A summary of the case against HS2 from HS2 Action Alliance. Analysis of the fatal flaws in the business case; why it won;t close the north south divide; the capacity lie; connectivity nonsense; service cuts; alternative and what the pubic think

1. HS2
- A Bad Deal for Britain -
July 2014

2. Seven Areas of Focus
1. Business Case
2. North South Divide
3. Capacity
4. Connectivity
5. Service Cuts
6. Alternatives
7. Public Opinion

3. Based on Government and HS2 Ltd figures

4. BUSINESS CASE BUILT ON
SAND

5. The deteriorating
business case
 Phase 1 Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) has fallen from
2.7 (12/09), to 2 (2/11),
 Now 1.7 (10/13)including “Wider Economic
Impacts” (WEI)
 On DfT’s normal criteria excluding WEI, now 1.4
 Correcting serious flaws in the evaluation would
lead to a BCR of 1.0 or less
 DfT categorise 1.0 – 1.5 as “low”, below 1.0 as
“poor”
 Normal pass mark for rail schemes is circa 2.0

6. The deteriorating
business case
 Absurd assumption no one works on trains remains
 Multiplied value of over crowding by five:
– To make up for having to cut average value
business traveller from £70k
 STILL 60%+ of benefit from time savings:
– Despite Government saying not about speed
– Ignores faster journeys due to planned
improvements = double counting

7. WON’T CLOSE THE NORTH
SOUTH DIVIDE

8. Economic case:
Academic evidence
 Reducing the North-South divide not supported by
serious academics:
– Tendency to benefit the hub (in this case London)
 Limited evidence for regeneration
 Zero sum game in the regions

9. Economic case:
Evidence from HS1
“Obviously, if you feel that something is going to do good for you, you
big it up. We saw that with HS1 in Kent as well, as to all the effects it
was going to have. I have to say, they are not visible to the naked
eye”
Professor Roger Vickerman (Transport Select Committee 6/9/11)
“Ashford station…has experienced little development and…Ebbsfleet
International station has so far only witnessed the building of a park
and ride facility”

10. Economic benefits:
KPMG report
 KPMG forecast in 2013 benefits of £15 billion per annum
 This compares with £15.4 billion over the life of the project in
August 2012
 Expert doubts on the methodology
– ‘Jaw dropping omissions’ - Dan Graham, Imperial College
and Henry Overman, LSE, Robert Peston, BBC
….and it doesn’t pass the test of common sense: the benefits
forecast by KPMG equate to each £1000 for each additional
round trip on HS2

11. The French Example
 No CAC 40 HQs in Lyon
– Connected 1981
– None in Marseille or Lille
 82% of CAC 40 HQs in
Paris
 France 0.7 growth 2014
 Contracting
manufacturing sector

12. CAPACITY MYTH

13. Is business travel declining?
 Business trips per person by all modes have fallen by 22%
since 1995/97 (DfT National Travel Survey)
 Virgin Rail has stated growth is concentrated on off-peak
and at weekends
 Euston evening peak load factors for Virgin only 52.2%
– Counts for 2011 – before any 11 car sets introduced
– DfT refuse Freedom of Information requests for data
– Finally released to the High Court as part of the December 2012
judicial review

14. Service group (long distance services into London) Load factor (3 hour
morning peak - 2010)
Paddington (Main Line and other fast trains) 99%
Waterloo (South West Main Line) 91%
St.Pancras (Midland Main Line) 80%
Liverpool Street (Great Eastern Main Line) 78%
Victoria (fast trains via East Croydon) 72%
Kings Cross (ECML long distance) 65%
Euston (long distance) 60%
St.Pancras (HS1 domestic) 41%
WCML one of least overcrowded
main line routes into London
Morning Peak Load Factors
Network Rail London & SE Route Utilisation
July 2012

15. DfT data on peak usage
Totalpeakandoff-peakcapacity andcriticalloadsontrainservicesarrivingatanddepartingfromLondonEustononatypicalautumnweekday: 2010to2012
2010 % Loading 2011 % Loading % change 2012 % Loading % change
Total capacity Total critical load Total capacity Total critical load nopassengers Total capacity Total critical load nopassengers
Longdistance 3 hourAM peak arrivals 12,438 7,510 60.4% 12,255 8,327 67.9% 10.9% 12,255 8,000 65.3% -3.9%
(virginservices) 1 hourAM peak arrivals 4,902 2,963 60.4% 4,902 3,487 71.1% 17.7% 4,902 3,149 64.2% -9.7%
3 hourPM peak departures 14,011 7,085 50.6% 14,109 8,062 57.1% 13.8% 14,011 7,961 56.8% -1.3%
1 hourPM peak departures 4,902 2,591 52.9% 4,902 2,952 60.2% 13.9% 4,902 2,886 58.9% -2.2%
Long distance Virgin services using Euston – source DfT
The data is before 35 out of 56 Pendolinos lengthened from 9 to 11 cars (providing a
further 150 standard class seats in each lengthened set).
Assuming 20 out of the 29 Pendolinos leaving Euston in the evening peak are now 11
car sets, the standard class load factor drops to 45.8% (and 43% overall).
........ they are at best half full, but is there more capacity if it’s needed?

16. Virgin West Coast results
 Passenger mile growth [Stagecoach Annual report]
– 2009/10 - 20.4%
– 2010/11 - 9.3%
– 2011/12 - 4.6%
– 2012/13 – 0.9%
 The slow down is not just on West Coast: East Coast
passenger miles grew by only 0.5% in 2012/13
But HS2 Ltd state “Our demand forecasts are conservative,
not optimistic. We assume 2.5% a year growth in
passenger numbers…..”

17. Who is HS2 for?
 Rail gets £6.8bn/a subsidy - 35% of government transport spend
 Rail users are relatively affluent - 47% of long distance journeys made by the
top 20% income households
……less than 0.2% of trips are by long distance rail

18. Pricing
 Assumption that will be no premium for travelling on
HS2 over classic service
 Results in unrealistic passenger forecasts
 HS1 costs 20% premium
 Ticket price rises on classic service above rest of
country to pay for HS1

19. CONNECTIVITY

20. HS2 will not…
 Create a ‘green spine’ – its is not even carbon neutral
 Connect Newcastle, York, Leeds, Sheffield, Nottingham and Birmingham
 Link Stoke-on-Trent to London
 Reduce the crush on Coventry to Birmingham commute
 Not provide express commuter services between northern cities
(Northern Hub will provide a link)
 Improve East - West links – Liverpool – Manchester – Leeds - Hull
 Link Wales
 Improve commuting for Peterborough and Luton (Thamselink)
 Improve links to Corby (Midland Mainline)

21. HIDDEN NASTIES

22. Cuts to existing services
 2013 business case delivers
£8.3 billion of cuts to existing
services:
– Up from £7.7 billion in 4th
business case
 12 towns and cities lose one
direct train an hour
 15 with longer journey times
– Carlisle 53 minutes longer
 Means no freight benefits
southern WCML
 No space to meet suburban
commuter demand

23. Phase 2 Cuts
City/Town Current Service Service Post HS2 Phase 2 Service Change Summary
HS2 Service (Phase 2
only)
Peterborough 3 trains/hour
(2 non-stop)
4 trains/hour, but only 1 non-stop Loss of 1 non-stop service Nil
Doncaster 3/4 trains/hour,
2 with only 1 intermediate stop
3 trains/ hour
(1 with 1 stop, others with 4/5 stops)
Increased journey times by
approx 10/15 mins
Nil
Wakefield 2 trains/hour
(1 with 2 stops, 1 with 3 stops)
1 trains/hour, with 5 stops Loss of one train/hour and approx
10 -15 min. longer journey time
Nil
Berwick on Tweed 1 train/hour
with 3 intermediate stops
1 train/hour with 7 intermediate stops Approx 20 min. longer journey
time
Nil
Aberdeen, Dundee,
Inverness
Through services to Aberdeen (3 daily)
and Inverness (1 daily)
No through trains Nil

24. SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVES

25. 51m Alternative
 Delivers a major increase in passenger capacity – more
than enough to meet DfT’s exagerated growth forecasts
 Reconfigure one first class car to standard
 Longer trains – 12 car except for Liverpool - stays 11 car
because of constraints at Lime Street
 Seats per set change from 145/294 to 94/594 (Standard
class increase of 102%)
 New trains and construction of a flyover will enable fast
peak capacity for Milton Keynes/Northampton to be
doubled before 2026!
DfT’s own consultants (WS Atkins) showed this alternative
had a Benefit Cost Ratio of 6, compared with 1.7 for HS2

26. 51m Alternative
 Segregates InterCity trains and freight on the core
of the route, improving reliability, increasing
freight capacity and reducing transit times
 Additional track between Rugby and Nuneaton
 Stafford rail by-pass
The capital cost of the alternative is c10% of
HS2,and it can be delivered flexibly and quickly, as
and when needed – in contrast HS2 is an “all or
nothing” solution, with no benefits until 2026

27. VOTERS DON’T WANT IT

28. Even with wild claims
of closures
October 2013

29. £2 million of PR later
May 2014

30. North don’t believe it will
help the North
April 2014

31. HS2 and Voting Intentions
52% nationally oppose plans to build HS2, while around 30%
support them
One fifth (19%) say they are more likely to support Labour if the
party opposed HS2
28% are less likely to vote Conservative because of their plans
to build HS2.
Comres March 2014

32. EVEN WESTMINSTER
DOESN’T AGREE

33. Would you support or oppose the complete
scrapping of HS2 and a return to the drawing
board in terms of planning for increased rail
capacity and new rail services?
 Support – 30%
 Oppose – 53%
 Don’t know – 14%
 Not stated – 3%
Full cross party support ?

34. The Case For/Against HS2
THE MYTH
Sound investment
We need the capacity
Heals North/South divide
It’s green
Radically reduce air flights
UK must catch-up with the EU
THE REALITY
It’s not value for money
No, & there are alternatives
Won’t rebalance economy
It’s not even carbon neutral
The facts don’t support this
UK already has a fast intercity
network
HS2 is a waste of money and the wrong priority