dissertation

i
COVER PAGE
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW
TOPIC OF DISSERTATION
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DRAWBACKS IN THE REGULATION OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS TRADE
(9,695)
IRENE MBITHE MULUMBA
L95S/9644/2010
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF LAWS
[BACCALAREUS LEGUME (LLB)] OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY]
APRIL,2014

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DECLARATIONS
Candidate’s Declaration:
This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or for any other
purpose to any other institution other than Kenyatta University for academic credit.
Irene Mbithe Mulumba L95S/ 9644/2010 9th
April 2014
This work has been submitted with my approval as supervisor.
SUPERVISOR
Signature ______________ Date ________________

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DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my brothers for all their support during the
time of my study.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
COVER PAGE.......................................................................................................................... i
DECLARATIONS .................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION .........................................................................................................................iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....................................................................................................vii
LIST OFABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................viii
LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS.................................................................. x
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................1
1.0 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1
1.1BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................1
1.2.1The United Nations Register for Conventional Arms (UNRCA) .......................................2
1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .....................................................................................5
1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY...................................................................................8
1.11SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY...............................................................................9
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................10
2.0 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................10
2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE ...............................10
2.1.1 The Legality of Transfers of Conventional Armaments.................................................10
2.1.2 The Motivating Factors for Arms Transfers.................................................................11
2.1.3 Stock Pile Mismanagement .......................................................................................12
2.1.4 The Problem of Brokering in the Conventional Arms Trade ..........................................12
2.2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS TRADE .13
2.2.1 The League of Nations Covenant ...............................................................................14
2.2.2 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) .........14
2.2.3 Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Conventional Arms Transfers.....15
2.2.4 The United Nations Conventional Arms Register (UNRCA) .........................................16
2.2.5 The Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods
and Technologies (WA)....................................................................................................17
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMAMENTS TRADE ......................................................................................................18

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2.3.1 The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)......................................18
2.3.2 Regional Disarmament Centers..................................................................................19
2.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRADE..............................................................................................................................19
2.4.1 Augmentation of armed conflict and political instability ...............................................20
2.4.2 Economic stagnation and inhibition to development .....................................................21
2.4.3 Violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law..................................22
2.4.4 Facilitation of terrorism and piracy undertakings..........................................................23
2.4.5 Invigoration of organized crime and human insecurity..................................................24
2.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................24
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW.....................................................25
3.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................25
3.1 The Phenomenon of Conventional Arms Trade...........................................................25
3.1.1Motivating factors for arms transfers ...........................................................................25
3.2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE..............26
3.2.1The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)....................................................................................26
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMS TRADE ..................................................................................................................29
3.4 CONSEQUENCES OF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRADE..............................................................................................................................29
3.4.1 Revitalization of poaching activities ...........................................................................30
3.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................32
CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................33
4.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................33
4.1 Issues summary..........................................................................................................33
4.2 Observations...............................................................................................................33
4.3 Recommendations ......................................................................................................33
4.4 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................35
Books................................................................................................................................36
Journals ............................................................................................................................37

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ABSTRACT
A close analysis at the recent increase in terrorist activities, armed conflict, poaching and
human rights violations makes one realize that conventional arms are the common thread in all
these trends. The research paper explores the phenomenon of conventional armaments trade.
While being appreciative of the laws, policies, regulations and institutions that govern the
trade, the paper illuminates the grave ramifications that the international community has had
to bear due to the lack of transparency and unaccountability in the conventional arms trade.
The dissertation highlights the drawbacks and loopholes that exist in the regulatory and
institutional framework. It details the extent to which the identified gaps have been exploited
to the benefit of a few people while occasioning incredible suffering to scores of others. In
addition it also expresses the prospect offered by the Arms Trade Treaty, 2013.

vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research paper is a result of tremendous benevolence of many people, who cannot all be
named here. I would like to offer my heartfelt gratitude to all those who shared their time and
resources to make this paper a success.
I acknowledge my parents for their continued support all through the time of my writing.
I would also like to appreciate Ms. Rachel Eshiwani for her suggestions. In addition for all of
her time she spent reading and advising on the paper.
Finally Ms. Maureen Waititu, Khairan Noor and Christopher Rosana for their assistance in
reading through the research paper to correct and edit.

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LIST OFABBREVIATIONS
ATT Arms Trade Treaty
CASA Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
GPS Global Positioning System
ICRC International Committee for Red Cross
LRA Lord Resistance Army
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NRA National Rifle Association
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNLIREC Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNODA United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs
UNODA United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs
UNRCA United Nations Conventional Arms Register
UNRCPD United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia
and the pacific

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UNREC United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSC (P-5) Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WA The Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual Use Goods and Technologies
WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction
WW1 World War I
WW2 World War II

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LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS
The League of Nations Covenant
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
The Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods
and Technologies (WA)
The United Nations Conventional Arms Register (UNRCA)
The Paris Communiqué
The London Communiqué
Seminal Resolution 43/75 I
Arms Trade Treaty(ATT)

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CHAPTER 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The research is titled “Analysis of the drawbacks in the regulation of conventional
armament trade”. It examines the draw backs that are facing the international regime on the
regulation of conventional armament trade.
1.1BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Conventional arms are categorized to include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile
launchers and small arms and light weapons1
.The trade has been characterized by a lot of
irregularity– a trade typified by corruption, bribery and high levels of illegality2
.
The advent of firearms during the industrial revolution in the European continent transformed
weapons development in the world3
. Technological novelty in conception and actualization
through mass production of rifled artillery and machine guns among other weapons 4
presented
a severe conundrum in the regulation of the use of such innovation.
Although treaties such as the Geneva Convention 19495
afforded states an opportunity to
regulate the use of firearms without human rights violations, their use proved fatal to
international security, political stability and also economic prosperity in the world. The
realization of this devastating effect has prompted many debates6
in the international arena on
the possibility of having an international instrument that regulates the trade of arms in the
world.
The CCW which entered into force in December 1983 was aimed at prohibiting superfluous
injury and unnecessary suffering to humanity. The protocols annexed therein attempted to
create a regulatory framework for conventional arms usage. The presence of this convention
1
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted in 2013
2
Transparency International (UK), ‘Preventing corruption in the official arms trade’,30 April
2006,update note 3
3
Luttwak, E,N (2008) Arms Control Redmond: Microsoft Corporation
4
Luttwak (n 3 above)1
5
Luttwak (n 3 above) 1
6
www.un.org Negotiations on ATT

2
has not yielded much in terms of regulation of the trade and transfer of arms through diversion
and brokering7
.
1.2.1The United Nations Register for Conventional Arms (UNRCA)
Since its inception in 1991, UNRCA has registered 170 state’s reports8
. This registry became
operational in March of 19939
.The figure of state reports denotes the deficiency in the level of
transparency in the global arms trade. The opaque disposition of the trade characterized with
secrets, has been a major contributor to the wanting levels of insecurity in the international
arena and consequently the high levels of poverty and human rights violations.
1.2.2 The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
Despite UNODA’s advice for states to exercise a transparent and predictable manner of arms
dealing, states have succeeded in concealing the arms deals they engage.10
In respect to export,
import, stock- pile, transshipment, brokering and diversion of arms consignments states are
encouraged to show transparency so as secure world peace, reduce human suffering and attain
economic prosperity, a call they have greatly disregarded.11
1.2.3The United Nations Regional Centers
The presence of the UN regional centers for peace and disarmament has not deterred the
reckless transfers of arms and in disastrous scenarios of diversion of arms consignments that
potent danger to national, regional and also international security12
. The regional institutions
include United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America
and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa (UNREC) and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia
and the pacific (UNRCPD).13
7
www.oxfam.org Oxfam 2007 “ Africa’s missing billions: international arms flows and cost of armed
conflict”
8
United Nations register of conventional arms database; (the expert panel appointed by the secretary
general recommended that a registry is established to publicize arms transfers.
9
P.Lewis ‘U.N passes voluntary register to curb arms sales’ New York Times Dec. 10, 1991 at A11
10
United Nations Office of Disarmament affairs (UNDOA) Paper No. 16: Assessing the United Nations
11
UNDOA(n 10 above)4
12
UNDOA(N 10 above)4
13
UNDOA(N 10 above)4

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1.2.4The Prospect
The acceptance and compliance with the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted
by UNGA in April 2013 in New York is the feasible means of attaining a transparent,
regulated and legal arms trade. The provisions of the treaty enhance transparency and
accountability in the trade. However it is faced with many challenges as discussed in chapter
three.
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The trade in conventional armaments has had grave ramifications since the inception of
weaponry. The poor regulation and lack of political will have substantiated the fact that an
operational apparatus at the international arena is not only the viable option but also the long
overdue effective measure.
The international community is confronted with severe inefficiency and inability to halt the
process of excessive and destabilizing accumulation of weaponry. This is further aggravated
by the fact that traditionally trade in arms has a foundation in armed conflict. Consequently
the arms dealers have ease in peddling propaganda just to initiate or escalate war, thus creating
necessity and dependency on their products.
Secondly, states have failed in the creation of transparency and accountability in the transfer
of conventional armaments. The opacity has precipitated a serious concern as to the accurate
position as to the production and stock piling of conventional arms. Manufacturing states are
able to go on a supply spree at the whims of the officials just as long as the recipient has hard
cash or something of equal importance like precious stone as evidenced by the situation in
Sierra Leone.
The imperviousness has also thwarted efforts to prevent rebels, gangs, terrorists, warlords and
insurgencies from accessing military equipment which they use in their illicit activities.
Corollary the efforts to maintain international peace and security have been frustrated since
the aggressors are far too equipped and have continued access to sophisticated weaponry to
keep them afloat as the international community plays catch up to the destructive nature of
their activities.

4
Thirdly, players in the industry have adopted the so called Nixon Doctrine. This is the use of
arms as a foreign policy tool. This doctrine became a grounded tool of international diplomacy
when Nixon, the then president of the United States of America, pledged to send arms as a
substitute of troops as a way to exert influence in developing states. Exporting states have
mastered the art of using large consignments of arms so as to gain diplomatic prowess over
other states. Super power rivalry has also found its way into the arms trade as exporting states
compete for a market for their merchandise.
The thriving shadow economy has further complicated the attempts to clean up a dirty trade
characterized by bribery and corruption. Activities in the black and grey markets have had far
reaching implications on the transparency in the trade. The black market blooms through
completely illegal activities. On the other hand the grey market is the conduit between the
legal and illegal transactions.
Due to the nature of the trade in conventional armament, and all the above mentioned
drawbacks, there has been great difficulty in maintaining international peace and security as
set out in the UN Charter14
. Economic stagnation for states has also been a consequence of the
poorly regulated trade as states make high investments in military equipment than socio-
economic affairs and also political instability impedes economic growth.
1.4 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is conventional armament trade?
2. Which is the regulatory framework for conventional armament trade?
3. What is the institutional framework the regulation the trade in conventional arms?
4. What are the consequences of the lack of transparency in conventional armament
trade?
5. What are the feasible policies that can be adopted efficiently regulate the trade?
14
United Nations Charter, 1945

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1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1) To explain what conventional armaments trade is.
2) To document the regulatory framework for conventional armament trade.
3) To analyze the institutional framework in the regulation of conventional armaments
trade.
4) To accentuate consequences of the lack of transparency in conventional armament
trade.
5) To enumerate the feasible policies that can be adopted to effectively regulate the trade.
1.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
War profiteering
Guaranteed market
1.7 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW
The following were the materials reviewed by the researcher;
Rachel, S & Suzette, G (2009) The International Arms Trade. Cambridge: Polity press
The book captures the historical perspective of the arms trade and discusses the high price the
world has had to pay due to the opaque disposition of the trade. Further it shows how the illicit
arms trade has managed to thrive despite the presence of laws that prohibit the activities of the
illegal market. The book also makes feasible recommendations for the players to adopt so as
to clean the trade.
CIVIL WARS, POLITICAL
INSTABILITY, INSECURITY,
ECONOMIC STAGNATION,
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
POACHING
THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
BELLIGERENTS, DRUG
DEALERS, REBELS,
MERCENARIES, TERRORISTS,
WARLORDS, POACHERS
OPEQUE AND
UNACCOUNTABLE ARMS
DEALERSHIP

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Feinstein, A (2011) The Shadow World: Inside The Global Arms Trade
The author has an inquisitorial perspective as he questions the existence of the trade and its
benefits. Further he shows the diabolical nature of the trade and how it is propagated by
unscrupulous individuals whose quest is profit at whatever cost. The book also discusses how
dealers engage in acts of war profiteering so as to keep their trade afloat and how their
governments honor them as heroes despite their contribution to human suffering.
Schroeder, M, Rachel S &Smith D (2007) The Small Arms Trade: A beginners Guide.
One World
The text provides guidance into what the trade is about and all the folds that the trade covers.
It explores the area of small and light arms and denotes how their trade has created an enigma
in solving issues of insecurity, political instability and terrorism.
Farah, D & Braun S (2007) Merchant of Death: money, guns, planes, and the man who
makes war possible. Hoboken: Wiley.
This piece of work shows the fundamental role that arms play in war. It denotes just how
much the availability of conventional weaponry provides sufficient motivation for man to
wage war against fellow man.
Gilby, N (2009) No- nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade.
The work provides course for the investigation of the entire phenomenon of the arms trade and
the ramifications that have stemmed from poor regulation of the trade.
Greene, O & Marsh, N (2011) Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and
the threat of armed violence. New York: Routledge
The authors of this book have highlighted and discussed how grave the consequences of an
opaque and an unaccountable military industry have shaken the political stability, security and
governance. They show just how loud the reverberations of the acts of negligence,
recklessness and corruption have torn the international community.

7
Garcia, D (2006) Small Arms and security: New emerging and international norms. New
York: Routledge
The author accentuates the contribution of small arms to insecurity and the legal norms and
principles that surrounds it. She makes a convincing case that the proliferation of arms
obfuscates the attempts to cooperative security and sustainable development.
Lumpe, L. (2000) Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms. Oslo: Zed
This book discusses in depth the meaning, methods and impact of the black market traffic in
guns and posits policy measures that states should adopt to effectively diminish the trade.
Rourke, J. T (1993) International politics on the world stage. Guilford: Dushkin
Publishing Group Inc.
Rourke discusses how the 1990s saw a precipitous decline in sales of arms in the international
plane. He outlines, in great detail, the motivating factors that states have in engaging in arms
transactions and expounds on the quagmire of attaining a regulated arms trade.
Anderson, G.D (1992) ‘The International Arms Trade: Regulating Conventional Arms
transfers in the Aftermath of the Gulf war 4. International Law Review 749
The writer articulates the process leading to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and how the
UNSC (P-5) participated in arming Iraq. Further he discusses the issue of the severity of
conflicts propagated by conventional arms. He makes a claim that the severity and the extent
of wars would be minimal if states were not so armed.
Catrina, C.C ‘International Arms Transfers: Supplier Policies and Recipient
Dependence’ (1990) 13 Disarmament 113
The author epitomizes the antic used by exporter to keep the supply chain open and how the
importers have become dependent on the suppliers and the risks this phenomena poses to
stability.

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1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The paper was based on qualitative research. Creswell (1998) characterizes qualitative
research as a probe procedure of understanding founded on distinct methodological traditions
of inquiry that explore a social problem. Qualitative research methods foster a holistic profile
of the phenomenon being researched.
The use of qualitative research methodology over quantitative offers several advantages.
These include flexibility, exploration of the phenomenon rather than confirmation of a
hypothesis, it offers textual data rather than numerical data and describes variations rather than
just quantify them. In addition it incorporates the context and perspective as part of the
research.
The mode of data collection for the project is through scrutinizing secondary sources of data-
reading already published works to establish the historical, current status in conventional arms
trade and lay a foundation for accurate predictability of the trade through inferences.
Data provided in international, regional and even national databases regarding the importation,
exportation, stock-piling, brokering, diversions was alluded to. The major databases that were
referred to were SIPRI year books, the UNRCA, the Database established by the United
Nations regional centers among other relatively smaller databases such as the congressional
research service on conventional weapons systems.
1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Despite the importance of this study there are various limitations to the study.
The first limitation was financial constraints. The research would have been more detailed if
the researcher had opportunity to travel and make observations in diverse places in the planet.
However the inadequacy of funds restricted the research activities that the researcher had
opportunity to go engage in.
Secondly the dearth of accurate data for military expenditures of states was also a limitation.
The fact that most states make classified their military expenses and engagements provided a
challenge in the accuracy of the data the researcher was able to get.

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1.11SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The successful completion of this research will enable me to attain the prerequisite
requirement to graduate with an LLB degree at Kenyatta University, School of Law.
Secondly the research adds into the body of knowledge that exists on issues of conventional
armament post the adoption of the ATT in 2013.
In addition the paper outlines and brings to the knowledge of the public the previously
classified armed transactions.
The study also denotes the importance of transparency and accountability of manufacturers to
the international community as part of their corporate responsibility.
The paper may influence the policy and institutional policies of the United Nations Office of
Disarmament affairs.

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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The chapter underscores sentiments of authors who have written on the conventional arms
trade. It is partitioned into four segments:
The initial segment describes the phenomenon of the conventional armaments trade. The
second part addresses the laws that the international community has developed in the attempt
to regulate the trade. The third part investigates the operational apparatus that provides
oversight at the international front. Finally the effects of lack of transparency in the trade are
discussed.
2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE
Conventional armaments refers battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers and
small arms and light weapons15
.
The activities of conventional arms trade comprise export, import, transit, transshipment and
brokering16
of conventional weapons. Conventional arms trade forms part of the world’s
business and it is known as the arms industry. Rachel and Suzette explain that arms are valid
tools of governments in the endeavour to ensure security17
and they are produced by defense
contractors.
2.1.1 The Legality of Transfers of Conventional Armaments
Rachel and Suzette explain that activities of the trade transcend the legal market arms trade to
black market arms trade and the grey market arms trade18
. According to them the legal market
entails trade engagements that are conducted for legitimate military needs of states and are
within the provisions of the law.
15
ATT (n 1 above)
16
ATT(n 1 above) Para 4
17
S Rachel & G Suzette, The International Arms Trade 1st
ed(2009)
18
S Rachel & G Suzette(n 17 above)

11
The 2001 Small Arms Survey defines the Black market transactions as those that clearly flaunt
national and/or international laws without official government consent and control19
.The grey
market has partially legal and illegal transactions. It is an amalgam of legal and illegal
activities as Rachel and Suzette expound20
.
2.1.2 The Motivating Factors for Arms Transfers
In their book, International Arms Trade, Rachel and Suzette elucidate an array of the factors
influencing the trade including economic considerations, the Nixon Doctrine and Security
Council embargoes on arms transfers.21
Rourke advances the opinion that the 1990’s saw a steep decline in the sale of arms at the
international arena. According to him, the 1980’s was the period characterized by the highest
rates of arms transfers with 77.5% of the imports valued at $490.1 Billion being received by
third world countries. The need for states to front conventional arms to other states according
to Rourke is motivated by the urge to arm allies during peace time, wanting to support
combatants a state favours over opponents, necessity to gain diplomatic influence over
recipient through establishing dependency and for economic gain.
2.1.2.1Nixon Doctrine
The Nixon Doctrine also called the Guam Doctrine. Rachel and Suzette espouse that it is the
use of conventional arms transfers as a tool of diplomacy and as a means to set a foundation
for foreign policy.22
They expound that it crystallized after Nixon; the then president of USA
stated that he was going to send arms instead of military assistance to the American allies.
2.1.2.2 Complexities in the Motivating factors for Arms Transfers
Anderson remarks that the new political dispensation and political alignments are influenced
by an assortment of factors23
.Therefore he asserts that identifying the motivation is complex.
The same sentiments are articulated by Feinstein, as he confirms that transfers are almost
always shrouded in secrecy due to the considerations expected in return of arms transfers. 24
19
Small Arms Survey, 2001:Profiling the problem Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 p. 167
20
21
22
23
DG Anderson ‘ The International Arms Trade: regulating conventional arms transfers in the
Aftermath of the Gulf War’ (1992)7 International Law Review 750
24
A Feinstein, The Shadow World : Inside the Global Arms Trade (2011) Oxford

12
2.1.3 Stock Pile Mismanagement
Stock pile refers to a quantity of ammunitions and weapons accumulated for probable future
use. The mismanagement of stock pile is the incompetent, negligent management of a
government stock pile by officials, as a result undermining the physical security that ought to
be afforded to the stock pile.
Oxfam reports that nearly one million of the seven to eight million firearms manufactured
annually vanish or are stolen.25
This is facilitated by corrupt government officials, who collude
to steal, misappropriate and transfer arms from government stockpiles to the highest bidder.
According to Oxfam these fire arms are engaged in activities that critically injure the
economic, political and social life of the international community. For instance armed conflict
minimizes an African country’s economy by 15%.26
Lumpe avers that military stockpiles are also often disposed off after acquisition of new
consignments and the disposal thereof may be legal or furtive27
a contributing factor to stock
pile maladministration.
2.1.4 The Problem of Brokering in the Conventional Arms Trade
As stated by Gilby, arms brokers are business persons with a background in the disciplined
forces, usually with networks in the arms supply chain.28
He further asserts that the
proprietors that engage in brokering of arms are unscrupulous individuals.29
They manipulate
the gaps in the regulatory frameworks to effect their arms transactions. In addition they have
expertise in tracing relatively low- cost arms to propagate their activities. Brain and Johan
explain that their reliance in the use of underhand tactics such as bribery and use of phony
documents typifies their activities as organized crime.30
25
Oxfam 2007 “ Africa’s missing billions: international arms flows and cost of armed conflict”
26
Oxfam (n 25 above) 3
27
Lumpe, L. (2000) Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms. Oslo: Zed P. 3
28
Gilby, N (2009) No- nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade.
29
Gilby(n 28 above)
30
Brian W & Johan P The Arms Fixers- Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents.

13
The activities of brokers cause complexity in the regulation of arms trade. They successfully
arm ferocious armed conflicts and oppressive governments and belligerents. Thus fuelling and
severing the conflicts to grand levels. Gilby states that the perpetrators of the Rwanda
genocide and Sierra Leone civil war were armed by brokers.31
Farah and Braun claim the individuals engaging in illegal transactions of arms are well
connected with powerful political outfits headed by presidents, princes and even military
generals.32
For instance Viktor Bout, a Russian with shrewd connections in the Soviet Military
Intelligence and endowed with linguistic skills had managed to arm the most hazardous
conflicts with the aid of his domination on air transport and protection of leaders.33
His planes
were the supply vessels for arms used by the Taliban in Afghanistan and also the al Qaeda
Terrorist Group.34
2.2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS
TRADE
The contemporary arms trade trailed the expansion of capitalism as exposed by Rachel and
Suzette.35
The beginning of the industrial revolution and the technological novelty it offered,
further complicated the conventional armaments availed to the market.36
Rachel and Suzette bring out the development of arms trade and advance that the regulatory
frame work, Pre WWI was exemplified by a Laissez –faire strategy but the policies changed
after the realization of the effects of the war. The attempts to regulate the trade have stalled
over the years due to the disagreements in the international arena especially the cold war, as
written by Rourke.37
31
Gilby, N (n 28 above)
32
Farah, D & Braun S (2007) Merchant of Death: money, guns, planes, and the man who makes war possible.
Hoboken: Wiley.
33
Farah, D &Braun S( n 32 above)
34
35
36
Rachel, S & Suzette, G(n 17 above)
37
Rourke, J. T (1993) International politics on the world stage. Guilford: Dushkin Publishing Group Inc.

14
However the destruction after WW2 and subsequent wars such as the Gulf War necessitated
the drafting of international as well as regional instruments to avert unprecedented scale of
destructions from reoccurring, as Anderson explains.
2.2.1 The League of Nations Covenant
The Covenant is the international treaty that established the League of Nations. It entered into
force in January 192038
. Its preamble denotes it was aimed at promoting co-operation and to
achieve international peace and security.
Article 23(d) of the Covenant provided that the League would be assigned the general
supervision of the armaments trade.
Article 8(5) of the Covenant showed that the state parties were in agreement that the
manufacturing, by private enterprises of conventional arms was susceptible to grave objection.
The council therein established, was mandated to advice on how diabolical effects attendant
upon such manufacture can be averted, with consideration of genuine needs of the state parties
which were unable to manufacture the arms for their safety.
2.2.2 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects (CCW)
Rachel and Suzette articulate that the CCW was adopted to reduce the suffering of military
men and also non combatants owing to certain inhumane weapons. The initial convention with
three annexed protocols was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in December 1983.39
The
three protocols are Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, Protocol II on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices and Protocol III on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.40
An extra protocol was added under the provisions of article 8 paragraph 3(b) of the
convention.41
This was protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons adopted in October 1995.
Protocol V prohibits the use of Explosive Remnants of war and it was adopted in 2003 and
38
Northedge, F.S (1986). The League of Nations: Its life and Times, 1920- 1946. New York: Holmes &
Meier.
39
Rachel, S & Suzette, G(n 17 above)141
40
41

15
entered into force in November 2006.42
The protocol obliges state parties to document and
present data on the use and desertion of explosive regulations.43
Rachel and Suzette point out that the execution of the provisions of the CCW has been faced
with hurdles.44
SIPRI provides data showing that there are states that develop and use the
prohibited weapons in blatant violation of the convention. Matters of agreement as to the
standard of adherence have also stalled as Rachel and Suzette note.
2.2.3 Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Conventional Arms
Transfers
According to a UN Study, the dire need of a binding international instrument that is stringent
in regulating arms transfers informed the UNSC involvement in the campaign for the control
of the arms trade.45
However the bipolar tension still offered a strong impediment to the
possibility of a regulatory treaty as Rourke explained. The only available avenue to avert
pending disasters due unregulated conventional arms trade was the use of UNGA and UNSC
resolutions despite their non-binding status.
2.2.3.1 Seminal Resolution 43/75 I
Anderson narrates that in 1980; during the third special session of the UNGA states including
USSR and USA expressed concern on the need to regulate the conventional armament trade46
.
Consequently, in December 1988, the UNGA adopted seminal resolution 43/ 75 I47
. The
resolution recognized that arms transfer posed a risk to international peace and security and
posed a threat to attainment of UN’s objectives.
2.2.4.2 The Paris Communiqué
Further Anderson explains that the realization of the devastating effects of unaccountability in
weapons trade became clear during the Gulf War. The weapons used by Sadaam Hussein in
waging the Gulf war were provided by UNSC (P-5) as Smolowe discusses.48
They convened
to find a solution to the menace that had resulted from imprudent arms exports. They passed
42
43
44
45
United Nations Transfer study: Meeting of the five on arms Transfers and Non- proliferation 3 July
1991(referred to as the Paris Communiqué.
46
Anderson (n 23 above) 772
47
G.A Res. 75 I, 43 U.N GAOR supp. (No. 49) at 81, U.N Doc A/43/49 (1989)
48
J Smolowe “Who armed Baghdad? (1991) at 34

16
the Paris communiqué. It expressed the belief of the UNSC (P-5) that indiscriminate arms and
technology transfers create instability.
2.2.3.2The London Communiqué
In the meeting in October 1991 the UNSC (P-5) made a resolution49
. The London
communiqué set out considerations for the exporters to take before making arms transfers.
These conditions included considerations as to;
1. The effect of the transfer in terms of aiding the recipient’s legitimate self- defense
needs.
2. The transfer’s appropriateness in response to security needs of the recipient.
3. The transfer’s aid to the mutual security needs of the recipient’s region.
Further the communiqué prohibited any transfer which might aggravate conflict, introduce
destabilizing military technology to the region, and violate embargoes or regional restraint.
Transfers of arms that would be used for activities other than defense needs or undermine the
recipients economy was prohibited by the resolution. The rules however, served a loose non
binding regulatory force.
2.2.4 The United Nations Conventional Arms Register (UNRCA)
The register was adopted through a UNGA resolution in a vote of 150-0 in 199150
and
became operational in January, 1992.
Rachel & Suzette aver that the register was aimed at the creation a transparent conventional
armaments trade. Through the information states document in the register, it is possible to
trace excessive and destabilizing accumulation conventional armaments.
In addition, the register was intended to boost confidence building and general cooperative
security. The adoption of the register of conventional arms was an endeavor for cooperative
49
United Nations Transfer study: Meeting of the five on arms Transfers and Non- proliferation 3 July
1991(referred to as the London Communiqué.
50
P Lewis ‘ U.N passes voluntary register to curb arms sales, New York Times Dec. 10, 1991 at A 11

17
security as part of global governance in the New World Order as stated by Laurence and his co
authors.51
They explain the cardinal aspirations of the register as the monitoring of buildups of excessive
and destabilizing accumulations, assurance provision, and amelioration of tensions,
maintenance of international stability and restraint on military production capacities52
. The
register obliged states to share data on transfers, stockpiles and procurement through national
production53
. The register further required the states to provide information that contextualized
the data54
.
2.2.4.1 Excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms
The register provided the criterion for establishing when the arms build ups had attained the
“excessive and destabilizing accumulation” measure. In excess of the modalities proposed
being controversial, the process of developing a universal and non discriminatory mechanism
did not bear a consensus.55
In supplement the register also created a forum for consultation between states on the data
availed. Paragraph 17 of the resolution called upon states to work together at all levels with
the intent to enhance and coordinate international efforts aimed at increased openness and
transparency. The process of data submission by states is reported to be fairly successful as
Laurence and co authors denote.56
2.2.5 The Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual
Use Goods and Technologies (WA)
The WA is a multilateral conventional arms export regulation regime57
. It has 41 participating
states since its establishment in 1996.58
The agreement gives primacy to transparency in national export control systems and attempts
to control brokering as expounded by Rachel and Suzette. It has a secretariat for administering
51
EJ Laurence, W Hendrik & W Herbert ‘ Managing the Global problems created by the conventional
arms trade: An assessment of the United Nations Register of conventional arms’ (2005) Global
Governance 225-246
52
Laurence, Hendrik& Herbert (n 51 above) 230
53
UN General Assembly (n 47 above ) par. 5
54
UN General Assembly UN (n 47 above ) par.2
55
56
57
Guidelines & procedures, including the initial elements The Wassenaar agreement
58
Guidelines and procedures (n 57 above)

18
its execution based in Vienna.59
It creates a forum for the exchange of information for
deliveries of conventional exports made60
creating an ambiance where the detection of
excessive and destabilizing accumulations.
The major flaw of the agreement is that it is not a treaty and thus is not binding as shown by
the Guidelines and principles.61
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS TRADE
The institutions charged with the responsibility of overseeing the transfers in conventional
arms are established by the laws above discussed. However, the absence of robust
conventional arms regime is a global disaster considering that since 1945 all wars and
conflicts have been fought with conventional weaponry causing over 20 million deaths as
documented by SIPRI.62
There are international, regions and municipal institutions that are mandated to deal with the
control of the trade in conventional weapons and disarmament 63
of already proliferated arms.
This paper addresses the UN agencies on armament issues. These bodies include UNODA and
its subsidiaries.
2.3.1 The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
The UNODA was formerly established the office of disarmament affairs in 1982 and it was re-
established in January 1998 by UNGA resolution 52/12.64
Its creation was consistent with the
Secretary - General’s report to the UNGA (A/51/950).65
It is a department of the UN
secretariat.66
59
60
61
62
SIPRI Year Book Supra Note at 221
63
www.un.org UNC/2013/4 Inf. 1
64
http://www.un.org/disarmament (accessed 31/01/2014)
65
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ (accessed 31/01/2014)
66
http://www.un.org/disarmament/(accessed 31/01/2014)

19
Article 26 of the UN Charter acknowledges the effects of diversion to the UN objectives,
therefore mandates the UNSC to formulate a system for armaments regulation. States submit
report to foster assurance and preventive measures.67
2.3.1.1 The mandate of UNODA
UNIDIR explains that UNODA is mandated to engage in activities of both control of arms and
disarmament.68
Arms control strives to limit weapons through agreed ways in terms quantity,
range, and lethality, transparency while disarmament aims at physical elimination of agreed
types of weapons or mutual commitments not to produce them.69
The conventional armament
branch, New York has the mandate of ensuring non proliferation of conventional weapons70
.
The office attains its goals through monitoring trends, identification of issues and challenges
and the implications there of. It also makes recommendations on issues of disarmament to the
UNGA.71
The branch on conventional arms is also charged with overseeing the functions of
the agency of Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA).72
2.3.2 Regional Disarmament Centers
These are subsidiaries of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.73
The regional
bodies include the regional centers to be highlighted are UNLIREC, UNREC and UNRCPD.
The centers’ activities extend to the region and sub region they serve.74
Their functions are
generally overseen by the regional disarmament branch in New York, which in turn cross-
fertilizes disarmament schemes in the regions.
2.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN CONVENTIONAL
ARMS TRADE
The opacity in the trade has resulted to multifarious effects. The effects are intricately
intertwined such that they cannot be perceived in isolation as they spill over. This paper
tackles the following upshots of indiscriminate transfers of conventional arms:
67
www.un.org UNC/2013/4 Inf. 1
68
UNIDIR ‘Coming to terms with security’ UNDIR/2001/16 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2001)
69
UNDIR(n 68 above)
70
71
72
73
74

20
2.4.1 Augmentation of armed conflict and political instability
ICRC classifies armed conflict as international or non- international.75
The former is conflict
between differing states while the later is between a government force and nongovernmental
forces or between such groups only.76
Armed conflict brews political instability.
As Rachel & Suzette assert, that it is debatable that conventional arms do not directly cause
armed conflict. However, it is certain that their availability engenders an incentive for war.
The number of non state conflicts alone was estimated at 35 in 2008.77
From 2004 to 2009
about 55,000 people are estimated to have died annually as a direct outcome of armed
conflict.78
Gilby, Anderson and Feinstein concur that wars have greatly undermined international peace
and security and are injurious to the principles and objectives of the United Nations.79
Feinstein affirms the end of the bipolar in international politics resulted to a new surge of
wars, with minimal interstate wars and an escalation of intrastate wars.80
Historically trade in arms has been driven by conflicts.81
The ease in accessing conventional
arms weakens the already tenuous nations and undermines the very security it purports to
protect as Lumpe explains.
The 1921 report by the temporary mixed commission,82
disclosed that the trade in
conventional was marred by activities that directly or indirectly perpetuated war. These
include arms manufacturing firms fomenting war to make profit, governments receiving
bribes for irregular arms transfers, dissemination of false military reports with the intent of
stimulating arms spending, manipulation the press by arms dealers so as to create nonexistent
illusions and formation of international arms rings to cause tension between states.
75
ICRC opinion paper march 2008
76
ICRC opinion paper(n 75 above)
77
Global Burden of Violence: Lethal Encounters. Geneva Declaration on armed Violence and
development, Vol. 2, Cambridge University press, 2011.
78
Global Burden of Violence(n 77 above)
79
United Nations Charter art. 1 par. 1
80
A Feinstein( n 24 above)
81
A Feinstein( n 24 above)

21
Feinstein articulates that for the trade to create profit, devious individuals in the trade engage
in activities to create the demand of the weapons high. War profiteering, was one of the means
used by Zaharoff Basil, a reputable arms dealer who stated that “I made wars so that I could
sell arms to both sides.”83
The author further explains thatWW1 and WWII ran their course taking the lives of millions
of people and occasioning inconceivable destruction but to Zaharoff it brought him honors and
accumulated wealth.84
It is the inadequacy of operational apparatus that allows people like
Zaharoff to create war economies that profit a few and bring horrific suffering to people. Later
wars too conformed to the same pattern such as the Gulf war.
Farah and Braun state that the creation and sustenance web of supply of illegal arms became
known in intelligence circles as the Shadow infrastructure. The synergetic network of
weapons dealers and recipients escalated armed conflicts.85
The international arms bazaar, increases- to a great extent the frequency, severity and duration
of wars both civil and trans-border wars. Klare advises that without an eager willingness by
many countries to sell weapons to combatants, the Iraq- Iran war would almost certainly
shorter and less severe.86
2.4.2 Economic stagnation and inhibition to development
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are centered on the economic abilities of states
to provide for their citizens. In contrast to building economies arms inhibit their growth as
Rachel and Suzette aver.
Control Arms Campaign report in 2005 states that a civil war in a low income country can cost
the international economy an estimated $ 50 billion annually.87
Conventional arms are used to
engage in activities such as crime which claim the lives persons in the productive age. UN
83
Feinstein (n 24 above)
84
Feinstein(n 24 above)
85
86
Klare,MT ‘Fueling the fire: How We Armed the Middle East’(1991)19 Bull of Atomic scientist 23
87
Control Arms Campaign, ‘ Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Next step for the UN programme of
Action’(June 2005), p.3 at www.controlarms.org/en/documents%20and%20files/reports/english-
reports/towards-an-arms-trade-treaty-next-steps-for-the-un (accessed 6 December 2013)

22
reveals that in Brazil gun violence is the number one cause of death of young men aged fifteen
to twenty four88
this negatively affects the production chain as the labour force is diminished.
Rachel and Suzette state that economic activities are halted or decelerated by armed activities
and human insecurity all associated with conventional arms. Enterprises remain closed due to
the fears of personnel being harmed. Further the above activities demoralize potential
investors, an opinion promoted by Rachel & Suzette.
Extravagant military expenditure undertaken by states owing to propaganda by arms dealers
inhibits investment in socio-economic spheres as Lumpe explains. SIPRI reveals that military
spending worldwide is estimated to be $1.74 trillion.89
For instance the realization of MDGs has been undermined by the diversion of public funds to
military expenditure, monitoring ceasefire, disarming, demobilization reintegration of former
combatants (DDR) reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure after armed conflict as
most authors expound. Twenty three African states are estimated to have lost $ 284 billion as a
consequence of armed conflict propagated by conventional arms as documented by
ECOWAS.90
2.4.3 Violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Humanitarian law seeks to protect civilians and injured combatants in times of war while
human rights law is a protection regime for human beings at all times. Rachel and Suzette
reveal that conventional arms have become endowments which human rights abusers use
against their victims. The availability of conventional arms to facilitate war avails an avenue
to flaunt the human rights laws with impunity occasioning untold suffering to the victims.
Further the co-authors explain that an environment of armed conflicts regenerates into an
opportunity for large scale human rights atrocities. Judicial executions, human trafficking,
torture, sexual and gender based violence and forced evictions are fuelled by the availability of
conventional arms to unlawful groups such as rebels, belligerents, quislings and organized
crime perpetrators as Rachel and Suzette expound.
88
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Brazil 2006-2009, Strategic Programme
Framework’(Vienna, August 2006)p.4 at www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/final2.pdf (accessed 6 December
2013)
89
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
90
http:// news.ecowas.int/presseshow,php?nb=110&lang=en&annee=2012 (accessed 6 December
2013)

23
Rachel and Suzette explain that weapons such as man- portable & vehicle mounted grenades,
Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs) and missiles have an undiscerning effect to
civilian areas. The authors cite that it is estimated that in Yemen, 71% of child conflict
casualties in 2009 were reportedly a direct result of shelling civilian areas by all the parties to
the conflict.91
In aggravation of an already dire situation the armed human rights abusers cause obstruction
of humanitarian action as Rachel and Suzette explain.92
The participants in the obstruction
process kill personnel and destroy property. It is reported that between 2000 and 2010 780
humanitarian workers were killed while 689 sustained injuries.93
2.4.4 Facilitation of terrorism and piracy undertakings
Black’s Law dictionary defines terrorism as the use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause
panic, especially as a means of affecting political conduct. Piracy on the other hand is robbery,
kidnapping or other criminal violence committed in the sea.94
Rachel and her co author narrate the failed attempt by Al-Qaida linked terrorists to shoot down
an Israeli 757 jet as it took off in Mombasa, Kenya with two SA-7 Grail shoulder missiles95
as
an exhibition of the extent to which terrorists are strongly armed. The opacity in the trade of
conventional weaponry has afforded terrorists with an avenue to heavily arm themselves for
the perpetuation of their diabolical acts.
A study by National Consortium on terrorism shows that through attacks carried out by the
usage of conventional arms the Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant organization has carried out 550
terrorist’s attacks, killing 1,600 and occasioning grievous injuries to 2,100, with the number
increasing rapidly.96
The common tactics used by the group include bombings and armed
assaults which comprise 72.6 % of their attacks.97
There is also great intensification of the
severity and the frequency of the attacks. The inability to trace back the supply chain of the
arms deepens the quandary of how to ensure human security and also maintain national
security.
91
Devastating Impact: Explosive Weapons and Children. Save the children(2011) p.5
92
UNODA (2013) The Impact of poorly regulated arms transfers on the work of the United Nations.
New York
93
http://www:unhrc.org/4/3e50d96.html
94
Black’s Law dictionary 9
th
ed.
95
96
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, background report
97
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (n 96 above) 1

24
2.4.5 Invigoration of organized crime and human insecurity
Black’s Law dictionary defines organized crime as wide spread criminal activity that are
coordinated and controlled through a central syndicate. Human security concept developed
with the realization that securing national borders does not necessarily ensure safety of the
nationals of a state.98
Rachel & Suzette expound the debate as to whether the provision of national security
guarantees human security takes center stage in the attempt to regulate the trade in
conventional arms. While national security concentrates on securing a state against external
threats human security focuses on protection of the individuals within the borders of the
state.99
While states invest in armaments to secure their borders the issue of protection of
citizens from common crime and organized crime in the country is undermined. The insecurity
is heightened by the simplicity of civilians and gangs accessing conventional weapons.
As Oxfam illuminates a significant number of the arms manufactured annually are
stolen.100
These fire arms are engaged in activities that critically injure the economic, political
and social life of the international community. The acts negatively affect the economies of the
affected states.101
Through brokering and diversion of arms to the grey and black arms markets
criminal activities keep flourishing while human security debilitated.
2.5 CONCLUSION
It is apparent that mechanisms in place for the regulation of conventional armament are
insufficient. They permit sabotage of the attempts of the international community to conform
to the principles and objectives of the UN and facilitate inconceivable human suffering. The
regulatory framework has however received a boost with the adoption of the Arms Trade
Treaty, 2013. The treaty creates an effective legal framework as well as an operational
apparatus to oversee its successful implementation. The scope of alteration proposed by the
ATT will be discussed in the next chapter.
98
S Rachel & G Suzette(n 17 above)118
99
S Rachel & G Suzette(n 17 above)118
100
Oxfam (n 25 above )3
101
Oxfam (n 25 above) 3

25
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
3.0 Introduction
This chapter discusses the researcher’s perspective on the issues addressed the literature
review.
3.1 The Phenomenon of Conventional Arms Trade
The trade in conventional arms entails transfer of conventional categories of arms outlined in
the previous chapter. In light of the opinion held by Rachel and Suzette, that arms are valid
tools for governments the researcher finds that to be true to the extent that governments rely
on the arms to ensure national security.
Most authors advance the opinion that arms trade is typified by cash transactions and grants.
The researcher humbly suggests that some transactions are barter, with the recipients offering
minerals and animal parts as consideration. For instance in the DRC the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) use elephant tusks to procure weapons and ammunition.102
The researcher concurs with the classification of arms markets as outlined by Rachel and
Suzette. The formal market, the Black and Grey arms markets still exist with the later forming
a nexus between the legal and illegal transactions. The existence of this kind of situation has
aggravated the grave effects of the trade while convoluting the efforts to regulate the trade. As
Gilby reveals that brokers armed Sierra Leone and Rwanda, the researcher sees this as a
forecast for a trend of illegality that will perpetually occasion wars.
3.1.1Motivating factors for arms transfers
Although Rourke espouses that exporter states make transfers for foreign policy issues and
economic gains, the international political land scope has sufficiently metamorphosed thus
invoking other motives. The stimulating considerations for states are no longer an isolated
factor but an amalgam of issues that inform the arms transfers that states make. With the new
and perpetually shifting alliances in the international plane, there has been a great complexity
in identifying the genuine interests of states in terms of the defense transfers.
102
Confidential African Parks debriefing transcript from Congolese escapee, May 14, 2010; Uganda
People’s Defense Force, debriefing notes on information provided by rebel defector Michael Oryem (on
files with authors); Former LRA second lieutenant, interview with author, Gulu, Uganda, March 24,
2013. Two former LRA soldiers, interviewed by author Gulu, Uganda, May 7 2013.

26
In addition, since the 1990’s there has been an emergence of a new crop of economically
stable countries which has made the monitoring of the undertakings in the trade convoluted.
The traditionally leading defense contractors are faced with steep competition from the new
entries. This creates an environment of survival for the fittest and the companies are willing to
engage in any activities that keep their products in demand. To keep the supply chain open the
dealers engage in actions of war profiteering, spreading of military propaganda and even using
the press implements in their disposal to keep their products relevant, therefore limiting the
consideration of foreign policy, a doctrine that is propounded by most authors.
Many authors reviewed were of the opinion that the laws regulating the trade are frequently
flaunted and that there are many loopholes exploited. The researcher finds that the political
will to conform to the laws is frail especially for the exporter states. This is evidenced by most
of the defense contractors who have lost credibility before the public, being rewarded and
protected by leaders in their respective countries and across the globe. Their untouchable
status coupled with states’ lack of political will to cleanse the trade of such characters makes
the attempt to regulate the trade feeble.
3.2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE
Anderson, Rachel and Suzette have discussed the laws that exist to regulate the trade. The
CCW, WA, UN register and the resolutions have been described as attempts that have not
yielded the anticipated results a position held by the researcher. The authors also discussed the
importance of an ATT and even recommended for its adoption despite all the impediments
they identified.
Although the treaty has not yet entered into force, the researcher humbly suggests that it
affords a great opportunity to the international community to mitigate the effects that the trade
has had to the world and has stringent laws than those which were existent. Its distinctive
provisions are hereunder discussed.
3.2.1The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
UNGA voted to adopt the ATT, international instrument seeking create regulations for the
trade in conventional weaponry.103
The agreement signature acceptance was opened in June
2013 and it had attracted the signatures of 75 countries within the initial month of opening.104
103
UNC/2013/4 Inf.1 Implications of and action on the recently adopted Arms Trade Treaty
104
UNC/2013/4 Inf. 1 (n 2 above) 1

27
The ATT affords an excellent opportunity for the international community to foster peace and
international security, prevent human rights violations and inhibit the access of arms to
belligerents, terrorist and warlords, pirates, poachers.
The treaty covers a large array of activities in the international plane. The preamble
paragraphs of the treaty articulate the recognition of the dangers that weapons have posed to
the human family and the aspirations to end the suffering and the commitment to ensure
sustainable peace and international security.
The ATT principles recognize the difficulty occasioned by the diversion of arms within states
therefore compelling states to create and maintain national control systems. In light of this the
treaty takes into consideration the justifiable interests of states for conventional arms
acquisitions and the right to self defense. This offers a solution to the quandary of the delicate
balance of the states’ rights to acquire arms and the prevention of accumulation excessive and
destabilizing arms stockpiles; a problem that has previously rocked the regulation
mechanisms.
Article 2 of the treaty expresses the purview in which it applies. In addition it also creates a
broad number of activities that comprise international trade. These include export, import,
transit, transshipment and brokering of conventional arms105
.
The treaty also appreciates that arms can be smuggled in parts and components and thus
provides that state parties shall create and sustain a national control system to regulate parts
and components. This is especially important for components in form that making it possible
for the assembling of the conventional arms covered under article 2.106
The awareness that
arms can be smuggled in portions which are then reassembled to a complete assemblage
presents an opportunity to shut one of the illegal conduits of illegal arms transfers.
Article 6 of the treaty emphasizes the need for states to respect the prohibitions made by the
UNSC under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The chapter mandates the UNSC to determine
and take appropriate action in situations of threat to peace and acts of aggression. This
recognition provides an ambiance where wars would be less severe and shorter due to the ease
of securing a ceasefire by curtailing the supply of arms to the warring factions.
105
ATT(n 1 above) art 2
106
ATT (n 1 above) art. 4

28
Further the treaty in article 7 creates a precise criterion for assessing exports. The gauge for
assessment is non discriminatory and ensures an analogous script for all exporters and
therefore creating a standard accountability test across the board.
The inclusion of transit, brokering and diversion of arms guarantees the impediment to the
activities of both the grey and black markets which have thrived through such activities. Since
these have played a great part in complicating the trade regulation attempts.
3.2.1.1The Secretariat
Article 18(1) of the ATT establishes the secretariat. It is mandated to offer assistance to
signatories in the implementation of the treaty. In executing its mandate, the secretariat has the
following functions:
Availing to parties reports under the treaty;
Keeping and providing states with the list of national points of contact;
Linking up states that have offered to help others in executing the provisions of the
treaty and promoting international cooperation;
Facilitating conferences and meetings for state parties and;
Other duties decided by conference of state parties.
The creation of the secretariat by the ATT offers a complementary institution for the UNODA.
The secretariat, I must say has a better opportunity to perform in the regulation of the arms
trade.
3.2.1.2 Challenges Facing the ATT
Despite the prospect that the ATT offers in regulating the trade, it has come under attack, with
powerful states challenging the treaty. States such as China, USA and Russia have formed a
formidable opposition to the treaty.107
China cites fears that the treaty allows the arming of
anti government actors. Further the opponent critic that the treaty restricts the formal sector
while creating a fertile ground for the underground markets to thrive. With the National Rifle
Association (NRA) stating that the treaty infringes on rights of American under the second
107
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2013/0411/UN-arms-trade-treaty-Will-it-receive-US-
Senate-approval

29
amendment,108
the treaty faces insurmountable objections from the people who ought to be its
guardians.
In addition the treaty has not created an enforcement mechanism to ensure its
implementation109
. The researcher finds the Secretariat there in established as feeble and
unable to ensure the faithful implementation of the trade.
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE
With most authors asserting moderate success for the UNODA and its subsidiaries, the
researcher, respectfully finds the institution as having concentrated overly on WMDs.
However, this paper is appreciative of the limitations and hurdles of the UNODA. These
include the limited mandate of these regional institutions coupled with the insufficiency of
political goodwill in the implementation of the provisions of the legal instruments establishing
them. In addition the budgetary allocations to the institutions are limitation to their
capabilities.
The fact that the UN has given primacy to the regulation of WMDs is also a hindrance in
terms of the enthusiasm and resources allocated to combating the hazardous ramifications
unregulated conventional arms trade.
However, the researcher modestly suggests that the requirement imposed on the state parties
by the ATT to create and sustain a National control List of the countries arms will assist the
institution. The requirement that the information therein contained is made public and also
given to the secretariat which shall share it with state party’s marks the dawn of an era of
accountability and openness in conventional arms trade.
3.4 CONSEQUENCES OF LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRADE
As discussed in the previous chapter there are several consequences of the irregularities in the
trade. Writers including Rachel and Suzette emphasize that the diffusion of arms from the
108
Senate-approval
109
Senate-approval

30
manufacturers to the hands of belligerents, war profiteers, war lords, terrorists, human rights
violators cause incredible suffering to the human population. The researcher concurs with the
writers’ opinions and in addition finds another consequence of poor regulation of the trade.
Arms channeled through underground ducts, that are insulated against law enforcement
mechanisms find their way to the hands of poachers who occasion suffering to animals.
A prevalent opinion among writers is that armed conflict and political instability is attributable
to easy access to arms. The researcher is of a similar opinion that irresponsible arms
dealership in this decade has caused insurgencies, as dealers stoke conflict to keep the
business afloat. The Arab spring for instance has clearly exhibited the kind of energy that the
availability of conventional arms contributes to a political process of transformation. Thus just
like in the previous decades conventional weaponry continues to cause incessant fighting and
instability in the world.
Terrorism as identified by Rachel and Suzette is also linked to irresponsible arms dealership.
With the rise in terror activities especially in the East Africa, the researcher observes that
conventional arms are still the weapons of choice for terrorists. Events such as the September
21st
Westgate attack in Nairobi, Kenya by men armed with AK-47 assault rifles110
also
confirmed that terrorists use the conventional weapons at their disposal to propagate their
attacks. Other attacks such as the Kampala attack and the many terror attacks in the coastal
towns of Kenya reveal that terrorists are heavily armed with conventional weapons.
Although the international community has put up arduous impediments that ensure terrorists
have no access to WMD, the same has not been replicated in the conventional armament front.
The inexactness as to the number of weapon transactions that have terrorists as the recipient
advances a great challenge in taking precise action to prevent excessive and destabilizing
accumulations of arms by terrorists.
3.4.1 Revitalization of poaching activities
Poaching is the illegal hunting, killing and capturing of animals.111
Environmental scientists
propound a concept, that poaching is an environmental crime thus any activity that
contravenes the laws and regulations established to protect renewable natural resources
including the illegal harvest of wildlife with intension of possessing, transporting, consuming
110
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (n 96 above) 1.
111
World Book Inc. (2005) World Book encyclopedia. 15 Chicago, IL; World book p.5871

31
or selling it and using its body parts is illegal112
.Poaching activities are injurious to
biodiversity and imperil the ecosystem.
Poachers use the animal parts to sustain their activities. The LRA for instance in Congo use
elephant tusks to procure weapons and ammunition.113
This depicts that the shadow
conventional armament trade does arm poachers as they accept precious stones and game parts
as sufficient consideration for weapons transferred to them.
Due to the high calibre artillery systems, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and satellite
transmitters the poachers are armed with; they easily outmaneuver the game rangers and
manage to capture the animals of their choice.114
They use of machine guns, poison and
explosives115
to capture and kill the animals of their choice.
Armed groups in Africa116
participate in elephant poaching to sustain their activities. Suspect
groups include Congolese, South Sudanese, Sudanese, Ugandan armed forces and state-
sponsored militias including the Janjaweed from Darfur are escalating the rate of elephant
population decrease.117
The incessant flow of arms and money to keep their activities afloat is
a challenge to respective national communities and international community’s in dealing with
the illegal activities of the groups and protection of endangered species. The environment is
critically jeopardized and thus the international efforts to protect the environment become
intricate.
With the lack of transparency in the trade of weapons the poachers will be able to access arms
and perpetuate their other malevolent activities with a threat of selling animal parts to
extinction. Poachers and illegal miners represent a well organized and highly equipped group
that engages in reciprocal transactions with arms dealers are they provide valuable stones and
game parts in exchange for arms. The spectrum of the adverse effects range from human rights
112
World Book Inc.(n 111 above)
113
Confidential African Parks debriefing transcript from Congolese escapee, May 14, 2010; Uganda People’s
Defense Force, debriefing notes on information provided by rebel defector Michael Oryem (on files with
authors); Former LRA second lieutenant, interview with author, Gulu, Uganda, March 24, 2013. Two former
LRA soldiers, interviewed by author Gulu, Uganda, May 7 2013.
114
African park rangers interview with authors, Garamba National Park, The Democratic Republic of Congo,
January 23, 2014
115
R.S Musgrave, S Parker & M Wolok (1993) Status of poaching in the United States- Are we protecting our
wildlife? Natural Resources Journal 33(4) 977-1014
116
R,S Musgrave, S Parker & M Wolok(n 115 above)
117
African Parks rangers, interview with authors, Garamba National Park, the democratic Republic of Congo,
January 23,2013; UNEP and others, ‘Elephants in the dust.’

32
violations, civil wars, terrorist activities, poaching and insecurity; activities that pose a threat
to the purposes and principles of the UN.118
3.5 CONCLUSION
In consideration of the above discussion, the researcher finds that currently, the trade in
conventional arms needs a stronger mechanism so as to foster transparency and accountability.
Although the UNGA adopted the ATT, the compliance to its provisions if and when it enters
into force is a matter that remains in speculation. The suggestions of how to concretize the
regulations in the trade form the bulk of the final chapter of this research paper.
118
Un Charter art. 1

33
CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter highlights in brief the issues addressed by the researcher, the observations made
and the researcher’s conclusion and recommendations.
4.1 Issues summary
The purpose of this research was to show the regulatory and institutional framework
controlling conventional arms trade, the effects of the lack of transparency in the trade and
make recommendations that would yield a better system in the regulation of the trade.
4.2 Observations
To the extent that there is some history of the effects of opaque arms transfers, the
international community does not have to speculate, it has to measure the damage occasioned
by the situation. The international community has a duty to protect human beings and animals
from the effects that have so far been witnessed as a result of arming dangerous groups of
people.
With states fostering global governance and collectively dealing with issues such as armed
conflict, insecurity, terrorism, poaching and piracy and international crimes there should be a
realization that conventional arms are a common thread in all of this problems. They directly
or indirectly facilitate these problems and it is therefore the prime time to halt the cycle by
creating a balance between the competing interests.
The benefit of a few people and unimaginable suffering to scores of people necessitates that
the regulation of conventional trade ought to receive the same enthusiasm as WMDs. The
researcher finds that the regulatory and institutional framework currently is fundamentally
flawed and insufficient. Therefore the following recommendations are made to the respective
stakeholders and the international community at large;
4.3 Recommendations
Firstly, the states should ratify and abide by the ATT. The treaty may not be perfect but it
offers a great promise in the regulation of arms. While it brings into perspective issues that
have been previously left out such as conventional components and parts, it also creates
inhibitions that ensure that terrorists, belligerents, war lords, rebels and poachers have no

34
access to arms. The treaty obliges states to red flag diversions of arms within their territories,
an activity that previously fed the illegal markets.
Secondly the international community should also negotiate and adopt a protocol that covers
the loopholes of the ATT. The protocol for instance should create a strong implementation and
enforcement mechanism for the treaty. This will ensure that the treaty does not suffer the same
fate the other instruments have suffered.
Thirdly the UNGA should cause the establishment of an Air, Maritime and Road control unit
as a branch of the UNODA. It should ensure the availability of transport controls with state
collaboration. This mechanism would limit the ease through which arms illegal arms
consignments are transported. Further there should of a central office to consolidate
intelligence on the transportation and liaise with respective national security agencies. The
independence of the office and focus on the supply system would offer a method of stopping
arms smuggling instead of awaiting the accumulation of excessive arms which may at times
pass undetected.
Further, states ought to cease insulating arms traffickers from accountability to the law.
Conventional arms trafficking and gun running should be brought under the international
criminal justice. The fact that arms dealers can engage in activities such as instigating and
fueling armed conflict so as to sell arms should awaken the international community to realize
that these individuals are as guilty as the perpetrators of the war. One of the objectives of the
international criminal justice system is deterrence and it should be used to deter the diabolical
activities in the trade. The brokers who arm perpetrators of genocide should be found
criminally culpable and should bear individual criminal responsibility.
In addition, the formal arms market should be subjected to heavy financial fines and; or
license revocation for flaunting international laws regulating the trade. They should also be
answerable for violating UNSC embargoes. Through such a system the defense contractors
will be accountable and transparent in the transactions they engage in and so will the
respective state parties.
Finally states should foster multilateral military observer regimes. Traditionally military
information about sovereign states has been a highly classified affair. This has complicated the
exercise of monitoring states excessive and destabilizing accumulations. Therefore states have

35
been able to introduce military technology and large stock piles that have a threatening
capacity in certain regions. Through states creating regional observers that exercise equality
and foster state cooperation’s, it would be possible to monitor regional conventional capacities
and detect destabilizing accumulations. Through accurate and concise observer reports arms
control and disarmament efforts would be easier since they would no longer be based on
speculation. The regional out fits stoking cooperation and transparency enhance confidence
between states.
4.4 CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the current status of the trade in conventional arms is fundamentally flawed
and occasions harm to the human family. States should therefore adopt the above
recommendations to make the trade less disastrous.

36
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http://www:oxfam.org

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