectarian conflicts and insecurity so as to perpetuate itself in
power (Usman 1987).
The impact of the harsh economic reality as expressed in poverty leading to conflict and
violent conflicts began to rear its ugly head. According to Abdu (2005), the 1980s
and 1990s witnessed increasing concentration of poverty and sectarian conflicts in
urban areas. The reason for this was the high influx of people to the urban areas in search
of employment opportunities.
Due to high rural-urban migration, the overall population growth rate for Nigerian urban
centres was 4.5 per annum compare to rural growth of 1.70% and a national rate
of 2.8 % (UNDP 2010).With the introduction of SAP by the Babangida regime which
brought about devastating effect on the people, the cumulative effect of this was
increasing unemployment, collapse of real wages, inflation, and collapse of public
facilities which resulted in conflicts of various types. The first in the recent series of
Kafanchan conflict started in March 1987. The crisis arose from a disagreement
between Muslim and Christian students in the College of Education Kafanchan. It later
spread to Kafanchan town and subsequent reprisal killings occurred in Kaduna,
Zaria, Katsina, Funtua, and Daura (then in Kaduna State). Though one may
argued that this conflict was religious in nature and therefore, should not be linked
with poverty, it seems so. The root cause could be traced to the harsh socio-economic
condition between and among the Hausa and Fulani, and the Southern Kaduna

7. 7
people. This can be explain in terms of political, economic, Social opportunities
between the Hausa and Fulani in one hand and the Southern Kaduna people on the
other hand. The harsh economic reality of the time as earlier explained above resulted in
frustration and the expression of aggression by the people in a religious manner. Thus,
economic factors could be explained as the major cause of this conflict. Generally, there
was deep-seated socio-political differences and distrust among these groups, and the
major factor behind all these sectarian conflicts as claimed by some analysts lays in
‟poverty”.
Thus, these conflicts have further justified the reasons for this research. Central and
complex issues involved in these battles included the land question, control of
political power in public governance; control, access, and distribution of resources,
ethnicity, religion, perception of justice and democratic question (Kazah-Toure,
1995).
Dilating further on conflict, Dunmoye ( 2003:29) agrees when he states: Conflicts in
Nigeria have been worsened by the economic crisis and pauperization of the citizen
in recent times. Factors that account for these conflicts are numerous. This includes
ethnicism, religious differences and their manipulation, land, hunger and increasing
population, chieftaincy disputes and the native/settlers syndrome.
A thorough observation of the issues raised above show that the causal factors of
conflicts are numerous but central to this is bad governance which is responsible
for the prevalent poverty.
This is in view of the fact that the political leaders have failed to give to the people a
dignified life through good governance. The politicians in most cases have been blamed
of stimulating these conflicts to their advantage thereby further creating deep division
among the people.

8. 8
The negative effect of these conflicts is that government, private individuals and
groups have spent huge amount of money in rebuilding the destruction caused by
conflicts in the country. The amount of money spent on security maintenance in Kaduna
as a state would be enough to move Nigeria to another level of socio–economic and
political development. What is very much disturbing is that, our fellow citizens who lost
their lives during such conflicts remained irreplaceable.
This project work will focus on the implication of the conflict and its remedy.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Political, Ethnic and religious conflicts have badly and negatively affected the socio-
economic growth of Nigeria as a nation. This has unhelpful effects on the nation’s
strength, safety and integration. The manipulation of political crises which always end as
religion and ethnic conflicts has been a major obstacle to the country’s efforts towards
achieving socio-economic development.
Political and Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have become serious challenges that
create room for divisions among people. It has also become a powerful means for
mobilization and exploitation in the country. They have been so manipulated that
virtually all institutions in the public and private sectors have been polarized along
ethnic and religious lines. Civil servants, community and social workers are main
victims of intimidation and oppression in their places of work. Survival and job security
are strongly based on who is of the same ethnic group and religion with the boss.
These are practices that do not promote peaceful and harmonious co-existence
among Nigerians. Our ethnic and religious values should have been a force that
will encourage Nigerians to appreciate the great benefits derivable from working

9. 9
together as Nigerians in honesty and for a better future irrespective of our ethnic
and religious differences.
The rate at which conflicts escalate in Kafanchan and its environs is quite alarming and
more worrisome as the area has occupied a volatile position in the history of sectarian
tensions and conflicts in Kaduna State. It has continued to witness vicious cycle of
violent conflicts, some of which have attracted national attention. Issues that do
not warrant people engaging in killings and destructions of life and property have
surfaced with devastating consequences. One keep wondering what could be the
possible causes of these conflicts in Kaduna State as a whole and Kafanchan in
particular? Some scholars have linked most sectarian conflicts of various
dimensions ranging from communal, ethno-religious, socio-cultural, political and
economic conflicts in the state to poverty, unemployment, improper upbringing of
children by parent and the contribution of the political leaders to win election through
dubious strategy.
It is on this view that this research study examined the political conflicts in Kaduna State
with particular focus on the Kafanchan conflicts of April, 2011. To achieve this
successfully, the study would attempt to provide answers to the following research
questions:
1.3 Research Questions
i. What were the implications of the conflicts in Kafanchan.
ii. How can the era of continuous conflicts in Kafanchan be brought to an end?
1.4 Hypotheses
H1: Conflict retards the socio-economic development of Kafanchan.

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H0: Conflict does not retard the socio-economic development of Kafanchan.
1.5 Purpose of the Study
This work is aimed at assessing the extent of human and material resources
destroyed or lost in conflict in Kaduna with particular reference to Kafanchan. It will
also create awareness on what those who do not want peace in Nigeria, especially in
Kafanchan and Kaduna are undertaking to undermine the state’s socio-economic and
political growth and development.
The research will unravel the roots and remote causes of conflicts in Kafanchan and
how these conflicts has contributed negatively to our socio–economic and political
development as a nation state.
The work also aims at establishing the fact that each ethnic group is as important as the
others. As such, the leadership of this great country should shun all form of favoritism
and know that leadership is not the sole responsibility of only one particular ethnic group
but for all irrespective of ethnic background, religion or political affiliation.
1.6 Significance of the Study
Political apathy, religion intolerance, ethnic bias, unemployment and general
hopelessness of the people were identified as some of the major causes of
conflicts in Kafanchan. The area is generally backward in many aspects and therefore,
needs urgent government intervention. The study will also show that poverty causes
conflicts in Kafanchan. The choice of the theory of human security has further revealed
the desperate need of governments at all levels to intervene by providing basic
amenities/services to the people of Kafanchan and the entire citizen of Jema’a Local
Government Area in order to cushion the effects of their sufferings and build peace,
development and sustenance of other sector of their economy. The study will be useful

11. 11
to academics and other researchers in their research work. It will also open more doors
for researchers to carry out in-depth research to test the validity of these findings. It will
be of enormous benefit to public policy analysts because it will draw their focus and
attention to the interface between poverty and conflicts. Moreover, this study will help
to unravel the factors responsible for the conflict escalation in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local
Government Area of Kaduna State.
This study will bring to focus the importance of understanding the real causes of
conflicts, and the best mechanisms to be adopted for the promotion and
achievement of peace and prosperity in the state. Also it will help to draw attention to the
need for a conducive environment to be created by the government within the State so
that citizens could enjoy a better life.
This research will also serve as a means towards the development of a strategic action
plan that will be a significant force in peaceful and harmonious co-existence
amongst the adherents of different religions in Nigeria.
It will strengthen a network of all the stakeholders who would share the experiences in
the search for peaceful co-existence which will in no small measure contribute to
the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria.
1.7 Scope of the Study
The scope of this study will be limited to the 2011 – 2017 conflicts in Kafanchan, Jema’a
Local Government Area of Kaduna State, their implication and remedy. A research of
this nature is never devoid of limitations such as insufficient time, resources and finance.
These limitations notwithstanding, an attempt will be made to successfully obtain all the
relevant data required in order to put this research together. However, whatever the
constraint, this study is still considered very useful in that it will provide some basis for
further research in the future on the topic covered. This research work will focus on the

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implications of conflicts and its remedy and will further discuss its effect on the socio-
economic and political development of Nigeria as a whole.
1.8 Method of Research
Nworgu (1991) defines research design as a plan or blue print which specifies how data
relating to a given problem should be collected and analyzed. Research design being a
plan or a strategy for conducting the research will be used based on survey research
method. This method the researcher believe will reveal useful information within a short
time. The choice of this method will also allow for a number of respondents who
themselves constitute a sample that will determine the character, features and quality
of the research. The purpose of this method is to discover meaning in data collected, so
that facts and events could be better understood, interpreted and explained.
The survey will be based on very simple procedure such as collecting data by
distribution of questionnaires.
1.9 Definition of Terms
Conflict
Conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectivities over values, claims to status,
power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their
values or claims over those of others (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999:14)
Conflict according to (Coser, 1956:8) is a struggle over scarce resources that are not
regulated by shared rules; it may include attempt to neutralize, eliminate or destroy
one’s rival. It is a product of antagonistic interest between two or more opposing
forces or groups within the society and may manifest itself in a continuum ranging from
early signals to violent crises or war (Alemika, 2004:4; cited in Ekpenyong et al,

13. 13
(2010). It arises when actors or groups are dissatisfied with existing social
conditions and thus seek the same goal or mutually incompatible goals (Agha, 2004: 66).

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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
The research topic is 2011 – 2017 conflicts in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government
Area of Kaduna State, their implication and remedy. The review of literature will be
done under the following headings: (1) The Origin of Conflict in Kafanchan and
Northern Nigeria (2) Analysis of conflict and its implications (3) causes of conflict: (a)
ethnic conflict (b) Illegal supply of arms (c) religion (c) unemployment (4) Proposed
plan for peace.
2.1 The Origin of Conflict in Kafanchan and Northern Nigeria
Alisan (2000) reported that Kaduna State in particular since independence has
grown to become one of the most important cities in northern Nigeria. Also, because of
its political and strategic importance, it became the military and police Headquarters of
northern Nigeria, where the top brass of the Nigerian Armed Forces in the north
resident. It has the highest concentration of military institutions in northern Nigeria.
Kaduna is now divided into two settlements: Christians dominate the southern part
of the state while Muslims occupy the northern part of the state. People take undue
advantage of this dominance in a particular section to foment ethno-religious conflicts.
Kafanchan which was a relatively peaceful town, has witnessed a circle of
violence, which has singled it out as one of the most volatile cities in Kaduna and
northern Nigeria (Makarfi, 2004).
2.2 Analysis of Conflict and its Implication
Conflicts arise from the pursuit of divergent goals and aspirations by individuals
or groups. Changes in the socio-political and religious environments provide fertile

15. 15
ground for conflicts involving individuals and groups probably interested in using such
conflicts to achieve communal or non-communal goals. Thus every pluralistic society is
bound to experience one form of conflict or the other (Makarfi: 2004)
Conflicts as defined by Sani (2007: 2) are viewed as thus: moments or times of danger
or great difficulties. Turning points, disasters, emergencies, calamities, levels of
conflicts with intense confrontations, between mobilized groups or armed forces
ethno-religious conflicts are on the rise recently.
At the mention of conflict, the thought that comes to most people’s mind is that of war,
fighting, argument, misunderstanding and the like. However, conflict has positive
impact in the society as it can increase clarity about existing problems, and
eventually lead to innovative breakthrough or new approaches to solving social
problems.
Conflict involves struggle over values and claims, power and resources in which
the aim of the opponents are to neutralize or engage in outright elimination of
rivals. Conflict is perceived as divergence of interest or belief which means common
objective cannot be actualized.
Akande (1998) is of the view that “there is no society without conflict; it is inherent to
societal relation and management. The ability to manage conflict makes a good
society or state, because conflict cannot be eradicated.” It can be noted that
conflict varies and is of different dimension.
The implications in most cases are confrontational, violent and sometimes may lead to
a state of anarchy. For instance, it can be social conflict as in the case of the topic under
research. It can be economic like the struggle on resource control, establishment
of markets and the location of some viable economic organizations like banks,
industries, among other issues. Likewise conflict can be political like the aftermath of

16. 16
the January, 1966 military coup d’etat, the political impasse after the annulment of
the June 12, 1993 presidential election in Nigeria, and the recent 2011 post-election
political violence and killing of innocent people in Kafanchan and other villages within
Kaduna and bombardment of security outlet by a group allegedly known as Boko Haram
in Nigeria.
Consequently, conflicts arise out of mistrust, hostility and polarization of relations
among groups at times in a competitive setting. One fact is that there are many causes of
conflict.
As stated earlier, conflicts know no bound as they happen in most countries of the
world. And such conflicts cut across both developed and the developing countries.
However, the nature and dynamics of the conflicts depend on the conflict
management techniques that are put in place to take care of the situation. Osaghae
(1994) observed that; “There is a tendency to assume that these conflicts are more
rampant and devastating in African countries where alternative action-bases like
class, activity organizations and party identities have not become deep rooted
enough to challenge the primacy of ethnicity. But they have been no less
destructive in advanced industrialized states where alternative action-bases and
management strategies are arguably better developed. Examples are Scottish and Irish
separatism in the United Kingdom, the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, the Quebec
question in Canada and diverse ethnic problems in the USA.”
Therefore, conflicts abound in both industrialized and non industrialized countries.
Generally, conflict is defined as an interaction between interdependent people who
perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they
attempt to achieve their goal. According to Coser (1956) “conflict is a struggle over
scarce resources that are not regulated by shared rules, it may include attempts to

17. 17
neutralize, eliminate, or destroy one’s rival”. Conflict is a product of antagonistic
interest between two or more opposing force and groups within the society and
may manifest itself on a continuum ranging from early warning signal to violent
crises or wars (Alemika, 2000). It arises when actors or groups are dissatisfied with
existing social conditions and thus seek the same goal or mutually incompatible
goals (Agha, 2004). To illustrate further, these social conditions suggest the
deprivation of basic human needs by the political leaders (ruling class) to the
people, a situation which raises frustration that results in aggressive violent explosions.
Galtung (1996) viewed conflict as a triangle with structure, attitudes and
behaviour as its vertices. By structure, he means the conflict situation, the parties,
and the conflict of interest among them. Conflict arises where the parties come to
have incompatible interests, values or goals. He use the term attitudes to refer to the
tendency for the parties to see conflict from their own point of view, to identify with own
side, and to diminish the concerns of others. Behavior includes gestures and
communications, which can convey either a hostile or a conciliatory intent.
According to Justino (2007), conflict can lead to poverty traps and on the other hand,
poverty can lead to conflicts traps too. As a result, initial outbreak of conflict is likely to
create a cycle of conflict and poverty traps from which households are not able to escape
easily (Collier, 2007; Justino, 2008; Justino, 2009); thus, high vulnerability to
household’s poverty increases the risk of participation in and support of conflict.
An individual that has been a victim of violent conflict is likely to participate in further
conflicts most especially if he/she was not properly compensated or the
perpetrators of the conflict were not punish during and after the previous conflict.
Some people participate in conflict if they are perceived to be a subject or target by
another group or an opposing group. In this case, Goodhand (2001) conceived conflict

18. 18
as a struggle between individuals or collectivities over values or claims to status,
power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their
values or claims over those of others. Conflict is embedded in society and cannot be
separated from ongoing political and social processes. Its eruption could be as a result of
deplorable human conditions. Fukuda-Parr (2008), described conflict as a critical human
development cost and capability of deprivation for individuals because human security is
threatened, infrastructure is destroyed, institution’s capacities are weakened, and conflict
destroys people’s livelihood through its impact on economic growth.
A certain amount of conflict is always present in society. It may even have positive
consequences. When a group experiences conflict with outsiders, group members
often draw closer together and achieve a greater sense of solidarity (Coser, 1956:8;
Simmel, 1955:31). When it takes place within a group, however, conflict creates
divisiveness rather than solidarity. The result is usually destruction of the group or
significant change in internal relationships (Brinkerhoff and white, 1988:88, cited in
Ekpenyong et al, 2010).
The above definitions have undeniable truth in them: conflict is inevitable in every social
relationship; it occurs between individuals, families, communities, states, countries,
organization or groups at varying degrees, the chief causal factor of conflict is
incompatible interest; and conflict can be associative or dissociative.
2.3 Causes of Conflicts
Inequality between groups is probably the foremost cause of conflict in Africa. It is
inequality between groups – rather than individuals – that increases the prospects of
violent conflict. It exists at three mutually reinforcing levels: economic, social and
political. In countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda, political power and its
benefits were monopolized by one group. Unequal access to power perpetuated a similar

19. 19
lack of access to resources and revenue. Where group inequality occurs there is also
differential access to education (as has notably been the case in Burundi).This plays a
key role in sustaining inequalities. Where a society is divided into two pre-dominant
groups, growing inequality between them often leads to conflict There are quite a
number of arguments advanced by different scholars on the causes of conflicts in Africa
and, Nigeria inclusive. According to Fukuda-Parr, (2008), the causal factors of conflict
in relation to poverty are link to the theories of “greed and grievance”. The greed theory
linked conflict with dependence on primary exports and natural source and the vested
interest of certain powerful groups creates an ability to finance civil conflict, especially
when employment and earning opportunities for young men are few, which causes them
to participate in the conflict. He further argued that the grievance theory focuses on
ethnic, religious and regional divisions and inequalities that can cause political
repression and conflict among impacted groups. Nnoli (1980) Elbadawi and Sambanis
(2000) and Salawu (2010) all concurred with the notion of ethnicity as the major cause
of conflicts in Africa. However, Paul collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) debunk
the conventional wisdom that most conflict arises from ethnic heterogeneity and
religious division. They instead maintained that situation of poverty creates greater
likelihood for internal conflicts to occur. Another argument put forward by scholars
is the fragility of states, a factor which Fukuda-Parr (2008), Gurr and Marshal
(2003) posit is often present in civil conflict and can exacerbate the effects of conflict on
the population. When state capacity is weak and there is lack of political means to
resolve conflict or prevent its occurrence, then citizens will feel insecure, resulting in
loss of confidence in the government’s legitimacy.
Modernization, democratization, colonization, militarization, population explosion,
volatile climate and environmentalism and economic factors have been highlighted as

20. 20
some of the causes of conflict. The existence or manifestation of any of these factors
mentioned could trigger conflict. Ehrlick (1973: 21-26, cited in Ikejiaku, 2009) argued
from the economic theory that the propensity to indulge in violent conflict is higher for
low income or less educated people. The assumption is that poor economic
conditions and low quality of life could serve as a breeding ground for conflict.
However, for the fact that poor economic condition might result from different
problems bedeviling Africa, economic factors could not fully explain conflict in Africa.
For example, Glaeser (2002), cited in Ikejiaku (2009) argues against economic
factors noting that political leaders often encourage individuals and groups to
engage in violence conflict in order to promote and protect their parochial and
egocentric interests (Justino, 2009).
State failure, ineffective and illegitimate governance, imbalance of power and
opportunities, the theft of national wealth by a small, self declared elite, the
repression of opposition, rights and freedom all feature prominently in conflict.
(Verstegen, 2001, Ibrahim 1995). Using governance as a factor, Ikejiaku (2009)
attributes the causes of conflicts in Africa on poverty which is rooted in political
corruption. He revealed that the trends of events in the past three decades show that
political corruption is the root cause of conflict. This situation has rendered most of the
states in the continent incapable of providing the basic needs of the people.
The failure of developing countries like Nigeria to bring about responsible governance
has heightened poverty which in turn makes the citizenry more vulnerable to violent
conflict that have plagued the society.
2.3.1 The Abuse of Ethnicity
Political leaders and belligerents in Africa have made increasing use of ethnic hatred.
Such abuse prolongs conflict, creates long term divisions that reduce the effectiveness of

21. 21
peace building efforts; as a result of these, there have been a greater number of fatalities
and injury than are experienced in more conventional fighting.
Nigeria is a pluralist society with multitude of ethnic groups that abound in the
country. According to Elaigwu (2000), Nigeria has about 300 ethnic groups and
over 400 lingo-cultural groups‟. He further stressed that, “an ethnic-group is a group
of people linked by common bonds of kinship and communal relationship. In some
cases, it has identifiable language, social, economic and cultural traits as
well as a distinct territory”. On the other hand, he observed that, “ethnicity is
ethnic consciousness transformed into a weapon of offence or defense in a
competitive process in relation with other groups over desired scarce resources.
Ethnicity often creates problems of integration, especially in a multinational state”.
Basically, ethnic conflicts in the modern setting are not unlike pre-colonial
struggles and wars of subordination, rebellion and hegemony. They tend to be centered
in struggle for autonomy and freedom from exploitation by small groups from larger
groups or by large groups under the thumb of powerful minorities.
Ethnic consciousness is a factor that propels ethnic conflict. Ethnic consciousness
implies the loyalty or attachment to an ethnic group either as a social, political
and economic entity, or a cultural community. So it is based on the promotion of
one’s ethnic group interest as opposed to other groups. Although ethnic
consciousness cannot be said to oppose the process of nation building but it is an
instrument through which an individual shows his own identity. Moreover, ethnic
conflict and ethnic consciousness existed in both the pre-colonial era and the colonial
period, though the colonialist promotes it to suit their interest. For instance, in northern
Nigeria, the colonialist pursued an active policy of segregating northerners from
southerners. Initially, the indigenous residents of a town in the North got along very well

22. 22
with migrants from the other parts of the North and also from the south. This was an
embarrassment to the colonialist who later invented the policy of “Sabongari”. Migrants
were forced to live apart from the indigenous populations in areas designated as
sabon-gari or “strangers quarters”. It is in this regard that Nnoli (1978) observed
that, “contrary to Euro-American propaganda, contemporary ethnicity in Nigeria is not
the result of some primitive mystique of the African causing one linguistic group to fight
another, but the result of the need for the local population to adapt to the colonial
and neo-colonial society”.
Ethnic conflict is a conflict that is inspired by ethnic factors. Onigu and Isaac (1999)
have identified seven main factors as sources of conflict. These are:
a) The land space and the resources available which consequently degenerate into
the question of “settlers” and “indigenes”.
b) Secondly, is the jurisdiction of certain traditional rulers and chiefs. For
example, when a king of one ethnic group or sub-ethnic group claims
rulership over people belonging to another ethnic group, his action often
generates conflict.
c) The creation of local government area councils and the location of their
headquarters is the third factor generating conflicts.
d) The fourth factor is the competition over access to scarce political and
economic resources for instance. The creation of states and local government
area councils mean the availability of more political and administrative
positions in the localities.
e) Contestants mobilize members of their ethnic and religious group for support
in the competition to hold such positions.

23. 23
f) The fifth factor derives from the micro and macro-social structures in
Nigeria as can be seen in the conflicting cultural interest, values and
preferences. So, the exploited coexistence of cultural, ethnic, and religious
differences amongst people in the same polity is itself inherently conflicting.
g) The sixth factor is the population growth and expansion tendencies to sustain
ethnic bound occupations. This occupation has to do with land and other
available resources. A resource in this sense may be seen as an opportunity
in the environment that has been identified and appraised by a population
of potential users.
h) The seventh sphere of conflict is the perception of disregard for cultural symbols
and the “pollution” of cultural practices which if it goes unchecked will lead to
violent conflict. It is noteworthy that, Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious country.
Fundamentally, the colonial economic policies led to the formation of ethnic
associations while the period of depression of 1928-1934 corresponding to the
period of the government’s most extensive withdrawal from social welfare
services, witnessed the unrivaled growth in the number and membership of these
associations. In order to emancipate their members from this socio-economic and
the adverse effects of the system of inequality imposed by the colonial order, the
various ethnic groups engaged in vicious competition with one another which severely
strained the social fabric of the nation.
Consequently, the inter-ethnic suspicion and subsequent feud that accompanied the
formation and activities of the political class resulted in various crises such as the
Kano riot of 1953 which was ethnic conflict in nature between the Hausas and the
Igbos, Census crises of 1962/63, the Action Group crises in the West in 1962, the

24. 24
1964 Federal election crisis and the Western Nigeria election crisis of 1965. All
these prompted the military intervention into the nation’s body politics.
The military coup of January 1966 had ethnic coloration as majority of those that were
killed were the leaders of the Northern and Western regions. Based on this, Nnoli (1978)
observed that, the coup was: “an attempt to limit ethnic competition through the use of
pre-emptive violence. Six of the seven majors and eighteen out of the other twenty-
three who actively participated in plotting and executing the coup came from the
same ethnic group.”
Consequently, Usman (2002:3) further observed that “there were of course, many other
cases of violent communal conflicts which did not get prominent treatment in the
media or, by the government and opinion leaders and politicians”. In this regard
one can observe that ethnic conflicts are no longer confined to urban centres,
which was earlier identified as the cradle site of antagonistic ethnicity, where
prompt attention is given to any violent eruption by both the press and the government.
Thus, we have the ruralization of ethnic conflicts as different ethnic groups that have
shared centuries and decades of more or less peaceful co-existence have been pitched
against one another as mortal enemies. In essence, this means that ethnic conflict
not only take place in urban centres but also in rural areas. Also, from the
various expositions made, it is understood that ethnic conflicts do not only happen
between the major ethnic groups in the country, i.e. Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo but
also in-between them, e.g. between the Hausas and Fulani over farm and grazing
land, among the Yorubas like the Ife and Modakeke conflicts, among others;
likewise there is intra-minority ethnic conflict like the Tiv-Jukun, Jukun-Kuteb, Bajju,
Ikulu, among others.

25. 25
Consequently, violent conflicts lead to loss of lives, properties and distrust among
the conflicting groups. It is in this view that Usman (2002:) observed that, “One of
the widespread attitudes towards these violent communal conflicts especially in the
immediate aftermath of bloodshed, the arson and other devastations, is that they are
just the result of madness by those involved. The perpetrators of this violence, on
both sides and even the actual planners do not appear to gain anything tangible
beyond the satisfaction of eliminating an Enemy.”
Meanwhile, it is due to the persistent ethnic conflicts which in most cases are violent in
nature that the principle of Federal Character and other national policies such as the
National Youth Service Corps Scheme and unity schools were introduced in order to
allay the fears of minorities, promotes unity in diversity and as well enhances even
development. Also the Federal Character Principle that is enshrined as part of our
national laws was meant to ensure the adoption of the quota system and equity in
appointments, provision of social amenities and infrastructures, etc. across all ethnic
groups in the country. Despite this, ethnic groups are alleging bias in favour of the other
making allegations against each other.
Meanwhile, Sako (1998) concluded that “at this age, ethnic conflict should not be a
factor that would take us back into the dark ages”.
2.3.2 Inordinate Supplies of Arms
The ready availability of small arms in Africa is a major factor in sustaining and fuelling
conflict. Considerable supplies of small arms are in circulation from previous wars. For
example, between 1972 and 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia imported $8 billion worth of
small arms and light weapons. In 1992, the Angolan government distributed an estimated
700,000 rifles to the population for their defense against UNITA. Caches of arms exist
throughout the continent and Africa has active trading networks that move arms between

26. 26
countries. However imports of arms, primarily from former Soviet Bloc countries,
continue to grow and to sustain conflict. The increasing capacity within Africa to
manufacture ammunition has removed yet another constraint on the use of small arms.
The ready availability and relatively low cost of small arms has been coupled with the
emergence of a network of both local and international dealers who trade arms for
minerals or other resources. This has been a major factor in prolonging African conflict
most especially in northern Nigerian, which has become self-sustaining conflicts and
consequently less amenable to external mediation or intervention.
2.3.3 Religious Conflict
A large number of religious belief systems and practices thrive in Nigeria. They
include ancient eastern religions such as Buddhism and newer philosophical beliefs
such as the Grail Movement. Most religious space is however, covered by
numerous Islamic and Christian sects and movements. The fact that the two main
religions have sacred texts that are accepted by virtually all sects and groups has
not prevented the growth of serious conflicts caused by different theological
interpretations. Nonetheless, factional and sectarian differences and struggles linked
to ideological, political and leadership variables seem to play a more important
role than theological differences.
Gofwen (2000) observed that religious intolerance has been identified as the major
source of religious conflict in all societies existing as long as the history of
mankind, and permeating all forms of human civilizations with attendant
destructive tendencies. He further stressed that no system could be found to be
impervious to it wherever it existed, because deeper cleavages are created in society by it
more than any other factors. Meanwhile, Balogun (1998) defines religious intolerance as

27. 27
“hostility towards other religious as well as the inability of religious adherents, to
harmonize between the theories and the practical aspect of religion”.
From this definition, one can understand that religious conflict is not only common
between different religions but as well between and among the same religions. It
is in this regard that Yau (1998) classified religious conflict into three categories.
These are “intra-religious conflicts, inter-religious and state versus religious
groups conflicts”. One thing to note here is that, a particular conflict could
degenerate to another conflict or from one type to another. An example is, a state
versus religious groups conflict can degenerate into an inter-religious conflict or vice
versa. Also commenting on the influence of the political economy on religious
conflicts in Nigeria, Yau (1998:18) opined that; With the collapse of the living
conditions of the majority of the citizens due to worsening economic crises engendered
by the Structural Adjustment Programmed (SAP), living became a precarious
endeavour for the majority; this created communal tension across neighboring
communities, which exploded in religious conflicts where the communities were
divided both ethnically and religiously. This was the case with the Kafanchan, Zangon-
Kataf and Tafawa-Balewa conflicts which although were sparked-off by religious
misunderstanding, they centred on the questions of land ownership, means of the
economic sustenance and local traditional institution. In these cases, the
“indigenous” Christian people believed that the Hausa/Fulani Muslims “Settlers”
have usurped their land in addition, to a deep-seated resentment against the
Hausa/Fulani traditional rule in their domains. The state-versus religious group
conflicts is when security forces and law enforcement agencies are pitted against
religious groups, which seem to either reject the authority of the state or contest
its legitimacy. For example, the Kaduna 1996 conflict was because of the demonstration

28. 28
staged by the Shiites demanding the release of their leaders which event also
resurfaced in 2015. This resulted in confrontation, which spread to Zaria town where the
Shiites beat a retreat of army troops which end in operation fire for fire that led to the
destruction of houses and loss of properties owned by the Shiites.
Christian activists are concerned mainly with what they regard as the threat of the
Islamization of the country and the imposition of the Sharia on Non-Muslims. The use of
state resources to subsidize Islamic activities, in particular the annual pilgrimage to
Mecca and the government take-over of missionary schools. Linked to these
concerns is the tradition of Muslim political hegemony in the country and in the army.
Christians worry that most regimes in the country’s post-independence history have
been dominated and led by northern Muslim politicians or military officers,
(International IDEA, 2000). Also Elaigwu (1999) outlined the series of violent
religious incidents in the country. The aforementioned chain of violent religious
events in the country have much hampered social integration, economic and
political development and above all nation building. Moreover, the local
governments areas which is basically the grass root level and where most of these
violent crises do emanate from and then transcend to the urban centres are mostly
affected devastatingly as all ingredients needed for socio-economic and political
development are dampened and vandalized, while confidence and mutual trust
among people is eroded.
Before now, Kafanchan College of Education was another scene of religious conflict in
March 30, 1987. The conflict according to Ola (1987: 3-4, 25) started when an itinerant
Christian preacher who was a recent convert from Islam, went to preach at a weekend
gathering organized by the fellowship of Christian students (FCS) in the predominantly
Christian town. In preparation of the programme, the Christian students printed a banner

29. 29
that read “Jesus Campus” at the gate of the college. That was used to direct invited
guests to the venue of the meeting. But the Muslim students allegedly pulled this down
under the excuse that Jesus does not own the campus in which they also dwelt. The
Muslim students of the college had raised an alarm to their fellow Muslims over
the inciting and allegedly blasphemous statement made by the preacher during the
programme.
They accused the preacher, one Reverend Bello Abubakar Bako, of denigrating Islam
and the Holy Qur’an. They went to confront their Christian colleagues and said
that Reverend Abubakar deserved to be punished for this “heresy”. On the strength of
this offence, the Muslim students allegedly physically attacked Reverend Abubakar and
their Christian colleagues in the process (News Watch, March 15, 1987:3-4, 25).
The conflict which was small at the beginning degenerated into violent religious conflict
that spread into the town. Within few hours, churches and mosques in Kafanchan
town were razed down. The week-long conflict soon turned into an orgy of bloody
confrontation between Muslims and Christians, spreading to neighbouring towns like
Kankia, Funtua, Kaduna metropolis, Zaria and environs. It was only the “shoot at
sight” order of the then GOC, Peter Ademokhai that halted the murderous ethno-
religious conflict thereby sparing the lives of many innocent Christians and
Muslims. The escalation of the conflict was blamed on Radio Nigeria, Kaduna, which
soon after the incident in Kafanchan, was alleged to have reported on an hourly interval
that Christians in Kafanchan were killing Muslims while some other Muslims had
fled into hiding and that two mosques had been burnt down and copies of Holy Qur’an
were being burnt in public. The riot was said to be particularly serious in Zaria where
over 40 churches, including that reported to be the oldest in northern Nigeria – St.
Bartholomew’s Angelical Church – were burnt. The family home of Nigeria’s former

30. 30
Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, adjoining a church, was vandalized and set on
fire. Not satisfied with that the rioters attempted to exhume the remains of Gowon’s
late father (Newswatch,March 15, 1987:25).
The conflict equally spread over to Kankia and Makarfi towns. By the time the riot
was brought under control, 25 people had died, 61 injured, over 6000 persons arrested
and property valued at millions of naira had been damaged. Between 40 and 47
churches, 3 mosques, 46 private houses, 19 vehicles and 30 hotels were destroyed.
Goods, shops, workshops, offices and petrol (fuel) stations were also destroyed (The
Guardian, March 15, 1987:17).
2.3.4 Unemployment, Lack of Education and Population Pressure
Areas with high levels of unemployment among young men and where male educational
levels are low face a far higher risk of conflict. Throughout Africa, factional conflict has
drawn on a pool of marginalized or socially excluded young men. Increasing insecurity
of land tenure in Nigeria and the high levels of rural unemployment provided a ready
group of participants in conflicts. For instance, the conflict in Liberia was fought by
socially marginalized young men.
Countries suffer from many different consequences of violent conflict. Violent conflict
kills people in different ways although it is often difficult to estimate how many.
Civilians and soldiers are killed in combat because of a higher prevalence of diseases
and increase in violent conflict.
Countries that have experienced violent conflict also face a high risk of renewed conflict.
It leads to unemployment and loss of income owing to disruption of economic activity,
destruction of infrastructure, uncertainty, increased cost of doing business, and capital
flight.

31. 31
Furthermore, social spending is often cut to accommodate increased military spending,
and the economy undergoes structural changes. Dealing with the consequences of violent
conflict is a humanitarian imperative; but it is also important because it decreases the
risk of the conflict recurring.
The following are some of the specific consequences of conflicts.
Economic decline
The economy usually declines relative to its peacetime trend such that by the end of a
conflict the economy is significantly smaller than it would have been had peace been
maintained. Understanding this economic contraction process is helpful in designing
remedial policies for the post-conflict phase.
Infrastructure
The most obvious legacy of conflict is destruction of public infrastructure. However,
infrastructure does not only deteriorate as a result of direct damage from conflict. As the
government shifts expenditure towards the military, public investment and expenditure
on maintenance are squeezed. The post-conflict legacy of these effects is an acute
shortage of public capital.
Security spending
During crisis, security spending inevitably increases as the government attempts to
enhance its capacity to resist the revolt. High security spending during conflict is hard to
reverse. During the post-conflict decade, security spending is usually maintained at a
high level, with little peace dividend being taken. This is in part a corollary of the high
risk of reversion to conflict, governments respond to risk by increasing military
spending. A more mundane reason is that rebel forces often need to be integrated into the
regular army; as a result, military forces expand instead of contracting. Even if forces are

32. 32
demobilized, there are substantial short-term costs. A more worrying reason is that by
the end of the crisis, the military is inevitably large and influential and is likely to lobby
for continued high military spending. One possible explanation for the post-conflict
effect is that the chosen level of military spending inadvertently becomes a signal of
government intentions. A radical reduction in military spending, as done by the post-
conflict government of Mozambique, may be understood by potential opponents as
indicating that the government intends to be inclusive rather than rely upon heavy
repression. Conversely, continued high military spending may be interpreted as an
intention to rule by force and may thus provoke violent pre-emptive opposition. One of
the implications is that sharp reductions in the military budget may directly enhance
peace as well as free up resources for reconstruction.
Time horizons
During conflict, military victory, or at least the avoidance of defeat, becomes an
overriding priority for government, which then shifts resources away from strategies that
only have long-term pay-offs towards those that deliver short-term gains. In economic
terms, this can be thought of as a shortening of time horizons, or an increase in the
government’s discount rate. The same shortening of time horizons is likely to affect
private economic behaviour. Faced with the uncertainties of civil war, people discount
the future more heavily. One of the consequences of discounting the future more heavily
is an increase in opportunistic behaviour. Normally, the main defence against
opportunism is people’s concern about not acquiring a reputation for opportunism since
this will harm their ability to be trusted in future deals. However, as the future becomes
more uncertain, there is a stronger incentive to snatch opportunities as they arise. Hence,
one of the legacies of conflict is heightened opportunism in the society, which in turn

33. 33
reduces productivity in all activities that normally depend on an element of trust. In
particular, it may be typically difficult to enforce credit.
Capital flight
During conflict, both fear and reduced opportunities induce people to withdraw
themselves and their assets to safety abroad. People with skills are best-placed to leave
the country: they are better able to finance emigration and they are more welcome in host
countries. Hence, society tends to lose its skilled people disproportionately. Alongside
the haemorrhage of skills is that of capital. People move assets abroad, simply to keep
them safe, and because the return on investment within the economy declines as
economic conditions deteriorate. The legacy of this flight of capital is an acute shortage
of skills, a large diaspora, a collapse in private investment, and an accumulation of
private wealth abroad.
Structural changes
The civil service, law, accountancy, and medicine are most vulnerable to the loss of
skilled people and the rise of opportunism. By definition, all the professions are skills-
intensive. However, they are also highly dependent upon internalized standards of
honesty. Hence, the rise of opportunism is damaging. One of the legacies of the flight of
skilled people and the rise of opportunism is deterioration in the performance of both the
civil service and the private professions. One of the causes of change is the different
degree of vulnerability of activities during crisis. If combatants raid movable assets, such
as livestock, and steal valuable crops, rural households may shift to less vulnerable
subsistence activities. Hence, one of the legacies of prolonged conflict is likely to be the
retreat of the rural economy away from market activities. Another source of structural
change arises from changes in demand. The collapse in investment during prolonged
conflict reduces demand in sectors that produce investment goods, especially the

34. 34
construction sector. Hence, a legacy of conflict is a shrunken construction sector.
Because of these structural changes, there is a further loss in skills. The maintenance of a
stock of acquired skills depends upon their repeated use and transmission. Therefore,
sustained contraction in output in a sector depletes the stock of skills. This can be
thought of as “forgetting by not doing”, a process somewhat analogous to reversing
“learning-by-doing”, which is normally a major force in productivity growth. The policy
legacy during crisis, governments tend to become desperate: as a result, policy and
governance deteriorate. The need for higher military spending collides with a decline in
tax revenues as the private formal economy contracts. Furthermore, aid declines as the
government is shut out of international credit markets and domestic credit markets dry
up. In response, the government resorts to an inflation tax, leaving the post-conflict
economy with a legacy of high inflation and reduced confidence in the currency (Adam,
Collier and Davies, 2008). Resorting to the inflation tax is merely the most obvious of a
wide range of unsustainable policies that sacrifice the future for the present. The short-
sighted policies adopted during war would have started to inflict costs by the time of
peace. One of the resulting implications is an urgent need for economic reform. More
disturbingly, the post-conflict fiscal situation may not be sustainable, and reform may be
needed merely to avert collapse.
2.4 Steps toward Peace Declaration
The following have been identified as the major strategies for the management of
conflicts in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government Area of Kaduna State.
2.4.1. Acknowledgement of Causes and Consequences of Violence
i. There exist fundamental fault lines within communities that manifest through violence.
These differences are grounded in discrimination based on the status of the person as
either indigene or settler as partly informed by history.

35. 35
ii. The Nigerian Constitution declares the concept of indigenization among other
reasons to protect the minority communities against the fear of domination by the larger
ethnic communities. This has had some unintended effects such as creating divisions
among Nigerians as either being first indigene or settler, rather than citizens of Nigeria.
ii. Traditional leadership and conflict resolution systems have been weakened,
reducing the capacity of communities to manage and prevent conflict and
criminality.
iii. Vacuum existing in arbitration and mediation mechanisms. This vacuum has
created the need for physical security to become of paramount concern with
various forces such as vigilantes and ethnic militias attempting to provide security
alongside security forces. Consequently, the competition of the various forces is less
effective security for all, less effective capacity for Government institutions to
provide services and maintain law and order.
iv. Lack of apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators.
v. Weak political-will which has led to the failure of governments to end violence.
vi. Unemployed youths with easy access to drugs are easily lured into violent acts.
vii. Failure to compensate victims of crisis resulting in feelings of anger which were
easily translated into violence.
viii. Violent conflict spillovers resulting from or across State borders, ethnic and
religious communities.
2.4.2. Strategies for Management of Conflicts
i. Bring the perpetrators of past violence to justice.
ii. Resettle or compensate Internally Displaced People (IDP’s).
iii. Offer compensation to victims and work towards institutional reforms to prevent
further violence

36. 36
iv. Recognize the history of oppression by some communities against each
other with narratives of pain passed on from generation to generation that
in turn contributed to violence to the communities perceived as oppressors.
v. Political leaders, traditional rulers, community and religious leaders, youth
organizations and non-governmental organizations should be united with the
aspiration of promoting peace and development among the various ethnic and
religious groups in Kafanchan.
vi. There should be fairness and equity in the establishment and distribution of
social amenities as well as infrastructural development in the Local
Government Areas in Kaduna State.
vii. Security agencies and apparatus should be equipped, trained and retrained in
order to enhance their ability in discharging their duties and responsibilities of
promoting peace and security in Kafanchan.
viii. Recruitment and appointment into government offices and parastatals at all
levels should reflect the geographical spread of the Local Government Areas in
the State.
ix. The rule of law should be uphold and applied on every citizen irrespective of
individual prominence or position in the society.

37. 37
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction
This is the procedure that was used in carrying out the study. The following sub-
headings were covered: research design, population of the study, sampling techniques,
instruments and method of data analysis.
3.1 Research Design
The design for this research was the stratified sampling method which was adopted to
ensure that the sample had certain characteristics that were representative of the
population on key variables; politicians, community and religious leaders, traders and
youth leaders. These target groups were purposely selected because of their relevance to
the research. Apart from the fact that they constituted a good sample size, they were able
to provide reliable views on the topic for this research. Questionnaires were administered
to obtain the desired information on the implication of the conflicts in Kafanchan.
3.2 Area of Study
The study was designed to examine the 2011-2017 Kafanchan conflicts, their implication
and remedy. Kafanchan has witnessed an atrocious waste of life and properties with
spill-over in Kaduna metropolis and other local government areas in the state and
beyond.
3.3 Population of the Study Area
The population of the study was the inhabitants of Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government
Area of Kaduna State.

38. 38
Kafanchan is a town in the southern part of Kaduna State in north-west Nigeria. It is the
location of a junction station of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. As at 2017
Kafanchan had an estimated population of 94,092.
It is dominated by Hausa/Fulani under Jama'a Emirate Council, while it environs
consists of Fanstwan and Kaninkon people. Other tribes found in Kafanchan area include
Bajju, Ham (Jaba) and Kagoro with strangers which include Igbo, Yoruba among others.
The dominant religions in Kafanchan are Christianity and Islam.
3.4 Sample and Sampling Technique
A sampling procedure is a systematic process employed to select a required proportion
of a target population due to financial constraint and limitation of time. Stratified
sampling techniques was adopted here. In view of this, Kafanchan was purposely
chosen because it has over the years witnessed some sectarian conflicts that have
attracted national attention in the southern part of Kaduna State.
Thirty (30) respondents were randomly selected from the five villages; these were
selected within Jema’a Local Government Area with a total of five ethnic groups. In
determining the sample size, the five (5) villages were used.
The sample was randomly selected from the five villages; in all one hundred and fifty (150)
people constituted the sample for the study area.
3.5 Instrument for Data Collection
The instrument for the collection of data for this study was the questionnaire. The
questionnaire was divided into sections A, B, and C. Section A contained the bio data
of the respondents, such as; sex, age, level of education background, and employment status.
Section B was on the implication of conflicts in Kafanchan while Section C was on conflict
management in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

39. 39
Questions on general information were drawn in such a way that the respondents
answered by ticking the appropriate column; in other words, the questionnaire was
structured.
The respondents responded to the questions by ticking ( ) on the alternative
columns provided.
3.6 Administration of the Instrument
Copies of the questionnaires were administered on the following categories of people,
namely; politicians, community and religious leaders, traders and youth leaders.
The data employed for this study was obtained via the administration of the
questionnaire. A total of one hundred and fifty (150) copies of the questionnaire were
administered by the researcher personally on the respondents in the sampled areas and
collected immediately but only one hundred and twenty-five (125) of them were
properly completed. This implies that the response rate was approximately 83%.
Number administered 150
Number returned 125
% Response 83
According to Nworgu (1991), “where all the questionnaires returned are less than 70%,
the result could differ considerably”. Therefore a response rate of 83% can be considered
adequate for valid statistical analysis.
The table above shows the rate of questionnaire administered.

40. 40
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
In this chapter, the data obtained with the aid of the questionnaire are carefully
presented. In the presentation, frequency tables and percentages were used to further
display clearly the data collected.
Table 4.1: Distribution of the Respondents by Gender
Sex Respondents Percent (%)
Male 75 60.0
Female 50 40.0
Total 125 100%
Table 4.1 above shows that out of the 125 respondents, 75 were from male and 50 were
female respondents. This means that 60% of the respondents are male while the
remaining 40% are female.
Table 4.2: Marital Status of Respondents
Marital Status Respondents Percent (%)
Married 67 53.6%
Single 55 44%
Divorce 0 0%
Widow 3 2.4%
Separated 0 0%
Total 125 100%

41. 41
Table 4.2 above shows the distribution of the respondents in terms of marital status. 67
of them were married, this constituted 53.6%, 55 of them were singles, representing
44% of the respondents while the remaining 3 were widows which is 2.4% of the
total respondents.
Table 4.3: Age Distribution of Respondents
Age Group Respondents Percent (%)
15-20 years 5 4.0
21-30 years 27 21.6
31-40 years 30 24.0
41-50 years 26 20.8
Above 50 years 37 29.6
Total 125 100%
Table 4.3 above displays the age distribution of the respondents. The analysis of the
age distribution of the respondents revealed that 5 of the respondents were between
the age of 15-20 years was 4% of the total respondents, the number within the age
group 21–30 years old were 27 representing 21.6% of the total respondents, the number
within the age range of 31–40 years old were 30 respondents which was 24% of the total
respondents, those within the age range of 41–50 years old were 26 representing 20.8%
while majority of them which were 37 were above 50 years representing 29.6%.
Table 4.4: Educational Qualification of Respondents
Respondents Qualification Respondents Percentage (%)
SSCE / GCE 12 9.6
Dip/ NCE 42 33.6

42. 42
HND /1st
Degree 52 41.6%
Postgraduate degree 16 12.8
Islamic studies 3 2.4
Total 125 100.0
The above Table 4.4 shows the educational qualification distribution of the respondents.
In terms of educational qualification of the respondents, the respondents with SSCE
/ GCE holders were 12 representing 9.6%, 42 representing 33.6% were Diploma/NCE
holders, 52 of them constituting 41.6% of the total respondents are either HND or first
degree holders, those with Post Graduate Qualification were 16 which represents 12.8%
of the respondents, while those with Islamic education were 3 representing 2.4% of the
total respondents.
Table 4.5: Occupational Distribution of Respondents
Occupation Respondents Percentage (%)
Politician 20 16.0
Community/religious leader 19 15.2
Retired military personnel 5 4.0
Member of youth organization 10 8.0
Security Personnel 5 4.0
Civil servant 20 16.0
Business man /woman / trader 20 16.0
Unemployed 16 12.8
Farmer 10 8.0
Total 125 100.0

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The above Table 4.5 shows the occupational distribution of respondents. The analysis of
the respondents who belonged to the three categories of politician, civil servant and
business men /women / traders were each 20 (16%) in number. The group of
Community/religious leaders were 19 (15.2%) respondents; retired military personnel
and security personnel were each 5 (4.0%) respondents; members of youth organization
and farmers each had 10 respondents while the group of unemployed had 16 (12.8%)
respondents.
Section B: Implication of the Conflicts
Data relating to the first research question and hypotheses was obtained from responses
to questions in section B of the questionnaire. The tables below shows the response
pattern to items in this section of the questionnaire.
Table 4.6: The Series of Conflicts in Kafanchan has Retarded Educational
Development at the Local Government Area level in the State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 30 24.
Agreed 76 60.8
Disagreed 13 10.4
Strongly Disagreed 5 4
I don’t know 1 0.8
Total 125 100
Table 4.6 above shows that thirty respondents strongly agreed that the series of conflicts
in Kafanchan has retarded educational development at the Local Government Area level
in the state. Seventy six (76) respondents agreed, thirteen respondents disagreed and five
respondents strongly disagreed that the series of conflict in Kafanchan has retarded the

44. 44
educational development at the Local Government Area level of the state while the
remaining one respondents said he did not know whether the conflict has retarded the
educational development or not.
Table 4.7: The Series of Conflicts in Kafanchan has Retarded Infrastructural
Development in the State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 33 26.4
Agreed 63 50.4
Disagreed 17 13.6
Strongly Disagreed 6 4.8
I don’t know 6 4.8
Total 125 100
Table 4.7 above shows that 33 (26.4%) strongly agreed while sixty three respondents
agreed that series of conflicts in Kafanchan has retarded infrastructural development in
the State. 17 respondents (13.6%) disagreed while six respondents strongly disagreed
that series of conflicts in Kafanchan has retarded infrastructural development in the
State. However, the remaining six respondents (4.8%) said that they don’t know whether
the conflicts retarded infrastructural development or not.
Table 4.8: The Series of Conflicts in Kafanchan Jema’a Local Government Area of
Kaduna State has Negatively Affected Investment Profile at the Local Government
Area Level in the State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 27 21.6

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Agreed 68 54.4
Disagreed 21 16.8
Strongly Disagreed 7 5.6
I don’t know 2 1.6
Total 125 100
Table 4.8 above shows that 27 respondents (21.6%) strongly agreed while sixty eight
respondents agreed that the series of conflicts in Kafanchan Jema’a Local Government
Area of Kaduna State has negatively affected investment profile at the Local
Government Area Level in the state. 21 respondents (16.8%) disagreed while 7 (5.6%)
strongly disagreed that the series of conflicts in Kafanchan Jema’a Local Government
Area of Kaduna State has negatively affected investment profile at the Local
Government Area Level in the state. However, the remaining 2 respondents (1.6%) said
that they did not know whether the crises negatively affected the investment profile or
not.

46. 46
Table 4.9: The polarization of Kafanchan along the ethnic and religious divide
undermines the much needed unity, peace and progress at the Local Government
Area level in the State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 20 16
Agreed 84 67.2
Disagreed 16 12.8
Strongly Disagreed 3 2.4
I don’t know 2 1.6
Total 125 100
From Table 4.9 above, the data displayed shows that 20 respondents strongly agreed
while 84 respondents agreed that the polarization of Kafanchan along ethnic and
religious divide undermines the much needed unity, peace and progress at the Local
Government Area level in the State. 16 respondents (12.8%) disagreed while three
respondents strongly disagreed that polarization of Kafanchan along ethnic and religious
divide undermines the much needed unity, peace and progress at the Local
Government Area level in the State. However, the remaining 2 (1.6%) said that they did
not know the consequences of polarization along ethnic and religious lines on unity,
peace and progress in the Local Government Area.

47. 47
Table 4.10: The series of conflicts in Kafanchan in Kaduna State has
heightened tension, suspicion and marginalization among the people of the State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 15 12
Agreed 86 68.8
Disagreed 19 15.2
Strongly Disagreed 2 1.6
I don’t know 3 2.4
Total 125 100
Table 4.10 above shows that fifteen respondents strongly agreed while eighty six
respondents agreed that the series of conflicts in Kafanchan has heightened tension,
suspicion and marginalization among the people of the State. Nineteen respondents
disagreed while two strongly disagreed with the proposition. The remaining three
respondents said they did not know whether the conflicts heightened tension, suspicion
and marginalization or not.
Table 4.11: The tension, suspicion and marginalization in Kafanchan in Kaduna
State have undermined the peaceful and social co-existence among the people of the
state.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 52 41.6
Agreed 28 22.4
Disagreed 21 16.8

48. 48
Strongly Disagreed 16 12.8
I don’t know 8 6.4
Total 125 100
Table 4.11 shows that 52 respondents representing 41.6% strongly agreed while 28
respondents representing 22.4% agreed that tension, suspicion and marginalization in
Kafanchan have undermined peaceful and social co-existence among the people of the
state. 21 respondents representing 16.8% disagreed while 16 respondents (12.8%)
strongly disagreed with this assumption. The remaining eight respondents said that they
did not know whether tension, suspicion and marginalization in Kafanchan undermines
peaceful and social coexistence or not.
Section C: Conflict Management Mechanisms in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local
Government Area of Kaduna State.
Table 4.12: Political leaders, traditional rulers, community and religious leaders,
youth organizations and non-governmental organizations should be united with the
aspiration of promoting peace and development among the various ethno-religious
groups in Kaduna State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 25 20
Agreed 98 78.4
Disagreed 1 0.8
Strongly Disagreed 0 0
I don’t know 1 0.8
Total 125 100

49. 49
Table 4.12 above shows that twenty five respondents strongly agreed while ninety eight
agreed that political leaders, traditional rulers, community and religious leaders, youth
organizations and non-governmental organizations should be united with the aspiration
of promoting peace and development among the various ethno-religious groups in
Kaduna State. One respondents disagreed while the remaining one said he did not know
if the leaders and different organization should be united on the issue of peace or not.
Table 4.13: There should be fairness and equity in the establishment and
distribution of social amenities and infrastructural development in the various
Local Government Areas in Kaduna State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 23 18.4
Agreed 94 75.2
Disagreed 4 3.2
Strongly Disagreed 3 2.4
I don’t know 1 0.8
Total 125 100
Table 4.13 above shows that twenty three respondents strongly agreed while ninety four
respondents agreed that there should be fairness and equity in the establishment and
distribution of social amenities and infrastructural development in the various Local
Government Areas in Kaduna State. Four respondents disagreed while three respondents
strongly disagreed that there should be fairness and equity in the establishment and
distribution of social amenities and infrastructural development in the various Local
Government Areas in Kaduna State. However, a lone respondent did not know if there

50. 50
should be fairness or not in the establishment and distribution of amenities and
infrastructures.
Table 4.14: Security agencies and apparatus should be equipped, trained and
retrained in order to enhance their ability in discharging their duties and
responsibilities of promoting peace and security in the various Local Government
Areas of Kaduna State.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 70 56
Agreed 53 42.4
Disagreed 1 0.8
Strongly Disagreed 1 0.8
I don’t know 0 0
Total 125 100
As observed in the above Table 4.14, 70 respondents (56%) strongly agreed while 53
respondents (42.4%) agreed that security agencies and apparatus should be equipped,
trained and retrained in order to enhance their ability in discharging their duties and
responsibilities of promoting peace and security in the various Local Government Areas
of Kaduna State. 2 respondents (1.6%) rejected the notion (one very strongly) that
security agencies and apparatus should be equipped, trained and retrained in order to
enhance their ability in discharging their duties and responsibilities of promoting peace
and security in the various Local Government Areas of Kaduna State.
Table 4.15: Recruitment and appointment into government offices and parastatals
at all levels should reflect the geographical spread of the various Local Government
Areas in the State.

51. 51
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 23 18.4
Agreed 89 71.2
Disagreed 4 3.2
Strongly Disagreed 3 2.4
I don’t know 6 4.8
Total 125 100
From Table 4.15 above, 23 respondents strongly agreed while 89 respondents agreed that
recruitment and appointment into government offices and parastatals at all levels should
reflect the geographical spread of the various Local Government Areas in the State. Four
respondents disagreed while three respondents strongly disagreed with this notion.
However, six respondents said they did not have any idea of what position to talk on the
proposal.
Table 4:16: Provision of job opportunities can reduce the high rate of poverty and
also reduce the chances of conflict in Kafanchan.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 39 31.2
Agreed 84 67.2
Disagreed 2 1.6
Strongly Disagreed 0 0
I don’t know 0 0
Total 125 100

52. 52
Table 4.16 above indicates that thirty nine respondents strongly agreed while eighty four
respondents agreed that the provision of job opportunities can reduce the high rate of
poverty and minimize the chances of conflict in Kafanchan. The remaining two
respondents disagreed that provision of job opportunities can reduce the high rate of
poverty and minimize the chances of conflict in Kafanchan.
Table 4.17: The rule of law should be uphold and applied on every citizen
irrespective of individual prominence or position in the society.
Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agreed 23 18.4
Agreed 89 71.2
Disagreed 4 3.2
Strongly Disagreed 3 2.4
I don’t know 6 4.8
Total 125 100
In table 4.17 above, twenty three respondents strongly agreed while eighty nine
respondents agreed that the rule of law should be upheld and applied on every citizen
irrespective of individual prominence or position in the society. Four respondents
disagreed while three strongly disagreed with this proposal that the rule of law should be
upheld and applied on every citizen irrespective of individual prominence or position in
the society. The remaining six respondents could not say whether the objective and
impartial application of the rule of law would be of any value in stemming the conflict.

53. 53
Research Findings
From the analyses of the research questions data, the following are the major findings of
this study:
1. Effects of Conflicts in Kafanchan
The following have been identified as the major effects of conflicts in Kafanchan.
i. Retardation of educational development in Kafanchan.
ii. Retardation of infrastructural development in Kafanchan.
iii. Negative impact on the investment profile of the state.
iv. Polarization of the state into ethnic and religious divide.
v. Absence of unity, peace and progress at the local government level.
vi. Prevalence of heightened tension, suspicion and marginalization among the
people of the state.
vii. Absence of genuine peaceful and social co-existence among the people of
Kafanchan.
2. Strategies for Management of Conflicts in Kafanchan
The following have been identified as the major strategies for the management of
conflicts in Kafanchan.
i. Political leaders, traditional rulers, community and religious leaders, youth
organizations and non-governmental organizations should be united with the
aspiration of promoting peace and development among the various ethnic and
religious groups in Kafanchan.
ii. There should be fairness and equity in the establishment and distribution of
social amenities as well as infrastructural development in the Local
Government Areas in Kaduna State.

54. 54
iii. Security agencies and apparatuses should be equipped, trained and retrained
in order to enhance their ability in discharging their duties and
responsibilities of promoting peace and security in Kafanchan.
iv. Recruitment and appointment into government offices and parastatals at all
levels should reflect the geographical spread of the Local Government Areas in
the state.
v. Provision of job opportunities can reduce the high rate of poverty and minimize
the chances of conflict in Kafanchan.
vi. The rule of law should be upheld and applied to every citizen irrespective of
individual prominence or position in the society.

55. 55
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 Introduction
In this chapter, which is the concluding chapter of the research work, the
summary of the entire work is presented. Finally, recommendations on how to
manage such conflicts and possibly avoid them are proffered.
5.1 Summary
In this study, an attempt has been made to find out the implication of the 2011 – 2017
Kafanchan conflicts in Jema’a Local Government Area of Kaduna State.
It was observed in the study that the effects of these conflicts in many parts of
Nigeria hitherto known to be peaceful have worsen to a worrisome proportion. The
socio-political and economic problems associated with conflict are immediately evident
and has far reaching consequences. The trauma to which people in conflict-prone areas
are subjected and the huge costs of post-conflict reconstruction of the society take a
heavy toll on the resources that would otherwise have been invested in development
projects. In particular, it has been observed that these conflicts have very adverse
consequential effects, especially on local governments. This is because whenever and
wherever there are violent conflicts; there will be destruction of lives and
properties, arson, looting and vandalization of public structures. Hence they retard
developments and other government programmes.
Since 1992, these ethnic and religious conflicts have become more frequent, more
widespread, more violent and destructive. For, whenever it occurred, thousands of
lives and properties were lost. The questions that will readily come to one’s mind are;
What are the causes of such conflicts? What are its consequences on the local

56. 56
government areas? And how can these conflicts be hindered against continuous
occurrence?
In line with these questions, the following objectives were presented:
i. To determine the implication of the 2011-2017 conflicts in Kafanchan
ii. To find out how the continuous occurrence of the conflicts can be stopped to related in
the above regard, some research questions were raised and hypotheses were formulated
to guide the conduct of the study so as to achieve the above objectives.
In the course of the literature review for this study, it was realized that there is
need for researchers to conduct more research in the field of security and conflict
resolution in order to find lasting solution to the crises.
Therefore, recommendations from such researches tend to take a more general approach.
This study addressed this shortcoming. Herein lays one of its significance. Also, this
study sought to add more to the existing researches and as well as strengthen facts and
records as to the reasons that often ignite conflicts in Kaduna State and Kafanchan in
particular. Moreover, the study examined both the negative and positive aspects of
conflict.
The design for this research was analytical. The primary source of data collection
were used. Questionnaires were administered and conducted to obtained the desired
information on the implication of conflict in Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government
Area of Kaduna State.
Also, other sources like textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, editorials, and
articles were critically analyzed in order to arrive at the acceptable and unified research
result.
This gave the researcher the privilege to hand pick certain groups of people that were
considered knowledgeable and important in the conduct of the research. A

57. 57
questionnaire was designed and administered on the following categories of people,
namely: politicians, community and religious leaders, and youth leaders. The
questionnaire had three sections with section A addressing issues on general
information of respondents, such as sex, age, level of education background,
employment status, and residential area. Section B was on the implications of conflicts
while Section C was on conflict management.
The data obtained and used for analysis were presented with the aid of frequency tables
and percentages.
Analyses of the data gathered were the basis for answering the research questions
and testing of the research hypotheses. Consequent upon these analyses, there should
be fairness and equity in the establishment and distribution of social amenities as
well as infrastructural development in the local government areas of Kaduna State.
Security agencies and apparatus should be well equipped with modern equipment,
techniques and gadgets and they should be trained and retrained in order to enhance
their ability in discharging their duties and responsibilities of maintaining peace and
security in Kaduna State.
Recruitment and appointment into government offices and parastatals at all levels should
reflect the geographical spread of the local government areas in the state.
As for the research hypotheses, it was discovered that: Conflicts retard the development
of socio-economic development at the local government area level.
There is significant difference in the effects of conflicts and development at the
local government level in Kaduna State.
There is significant difference in the mechanisms for managing conflicts and
development in Kafanchan.

58. 58
5.2 Conclusion
Kafanchan has witness tremendous setback arising from the incessant political, ethnic
and religious conflict across the length and breadth of the state. Ethnicity and religion
have often been used as a negative force in Kaduna State with the aim of gaining power
through the manipulation of sectarian sentiments and the ignorance of the masses.
The huge cost of settling the internally displace persons arising from such conflicts in
the local government areas, the rebuilding and the reconstruction of destroyed
public properties, the set back to educational development of the pupils, the loss
of investment opportunities due to insecurity and anarchy, the polarization of urban
local government areas like Kaduna North and Kaduna South local government
areas into ethnic and religious divide impact negatively on the much desired
peace, unity and progress at the local government area level and the state at large.
In view of the above and arising from the findings of this study, it has become
imperative that some incidental beneficiaries of these conflicts like the political elites
that are either in or out of power as well as those amongst these elites who are
indigenes of the state residing within or outside the state, should guard against
negative tendencies that creates divisions among people for their unpatriotic
interests. Also, the economic elites that gain from the patronage of contracts and
profits from supplies of goods and services, which have been found to constitute
major problem to the peaceful coexistence of the people at the grassroots level
should guard against negative tendencies. The religious/community leaders who
always clamour for recognition by the government at all levels are part of the
major problem in ethnic and religious conflict at the local government level as they
are always requested to come out and control tension and the breakdown of the law
and order. The unemployed youths are yet another army that inflame the embers of

59. 59
violent conflicts across the state. This is because they derive benefit through looting,
arson and stealing of individual and public properties.
Violent conflicts last longer and are deadlier in Africa than in other regions. As a result,
the social and economic costs of conflict are higher in Africa. The costs spread well
beyond the borders of the host country to the conflict. They also endure long after
military operations end. In terms of social costs, while young men make up the highest
share of fatalities in combat, the increased disease burden disproportionately affects
women and children. Violent conflicts continue to kill long after the fighting stops.
Health sectors in post-conflict economies are devastated and unable to meet the huge
demand for health services. Usually, little resources are available to deal with the trauma
of violent conflict. Violent conflicts also have health consequences for neighboring
countries. Regional disease control programs are interrupted and preventable
communicable diseases continue to kill in Africa. However, temporary cease fires for
vaccinations and other disease control measures have been successful in lessening the
regional consequences of war. Violent conflicts in Africa also cause displacement on a
massive scale. Thus, Africa generates a high proportion of the global total of refugees
and internally displaced persons.
The economic costs of conflict are also high, although these are difficult to estimate.
They include loss of income and assets, damage to infrastructure, cuts in social spending,
increased opportunism in economic transactions, capital flight, and a legacy of poor
policy. The economic costs also endure long after the fighting stops.
Capital flight may continue while the legacy of poor policy may be hard to reverse.
Understanding and dealing with the costs of conflict is a major challenge to recovery
from conflict.

60. 60
On the basis of the findings from this study, it became necessary that some
durable solutions should be recommended on how to foster peaceful and harmonious co-
existence among the people of Kaduna State in order to promote and bring about the
much needed human and infrastructural development in Kaduna as well as Kafanchan in
particular and Nigeria in general. Consequently, the following recommendations are
geared towards this direction.
5.3 Recommendations
a) Political leaders, traditional rulers, community and religious leaders, youth
organizations and non-governmental organizations should be united with the
aspirations of promoting peace and development among the various ethnic and
religious groups in Kaduna State.
b) There should be fairness and equity in the establishment and distribution of
social amenities as well as infrastructural development in the local government
areas of Kaduna State.
c) Security agencies and apparatuses should be well equipped with modern
equipment, gadgets and techniques and be given up to date training on how to
control and manage social conflicts of such magnitude and as well to enhance
their ability in discharging their duties and responsibilities of maintaining
peace and security in the local government areas of Kaduna State.
d) Recruitments and appointments into government offices and parastatals at
all levels should reflect the geographical spread of the local government areas
in the state.

61. 61
e) The local government areas should build a culture of tolerance, trust and love
among its citizens through dialogue, workshops, and conferences in inter-ethnic
and inter-religious relations.
f) Poverty and ignorance should be tackled head-on through the creation of job
opportunities for the unemployed youths.
g) There should be intense enlightenment campaign on the need to accommodate
the opinions of others and individual differences through tolerance and
harmonious co-existence.
h) Finally, the rule of law should be upheld by ensuring that all the perpetrators and
those that are adjudge to have flamed the embers of violent conflicts are
punish accordingly without fear or favour.

62. 62
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