2. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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Does class matter in politics? Certainly, since the financial collapse of 2008 and the
resulting Great Recession class issues have dominated American political discourse. Longer‐
term trends also suggest that class should be increasingly relevant in political decision‐making.
Over the past forty years, economic inequality has increased while social mobility has
decreased (Bartels 2008; Beller and Hout 2006), and the past six years have seen the worst
economic performance in almost eighty years, at least for working and middle‐class individuals.
Class has become an increasingly salient factor in American lives. The question remains of
whether class is a salient factor in political decision‐making. Empirical analyses of class politics
continues to produced mixed results, with arguments for continued traditional class politics,
the decline of class politics, and the emergence of new patterns of class politics all remaining
prevalent in the literature.
Central to the debate over the relationship between class and electoral politics is the
definition and operationalization of class. Early studies of class voting typically utilized a
manual/nonmanual dichotomous measure of class (Goldthorpe 2001). More recent work has
employed a multi‐categorical occupation‐based class schema prevalent in social mobility
studies, originally developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (henceforth known as the
“EGP class schema”) (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979; Evans 1999; Hout, et al 1995;
Manza and Brooks 1999; Brady; Sosnaud, and Frenk 2009). Finally, others advocate instead for
the use of income as an operationalization of class arguing that relative positions within the
income distribution better capture overall life chances, diverging economic interests, and the
effects of economic inequality (Bartels 2005; 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Stonecash, et
3. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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al. 2000). These three definitions of class produce consistently different conclusions about the
relationship between class and voting.
While class‐voting researchers argue at length about which measures of class are most
appropriate, few have performed in‐depth empirical comparisons of the different measures of
class (Nieuwbeerta 1996; Stonecash, et al. 2000). Different measures of class imply different
mechanisms by which outcomes such as vote choice are affected. For example, do economic
inequalities have a greater influence on political decision‐making or are the relational
characteristics at the site of production more influential (Brady, et al 2009; Weeden and Grusky
2005)? By comparing different measures of class, this study will not only shed light on the
ongoing debate over whether class voting exists, but how class operates. This paper will add to
the literature by analyzing the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections, specifying three
different operationalizations of class‐based voting: manual/nonmanual occupational
dichotomy, the EGP class schema, and income categories. While many class‐voting studies
examine the relationship between class and vote cross‐nationally and/or over time, estimating
models of class voting in one country over time, and that vary only in the focal variable, will
allow for a careful and detailed analysis of the differences between measures of class. By
exploring in a critical and comparative manner how the prevailing conceptualizations of class
impact empirical studies of class voting, this paper will clarify how and why decisions about
class operationalizations produce different, sometimes contradictory results.
Literature Review
Before reviewing the developments and debates in class‐voting research, it may be
beneficial to step back and ask what, fundamentally, is meant by “class.” Erik Olin Wright notes
4. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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that Marx himself, whose work deals so closely with class, never provided a concrete definition
(1985), though he notes that Marxist class analysts generally define class as groups sharing
“common structural positions within the social organization of production” (1979:4). Max
Weber, on the other hand defines a class as a group of people that share a similar “specific
causal [economic] component of their life chances” (CSP:181). While there are other
conceptualizations, Marxist and Weberian definitions tend to dominate current sociological
class analysis. Regardless of how class is conceptualized, one basic commonality is that class
describes a “structure of inequality” (Chan 2007). In the case of class‐voting, class is generally
understood as a structure of economic inequality. Thus, much of the debate in class‐voting
research centers on how to operationalize class.
Many have charted the historical course of class voting scholarship over the past sixty
years (Evans 1999; Nieuwbeerta 1996; Hout et al 1995; Goldthorpe 2001). Generally, that
history begins with the era of the Alford index‐ a method for measuring absolute class voting‐
and a broad consensus that the salience of class as a determinant of vote‐choice was declining,
that voting behavior was dealigning from class. A second era of scholarship emerged in the
1980s, criticizing the use of the Alford index and the conclusion of the decline of class salience,
and instead proposed a more complex measure of class and the use of more sophisticated
multivariate statistical techniques (Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, et al. 1995; Evans 1999;
Goldthorpe 2001). As a result, new conclusions emerged that, at least in the United States,
there has been some type of class realignment‐ that class was still salient, but classes were
forming new allegiances to parties and candidates (Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, et al. 1995;
Brady, Sosnaud, and Frenk 2009). Recently, these conclusions have been challenged, with
5. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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some research, using income categories to operationalize class and finding that there is
continued traditional strong class voting in many postindustrial western democracies (Bartels
2005; Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Stonecash, et al. 2000; van der Waal, et al.
2007).
Class Dealignment and the Alford Index
Goldthorpe (2001:106‐8) identifies four contending reasons often cited for the decline
in class voting found by some studies. One reason is that traditional class divisions have given
way to sectoral divisions, a split between those employed in the public sector versus those
employed in the private sector, and between those who rely on the public sector versus those
who rely on the private sector for the provision of health, housing, education, and transport. A
second reason cited is that social structural locations, however defined, are becoming less
influential, especially among younger generations whose political behavior is shaped more by
belief and value systems. Third, voters are making political decisions based upon rational
assessments of particular issues and policies, rather than voting unthinkingly for the “natural
party” of their class, resulting in volatility from election to election in both the strength of party
support and its social composition.
Fourth, Clark and Lipset ([1991]2001), perhaps the most well‐known of the class‐
dealignment camp, argue that class salience in the political sphere is a function of the extent of
polarization of hierarchical divisions in the labor market and society (Clark and Lipset
[1991]2001). In the second half of the twentieth century, there has been a diversification of
occupational structures, moving away from regimented industrial jobs and towards a more
diverse array of service and information jobs, characterized by more middle‐management and
6. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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more specialized knowledge jobs, decreasing hierarchical relationships and decreasing shared
labor market experiences (Clark, Lipset, and Rempel [1993]2001:83). At the same time, the
development of welfare states have alleviated the boom‐bust cycles, improving the condition of
the working class and diffusing class conflict (Clark, et al. [1993]2001:83). Consequently, the
fragmentation of the working class and the rise of the middle class have rendered traditional
conceptions of class obsolete (Clark, et al. [1993]2001). Further, traditional political divisions
are being redefined. There are now “two lefts”‐ one representing a traditional working‐class
constituency and another representing a socially liberal professional class. As society becomes
wealthier, people begin to take basic material necessities for granted and grow more concerned
with lifestyle issues, a trend that is most pronounced among young, more affluent persons
(Clark and Lipset [1991]2001 47).
Hechter comes to a similar conclusion as Clark and Lipset‐ cultural concerns have grown
in importance, supplanting class identity as a significant influence on vote‐choice. Hechter
claims that two trends have resulted in status, and hence culture, becoming more salient than
class (2004). On the one hand, class boundaries have become more permeable, and class
organizational capacity and class consciousness have declined. At the same time, on the other
hand, status boundaries have become less permeable, status‐group organizational capacity has
not declined, and status‐group consciousness has grown (2004:408‐9,412‐3). He credits claims
that the rise of direct rule in the form of the welfare state, which increased social welfare
benefits and negated many of the incentives for class‐based organizing. This development
provided opportunities for status‐groups to organize and demand minority‐group benefits,
resulting in the rise of cultural politics and the decline of class politics (Hechter 2004:429‐30).
7. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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The classic measure upon which many of the class‐dealignment arguments rest is the
Alford index (Alford 1967, Clark and Lipset [1991]2001, Clark, et al [1993]2001). The Alford
index uses a 2x2 cross‐tabulation of class, measured as manual or nonmanual occupation, by
party, measured as left or non‐left party. The index is calculated by taking the difference
between the percentage of manual workers that vote for the left party and the percentage of
nonmanual workers that vote for the left party. Thus, if 60 percent of manual workers vote for
the left party and 40 percent of nonmanual workers vote for the left party, then the Alford
index is 20; a low or negative score means that there is little or no traditional class voting
(Alford 1967).
Class Realignment and the EGP Class Schema
While the Alford Index was the standard measure of class voting for many years, it has
been widely challenged on theoretical and methodological grounds (Nieuwbeerta 1996; Evans
1999; Weakliem 1995; Hout, et al 1995; Goldthorpe 2001). The manual/nonmanual dichotomy
has been criticized in that it can obscure variations within the classes, thus showing changes in
class voting that in reality are changes in class composition (Evans 8). Further, the rise of the
postindustrial era and the growth of low wage white‐collar and retail employment render the
manual/nonmanual distinction less theoretically salient.
As a result, many favor a more complex, multi‐categorical class schema (Hout, et al.
1995; Manza and Brooks 1999:Chap. 3; Brady, et al. 2009, Evans, Nieuwbeerta 1996,
Goldthorpe 2001). Many sociologists studying class voting have adopted some version of the
EGP class‐schema (Erikson, et al 1979; Evans 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, et al 1995;
8. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl 2003; Nieuwbeerta1
1996). Manza and Brooks (1999:57) argue
for a well‐designed relational class scheme that distinguishes groups that differ in educational
credentials, trusted salaried employees vs. restricted wage employees, and those who possess
organizational assets in their employment situations vs. those who do not possess such assets.
They contend that this model best captures long‐term differences in life chances that current
income may miss. Brady, et al. (2009) make similar arguments in favor of their similar
operational definition.
By and large, research utilizing a type of the EGP class schema tends to conclude that,
while class remains a salient factor in American electoral politics, some type of realignment has
occurred beginning around 1970 (Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, et al. 1995; Brady; Sosnaud,
and Frenk 2009; Evans 2000). Manza and Brooks find that while there is overall stability in the
class cleavage, traditional class‐party alignments are shifting. Between 1972 and 1992
professionals trended more Democratic, while in 1980 self‐employed and unskilled workers
experienced an abrupt shift towards the Republican Party (Manza and Brooks 1999:75; Hout,
Brooks, and Manza 1995:825). Increasingly liberal views on social issues are credited with the
shift of professionals towards the Democratic Party, while high levels of economic
dissatisfaction under Democratic administrations are identified as the causal factors for the
rightward shift of the self‐employed and unskilled workers (Manza and Brooks 1999:78). Brady,
et al. (2009:129) find that after 1992, working‐class men and women begin to differ sharply,
1
Nieuwbeerta’s expansive cross‐national study actually finds that most of the 20 western democracies included in
his study indicate a general declining trend in class voting. However, the United States is an exception that shows
not a decline, but rather a trendless fluctuation (370)
9. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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with men strongly supporting Republicans and women tending to support the Democratic
Party.
Income and Traditional Class Voting Alignments
Some researchers find occupationally based class definitions like the EGP class schema
to be problematic, and instead argue that income is a more useful indicator of class (Bartels
2005; Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Stonecash 2006; Stonecash, et al. 2000; van
der Waal, et al. 2007). “Income reflects the resources individuals have at their disposal, which
significantly affects their access to opportunities and quality of life” (Brewer and Stonecash
2001:137). Income is associated with quality of schools, chances of attending college, and
whether a person has health insurance or pensions (Stonecash, et al. 2000:738). Other
measures, such as the EGP class schema, capture situations that are not directly related to a
person’s economic position, which can confuse as class effects those effects that might be
better understood as cultural or status driven (Brewer and Stonecash 2001; van der Waal, et al.
2007; Chan 2007). Using relative income position offers an objective, clear‐cut measure of class
that focuses on the effects of material economic differences upon voting behavior and political
affiliation (Bartels 2008:71).
Those that utilize income as an indicator of class tend to find a continuation of
traditional class politics, with low‐income voters more likely to support the Democratic Party
and middle‐ and upper‐income voters showing stronger support for the Republican Party
(Bartels 2005; Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Stonecash, et al. 2000; van der Waal,
et al 2007; Gelman 2010). van der Waal, et al (2007) argue that rather than the zero‐sum game
that Hechter (2004:430) suggests, class voting has in fact become stronger in the United States,
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but is being overwhelmed by crosscutting cultural voting “driven by a cultural dynamic that is
rooted in educational differences” (van der Waal, et al.2007:417). They contend that using
occupation to operationalize class essentially confuses class voting, based on economic
position, with cultural voting, based on cultural capital, leading to the flawed conclusion that
class voting has declined, when in fact it has increased, just not as much as cultural voting (van
der Waal, et al. 2007:409).
Bartels (2006; 2008) finds that rather than being eclipsed by cultural concerns, as
Hechter (2004) concludes, or overwhelmed by cultural voting, as van der Waal, et al (2007)
conclude, traditional class voting has actually strengthened with the gap in the share of the
Democratic vote between low‐income and high‐income voters growing over the past forty
years (Bartels 2008:73). Brewer and Stonecash find that class, as opposed to race, accounts for
declining Southern support for the Democratic Party, as the middle and upper class moved
more toward the Republican Party (2001). However, these declines are offset with steadily
increasing working‐class support outside of the South between the 1950s and 1990s, and large
increases in Democratic support amnd middle‐income groups in the 1990s (Stonecash, et al.
2000).
Andrew Gelman presents findings that complicate both Bartels’ and van der Waal, et
al.’s conclusions (2010).2
Gelman seeks to explain the red state/blue state phenomenon that
leads many in the media to conflate low‐income red state support for Republicans with low‐
income individual support for the Republicans. He finds that while income predicts vote choice
2
Andrew Gelman doesn’t specifically engage around the concept of “class‐voting,” in the same vein as this
discussion.
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in every state, with high‐income voters more likely than low‐income voters to vote Republican,
this relationship is much more pronounced in poor red states than wealthy blue states. In
other words, in the rich blue states, high‐income voters are only slightly more likely to vote
Republican than low‐income voters, but in poor red states that difference is much greater.
Rather than a general continuation of traditional class voting (Bartels 2008; Stonecash, et al.
2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Stonecash 2006) or class voting being overwhelmed by
cultural voting altogether (van der Waal, et al. 2007), Gelman’s results suggest that while low‐
income voters continue traditional class voting, high income votes are split by cultural and
religious beliefs and values.
The evolution of class voting research is one of competing claims resulting from
competing operationalizations of class. It is clear that class‐voting studies based on occupation
yield different results and different conclusions than studies based on income. What isn’t clear
is the reason for these differences. Many of these studies assume that their preferred variable
better captures the same underlying phenomenon more completely than the other. But
perhaps they are in fact capturing different aspects of that phenomenon. Occupation‐based
class voting models may be capturing the effects of different authority relations,
responsibilities, educational requirements, or other job‐related differences more so than
economic inequalities or differences in overall life chances. Income‐based class‐voting models,
on the other hand, are almost exclusively capturing economic differences that are closely
associated with many determinants of life chances (future earnings, benefits, education, etc…).
Further, an income‐based class map generates a few class categories of relative‐income
positions, categories with clearly different economic interests. Complex occupational class
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maps, on the other hand, can’t necessarily clearly differentiated in any meaningful way the way
relative‐income can or the way that manual/nonmanual class served as a proxy for owners and
workers in earlier generations. Therefore, an income‐based class model may be better
positioned to capture class antagonisms that result and the impact they have on vote choice.
What follows is an empirical analysis of class voting in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 US
presidential election that use three different operationalizations of class: manual/nonmanual
occupation, EGP occupation, and income.3
By varying the focal independent variable, this
research design will allow for a systematic analysis of the differences that class
operationalization makes in our understanding of class politics.
Data and Methods
This paper uses data from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Study
(ANES) Time Series surveys. During each election cycle, the ANES conducts face‐to‐face pre‐
and post‐election surveys. In 2004 and 2008, the surveys used multistage random sampling to
identify the sample.4
5
The preliminary release of the 2012 survey is unique in that it includes
both a face‐to‐face and online component. The online component recruited respondents from
3
While some have used education as a measure of class (e.g. defining the “working class” as those without a
college degree), there is good reason not to operationalize class by level of education. Bartels (2008:69‐71) notes
that, among other reasons, there is a lack of correspondence between education and concrete economic
circumstances, which makes using education itself as a measure of class problematic.
4
In 2004, the sample was derived in four stages: primary sampling of metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), New
England statistical areas, and non‐MSA counties; secondary sampling of area segments; tertiary sampling of
households; and random selection of an eligible respondent from selected households.
5
The 2008 American National Election Survey (2008 ANES) utilized a complex survey design with a purposive
oversample of African American and Latino respondents. The target population was all English and Spanish‐
speaking US citizen residing in the continental United States that were 18 or older as of October 31, 2008. The first
three stages of sample selection were hierarchically clustered into counties, census tracts, and census block
groups. Stage 4 selected a sample of residential households from a mailing list for the selected census block group.
At the fifth and final stage, the interviewer selected an eligible respondent. Two sets of weight variable were
included in the dataset to adjust for the oversample (Lupia, Krosnick, Luevano, DeBell, and Donakowski 2009:7‐8).
13. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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members of the KnowledgePanel, a panel of regular respondents administered by GfK (5). The
panel is recruited through address‐based and random‐digit dialing probability sampling, from
which a sample of respondents for the 2012 ANES was drawn (21). The online component of
the sample is appealing in this case because it includes pre‐coded data on occupation, whereas
the data for the open‐ended question on occupation for the face‐to‐face sample has yet to be
released. Because of the complex sampling methods utilized in all three surveys, each includes
weights to correct for the unequal probability of selection (DeBell 2010:15). All regressions are
estimated using the appropriate weights with the “svy” commands in Stata 11.2.
Following the lead of previous studies, in addition to the key occupational and income
independent variables, eight independent variables are included as possible predictors: age,
education, gender, ideological self‐identification, race, region, religion, and household union
membership. These variables are included as controls since they are often theorized to impact
vote choice (Hout, et al. 1995:810; Manza and Brooks 1999; Brady, et al. 2009: 123; Winders
1999:837‐8 for succinct review of the research). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all
variables.
Dependent and Key Independent Variables
The presidential vote‐choice variable was recoded into an indicator variable (1: voted
for the Democrat; 0: did not vote for the Democrat). A summary variable of household income
combines data for both household and individual income6
. In keeping with the previous
6
For household income, respondents are asked, “Please look at the booklet and tell me the letter of the income
group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in [the prior calendar year] before taxes.
This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.” For individual
income, respondents are asked, “Now we are interested in the income that you yourself received in [the prior
calendar year] , not including any of the income received by (your spouse and) the rest of your family. Please look
at this page and tell me the income you yourself had in [the prior calendar year] before taxes. This figure should
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practice of class‐voting research that operationalizes class as household income, this study
recoded the variable into four income categories7
(Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001).
The survey includes detailed information on both the respondent’s current and former
occupation.8
Whether or not a respondent is currently or was recently an owner was also
captured. The 2004 data coded occupation into the 2000 Standard Occupation Classification
(SOC) 25 major groups; the 2008 data were coded into the 2010 SOC 97 minor groups; and the
2012 data were coded into the 2010 SOC 23 major occupation groups9
. These responses were
coded into two different occupation variables. The first is a close approximation of the EGP
schema utilized by Manza and Brooks (1999): professionals, managers and administrators,
routine white‐collar workers, skilled manual labor, and unskilled manual labor.10
The 2004 and
2012 data were recoded from the SOC major groups, while the 2008 data was first collapse
from the 97 SOC minor groups into the major codes before finally being recoded into the EGP
class schema. Then, respondents that were self‐employed were recoded as owners and
proprietors. Finally, the second occupation variable was coded from the EGP variable into a
manual/nonmanual indicator variable (1=Nonmanual).11
Control Variables
include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.” The variable is categorical, with 25
income categories ranging from $0‐2,999 to $150,000 or more.
7
1= $0‐34,999; 2=$35,000‐74,999; 3=$75,000 to $124,999; 4=$125,000+.
8
Respondents were asked “What is (was) your main occupation? (What kind of work do (did) you do? What are
(were) your most important activities or duties?)”
9
The 2010 SOC major codes were revised and combined business occupations with finance specialist and
construction trades with extraction trades. Neither change resulted in differences in final codes.
10
Manza and Brooks included a category for non‐fulltime labor‐force participation. However, giving the available
data on past occupations, these respondents were coded as their most recent occupation rather than a residual
category.
11
Manual= Skilled and unskilled manual labor. Nonmanual= Professionals, managers, owners, and routine white‐
collar workers.
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Age, gender, race, region, and race were all determined using a pre‐interview household
screener tool. In the 2004 and 2008 data, age was quantitative and recoded into four age
categories; the 2012 data was already restricted to age categories and recoded to match the
2004 and 2008 coding.12
Gender was recoded into an indicator variable (1=female). Region was
coded as an indicator variable (1=South) to control for the South’s often unique post‐Civil War
voting trends (Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2001).13
Race was recoded into an indicator
variable (white=1, nonwhite=0).14
Race marks the one point of departure between the models
to be estimated. In the 2008 sample, only 33 nonwhite respondents reported voting for
someone other than Barack Obama. This lack of variation is probably indicative of the historic
nature of Barack Obama’s candidacy. Because of this, race is dropped as a control in 2008
Education was derived from two questions about high school and postsecondary
education and combined into a single variable.15
Religion and union membership were both
recoded into indicator variables as well. 16
17
Ideological identification was coded on a seven‐
point likert scale from extreme liberal to extreme conservative; because of small cell sizes on
the extremes, extreme liberal was combined with liberal and extreme conservatives were
combined with conservatives to create a five point scale.
There were significant missing data across all three surveys for presidential vote choice,
in 2004 and 2012 for occupation, and in 2004 and 2008 on income, and is shown in Table A.
12
17‐29 year‐olds, 30‐49, 50‐64, 65 and up.
13
Originally coded into four census regions, 1=northeast, 2=north central, 3=south, and 4=west
14
Originally coded as 1=white, 2=black/African America, 4=other Race, 5=white and another race, 6=black and
another race, and 7=white, black, and another race
15
1= Less than high school, 2= High school diploma, 3= Some college/Associate’s degree, 4= Bachelor's degree, and
5= Advanced Degree.
16
Respondents were asked “Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?”
17
Respondents were asked “Do you or anyone else in this household belong to a labor union?”
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Most of the missing data on presidential vote choice were nonvoters or did not participate in
the post‐election survey, and listwise deletion was deemed appropriate. Missing income data
were problematic in the 2004 and 2008 data. Analysis indicated that missing data was
significantly correlated with education. As such, the conditional median income by education
was imputed. After estimating the models using both the imputed data and listwise deletion, I
found that there was no significant difference in the statistical significance, size, or direction of
the income coefficients, and therefore listwise deletion is preferred. Finally, missing occupation
data is most extreme for the 2012 data. Since the preliminary release of the 2012 data
provides no information concerning the nature of the missing data (it is simply assigned a
generic “missing” code), imputation was not attempted and listwise deletion was used. The
final analytic samples for each year are: 2004 N=647; 2008 N=1,319; and 2012 N= 2,214.
Results
Four unconditional and full models were estimated for each election, found on Tables 2,
3, and 4: manual/nonmanual class, EGP class, income, and a model including both EGP class and
income; models that include both income and race also include an interaction term. In addition
to the logistic regression, the Alford index was calculated for the manual/nonmanual models.
Assessment of the overall goodness of fit of models that correct for complex sampling are
limited. An F‐adjusted mean residual test was performed using the command “svylogitgof” to
assess model fit; a significant result indicates poor model fit (Archer and Lemeshow 2006).
Adjusted Count R2
statistics were also calculated for each model. Predicted probabilities of
voting Democratic were calculated with all control variables set at their mean; they are
presented in Table 5 and Figures 1, 2, and 3.
17. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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Manual/Nonmanual Class Voting.
The coefficient for the manual/nonmanual variable is not significant in 2004 and 2012,
but it is, somewhat surprisingly, significant in 2008. The Alford index also indicates significant
class voting in 2008; whereas the Alford index in 2004 and 2012 is ‐0.74 and 2.87 (among the
lowest levels since 1972), respectively, in 2008 the index is 11.96 (Clark, et al 2001:100). The
predicted probabilities in Table 5 and Figure 1 show that the cause of this 2008 divergence is
the significant variation election‐to‐election among manual workers; their predicted probability
of voting Democratic dramatically increases between 2004 and 2008, from 0.5 to 0.69, only to
return to a lower level of 0.48 in 2012. Nonmanual workers show a similar, though much more
attenuated pattern. In 2004 the odds of a nonmanual worker voting Democratic were 6.6%
lower than manual workers, whereas in 2012, that difference grew to 19.1%.
EGP Class Voting
In the EGP models, each occupational category was included as separate indicator
variables with managers as the reference category. In 2004 the coefficient for professionals is
significant; in 2008 the coefficients for routine white‐collar, skilled, and unskilled workers are
significant; and in 2012, the coefficients for professionals, routine white‐collar workers, and
skilled workers are significant. Examining the predicted probabilities in Table 5 and illustrated
in Figure 2, we see several patterns. Skilled, unskilled, and routine white‐collar works were
fairly diverse in 2004, ranging in probabilities of voting Democratic from a low of 0.48 for skilled
workers to a high of 0.67 for unskilled workers. In 2008 the probabilities for skilled and routine
white‐collar workers are significantly greater, 0.68 and 0.67 respectively, and much closer to
skilled workers’ 0.72 probability of voting Democratic. At the same time the opposite trend
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occurs among professionals and owners/proprietors, whose relatively high probabilities of
voting Democratic in 2004 trends downwards to align closer to managers’ consistently low
probability of voting Democratic. In 2012, skilled workers’ and professionals’ maintain their
relatively high and middling probabilities, respectively, while unskilled workers, routine white‐
collar workers, and owners converged with professionals, all with predicted probabilities
between 0.5 and 0.54. In other words, while there was considerable variation between
occupations’ probability of voting Democratic in 2004 and 2008, in 2012 four out of the six
occupational predicted probabilities are close to fifty percent‐ they were as likely to vote
Democratic as not. The only significant difference in 2012 is between skilled workers and
managers with probabilities of 0.64 and 0.42, respectively.
Income Class Voting
The income models were estimated using separate indicator variables with very high
income (those making over $125,000 per year) as the reference category. All of the coefficients
are significant except for low and high income in 2004. The predicted probabilities in Table 5
and Figure 3 show some trends contrary to expectations. In 2004 the predicted probabilities of
voting Democratic for low and middle income respondents are above 60%, with middle‐income
earners actually more likely to vote Democratic than low‐income voter. The probabilities of
voting Democratic for high and very high income respondents are much lower at 0.33 and 0.23,
respectively. The probability for middle‐income earners drops significantly from its high in 2004
(when they had the highest probability of any group at 0.78) to a low in 2012 of 0.51, slightly
lower than high‐income earners. The probabilities of both high‐ and very high‐income earners
voting Democratic rise significantly in 2008. High‐income earners maintain this increased
19. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 18
probability in 2012 but the probability of very high‐income earners voting Dem0cratic falls to a
new low of 0.18. The probability of low‐income earners voting Democratic increases both in
2008 and 2012 to a high of 0.75.
EGP and Income Class Voting
A final model was estimated that included both EGP occupations and income categories
as controls for each other. The coefficients for skilled workers and high‐income earners in 2008
and professionals in 2012 are no longer significant. Table 6 shows the absolute and
proportional differences in odd ratios between the respective individual models and the
combined models for significant key variables. For the most part, when controlling for both
occupation and income, each odds ratio decreases between two and twenty‐five percent.
There are three notable differences. In 2008 the odds ratio for unskilled workers is halved when
controlling for income, and the odds ratio for middle‐income workers 1.38 times greater when
controlling for occupation. Likewise, in 2012, when controlling for occupation, the odds ratio of
high‐income earners is 1.17 times larger.
Model Fit
Many of the more common measures of model fit are not available when logistic
regressions are fitted using the ‘svy’ command to adjust for complex sample designs. However,
the adjusted count R2
and an F‐adjusted mean residual test are provided for each model
(Archer and Lemeshow 2006). A significant F‐test indicates poor model fit. The adjusted count
R2
indicates how much better the model is at predicted the outcome than simply predicting the
modal outcome for all cases. For example, in 2004 the income model generated correct
predictions for 65.6 percent more cases than a null model, while the EGP class model generated
20. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 19
correct predictions for 64.4 percent more cases than the null model. Note that the low R2
statistics for all of the 2008 models are due to the very large row margin for those that voted
for Barack Obama‐ in other words, simply predicting that every case voted for Barack Obama
will by itself correctly predict the outcome for 65% of the cases. That said, within each year,
there is little difference between the models on either measure, though the p‐values for the F‐
tests of income in 2004 and 2008 indicates that those models are only marginally well‐fitted.
Discussion and Conclusion
Since the end of World War II, there have been three waves of class voting research that
have attempted to answer the question: does class matter in electoral politics. Each wave of
research has produced differing answers‐ class politics is dead, class politics is realigning, or
class politics persists‐ and each wave of research has utilized different measures of class. Yet
few class‐voting scholars have systematically compared different measures of class in the same
electoral context, instead arguing that either occupation (measured as a manual/nonmanual
dichotomy or as the EGP class schema) or income are better measures of the same underlying
concept that we call “class.” But in modern postindustrial economies, it is reasonable to ask
whether or not there is‐ at least in the political realm‐ one underlying phenomenon of class. In
order to address these issues empirically, this paper has estimated four models of class voting
for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections: a manual/nonmanual class model, an EGP
class model, an income class model, and a model that included both income and EGP class
measures.
The manual/non‐manual coefficients were not significant in 2004 and 2012, but did
produce a significant result in 2008. In 2004 and 2012 manual workers are slightly less likely to
21. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 20
vote Democratic, while in 2008 manual workers have a significantly higher probability of voting
Democratic than non‐manual workers (0.69 and 0.56, respectively). Likewise, relying on the
Alford index would lead to the same conclusion that class voting was nonexistent in the 2004
and 2012 elections, but present in 2008. These results suggest that logistic regression, with its
ability to control for changes in the sizes of the different classes and to control for other
variables, doesn’t produce significantly different results from the Alford Index.
But when we examine the predicted probabilities of the EGP model in Figure 2, we find
that the inconsistent results of the manual/non‐manual models are not due to a substantive
decline in class politics, but due to changes among occupational groups within those two big
classes. In 2004 and 2012, the probabilities of the two components of the manual class, skilled
and unskilled workers, are farther apart, aligned more with managers in the case of skilled
works and aligned more with professionals in the case of unskilled workers. Likewise in 2012,
skilled and unskilled workers are still far apart, albeit in different configurations, skilled workers
are no longer aligned with anyone in their greatly increased support for Democrats, whereas
unskilled workers much decreased support for Democrats aligns them more with professionals,
routine white‐collar workers, and owners. In other words, rather than an increasingly complex
occupational structure leading to class being “less inescapably polarizing… [and thus] less
subjectively salient and less politically influential,” such results demonstrate one of the major
shortcomings in operationalizing class in this manner: significant changes in political alignments
among different types of workers classified as “manual laborers” are obscured and lead one,
wrongly, to conclude that class is no longer a significant political force (2001:101). But, when
taken in the context of the other models estimated here, the more realistic conclusion is that,
22. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 21
because of the increasing complexity in occupational structure, the manual/nonmanual class
model is no longer a relevant distinction and is therefore producing inaccurate class‐voting
models.
It is exactly this failure that led many sociologists to favor the EGP model, which is
essentially a decomposition of the manual/nonmanual model (Nieuwbeerta 1996; Evans 1999;
Weakliem 1995; Hout, et al 1995; Goldthorpe 2001). Aside from the insights into the failure of
the dichotomous occupational measure, the results of the EGP model are most surprising in
that they diverge from previous research in at least two significant ways (Manza and Brooks
1999; Hout, et al. 1995). While Manza and Brooks detected strong support for the Democratic
candidate among professionals (1999:65), the predicted probabilities of professionals voting
Democratic declined significantly after 2004, such that, in 2012, their probability of voting
Democratic is indistinguishable from routine white‐collar works, unskilled works, and owners.
Manza and Brooks also found that unskilled workers’ support of the Democrats decreased
dramatically beginning in 1980‐ they are the so‐called “Reagan Democrats.” These results show
strong support for Democratic candidate in 2004 and 2008. And while that support did decline
in 2012, they are still more likely to support the Democratic candidate than the Republican
candidate. Further, this research confirms Manza and Brooks’ research that shows skilled
workers more strongly supporting the Democratic candidate (1999:65).
Overall, operationalizing class using income categories resulted in voting that one would
expect from traditional class politics and previous class‐voting studies (Bartels 2008:73; van der
Waal, et al. 2007:415), with low‐income individuals supporting the left political party, the
middle‐ and high‐income individuals less supportive of the left political party (with the
23. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 22
exception of the middle‐income earners’ very high support of Democrats in 2004), and very
high‐income individuals supporting the right political party. This is a clear relationship that one
would expect in a capitalist democracy with very high wealth and income inequalities. But,
rather than a traditional rational‐choice explanation of class voting (that is, vote‐choice based
on a rational expectation of optimal economic outcome), or thinking of income as simply a
proxy measure of class (Brady, et al. 2009), another explanation is possible. As income and
wealth inequality grow and class mobility declines (Beller and Hout 2006), the shared
experiences of individuals from different economic backgrounds also declines—as do the life
chances of those with lower incomes. More so than in the past, income captures more than
simply an individual’s earning potential at that moment in time. It has become much more
predictive of an individual’s overall life‐chances, the life‐chances of their children, and their
social relations in general (Stonecash, et al. 2000). In other words, income may play a much
greater role in class formation and the creation of class antagonisms that go beyond the
immediate pocket‐book effects that are typically theorized to be at work in income‐based
voting patterns.
The conclusions drawn here are limited insofar as they are based on only three
elections, two of which occurred in unique historical circumstances. The election in 2008 saw
the first African American from a major party to appear on the general election ballot. At the
same time, the United States was just beginning to experience the most severe economic crisis
in eighty years. Further, in 2012, the economic recovery had been experienced primarily by
only the most well‐to‐do Americans, while the working and middle classes suffered prolonged
unemployment or stagnant earnings. Even under ideal circumstances, it is difficult to
24. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 23
differentiate meaningful trends from trendless fluctuation; even more‐so given the
circumstances described above. These limitations highlight the need for future research that
takes into account a larger range of elections.
Nevertheless, this study provides strong evidence of the continuing influence of class on
voting behavior. We have seen that rather understanding occupation and income as two
competing measures of the same underlying concept of “class,” they are capturing different
conceptualizations of class. The complex occupational class map that is appropriate for
postindustrial economies best captures relational differences in authority, autonomy, and
responsibility, but can obscure material economic differences. Income, on the other hand, is
more and more reflective of deep economic divisions that are forming classes that are more
and more isolated from each other in society more generally. In either case, claims that class
no longer matters in politics or has been supplanted by cultural issues in prosperous
postindustrial societies are clearly unwarranted.
25. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 24
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Appendix: Missing Data
Table A: Missing Data
2004 2008 2012
Presidential Vote Choice 20% 23.2% 16.9%
(243) (552) (652)
Income 9.9% 6.8% 2%
(120) (159) (76)
Occupation 8.0% 6.8% 22.8%
(120) (158) (881)
N 1,066 2,102 3,581
Source: American National Election Survey 2004, 2008, 2012 Time Series
Studies
29. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 28
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2004 2008 2012
Presidential Vote Choice
Voted for Democratic candidate 0.50 0.65 0.52
Income
$0‐34,999 0.29 0.39 0.29
$35‐74,999 0.34 0.36 0.32
$75,000‐$124,999 0.26 0.17 0.24
<$125,000 0.11 0.09 0.16
EGP Occupation
Professionals 0.27 0.232 0.31
Managers 0.11 0.13 0.12
Owners 0.15 0.12 0.2
Routine white‐collar workers 0.26 0.24 0.19
Skilled workers 0.12 0.16 0.08
Unskilled workers 0.1 0.13 0.1
Manual/Nonmanual Occupation
Manual 0.21 0.29 0.18
Nonmanual 0.79 0.71 0.82
Age
18‐29 0.17 0.16 0.09
30‐49 0.35 0.39 0.27
50‐64 0.31 0.28 0.35
65 and up 0.17 0.17 0.29
Education
Less than high school 0.05 0.08 0.05
High school diploma 0.24 0.3 0.2
Some college/Associate’s degree 0.33 0.35 0.32
Bachelor’s degree 0.22 0.19 0.24
Advanced degree 0.16 0.08 0.19
Gender
Female 0.5 0.56 0.45
Ideological Identification
Liberal 0.25 0.29 0.25
Slightly liberal 0.14 0.1 0.12
Moderate 0.06 0.1 0
Slightly conservative 0.15 0.12 0.15
Conservative 0.4 0.38 0.48
Political Party Self‐Identification
Republican 0.45 0.32 0.4
30. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2004 2008 2012
Democrat 0.5 0.61 0.5
Independent 0.05 0.07 0.1
Race White 0.77 0.64 0.7
Region South 0.3 0.46 0.36
Religion R says religion is important 0.77 0.76 0.67
Union Household with union member 0.19 0.14 0.19
N 674 1,316 2,214
Source: American National Election Studies 2004, 2008, 2012 Time Series Studies
Standard Deviation in Parenthesis
31. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 30
Table 2: Logistic Regression Predicting 2004 Democratic Presidential Vote
Manual EGP Income Income and EGP
Professionals 1.01** 0.94* 0.94** 0.78*
(0.30) (0.35) (0.30) (0.37)
Owners 0.41 0.55 0.29 0.40
(0.30) (0.42) (0.31) (0.43)
Routine W‐C 0.46 0.61 0.19 0.41
(0.29) (0.35) (0.27) (0.32)
Skilled 0.42 0.26 0.22 0.11
(0.34) (0.51) (0.36) (0.50)
Unskilled 1.02** 1.04 0.66 0.68
(0.35) (0.51) (0.33) (0.43)
Non‐manual ‐0.11 ‐0.07
(0.18) (0.37)
Low Income 1.00* 1.77 1.03** 1.52
(0.39) (0.99) (0.36) (1.11)
Middle Income 0.71** 2.48** 0.74** 2.30*
(0.25) (0.81) (0.25) (0.87)
High Income 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.34
(0.28) (0.80) (0.29) (0.91)
Age 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Education ‐0.19 ‐0.25* ‐0.03 ‐0.11
(0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13)
Gender 0.58* 0.44* 0.42* 0.32
(0.21) (0.21) (0.17) (0.20)
Ideological ID ‐0.88*** ‐0.89*** ‐0.90*** ‐0.90***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Race (White) ‐2.00*** ‐2.06*** ‐1.33 ‐1.51
(0.39) (0.38) (0.75) (0.85)
Race*Low Income ‐0.49 ‐0.35
(1.14) (1.22)
Race*Mid Income ‐1.58 ‐1.40
(0.99) (1.02)
Race*High Income ‐0.09 0.08
(0.97) (1.04)
Region (South) 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.14
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Religiosity 0.00 0.01 ‐0.05 ‐0.04
(0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27)
Union household 0.86** 0.85** 1.03** 1.00**
(0.29) (0.30) (0.33) (0.32)
Constant 0.08 5.55*** ‐0.59* 5.18*** ‐0.62* 3.74*** ‐1.05** 3.78**
(0.17) (0.63) (0.28) (0.86) (0.28) (0.93) (0.33) (1.13)
F‐Adjusted
Goodness of Fit p=0.74 p<0.01 p=0.8 p=0.18 p=0.982 p=0.067 p=0.99 p=0.04
Adjusted count R2
0.6346 0.6439 0.6563 0.6594
N 647 647 647 647 647 647 647 647
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
32. The End of History? Three Models of Class Voting in US Presidential Elections John Coutley
Coutley 31
Table 3: Logistic Regression Predicting 2008 Democratic Presidential Vote
Manual EGP Income Income and EGP
Professionals 0.42 0.51 0.34 0.39
(0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.31)
Owners 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.09
(0.35) (0.39) (0.35) (0.39)
Routine W‐C 0.82** 1.00** 0.56 0.79*
(0.30) (0.37) (0.31) (0.37)
Skilled 0.77* 1.04* 0.49 0.80
(0.30) (0.41) (0.31) (0.40)
Unskilled 1.15*** 1.23** 0.79* 0.95*
(0.31) (0.43) (0.32) (0.43)
Non‐manual ‐0.49** ‐0.57**
(0.18) (0.21)
Low Income 1.48*** 1.55*** 1.28*** 1.33***
(0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.33)
Middle Income 1.06*** 1.02*** 0.93*** 0.89**
(0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.27)
High Income 0.71** 0.63* 0.62* 0.50
(0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31)
Age ‐0.16* ‐0.13 ‐0.17* ‐0.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Education ‐0.27*** ‐0.22** ‐0.18* ‐0.10
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Gender 0.36** 0.30* 0.12 0.19
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Ideological ID ‐0.72*** ‐0.73*** ‐0.71*** ‐0.73***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Race (White)
Race*Low Income
Race*Mid Income
Race*High Income
Region (South) ‐0.47 ‐0.49 ‐0.48 ‐0.49
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Religiosity ‐0.13 ‐0.16 ‐0.21 ‐0.21
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Union household 0.09 0.07 0.30 0.21
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Constant 0.50** 5.05*** ‐0.43 3.87*** ‐0.86*** 3.55*** ‐1.12*** 2.90***
(0.17) (0.51) (0.24) (0.62) (0.24) (0.55) (0.25) (0.63)
F‐Adjusted
Goodness of Fit p=0.98 p<0.01 p=1.0 p=0.58 p=0.98 p=0.07 p=0.89 p=0.49
Adjusted count R2
0.18 0.1887 0.2104 0.2191
N 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
