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Chapter 1 3

  1. 1. KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DAR ES SALAAM DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Ethnicity and Religious Instability in Nigeria Case study: - Nigeria, plateau state, Jos. BY MUHAMMAD ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM BCR/0007/102/DT Supervisor by Ms. Pribenska Eliska April 2013
  2. 2. List of table content Chapter One List of abbreviation Introduction 1.1 Background of the study 1.2 Statement of the problem 1.3 Purpose of the study 1.4 Objectives of the study 1.5 Research question 1.6 Hypothesis of the study 1.7 Significant of the study 1.8 Scope of the study 1.9 Operational definition of terms Chapter Two Literature review 2.1 Theoretical framework 2.2 Ethno-religious and political conflict in Jos 1. Competing historical interpretations and political claims 2. The creation of Jos north LGA 3. Citizenship and indigene rights 4. Rural land conflicts 5. The ethnic dimension of the Jos crises 6. The religious dimension
  3. 3. 2.3 Causes of religious and ethno-politics in Jos 2.4 The causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos can be classified into two major heading 1. Remote causes of ethno-religious crises 2. Immediate causes of ethno-religious crises 2.5 Influence of resource control on Jos ethno-religious conflicts Chapter Three 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Research design 3.3 Population of the study 3.4 Sample size 3.5 Sampling procedure 3.6 Research instrument 3.7 Validation of the instrument 3.8 Reliability of the instrument 3.9 Procedure for data collection 3.10 Method of data analysis Ethical consideration
  4. 4. List of abbreviation ANPP All Nigeria People Party BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CAN Christian Association of Nigeria COCIN Church of Christ in Nigeria HRW Human Rights Watch IPCR Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution LGA Local Government Area NGO Non-Governmental Organisation PDP People Democratic Party SAP Structural Adjustment Program VOA Voice of America
  5. 5. Chapter one Introduction 1.1 Background of the study According to James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) argue that, ―a good theory of ethnic conflict should be able to explain why, despite the greater tensions, peaceful and cooperative [ethnic] relations are by far more typical outcome than is large scale violence.‖ According to them, because of the benefits of peace and the costs of inter- ethnic violence, ―decentralized institutional arrangements are likely to arise to moderate problems of interethnic opportunism.‖ Although peaceful resolution of inter-ethnic tensions should always prevail as a rational, more beneficial approach, violent ethnic conflicts continue to occur across the world. The global community is haunted by physical and emotional consequences of recent ethnic violence such as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda and Darfur, and sectarian violence in Iraq. Continuous examination of the causes of ethnic conflict is necessary, so that we may develop a better understanding of what causes the breakdown of peace in various multi- ethnic contexts and create a more comprehensive basis for peacebuilding and post- conflict development in ethnically divided societies. Literature on causes of ethnic conflict covers a number of competing theories. Some of the major explanations include: primordialist, institutional, political entrepreneurs, and competition over resources theories. But, as Jalali and Lipset argue, ―Given the variety of ethnic conflicts and their dynamic and fluid qualities, no one factor can provide a comprehensive explanation.‖ In Africa, Journalistic accounts of wars in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and several other countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s have raised concern that ethnic cleavages and overlapping affiliations of religion and race may undermine prospects for economic and political development in much of Africa. Ethnic diversity may lead to increased civil strife. This perception is fostered both by some graphic individual scenes of inter ethnic violence, and by an aggregate correlation: Africa has not only the highest ethnic diversity, but also the highest incidence of civil war. Potentially, this might account for the detrimental economic effects of diversity. In countries of traditional stability, ethnic conflict is becoming an increasing factor. In Kenya, ethnic tensions related to multiparty elections resulted in the deaths of 1,500 people between late 1991 and late 1993. Additional deaths have occurred in relation to the election in 1997, including post election recriminations against non-government
  6. 6. voting areas in early January 1998. South Africa lost 14,000 citizens due to the racial and ethnic violence, which was part of transition to majority rule between 1990 and 1994. In Nigeria, the colonial masters provided urban setting, which constitutes the cradle of contemporary ethnicity. The British colonialist while pretending to carry out a mission of uniting the warring ethnic groups consciously and systematically separated the various Nigerian people thereby creating a suitable atmosphere for conflict. With the heterogeneous nature of the country, the tendency of the various nationals is towards parochial consciousness at the expense of national consciousness. A far reaching and in- depth survey of Nigeria public opinion carried out by the International Foundation for Elections Systems-IFES on behalf of United States Agency for International Development-USAID in 2000 found out that ethnicity is the strongest type of identity among Nigerians. Almost half of all Nigerians (48.2%) choose to tag themselves with an ―ethnic‖ identity. Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Africa in general arise as result of scarcity of political resources, multi-culturalism, religion, militarisation of ethnicity among others. These conflicts cannot be ignored. It is therefore patently clear that realistic measures to solve these problems are needed. This study, therefore, relies on content analysis as its methodology to examine ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. It also examines the effects of ethnic conflicts on the country‘s search for unity and identifies the possible issues for resolution. Over the last decade, the political crises over ‗indigene‘ rights and political representation in Jos, capital of plateau state, has developed into a protracted communal conflict affecting most parts of the state. At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people have been killed since late 2001, when the first major riot broke out in 2004 Jos in more than three decades. Ten years later, only the heavy presence of military and police forces ensures a fragile claim in the city. Tension between ethnic group rooted in allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into an explosive mix. The presence of well organised armed groups in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons, and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos all point to the real risk of future large-scale violence. 1.2 Statement of the problem More than 13,500 people have been killed in communal violence since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 (HRW, 2010). The Middle Belt region, to which Plateau State belongs,
  7. 7. is one of the areas worst hit. The 2001 Jos riot claimed at least 1,000 lives in Jos (HRW, 2001). Subsequently, long-standing tensions within smaller towns and villages in Plateau State violently escalated. The killings only came to a halt when the federal government declared a state of emergency in 2004, after about 700 people had been killed in an attack on the town of Yelwa in southern Plateau State (HRW, 2005). Clashes between Muslim and Christian youths rocked the city of Jos again in 2008, killing at least 700. In 2008, another crises was erupted in which close to 200 live were lost, houses and vehicles were set ablaze during the crises, according to Red Cross said more than a hundred people were seriously injured in the fighting and 3,000 people were displaced in the clashes, (Dakar and Brussels, 2012). Another analysis according to the report which carried by the news of December 15, 2008, Mr. Bala Zuberu, the trading company, lost about Naira 28 million when his business centre where he sold car‘s was razed to the ground, and also according to the news, Alhaji Musa Adamu of Pama Motors lost about Naira 60 millions of car‘s during the crises, many of their houses were burnt and many Mosques destroyed, a number of petrol stations belonging to Muslim at Farin Gada ward of Jos metropolis were also razed to the ground during the crises, (Dakar and Brussels, 2012). According to IRIN (2005), the year 2010 has been one of the worst on record, with more than 1,000 lives lost their life. The human cost of the violence is immense, the number of internally displaced people since 2001 peaked in 2004, with up to 220,000 people displaced. After the 2008 riot, more than 10,000 were displaced, whilst violence in 2010 resulted in about 18,000 people fleeing the clashes (IRIN, 2010). Numerous houses in Jos have been burned and blackened remnants litter the streets in many parts of the city. All sides suffer a massive loss due to livelihoods destroyed. Violence and displacement have reshaped Jos and many rural settlements. As neighbourhoods become religiously segregated, ‗no-go areas‘ alter patterns of residency, business, transportation, and trade. On the other hand, the police statement put the number of casualties at 326, whilst another put it at 362, Human Right Watch confirmed that about 150 dead bodies were pulled from a village well known at kurum Karama, (Dakar and Brussels, 2012). The Red Cross society of Nigeria noted more than 8,000 refugees in the Toro local government area of Bauchi state. According to Vanguard (2012), recently in 2012 Boko Haram increased the tension in Jos plateau state by killing a senator and house of representative that has been stalking place in Plateau State thickened, in July 8, 2012, after Senator Gyang Dantong and the Majority Leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly, Mr. Gyang Fulani were killed whilst
  8. 8. attending the mass burial of about 50 victims of Saturday‘s attack on villages in Barkin Ladi and Riyom local government areas of the state. The death of the lawmakers came on the heels of the discovery on the remains of over 50 persons mostly women and children burnt inside the residence of a local pastor where they had taken refuge following the attack on about 14 villages by suspected Fulani herdsmen on Saturday (Vanguard, 2012). The two lawmakers were reportedly gunned down at Maseh village in Riyom LGA where over 50 victims of Saturday‘s attack were being buried. The gunmen reportedly stormed the venue and opened fire on those present, causing more deaths. Member representing Barkin-Ladi/Riyom Constituency in the House of Representatives, Mr. Simon Mwadkon was lucky as he escaped with injuries and was resuscitated at the Barkin-Ladi General Hospital where he was rushed to after he fainted. Senator Dantong was the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP senator representing the Plateau North Senatorial District and was until his death yesterday, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Health (Vanguard, 2012). The death of the 50 persons in the residence of the pastor of the Church of Christ in Nigeria at Maseh village was believed to have been the handiwork of the suspected Fulani herdsmen who were believed to have torched the house when they discovered that the people had taken refuge there. The killing of the lawmakers sparked off angry reactions around the Plateau as youths took over the highway to protest what they described as genocide against the Berom people allegedly by the Fulani. The angry reaction following the killings in 2012, forced many motorists travelling along the Jos-Riyom highway to turn back to avoid being caught in the disturbance. The Permanent Secretary in charge of security in the Cabinet Office, Mr. Istifanus Gyang confirmed the killing of the two lawmakers (Vanguard, 2012). In another hand, Abraham Yiljap, the state‘s Commissioner of Information, confirmed the assassination in a statement. Gyang Fulani, a member of the Plateau State House of Assembly, was also reportedly shot during the attack. Meanwhile the AP reports that Raids and reprisal attacks left 37 people dead in Jos Christian villages on Saturday July 8, 2012, where authorities have struggled to contain religious violence, authorities said Sunday July 9, 2012 (Information Nigeria, 2013). Mustapha Salisu, spokesman for a special taskforce made up of policemen and soldiers deployed in the area to curb years of violence, said assailants launched ―sophisticated attacks‖ on several villages near Jos early Saturday. They came in hundreds said Salisu, some had (police) uniforms and some even had bulletproof vests, and he said the special taskforce fought back for hours and two policemen in the battle, he also
  9. 9. added that 14 civilians were killed in the raids and that the task-force killed 21 assailant (Information Nigeria, 2013). In view of the above statements, the problems of this study are: - a) Resource control; b) Political power sharing; c) Land; d) Religious domination; and e) External forces. 1.3 Purpose of the study The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of ethnicity and religious intolerance on ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state Nigeria, the study also will look at how poverty and unemployment was a product of ethno-religious instability which in torn gave birth to incessant the confrontation of the both, in recent times, poverty led to mutual and mass slaughter of the Jos people, insisting that idle hands were always the devils instrument and that if people were fully engaged they would hardly have time to see others as their enemies. These indicate the lack of education, unemployment and political awareness may also trigger the conflict, the need of this research might provide the mechanism in giving suggestion and recommendation to overcome the problem. 1.4 Objective of the study The specific objectives of this study are to: - 1. Determine the impact of indigene-settlers on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state. 2. Determine the impact of political power sharing on ethnic-religious conflicts in Jos, Plateau state. 3. Determine the impact of resource control on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state. 1.5 Research question 1. What are the effects of indigene-settlers on ethno-religious conflicts in Jos Plateau state?
  10. 10. 2. What are the effects of political power sharing on ethno-religious conflicts in Jos Plateau state? 3. What are the effects of resources control on ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau state? 1.6 Research Hypotheses Ho1= there is no significant effects of indigene-settlers on ethnic-religious conflicts in Jos, Plateau state. Ho2= there is no significant effects of political power sharing on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state. Ho3= there is no significant effects of resources control on ethnic-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state. 1.7 Significant of the study The study will be of great importance to academics, political groups, leaders, and non- governmental organisation in the following ways. The elimination of ethnicity along the divided line through the strengthens the rule of law, the enforcement of institution like the police and working with the constitution effectively, the police will be more highlighting about the crisis within (ethno-religious conflict), they would play a key role in changing the behaviour of the community. This will make their work easy in identifying the crises in order to prevention as well as securing the society from escalation of the violence, to control the measures through cautions and suing in the court of law. The non-governmental organisations, traditional rulers, and other religious sectors would help the community to prevent the crises from escalation in Jos, (Plateau state) communities, these might be through the seminars and the religious tolerance will be as a reasonable accompaniment of such things to not attacking, harassing, insulting, abusing, or looking down those of other belief. Focusing on the potentially positive role of religion with respect to morality, social harmony, sustainable development social justice and achievement of certain development objectives, also the role of religious organisation in the provision of education and health services, the religious to integrates in all aspect of Jos (Plateau state) communities can provides a basis for the interaction of different units, introduces order, harmony and disciplines into social relations, serves as a mechanism that makes society‘s productive and thus has a role in nation building.
  11. 11. The government and institutions more especially the traditional rulers of each ethnic group have to acknowledge the extent and the impact of ethno-religious conflict in the environment, specifically around the main major ethnic groups. The law most be formulated and the penalties to culprits to court the further spreading of such crises. Democracy as an institutional arrangement that guarantees the preservation of individual‘s rights is not only predicated on the principle of liberty, equality, justice, representation, consensus, and peacebuilding. For example, a social justice through cultural renewal in Jos (Plateau state) ordinarily engenders a climate that upholds and ensures the enthronement of the responsiveness, transparency, and accountability of the state and that they value and actualise their potentials, and political education and enlighten also to make the leaders accountable to the citizens and the citizens to obey the government law and regulations. In other word, the decentralisation of government that enhance the efficiency, equality, and legitimacy of democracy and the political culture which especially as a democratic values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and the creation of a civil society that facilitates and enhance public participation in the democratic process that prevents abusive power from becoming concentrated at the centre of the society. The study is expected to be used by Human Right Watch and academics institutions; the foundation of human right watch initiation is to investigate if there is violation of human right, whilst the academic institution is to highlights the impact of ethno-religious conflict in the region (Plateau state). This study might be have source of getting peace, respect for democratic rights, commitment to promote regional security, peace, and stability, the promotion of human development, and freedom to life. 1.8 Scope of the study The study would take place in Nigeria (Jos, Plateau state) in related to the fact of ethno- religious conflict, the ethnic groups are the main focus on this study, the centre also will be much considered to my research, civilian and ethno-religion must be considered in the society. 1.10 Content Scope
  12. 12. Ethnicity and religious are consider as the independent variable in the influence of instability in Jos Plateau State, Nigeria. 1.11 Time Scope The study will cover from April to the end of July. 1.12 Operational definition Conflict: - refers as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Corruption: - refer as the abuse of power for private gain. Fulbe: - refers to Fulani people traditionally cattle herders of Muslim faith. Indigene: - refers as a citizen on a particular territory that shares the same historical ancestries and common values. Indigenous People: - refers to the ethnic minorities who have been marginalised as their historical territories became part of a state. Migrants: - refers to people who came from different area and settle in another place. Migration: - refers as the movement of people from one place in the world to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary. Non-Indigene: - refers as the people who settle in another locality area for seeking a refugee. Peace: - refers as a state of harmony and the absence of physical violence. Politics: refer as authoritative location of the resources (materials and symbolic leadership) to particular time. Poverty: - refers as the population living under 1$ dollar per day. Religion: - refers as a means and ways through which individuals relate to God or Allah through prayer and worship.
  13. 13. Settlers: - refers as a person has migrated to an area and established permanent residence there, often to colonise the area. Squatter: - refers as a person who live upon premises owned by another person, without the owners permission either uninhabited building or unused land. Violence: - refers as is the use of physical force or power, against a person, or against a group or community.
  14. 14. CHAPTER TWO Literature Review 2.1 Concepts, ideas, opinions from authors/experts Nigeria is a plural, highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi- religions polity, with a diversity of ethnic groups. (Danfulani, 2009: Smyth and Robinson, 2001). This identity is played out in the way the country is bifurcated along the lines of religion, language, culture, ethnicity and regional identity, Osaghae and Suberu (2005). Of the population of over 150 million people, the country is almost half Christians and half Muslims, aside other religions (Paden, 2008; Schwartz, 2010). In Nigeria, as in all of Africa, ―political competition, via the electoral process, embraces inevitably and inescapably, an uneasy tension between conflict and consensus‖ (Diamond, 1982); violent identity conflicts have become, since 1999, a method of collective action by diverse ethnic and religious groups engaged in contestations for political power. The most prominent of these conflicts are those that have pitted Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion, ethnicity and politics. Jos, the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria has, over the past decade, witnessed violent communal clashes across ethnic and religious fault lines. These clashes have claimed ―thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of others, and fostered a climate of instability throughout the surrounding region‖ (Kwaja, 2011). While large scale violence has occurred periodically since 2001, in recent years attacks have become more frequent, widespread, and efficient. The conflict in Jos is often usually characterized as inter-religious or inter-ethnic, mainly between the majority but marginal Christian ‗indigence‘ (Anagula, Berom and Afrisare) and the minority but dominant Muslim Hausa Fulani groups (Adebanwi: 2005). As is often the case with identity conflicts in Africa, these are socially constructed stereo-types that are manipulated to trigger and drive violence in Jos (Aapengnuo, 2010; Kwaja, 2011). They veil deeper institutional factors within the Nigerian social fabric that are abused and exploited to deny citizens access to resources, basic rights, and participation in political process; factors that if unaddressed, have the potential to fan the embers of violence across the country.
  15. 15. In the face of violent identity conflagrations, efforts at peace building become sisyphusean, or very daunting, to say the least. Over the years, government responses to the recurring Jos conflicts have widely been perceived as ineffective. At least, 16 public commissions have been launched to examine the conflict and proffer solutions but as yet, little gains have been made, owing to lack of the needed political will to act on the commissions‘ findings. It is based on the foregoing, that this paper takes another critical look at ethnic and religious identity construction in Nigeria and its implications for national building in Jos, Plateau State. Countries where centrifugal and fissiparous tendencies exist are often victims of violent identity conflicts. More importantly, the patterns of social cleavages in any given society are an important determinant of the intensity and irreconcilability of conflict. These can best be situated within the theoretical framework of identity politics, which interrogates the origins of identity construction and their fundamentalisation, including their recourse to violent conflagrations. Identity politics is the political activity of various ethnic religious and cultural groupings in demanding greater economic, social and political rights or self determination (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). It claims to represent and seeks to advance the interest of particular groups, the members of whom often share and unite around common experience of perceived social and economic injustice, relative to the society of which they form part and exist in (Ambe- Uva, 2010). This usually gives rise to a political basis ground which they may unite and begin to assert themselves in society (Zweri and Zahid, 2007). Identity politics means more than the sole recognition of ethnic religious or cultural identity. In fact, it seeks to carry these identities forward, beyond mere self-identification, to a political framework based upon that identity. Nigeria presents a complex of individual as well as cross-crossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main basis for violent conflicts in the country. This is both from the point of view of identities mostly commonly assumed by citizens ―especially for political purposes and the identities often implicated in day-to-day contestations over citizenship as well as competitions and conflicts over resources and privileges‖ (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Two approaches aptly capture the nature of Nigeria‘s identity diversity. One is Geertz‘s (1963) famous distinction between primordial ties, which are basically inscriptive and based on the ‗givens‘ of life (tribe, Kinship, ethnicity etc) and civil ties, which hinge on society type aggregations like class, political party affiliation, interest group membership and so on. The
  16. 16. second approach is more or less, a conflict based perspective in which only identities that form the basis of political demand, mobilization and action, or the so-called politicized identities, may be regarded as politically salient. Young (1976), Kasfir (1976) and Rothschild (1981) are some of the leading proponents of politicized identity. While this approach has the merit of focusing on active identities, it is mistaken in the exclusion of identities that are not politically salient such as gender and profession. This is because often times, identities tend to be situational and like volcanoes, identities that are dormant today can become active tomorrow. Thus, what is clear is that any examination of Nigeria‘s identity would necessarily have to be inclusive of all identities, civil or primordial and the ways in which they are intricately linked. This is necessary to enable us situate the various identities, especially the more active and politically salient identities in their fuller, robust and recursive contents. Plateau, a state of plural ethnicity and religion, has had several cases of identity based conflicts. It is the second most ethnically diverse state in Nigeria after Adamawa (Alubo, 2006). Like elsewhere in Nigeria, this diverse population is seen as bearing two identities; indeperes and settlers. There are also two major religions Christianity and Islam. In its contemporary situation, most of the so-called settlers are Muslims, while the supposed indigenes are mostly Christians. Based on past experiences, particularly in Jos, conflict which begin as politically based frequently assume ethnic and religious dimensions (as in 2001 and 2008), in a telling conflation of religion and ethnicity (Alubo, 2009; Cesey, 2007). Identity conflicts in Jos are mostly between indigenes (Beron, Anaguta and Afrisarte and Settlers (Hausa/Fulani). In his research on communal violence in Plateau State, Bagudu (2004) reveals a count of ―over 62 identity driven conflicts within a decade, with 22 recorded in 2004 alone‖. Also while indigenes have different identities, these are neatly folded into a common umbrella (Best, 2007) for the purpose of uniting against a perceived common enemy. Thus, the recurring Jos conflict illustrates how identity is used as the basis to access opportunities and ultimately, inclusive citizenship. 2.2 Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework for this study is the human needs theory by Burton (1987). The theory operates on the premise that a pre-condition for the resolution of conflict is that fundamental human needs be met. Burton adopted eight fundamental needs from the basis of the work by the American sociologist Paul Sites and introduced one further need of his own.
  17. 17. Those adopted needs included control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality and esteem/recognition. Burton‘s additional need was ‗role-defence,‘ the need to defend one‘s role. Burton called these ―ontological needs‖ as he regarded them as a consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the consequence. He argued that, antecedents to human needs theory came from a variety of disciplines. That in the biological and sociobiological disciplines conflict is perceived to result from competition over scarce resources as a result of common needs. In social psychology Henry Murray, Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) describe needs (some say ‗drives‘) as important in understanding factors for human motivation. Further Burton distinguishes ontological needs from values and interests. He defines ontological needs as non-negotiable; values as offering some limited opportunities for negotiation; and interests as negotiable issues. Burton distinguishes conflict from the related term of ‗dispute‘. He defined ‗conflict‘ as an action over these non-negotiable human needs, whereas a ‗dispute‘ was over negotiable values. Burton distinguishes conflict resolution, from the related terms of conflict management and conflict settlement. To Burton conflict resolution solved deep seemingly intractable issues, whereas settlement only addressed the superficial factors of conflict. The theory was not without controversy. His notion of needs falls under criticism especially from those cultural anthropologists and relativists, who were (and still are) resistant to universal values, among those were fellow members of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black. The relationship between religious, political power, land, resources control, and international interference as the factors responsible for the ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, this can be described by using a model as follows: -
  18. 18. Ethnicity and Religious Conflict in Jos -Bad governance -Poverty and exclusion -Unemployment -Lack of education -Deprived of right to life - Poor infrastructure -Land -Religion -Resources control -Political power -international interference -Competing historical interpretation and political claim -Creation of Jos North LGA -Citizenship and indigene right Conflict -Conflict resolution Disarmament Demobilised Reintegration Resettlement Reconciliation Reconstruction e.t.c -Conflict management Mediation Negotiation Arbitration Judiciary -Potential for Sustainable Peace Economic reforms, creditable institutions, eradicating ethnic sentiment, involvement of ethnic/religious dogmas, rule of law, good governance, and capacity-building in national and local governance such as, reconstruction, free and fair election. Infrastructural development; roads, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, aids, and so on. Promoting human development and peace, security, and stability. Promoting equality between citizens and settlers, gender equality, human right, right to life, institutions of basic right, more especially for minority, and respects for democratic rights. Empowerment of both indigenes and settlers for achieving political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental security among all peoples.
  19. 19. 2.3 Ethno-Religious and Political conflicts in Jos Situated on the northern edge of the ‗middle belt‘ in central Nigeria, where the country‘s ―predominantly Muslim northern half blends with the generally Christian south, Jos is a relatively new city‖ (Kwaja, 2011). Before its descent into violence the city was regarded by both Nigerians and foreigners alike, as a peaceful settlement with a temperate climate of magnetic attraction (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Higazi, 2011; Plotnicov, 1967, Gaya Best, 2007). While the serenity of the place lasted, it was reputed as the ―Home of peace and tourism‖. Today however, the city is being mockingly referred to as the ―Home of pieces and terrorism‖, (Jeadayibe and Kudu, 2010). Since the early 1980s and especially from 2001, Jos has witnessed long-running, even if understated, rivalry between the majority but marginal Christian indigenes (Anaguta, Berom and Afisare) and the minority but dominant settler Hausa/Fulani (Adebanwi, 2005). The result of these rivalries has been recurring ethno-religious and political violence. The Jos crisis is usually attributed to ―the polyglot nature of the city which resulted from the nineteenth century migrations of different ethnic groups to the area to work in the Tin mines‖ (Danfulani and Twatshak, 2002). Today, is founding, or rather precisely who founded Jos city is part of the problem that sparked of the recurring violence (Gaya-Best, 2007). As such, the ownership of Jos is hotly contested among the three main indigenous ethnic groups (the Berom, Anaguta and Afisare) where traditional land meet on an unmarked border line in Jos town on the one hand and the descendants of Hausa-Fulani settlers, who initially settled in Jos as traders and Tin miners on the other hand. Signals pointing towards the manifestation of contentions issues between Muslim settlers and Christian indigenes started emanating in Jos in the 1990s (Danfulani, 2006), culminating in 1994 into open clashes mainly between the Berom indigenes and Hausa-Fulani settlers over farmland and chieftaincy issues. Abdu (2002) opines that the ―1990s witnessed a resurgence in identity politics in Jos, this time centering around the control of Jos North Local Government carved from the former Jos local government in 1991‖, which enhanced the Hausa-Fulani hegemonic control of political powers in the local government.
  20. 20. On April 12, 1994, the growing tension escalated into violent clashes when Sanusi Mato, a Hausa-Fulani man was appointed chairman of Jos North Local Government transition committee. The indigenes rejected the appointment because, as Sha (1998:57) observed, they ―interpreted the action as the confirmation of the fear that the federal government wanted to provide basis for the Hausa-Fulani to assume political hegemony in Jos‖. The ensuring violence led to the ―burning down and vandalisation of government properties‖ (Abdu, 2002). Also, in March 16, 1996, electoral violence in Angwar Rogo, a predominantly Hausa Fulani settlement almost escalated to ethno-religious violence. The indigenes alleged that the Hausa- Fulani tried to rig election by smuggling into the polling stations ―Shagari voters‖ from the Northern part of the country. This prompted the electoral officers to screen out the unknown faces thereby evoking anger and protest among Hausa-Fulani youths. The resulting violence ―left three people dead‖ (Abdu, 2002). In September 2001 another devastating ethno-religious conflict broke out in Jos when Alhaji Mohammed Muktar, a Hausa-Fulani and a former chairman of Jos North Local Government was appointed as the coordinator of the Federal Government‘s National Poverty Alleviation Programme in Jos North. Indigenous Christian youths rejected the appointment on grounds that while he was chairman of the local government, he was indicted by a court ruling, which removed him from office for among other offences, falsification of birth records, perjury and falsehood (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). The Christian youths also felt aggrieved by the appointment of a person from the minority Jasawa group (Hausa-Fulani) to head such a sensitive office (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002). The resulting sectarian violence claimed as many as 1,000 lives (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In 2004, more than 1,000 people were killed in attacks against Muslim and Christian villages from February to May, and 250,000 were displaced, especially in the town of Yelwa (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Kwaja, 2011). These attacks revolved around contestations over land and chieftaincy. Table 1 below shows in chronological order large-scale communal clashes in and around Jos since 1994. Table 1: Large-scale communal clashes in and around Jos
  21. 21. Year Proximate Trigger Extent of Violence 1994 Appointment of lay leaders prompt protests and counter demonstration Four killed. Several city markets, an Islamic school, and places of worship destroyed. 2001 Appointment of local administrator of welfare allowances leads to weeks of demonstrations. Tension rise, resulting in violence. An estimated 1,000 to 3,000 killed. Violence expands across plateau state. Attacks by youth groups in Muslim and Christian neighbourhoods, no mosques and churches, and at the university of Jos. Sporadic attacks continue through 2002-2003, killing hundreds and destroying 72 villages. 2004 National election held but postponed in plateau state, local officials are appointed, resulting in disputes. More than 1,000 killed in attacks against Muslim and Christian villages from February to May, and 250,000 are displaced. Federal government removes state governor and appoints temporary replacement. 2008 Local government election -The first in Jos since 2002 -Are schedule then delayed three times. Disputes emerge over patty nominees and results. Nearly 800 killed in gang attacks and riot from November to December. 2010 A dispute over reconstruction of a home destroyed by clashes in 2008 leads to violence in January and reprisal in March and throughout the year. January: up to 500 residents killed over 4 days in January. Many villages and homes destroyed. March: up to 500 killed in an oversight attack. December: nearly 80 killed following twin car bombs. Hundred more die in frequent intermittent
  22. 22. attacks. 2011 Disputes between farmers and herdsmen over farmland leads to wanton destruction of lives and property throughout the year and especially in September and December. September: over 100 residents killed in several days of fighting in and around Jos. December: over 20 people killed in coordinated attacks. 2012 Land-related communal conflicts between the predominantly Berom ethnic group and Hausa/Fulani herdsmen continue to rear its ugly head in Jos, leading to a complex interplay of conflict factors. February: Suicide Bomber Rams Car Into Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), instantly killing three, injuring 38 and damaging 30 vehicles. July: gunmen attack over 10 villages, kill over 300, including a serving Senator Gyang Dantong, and the majority leader of plateau House of assembly, Hon. Gyang Fulani. Source: Kwaja (2011): Researchers’ Fieldwork, 2012. According to HRW (2009), again, two days of inter-communal violence on November 28 to 29, 2008, followed a disputed local government election in Jos north local government on November 27, 2008. The violence pitted predominantly Christian indigenes from the Berom, Afisare and Anaputa ethnic groups who were largely in support of the Christian candidate from the ruling People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) against Muslim ‗non-indigenes‘ primarily from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, who backed the Muslim candidate from the opposition, All Nigeria People‘s Party (ANPP) (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The PDP Chairmanship aspirant, Timothy Buba Polled 92,907 votes to beat his closest rival from ANPP, Aminu Baba with 72,890 votes (Ambe-Uve, 2010). It was the declaration of Timothy Buba, as winner of the election that sparked off the chain of events that led to the crisis. During the crisis, rampaging youths burnt down many vehicles, churches, mosques, filling stations and private houses. In all more than 700 people were reported dead while thousands were displaced and took refuge in several locations (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010).
  23. 23. In January 2010, violence quickly broke out when a Hausa-Fulani man attempted to reconstruct his home which was destroyed during the 2008 clashes. Christians youths in the area vehemently opposed the reconstruction of the building and soon, the matter resulted in serious ethnic and religious disputes that left over 1,000 people dead (Kwaja, 2011). In December of the same year, nearly 80 people were killed in twin car bomb attacks. Since 2010, several hundreds of Muslims and Christians have died in Jos in coordinated bomb attacks in worship centres and other public places. The dreaded Boko Haram sect has claimed responsibility for some of these killings as the security situation continues to depreciate in Jos. At the times of doing this research, violent ethnic and communal clashes are still a recurring phenomenon in Jos and environs. I. Competing historical interpretations and political claims Labels such as ‘settler’, ‘native’, ‘non-native’, ‘host community’, ‘foreigner’, ‘native foreigner’, ‘stranger element’, ‘squatter’, ‘non-squatter’, ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’, ‘indigene’, ‘non-indigene’ [. . .] among many others are used daily in Nigeria to describe, stigmatise or stereotype the ‘other’ as a category who ‘does not belong’ (Danfulani, 2006). According to Mohammed (2007) state that, both sides selectively point to historical records to justify their claim to the city of Jos, to indigene rights, and to political representation. Hausa–Fulani leaders argue that there was no Jos when they arrived on the Plateau. They claim to have founded Jos and nurtured it into a modern city. A recent publication circulating among the Hausa–Fulani cites the 1930 Jos Township census to demonstrate that back then the Hausa constituted by far the most numerous ethnic group in the township (Mohammed, 2007). Jasawa leaders also point out that parts of what is Plateau State today used to be under the Bauchi Emirate. The indigenes emphasize that the high plateau was never conquered by the Dan Fodio jihad movement because plateau people actively resisted the jihad expansion. As noted above, the British policy of indirect rule initially relied on the structures of the Bauchi Emirate to administer Jos. In 1926 the British introduced a separate administration for the high plateau area around Jos (Best, 2007). The contested history of Jos also finds expression in the trend among the indigenes to rename areas and streets to erase the Hausa legacy, although most people in Jos speak Hausa fluently.
  24. 24. II. The creation of Jos North LGA The contemporary political conflict between the indigenes and the Hausa–Fulani dates back at least two decades. Under the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the Hausa–Fulani actively lobbied for the establishment of a local government in which they would be predominant. In 1991, their request was granted with the creation of Jos North LGA. The new boundaries made the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere minorities within Jos North LGA. The three groups vehemently protested the creation of Jos North, arguing that they had not been consulted and that they had not consented to it. They view the split of the old Jos LGA into Jos North and South LGAs as a deliberate strategy to give full political control over an LGA to the Hausa population (Best, 2007). Jos North LGA comprises the commercial centre of Jos as well as the main political and traditional offices, such as the palace of the indigene traditional leader, the Gbong Gwom of Jos. According to Best (2007) state that, since the creation of Jos North LGA, elections and political appointments has been accompanied by strong tensions between the Hausa and the indigenes. A first minor crisis occurred in 1994 over the appointment of a Hausa candidate as chairman of the Jos North Local Government Council. The Berom and other indigene groups strongly protested the appointment. They maintained that the position should go to an indigene. Four people were killed during the protests and parts of several market areas as well as an Islamic school and mosque were destroyed (Best, 2007). III. Citizenship and indigene rights Nigeria‘s constitution grants every citizen the right to settle anywhere within the country and prohibits the government from discriminating against citizens based on ethnicity or religion. Nevertheless, strong regulations continue to favour the indigenes within states and even LGAs. Non-indigenes are excluded from university scholarships, pay higher school and university fees, and cannot be recruited into the civil service. The lack of political representation is thus perpetuated for non-indigene settlers. Local government authorities decide over the issuing of indigene certificates to their favoured ethnic and religious groups. The indigene status is therefore highly contested, especially since it is linked to important
  25. 25. political, economic, and educational benefits. Long-term exclusion of one group‘s elite from political offices erodes existing patronage networks. The Jasawa population complains that since the early 1990s it has become almost impossible for them to receive indigene status, despite the fact that their community settled there generations ago. Proponents of indigene rights claim that any settler can return to his ‗place of origin‘ and demand an indigene certificate there. In theory, therefore, no citizen would be discriminated against. In practice, however, many settlers have lived within their localities for several generations and cannot trace back their origins to a place where their ethnic group would constitute a majority. Although the Hausa–Fulani dominate the northern Muslim states, many Hausa–Fulani settlers in Plateau State have no ancestors in these states and cannot claim indigene rights there. Human Rights Watch refers to such settlers as ‗stateless citizens‘ who are gravely disadvantaged and have no access to higher education or jobs in the civil service, the military, or the police forces (HRW, 2006). Many Hausa–Fulani are now seeking to obtain certificates from Kano or Bauchi. But even if they can receive certificates there, indigene status in another state is of little use for employment within the Plateau State civil service. However, many Christians of the Igbo and Yoruba communities are also ‗settlers‘ in Jos North LGA. Their ancestors moved there during the same time period as the Hausa–Fulani. These settler groups do not claim indigene rights and have never been dominant in the politics of the city. In contrast, the Jasawa elite held political offices under the British and under the former military administration. Ostien concludes that ‗the city‘s settler problem is a Jasawa problem‘ (Ostien, 2009). A Muslim elder in Jos stated that if a solution could be found to the conflict over indigene rights, 95 per cent of the potential for violent conflict in Plateau State would be removed. Berom elders have reiterated time and again that they are not willing to compromise over the Hausa–Fulani settler status. In 2001, Berom elders stated that ‗not only is Jos on Berom land, but Jos is our JERUSALEM and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere‘ (Best, 2007). A few years later, the traditional Berom leader stated that even if the Hausa had been in Plateau State for more than 1,000 years, they would remain non-indigene (HRW, 2006). Indigene politicians add that the problem is one of assimilation: -
  26. 26. Box 1 Nigeria‘s citizenship crisis In principle, all Nigerian citizens are equal no matter the circumstances of their birth and whether or not they reside in their places of origin. But in practice, one is a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin [. . .], no matter for how long one resides or domiciles in a state other than his own (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). The conflict over citizenship and indigene rights is in no way peculiar to Plateau State. Most states of the Nigerian federation face an indigene or citizenship crisis. The constitution privileges local descent over residency. Those who leave their state of origin risk becoming ‘second-class citizens’ in another part of the federation. Within a country of more than 250 ethnic groups, the discrimination against non-indigenes in all six geo-political zones threatens to tear the country apart. Indigene status is an important tool in the politics of identity and labelling. Differing interpretations of local history are applied to mark the boundaries of who belongs and who is left out. Source: Golwa and Ojiji (2008) as long as the Hausa do not identify themselves as Berom, they identify themselves as settlers (HRW, 2006), thus effectively demanding submission to Berom political control. However, several respondents also stated that if it were not for the Hausa–Fulani as a common enemy, the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere would be fighting among themselves over the ownership of Jos and privileges. Indeed, recent tensions between the Berom and the Afizere underline how easily notions of indignity are manipulated. The Afizere had sided with the Jasawa in the lead-up to the 2008 local elections against People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate Jonah Jang. After Jang assumed office, Afizeres complained that he intended to ‗chase them out to Bauchi‘ and sent a letter of official complaint to the Prince Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos unrest of 28 November 2008 (Ostien, 2009). Urban discourse over claims to indigene rights and political control has since reverberated within smaller towns of Plateau State such as Namu, Yelwa, and Wase. I. Rural land conflicts According to Blench, 2003 state that, land conflicts existed in Jos long before the September 2001 crisis. Sporadic violent confrontations over farming and grazing land were already reported during colonial times. Before the 2001 crisis, conflicts between farmers and herders
  27. 27. in Plateau State had not reached levels as high as in some neighbouring states. Indeed, local community leaders settled most tensions without having recourse to violent means. Yet with the expansion of agricultural production over the past decades, land for farming and grazing became contested. The increase of farming reduced the cattle herders‘ access to water for their livestock and changed the interaction between farmers and herders. The pastoral Fulani have been accused of allowing their cattle to graze on the land of the indigene population. These claims gave rise to rustling of the valuable cattle and attacks on Fulani communities. Large numbers of cattle were stolen from the Fulani, who responded with counter-attacks on mostly Christian villages (HRW, 2005). After the first riot in Jos in 2001, many Christians brought corpses back to their home village for burial. This practice further aggravated tensions. Some village communities turned their anger against the Muslim Fulani, who responded with reprisal attacks. The Fulani claim to have lost at least 1,800 tribe members and more than 160,000 cows between September 2001 and May 2004 (HRW, 2005). The violent conflict is ongoing. II. The ethnic dimension of the Jos crisis The indigene–settler issue is endemic in the ‗Middle Belt‘ states surrounding the Plateau. According to IPCR 2008b, indicate that, the North-Central is a ‗hyperactive conflict zone‘ plagued with rural conflicts over land and grazing rights and over political representation. Several states, such as Benue and Plateau, are reported to host large numbers of ex-soldiers with access to weapons. These individuals are also available to form and train militias based on existing vigilante groups. The proliferation of arms in the North-Central Zone has been recognized as an alarming trend for several years (IPCR, 2003). The presence of militias and thugs for hire in neighbouring states is worrisome for Plateau State. In addition, Kaduna and Bauchi states are also infected by violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians. In 2000, Kaduna city suffered massive communal violence between Muslims and Christians over the introduction of Sharia criminal law, with at least 2,000 people having been killed. Smaller riots took place again in 2002, this time over the ‗Miss World‘ contest that was set to take place in Nigeria. As a result, the city today is largely segregated into a Christian southern and a Muslim northern part. Kaduna city has remained
  28. 28. peaceful since 2002, but the April 2011 post-election riots demonstrated the fragility of this separated arrangement. Bauchi State was also badly hit by Muslim protests in April 2011. Bauchi has repeatedly been rocked by clashes with religious dimensions in rural communities. For instance, in May 2011, a Christian-dominated village was attacked and 16 people were killed (BBC, 2011b). The Muslim community in Jos is frequently accused of receiving mercenaries from Bauchi and other states farther north, as well as from Chad and Niger. These accounts are very widespread. Given the small number of arrests made subsequent to violent clashes in Plateau State, it is difficult to assess their validity. Many Christians in Jos point to the discrimination against fellow Christians in Muslim- dominated northern states and therefore see no wrong in political exclusion of the Jasawa community in Jos. For instance, the ancient city of Kano hosts a significant Christian population that is denied indigene rights. Non-Hausa there have never been granted a local government area but ‗were divided and placed at Hausa dominated areas just to ensure that non-indigenes never dominated any political space in Kano‘ (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). Christians in Kano have been subjected to many forms of discrimination and to reprisal attacks following violence in Plateau State. Other indigene representatives in Jos demand a national solution to the problem. They argue that they will not be the first to compromise on privileges widely enjoyed by other ethnic communities throughout the federation. However, they know that a national solution would require an amendment to the Nigerian constitution, which is not on the agenda at the moment. The emergence of militant fundamentalists in the northern states is yet another significant regional development. The 2010 Christmas bombings in Jos occurred alongside attacks by extremist Islamists on churches in the northern town of Maiduguri in Borno State. Borno has been plagued by the re-emergence of the Boko Haram sect despite a major security crackdown in July 2009, when hundreds of people were killed during clashes between the sect and security forces. Christian places of worship have since been targeted. On Christmas Eve 2010 some 30 alleged Islamists killed a pastor and several other Christians at a church in Maiduguri. In 2011 Boko Haram remained in the news headlines with several bomb attacks, including the bombing of the headquarters of the United Nations in Abuja, and assassinations of politicians in Maiduguri.
  29. 29. III. The religious dimension Several factors have contributed to the religious dimensions of the confrontation in Jos. According to Falola 1998, argue that, generally, religion has become entrenched in Nigerian politics since the mid-1970s, with both politicians and religious leaders urging their followers to vote along religious lines. National regime change in 1999 lent the religious factor a new fervour. The birth of the fourth republic was followed by violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians in northern states, which further eroded trust between the religious communities in Jos. Specifically, the introduction of the Sharia criminal code in 12 northern states in 2000 and 2001 provoked major protest from Christians. Many objected to what they perceived as a progressive Islamisation of public life and discrimination against Christian minorities in northern cities (Falola, 1998). Disputes over Sharia resulted in deadly inter- religious violence in the cities of Kano and Kaduna. This development led a substantive number of Christians to move out from the northern states, such as Kano and Bauchi, into Plateau State. They brought with them stories of discrimination and atrocities, exacerbating tensions between religious communities in Jos. Among Christians, perceptions of the Jos conflict have become interlinked with regional and national politics. They fear that if Muslims win control over Jos North LGA, they will soon control Plateau State as a whole. This scenario is portrayed as a first step towards winning political control over Nigeria and expanding Islamic influence on the African continent. Several Christian respondents stated: ‗If the Muslims have Jos, they have Nigeria. And if they have Nigeria, they have Africa‘. Other Christian respondents refused to give credence to generalizations that portray the local conflict over political participation in Jos North LGA as a religious confrontation of international dimensions. Still, many Christians—among them high-level religious leaders, academics, and journalists—invoke the terms ‗jihad‘ and ‗terrorists‘ to explain the current situation. Several Christian representatives and NGOs understand the struggle over Jos North LGA as a direct extension of the 19th-century Dan Fodio jihad, which came to a halt on the mountains of Plateau, taking the causes of the contemporary political crisis in Jos into lesser account. In response to the 2008 crisis, many Christian leaders linked the Jos conflict to a broader religious confrontation. They pointed to the destruction of religious rather than political institutions after election disputes. For example, the former chairman of the Plateau State
  30. 30. Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama, known for his very active role in inter-faith peace-building, stated subsequent to the 2008 riot: - We were taken aback by the turn of events in Jos. We thought it was political, but from all indications it is not so. We were surprised at the way some of our churches and property were attacked and some of our faithful and Clergy killed. The attacks were carefully planned and executed. The questions that bog our minds are why churches were and Clergy attacked and killed? Why were politicians and political party offices not attacked if it were a political conflict? Why were the business premises and property of innocent civilians destroyed? We strongly feel that it was not political, but pre-meditated act[s] under the guise of elections (This Day, 2008). The Muslim leadership in Jos vehemently protested the religious framing of the 2008 crisis. In the name of the Jos North Muslim Ummah, they stated: - The November 2008 violence in Jos was ethno-political in all ramifications; its antecedents, the circumstances, the principal actors and the reason so far adduced by all parties only point to one inevitable conclusion; the struggle by ethnic groups to capture political power and manipulate for selfish reasons or to keep as vehicle for attaining socio-political goals. [. . .] We cannot deny the fact that Mosques and Churches were destroyed in the mayhem, so also Schools, Residential houses, markets and other places that serve the common needs of all, regardless of faith, were destroyed (Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009a). During the 2011 campaigns for gubernatorial elections, the religious and regional framing of the Jos conflict surfaced once more. Former Vice-Governor Pauline Tallen had secured Jasawa support in her race against Governor Jonah Jang. Yet days before the vote, text messages were sent around in Jos claiming that she was an instrument within the collective Hausa aspirations to rule Nigeria: ‘To all Muslims: we must reclaim Kaduna, install a Muslim governor in Taraba, plant a deputy governor in Benue, install a woman as governor (which is Haram but she’s a necessary weapon of change) in Plateau. We must capture Central Nigeria. Council of Ulama, Northern Nigeria’ (Owuamanam, 2011).
  31. 31. The Council of Ulama has not confirmed responsibility for the text message. Its origin remains unclear, but deliberate fabrication is very likely. The voting pattern confirmed that Tallen‘s cooperation with the Jasawa in Jos damaged her chances among Christian and indigene voters. Governor Jang won the election by a clear margin. 2.4 Causes of Religious and Ethnic Politics As Last 2007 argue that, for both Islamic and Christian organisations in northern Nigeria, Jos is a centre point for proselytisation and it has proved to be a fertile ground for the establishment and development of new religious movements and ideas. This is partly because Jos is a relatively new city – only about one hundred years old – without the long established traditions and religious orthodoxies in old northern cities like Kano and Zaria. This makes it attractive for Muslim reformers, who have been able to establish themselves more easily in Jos than elsewhere. The largest Islamic reform movement in Nigeria (with a presence in contiguous countries in West Africa too) is Izala: Jama’atu Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al- Sunna (the Association for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna). Izala was started in Jos in 1978 and is considered Salafist, promoting what it asserts is a more orthodox, scriptural Islam, emphasising the Sunna and denouncing the supposedly heterodox practices of the Sufis (Loimeier, 1997; Kane, 2003). Jos has also been conducive for Christian missions, from the European missionaries who established their presence with the founding of the town, to Nigerian and foreign evangelists in the present. The position of Jos as a bastion for Christianity in the north is enhanced by its location on the cusp of the core north while being indisputably part of the middle-belt. Initially Jos was the base for the evangelisation of Plateau peoples but it then became the most important missionary centre for all of northern Nigeria, a base from which evangelisation was organised into areas beyond the Plateau, among the heterogeneous non- Muslim populations of central Nigeria who until the 1930s were unconverted to either of the world religions and difficult to access, physically and socially. Also with its large southern population, Jos became more orientated towards Christianity, although Muslims have always had a strong presence in the city. Religious competition, fundamentalism, and assertiveness have increased in Nigeria and violence occurred elsewhere in the north through the 1980s and 1990s, but large scale violence in Jos still did not seem inevitable. The culture of the city was
  32. 32. more cosmopolitan, with tolerance and even friendly relations between the two religious groups. This situation has now been undermined. As Kane (2003) argues, there has been a fragmentation of religious authority in Nigeria. The multiplicity of movements among both Muslims and Christians have had to formulate their own responses to insecurity and conflict, so processes of mobilisation can be relatively decentralised. Religious reform movements began around the time of an upsurge in communal politics more generally, in the late 1970s. Born-again Christians have at times been strident in their rhetoric against Muslims, and even critical of the principles of democracy (Marshall, 1995, 2009). The same is true of some of the Islamic movements in attitudes towards Christians and the secular state, although the disputes among Muslims themselves have also been intense (Loimeier, 1997; Falola, 1998; Kane, 2003). The intensification of ethnic and religious politics coincided with growing socio-economic crisis in Nigeria, prevalent through the 1980s with falling oil revenues and the impact of a disastrous Structural Adjustment Programme, implemented by Babangida‘s military regime from 1986. As communal politics became more acute, social and political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion increased. This does not explain why violence occurred on such a large scale, but discrimination and bias in government, and the narrow ethnic and religious politics among both Christians and Muslims increased tension and polarisation along communal lines. In addition, social problems at different levels of society – including high levels of group inequality and youth unemployment – have increased the propensity for violence. The dominant discourses in the conflicts refer to political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion, on the Muslim side, and fears of religious and cultural domination, among Plateau Christians. There are variations across Plateau State in the way these themes are articulated, but the issues are similar. There is much political propaganda, inciting religious or cultural fears – such as of a Muslim conspiracy to Islamise Nigeria – that are not necessarily grounded in reality. In most cases the state is a central reference point. A key element of the dispute is over which groups are represented in government and have access to the state, with much controversy over how state and local governments exercise power. For these reasons the conflicts need to be placed in the context of the local political economy. Sometimes the behaviour of actors within the political and economic spheres is influenced by religious beliefs and ethnic patronage and clientelism, but people also act according to
  33. 33. political and economic expediency. Government decision-making and patronage tends to benefit communities with representatives in positions of political power more than it does communities who are excluded. In fact, government decisions may be made to the detriment of those who do not have political power, particularly where politics is underpinned by ethnic ideologies – where politics is ethnically exclusive rather than inclusive. According to Suberu 2001, suggested that, among Nigerian elites there is a big financial incentive for gaining political positions and there are instrumental reasons for ethnic mobilisation, which is even used to create new political constituencies. Nigeria is an oil- based, rentier state. Money is transferred monthly to each of the 36 states and 774 local governments in the federation. This transfer, the federal revenue allocation, goes from the central government into a separate account for each state and LGA. A formula is used to calculate the size of the transfer to each unit in the federation, based on population size and the derivation principle (oil-producing states receive a higher share than non-oil producing states). Oil revenues comprise more than 90 per cent of Nigeria‘s internal income and its diversion by political elites allows that class to sustain itself in power. This lucrative arrangement generates demand for new administrative units in Nigeria, although other factors, such as minority concerns, are also important (Suberu, 2001). The creation of new states and local government areas is often demanded on an ethnic basis, with groups making territorial claims by arguing they have a historical attachment to a particular area. This tendency has greatly exacerbated indigeneity politics, as groups compete for the control of states, local governments, and even wards, on account of the financial benefits and status this will bring to them. Statism is exacerbated by the dependence on petroleum export revenues, which have undermined and led to the neglect of other economic sectors – to quote Rotimi Suberu (1998), the ‗economic centrality of the Nigerian state derives significantly from the underdevelopment of the country‘s economy‘. 2.5 The Causes of Ethno-Religious conflicts in Jos Can be Classified into two major headings: - i. Remote Causes of ethno-religious crises
  34. 34. The crises on the Jos Plateau are first and foremost a struggle over land. Majority of Plateau State indigenes are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers or workers in the civil service, while the mainly Muslim minorities are Hausa dry-season farmers and cattle raring Fulani, with the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and Hausa dominating the business life of the metropolis. Some indigenes, particularly from the Southern Senatorial district are also cattle herders. The land thus remains an important emotive factor to a region that is predominantly inhabited by peasant farmers (frustrated over lack of fertilizers) and cattle herders, who usually are mutually conflict prone. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) brought about the retirement and retrenchment of many public servants, semi or low educated-petty company workers and military personnel (most who actively participated in the civil war) occasioning their return to the farmlands thereby exerting great pressure on land resources Thus: - Suddenly, land which used to be available to those who used or needed it became a prized possession. Both the host communities and settlers alike began to rationalise their inability to acquire and possess land to the presence of the other group, thereby undermining the imperative of their co-existence and the basis of consensus and confidence building. These factors probably account for the preponderance of land disputes as an index in the perennial communal conflict profile of the Middle-Belt. Land is central to survival, hence conflict very often occur over access to pastoral and arable land. Differences in ethnic nationality and religion between Plateau ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulani only serve to compound these economic problems. The collapse of the once thriving tin mining industry in the state and the arrival of petro-dollars gave birth to attendant dislocation and job losses. This unfortunately coincided with period of Shari‘ah expansion in the northern states. The second cause of the Jos Plateau crises is centred over the politics of participation in government by both ―indigenes‖ and ―settlers‖. Issues here include the creation of the Jos South LG out of Jos North by the military administration of Babangida, along religious lines, with the former purportedly for Christians and the latter for Hausa-Fulani Muslims. Moreover, appointments in Plateau State which is predominantly Christian during the long military (mis)rule was along religious lines, with the Muslim minority sometimes having more portfolios than Christians. With the return to multi-party democracy, however, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims were left out in the cold, since they lacked the numerical strength to
  35. 35. successfully back their candidates. This coupled with the issue of ethnicity coalesce to cause Muslim Hausa-Fulani minority, who used to be in the centre of political activities to feel that they are losing control. The Christians were eager to exercise their voting right to wrestle political control from the Hausa-Fulani Muslims whom they regard as ―settlers‖. In 1999, no Hausa-Fulani Muslim was voted to either to the Senate or the National House of Assembly and only one was voted to the Plateau State of Assembly. This heightened the indigene-ship, citizenship and settler-ship syndrome in the area. The recurrent problem constituted by the indigene/settler syndrome in Jos, mostly between the Hausa-Fulani self styled Jasawa and the traditional natives of Jos town (the Berom, Anaguta and Afisare) constitute a major factor for the Jos crises. The social dimension is also very revealing, since despite their many years in Jos, the Hausa- Fulani Muslim community failed to integrate fully into the Jos Plateau society. The community being Muslim does not tolerate marriage between their daughters and Christian but they do marry Christian girls. Most Jos Plateau Christian communities detest this lopsided mode of social interaction. This has given birth to what the Christians refer to as Hausa- Fulani raini ‗culture of belittling‘ and arrogance since they look down with open contempt and lack of respect upon their host community, using such intemperate language and stereotypes as arna, infidels, Sarkin arna, the chief of infidels, kafirai (kafir) to describe them. They exhibit total disregard for the culture, religion and traditional institutions of their host communities. This is a fundamental reason that has birthed deep seated bitterness, with far reaching social consequences, that has continued to fan conflict on the Jos Plateau. This has severely breached the laws of communal harmony and interaction. Indeed the source of tension in the Jos settler/indigene relationship also stems from the Hausa-Fulani claim over the ownership of Jos, the chieftaincy stool and other tenuous claims to political offices. This is what has pitted Muslim Hausa-Fulani against such predominant Christian indigenous ethnic groups as the Berom, Afisare and the Anaguta on one hand and other settlers like the Yoruba, Urhobo, and Igbo on the other. Issues such as lopsided/partisan reporting of the crisis by both local and foreign media, cow theft or cattle rustling and religious affiliation only served as gasoline added to flames that are consuming dry grass in harmattan season. It should be noted that BBC Hausa Service, DW Hausa and VOA Hausa
  36. 36. units covering of the Jos Plateau crises was biased because the Hausa speakers working for these media outfits are mostly Hausa Muslims. ii. Immediate Causes of ethno-religious crises The immediate causes of the September 2001 ethno-religious crises in Jos are three, namely, struggle over political appointments, blockage of street for the purposes of praying, eslewhere referred to by this author as street praying, and the expansion of Shari’ah laws that introduced rather severe punishments for hadd crimes in twelve northern states of Nigeria. The Jos April 12 th 1994 conflicts between the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Anaguta, Afizare (Izere) and Berom centred on the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Hausa-Fulani as Jos North LG Chairman of the Caretaker Committee by the military. When Alhaji Muktar a Hausa-Fulani again became coordinator of the Federal Government initiated Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) in 2001, tensions resume immediately between along the old lines of ethnic and religious divide. Thus, contestations over economic and political space constitute one of the immediate causes of conflicts in Jos in September 2001. Another cause of the crisis is street praying, that is the blocking of a major street for the purposes of religious worship or rituals. Some Muslim zealots boldly beat up Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam, a young Christian lady ostensibly because she was walking on a major street, the only access to her home, while the street was ‗closed‘ for the Juma‘at prayers.15 According to Rhoda, on 7th September, 2001, by 1.45 pm while she was going back to her work place from break at home, she was accosted and beaten up by some Muslim youth for passing through a footpath near a mosque, which is beside her home. When she ran home for safety, the youths followed her in a large number and beat up her father. This free for all fight later spread to some parts of Jos town. The expansion of Shari‘ah in twelve northern states forced a great deal of Christians to flee from the core north. Most of them sought for and found refuge in Jos, which they considered a safe haven. Likewise, a number of liberal Muslims fleeing from a more strict form of Islam sought refuge in Jos. However, the remnants of the followers of Maitatsine, a Muslim fundamentalist, whose followers caused mayhem across the northern Muslim states of Nigeria from 1980 to the 1990s have been living in the Angwan Rogo and Kona Shagari area of Jos for many years. These militant
  37. 37. elements also wanted Shari’ah law imposed in Plateau State. Naturally, fleeing Christians felt they should not give and inch to Muslims in a ―Christian state‖. So, The September 7, 2001 crisis in Jos is commonly believed to be a spill out of the Shari’ah fervour [sic]. As the Shari’ah law was adopted in surrounding state in domino-fashion, religious passion became inflamed in Plateau State. The President’s complacency in the face of the grievous infringement of Nigeria’s secularity not only emboldened some Muslims to demonstrate defiance for constituted authorities elsewhere but encouraged them to nurse particularistic religious sentiments for the Shari’ah even in areas where they constituted a minority population of settlers. The ineptitude of government in dealing with the Zamfara declaration of State religion sent the wrong signals across the nation. Obasanjo‘s position was that being a political Shari‘ah, given time it will fizzle out and disappear in thin air. 2.6 Influence of resource control on Jos ethno-religious conflict The Jos Plateau attracted pastoralists in the nineteenth century when its human population was relatively sparse. The discovery of tin and the subsequent growth of Jos, inevitably brought a major expansion of the farming population, and all but very marginal land was brought into cultivation. Colonial officials were already noting instances of farmer-grazier conflict on the Plateau as early as the 1940s (Davies, 1946), while Awogbade (1983) documented similar problems in the 1970s. During the 1980s, some Fulbe from the Plateau moved permanently into the lowlands, especially into the forested region along the Benue, where farming populations are still sparse. Nonetheless, the low-disease environment and wide grasslands of the Plateau were too attractive to pastoralists and many began to settle and integrate with local communities. While most indigenous Plateau populations depended on upland rain fed cultivation, and the principal cereal crops were sorghum and millet, this provided a significant basis for interaction between the two groups. The farmers kept few cattle (although populations of the indigenous muturu, a humpless longhorn were probably higher than today) and the Fulbe could graze their cattle on the crop residues, with the farmers benefiting from the manure. However, once dry-season gardening began to take off, the river edges that had provided lush grazing were increasingly populated by farms. Moreover, the tubers and vegetables mainly grown there did not provide attractive residues for cattle and the farmers increasingly preferred fertiliser. At the same time, the ADP system
  38. 38. encouraged a switch to maize while the growth of potato cultivation made even crop residues in upland areas unsuitable for cattle. These agronomic changes did not take place without problems; pastoralists came to river- banks previously covered in grass to find tomatoes. Young men herded their cattle between upland cereal fields and the cattle strayed into the crops. However, these types of conflicts were usually settled informally and the types of violent clashes characteristic of some other northern states were not characteristic of Plateau. However, from 2001 onwards the situation has changed dramatically in character, with urban conflicts being replayed in rural areas with unattractive consequences for all sides. On the 8th of September, 2001, serious religious conflict broke out in Jos, and riots between Christians and Muslims led to substantial loss of life and property. Once the news filtered through to rural areas, there was significant pressure for the indigenous farming populations to attack the resident Fulbe pastoralists. This occurred at several sites around Jos, notably Miango, Vom and Riyom, leading to numbers of deaths, burnings of houses and property and theft of stock. Elsewhere in rural communities, emissaries were sent to urge these attacks, but fortunately more pacific counsels prevailed and the peace was kept. Nonetheless, many pastoralists were forced to flee Plateau State and reached Bauchi, which has a reputation for being more sympathetic to Muslims. The governor offered to open up Forest Reserves and it is there that many of the refugees are now settled; few have any intention of returning to Plateau State. In June 2003, some herds were encountered making their way on to the Plateau on an experimental basis; but relations remain very tense. One of the other bases for interchange between Fulbe and farmers was the hiring of boys to herd cattle. Most Fulbe herds are too large to be herded by the family labour alone, and indeed many Fulbe household heads noted that their sons would rather hang around in towns than herd cattle, as a result of education. But it was common for many of the larger tribes to send their sons herding with the Fulbe; usually they would be paid with a one- or two-year old bull after one year or a heifer after two years. Such animals have become the basis for small village herds now kept by many indigenous groups. However, since the crisis, a breakdown of trust has meant that many of the larger groups, such as the Irigwe and the Berom have withdrawn their children and many other groups are now more sceptical.
  39. 39. A major consequence of the crisis has been that a number of key stock routes across the Jos Plateau, especially those passing near Miango, Riyom and Vom are now permanently blocked and are unlikely to reopen in the near future. There has been a response to this, albeit hard to interpret. In October 2002, a series of attacks by well-armed groups on villages in the Jos area began and continued through into 2003 with the Berom people of Rim and Bachit the principal victims. The attackers are widely to believe to be mercenaries, coming either from Niger or further north in Nigeria and their goal seems to be creation of mayhem rather than theft. It is widely believed that this is revenge exacted by the Fulbe for the earlier killings, but this seems unlikely. More probable is that elite northern interests are taking advantage of the situation to foment disorder. The consequence has been to further sow distrust in rural areas but also to give the resident farming populations a powerful rationale for permanently taking over valuable Fulbe farmland along rivers. If this were not enough, at the other end of the state, an even more serious outbreak of hostilities has turned the region into a virtual no-go area. The most striking feature of this rural strife is the absence of any effective response from government. After a conflict occurs, police and army roadblocks are set up for a week or so, but then are removed once there is no immediate fighting. Refugees are settled in rural areas or have moved to towns such as Langtang and Jos to stay with relatives. Insecurity has discouraged farming in many areas and severe food shortages are beginning to be felt, especially in the southeast. These episodes illustrate the problems in dealing with community conflict. What are originally conflicts for resources are being transformed through religious affiliation; the original issue may not have been the Fulbe, but they have been drawn in. The consequence of government failure to restrain expanding private ownership and trade in modern weapons is now highly apparent. They also show that the churches have now become wealthy and are no longer willing to remain passive. They are highly organised and willing to fund ethnic agendas and confront armed attacks. This is unlikely to provide fertile ground for the LDPs proposed by Fadama II.
  40. 40. CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction The study examines the ethnicity and religious instability in Nigeria, a case study of Jos plateau state. This chapter describes the procedures, techniques and strategies employed in the study. The method to be used is discussed under the following headings:-  Research design  Population  Sample and sampling techniques  Research instrument;  Validity of the instrument;  Reliability of the instrument;  Administration of instrument;  Procedure for data collection  Method of data analysis 3.2 Research Design The design of the study is a descriptive survey aimed at assessing the influence of ethnicity and religious instability on conflict in jos plateau state, by examining the opinions of political leaders, religious leaders, religious bodies, traditional rulers, members of the communities, and other stake holders. Descriptive survey research design according to Ali (1996) is concerned with describing events as they are without any manipulation of what is being observed while in Nwan‘s words (2005) survey research is one in which a group of people or items is studied by collecting and analyzing data from only few people or items (sample) considered to be representative of the entire group, and the finding from the sample is expected to be generalized to the entire population. Therefore, this study‘s adoption of descriptive survey research design is justified.
  41. 41. 3.3 Population of the Study The population for this study will comprise all the five local government areas the worst heats by the conflict, which comprising Jos north, Jos east, Jos south, langtang north, and langtang south with the total of 1,068,563, with respondent both Muslim and Christian. The population is suitable for this study in that it is gender sensitive and is characterized by both subjects (Muslim and Christian) equally selected that can easily be studied with the use of the proposed research instruments. Table 1: data showing the population of each of the five local governments in Jos No. Local government areas Resources Population Sample 1 Jos north Trading and commerce 429,300 80 2 Jos east Coffee, farm product, and farm land 85,602 80 3 Jos south Fertile land, mining ponds and farming 306,716 80 4 Langtang north Fertile land and farm land 140,643 80 5 Langtang south Fertile land and farm land 106,305 80 Total 1,068,563 400 Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, 2006 National Census. 3.4 Sample size The sample will comprise of 400 respondents from the selected local government areas from Jos plateau state. The researcher will obtain this sample size form the target population of 1,068563 with the aid of Slovene formula of: - n= N 1+ n(e)2 Where n= Sample size N = sampled population and e = Level of significance of 0.05
  42. 42. 3.5 Sampling procedure The researcher will use stratified random and purposive sampling techniques to collect data (select sample) form various local government areas of the survey population according to glass and Hopkins in Muddah (2006) stratified random sampling ensures that all members of the population have equal chances of being selected. First the plateau state conflict were stratified in to five (5) local government areas form which the required sample of respondent will be selected though stratified random sampling method to ensure that each stratum (local government areas) is equally represented white purposive sampling will be used to select the required form the sampled from the population. 3.6 Research Instrument The research instrument for this study is a researchers developed questionnaires titled: ethnicity and religious conflict questionnaire (ERIQ). The items used in the questionnaires were obtained from literature. The questionnaire consists of 20 items divided into four sections based on types of ethno-religious conflict factors effecting Jos plateau state which deals with the views of the respondents on the influence of these ethno-religious conflict factors. The questionnaire was structured on a closed ended format on YES or NO responses. 3.7 Validation of the Instrument The instrument will be validated by three experts in the field of conflict management, statistics and the research supervisor and senior executive members of the local government areas selected in Jos plateau state. They will review the items in terms of theirs clarity, relevance, contents coverage and appropriateness; their suggestions will then be incorporated in to the final version of the instrument for use in this study. Gazali (1993) called this ‗Logical Reasoning and personal judgment of specialist‘ 3.8 Reliability of the Instrument To test the reliability of the instrument, a pilot study will be conducted in five local government areas selected from plateau state and 40 subjects or sample selected consisting of 5 local government area and 10 politicians, religious leaders and followers. Split half reliability co-efficient will be determined by correlating the scores of the odd items against even number items Anatasi (1976) in Sadiq (1991).
  43. 43. After obtaining the 2 scores for each respondent, they will then be correlated using the person product-moment correlation methods. To get the consistency of the total test, it will be necessary to correct the split half test correlation to the expected full – length value. This will be done by applying the Speaman Brown prophecy formula, which is: - Where r1 = Reliability of whole test r = Correlation co-efficient of the split test and 2 = Doubling factors Agu, (2002) If for example the correlation co-efficient of the spit half test r = 0. 7 The above was to give unbiased reliability indices for the full length test. 3.9 Procedure for Data Collection A letter of introduction will be obtained from the researcher‘s department to the local government areas, political organizations, and religious bodies in Jos plateau State. The researcher having secured permission from the local government areas authorities will visit the selected bodies. The researcher and one research assistants selected in each organisation will administer the questionnaire in the following ways. The procedure for the administration of questionnaire will be done as follows: Stage i: the researcher and the research assistant selected in each organisation with the help of the politicians, religious leaders and followers, and research assistants will administer the questionnaire to the respondents using simple random sampling
  44. 44. without replacement. On the whole, four hundred (400) questionnaires will be administered. Stage ii: after an interval of one hour the researchers and research assistant will go round to collect the completed questionnaire. Only the correctly filled or completed questionnaire will be used for data analysis. Stage iii: completed questionnaires will be collected on the sport to ensure good return and the total number collected back will be the figure to the used for the purpose of data analysis. 3.10 Method of data Analysis The completed questionnaires are gathered, the frequency of respondents to each of the 20 items of the questionnaire will be compiled. The descriptive statistics of frequency counts, and percentages, will be used to describe data from respondents and to answer the research questions, while inferential statistics of chi-square (X2 ) test will be used in testing and analyzing the null hypotheses at 0.05 alpha levels. Ethical considerations Firstly, the researcher will make self identification to the respondents without creating room misrepresentation. The respondents will be provided with the researchers, information through his identity card and covering letter from the department of social sciences for further identification. Secondly, the respondents will also be informed about the title this of the research, that is an informed consent and participation of respondents. The procedure to be used and the expected benefits to the participants and the society will also be disclosed to them. Thirdly, the respondents will be given enough information about the study and opportunity to ask questions and have them answered. They will voluntarily participate in giving information and no coercion or promises of benefits as a result of participation will be applied. Fourthly, anonymity is another ethical consideration that the study will take into consideration. In this respondents will not provide their names and other identifications that
  45. 45. will give clues of knowing the person who has provided the information, this will ensure that the privacy and security of respondents are grantee. Dresser (1998) stated that the administrative burden of ethical reviews and procedures is balanced by the protection of participants.