1. THE PROSPECTS OF KOREAN UNIFICATION
AND ITS IMPLICATION TO THE PHILIPPINES
A Term Paper in AS 234
(Special Problems on East Asia)
Presented to
Professor BENITO LIM
Asian Center, University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
In partial fulfillment of the requirements in
AS 234 Summer, Academic Year 1999
By
JAIME ESCOSIO NOBLE, JR.
AS 234 / 9–11 MF
27 May 1999

2. Table of Contents
I. Introduction 1
II. Korean peninsula’s geography 2
III. Historical overview of Korean nation
a) Ancient history 3
b) Japanese annexation of Korea 4
c) World war II and Korean division 5
IV. The prospects of Korean unification
a) Unification by war 7
b) Unification by mutual consent 8
c) U nification by or failure to act 9
V. Factors that affects Korean unification 11
VI. Implication of Korean unification on Unified Korea
a) Economic 12
b) Socio-cultural 13
c) Military 13
d) Ideological 15
VIII. Conclusion 15

3. I. Introduction
The world is entering an age of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this
uncertain environment of changing world reality, Korean’s may ask what is the
likelihood of Korean unification? How? and, What will be its implication to
economy, politics, and the people? Over the past several years both the Republic
of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK, or North Korea) have experienced a number of significant changes. In
the South, Kim Dae-jung was elected president to realize the first peaceful
transfer of power to the opposition in the republican dominated country.1
At the same time, North’s Supreme People’s Assembly was recently
called into session for the first time on four and a half years to amend the
constitution, to designate the chairman of the National Defense Commission as
the state’s supreme leader. As expected, former DPRK president Kim II Sung’s
son Kim Jong-il, who had been selected as general secretary of the Worker’s
Party in October 1997, was inaugurated as chairman of National Defense
Commission.2
1 Kwon Man-hak, “Political Changes and Inter-Korean Relations,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-October 1998), pp. 1.
2 Also means that Kim Jung-il will be the state supreme leader as mandated by the new constitution. Ibid., pp. 2.

4. Korea in the past has been passive. As a matter of fact the peninsula
became a battleground of the fighting’s but Korean people today seem more
active and determined to take charge of their own destiny. The question of the
future prospects of Korean unification lies on the both ROK and DPRK. Likewise,
major powers play an important role in the said process. This includes United
States, China, Japan, and Russia. Because of the relative decrease of U.S.
economic power and the concomitant rise of Japan and China as economic
power. United States of America’s goal is to thwart emergence of rival
superpower to challenge U.S. supremacy3
Thus purposefully maintains its
presence in the Asia specifically on East Asia.
Korea played a sensitive role as the buffer and support in the balance of
power among the major powers especially during cold war. Koreans are pooling
their knowledge and energy to take part of the new global order. However, they
have to overcome numerous obstacles, and must settle the past to culminate
their goal of unifying Korea.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold: 1) it will examine the cause of
Korean division; 2) it will evaluate the realities in Korea related to its unification;
3) it will postulate the future prospects of Korean unification; and finally, 4) it will
assess the possible impact and the implication of Korean unification to Asia.
3
Young Whan Kihl, “Korea After the Cold War: An Introduction.” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold
War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 5.

5. II. Korean peninsula’s geography
The land mass of Korea covers 220,843 sq. km., bordering on Manchuria
and Russia to the north, facing China to the west across the Yellow Sea and
Japan to the east and south across the East Sea and Korea Straits. It is
approximately 1,000-km long, and 200 km wide. Extending approximately 34
degrees to 43 degrees North latitude, it falls entirely within the Temperate Zone.
However, it is sad to say that the peninsula is divided into North and South
by two opposing ideologies. North Korea occupies just over the half of Korean
peninsula, It has the area of 120,538-sq. km., and its population reached 25.5
million as of July 1998. The Yalu and Tumen rivers form its south border and with
China and Russia bordering the north. It’s southern border with South Korea
north of the 38th
parallel. It is a mountainous country, three fourth of which is
forested highland. The climate is warm temperate, although winters can be cold
in the north. Most rain falls during the summer. Nearly 90% of its arable land is
farmed by cooperatives employ over 40% of the labor force and rice is the main
crop grown. North Korea is quite endowed with fuel and minerals. Deposits of
coal and hydroelectric power generate electricity, and substantial deposits of iron
ore are found in the north. 60% of labor force are employed in industry; the most
important of which are metallurgical, building, cement and chemicals.
On the other hand, South Korea occupies the southern half of the
peninsula. It has the population of 45.9 million as of July 1998. It is predominantly
mountainous with the highest ranges running north to south along the East
Coast. The extreme south has a humid warm temperate climate while farther

6. north is more continental. Most rain falls in summer because of its proximity to
East Asian monsoon belt. Cultivated land only represents 23% of the country’s
total area and the main crop is rice. The country has few natural resources but
flourishing manufacturing industry and worlds leading supplier of ships, electronic
equipment, electrical goods, petrochemicals, and steel. Its people enjoy a
reasonably high standard of living than in the North.
III. Historical overview of Korean nation
a) Ancient history
Historians trace the origin of the Korean nation to the prehistoric peoples
who inhabited not only the Korean peninsula but also a wide region north of the
Yalu and Tumen rivers. Known by such names as Puyo, Old Choson, Ye, Maek,
Okcho, Chin, and others, they evolved over a period of centuries into the three
kingdoms of Koguryo (conventionally dated 37 B.C.-A.D. 668), Paekche (18B.C.-
A.D. 660), and Silla (57B.C.-A.D. 668), Koguryo, astride today’s northwestern
Korea and southern Manchuria, was a powerful military power in its heyday and
had close contacts, including frequent military conflicts with the expanding
empires in China proper. Paekche occupied the southwestern part of the
peninsula. Silla, isolated from China in the southeastern corner of the peninsula,
was the last to benefit from the advance Chinese civilization. 4
For many years, the three kingdoms were in a state of constant warfare
against one another until Silla manage to defeat first Paekche and then Koguryo.
4 Han-Kyo Kim, “Korean Unification in Historical Per
spective.” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl,
(USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 17.

7. Unified Silla ruled for nearly 300 years, all of the former Paekche land and a
southern portion of Koguryo or roughly two thirds of the Korean peninsula. Thus,
Unified Silla’s success laid the foundation for the formation of a Korean nation.5
b) Japanese annexation of Korea
When newly westernizing Japan chose to challenge China, a Sino-
Japanese war resulted entailing many battles fought on Korean soil in 1894 and
1895. China’ s defeat invites Japan’s appetite to colonized Korea. Ten years later
Japan took on Russia and was again victorious. Unrestrained by competition,
Japan completed its conquest on Korea by forcing to sign treaty of annexation in
1910, the first time the entire nation had to submit to foreign colonial power.
For thirty-six years, Japan imposed harsh militarist rule that totally
exploited and maltreated Koreans. The Japanese colonial government seized
legitimate lands. Thus, farmers were deprived and accepted the status as
tenants. In area of commerce and finance, laws regarding the establishment of
commercial enterprises were written and interpreted to favor Japanese firms.
Koreans are only allowed to own small-scale industries.6
Koreas natural
resources were also diverted into Japanese hands. Timber resources were
exploited, excessive quantities of rice were exported to Japan. The Korean
people were completely excluded from their own economy.
5 Ibid., pp., 17.
6 Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, Trans. Lee Kyung-shik, Ed. Grafton K. Mintz, Seoul: The Euloo Publishing, 1979. pp. 468.

8. In matters of education and religion the Japanese used a combination
strict control and suppression to prevent the growth of nationalism and of
democratic ideas. As a consequence, religious organizations were carefully
watch and Koreans were prevented from receiving higher education. Fighters for
Korean independence both home and abroad planned a nationwide
demonstration and protest for freedom from Japanese rule. In March 1, 1919
simultaneous demonstration from Seoul and other part of Korea was carried out.
Thousands of national flag appears and many joined what was called today as
“March 1 movement.”7
As a result, Japanese reacted with violence. Japanese soldiers arrested,
tortured and fired into unarmed crowds killing and wounding many. Furthermore,
Japanese resorted to burning houses and churches indiscriminately, unlawfully
tried and convicted Korean protesters. The March 1 movement was a failure
because the Japanese were not moved to grant Korea’s freedom, nor did other
nation offer a practical support. However, the movement was of great
significance because it climaxed the formation of national consciousness and in
essence it did succeed.
c) World war II and Korean division
While intensifying her oppression of Korea, Japan was initiating a series of
military conquests that brought her into World War II and finally resulted in her
defeat and liberation of Korea. The tremendous destruction of the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted from unconditional surrender of
7 Ibid., pp. 476.

9. Japan on August 15, 1945. The provision of Potsdam and Cairo declarations
immediately came into effect, and after forty years of struggle against the
oppression of Japan who had tried to eliminate their identity, Korea was finally
free. But only in about three weeks the Korean people lived in a state freedom.8
Their happiness was soon overshadowed with domestic and political differences
and the collision of the United States and Russia. The primary differences were
between the Nationalists, who were awaiting the return of Provisional
Government leaders, and the Socialist and Communist, who wished to set up a
socialist state.
Meanwhile, arrangements made among the victorious Allies were
developed to have grave consequences for Korea. One of the agreements was
that after Russia’s entry into the war against Japan, upon Japanese surrender,
Russian troops should occupy Korea north of the thirty eight parallel, while the
United States should occupy the area south of it.9
With the Russian forces
already occupying the north and American forces occupying the south.
The division of the country was widely resented. Unfortunately, Allied
Powers had decided that Korea was to be ruled by trusteeship system for a
maximum of five years to be formed under United States, Britain, Russia, and
China.10
Resistance was practically unanimous, in so far that Koreans are
longing for independence. They could not accept the idea of foreign rule.
8 Ibid., pp. 497.
9 Ibid., pp. 499.
10 Ibid., pp. 500.

10. However, Communist troops in Korea on Russian instruction, suddenly came out
in favor of trusteeship.11
In June 1950 without any declaration of war, North Korean troops crossed
the thirty-eighth parallel and swept down upon the South inferior forces. The
South immediately protested to the United Nations who passed a resolution
ordering the north to withdraw to the thirty-eight parallel and encourage member
nations to give military support. Joint forces of U.S., Britain, France, Canada,
Australia, the Philippines, and Turkey pushed the Communist out of South Korea.
But the communist Chinese intervened and sent forces to aid North troops. Seoul
once again fell into Communist hands in January 4, 1951. The joint UN forces
mounted a counter-attack, which re-took Seoul on March 12. A standoff was
reached in the area along the thirty-eighth parallel, where the conflict had
begun.12
On July 27, 1953 both Koreas agreed to pull back forces behind a
demilitarized zone.
The war had resulted in loss of life and property. But the gravest damage
was to the Korean dream of unification.
IV. The future prospects of Korean unification
a) Unification by war
There are two general variants of war scenario we can conceive. The first
refers to a deliberate war, a process whereby war is deliberately chosen from the
11 Ibid., pp. 501.
12 Ibid., pp. 506.

11. beginning as the means to achieve unification. North Korea (1950-1953)13
attempted this example, if that was successful, it would refer to this strategy of
Korean unification.
The second is war by escalation scenes, triggered by retaliations either by
North or South Koreas. This type of scenario entails several instances of conflict
that may result into this setting. One example was the incidence of Korean Airline
bombing that leads to retaliations by the South. If the conflict escalates into full-
scale war that eventually culminates in a unified Korea under the means of either
Korea. But unless terrorist acts are extraordinary in terms of scale of target, both
Koreas are unlikely to retaliate with military actions on a level that would lead to a
full-scale war between them.14
Another instance of escalation scenario that poses a hypothetical situation
is North Korea’s military operations aimed at occupation of a limited portion of
South Korea’s territory. If this action provokes full-scale war that will results in
Unification of Korea. However, this hypothetical situation of North Korea’s first
successfully occupying a part of South Korean territory (whether the islands, the
area of Seoul, or even Seoul), then stopping military operations and calling for a
cease-fire. Some Korean analysts assume the U.S. might be inclined to explore
the possibility of a negotiated settlement rather than commit to war automatically.
Last scenario might effect in so far as the North Korea’s imminent success
in developing nuclear weapons. The probability of U.S. and South Korea to
undertake appropriate action against North Korea is more apparent. There are
13
14 Young Kim, “Prospects for Korean Unification: An Assessment,” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 254.

12. number of reasons for this. One was North refusal to sign nuclear safeguards
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Without such an agreement
the IAEA was unable to inspect the North’s nuclear facilities to verify the
manufacture of Nuclear weapons. Added to this, U.S. claimed that North Korea’s
nuclear fuel reprocessing plants which uses plutonium as a fuel and was testing
a nuclear bomb detonator. However, the U.S. has not produced any evidence.15
If both U.S. and South Korea agreed to initiate preventive military strikes to North
Korean target, it will result to full-scale war and eventual unification of either side.
Again, because of probable adverse nuclear repercussions of war,
International community will be against U.S. military strikes.
b) Unification by mutual consent or non-violent unification
These can be effected by prior consent of the existing authorities of both
North and South, can also be called non-violent or peaceful unification in
conformity of international law that disputes are supposed to be settled,
conformably to one of the basic principles of the United Nations “by peaceful
means in such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.”16
For example, by mutual consent a joint committee should be established
to draft a Constitution, and the formula for unification must be accepted by both
parties. One formula might be general nationwide election based on population to
elect a chief executive or to compose a national assembly. In any event, the
15 Sharif Shuja, “The DPRK’s Nuclear Program and Polic
16

13. emergence of state is in accordance with international law. As a matter of fact,
President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea proclaimed his North Korean policy by
“advancing non-use of force by either party, the promotion of reconciliation and
cooperation between two Koreas, and the assurance that South Korea will not try
to absorb the North.”17
It is important to note that Democratic West Germany in its desire to
achieve German unification displayed the wisdom of broadening the base for
peaceful unification by adhering to peaceful coexistence, exchanges and
cooperation instead of merely displaying unification slogan. The Korean people
should keep in mind that German unification pursued a peace policy first rather
than extending premature unification overtures.18
c) Unification by default or failure to act
This type of unification entails collapse of the regime of one side when it
becomes unable to perform effective government function. The disintegration
enables the other side to extend effective control to the collapsing side being
absorbed.19
The problem North Korea facing today is the ongoing food crisis. In 1995,
about 500,000 people died of hunger. In 1996 hunger hits some 1 million deaths
from starvation.20
And if food shortages persist, more North Koreans will die,
17
18
19 ssment,” Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Ed. Young Whan Kihl, (USA: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 256.
20 Hwang Jang-yop, Strategy for Peaceful Korean Unification,” Korea Focus, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January -February 1999), 39.

14. while survivors specifically the children will suffer much from malnutrition and
deformity. Therefore, the issue of North Korea’s food difficulties has might be
prelude to advancing Korean unification. Likewise due to accumulation of
adverse condition at home and abroad, North Korea may suddenly compromise
with the South.
The absorption scenario foresees a serious economic dislocation in North
Korea involving acute and widespread shortages of food and other basic
necessities of life. It is therefore an essential strategy to use food aid that will
lead to unification.
Prevailing opinion in Japan and the United States holds that North Korea
will be unable to survive and will ultimately collapse, though some maintain that
North Korea will somehow manage to muddle through. Opinion in China and
Russia, on the other hand, despite its present difficulties, North Korea will not
collapsed easily and in fact will overcome its problem and move forward with
national development.21
These differences of opinion among influential external
forces in unification play a critical role and both Koreas should seek workable
objectives and appropriate unification policies with each of the countries
concerned.
V) Factors that affects Korean unification
The Korean peninsula is exposed to the immediate impact of tensions
among the major world powers. The geopolitical location of the peninsula which
21 Park Young-ho, “International Perceptions of Korean Unification Issues,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 75.

15. is at the center of world politics, also means an opportunity for Koreans to
contribute to world peace.
Both external and internal factors should be regarded in working with the
Issue of Korean unification. The four key players in Korean unification are China,
Japan, Russia, and United States. They are expected to continue their respective
spheres of influence with regard to the question unification because of traditional
interests in the Korean peninsula and the impact of change on the peninsula
would alter their respective influences.
China will play a vital role in Korean Unification; China has now the third
largest economy in the world and enjoyed the fastest economic growth during the
last three years. It has successfully carried out economic reform without
changing its basic communist rule.
The regional context of the U.S. policy towards North and South Korea is
interrelated with that of China through the U.S. - Japan security alliance and
manages to hold North Korea under its influence. Therefore, the goal of
preventing the emergence of a superpower in Northeast Asia can be more easily
achieved.22
The problem with North Korea is its attempt to cut off the flow of
information from external sources by strictly regulating all contact with foreigners
thereby maintaining a high degree of isolation.23
We recognize United States as the world’s only true superpower but it is
difficult to depend upon its leadership because it lacks morality and can not lead
22
Sung-Han Kim, “U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula and ROK-U.S. Relations,” The Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 138.
23
Kim Hak-jon, “Prospects for change under Kim Jung Il regime,” Korea Focus. Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-October
1998), pp. 28.

16. by force alone. U.S. carelessness was manifested in Cuba, Kosovo, the Middle
East, and recently Yugoslavia.
VII. Implication of Korean unification.
a) Economic
The implication of the unified peninsula is sound economy. Because of
unification North and South national wealth, energy, and resources will be
diverted for progress. The South’s economy, for example, grew at an average
rate of 9.2 % during 1982-92 period. However , in 1991 North Korea’s economy
contracted to 5.2 % after shrinking 3.7 percent in 1990. The South has more than
six times the per capita income of the North, $6,498 per capita as compared with
the latter is $1,038. South Korea’s gross national product totaled $280.8 billion in
1991, compared with North’s $22.9 billion.24
Looking into this unbalance
criterion It is therefore the right time for both to unify for balance and
economic strength.
To hasten the growth of a nation is the goal of every transformation. The
unification of two Korea’s would mean a major challenge in terms of economy
among Korean people. It would interesting to speculate the blending of
communist model of command economy and capitalist pattern of market
economy. We can note that command economy was proven to be a failure, and
the market economy excels in creating wealth and elevating the average
24
John Chung Hwan Oh, “The Future of Democracy and Economic Growth in Korea,” Korean Observer, Vol. 15,
No. 1 (Spring 1994), 49.

17. standard of living for the whole society.25
In fact, more and more countries have
come to accept democracy and market economy as the prevailing ideology.
However, the capitalist market economy has inherent deficiencies, such as
inflation, unemployment, speculation and growing gap between rich and poor,
and growing gap between rich and poor. Likewise the democratic ideals of
human rights and dignity can easily be slighted in the blind quest for ceaseless
economic growth. Nonetheless, answers to these problems are being found in
such socialist precepts as equality, social justice, social welfare, and government
initiative.26
Unified Korea may adopt the Chinese model of economy. In fact, the
primary determinant of a nation power is seen to be its economic strength.
Indeed, economic strength is the basis of strong military power.27
b) Socio-cultural
The unification of Korea will result to enhance cultural identity. Korea is in
great need of building its self-confidence and redefining it national identity. Years
of dependence on external culture have robbed Korea of a clear sense of
national identity.28
Likewise, the national identity would be bolstered by a growing
awareness among Koreans of their tradition and its values. Also, Confucianism is
essential to preserve the elements of Korean culture and to accommodate
foreign culture.
25
Ibid., pp. 4.
26
Ibid., pp. 5.
27
Hong Soon-young, “Foreign Policy Agenda of the Republic of Korea in the New Century,” Korean Observations
on Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5.
28
The Presidential Commission on the 21st
Century, Korea in the 21st
Century, Korea: Seoul Press, 1995, pp. 90.

18. Social integration is a process that resolves the active or latent conflict
stemming from cultural differences which relates to nation building.29
By this
assertion it is clear that unification is a measure for nation building.
c) Military
A unified Korea will have a powerful military to protect national interest of
the country. At present, North Korea maintains a large standing forces of more
than one million, over one and a half times that of South Korea which w It has
3,700 tanks, 2,500 armored personnel carriers, and 9,800 artillery pieces, over
two times those of South Korea in every category. The North has 740 naval
vessels, while the South has 230. The number of North Korean aircraft reaches
1,620, while the South has 1,290.30
. North Korea has 290 helicopters while
South has 290. In addition to this ground, sea and air force capacities, North
Korea is capable to build and modify the Scud missiles.31
With the military might
of integrated armed forces, Unified Korea will be a strong nation in terms of
military.
It could then experiment with the idea of common security as its new
security concept. This could ease the security concerns of Korea’s neighbors in
East Asia. Likewise, these can serve to lessen the arms race and military
confrontation of the region, while advancing a more peaceful and stable security
29
Sharif Shuja, “The Politics of Korean Unification: A case Study,” Korean Observer, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer
1998), pp. 310.
30
Chang-Il Ohn, “South Korea’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy,” Korean Observer. Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring
1994), 18.
31
Ibid., pp. 18.

19. environment.32
A Unified Korea may also consider introducing a collective
security system under which the four major powers having stakes on the
peninsula could cooperate with one another. Therefore, these can help minimize
political and military distrust of a unified Korea and create regional stability.
National security, however, includes more than what is required in the
concept of national defense. It demands the ability of a nation to preserve itself
not only against external threats but also against internal disintegration.33
In other
words, while national defense by concept puts much emphasis on a nation
capability to cope with external threats, national security means the ability of a
nation to sustain itself as a nation from either external and internal threats or
both.34
Therefore these will be the bigger challenge to Unified Korea.
d) Ideological
Despite the worldwide bankruptcy of communistic ideology, North Korea
still clings to its own idiocy under the banner of “live in our own way.” North
Korean leadership is reluctant to accept the fact that communistic ideology has
undermined the individual creativity by putting too much emphasis on the equality
of the masses and undercut the individual desire to make economic profits for
32
Han Yong Sup, “Unification and Inter-Korean Military Integration,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September-
October 1998), pp. 43.
33
Ibid., pp. 21.
34
Ibid., pp. 21.

20. oneself and one’s associate all of which are prerequisite for increasing the
economic vitality and potentiality of a nation.35
A unified Korea will embrace an ideology which can culminate a healthy
nation. They may adopt Chinese type of socialism. Whatever the ideology a
unified Korea adopts, it has to make sure that there must be freedom and justice.
Furthermore, a unified Korea must embrace peace rather than conflict,
defense rather than offense, rapprochement rather than confrontation, these
three elements are to be merged into both North and South posture.
VIII. Conclusion
From the perspective of the author the peninsula seems to be ripe for a
unification because of Socio-economic preconditions. However, the legacy of
distrust left by Korean War makes it conducive that a non-violent pact bet the two
Koreas be effected before any serious negotiations for peaceful unification can
started. Thus for South, the peaceful co-existence of two Koreas must be
recognized as necessary first stage. On the contrary North Korea argues that
cross recognition will result to permanent division of the peninsula. Thus, North
demands U.S. troops withdrawal and immediate political negotiation be carried
out to hasten unification. 36
35
Ibid., pp. 18.
36
The author personally believes that this is a workable option. In fact the presence of U.S. forces in Korea is a
major obstacle to unification. Therefore, withdrawal was the main argument and condition for peaceful unification
by the North. Unfortunately, South authorities are against this idea.

21. The basic difference of both Koreas in forming a unified government is the
means. South Korean government desires a free Korean general election under
the management and supervision. In contrast North Korea, argues that neutral
countries should supervise general election. This was because North Korea
fought against United Nations cannot be presumed to be unbiased. An
alternative would be an all-Korean election managed by Korean’s themselves.
However, it will be difficult to unify overnight two states that have been
hostile to each other over the past 50 years. Nonetheless, efforts should begin
with the basic issues of preventing war, establishing a lasting peace, and
narrowing the gap between two Koreas. The culmination of peaceful unification
stands the struggle among major powers namely U.S., China, Russia, and Japan
as well as progressive countries in the world. In this regard North and South must
not adopt hostile policies, no matter how minor toward any of these countries.
Instead should be conciliatory toward them all. Although it is generally assumed
that specialist from this countries would agree that present circumstances in
Northeast Asia would be favorable for facilitating Korean unification, the
Americans were more hesitant to make this claim.37
It is important that both sides promote reconciliation and peaceful
coexistence by understanding problems thereby fostering an atmosphere ripe for
peaceful unification. After all, peace is more important than unification.
37
Park Young-ho, “International Perceptions of Korean Unification Issues,” Korea Focus, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January-
February 1998), pp. 72.

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