FinalDraftIRA

Troubles and Terrorism: Why did the Irish Republican
Army Resort to Terrorism?
John Peller

Troubles and Terrorism: Why did the Irish Republican Army Resort to Terrorism?
The Troubles, one of the most unpleasant periods in recent British history, have been a
blight on the European landscape since the late 1960s. What began as a simple Civil Rights
movement for the Protestant and Catholic working class devolved into a bloody mess of
bombings, shootings, and unsavoury government collusion. These tactics, used by paramilitaries
on either side of the sectarian divide have more in common with conflicts seen in Israel and
Palestine, than they do in Ukraine and Russia. Why did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) resort
to using terrorist strategies in its struggle against British Occupation rather than fighting a more
traditional guerilla war? Many strategies were employed against the British, but it was quickly
established that provocation of the British military would garner support for a republican
movement and plant in the Catholic majority, the seeds of mistrust and hatred of the British
government. As the Troubles progressed, clashes with the British Army declined, while
bombings and shootings in civilian areas became more commonplace.
When it comes to small, poorly-equipped, militias such as the IRA, jus in bello combat is
typically one sided, as it was in the case of the original Easter Rebellion of 1916. There was no
way for a small confederation of Irish rebels to realistically win a head to head war, especially
against a British military and a British home front that was already mobilized due to the outbreak
of World War I. There are five specific strategies that paramilitary organizations can employ
against their military opponents: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding.
Attrition is defined as, “terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough

to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy.” Intimidation is used1
when terrorists want to convince the general population that they can punish anyone who doesn’t
obey them and the state is powerless to stop it. A provocation strategy is “an attempt to induce
the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population
and moves them to support the terrorists.” A spoiler strategy is an “attack in an effort to2
persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and untrustworthy, thus
undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement.” Finally, groups using outbidding “use3
violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than
rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support.” The IRA did not use all of these strategies4
during their campaign against the British, but there are examples of them using at least three of
the strategies. In its origins, the IRA hoped to fight a war of attrition with the British during the
1916 rebellion, due to the costly effects of the ongoing war in Europe. The IRA subsequently
abandoned this method and used provocation, which was used for the vast majority of the
conflict, due to its effectiveness at provoking the British military, as well as galvanizing support
from the population in Northern Ireland. Finally, spoilers were only uses in one specific instance:
After the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the Continuity IRA denounced the ceasefire,
arguing that the Sinn Fein signees of the treaty could not be trusted to help the Catholic,
Republican population of the north. Because the IRA solely relied on provocation from the Irish
1
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism”. International Security 31
(1). The MIT Press: p. 51
2
3
4

War for Independence in the 1920s, until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it
can be said that it was their most successful strategy against the British. Why the the IRA chose
to use provocation is evident through the history of their struggle against the British.
The Irish Republican Army draws its origins from the ideas of the leaders of the Easter
Rebellion of 1916. According to the Republicans’ argument Great Britain was occupying their
country by force, and therefore, in their view, the prosecution of the so called “armed struggle”
was justified in order to expel the British from Ireland. The Easter Rebellion was an armed5
rebellion in Ireland during Easter Week, 1916. The Rebellion was started by Irish republicans
with the goals of ending British rule in Ireland and establishing an independent Irish Republic
while the United Kingdom was heavily engaged in World War I. The British army quickly ended
the insurrection, but made the mistake of executing the leaders instead of imprisoning them for
life. After the execution of the leaders, anti-British sentiment skyrocketed as shown by the rise in
popularity of the republican newspaper, An Phoblacht. After the 1916, the paper published an
article which outlined why the Irish had become disenfranchised with the British Government:
“British soldiers and British Administrators have never brought anything but death suffering
starvation and untold misery to the people in this country. They will never bring anything else
until they get out.” The Irish population echoed this sentiment, as the Irish War of Independence6
began soon after. The Easter Rising was the first large scale “successful” Irish rebellion since
the Rebellion of 1798. Some distinction must be made however, that the Easter Rising was not
5
Alonso, Rogelio. "The modernization in Irish Republican thinking toward the utility of violence." Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 24.2 (2001): p. 132
6
Smith, Michael Lawrence Rowan. Fighting for Ireland?: the military strategy of the Irish Republican
movement. Routledge, 2002. p. 6

successful in the sense that they were victorious, but they were able to garner the sympathy and
support of the general Irish population.
During the Irish War of Independence, the IRA employed a guerilla campaign against the
much stronger British Army. At this time, the IRA were forming into a number of full-time
guerrilla groups, under the title ‘Active Service Units’ or ‘flying columns’” The flying column7
was an invention of the East Limerick Brigade of the IRA, which had a similar function to the
Minuteman militias of the American Revolutionary War. The idea behind the flying column was
an “efficient, disciplined, compact and swift-moving body of men which would strike at the
enemy when a suitable opportunity arose.” By the end of 1920, there were dozens of these8
Active Service Units, which were well-armed with weapons and explosives, patrolling the
countryside outside of dublin. These flying columns would travel around on bicycles and small
carts in order to be able to travel quickly and inconspicuously. These flying columns disrupted
British supply routes and convoys by ambushing them as they travelled at night. Much of the
success found by the IRA during the Irish War of Independence can be attributed to the existence
of these flying columns, because without them, the British almost surely would have won that
war and quelled further thought of Irish rebellion. After the War of Independence, the IRA split
between those who accepted the teams of the peace treaty and those that did not, or more
specifically, those that accepted the partition of Ulster in the north from the Republic in the
south. With the creation of the Crown State of Northern Ireland, Catholics and Nationalists
became a minority to the Protestant Unionist population, and the Unionists summarily were put
7
Townshend, Charles. The British campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: the development of political and
military policies. Oxford University Press, 1975. p. 114
8
Townshend, Charles. The British campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: the development of political and
military policies. Oxford University Press, 1975. p. 114

into power by the British Government for 40 years. Stormont, the seat of the government of
Northern Ireland, was the tool the Unionists used de jure segregation to split the Protestant
population from the Catholic population. De facto segregation was promoted by many on both
sides, with the Catholic Clergy advocating for segregated schools in order to preserve the
Catholic faith of future generations, and by Ian Paisley advocating for complete separation from
all things Catholic or Republican. In 1962, Lord Cameron was tasked with an inquiry into the
civil unrest that had broken out in Northern Ireland. “Membership of the ruling Unionist Party
was not open to Catholics, Cameron pointed out, adding, that ‘the Orange Order does in fact
exercise influence within the Unionist party...” Cameron’s report detailed many other9
grievances against the Catholic population in northern Ireland: “The Cameron Commission
sustained charges that Catholics were discriminated against in housing, local voting,
employment.” These problems led to the creation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights10
Association (NICRA), who began staging multiple protests and marches, taking inspiration from
the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
Derry, (or Londonderry as it’s known to Unionists), was a major source of
demonstrations by NICRA, as the city’s population was more than 2/3 Catholic in the 1960s.
Cronin writes:
“NICRA then stated its demands boldly: universal franchise in local elections,
electoral boundaries drawn by independent commissions, compulsory points system for
housing, repeal of the special powers act, disbandment of the ‘B’ Specials (military
police) and withdrawal of the Public Order Bill which the Unionists were pressing
9
Cronin, Sean. Irish nationalism: A history of its roots and ideology. Continuum, 1981, 1981. p. 179
10

through Stormont to halt civil rights demonstrations.” also humorously adding “For11
anyone slightly acquainted with the politics of Northern Ireland, this seemed a utopian
list of demands, yet a year or so after 5 October, 1968, most of them were granted.”6
Among the demands that were not granted, was the removal of the “B” Specials and the
removal of the Public Order Act. The demands that were granted however, to many years to
complete as Stormont begrudgingly enacted legislation for the demands. Because Derry acted as
a fountain of civil rights unrest, Stormont acted by banning public civil rights demonstrations
without a permit. This was especially problematic, because the government would not willingly
issue protest permits to Nationalists wanting civil rights. Unsurprisingly, the action taken against
NICRA backfired: “The Derry ban drew thousands of Nationalists to the streets; the police
attacks were seen on television. The message was clear: in the Nationalist city of Derry, a march
for decent housing was considered a subversive act.” The attacks which Cronin references is12
the Bloody Sunday Massacre which was an incident on January 30, 1972 in the Bogside area of
Derry, Northern Ireland. British soldiers shot 26 unarmed civilians during a protest march for
civil rights. The British defended this action by stating that the IRA had infiltrated the NICRA
and were using it as a defense in order to attack the British Military. According to Sean Cronin:
“The truth, however was the at the IRA did not infiltrate and take over the civil rights
movement in Northern Ireland: it began it. Its purposes were quite open and not sinister at all,
resulting from a failure of the 1950s armed resistance campaign.”13
11
12
13

What the British actually had meant by infiltration by the IRA, was actually a violent
breakaway from the group, known as the Provisionals, or the PIRA. The PIRA had broken away
from the IRA, due to their socialist/communist leanings. The PIRA is the organization
responsible for much of the terrorist activities in the North, as they believed that armed conflict
was the only remaining way to ensure a united Irish republic.
Terrorism is defined as“a weapon of coercive intimidation, typically involving the taking
of hostages and the threat of the gun and the bomb, designed to make governments submit to the
demands.” Hostages were not taken by the PIRA, but guns and bombs were commonplace14
According to Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, a method that terrorists may use to galvanize
support is known as provocation. The PIRA frequently used provocation in order to gain support
from the more moderate Catholics. Provocation is defined by Kydd and Walters as “an attempt to
induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the
population and moves them to support the terrorists” Michael Smith agrees with this idea citing15
a:
“widespread feeling in the early 1970s that the rioting and general street
disturbances of this period had been orchestrated by the Provisionals as part of a
deliberate strategy to weaken the relationship between the army and the Catholic
Community.”16
The British response to anything that could possibly be related to the Provisionals was to
crack down, hard. The ‘B’ Specials, with the authority of the British government began a
14
Wilkinson, Paul. Political terrorism. London: Macmillan, 1974. p. 1
15
16

program of internment, in which those suspected of involvement with the Provisionals would be
detained indefinitely. The effects of this are noted by Michael Smith, as he states “Overall, the
civil disturbances of 1970, and the British Army’s response to them, did have a visible impact on
Catholic Attitudes.”11
Smith also writes:
“Although the army’s rough treatment was handed out to both Catholics and
Protestants in equal measure, it had an especially alienating effect on Catholics, who
grew to share the Provisionals’ perception of a force trying to protect, not the Catholic
population, but the repressive Unionist party at Stormont.”17
As a result of the British crackdown on PIRA activities, the began to gain more support from
working class Catholics.
Civil Disobedience was not the only strategy that the Provisionals resorted to in their
campaign against the British. The central Irish Republic strategy has always been based on
physical force-mass rebellion, Fenian assassinations, guerrilla war, and bombing campaigns.18
More and more, the PIRA began to use a different type of weapon, the car-bomb, which became
a core strategy of theirs. Smith agrees saying, “The cutting edge of PIRA’s strategy was its
bombing campaign. PIRA’s most potent weapon was, in fact, its own invention the car bomb.”19
There were multiple reasons for using car-bombs, mostly due to how easy they were to disguise
as well as transport. The inspiration for the car-bomb can most likely be drawn from the flying
columns of the War of Independence. The ease of transport reflects the high mobility of the
17
18
Bell, J. Bowyer. "The Escalation of Insurgency: The Provisional Irish Republican Army's Experience,
1969–1971." The Review of Politics 35.03 (1973): p. 399
19

flying column that was used to ambush British army convoys. The bombs also did not have a
singular purpose. In general to bring down Stormont, PIRA needed to cause sufficient instability
in Northern Ireland in order to create the perception of chaos and ungovernability.” The20
perception of chaos and ungovernability is important in the use of a provocation strategy,
because it creates the feeling that the current government is unable to provide security, which
gives validation to the terrorist goals. This sentiment is echoed by Smith again:
“The strategic aim of the the car-bombings was to make the government and
administration of the occupied North as difficult as possible, while simultaneously
striking at its colonial infrastructure.” and “The rationale was to restrict the province’s
economic base by hitting commercial and business premises to drive away investment
and force the British to pay compensation.”21
The PIRA did not only conduct bombings to attack the economic infrastructure of the British
government in Northern Ireland. There were several other strategic factors. In one way, the PIRA
saw themselves as defenders of Ireland from British Invaders. An article was posted in the New
York Times, which read:
“On Stanleys Walk in the Bogside, 21 year old Martin McGuinness, the officer in
charge of the Provisional wing, said: “the job as far as I’m concerned, is fighting the
British army. Ours is an offensive role. No one likes to kill. I don’t. But we’re at war.
These people are invaders.”22
20
movement. Routledge, 2002. p.98
21
movement. Routledge, 2002. p.93
22
Wallace, Michael, and Gene Brown. "The I.R.A." Terrorism. New York: Arno, 1979. N. pag. Print. p. 244

In this article, Martin McGuinness, who now is sharing power as the head of state in Northern
Ireland, lays down his reasoning for why the PIRA does the campaigns it does. Smith
corroborates this idea stating “By reducing the army’s presence in Catholic areas, the
Provisionals could hope to enhance their credibility as defenders.” Wilkinson would agree with23
McGuinness, as he theorizes why terrorism is justified:
“Terrorism is justified by its perpetrators on the ground that they are struggling
against cruel and oppressive regimes, and that any means are justified-even the shedding
of innocent blood-in pursuance of this.”24
Not only are there economic and symbolic reasons that the PIRA resorted to bombings, but there
were also strategic military advantages to operate in this manner. Michael Smith argues that the
PIRA conducted bombings in a frequent manner in order to prevent counterinsurgency
operations.
“In tandem with the economic war, the bombings served a number of tactical objectives.
The Provisionals believed that the bombing threat could divert the security forces from
counter-insurgency operations by tying down large numbers of troops in static positions guarding
potential targets.”25
A horrific example of a “successful car-bomb” operation was the Omagh Bombing in
1998. At this time, there had been another schism in the Irish Republican movement with the
Provisionals disarming during the Belfast Agreement, and the Continuity/Real IRA conducting
active operations, as they opposed any peace process without a 32 county republic. Omagh stood
23
24
Wilkinson, Paul. Political terrorism. London: Macmillan, 1974. p. 1
25

out as a good symbolic target for the Real IRA. It is an economic, administrative, legal, and
military center and thus can be identified with an attack on the British presence and rule as a
whole. This attack was different than earlier bombings by the IRA because, “In the early stages26
of the conflict most civilian deaths were the largely unintended consequences of other activities,
such as random car bombings in city and town centres where inadequate or misleading warnings
were provided.” In the instance of the Omagh bombing, no warning was given and all of the27
civilian deaths were seen as necessary casualties.
Terrorism is and was a good strategy to use against the British because being a western
liberal democracy, they were unable to crack down on the perpetrators like Soviets or the
Chinese without a sizable opposition. The British response to the both the unrest of the Catholic
community as well as the military campaign of the IRA solidified the well executed strategy of
provocation by the IRA. According to Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “British policy from 1976 onwards
was aimed at pressing the military advantage and pushing the IRA towards a unilateral
abandonment of its campaign.” The British government’s first step at combating Irish terrorism28
was the passing of the Special Powers Act of 1922, which gave the NI government sweeping
power to combat Irish terrorism. The Special Powers Act began the alienation of the Catholic
Community that the IRA’s strategy of provocation relied on. As a part of the Special Powers act,
the Ulster Special Constabulary(USC) was established. “The USC, popularly dubbed the ‘B
Men’, was attacked as a loyalist army as it had no Catholic membership.” Having a special29
26
Dingley, James. "The bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: the bombers, their tactics, strategy, and
purpose behind the incident." Studies in conflict and terrorism 24.6 (2001): p 458
27
p. 907
28
Ó Dochartaigh, N. (2015), The Longest Negotiation: British Policy, IRA Strategy and the Making of the
Northern Ireland Peace Settlement. Political Studies, 63: p. 208
29
Flackes, William D. Northern Ireland: A Political Directory. New York: St. Martin's Pr., 1980. Print. p. 197

police force comprised solely of Protestants made Catholic communities feel like they were not
represented by the British government. Next, laws were passed attempting to combat the spread
of weapons to Northern Ireland. “The Explosives Act of 1970 tightened controls on the use of
explosives. The Firearms Amendment of 1971 had similar objectives” This decision was one of30
the more logical decisions by the British government. This legislation was well received as it was
hoped that the violence would stop spreading. However, the legislation failed, and led to the
Battle of the Bogside, which can be pinpointed as a major failure in British policymaking.
According to William Flackes,
“One of the most agonised decisions of the NI government was to call for the
assistance of the army to maintain order. It was taken on 14 Aug. 1969, after [Royal
Ulster Constabulary] officers accepted that their men were too exhausted to maintain
their effort on the edge of Derry’s Bogside and in Belfast”31
The introduction of the Army to Northern Ireland was not seen as problematic at first though.
Martin Wallace notes, “The deployment of troops, initially welcomed by Catholic communities
in Londonderry and Belfast against protestant attackers, fundamentally altered relationships
between the British and Northern Irish governments.” The Catholic communities of Northern32
Ireland saw the Army as an impartial protector that would save them from Protestant attackers.
Flackes also agrees with this sentiment, saying virtually the same thing:
“In many Catholic areas of Belfast, the soldiers were a warm welcome since they
were treated as an insurance against loyalist incursions. This situation did not persist
30
Wallace, Martin. British Government in Northern Ireland: From Devolution to Direct Rule. Newton Abbot:
David & Charles, 1982. Print. p.42
31
32
David & Charles, 1982. Print. p. 36

though, since the rise of the PIRA led most Republicans to renew their natural resentment
towards British forces.”33
Why the support for the Army changed so quickly is due to the Army’s policy of internment.
Beginning “On 9 August 1971, 342 men were arrested under the Special Powers Act” These34
men were accused of either belonging to the IRA or conspiring with the IRA. They were not
given a trial and were held indefinitely. This decision was a huge mistake by the British
Government, but solidified the success of the IRA’s strategy of provocation. Flackes would
Agree with Kydd, as he argues that “This was partly because it was followed by an escalation of
violence, and partly because it led to the serious alienation of the Catholic community from the
Stormont System.” Not only does “The alienation of the Catholic community was compounded35
by the manner in which the internment was undertaken.” In the aftermath of Operation36
Demetrius, which called for the internment of potential militants, over 7000 Catholic families
had been displaced, some of them living in refugee camps in the Republic of Ireland. It is clearly
evident that the strategy of provocation by the IRA was a complete success in turning Catholics
from supporting the British to supporting the IRA
Although the crackdown by the British Government was extreme, any crackdown by the
British would have massively turned support from the British to the Irish Republican Army.
Wilkinson explains the reasoning behind this. “Liberal democracy, by definition, precludes rule
by matter of state terror. For Western liberals it is a matter for rejoicing that our societies do not
33
34
35
36

have to suffer totalitarian governmental terror of the Soviet kind.” What liberal democracies37
have however, is soft power. Cochrane argues that soft power is less visible than hard power and
is characterized not by coercion or threat, but by the power to influence others and to frame the
agenda. Because terrorism relies on an oppressive response to garner support, the PIRA’s38
campaign from the 1970s to the 1990s was a success. But as Britain shifted from hard power to
soft power responses, the successes of the Provisional Irish Republican Army came to steady
end.
37
Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism versus liberal democracy: The problems of response. No. 67. London:
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976. p. 6
38
Cochrane, Feargal. 2007. “Irish-america, the End of the Ira's Armed Struggle and the Utility of 'soft
Power'”. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.:p. 216

Alonso, Rogelio. "The modernization in Irish Republican thinking toward the utility of violence."
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24.2 (2001): 131-144.
Bell, J. Bowyer. "The Escalation of Insurgency: The Provisional Irish Republican Army's Experience,
1969–1971." The Review of Politics 35.03 (1973): 398-411.
Cochrane, Feargal. 2007. “Irish-america, the End of the Ira's Armed Struggle and the Utility of 'soft
Power'”. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 215–31.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640484.
Cronin, Sean. Irish nationalism: A history of its roots and ideology. Continuum, 1981, 1981.
Dingley, James. "The bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: the bombers, their tactics, strategy, and
purpose behind the incident." Studies in conflict and terrorism 24.6 (2001): 451-465.
Flackes, William D. Northern Ireland: A Political Directory. New York: St. Martin's Pr., 1980. Print.
Hayes, B. C. and McAllister, I. (2001), Sowing Dragon’s Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence
and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. Political Studies, 49: 901–922.
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism”. International Security
31 (1). The MIT Press: 49–80. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137539.
Ó Dochartaigh, N. (2015), The Longest Negotiation: British Policy, IRA Strategy and the Making of
the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement. Political Studies, 63: 202–220.
movement. Routledge, 2002.
Townshend, Charles. The British campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: the development of political
and military policies. Oxford University Press, 1975.
Wallace, Martin. British Government in Northern Ireland: From Devolution to Direct Rule. Newton
Abbot: David & Charles, 1982. Print.
Wallace, Michael, and Gene Brown. "The I.R.A." Terrorism. New York: Arno, 1979. N. pag. Print.
Wilkinson, Paul. Political terrorism. London: Macmillan, 1974.
Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism versus liberal democracy: The problems of response. No. 67. London:
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976
COPYRIGHT © 2015
John Peller
University of MInnesota

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