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Privacy-preserving seamless digital
              infrastructures
              – why, what, how and when

              Kristian Gjøsteen
              Department of Mathematical Sciences
              VERDIKT conference, April 26, 2012

www.ntnu.no                        Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
2

    Contents

       Why?


       What?


       How?


       When?




www.ntnu.no    Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
3
    Privacy-Preserving Seamless Digital
    Infrastructures
       Funded by VERDIKT from 2008 to 2011.

       One PhD student and one post.doc.

       Department of Mathematical Sciences and Department of
       Telematics at NTNU.

       The cryptography group at Aarhus University, Denmark.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.
         — Eavesdropping on a GSM network.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.
         — Eavesdropping on a GSM network.
         — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and
           journalists.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.
         — Eavesdropping on a GSM network.
         — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and
           journalists.
         — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as
           entertainment.




www.ntnu.no                          Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.
         — Eavesdropping on a GSM network.
         — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and
           journalists.
         — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as
           entertainment.
         — For years, bank employees sold celebrity account transcripts
           to the Norwegian gossip magazine Se og Hør.




www.ntnu.no                           Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
4

    Recent Privacy Compromises
         — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many.
         — Tracking users of a GSM network.
         — Eavesdropping on a GSM network.
         — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and
           journalists.
         — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as
           entertainment.
         — For years, bank employees sold celebrity account transcripts
           to the Norwegian gossip magazine Se og Hør.
         — Deutsche Telecom used their mobile phone network to track
           journalists’ movements.


www.ntnu.no                           Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
5

    A Solution?
       Often, the problem is insecurely stored data. The obvious solution
       is to stop storing the data.

       Unfortunately, the EU data retention directive says that if the data is
       generated, it must be stored. Storing data securely is expensive.

       It would anyway not prevent Deutsche Telecom from attacking their
       users.




www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
6

    Seamless
       People want privacy.

       People are not prepared to pay for privacy.

         — How much privacy is achievable without increasing user-visible
           complexity?




www.ntnu.no                           Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
7

    Preserving Privacy
       Privacy for mobile communication is:
         — Nobody knows what I am saying.
         — Nobody knows who I am talking to.
         — Nobody knows where I am.

       Today’s systems efficiently provide little or no privacy.

       There are cryptographic schemes that provide almost perfect
       privacy, but they are expensive and complicated.

         — We need a trade-off.



www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
8

    Fundamental Idea
       A fundamental idea in cryptographic research is to distribute
       computation and knowledge among several parties.

       Done correctly we can tolerate if some – but not all – parties are
       malicious.




www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
9

    Anonymous Key Agreement
       Anonymous key agreement may be a solution.

       We have: One or more networks of radio towers, willing to talk to
       phones near them.

       Idea: Every time a user moves, he anonymously agrees on a key
       with a new radio tower. Once the key is established, it can be used
       for secure communication.

       Note: If the user is communicating while moving, traffic analysis
       alone will usually allow an attacker to trace the user.




www.ntnu.no                           Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
10

     Anonymous Key Agreement I
       Signatures, group signatures and Diffie-Hellman.

                     User                                       Network
                                        gx
                                 g y , sign(. . . )
                                groupsign(. . . )


       But: § Group signatures are expensive. § Anyone with a radio can
       force the network to do a lot of work. § Where do we send the bill
       for data usage?




www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
11

     Today’s Mobile Communications
       We have three separate mobile networks in Norway.

       We have ∞ virtual operators and resellers.

       We can reuse the business model! The GSM networks no longer
       sell network access directly. Instead, they sell capacity to virtual
       operators (service providers in our terminology).
         — The network provides connectivity.
         — The service provider sends the bill.




www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
12

     Anonymous Key Agreement II
       Public key encryption.

        User                             Network                                           S. Prov.
                  S, c = {U, n1 }ekS                                    c
                           c                        k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS
                    {k , n2 , . . . }k                                 n2
                                                                       ok


       But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of
       key agreement. § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider
       to do a lot of work.


www.ntnu.no                              Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
13

     Anonymous Key Agreement III
       Public key encryption and Diffie-Hellman.

        User                               Network                                           S. Prov.
                S, g x , c = {U, n1 }ekS                                  c
                         c , gy                       k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS
                      {n2 , . . . }k                                     n2
                                                                         ok


       But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of
       key agreement. § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider
       to do a lot of work.


www.ntnu.no                                Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
14

     Anonymous Key Agreement IV
       Public key encryption, Diffie-Hellman and a signature.

        User                               Network                                           S. Prov.
                S, g x , c = {U, n1 }ekS                                  c
                         c , gy                       k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS
                      {n2 , . . . }k                                     n2
                       {. . . }skN                                       ok


       But: § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider to do a lot
       of work.



www.ntnu.no                                Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
15

     Anonymous Key Agreement V
       Identity tokens, Diffie-Hellman and a signature.

        User                             Network                                           S. Prov.
                  S, T = {U}kS , g x                                 T , n1
                            c                          c = {T , N, n1 , n2 }kUS
                            n1
                     g y , {. . . }skN
                     {n2 , . . . }g xy                                 n2
                                                                       ok


       But: § Identity tokens allow a tracing DoS-attack.


www.ntnu.no                              Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
16

     Anonymous Key Agreement VI
       Identity tokens.

        User                           Network                                           S. Prov.
                    S, T = {U}kS                                   T , n1
                           c                    k, c = {T , N, n1 , n2 , k}kUS
                     {k , n1 , n2 }k                                 n2
                                                                     ok



       But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of
       key agreement. § Identity tokens allow a tracing DoS-attack.


www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
17

     Anonymous So What?
       Different key agreement protocols have different security
       properties. What happens when you build upon this base?




www.ntnu.no                          Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
18

     Tomorrow’s NFC Payment Systems
       Privacy for electronic payment is:
         — Nobody knows where I am spending my money.

       Today, electronic payment methods let the bank know where I
       spend my money. Merchants can often tell when I make repeat
       purchases.

       New mobile phones can use near field communication to talk to a
       merchants’ point-of-sale systems.
         — NFC payment systems could be made privacy-preserving,
           especially if we have a privacy-preserving mobile network.



www.ntnu.no                            Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
19

     Anonymous Payment
       Blind signatures, privacy-preserving communication and NFC.


        Bank                              User                                            Merchant
                                                                    pay
                request(ch, . . . )                                  ch
                      issue                                    signature



                                      ch, signature


       The merchant doesn’t know who you are, the bank doesn’t know
       where you shop.
www.ntnu.no                               Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
20

     Cryptographic Security Proofs
       Theoretical work:
         — We needed an improved model for cryptographic security
           proofs.
         — We have studied one approach to machine-verifiable proofs.




www.ntnu.no                         Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
21

     E-valg 2011
       We have contributed to the design and analysis of the
       cryptosystem underlying the 2011 trial of internet voting in Norway.
         — This is a seamless digital infrastructure just like the previous
           examples. It was deployed and worked very well.




www.ntnu.no                             Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
22

     When?
         — Not gonna happen.
       Our work will not change mobile phone networks or payment
       infrastructures. But thanks to our work and E-valg 2011, we know
       that it is possible to do better.

       There’s no excuse not to do better for new infrastructures.




www.ntnu.no                           Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures

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Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures - why, what, how and when, Kristian Gjøsteen, NTNU

  • 1. Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures – why, what, how and when Kristian Gjøsteen Department of Mathematical Sciences VERDIKT conference, April 26, 2012 www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 2. 2 Contents Why? What? How? When? www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 3. 3 Privacy-Preserving Seamless Digital Infrastructures Funded by VERDIKT from 2008 to 2011. One PhD student and one post.doc. Department of Mathematical Sciences and Department of Telematics at NTNU. The cryptography group at Aarhus University, Denmark. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 4. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 5. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 6. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. — Eavesdropping on a GSM network. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 7. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. — Eavesdropping on a GSM network. — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and journalists. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 8. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. — Eavesdropping on a GSM network. — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and journalists. — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as entertainment. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 9. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. — Eavesdropping on a GSM network. — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and journalists. — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as entertainment. — For years, bank employees sold celebrity account transcripts to the Norwegian gossip magazine Se og Hør. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 10. 4 Recent Privacy Compromises — One specific person’s tax return was shown to many. — Tracking users of a GSM network. — Eavesdropping on a GSM network. — HP stole the phone records of HP board members and journalists. — Bank employees used celebrity bank account transcripts as entertainment. — For years, bank employees sold celebrity account transcripts to the Norwegian gossip magazine Se og Hør. — Deutsche Telecom used their mobile phone network to track journalists’ movements. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 11. 5 A Solution? Often, the problem is insecurely stored data. The obvious solution is to stop storing the data. Unfortunately, the EU data retention directive says that if the data is generated, it must be stored. Storing data securely is expensive. It would anyway not prevent Deutsche Telecom from attacking their users. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 12. 6 Seamless People want privacy. People are not prepared to pay for privacy. — How much privacy is achievable without increasing user-visible complexity? www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 13. 7 Preserving Privacy Privacy for mobile communication is: — Nobody knows what I am saying. — Nobody knows who I am talking to. — Nobody knows where I am. Today’s systems efficiently provide little or no privacy. There are cryptographic schemes that provide almost perfect privacy, but they are expensive and complicated. — We need a trade-off. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 14. 8 Fundamental Idea A fundamental idea in cryptographic research is to distribute computation and knowledge among several parties. Done correctly we can tolerate if some – but not all – parties are malicious. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 15. 9 Anonymous Key Agreement Anonymous key agreement may be a solution. We have: One or more networks of radio towers, willing to talk to phones near them. Idea: Every time a user moves, he anonymously agrees on a key with a new radio tower. Once the key is established, it can be used for secure communication. Note: If the user is communicating while moving, traffic analysis alone will usually allow an attacker to trace the user. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 16. 10 Anonymous Key Agreement I Signatures, group signatures and Diffie-Hellman. User Network gx g y , sign(. . . ) groupsign(. . . ) But: § Group signatures are expensive. § Anyone with a radio can force the network to do a lot of work. § Where do we send the bill for data usage? www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 17. 11 Today’s Mobile Communications We have three separate mobile networks in Norway. We have ∞ virtual operators and resellers. We can reuse the business model! The GSM networks no longer sell network access directly. Instead, they sell capacity to virtual operators (service providers in our terminology). — The network provides connectivity. — The service provider sends the bill. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 18. 12 Anonymous Key Agreement II Public key encryption. User Network S. Prov. S, c = {U, n1 }ekS c c k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS {k , n2 , . . . }k n2 ok But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of key agreement. § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider to do a lot of work. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 19. 13 Anonymous Key Agreement III Public key encryption and Diffie-Hellman. User Network S. Prov. S, g x , c = {U, n1 }ekS c c , gy k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS {n2 , . . . }k n2 ok But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of key agreement. § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider to do a lot of work. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 20. 14 Anonymous Key Agreement IV Public key encryption, Diffie-Hellman and a signature. User Network S. Prov. S, g x , c = {U, n1 }ekS c c , gy k , c = {N, n1 , n2 , k }kUS {n2 , . . . }k n2 {. . . }skN ok But: § Anyone with a radio can force a service provider to do a lot of work. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 21. 15 Anonymous Key Agreement V Identity tokens, Diffie-Hellman and a signature. User Network S. Prov. S, T = {U}kS , g x T , n1 c c = {T , N, n1 , n2 }kUS n1 g y , {. . . }skN {n2 , . . . }g xy n2 ok But: § Identity tokens allow a tracing DoS-attack. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 22. 16 Anonymous Key Agreement VI Identity tokens. User Network S. Prov. S, T = {U}kS T , n1 c k, c = {T , N, n1 , n2 , k}kUS {k , n1 , n2 }k n2 ok But: § A malicious service provider can do anything at the time of key agreement. § Identity tokens allow a tracing DoS-attack. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 23. 17 Anonymous So What? Different key agreement protocols have different security properties. What happens when you build upon this base? www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 24. 18 Tomorrow’s NFC Payment Systems Privacy for electronic payment is: — Nobody knows where I am spending my money. Today, electronic payment methods let the bank know where I spend my money. Merchants can often tell when I make repeat purchases. New mobile phones can use near field communication to talk to a merchants’ point-of-sale systems. — NFC payment systems could be made privacy-preserving, especially if we have a privacy-preserving mobile network. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 25. 19 Anonymous Payment Blind signatures, privacy-preserving communication and NFC. Bank User Merchant pay request(ch, . . . ) ch issue signature ch, signature The merchant doesn’t know who you are, the bank doesn’t know where you shop. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 26. 20 Cryptographic Security Proofs Theoretical work: — We needed an improved model for cryptographic security proofs. — We have studied one approach to machine-verifiable proofs. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 27. 21 E-valg 2011 We have contributed to the design and analysis of the cryptosystem underlying the 2011 trial of internet voting in Norway. — This is a seamless digital infrastructure just like the previous examples. It was deployed and worked very well. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures
  • 28. 22 When? — Not gonna happen. Our work will not change mobile phone networks or payment infrastructures. But thanks to our work and E-valg 2011, we know that it is possible to do better. There’s no excuse not to do better for new infrastructures. www.ntnu.no Kristian Gjøsteen, Privacy-preserving seamless digital infrastructures