Collection of pptx slides, converted to pdf, which were used by Dr. Jeff Ramsay as part of his Occasional Lecturers on Military History at the Botswana Defence Force Command and Staff College from 2008-2019.
2. Introduction to Military History
TOPICS –
• ROLE OF MILITARY HISTORY
• WHO’S HISTORY?
• EVIDENCE - SOURCES OF HISTORY
• METHODOLOGIES OF MILITARY HISTORY
▪ BATTLE ANALYSIS
▪ TEN THREADS OF MILITARY CONTINUITY
3. What is Military History?
1)The record of activities of armed
forces in war and peace.
2) The study of armed conflict and its
impact on society.
3) A continuous dialogue between the
past and present about future
possibilities.
4. Role and Use
• Learn from past
experience
• Understand military
concepts
• Study lives of
soldiers in the past
• Broaden knowledge
of military subjects
• Understand
leadership issues
• Understand
doctrinal evolution
• Learn about
strategy & tactics
Uses of Military History
5. Misinterpreting Military History
• History provides understanding, not
proof.
• History provides insight, not analogy.
• Wrong lessons learned, e.g. different
lessons learned by French and
German military planners in the
aftermath of World War I as a factor in
the Fall of France during world War II
7. "Happy is the nation that has no history. By this standard there can
be few nations in Africa happier than Bechuanaland, for apart from
the inter- and intra-tribal conflicts normal to the African continent
before its emergence into modern life and thought, its record is
remarkably free of incident of any kind. The Batswana offered an
equally friendly reception to missionaries, traders and soldiers alike
when they came to offer their various receipts for happiness, and
since the British drew a line on the map and said 'This is
Bechuanaland' they have lived quietly and undemandingly for
seventy uneventful years."
THE CHALLENGE –
OVERCOMING THE MYTH
8. IN 1970 THIS NATION'S FIRST PRESIDENT, SERETSE KHAMA,
REJECTED THE SUCH IGNORANCE:
"We were taught, sometimes in a very positive
way, to despise ourselves and our ways of life.
We were made to believe that we had no past
to speak of, no history to boast of. The past,
so far as we were concerned, was just a blank
and nothing more...
It should now be our intention to try to
retrieve what we can of our past. We should
write our own history books, to prove that we
did have a past, and that it was a past that
was just as worth writing and learning about
as any other. We must do this for the simple
reason that a nation without a past is a lost
nation, and a people without a past are a
people without a soul."
Notwithstanding the fact that local communities are the heirs of a
military heritage that "was just as worth writing and learning about as
any other”, the history of local militarism and conflict has been
virtually neglected in post-colonial as well as colonial curricula.
9.
10. TOWARDS RECLAIMING
BOTSWANA’S MILITARY HISTORY
Like many nations,
modern Botswana has
to a great extent been
forged in military
conflict and shaped by
indigenous military
culture. This heritage is
reflected in the state’s
international
boundaries as well as
sense of domestic
identity, which in each
case can be traced to
the formation and
reformation of polities
among the western
Batswana during the
18th and 19th centuries.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15. *"He is the hero who does not sit by the fire, who when the tribes came together, came
together and went to fetch wood, remained behind and examined the rifles; he picked out
those for shooting far, he picked out carbines and breechloaders” [carbines= "short ones-
bojane" breechloaders= "with bolts-bautu“]
Like other Late Iron Age peoples of southern Africa,
pre-colonial Setswana society had a strong warrior
tradition, as reflected in oral traditions, songs and
praise poems celebrating martial prowess
16. In the 19th Century local
Batswana groups or merafe
made a remarkably rapid
transition from classic late
Iron Age weapons and tactics
to the demands of advanced
gun warfare, which allowed
local merafe to defeat the
Boers the Amandebele
17.
18. During the 20th Century Batswana operating as
mephato made significant contributions in the Boer
War of 1899-1902, World War I and World War II.
19.
20.
21. TO DENY PEOPLE THEIR PAST IS TO
DISEMPOWER THEM BY ROBBING
THEM OF THEIR IDENTITY
Around the world people living in different nations
study their own history to know more about
themselves.
Colonial rulers understood that people who did not
know their past were like trees without roots that
could be pushed aside easily.
Imagine if you woke up one morning having
completely forgotten were you came from. You
would be confused and uncertain of what to do. It
is the same for a community or nation.
To know where to go one needs to know where one
has been.
22. SUMMARY Batswana, along with other
indigenous Africans had a military culture, which
"was just as worth writing and learning about as
any other”, yet we confine ourselves to:
• The history of others – Bismarck and Shaka, not
Sebego, Sechele or Khama, or Sandile, Simon
Kooper etc. as a military figures
• World Wars I II, but not the decisive role played
by Batswana and other Africans in those conflicts
• We thus neglect the role played by war, both in the
pre-colonial and colonial eras in shaping who we
are today.
• Myth of Batswana as peace loving to the point of
docility – e.g. asking “protection”
23. HISTORICAL SOURCES – TYPES OF
EVIDENCE
Historians use three main types of historical
evidence:
• MATERIAL EVIDENCE,
• ORAL EVIDENCE, AND
• WRITTEN EVIDENCE.
• Each of these three can be either “primary” or “secondary” in
character
• Written evidence about Botswana only goes back to the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Oral evidence takes us
no further than the seventeenth century. So in recovering
Botswana's early history material evidence is important.
25. Written (Secondary) – a description of the
Kaditshwene ruins in Lehurutshe:
By the beginning of the 19th century, the Bahurutshe
boo Mogkathla capital of Kaditshwene was inhabited by
about 20,000. The Bahurutshe were then a thriving
community, being renowned as metal workers. Their
wealth was largely based on their iron and copper smelting capabilities,
enabling trade, and extensive cattle farming.
Evidence of this industry is still evident in the extensive ruins of Kaditshwene
today. A large number of preserved iron smelting furnaces in the plains
below the hill ruin complex are witness of their capabilities and the extent of
this early art at Kaditshwene.
The ancient archaeological site is is one of the largest stone-walled complexes
in Southern Africa. The hill top ruins constitute the best preserved part of
this ancient city. It was once the home of Kgosi Senosi the ruler of the boo
Mogkathla and was visited and well described by the London Missionary
John Campbell in May 1820.
26. Written (Primary) John Campbell’s
description of Kaditshwene 1820
”We visited several other houses ; I admired the cleanness
and flatness of all their yards. The ground is first covered
with soft wrought clay, and smoothed by rolling hard clay
vessels over it. In most of them the women were
employed in thrashing out the corn, of which there
appeared to have been a good crop. Every family has a
house for storing it up, containing rows of large clay
vessels, neatly manufactured, and capable of holding ten
or twelve bushels each. They are arranged like casks in a
cellar, are a little elevated from the ground, and many of
them reach to the roof. For the sake of convenience,
some of the vessels have a small door near the top, and
another near the bottom, for more easily filling or
emptying them. A great many followed us from Sinosee's
district to our wagons, which was about a mile and a half
in distance. We stopped.” at two smiths shops by the
way, and procured some samples of the iron they had
been smelting.”
27. The archaeological and historical significance of Kaditshwene in the
early 19th century is well documented by the Rev. John Campbell’s
drawings, as well as descriptions, which have greatly aided in the
process of identification.
Drawing of
Kaditshwene hill top
by Campbell in 1820
referenced to
contemporary photos
29. Senosi’s house
at Kaditshwene
in 1820
“Sinosee’s house was
neatly finished …The
wall was painted
yellow and
ornamented with
figures of shield,
elephants,
cameleopards, etc. It
was also adorned with
a neat cornice or
border painted in a
red colour.” -Campbell
33. Focus Areas in the Study of
Military History can include -
• Battles &
Campaigns
• Strategy & Tactics
• Doctrine &
Training
• Organizations
• Logistics
• Military &
Society
• Weapons &
Technology
• Military Leaders
34. Continuity in Principles of War
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of Force
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Surprise
Security
Simplicity
MANEUVER
FIREPOWER
PROTECTION
LEADERSHIP
INFORMATION
35.
36. 1800--------------------1900---------------------2000
• Military Theory & Doctrine ------------------------------------------------->
• Military Professionalism---------------------------------------------------------->
• Generalship--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Strategy------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
• Tactics--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Logistics----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Technology----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Social Factors---------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Political Factors----------------------------------------------------------------------------->
• Economic Factors------------------------------------------------------------------------->
37. THEORY & DOCTRINE
• Doctrine: Generally accepted
body of practices that govern
Organization, Training, and
Fighting.
• Military Theorists: Those who
think deeply about war and
influence others. They seek
solutions, create frameworks &
advance new concepts.
38. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM
• Attitude or state of mind.
• Military professional is an expert in the
management of violence.
• Functions of the professional army include
organizing, equipping, training, planning and
directing forces, in and out of combat.
• Esprite de Corps
39. Generalship
• Art of command high
levels.
• Functions include
Forming, Organizing,
Equipping, and Training
armies and/or major
portions of them.
• Involves the detailed
Strategic, Tactical and
Logistical planning.
• Entails Leadership and
Management.
40. STRATEGY
• Preparation for and the waging of
war.
• Dynamic in nature and has
evolved with the complexities of
weapon technology.
• Grand Strategy: Coalition level
• National Strategy:
• Military Strategy: Derived from
above.
41. TACTICS
• The Preparation and actual conduct of
Combat on the battlefield.
• The employment of units in combat ,
the ordered arrangement and
maneuver of units in relation to each
other to utilize their full potential.
• Close connection with Technology,
Logistics and Strategy.
42. LOGISTICS & ADMINISTRATION
• Supply, Transportation, Evacuation
and Hospitalization, Service and
Personnel Management.
• Relationship between the state’s
Economic capacity and its capability
for supporting military forces.
• In the last century has developed into
one of the dominant factors of
warfare.
43. TECHNOLOGY
• The Application of science to war.
• Accounts for new weapons and
the entire range of new
equipment.
• The Industrial Revolution caused
technological advances in the
fields of weapons, transportation,
communication, construction and
medicine in Botswana and the
World.
44. POLITICAL FACTORS
• Characteristic elements or actions of
governments that affect warfare.
• Provide the forces and trends that
shape warfare and the goals for
which wars are fought.
• Generally political goals drive
military goals.
45. SOCIAL FACTORS
• Human relationships that affect
warfare are social factors.
• Includes concepts, such as,
popular attitudes, revolution,
militarism, psychological warfare,
amd combat psychology.
• Modern combatants have aimed
at inflicting Total War on a
nation’s people.
46. ECONOMIC FACTORS
• Elements that affect warfare,
such as, Production, Distribution,
and Consumption of the
resources of the state.
• Economic warfare possible
through blockade, attacks on
infrastructure.
• Different types of economies
affect warfare.
47. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF
FACTORS
• Political, Social and Economic
Factors are all interrelated.
• They are so complex that
studying each one separately
is impossible.
• These forces provide the
foundation of national power.
48. Battle Analysis
❖ Select a topic related to the types of lessons desired.
❖Quantity and type of sources.
❖Quality of sources (content, bias, and intent).
Step 1--Define the Subject
(what, where, when, who, how – sources)
49. Battle Analysis
❖ State missions of opposing forces
❖ Describe initial disposition of forces
❖ Describe opening moves
❖ Detail major phases
❖ State outcome
Step 2--Describe the Action
Step 3--Draw Lessons & Insights
❖Why did events turn out the way they did?
❖What is relevant about this study to current operations?
❖Who won? Who lost?
❖What were the constants that affected the outcome?
50.
51. The 28/8/1826 Battle of Dithubaruba
• Oral traditions about this event are augmented by entries in
the journal of Andrew Geddes Bain, a trader who, with his
partner John Biddulph, accompanied the Bangwaketse. This
document contains uniquely detailed insights into early
nineteenth century Setswana military culture, as well as the
genius of the Bangwaketse commander, Kgosi Sebego.
• By 1826 the merafe of southern Botswana were living in the
shadow of Sebetwane's Makololo (originally Bafokeng
bagaPatsa). These invaders had driven the Bakwena, under
Kgosi Moruakgomo, out of Eastern Kweneng. Moruakgomo
then joined forces with Sebego's father, Makaba II, and the
Bakgatla bagaMmanaana ruler Kontle. But, this alliance was
defeated at Losabanyana; Makaba being among the fallen.
53. Bain described Sebego:
"His appearance is very prepossessing &
alone point him out as the Chief among his
subjects. He is above the common size, well
made...He was dressed in a jackal's Kabo,
had his head wrapped in a large & beautiful
snake's skin & in his hand carried a
handsome battle axe. On his legs, ankles &
wrists he wore an unusual number of copper
rings & bracelets of curious workmanship,...
Round his ankles were four rows of beads of
virgin gold which he told me he had taken
from a Mantatee chief he had killed in battle."
54. Bain was impressed by what he saw:
"We could not help admiring the
good order & discipline which
prevailed among the people &
the alacrity with which the
Chief's orders were executed."
He added:
55. Their dress consisted of a panther's
[leopard/nkwe] hide thrown carelessly
over their shoulders; a lynx's [thwane]
skin suspended round their neck & cut
in oval form, covered the lower part of
the body. A white tuft of goats hair
made in the shape of the sun & a plume
of ostrich feathers crowned their head
which, from the way they were covered
with sebilo & fat, a good deal
resembled a steel helmet when
exposed to the rays of the sun.
56. Each had a shield of white ox-hide,
generally with a back or brown spot
in the middle, to which were fastened
3 to 6 assagais. It is suspended from
the Chacka [tshaka] or Battleaxe
which they carry on their left
shoulders & dangles at their backs,
the shafts of the assagais being
upwards & the blades fixed in the
pocket of the bottom of the shield."
57.
58.
59. Bain's description of Sengwaketse battle dress
and armaments is consistent with other early
nineteenth century accounts and illustrations of
local Batswana. Contrary to the Bantu
Education mythology found in schools short
stabbing spears (diputlela/segai), as well as the
long throwing spears (marumo) were used by
Batswana before Shaka. Another trader,
Gordon Cumming, noted that the throwing
spears were generally six feet long but quite
light: "a skillful warrior will send one through a
mans body at one hundred yards". The battle
axe, knobkerrie, and long knife completed the
armament.
60. • Local shields were neither of the long
Amazulu type nor the small four pointed
protectors used by Basotho and
Batlhaping. Instead they were of medium
size and oval shape. In contrast to the
white Bangwaketse shields, the Bakwena-
"Makgakga mantsho
agaMmaseotisanaga" - preferred buffalo
(nare) skin, while Bangwato used giraffe
as well as buffalo.
61. A ) N. Tswana:
Bakwena, also
Bangwaketse,
Bangwato ctc.
B) S. Tswana:
Barolong,
Batlhaping,
C) Basotho
64. Notwithstanding its more modern status as a
manifestation of royalty, the leopard skin cloak
was a standard part of the traditional uniform.
The cloaks were worn together with long
aprons, covering the chest and loins (in
addition to a leather lebante) made from
karrosses of other spotted animals. The legs
of warriors were adorned with copper wire
bangles and beads, while their feet were
protected by sandals.
•
Ostrich feather headresses were common among
most local merafe. White feathers were
sometimes reserved for those of higher rank.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72. “Several useful articles are carried about
them as constant appendages, and are
always hung around the neck. Of these the
tipa or knife, is the most common and the
most indispensable ...The blade, which is
made with an edge on both sides, is mere
iron...The handle and sheath are most
commonly of horn or wood variously
carved; the latter part consists of two flat
pieces bound together with sinew: the front
piece alone is ornamented…Those parts
which are black, are cut into the ivory, and
filled up with a dark gummy substance” -
William Burchell, TRAVELS IN THE
INTERIOR OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1822
73.
74. The Art of Dithipa
“Several useful articles are carried about them as
constant appendages, and are always hung around the
neck. Of these the tipa or knife, is the most common and
the most indispensable ... [Of the three illustrated] the
third is one of the most handsome, its handle and sheath
being carved out of ivory. The blade, which is made with
an edge on both sides, is mere iron ...The handle and
sheath are most commonly of horn or wood variously
carved; the latter part consists of two flat pieces
bound together with sinew: the front piece alone is
ornamented. To the hinder part is tied a thong which is
fastened to a necklace, while the lower end of it is left
hanging below the knife for the purpose of keeping it in a
perpendicular position. In the [third knife illustrated] …
the two weasels on the sheath are left in “high relief”;
and from this some idea may be formed of the patience of
these people in carving. But all work of this kind is done,
perhaps, merely for amusement; as it is generally
carried about with them, and taken in hand only when
they have nothing else to do: so that it proceeds in a
very desultory manner, and a long time passes before it
is finished. Those parts which are black, are cut into the
ivory, and filled up with a dark gummy SubStance’.
“Perhaps the Bechuana knife is the most common of all the
implements made by this ingenious tribe. The general form of
the knife is ten inches in length inclusive of the handle and
the blade, which is double-edged, nearly flat and is a little
thicker along the middle than at the edges. In fact, it is simply
a spear-head inserted into a handle. The sheath is made from
two pieces of wood, hollowed just sufficiently to receive the
blade tightly, and then lashed firmly together with sinews. On
one side of the sheath a kind of loop is carved out of the solid
wood, through which the wearer can pass the string by which
he hangs it to his neck. The ordinary forms are simply a
handle, sheath, and blade, all without any ornament, but the
ingenious smith often adds a considerable amount of
decoration. One favourite mode of doing so is to make the
handle of ivory, and carve it into the form of some animal. The
handle is often cut into the form of the hippopotamus or the
giraffe, and in all cases the character of the animal is hit
off exactly by the native carver. Along the sheath is
generally a pattern of some nature, and in many instances it
is really of an artistic character, worthy to be transferred
to European weaponS”.
From: William Burchell, TRAVELS IN THE INTERIOR OF SOUTHERN
AFRICA, 1822:
From: J.G. Wood, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN BEING AN
ACCOUNT OF THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE UNCIVILISED
RACES OF MAN,1874.
75. In an instant, to our utter astonishment, the whole army
squatted down in the form of a crescent, himself
[Sebego] in the centre & one of his brothers [actually
Kowe, the senior paternal uncle of the
BagaMmanaana Kgosi Kontle, and Malmanyana, a
Mongwaketse Motona] on each side of him. When
they were all seated he looked round and without
rising up called out Hey! Hey! &, his two brothers
giving a whistle through their teeth, all was in a
moment dead silence. He then commenced a long
harangue which seemed principally addressed to the
right wing, then turning to the left he addressed them
in a similar manner."
76. • "The Captains with their companies from the right
filed off to the left, passing the front of the
semicircular phalanx in the greatest order and
regularity. Similar orders were issued to those on the
left who branched off in the opposite direction &,
when about equal distance from the main body, both
went off at a double quick march...Having allowed the
right and left wings time to advance and scour the
country to an extent of at least three miles on each
side of us in the semicircular form as they had been
seated on the ground, we continued our march with
the Chief at the centre, having appointed the place to
close in on the game to be Makletsaanie [Matlhoshane
near Moshupa],...A little before sunset the hunters
closed together at Makletsaanie, where we were to
encamp for the night, & killed 33 quaggas Elands &
Wildebeests."
77.
78.
79. Logistics & Administration
• For Batswana the formation had a dual
advantage. While on the march the horns would
spread out for several kilometers. Besides
eliminating the possibility of the advancing force
falling prey to sudden ambush by better
positioned opposition, the horns could be
brought together to entrap game for the pot. In
this way mephato used to not have to burden
themselves with provisions while on campaign.
Thus, Bain reported:
80. Logistics & Administration - The meat was brought to Sebego for distribution.
But, before they could enjoy there braii the men were given the signal to
establish and secure their camouflaged encampment.
ENCAMPMENT:"Our encampment was in the midst of a thick
wood, which seemed in a moment as if by magic deprived
of its foliage, presenting to the eye nothing but a forest of
stumps. At a signal given by the King every one mounted
the trees and with their battleaxes chopped off all the
branches, which were instantly converted into circular
fences for each company to pass the night in. Within this
screen are arranged all their shields & assagais &, being
thickly covered with long grass, only leaving a small space
in the middle for a fire, they quartered as comfortably as
any European army could be in tents. They slept with their
feet pointing to the centre & their arms at their heads."
81. Before noon Sebego's 3,000 were joined by another 1,000 man
contingent who had marched from Kang. The identity of these
reinforcements is uncertain. They may have been Bakgalagari
but it seems more likely that they were Bakwena of Kgosi
Moruakgomo's Ratshosa faction (Sechele's dynastic rivals).
Moruakgomo had fled into the desert following the earlier defeat
by Sebetwane of Makaba II's Bangwaketse-BaRatshosa-
BagaMmanaana alliance at Losabanyana.
At Phiring some seventy zebra and wildebeest were slaughtered.
The screens were once more put in place and the camp settled
down for a long evening feast. It was to be the warriors last
meal before battle:
–
"Innumerable fires rose in all directions stretching to the
borders of the wood, and the sound of Chackas [ditshaka-
battleaxes] breaking the marrow of bone did not cease till
next morning."
82. For the rest of the march on Dithubaruba the
mephato maintained the integrity of the two
wings or "horns". This formation, which should
be familiar to students of Shaka, is the
infamous "horns of the buffalo" pattern. As with
the the short stabbing spear or assagai
(putlela), its local use predates the time of the
first Amazulu Nkosi. Its many southern African
practitioners included the late 17th century
Banyayi-Bakalanga Mambo Nichasike I
(Changamire), whose destroyers ("rozwi")
defeated the Portuguese in Mozambique.
Elsewhere it was the classic formation of such
other iron age militarists as Alexander of
Macedonia, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar.
89. Logistics and Administration
The advance resumed before sunrise. Prior to setting off the
warriors loaded themselves up with water, which they stored in
bags made from the stomachs and intestines of the animals
that had been killed during the previous day's hunt.
•
After about an hour, as the rays of dawn broke across the western
horizon, the two horns of the army joined in a tight "buffalo
head" formation. At the centre, in a spot covered with large flat
stones, Sebego consulted his letaese (magic dice) with the help
of a moroka (rainmaker). Then the day's orders were given and
the two horns spread out once more. Their new destination was
Phiring in the Leropo hills, which had previously been a
Bakwena mining centre.
•
90. Before noon Sebego's 3,000 were joined by another 1,000 man
contingent who had marched from Kang. The identity of these
reinforcements is uncertain. They may have been Bakgalagari
but it seems more likely that they were Bakwena of Kgosi
Moruakgomo's Ratshosa faction (Sechele's dynastic rivals).
Moruakgomo had fled into the desert following the earlier defeat
by Sebetwane of Makaba II's Bangwaketse-BaRatshosa-
BagaMmanaana alliance at Losabanyana.
At Phiring some seventy zebra and wildebeest were slaughtered.
The screens were once more put in place and the camp settled
down for a long evening feast. It was to be the warriors last
meal before battle:
–
"Innumerable fires rose in all directions stretching to the
borders of the wood, and the sound of Chackas [ditshaka-
battleaxes] breaking the marrow of bone did not cease till
next morning."
91. Generalship (includes inspirational leadership)
• Sebego's army, now numbering over 4,000, had marched only
a short distance on the morning of 27 August, 1828 before it
halted. Once more the mephato assembled in a semi-circular
"buffalo head" formation. Their upright spears were said to
resemble "a thick valley of reeds."
•
• As the Kgosi rose silence descended within the ranks. He then
waved a spear in the air, shouting out "Marumo!". The warriors
then exploded in a great outburst of whistled applause as they
waved their spears and beat them against their white shields.
Then, almost at once, silence was restored. Sebego addressed
his Bangwaketse; his words recorded by Bain:
92. Sebego’s oration:
“Warriors! The honour of your country is now at
stake and you are called upon to protect it. Long,
long have the scum and dread of the earth had
possession of our finest fields, driven us from our
flourishing towns and are still feeding on the
fattest of our flocks and herds. They have killed
your late king, my father, who was the love of his
subjects and the dread of his enemies. Shall we
longer live in continual fear of such a scourge?
No! the time has now come when we must rid
ourselves of them forever, that we may again
restore peace to the world and claim its admiration
as we are wont to do.
93. “Fortune has favoured us by sending the
Makgoa to our country just as we were
preparing to strike this decisive blow; but let
not the brunt of the battle fall on them. Their
thunder and lightning [guns] will strike
terror on the enemy, but on your bravery
alone I trust. The Makgoa are great Captains
and have passed through our enemies to
visit us let them be witnesses to your
courage that the fame of your glory might
reach the most distant of nations.
94. "The Makgare [Bakololo] are numerous as the
locusts of the field, but let that not
discourage you, for the Bangwaketse have
hearts of lions! Yes the Bangwaketse alone
have stemmed the torrent of the Makgare,
which swept from the face of the earth our
once powerful neighbors the Bahurutshe
and Bakwena, whose very names are now
almost forgotten. Let them no more enter
the territories of Moleta where they
butchered my renowned father Makaba. Yes
his glorious name must rouse our hearts to
vengeance! Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!"
95. Final advance
For the rest of the day the mephato maintained a tight formation,
while scouts spread out in all directions. There was concern
when one of these advance parties failed to capture a Mokololo
woman who had sighted them. Sebego's battleplan called for
taking the enemy completely by surprise. When his troops were
within a dozen kilometers of Dithubaruba another halt was
ordered. Concealed in thick treecover most of warriors rested
till sunset, when the final advance was ordered. Of Sebego,
who had not slept the night before, Bain noted:
"The King was, notwithstanding, always on his legs examining everything
of consequence with his own eyes, and indeed we were astonished at
the precautions, foresight and military skill used by this intrepid Chief,
which indicated a practical knowledge of his profession that would not
have disgraced any European general."
96. At about 4:00 am, 28 August 1826, Sebego ordered the final
advance. Under cover of darkness his 4,000 warriors
passed quietly through the open valley below Dithubaruba.
It was potentially the most dangerous phase of the
operation. Had the Bakololo been alerted they could have
easily ambushed the Bangwaketse. As it was Sebetwane's
men slept peacefully as Sebego's stealthily moved up the
hills surrounding the stonewalled settlement. Wrote Bain:
•
"Every pass was quietly taken possession of before we,
with the main body headed by his majesty,
commenced our movement in breathless silence down
the valley....we passed through a small kloof and, on
reaching its summit, the faint streaks of dawn now
becoming visible dimly discovered to us the devoted
town of Letubaruba [Dithubaruba] at our feet....One
glance at the situation showed the wisdom of the
general, for the Wanketzee [Bangwaketse] white
shields were now plainly perceptible in every outlet
with a large body in the rear, so it was impossible for
anyone to escape."
97. Final advance
For the rest of the day the mephato maintained a tight formation,
while scouts spread out in all directions. There was concern
when one of these advance parties failed to capture a Mokololo
woman who had sighted them. Sebego's battleplan called for
taking the enemy completely by surprise. When his troops were
within a dozen kilometers of Dithubaruba another halt was
ordered. Concealed in thick treecover most of warriors rested
till sunset, when the final advance was ordered. Of Sebego,
who had not slept the night before, Bain noted:
"The King was, notwithstanding, always on his legs examining everything
of consequence with his own eyes, and indeed we were astonished at
the precautions, foresight and military skill used by this intrepid Chief,
which indicated a practical knowledge of his profession that would not
have disgraced any European general."
98.
99.
100. “Mogale wa pitse e
tshweu ga bonwe,
Moetapele wa
masaropo o jele
mmu, O phamotswe
ke phamole ya ga
Marumo, A mo isa
bogwera bo iwang ke
Masweu le Bantsho.
Nnoi o a lele, ere a
lela mathlo a gagwe
a kwano, Ebile o
futsa nkwe ya losika
loo Makgetla, O
futsa phamole e
testsweng ke
Marumo, A re
setlhodi sele se re
jetsa banna, sa
tlhoga sa re baya ka
boswagadi.”
101.
102.
103.
104.
105. Keene mogale
yoosanneng isong,
yoerileng tshaba
diphuthegile,
diphuthegile diya
kgonnye, asale
asekaseka ditlhobolo;
atlhopha tsedimafulo
athata, atlhopha
bobjane le bobautu.”
• ["He is the hero who does not sit by the fire,
who when the tribes came together, came
together and went to fetch wood, remained
behind and examined the rifles; he picked out
those for shooting far, he picked out carbines
and breechloaders.”]
Guns are found Setswana praise poetry from the period, such as
the following passage for Kgosi Khama III, which underscores
the fact that the story of guns has been as much about their
quality as quantity:
106.
107.
108. Top of Form
Bottom of Form
An extract from an August 1850 letter by
Livingstone to Robert Moffat – “Can you get the
bullet mould (perhaps 2, & ramrods to fit)
of 8 to lb. or rather fit 8 to the pound bore
but conical, from Birmingham? Those which
have an indentation behind fire much
further, the dotted line marking the
indentation. Sechele is very anxious to get
the seven-barrelled gun. You seem to have
forgotten it.’”
The missionary’s correspondence
included the following hand drawn
sketch -
110. • The passage also gives additional insight into Sechele’s, by then
already sophisticated, appreciation of munitions. In this respect,
one’s attention may be drawn to Livingstone’s reference to the
Kgosi’s desire to acquire a Nock Gun, i.e. the Nock’s Company’s
seven barreled Carbine Volley Gun.
111. It is not clear whether or not Sechele ever
obtained his desired Nock Gun, a weapon
originally designed for the Royal Navy. From a
single charge it fired from its seven barrels
in close sequence. Volley guns are the ancestors
of the machine gun, reaching their apex with the
Mitrailleuse, which was overtaken by the
rotating Gatling gun
German Wall Gun
c. 1700
French Mitrailluese 1866
American Gatling Gun 1876
British Nock Gun c. 1800
112. • As an example of cutting edge weapon’s technology
the more intriguing element of Livingstone’s prose is
rather his reference, with evident prior familiarity, to
heavy cylindro-conical bullet moulds.
• While Livingstone’s sketch may appear
unremarkable today, in 1850 it illustrated a pattern
that would not have been found as ordinary issue in
any European arsenal.
• Prior to the 1850’s militaries around the world, as
well as well as most civilian marksmen, still relied on
spherical or ball shot, usually fired from smooth bore
muskets rather than conical or elongated bullets.
113.
114. • Sharp pointed cylindro-conical bullets,
similar in design albeit of a smaller size than
Livingstone’s projectile, were only introduced
into regular military service in 1846, when
they were first adopted by elite French rifle
corps.
• By 1850 their additional presence would
otherwise have still been confined to a
relative handful rifle companies in Austria
and, at least as test munitions, Prussia and
some of the lesser German states
115. Evolution of the Bullet UK & France 1832-48
From 1830s Delvigne
developed cylindro-
spherical & cylindro-
conical bullets
From 1841 Capt. Tamisier
added grooves for stability.
Norton’s bullet 1832
Greener’s Bullet 1836
Capt. Minie’s 1848 bullet
was a refinement of
Tamisier’s work.
In 1852 H.M.G. paid Minie
L 20 thousand for rights to
the his bullet, were sued
by Greener, who settled for
L 1 thousand in 1857
Capt. Norton began experimenting with hallow base conical bullets in 1820s, initially
inspired by his study of Indian blowpipes; leading to the 1832 Norton prototype, which
was perfected in 1836 by William Greener
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122. • Writing on elongated bullets in 1852, Professor John
Scoffern observed that while conical projectiles had
only recently been adopted by the British rifle brigade,
along with their French, Prussian and Austrian
counterparts, ‘sportsmen, too, admit their great
superiority, and indeed their use may be pronounced as
universal,’ further noting:
• Very soon after the application of these conical
projectiles, followed two important additions to them,
both of which would have been totally inapplicable to
spherical ball. M. Delvigne, we believe, first made the
conical tip of a piece of hardened steel, thus imparting
to the lead an amazing increase in penetrating force,
enabling it to crash through the skull of an elephant
with ease, or perforate a rhinoceros.
123. OTHER THINGS YOU CAN KILL
WITH AN 8 BORE CYLINDRO-
CONICAL PROJECTILE...
124.
125. • In July 1876
breechloaders
• enabled Bakwena
to defeat
Bakgatla and
Batlokwa near
Molepolole
In July 1866 the use of
breechloading rifles
ensured Prussian
victory over the
Austrians at Sadowa
131. • That both the Batswana and the Boers fought to a standstill in a late morning to
dusk battle at Dimawe on 31st August 1852 is established, what is emerging as
something of a revelation is the sophistication of the weapons and tactics that
were employed by both sides at the engagement, e.g. from a recently published
online letter by David Livingstone to William Oswell, writing on the 20th
September 1852:
• “On Monday they [the Boers] began their attack on the town by firing
with swivels. They communicated fire to the houses. This made many
of the women flee and the heat became so great the men huddled
together on the little hill in the middle of the town - the smoke
prevented them from seeing the Boers though the latter saw them
huddled in groups. They killed 60 Bakwains and 35 Boers fell - and a
great number of horses. Sechele shot 4 Boers with his
two double barreled guns. When they made a dash at the
hill, one bullet passing through two men, and a bullet went through
the sleeve of his coat. These 60 are those whom they counted near the
town. Sechele thinks others may have fallen among the women who
ran away - these are not yet counted. They maintained their position
one whole day on the hill, cutting off the Boers every time they came
near. The Boers continued their firing with swivels till the evening and
then retired.”
132. Artillery
Of the six artillery pieces known to have been
deployed at Dimawe (i.e. at least 5 Boer and 1
Batswana), by far the most formidable was
Sechele’s long range 6 Pounder, so classified
because it fired 6 pound (2.7 kilogram) solid
round shot, although like other cannon of the era
it was also capable of firing smaller “grape shot”
and “course shot”, the latter of which could
consist of bits of iron, lead or even rocks. That
Sechele possessed a stock of round shot is
confirmed by James Chapman, who on 28th
October 1852 recorded Sechele’s own account of
the battle, including: “He did not know how
many Boers they had killed, he only saw 3 or 4,
but the Griquas tell them 30. He brought out
some leaden cannon balls and smiled rather
contemptuously.
133. • The Boer commander, Scholtz, in a 12th September 1852 dispatch to Andries
Pretorius, further notes:
•
• “I gave order to storm the defences when the cannons had fired. This was
done with great courage, by the help of the Lord. But, you cannot conceive
how hard the fight was. It must have lasted six hours altogether. Afterward I
captured everything and set fire to the village. But the enemy retained the
hill with caves, and I could not take it because my troops were exhausted. I
had 70 cannon shots alone fired, with the loss of three men six wounded. In
the evening the battle stopped.”
•
• Also, from Scholtz’s official report:
• “I advanced with three hundred men close to his battery [i.e. Sechele’s
artillery position] and sent messengers to prevail upon him to accept peace
as I would otherwise be compelled to fight with cannon, and this might
endanger the women and children. All this did not dispose him to
peace...Upon which, under a shower of balls, I advanced upon the battery,
confiding my fate in the hands of the Lord...“During the battle, gunner officer
M. Viljoen’s cannon caught fire when being loaded with powder, and he was
severely injured, as he loaded the piece himself in order to encourage those
under him. Because of this and other circumstances we were overtaken by
nightfall; and with the enemy still holding a rocky hill of caves I was obliged
to withdraw my men and return to laager.”
134. • The largest Sechele’s 6 Pounder, so classified because it fired 6 pound (2.7
kilogram) solid iron shot for up to 3000 yards.
• It could also fire “grape shot”, that is a load of ordinary ball shot, and “course
shot”, which could take the form of small bits of iron, rocks etc.
• Sechele’s possession of solid shot confirmed by a 28th October 1852 diary entry
by James Chapman, who in recording the Kgosi’s account of the battle noted:
“He did not know how many Boers they had killed, he only saw 3 or
4, but the Griquas tell them 30. He brought out some leaden cannon
balls and smiled rather contemptuously.”
• The balls could have been cast by local smiths as well as imported.
•
• The gun powder used for the cannon would have been the same as that of the
muskets, the key in each case being the need to apply just the right amount.
• By the mid-19th century Africans were making their own gunpowder, although
imported powder was preferred, as Francis Galton observed at the time* –
136. * SA Cannon Society, private communication Dec. 2011
137. Swivel guns were a common armament among the Boer trekkers, being
available in the region as naval surplus sold off from either passing
ships or as autioned salvage from those that had run aground or
otherwise been decommissioned.
138. • It is, however, doubtful that the Bakwena bested the Boer artillery. In addition to more
experience, the Boer gunners had an advantage in numbers and battlefield deposition. Besides
the 4 Pounder they brought with them at least four smaller, 2-2.5 pounder swivel guns, which
are reported to have been responsible for many of the Bakwena casualties. The central
importance of artillery in the battle is confirmed by a variety of Boer sources including Kruger’s
own memoirs:
•
• “…On Monday morning the battle began. I was well in front, and brought down a number of
Kaffirs with my four-pounder, which I had loaded with coarse shot When the mountain on which
Secheli's town lay was already partly taken, Louw du Plessis, who was serving the guns,
accidently hit a large rock, and the ball, rebounding, struck my head with such force that I fell
to the ground unconscious. A certain van Rooyen had to help me to my feet, and at the same
time bound up my aching head in a cloth. While I was lying unconscious and van Rooyen was
busying himself about me, a Hottentot servant of my brother's, thanks to his accurate aim, kept
the Kaffirs at a safe distance. When I came to myself, the first thing I saw was that the Kaffirs
were creeping up behind rocks and boulders, and I realized the danger to which my burghers
would be exposed if they were not warned in time. I at once got up to lead the attack on the
dangerous points, although my wound prevented me from carrying my musket. The Kaffirs kept
up a hot fire from every cave and gorge, but, after a sharp fight,
• the burghers succeeded in driving them from the mountain. My life was
• in danger for a second time during this same battle. One of the enemy's
• rifle bullets, fired by the enemy from a huge rifle, struck me on the
• chest and tore my jacket in two…”
220. “A lot of people
said we
were
going to be sold
into slavery ….
Some were
getting seasick
because they
were not used to
salt water, the
smell of the
ship, the oil,
the muck, was
unbearable”. –
Kande Kamara
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252. The South African authorities
feared the racial effect of
introducing black Africans to
European warfare and society;
resulting in restrictions on
their deployment, including
the confining of off duty
troops to compounds whose
design was the same as those
for German P.O.Ws
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318. THE FORMATION AND
EVOLUTION OF THE
BOTSWANA DEFENCE
FORCE (BDF)
• At independence in 1966 Botswana had no military
• Unlike other countries in the rest of Africa,
Botswana did not
• inherit any military establishment at independence.
The leadership at the
• Besides the colonial legacy of not having a local
military formation the new state faced severe
resource constraints
319. • Botswana was one of the poorest and
most underdeveloped in the world at
independence. The indicators of this
underdevelopment included the fact that
the country’s per capita income was
US$60 in 1966. There was only 8 km of
tarred road, and 22 university graduates.
• The new government initially relied on
Britain to finance both the recurrent and
development budget.
• In 1965-66 Botswana deliberately
deferred the creation of the military
despite the fact that at independence
the constitution provided for its
existence.
320.
321. Sir Seretse Khama,
often observed that
although Botswana
abhorred apartheid,
colonialism and white
minority rule, the
country did not have
the means or muscle
to exert any physical
pressure on its
powerful neighbours.
His vision was to
create a multiparty
non-racial democratic
state in Botswana that
would serve as a
model of interracial
harmony.
322. FROM POLICE MOBILE UNIT TO
THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE
• Instead of a military establishment, in
1966 Botswana expanded, trained and
equipped a thousand man paramilitary
Police Mobile Unit (PMU), inherited
from the colonial administration.
• From the outset The PMU patrolled
Botswana’s borders, while also
undertaking the internal policing
functions.
323.
324. • National and regional factors,
however, combined gave impetus to
the formation of the BDF.
• At independence virtually all
Botswana’s neighbours were ruled by
white minority settler regimes
• The liberation struggles in Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa
had an immediate and profound
impact
325. • With the liberation struggle intensifying, especially in
the mid to late 1970s, Botswana was increasingly
bearing the heat of the conflict. This was primarily due
to incursions into Botswana territory by both freedom
fighters and those bent on their annihilation.
• In particular, the security forces of Smith regime in
then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) repeatedly
violated Botswana’s territorial integrity
• As the liberation struggle escalated Rhodesian
government forces were increasingly crossing into
Botswana raiding villages, kidnapping people and even
killing some. The PMU proved ill equipped with this
mounting challenge.
• The Botswana government thus bowed to this
increasing pressure and made the creation of the
military a priority; thus the BDF Bill was tabled before
parliament in April 1977.
326.
327.
328. • Fisher and Sharp argue that an
unintended consequence of this is that
the BDF’s development pattern has
missed the systematic and strategic
steps of conventional military
development.
• Efforts to develop the BDF have rather
been reactive.
• This has also been a key factor
informing the strategic development of
the army, its command structure,
deployment practices, doctrine,
procurement and acquisition,
recruitment, promotion and retirement
policy, as well as its general posture.
329. BDF operations have always been guided by some
fundamental values and principles on which it
has anchored its operations. These principles
include:
• peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness;
• non-interference in the affairs of other nations;
and
• not using Botswana as a springboard for attacks
on any of its neighbours.
When the BDF was created, government took a
deliberate policy move to create a professional
and well-disciplined defence force that would
stay outside of politics. This was viewed as a
sure way of reducing the possibilities of a coup.
Inevitably such a policy position would go a long
way in influencing training and development of
the officer corps, as well as force structure in
later years.
333. • Training of first pilots
and formation of Air
Wing (1882)
• Acquisition of Armour
(APCs)
• Establishment of
Brigades (1988)
334. BDF AND REGIONAL
PEACEKEEPING
• BDF Contigent participates in “Operation
restore Hope” and UNISOM II in Somalia
(1992-94)
• BDF participate in UNOMOZ (1992)
• UN Peace Keeping Mission in Rwanda
• SADC backed Operation BOLEAS (1998)
and Operation Maluti in Lesotho
• BDF Observers in Darfur (2005)
335. • Establishment of Thebephatshwa Air
Base and aCquisation of fighter jets
• Formation of armoured regiment,
acquisition of light tanks (1995-96)
336. • Establishment of Ground Force
Command (1977), Air Arm
Command (1982) and Defence
Logistics Command (2002).
337. • Recruitment of female commissioned
officers (2007)
• Establishment of Defence Command
Staff College (2008)
• Establishment of the Ministry of
Defence, Justice and Security (2009)
• Enrolement of female NCO (2015).
342. Conclusion:
MILITARY HISTORY THUS
PROVIDES THE ARMY’S INSTITUTIONAL
MEMORY.
PROVIDES A GUIDE TO HOW TROOPS
BEHAVE IN BATTLE.
REVEALS THE PATTERNS, TRENDS &
RELATIONSHIPS NECESSARY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE.
343. TIDY SOLUTIONS IN BATTLE IS A
DELUSION -ALL WARS ARE VERY
UNTIDY.
“ If you know both yourself
and your enemy, you can
win numerous battles
without jeopardy… but
there is no strategy
guaranteeing winning.” -
Sun Tzu (The Art of War)