.

1. Working Paper No. 108 – June 2013
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT
POLICY: MAPPING DONOR STRATEGIES AND
PRACTICES
David D’Hollander, Axel Marx and Jan Wouters

2. INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY:
MAPPING DONOR STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES
David D’Hollander, Axel Marx and Jan Wouters
ABSTRACT
Integrating human rights in development policy has been highlighted as a key priority on international,
European and national level. This mapping exercise presents a review of the donor strategies and
practices for integrating human rights in development policy which have emerged in recent years. It draws
upon a broad selection of policy and guidance documents from multi- and bilateral donors, reports and
recommendations from international institutions as well as academic research. The paper distinguishes
five approaches for integrating human rights in development policy: (1) rhetorical endorsement of human
rights; (2) human rights dialogue and conditionality; (3) human rights and democracy programmes; (4)
human rights mainstreaming, and (5) human rights-based approaches. These different policy approaches
can build on each other and strengthen the integration of human rights in development cooperation policy
and can also be presented as self-standing policy 'options'. As a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA)
constitutes the most comprehensive strategy, closer attention is given to this concept and its
implementation. Finally, the paper addresses the evaluation of human rights policies and the operational
difficulties faced in institutionalising human rights. It notes that donors continue to face a number of
organizational challenges in implementing their human rights policies.
KEY WORDS
Human Rights, Development Cooperation, Donor Policy, Human Rights-Based Approach, Mainstreaming
AUTHORS
David D’Hollander is junior researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (KU
Leuven).
Axel Marx is the research manager at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (KU Leuven).
Jan Wouters is Jean Monnet Chair EU and Global Governance, Full Professor of International Law and
International Organizations, Director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (KU Leuven).
ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE
David.Dhollander@ggs.kuleuven.be
Axel.Marx@ggs.kuleuven.be
Jan.Wouters@ggs.kuleuven.be
© 2013 by David D’Hollander, Axel Marx and Jan Wouters. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper
may be reproduced without permission of the authors.
Working papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and critical
discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review.

3. 3
Table of Contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ .............. 5
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. .............. 6
1. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: DISPARITIES AND CONVERGENCES .......... .............. 7
2. INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY: EVOLVING PRACTICES ........... .............. 9
2.1. Rhetorical Endorsement .................................................................................................14
2.1.1. Human Rights, MDGs and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda 15
2.2. Human Rights Dialogue and Conditionality ....................................................................17
2.2.1. Human Rights as a Prerequisite 18
2.2.2. Human Rights in Performance Assessment 20
2.2.3. Human Rights in Policy Dialogues 23
2.3. Human Rights and Democracy Programmes ..................................................................24
2.4. Human Rights Mainstreaming ........................................................................................26
3. HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT ................................................ .............27
3.1. HRBA as a Concept .......................................................................................................27
3.2. Motives and Drivers for Adopting a HRBA ......................................................................30
3.3. Components of the HRBA: Outcomes and Processes ....................................................31
3.4. From Service Delivery to Building Capacity for Rights-holders and Duty-bearers ...........33
3.5. Implementing a HRBA in Development Programming ....................................................35
3.5.1. Universality and Inalienability, Indivisibility, Interdependence and Interrelatedness
37
3.5.2. Non-discrimination and Equality 38
3.5.3. Participation and Empowerment 39
3.5.4. Accountability, Transparency and Rule of Law 41
4. EVALUATING HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT ARENA .......................... ............43
4.1. Measuring Outcomes and Impacts .................................................................................43
4.1.1. Human Rights Conditionality and Dialogue 44
4.1.2. Human Rights and Democracy Programmes 45
4.1.3. Human Rights Mainstreaming and applying a HRBA 46
4.2. Challenges of Institutionalizing Human Rights ................................................................48
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................ .............51

4. ANNEX 1. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS ......53
ANNEX 2. INFOSHEET LINKING DEVELOPMENT THEMES AND MDGS TO HR MECHANISMS AND
INSTRUMENTS .............................................................................................................. .............55
ANNEX 3. OHCHR INDICATORS FOR THE RIGHT TO HEALTH ............................................ .............58
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................. .............59
4

5. 5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADC Austrian Development Cooperation
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFID UK Department for International Development
EC European Commission
ECSR Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
HRBA Human Rights-based Approach
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PCR Political and Civil Rights
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDC Swiss Development Cooperation
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDG United Nations Development Group
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID United States Agency for International Development

6. 6
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY:
MAPPING DONOR STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES1
David D’Hollander, Axel Marx and Jan Wouters
INTRODUCTION
Human rights and development are considered ‘parallel streams’ which address similar
problems and share similar values (Darrow and Tomas, 2005; Robinson, 2005; McInerney-
Lankford, 2009). Both the human rights movement and the development communities see
themselves as progressive and transformative, with the aim to “bring into being new worlds that
are more prosperous, more humanly fulfilling, and more just” (Archer, 2009, p.26). More often
than not, the operational focus of development and human rights work is concentrated on the
same target groups and subject areas (Sano, 2000). Despite this convergence of goals and
operational fields, a synergy between human rights and development policy only took root in the
early 1990s. Since then, the integration of human rights in development policy has been
undertaken by donors in various ways (OECD/WB, 2013). The lack of consensus on a single
approach to integrate human rights has led to a broad range of practices among different
development actors.
This paper presents an overview of how human rights are integrated in development policy, with
a particular emphasis on the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA). At the outset it should be
noted that the integration of human rights is not restricted to the application of the human rights
legal framework stricto sensu. The covenants, protocols, standards and principles of the human
rights framework are operationalized in various ways and the use of formal legal channels is
only one aspect of the human rights approach to development. As a result, the present paper
focuses mainly on policy strategies adopted by donors and aid agencies without adopting a
strictly legal perspective. While this paper concentrates mainly on donor policy, the implications
of human rights policies bear on the whole development ‘chain’, including multilateral and
bilateral development agencies, investment banks, implementing agencies, private contractors,
civil society organizations, or community-based organizations. The present paper attempts to
cover the general lines of this broad field, with a particular focus on the policy of bilateral donor
agencies. To capture the evolution of practices and the debate on the role of human rights in
development work, it draws upon a number of academic publications. To further illustrate
concrete policy measures, we refer to a number of strategy and policy papers, manuals,
guidance instruments and reports from donor agencies and other aid actors. As a result,
academic scholarship and observations on the integration of human rights in development work
are complemented with practical examples of policy practices and outcomes.
The first section briefly explores the differences between the development and human rights
communities from a historical perspective, illustrating the context in which human rights policies
1 This paper is also published in the working paper series of the Policy Research Centre on "Foreign Affairs,
International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation" of the Flemish Government. We thank the Flemish
Government for their interest and support.

7. have been introduced into development policy. Section 2 presents a categorization of current
strategies which integrate human rights into donor policy, i.e. (i) the rhetorical endorsement of
human rights, (ii) human rights and democracy programmes, (iii) human rights dialogue and
conditionality, (vi) human rights mainstreaming, and (v) and human rights-based approaches
(HRBA). Section 3 further elaborates on the concept, theory and implementation of HRBA, as
this is arguably the most structural effort to integrate human rights into development policy.
Finally, in section 4 we address issues concerning the evaluation of human rights policies and
the operational challenges faced in institutionalizing human rights. The concluding remarks
consider the implications of some recent developments for the position of human rights in
development policy.
7
1. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: DISPARITIES AND CONVERGENCES
The progressive integration of the human rights framework into development practice began
approximately two decades ago. However, it has been argued that the full integration of human
rights in development policy, at the conceptual, institutional and operational levels, remains
fragmented and partial (Uvin, 2004; Alston and Robinson, 2005). The majority of donors and aid
agencies are still grappling with the implications of fully committing to human rights and gearing
their operational strategy towards them. Questions and doubts about the necessity, usefulness
and added value of integrating human rights in development policy still linger. In this sense, it
has been argued that we have only seen the beginning of a long-term ‘institutional exchange’
between human rights and development policy (Archer, 2009, p.21). While most large western
donors now have a human rights policy in some form or another, the rise of new donors such as
China, but also the uprisings in the Arab world, has given new salience to the role of human
rights policies in development. This study cannot explore the full implications of these new
dynamics, but aims to contribute to this debate by providing clarity on how human rights have
been operationalized in development policy.
In order to discuss how and to what extent human rights are currently integrated in development
policy, it is necessary to understand the past ‘distance’ between the human rights and
development communities. Since their establishment in the post-1945 era, development policy
and human rights have evolved along separate institutional paths and existed largely in isolation
from each other (Alston, 2003, p.9). In a simplified dichotomy, traditional development concerns
economic growth and providing basic needs to communities, while traditional human rights work
concerns the protection of the individual against any abuse of (state) power (Tomasevski, 1989;
Sano, 2000). Accordingly, human rights has been the working area of lawyers and legal experts,
while development policy was conceived by economists and implemented by technically-orientated
practitioners. Traditionally, human rights organisations have used highly visible
advocacy, activism and ‘naming and shaming’ strategies with a focus on cases of illegal
executions, arbitrary detention or torture. Development cooperation agencies on the other hand,
were concerned with setting up resource intensive technical interventions in sectors such as
agriculture or infrastructure. From the 1980s onwards, the development sector underwent a
transformation with a sharp rise of NGOs and increased attention for the basic needs of the
poor. Contrary to human rights work, development policy often operates outside the spotlights of

8. public opinion. These differences led one observer to state that “[…] the cultures, vocabulary,
experience and instincts of the human rights world and the development assistance /
humanitarian worlds are distinct” (O’Neil and Bye, 2002, on cit. Munro, 2009, p. 187).
An overview of the various human rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on Political
and Civil Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can be
found in Annex 1. In theory, the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in
1966, offered a ‘bridge’ between the human rights and development worlds. However, for a long
period the human rights community concentrated exclusively on political and civil rights (PCR),
apparent in the UN machinery and the work of NGOs such as Amnesty International. On the
other hand, the development community saw little need for a legal interpretation of their work
through the ESCR framework (Uvin, 2004). Moreover, the language of human rights was seen
as political and confrontational during the Cold War period, in which the West championed PCR
(e.g. democratic freedoms) and the Soviet Bloc emphasized ESCR (e.g. equal economic
development) (OECD/WB, 2013, p.4). The recognition of the right to development by the UN in
1986 could be seen as a first symbolical milestone towards a greater synergy between the
development and human rights communities (Uvin, 2004; p. 42). It was an effort to reform the
global economic order and aimed to provide a legal basis for the redistribution of resources.
However, the complex legal wording of the right to development and the fact that it is only
recognized in a legally non-binding instrument meant that it had little impact on the work of
development and human rights organisations, or the relation between them (Uvin, 2004; p. 42;
Cornwall and Musembi, 2004; p.1421-1422).
The human rights and development communities moved closer towards each other after the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Symbolically, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the Vienna
Declaration reaffirmed the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, and
emphasized the interrelatedness between democracy, development and human rights and
fundamental freedoms (Cornwall and Musembi, 2004, p. 1422). Following this, large human
rights NGOs progressively broadened their scope to include economic and social issues and
new rights-based NGOs emerged focusing on ESCR, such as the Foodfirst Information Action
Network (FIAN). These played pioneering roles in international fora, creating cross-cutting
linkages between the development and human rights communities (Plipat, 2006; Cornwall and
Musembi, 2004). Within the UN system, greater interest towards ESCR followed with, for
example, the establishment a Special Rapporteur on the right to education in 1998. As the
human rights community increasingly addressed issues related to economic and social
development, the development sector also turned towards the language of human rights
(Robinson, 2005, p. 30). On a conceptual level, understandings of development as consisting of
purely economic and institutional matters gave way to the notion of ‘human development’.2
2 The influential work of Amartya Sen and the introduction of the capability-approach, which quickly spread as a
theoretical paradigm within the development community, redefined the analytical scope of poverty and development.
The ‘capability’ approach perceives poverty as the absence of capabilities to realize certain elementary freedoms
which are at the very heart of human dignity (Sen, 1992). In addressing the many obstacles which keep people from
achieving capabilities, development is conceived as a process towards greater freedom (Sen, 1999a). Departing from
this position, further work by Sen, Nussbaum and other authors explored the linkages between these capabilities,
elementary freedoms and human rights (Sen, 1999b, 2004, 2005; Nussbaum, 1997, 2003, 2004).
8

9. Methodologies such as the capabilities approach and the sustainable livelihoods framework
were increasingly considered as complementary to a human rights approach to development,
both in normative, theoretical and practical terms (Vizard, 2006; Vizard et al., 2011; Moser and
Norton, 2001; Conway et al., 2002). Greater attention for human rights in development work
was also pushed forth by events on the field, in particular the 1994 Rwandan genocide
(Robinson, 2005, p. 30; Uvin, 2004).3 As a number of factors stimulated exchanges between
human rights and development in the 1990s, it could be said that “[…] development was
increasingly perceived as a right, whereas earlier it had been perceived as an instrument of
solidarity” (Sano, 2000, p. 736).
Today, an increasing overlap between development and human rights can be observed on
several levels (McInerney-Lankford, 2009, p.52-53).4 Perhaps more important is the gradual
shift in perceptions on the role human rights within the international development community.
Donors are increasingly convinced that human rights are not merely ‘moral considerations’ but
are in fact instrumental in making development cooperation and poverty reduction more efficient
through improved governance (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 74). These changing perceptions provide
the background for an evolving set of practical applications in the development sector.
9
2. INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY: EVOLVING PRACTICES
There has been a significant evolution in how development policy has been aligned with human
rights and how the concept of human rights has been operationalized. This section presents a
non-exhaustive overview of the different policy practices which reflect the integration of human
rights in development policy. In this study, we understand the ‘human rights framework’ as the
framework of the nine core international human rights treaties (box 1) and their optional
protocols.
An overview of particular human rights can be found in annex 2. It is important to note that not
all human rights treaties have been signed and ratified by all states, but despite several notable
exceptions, the human rights framework is founded upon a broad international consensus.5
State compliance to these treaties is in first instance monitored by the UN treaty bodies, but a
number of other UN mechanisms, such as the Special Procedures, as well as a range of non-governmental
organisations have effectively taken up this role.
3 A much-read account is ‘Aiding Violence’ by Peter Uvin, addressing the role of the international development
community during the 1994 genocidal killings in Rwanda (Uvin, 1998). ‘Blind’ development donors and agencies were
largely unaware of the dynamics of ethnic tension and the spiral of violence which ensued, and in some cases
supported conflict dynamics.
4 McInerney-Lankford identifies (i) an overlap in obligations, as the right to development is increasingly, but not
unanimously, recognized as a human right, (ii) a factual or substantive overlap, as human rights organisations and
development agencies address similar problems regarding poverty, inequality and exclusion and (iii) an overlap or
convergence of principles, such as participation, transparency and equality, which are currently shared by both the
development and the human rights community.
5 One of the more important exceptions is the ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families’ which to date has only been ratified by 46 countries.

10. 10
Box 1: The Nine core international human rights treaties
Date Monitoring
body
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
21 Dec
1965
CERD
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 16 Dec
1966
CCPR
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
16 Dec
1966
CESCR
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
18 Dec
1979
CEDAW
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
10 Dec
1984
CAT
Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 Nov
1989
CRC
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
18 Dec
1990
CMW
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance
20 Dec
2006
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 13 Dec
2006
CRPD
Source: OHCHR (www2.ohchr.org/english/law/)
Two broad categories are distinguished; political and civil rights (PCR) and economic, social
and cultural rights (ESCR). Each signatory state has an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill
these rights (box 2).
Box 2: Categories and dimensions of human rights
I Respect
(no interference in the
exercise of the right)
II Protect
(prevent violations from
third parties)
III Fulfil
(provision of resources
and the outcomes of
policies)
Civil and
political
rights
Torture, extra-judicial
killings, disappearance,
arbitrary detention, unfair
trials, electoral
intimidation,
disenfranchisement
Measures to prevent
non-state actors from
committing violations,
such as torture, extra-judicial
killings,
disappearance,
abduction, and electoral
intimidation.
Investment in judiciaries,
prisons, police forces,
and elections, and
resource allocations to
ability
Economic,
social, and
cultural
rights
Ethnic, racial, gender or
linguistic
discrimination in health,
education, and welfare
and resource allocations
Measures to prevent
non-state actors from
engaging in
discriminatory behaviour
that limits access to
Progressive realization
Investment in health,
education, and welfare,
and resource allocations
to ability.

11. 11
below ability.
health, education, and
other welfare.
Source: UNDP (2006)
Development policy can support partner countries in realising each of these obligations in
respect of any specific right, although in practice it has generally focused on assisting the
fulfilment of ECSR. How the human rights framework has been applied by the development
community varies significantly. The debate on how to integrate human rights in development is
still ongoing, as practitioners from both the human rights and the development communities
continue to interact.
Accordingly, this overview is not a definitive listing of different policy strategies but a compact
presentation of how ‘human rights in development’ has been conceptualised and implemented.
The overview distinguishes five different policy approaches:
 rhetorical endorsement of human rights,
 human rights dialogue and conditionality,
 human rights and democracy programmes,
 human rights mainstreaming and
 human rights-based approaches.
The categorisation is based on the 2013 OECD/World Bank publication ‘Integrating Human
Rights into Development; donor approaches, experiences and challenges’ (see Table 1.), and
Peter Uvin’s division of how human rights have been integrated in development practice (Uvin,
2004). Similar divisions of approaches are also reflected in policy documents, such as in the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs communication on human rights and foreign policy; “There
are three main tools for promoting human rights […] development policy dialogue; development
projects directly aimed at strengthening human rights and democracy; and integration of human
rights and democracy into development cooperation as a whole.” (SMFA, 2003, p. 17).

12. A more descriptive typology is presented in a 2010 World Bank study, which distinguishes three
modes of integration (McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 29): (i) ‘non-explicit integration’
acknowledges a substantive overlap between the areas covered by human rights and
development, but does not embrace an explicit commitment to human rights, (ii) the ‘integration
of human rights principles’ entails the strategic and sectoral integration of human rights
principles, while also applying other perspectives and (iii) the ‘integration of human rights
accountability’, whereby legal accountability is emphasized, and programming is explicitly
framed in human rights norms and obligations.
From an operational and policy-oriented perspective this paper relies on an adaptation of the
different approaches as identified in the aforementioned OECD/WB report (table 1). Two
important points concerning the categorisation in this paper should be highlighted. First, in
practice, a mix of different approaches is applied simultaneously, as the boundaries between
categories are blurred. Notably, when donors ‘mainstream’ human rights throughout different
thematic operational fields, this is often similar to a integrating a ‘human rights-based approach’
(OECD/WB, 2013, p. 24). This raises a second point concerning the linear or non-linear
character of the above typologies. Table 1 can be read as a ‘policy menu’, an overview of
possible strategies each within their own right. Alternatively, it can also be read as a linear
process ending with the human rights-based approach. This view is presented in Uvin’s
typology, which describes a stepwise evolution in donor policy, from embracing human rights
12
Table 1: Donor approaches to integrating human rights
Implicit human
rights work
Human rights
projects
Human rights
dialogue
Human rights
mainstreaming
Human rights-based
approaches
Agencies may not
explicitly work on
human rights
issues and prefer
to use other
descriptors
(empowerment or
general good
governance). The
goal, content and
approach can be
related to other
explicit forms of
human rights
integration rather
than
“repackaging”.
Projects or
programmes
directly targeted
at the realisation
of specific rights
(e.g. freedom of
expression),
specific groups
(e.g. children) or
in support of
human rights
organisations
(e.g. in civil
society).
Foreign policy
and aid
dialogues
include human
rights issues,
sometimes
linked to
conditionality.
Aid modalities
and volumes
may be
affected in
cases of
significant
human rights
violations.
Efforts to ensure
that human rights
are integrated
into all sectors of
existing aid
interventions
(e.g. water,
education). This
may include “do
no harm”
aspects.
Human rights
considered
constitutive of the
goal of
development,
leading to a new
approach to aid
and requiring
institutional
change.
Source: OECD/World Bank (2013)

13. rhetorically, moving to political conditionality in aid allocation and providing positive support
through individual programmes, and finally coming to the adoption of a human rights-based
approach or HRBA (Uvin, 2004). Each of these ‘stages’ awards a greater role to human rights in
development policy, a process concluded by the HRBA in which the realisation of human rights
is the goal of development (see section 3). Accordingly, each of the ‘steps’ requires greater time
and resources to implement and thus implies greater commitment. A HRBA also incorporates
the ‘previous’ policy strategies on human rights, but places them in a coherent framework, a
new development paradigm fully aligned with the human rights framework.
While this paper largely avoids a linear perspective, it is useful to distinguish between first and
second generation human rights policies (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 6). Under the former, human
rights are perceived as a component of democracy-building and ‘good governance’
programmes, their scope is often limited to PCR, which can be supported through individual
projects and programmes or ‘punished’ through a conditionality policy. The second generation
of human rights policies adopt human rights as a transversal theme in development policy,
covering all operation including technical projects unrelated to democracy or political
governance. Such donors generally have an explicit mandate to promote human rights in their
work (OECD/WB, 2013, preface). This 'evolution' is not universal. While ‘second generation’
human rights policies (e.g. mainstreaming and HRBAs) have been adopted by a growing
number of multilateral, bilateral and NGO agencies, several large donors have not. This is most
notably the case of USAID6, CIDA7 and AUSAID8 which none the less commit resources to
human rights-related programming. More importantly, even those development agencies which
have a strong mandate to address human rights, often operationalized through mainstreaming
policies or adopting a HRBA, are often struggling with the challenges of practical
implementation (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). Clearly, some donors committed to ‘second
generation’ policies have not invested in significant policy changes to integrate human rights
(OECD/WB, 2013, p. 25). In this sense, differentiating between donors with ‘progressive’ or
‘second generation’ human rights policies and those with ‘traditional’ approaches can be
misleading.
6 The United States has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This
conviction that human rights are mainly PCR prevents the mainstreaming of human rights or a HRBA, both of which
are based on the idea of inequality and indivisibility of all human rights (UNCU, 2003). None the less, the US has one
of the most extensive democracy assistance programmes, and through this it is a large player in supporting human
rights projects on PCR such as freedom of expression, or access to justice programmes.
7 CIDA recognizes human rights as a governance theme and since the ‘ODA Accountability Act’ of 2008 development
cooperation is to be consistent with international human rights standards (CCIC, 2008). However, no coherent human
rights-based strategy has been adopted by CIDA, with the exception of its ‘Action Plan on Child Protection’ which
embraces UNICEF’s rights-based approach (CIDA, 2001).
8 Despite a parliamentary committee recommending AUSAID to formally adopt a human rights-based approach, it
has not yet taken the step to develop such comprehensive policy (JSC, 2010).
13

14. 14
2.1. RHETORICAL ENDORSEMENT
At the end of the Cold War, the terminology of human rights entered into the policy and mission
statements of donor and development agencies. The powerful normative language of human
rights was adopted by a development sector in search for “[…]a normative discourse with which
to address an increasingly globalized world” (Gready and Ensor, 2005; p.22).
In first instance, the integration of human rights implied the recognition of their importance and
relevance for development, and adding them as a ‘goal’ of development itself. In many cases,
human rights were introduced as essential, underlying, components of ‘good governance’
and/or ‘democracy’ (Grindle, 2010; Gisselquist, 2012). In this rhetorical endorsement by
development actors, human rights were often narrowly conceived as PCR and to a lesser extent
ESCR (Sano, 2000; p. 743). This conception of human rights as a tool in the democracy toolkit
is reflected in the first generation of human rights policies. In this early stage, some
development actors not only inserted references to human rights but also claimed their work
had been successful in fulfilling human rights all along (Uvin, 2007, p. 600). This use of human
rights language in ‘repackaging’ development is not unharmful, as it suggests human rights is a
new ‘feel good’ term for the development community and ignores actual and far-going
implications the integration of human rights could have on the practice of development (Uvin,
2004; p. 51). However, the rhetorical endorsement of human rights in development policy can
be viewed as the “beginning of a new learning curve” (Uvin, 2004, p. 51).
Currently, few western donor agencies do not include human rights in their mission statements
or do not identify it as a thematic area of work. Moreover, multilateral agreements and policy
statements have increasingly included human rights as a crucial and essential factor in poverty
reduction and development cooperation (see box 3).
Box 3: Interagency or Multilateral Agreements on, or referring to, Human Rights and
Development
UN Vienna Human Rights Declaration and Program of Action (1993)
UN Millennium Declaration (2000)
DAC-Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (2001)
UN Interagency Common Understanding of an Human Rights-Based Approach (2003)
UN World Summit Outcome Document (2005)
OECD-DAC Action-Oriented Paper on Human Rights and Development (2007)
Accra Agenda for Action (2008)

15. 15
UN MDG 2010 Summit Outcome Document (2010)
Busan Outcome Document (2011)
The 25th Anniversary of the Declaration on the Right to Development, Joint Statement of
Chairpersons of the UN Treaty Bodies (2011)
Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Right to
Development (2011)
UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) Outcome Document (2012)
Source: OECD/World Bank (2013)
Throughout this mapping study, the policy implications behind these statements and
agreements will be further discussed, but on themselves they illustrate how human rights have
increasingly become a part of the global development agenda. To what extent this emerging
human rights-agenda affects or should be integrated into the existing cornerstones of
development policy, notably the MDG framework and the Aid-Effectiveness principles, has
become an important issue.
2.1.1. Human Rights, MDGs and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda
Several authors and organisations have underlined how human rights overlap or should further
be integrated into the Aid Effectiveness Agenda and the MDG framework. These are currently at
the heart of most agencies’ policies, and in particular progress on MDG indicators is commonly
used to evaluate progress. The Millennium Declaration recognises the links between human
rights, good governance and sustainable development. The MDGs and human rights have been
regarded as overlapping and mutually reinforcing. However, prominent voices indicated early on
that the MDGs ‘reflect only a partial human rights agenda’ and a challenge remains to ensure
they become fully compatible (Alston, 2003, p. 7). From within the human rights community, the
MDGs have been criticized for a number of reasons, including their top-down logic and lack of
grass-roots support (Darrow, 2012, p. 59).9 Accordingly, several calls for integrating human
rights concerns into the realisation of the MDGs have been submitted (Alston, 2003, 2005). At
the 2010 MDG ‘review summit’ member states confirmed the importance of human rights for
achieving progress (OHCHR, 2010; Darrow, 2012, p. 72-73).
Led by the UN OHCHR, steps have been taken to develop a human rights-based approach to
the MDGs, whereby ‘each millennium development goal, target and indicator should be
9 Arguably, not only is the scope of the MDGs poorly specified and even arbitrary, but progress on the MDGs has
also provided a ‘fig leaf’ for authoritarian regimes (e.g. Darrow notes the case of Tunisia) (Darrow, 2012, p. 60-65).
Another much heard critique is that the MDG targets specify average outcomes, making them ‘equity-blind’, and in
this regard might have increased overall inequalities (Darrow, 2012, p. 66-67).

16. interpreted in the context of human rights’ (OHCHR, 2008, p.7). The OHCHR thereby highlights
the necessity of respecting civil and political rights in the MDG process, as implementation is
often still a top-down experience wherein national governments are not necessarily respecting
the right of organizations and citizens to participate. This implies the creation of space for
participation in MDG-related activities, preventing elite-capture, increasing transparency and
making information about policies and programmes accessible (OHCHR, 2008, p. 11-12). A lack
of attention for exclusion and non-discrimination has been a recurrent critique. Although three
MDGs are specifically aimed at vulnerable groups (children and youth, women and girls and
slum dwellers) the OHCHR has argued the principle of non-discrimination is not sufficiently
embedded in the MDG framework, which is why on the level of national implementation this has
led to poor or no progress for specific demographic groups and minorities (OHCHR, 2008, p. 9).
This is also illustrated by the fact that some countries have focused on the ‘relatively well-off’
among the poor population in order to make progress, while extreme poverty remains
unaddressed (OHCHR, 2008, p. 4). The OHCHR’s human rights-based approach to the MDGs
focuses heavily on mainstreaming issues of non-discrimination across all MDGs, with the aim to
ensure that excluded groups such as women, orphans, ethnic or religious minorities are
reached.
With discussions on the post MDG-framework starting to gain speed, the role of human rights in
a post-2015 framework has become an important theme (Darrow, 2012). Some have argued the
human rights framework offers a departure point to redesign the MDG framework altogether,
and any new targets after 2015 should not be based upon the availability of data, but should be
founded upon the shared legal standards represented by the human rights framework
(Langford, 2010, p. 85-86). In reiterating that ‘goal setting without accountability’ does not
function, some have called for developing a framework for ‘millennium development rights’
instead of goals (Dorsey, et al., 2010, p. 521). In similar vein, development organizations have
advocated for ‘righting the MDGs’ (Actionaid, 2012) and argued for a ‘human rights-centred
sustainable development agenda’ in the post 2015 era (CESR, 2013). Importantly, the EC has
also indicated that a future framework should ‘put particular emphasis on moving towards a
rights-based approach to development’ (EC, 2013, p. 11). In similar vein, the OHCHR has
recently issued its vision on how human rights accountability can be integrated in the post-2015
agenda (OHCHR, 2013).
Another key issue is the relation between human rights and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda. At
the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Bussan, human rights were recognized as
the foundation of co-operation for effective development. A thematic Session on ‘Rights-Based
Approaches to Development’ was held, underlining the need to move forward on the issue.
Donors such as SIDA have advocated a ‘broadened’ and ‘more inclusive’ aid effectiveness
agenda, noting that there are various possibilities to better include human rights and gender
within the concepts and practice of aid effectiveness (SIDA, 2010). Several reports and authors
have pointed towards the compatibility of the human rights agenda with the Paris Declaration,
arguing that human rights norms, analysis and practice can add ‘practical value’ by providing
additional tools to strengthen the implementation and monitoring of the Paris principles (Foresti
et al., 2006, p. 11). In enhancing donor harmonization for example, the international human
16

17. rights framework can provide a ‘unique starting point’, as it combines legal authority and political
legitimacy (Foresti et al., 2006, p. 42). Stressing how objectives such as reducing poverty and
increasing growth cannot be met if human rights are not addressed, the OECD-DAC has
provided guidance on how to improve the linkages between human rights and the aid
effectiveness in the health sector (OECD/GOVNET, 2008a), and published a series of briefings
with action points for integrating human rights into each Paris principle.
Finally, it is also worth noting that a HRBA is seen as complementary to the concept of, people-centred
or pro-poor growth, endorsed by many donors (Foresti et. al., 2010), and it overlaps
with the capability- or livelihoods- approach commonly applied within the development
community (Vizard, 2006; Vizard et al., 2011). In this sense, rather than adding a ‘new’ agenda
or overriding others, the integration of human rights suggests adjusting or calibrating existing
priorities, tools and methodologies in line with the human rights framework and principles.
17
2.2. HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE AND CONDITIONALITY
The most evident form of integrating human rights in development policy is the use of human
rights-based conditionality in the allocation of aid. The majority of traditional bilateral donors
apply political conditionality policies, which very often includes a human rights dimension
(OECD/WB, 2013, p. 45). Importantly, conditions relating to democratic governance and human
rights have appeared as one of the major differences between ‘western’ donors and emerging
‘southern’ donors. Conditionality plays an important role in deciding which aid modality to use,
and specifically whether to provide direct (budget) support to governments (see box 3). The
purpose of human rights-based conditionality and dialogue is to use development aid as
leverage for ensuring compliance with human rights norms. Practically, this implies that
determining the eligibility of countries and the performance of partners is subjected to human
rights assessments. The concept and application of conditions in aid allocation has seen an
evolution from ‘negative’ or ‘punitive’ (i.e. suspending or threatening to suspend support) to
‘positive’ and ‘consensual’ conditionality (i.e. avoiding suspension, emphasizing dialogue,
making increases or decreases in support dependent on commonly agreed indicators) (Killick et
al., 1998; Morrow, 2005). Consensual conditionality implies donor and recipient enter into a
‘constructive’ policy dialogue. In donor terminology, ‘conditionality’ is often avoided and replaced
by a ‘dialogue’, but arguably, policy dialogue can be seen as another form of donor
conditionality (Molenaers and Renard, 2008, p. 11). It is important to note that the inclusion of
human rights as a condition is contested by a technocratic approach, recommended by the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, which posits that political or human rights
conditionality “should not be specifically linked to budget support or any individual aid
instrument, but rather should be handled in the context of the overarching political dialogue
between a partner country and its donors” (OECD-DAC, 2006, p. 32-33). This implies donors
should separate human rights issues from macro-economic, managerial and ‘technical’
conditions, and as ‘political issues’, they should not be part of the policy dialogue of
development partnerships. Before addressing the contested place of human rights in policy
dialogues, we first present a brief overview of how donors have included human rights in the

18. process of selecting partner countries and in the subsequent monitoring of partnership
performance.
18
Box 4: General and Sector Budget Support
The OECD-DAC defines ‘budget support as “[…] a method of financing a partner’s country
budget through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the partner
government’s national treasury. The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance with the
recipient’s budgetary procedures.” (OECD-DAC, 2006, p. 26). Budget support emerged as an
aid-modality at the turn of the millennium. Since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and
the European Council’s ‘Consensus on Development’, budget support has been favoured by
many donors over ‘traditional’ project or programme-based development (Koeberle and
Stavreski, 2006, p. 7-8). A crucial distinction is to be made between general budget support - a
general contribution to the overall public budget - and sector budget support - financial aid
earmarked to a specific sector - usually defined in broad terms such as education and health -
or a more specific subsector, such as primary health care financing. Sector budget support is
not to be confused with a Sector-wide Approach (SWAp), which also focuses on a particular
sector but implies the use of various aid modalities including but not restricted to sector budget
support. The difference between general and sector budget support is of particular relevance to
‘political’ and human rights conditionalities and dialogues. Sector budget support is often
perceived as being outside the scope of ‘political dialogue’ as it targets specific areas below the
national level. Accordingly, some donors such as the EU, foresee a transfer of resources from
general to sector support, or towards other aid modalities, in case of human rights violations
(EC, 2012).
Despite the affirmation of budget support as the most ‘aid effective’ modality at the Busan
Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the actual use of budget support has stagnated.
The Paris Declaration set a target of 85% of ODA being channelled through budget support.
The 2011 OECD-DAC survey on the use of budget support estimated the share of budget
support in ODA at only 43% (OECD-DAC, 2011, p.32). Accordingly, there has been a growing
disillusion about the results of budget support, and large donors such as DFID have indicated
progressive decreases in funding for this modality (ODI, 2012, p. 1).
2.2.1. Human Rights as a Prerequisite
In many instances, donors refer to human rights as an underlying principle of their partnerships,
often as part of several conditions relating to ‘democratic governance’ or ‘good governance’
(UNDP, 2007). The Irish development agency for example, understands good governance as
‘respect for human rights and the rule of law, free press, pluralistic democracy, independence of
the judiciary, accountability to citizens’ (IrishAid, 2008, p. 5). The German Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) considers a state eligible if they act in a ‘development-oriented
manner’, which includes that it ‘respects and protects all human rights and earnestly
endeavours to fulfil them for all its citizens’ (BMZ, 2009, p.5). It has developed a catalogue of

19. criteria which underlines granting of budget support is ‘conditional on compliance with reliable
minimum standards of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and peace’ (BMZ, 2008, p.14).
Similarly, the political governance conditions applied by Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation (NORAD) includes human rights but also ‘open multi-party elections’ and
‘participation in decision-making processes’ (NORAD, 2007, p. 11) and the criteria set by the
Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) are based on three overarching pillars: ‘respect of
human rights, democracy and the rule of law, peace and security’ (ADC, 2009, p. 17). The
human rights element is thus one out of several components defining governance preconditions.
However categorised, most bilateral donors include a broad reference to human rights, and
‘good’ or ‘democratic’ governance as underlying principles in the memorandum of
understanding agreed upon with the partner country (Hoven, 2009; Vanheukelom et. al., 2011;
Molenaers, 2012).
Because of the close link to democratic or good governance, human rights conditionality has
traditionally focused on PCR (OECD-DAC, 2006, p.53). This is perhaps evident, as the
progressive realisation of ECSR is considered a goal, rather than a prerequisite, of development
policy. Accordingly, donors might refer to a ‘willingness to move forward’ on ECSR (DANIDA,
2012, p.10). Setting a commitment to the progressive realisation of ESCR as a precondition is
often framed through demanding a country-driven development strategy such as the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). As the World Bank and the IMF were the initial drivers
behind the poverty reduction strategy papers, these were conceived in technical terms and
without reference to human rights (Stewart and Wang, 2005; Tostensen, 2007). In the
meantime, inroads have been made to integrate human rights in poverty reduction strategies
and applying a human rights-based approach to the drafting process (OHCHR, 2003, 2006a;
WHO, 2005).10 In this regard, the revision of DFID’s conditionality policy in 2005 underlines the
need to incorporate human rights-based benchmarks into poverty reduction plans, linking a
commitment to poverty reduction with a commitment to respect human rights and other
international obligations (DFID/FCO/HMT, 2005, p. 4). Some country PRSPs include references
to human rights in general, as well as specific areas of human rights.11
Although human rights are generally referred to as a precondition for selecting partner
countries, the methodology or process behind the selection remains unclear. Donors use a
variety of in-house or external ‘governance assessments’ to verify compliance with
preconditions or monitor the performance of partnerships, but these are heavily focussed on
macro-economic performance, often paying special attention to the recipient’s track record on
corruption (Koeberle and Stavreski, 2005; UNDP, 2007). An OECD survey analysing a number
of different governance assessment tools indicated ‘human rights’ are included in most general
country assessments (OECD-DAC, 2008a). These can include human rights indicators (see box
10 Note the human rights-based approach to PRS put forward by the OHCHR is not just an effort to ‘rephrase’ PRSPs
in human rights language; it also incorporates the conceptual framework of HRBA as described in section 4.
11 For example the current and previous PRSPs of the government of Malawi refer to human rights and embraces the
concept of a human rights-based approach to development (Government of Malawi, 2012; Tostensen, 2007). Other
countries such as Tanzania and Uganda have also incorporated human rights language in their first PRSPs
(Tostensen, 2007).
19

20. 4), which can be broadly categorised as indicators for ‘compliance measurement’ and for
‘performance assessment’ (see Box 4).
While it is possible to identify eligibility conditions by screening donor policy documents, the
actual selection procedures are often not transparent. A recent study indicates two out of five of
the examined donors referred to human rights explicitly in their eligibility criteria, but how these
are assessed and weighed against other criteria in the selection procedure is not clear
(Molenaers, 2012, p. 797). A 2006 evaluation study on budget support indicates donors tend to
emphasize technical assessments while political risks (e.g. probability of human rights
violations) were less considered (IDD and Associates, 2006). It is also crucial to note aid
allocation is not only determined by conditionalities set by donor agencies, but is often part of a
larger strategy at the level of foreign ministries.12 In this sense, the apparent double standards
regarding human rights issues are an oft mentioned criticism. To confront this, the need to
harmonize eligibility criteria and assessments and make them more objective, has been
stressed (UNDP, 2007, p. 68; OECD-DAC, 2008a). This is also supported in the EU’s recently
adopted strategy on budget support, which urges member states to engage more closely and
coherently on the conditions of aid allocation and coordinate their human rights assessments
(Council of the European Union, 2012a).
20
2.2.2. Human Rights in Performance Assessment
Assessing and monitoring the performance of recipient governments is a pertinent issue for all
donors. In some cases, eligibility and performance criteria are the same, while other donors use
different assessment criteria (Molenaers et al., 2010, p. 15). In order to monitor violations and/or
progress on the realisation human rights, donors often demand annual assessments of their
country offices. These assessments are sometimes part of general country assessments, or but
a number of donors also work with human-rights specific assessments (OECD-DAC, 2008a, p.
8). The assessments are often qualitative descriptions of the situation on the ground based
upon local and international sources, but can also include standardised human rights indicators
and ‘scores’ (i.e. comparative indicators). More than 30 different measurements exist (Dibbets
et al., 2010), box 5 presents a brief description of human rights indicators.
Box 5: Human Rights Indicators
To measure human rights a number of indicators have been developed which vary greatly in
scope, rigour, complexity and availability. The multi-dimensional nature of human rights cannot
be captured by one single ‘Human Rights Index’ (Landman and Carvalho, 2010, p.130). Some
aim to measure the occurrence of human rights violations or a state’s legal compliance with the
human rights framework. More complex measurements integrate several sub-indicators to
measure the extend to which a government has taken measures to ensure the realization of
12 Geopolitical interests, linguistic and cultural ties and post-colonial relationships are overarching factors which
explain aid allocation patterns and the ‘ambiguous’ implementation of human right and democracy-related
conditionality by different members of the donor community (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Barrat, 2008).

21. human rights, or as illustrated below, set out a comprehensive measurement framework for a
specific right (McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 20). In human rights assessments, two
principal methodologies of indicator formulations can be identified: (1) compliance indicators
measuring the human rights accountability of states as duty-bearers, and (2) indicators
measuring the effectiveness of state policy and/or the implementation of specific programmes
(McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 45).
In conditionality policy, indicators of compliance are most often integrated in governance
assessments. Most donors include here the state of ratification of human rights treaties and
other agreements. Commonly used by donors are the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs)
published by the World Bank Institute. This is a set of governance indicators, available for most
countries, covering several governance categories related to human rights, including ‘voice and
Accountability’ and ‘rule of law’. The WGIs integrate data from various human rights surveys
and databases, including the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. This is an indicator covering a
range of human rights areas including involuntary disappearances, torture, freedom of speech,
women’s rights, independence of the judiciary etc. A similar collection of human rights indicators
are the Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ indicators, which creates a global ranking
based on a checklist political rights and civil liberties. A more specific indicator is the ‘Press
Freedom Index’ developed by Reporters without Borders, which compiles a ranking on the basis
of questionnaires completed by journalists and media experts, measuring violations of the right
to freedom of expression. In transferring human rights issues to standardized scales, these
indicators rank countries according to their ability to protect human rights, only covering the
‘respect’ dimension of human rights (UNDP, 2006, p. 8). Focussing on violations or non-compliance,
they are often associated with negative human rights conditionality, e.g.
suspending aid in case of grave violations (McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 22). In line
with the concept of consensual conditionality policies and human rights dialogues, more
complex assessments focussing on the progressive realization of the human rights framework
have been developed. The Danish Centre for Human Rights has formulated extensive sets of
human rights indicators which combine compliance indicators with human development
indicators (e.g. literacy rate), adding new layers to measure the commitment to civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights, or efforts to eliminate discrimination, etc. (Sano and
Lindholt, 2000; Andersen and Sano, 2006). Elaborating on this work, the OHCHR has
developed a methodology and framework for monitoring state compliance with specific human
rights, such as the right to participate in public affairs, the right to health, or the right to food
(OHCHR, 2002, 2008; McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 18-24). The OHCHR
assessment framework presents three layers of human rights indicators;
 Structural (e.g. have states ratified human rights instruments/conventions),
 Process (e.g. factual indicators on specific issues, for example in case of the right to
21
freedom of expression, the number of censored newspapers),
 Outcomes (e.g. direct measures of the realization of a human right, for example in case
of the right to adequate housing the average of homeless persons per 100,000
population)

22. These assessments capture a duty-bearer’s commitment, efforts and results, respectively. For
each of these indicators the OHCHR has also developed guidelines for disaggregating data in
order to identify vulnerable and excluded groups (OHCHR, 2002, 2008; McInerney-Lankford
and Sano, 2010, p. 18-24). The indicators were developed for the UN human rights treaty
bodies, whereby states are expected to report using the assessment framework. However, they
can also serve as instruments for donors in evaluating partnerships or measuring progress in
specific areas of work in partner countries. In Annex 3 the OHCHR indicator set for the right to
health is included as an example. In addressing the lack of uniformity in ‘measuring human
rights’ between development actors, the use of these OHCHR indicators may help promote a
more systematic approach (McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 18-24). However, to date
their practical use is still limited as most states still have to adopt this reporting framework.
Moreover, states might not have the capacity to carry out the extensive data collection that is
required, or might be unwilling to share data of a sensitive-nature (Landman and Carvalho,
2010, p. 122). Donor agencies face the same practical challenge in operationalizing the more
complex human rights indicators within programmes or projects. Linking such programme
assessments/indicators in the human rights field to country or global assessments/indicators
also remains a challenge (Dibbets et al., 2010, p. 47). How donors can effectively integrate
human rights concerns and results-based management within their monitoring and evaluation
framework continues to be a work in progress.
In assessing human rights performance donors have a range of assessments and indicators to
choose from. However, again, there is little donor transparency as to how these are used, and
what decision-making processes guide human rights considerations in performance
assessment. As human rights are often included as ‘underlying principles’ in partnership
agreements, their exact content often remains vague (Molenaers, 2012, p. 800-801). As such
there is a significant difference in how donors interpret them, to what extent they are considered
actual ‘conditions’, and when a breach of these principles should lead to suspension of support
(Molenaers, 2012, p. 800-801). Accordingly, there seems to be little coherence donor policies
concerning the weight attributed to human rights performance. For example, NORAD’s
performance assessment framework includes human rights, gender and environmental
concerns as cross-cutting issues, but these are applied pragmatically, taking into account
country-specific conditions and the limitations of specific programmes (NORAD, 2005, p. 17).
Similarly, the EC’s recent revision of its budget support policy notes ‘conditions may be
attached’ but does not prescribe the use of specific indicators as these ‘should be drawn from
each country's national and/or sector development policy’ and should ‘contain a mix of process,
output and outcome indicators’ (EC, 2011a, p. 10).
Rather than using uniform performance indicators, the EC, as many other donors, relies on
broader qualitative reporting from its country delegations. Moreover, concerns have been raised
about ‘overburdening’ the budget support instrument with too many assessment- and indicator-tools
(ODI/ETTG, 2012, p. 5). While human rights concerns seem to play an increasing role
between donors and recipients, the experience to date shows the termination of support only
occurs in extreme cases of violations, such as military coups or fraudulent elections (Bartels,
2005, p. 37; OECD/WB, 2013, p.46; Zimelis, 2011, p. 403).
22

23. 23
2.2.3. Human Rights in Policy Dialogues
Through policy dialogue, donors engage with recipients to persuade them to adopt particular
policies and reforms (Morrissey, 2005, p 237). While conditionality has an element of coercion,
policy dialogue does not, and arguably is a more effective means of reforming policy (Morrissey,
2005, p 237). To what extent human rights can or should be addressed in policy dialogue is a
contested issue within the donor community. As noted earlier, the ‘technocratic’ approach
proposed by the OECD-DAC advices against the use of budget support as an instrument to
address human rights issues or political developments (OECD-DAC, 2006). Accordingly what
has been proposed is a separation between a ‘political’ dialogue at the diplomatic or ministerial
level, and a ‘policy’ dialogue at the level of development actors, which refrains from addressing
human rights issues (Molenaers, 2012, p. 796). Within the EU, such political dialogue can be
initiated under the Cotonou agreement (box 6), which provides an institutionalised instrument for
EU member states to address human rights issues with their ACP partner countries. Despite the
platform offered by the Cotonou framework, bilateral donors use the policy dialogue ‘unilateraly’
to address human rights concerns. Indeed, a significant part of mainstreaming human rights
(see infra 4.) which several donors, including the EC have undertaken, is to introduce human
rights issues more openly with partner governments. As Germany’s Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development states, budget support has a ‘governance objective’ to ‘promote
political dialogue on respect for and realisation of human rights, democratic participation, the
rule of law and gender equality’ (BMZ, 2008, p. 8).
Box 6: EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement
As early as 1977 the EU/EC has applied human rights conditionality when it suspended aid to
Uganda in response to massacres committed under the regime of Idi Amin (Bartels, 2005). The
use of human rights as a condition of aid was first institutionalized in the Lomé IV agreement
between the EU and the ACP countries, stating “Cooperation shall be directed towards
development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which
entails respect for and promotion of all human rights.”(EC, 2000, Article 5). The legal framework
and instruments for applying human rights-based conditionality were further developed in the
revision of the Lomé agreements and eventually consolidated by the Cotonou Partnership
Agreement signed in 2000 (Zimelis, 2011; Cuyckens, 2010). The Cotonou agreement affirms
respect for human rights, adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law as ‘essential
elements’ of the ACP–EU partnership (EC, 2000, Article 9). In case of a breach of any of these
essential elements, a three step process is initiated, as described under Article 96 of the
Agreement (Cuyckens, 2010). In first instance, an ‘exhaustive political dialogue’ must be
undertaken between the parties. If these efforts are not satisfactory a consultation procedure is
launched in which the EU troika (Council presidency, Secretary-General of the Union and the
Commissioner in charge of external relations) negotiates with the ACP country in question
accompanied by friendly countries, regional organizations and members of the ACP secretariat.
In case this consultation procedure has failed to resolve the issue, in a last stage the adoption of
‘appropriate measures’ is considered, with suspension of the agreement - and subsequent
freezing of official aid - as last resort (Article 96(2)(c)(1)).

24. Several of the above mentioned donors share this policy approach, and human rights dialogues
have been initiated at the sector level, at the country-strategy or as part of bilateral relations
(Piron and O’Neil, 2005; p.35).13 The importance of human rights in policy dialogues was further
underlined by the Accra Agenda for Action, which referred to international obligations of human
rights in its provision for an expanded policy dialogue between development partners
(McInerney-Lankford and Sano, 2010, p.33). Moving beyond a ‘punitive conditionality’ towards
consensual dialogue, the use of the above-mentioned human rights assessments and indicators
can be used to identify areas of common concern between donor and recipient (McInerney-
Lankford and Sano, 2010, p. 12). Using the human rights framework to identify areas of work or
highlight issues such as discrimination adds legal grounds to donor concerns, but the
effectiveness of this strategy also depends on whether partner governments recognize the
validity of human rights norms, or deny violations are taking place (Würth and Seidensticker,
2005, p. 18). Arguably, a successful integration of human rights into policy dialogues largely
depends on the openness of the partner government.
24
2.3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAMMES
Integration of human rights in development policy has come in the form of individual projects
which are directly targeted at the realisation of specific rights, the rights of specific groups or in
support of specific human rights organisations or defenders (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 48). Within the
so-called first generation of human rights policies in development, the scope of human rights
projects has been limited to initiatives covering various dimensions of democratic governance.
Accordingly, many projects focus mainly on the realisation or protection of PCR and are initiated
under the broader umbrella of ‘democracy promotion’ or ‘good governance’. Uvin describes
these projects as a form ‘positive support for human rights’ where the goals is to ‘create the
conditions for the achievement of specific human rights outcomes’ (Uvin, 2004, p. 83). He
estimates around 10% of aid budgets are dedicated to this type of support, but the share of the
human rights projects within the total budget differs from donor to donor. Human rights and
democracy projects have various goals; build the capacity of human rights organisations (e.g.
civil society groups, national human rights institutions), provide human rights training and
human rights education (e.g. to civil servants, community workers, politicians, teachers, labour-unions,
etc.), support for legal reform (e.g. adoption of laws in line with human rights framework,
strengthening judicial infrastructure, training judges) (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 48). Besides investing
in organisations or public structures, projects can also be limited to certain democratic or human
rights-related processes and procedures (e.g. support and monitoring of referenda and
elections, capacity-building for media and political parties). In addition to country-specific
support, bilateral donors have also invested in global initiatives on human rights, or have
provided funds for research projects and knowledge dissemination on human rights (OECD/WB,
2013, p. 49).
13 This shift towards multi-leveled human rights dialogue is in line with the adoption of a human rights-based
approach, as discussed in section 3.

25. While several donors have adopted human rights policies which cover all development areas,
often governance related human-rights projects remain at the core of their human rights work.
For example, SIDA launched its programme for ‘peace, democracy and human rights’ in 1997
which at the time mainly funded projects aimed at promoting democratic values through civil
society organisations (SIDA, 2008, p. 9). In 2010, up to 27% of SIDA’s assistance was
dedicated to ‘democracy and human rights’ and more than one third of this budget was targeted
towards democratic participation and civil society support (SIDA, 2011a). A different example of
a human rights-specific policy with a strong focus on political governance is the European
Commission’s European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).14 Its resources
are dedicated to electoral observation missions and democracy building, projects regarding
freedom of expression and association, human rights education and civil society building, as
well as the protection of human rights defenders (EIDHR, 2011). Often, donors have established
similar human rights- or democracy-specific funds for channeling resources to civil society
organization. For example, the Dutch government established a ‘Human Rights Funds’ in 2008
to support activities and capacity-building of human rights organizations as well as protect and
support human rights defenders (DMFA, 2007). Donors have also set up joint human rights-funds
with a specific country focus, such as the ‘Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund’ aimed
at strengthening democratic governance in Nepal, a joint-initiative by five bilateral donors (ESP,
2012).
Donors direct their human rights funding through several channels, including multilateral
organisations, international, local and domestic NGOs, domestic and local human rights
institutions, partner country government offices or public institutions, domestic private sector
companies such as consultants, etc. A case in point is NORAD’s human rights portfolio which
distinguishes seven categories of human rights channels, of which multilateral organizations,
local and domestic Norwegian NGOs are the biggest recipients (NORAD, 2011, p. 36).
Similarly, the EC’s financial commitments towards democracy and human rights are mainly
channeled through international organisations and civil society organizations (EC, 2011b, p. 36).
Human rights programmes are often carried out in cooperation with multilateral organizations in
‘multi-bi’ or ‘bi-multi’ programmes. In many cases UN-agencies are involved which have build-up
considerable experience in working with human rights in development (see infra, p.16). For
example, a significant share of the EC’s human rights and democracy budget is channeled
through the UNDP (EC, 2011b, p. 36). Different types of partnerships are those with national
human rights institutions (NHRIs).15 Donors can directly strengthen the institutional development
of these human rights ‘watchdogs’ in recipient countries. Alternatively, they can provide funding
or commission development projects to their ‘domestic’ NHRI. For example DANIDA cooperates
with the Danish Institute for Human Rights in organizing human rights centred-capacity building
in developing countries (DIHR, 2010; 2012). Another specific niche in the human rights portfolio
is support for the international bodies, structures and mechanisms related to the human rights
14 Until 2006 named the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.
15 A NRHI can be defined as ‘an institution with a constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote
human rights. NHRIs are independent, autonomous institutions that operate at the national level. They are part of the
State, are created by law, and are funded by the State.’ (UNDP/OHCHR, 2010, p. 2). An important element in
engaging with NHRIs is their capacity to function independently from the government, this is measured through
assessing compliance to the ‘Paris Principles’(UNDP/OHCHR, 2010, p. 10).
25

26. framework, which includes international or regional courts, and the broader UN human rights
system consisting of the human rights council, treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, etc. In this
regard a particular funding channel is the contributions made to the Office of the High-
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which manages nine voluntary trust funds through
which states can contribute to specific activities (OHCHR, 2011, p. 154-161). With regards to
the development activities of the OHCHR in particular, funds can be earmarked for its field work
in specific regions. Bilateral donor agencies such as SIDA have provided support to specific
OHCHR country programmes and intensified dialogue and cooperation at the local/national
level (SIDA, 2011b).
Despite this diversity in funding channels and partnerships, human rights initiatives in the
context of democracy-building have often been aimed at supporting civil society organizations
working on political and civil rights. This type of engagement thus becomes inherently political,
as the choice of partner organizations can affect relations with the local government. In this
sense, donors often emphasize the importance of funding organisations which work towards the
‘peaceful conciliation of group interests’ (EC, 2011c, p.3) and do not undermine legitimate state
institutions (SIDA, 2007).
26
2.4. HUMAN RIGHTS MAINSTREAMING
Human rights-and democracy programmes have been on the policy menu of donors for some
time, but have often remained an isolated branch within agencies. A strict separation has
existed or still exists between human rights and democracy projects and ‘traditional’
programmes focusing on technical interventions in non-governance areas such as agricultural
development or education (Uvin, 2004, Sano 2000). This ‘ghetto-isation’ of human rights is not
only institutional, but can also be the consequence of staff-perceptions (e.g. ‘human rights are
not part of my work’) or political decisions (EC, 2011b, p. 70). In reaction to this, several donors
have moved towards more comprehensive approaches to integrating human rights in
development policy, enabling human rights to be considered more broadly. Moving away from
the notion that human rights are only a tool in democracy promotion, various donors have
increasingly integrated human rights outside the area of political governance through
mainstreaming policies.
Mainstreaming human rights in donor policy can be understood as the integration of human
rights in all areas and dimensions of development cooperation policy. The EC clarifies
mainstreaming as ‘the process of integrating human rights and democratization issues into all
aspects of EU policy decision making and implementation, including external assistance’ (EC,
2006, p. 13). Mainstreaming policies often seem to ‘evolve’ into a HRBA, a policy concept which
is discussed at length under section 3. For example, the recent EU ‘Strategic Framework and
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’ indicates a more coherent approach to
systematic mainstreaming by adopting a human rights-based approach to the EU’s
development policy (Council of the European Union, 2012b, p. 1). Similarly, the UN system
which in many ways pioneered human rights mainstreaming, has since evolved to a ‘human
rights-based approach’.

27. In terms of policy, human rights mainstreaming often implies that all activities are screened for
their potential human rights impact, a so-called ‘Do No Harm’ policy (see infra 3.5.1.). In
addition, mainstreaming has often been associated with addressing human rights more clearly
and consistently in policy and political dialogues with partners (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 6).
Mainstreaming human rights is closely related to a ‘human rights-based approach’, as both
approaches apply an understanding of the human rights framework to development policy.
Accordingly, most donor policies, as well as practitioners, do not differentiate clearly between
the two concepts. In this analysis we differentiate between a human rights-based approach (see
section 3) on one hand, which entails an institution-wide reorientation of a donor’s view on
development and the adoption of a coherent ‘theory of change’, and mainstreaming human
rights on the other hand, which can be seen as less comprehensive and often focussing on
particular sub-groups of human rights such as women’s rights (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 28-34).
While the HRBA implies a strengthening and systematic application of human rights
mainstreaming, a ‘mainstreaming’ policy does not necessarily imply the adoption of a HRBA and
can be more selective in its scope. This becomes clear in donor practice, where mainstreaming
human rights has often focussed on two specific areas; the rights of the child (applying the
Convention on the Rights of Child) and women’s rights (applying the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women). Furthermore, the mainstreaming of
women’s and children’s rights is often undertaken most comprehensively in the health and
education sector, whereas donors have found it more challenging to mainstream human rights
in other areas (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 35-41). While the relevance of the human rights framework
for sustainable livelihoods or infrastructure programmes has been explored, in practice donors
have found it more difficult to operationalize human rights mainstreaming (or apply a HRBA) in
these areas.
27
3. HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
3.1. HRBA AS A CONCEPT
The increasing convergence of human rights and development policy has led to strategies, of
which the most comprehensive has been the Human Rights-Based Approach to development
(HRBA). A HRBA builds upon ‘human rights mainstreaming’ by applying a human rights
perspective to all areas of human development. Since the late nineties, it has been adopted by
a significant number of multilateral and bilateral donors and NGO development agencies, to the
extent that we can now speak of a ‘rights-based development sector’ within the development
community (Kindornay et al., 2012, p. 485). An early definition by the Overseas Development
Institute formulates a HRBA as follows;“A rights-based approach to development sets the
achievement of human rights as an objective of development. It uses thinking about human
rights as the scaffolding of development policy. It invokes the international apparatus of human
rights accountability in support of development action. In all of these, it is concerned not just
with civil and political rights, but also with economic, social and cultural rights.” (ODI, 1999; p.1).
Within the UN system, the concept of a HRBA was born out of the need to have a more

28. comprehensive, coherent and systematic understanding of ‘mainstreaming’ human rights across
agencies (Oberleitner, 2008, p. 361). UNICEF pioneered the implementation of a HRBA as it
progressively aligned and designed its development strategy in line with the standards and
principles of the Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC), officially mandating this approach in
1998 (Oberleitner, 2008, p. 369). To harmonize the various experiences within the UN, a
‘common understanding’ on the HRBA, also known as the Stamford Common Understanding,
was written down in 2003 and adopted by the UN development group.16
Box 7: UN Interagency Common Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to
28
Development (UNCU)
 All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should
further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other international human rights instruments.
 Human rights standards contained in, and principles17 derived from, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all
development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the
programming process.
 Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-bearers’
to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights.
The UN Common Understanding (UNCU – see Box 6) captures in broad strokes what the
concept of a HRBA stands for; the establishment of a legal basis for development work by
explicitly applying the human rights framework; the instrumental use of human rights standards
and principles in development operations; and the emphasis on the awareness and structural
capacity of both rights-holders (e.g. citizens) and duty-bearers (e.g. governments). The UNCU is
not authoritative, donors and agencies have developed their own interpretations of a HRBA, and
accordingly it “[…]has come to mean different things to different people, depending upon
thematic focus, disciplinary bias, agency profile, and the external political, social, and cultural
environment” (Darrow and Tomas, 2005, pp.483). Parallel to the UNCU, the Development
Assistance Committee of the OECD issued a recommendation on how to effectively integrate
human rights into development policy through ten principles for harmonized donor action
(OECD-DAC, 2007 – Box 8).
16 The United Nations Development group was founded in 1997 and comprises the 32 funds, programmes, agencies,
and other UN bodies that play a role in development.
17 The Common Understanding identifies the following six principles; universality and inalienability; indivisibility; inter-dependence
and inter-relatedness; non-discrimination and equality; participation and inclusion; accountability and the
rule of law. These principles and their implication will further be elaborated upon under section 3.4.

29. 29
Box 8: OECD-DAC Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development
1. Build a shared understanding of the links between human rights obligations and development
priorities through dialogue.
2. Identify areas of support to partner governments on human rights.
3. Safeguard human rights in processes of state-building.
4. Support the demand side of human rights.
5. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for more inclusive and stable societies.
6. Consider human rights in decisions on alignment and aid instruments.
7. Consider mutual reinforcement between human rights and aid effectiveness principles.
8. Do no harm.
9. Take a harmonised and graduated approach to deteriorating human rights situations.
10. Ensure that the scaling-up of aid is conducive to human rights.
Although the OECD-DAC does not explicitly recommend a HRBA in line with the UNCU, the
above principles could be read as ‘action-oriented’ interpretations of the UNCU.
The ‘vagueness’ of the HRBA has been a recurrent point of criticism (Darrow and Tomas, 2005,
pp.483), but has also been regarded as a ‘flexibility’; it can be adapted to a range of different
policy contexts, adopted as a comprehensive institution-wide concept or applied selectively to a
specific area or type of intervention. A good example of this flexibility is how some agencies or
specific development projects have worked with a ‘rights-based’ instead of a ‘human rights-based’
approach. While the acronym HRBA is most commonly used to cover both – as in this
paper - some rights-based approaches do not specifically draw upon the principles and
conventions agreed upon in international human rights law. Arguably, this gives the advantage
of defining rights more fluidly and allows greater interaction with local understandings of justice
and local power dynamics (Piron, 2005a, p. 24-25). However, the absence of a normative
framework risks broadening the scope of rights language to include virtually any demand, and
therefore the UNCU underlines the necessity to refer to the actual obligations of states under
the human rights framework. It also emphasizes the relevance of the larger human rights
system for development programming (human rights treaty bodies, Special Rapporteurs, the
Universal Periodic Review, etc.).18 For an overview of how the various human rights instruments
and mechanisms are connected to the main work-areas of development cooperation agencies,
as well as the millennium development goals (MDGs), a reference sheet can be found in Annex
2. Below, the motives and drivers for adopting a HRBA are further discussed (section 3.2).
Section 3.3 discusses the core concepts of the HRBA. Under sections 3.4 and 3.5 an
assessment is made of how a HRBA translates into policy and practice.
18 The UNCU identifies the following elements which are ‘necessary, specific, and unique’ to a human right-based
approach: Assessment and analysis in order to identify the human rights claims of rights-holders and the
corresponding human rights obligations of duty-bearers as well as the immediate, underlying, and structural causes
of the non-realization of rights; Programmes assess the capacity of rights-holders to claim their rights and of duty-bearers
to fulfil their obligations. They then develop strategies to build these capacities; Programmes monitor and
evaluate both outcomes and processes guided by human rights standards and principles; Programming is informed
by the recommendations of international human rights bodies and mechanisms (UNCU, 2003).

30. 30
3.2. MOTIVES AND DRIVERS FOR ADOPTING A HRBA
In theory, the adoption of a HRBA demands “a systematic transformation in the way in which the
goal of development is conceptualized, objectives set and monitored, strategies developed and
the relationship with partners managed.” (Piron, 2005a, p. 23). Accordingly, the reasoning
behind the adoption of a HRBA can be twofold; a normative approach (i.e. a new vision on
development) and/or an instrumental approach (i.e. a new way of doing development)
(OECD/WB, 2013; Darrow and Tomas, 2005; Piron 2005). The normative reasoning stresses
that states and their development agencies have a moral and legal duty to respect, protect and
fulfil human rights, including outside their national jurisdiction. As described in BMZ’s ‘Action
Plan’ “Human rights provide us with legally binding standards to which we, in common with our
partner countries, have committed ourselves inside and outside our borders. We have jointly
ratified international human rights treaties and so it is our joint responsibility to work for the
respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights. By meeting our obligations, we want to help
our partners specifically and effectively to meet theirs” (BMZ, 2008, p. 4).
The legal basis for the integration of human rights in development policies is increasingly
recognized. In the European context, the International Human Rights Network lists four
arguments (IHRN, 2008, p.49-50): (i) the Human rights treaty obligations of EU Member States
and partner developing states (ii) the obligation of states to respect their treaty obligations when
they act through the entities they create (e.g. development agencies) (iii) the EU founding
treaties; particularly Article 6 and 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (iv)
and the Cotonou Agreement (see box 3). An important development in the further clarification
and identification of the legal responsibilities which states have under international human rights
framework are the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (De Schutter, et al., 2012). Adopted in 2011 by leading
experts in international law and human rights, these principles are particularly relevant for
development policy as they provide a clear and consistent legal argument of how the human
rights frameworks applies to ‘matters of world poverty, inequality and development’ (Salomon,
2012, p.455).
Instrumental approaches see a HRBA as a way of enhancing the impact and effectiveness of
development work. As one of the early bilateral agencies to adopt the approach, SIDA states;
“The object of raising poor people’s standard of living can more easily be achieved through
working with a democracy and human rights approach. This approach conveys particular values
to development co-operation by setting the individual person in the centre. The approach can
also make cooperation more efficient through contributing to the identification of the people who
are discriminated against and the power structures in society that affect poor people’s lives.”
(SIDA, 2001, p.1). As described in more detail below, a rights-based approach addresses the
root causes of poverty (e.g. institutionalized forms of discrimination and exclusion) and focuses
on structural outcomes which can lead to more effective poverty eradication (Piron, 2005a, p.
23).

31. Besides adding greater potential for structural change, a HRBA is also seen as increasing
effectiveness through consolidating the use of ‘good programming practices’ (OECD/WB, 2013,
p. 88). Theorists and practitioners have identified several dimensions of added value of a
HRBA; it offers a normative basis for policy choices and a predictable framework for action with
the advantage of objectivity and the definition of appropriate legal limits (Darrow and Tomas,
2005, p. 485-486). From an organisational perspective, a HRBA has the potential to provide
development planning with more clarity and rigor and generate new partnerships by bringing
‘natural allies’ together (Hickey and Mitlin, 2009, p. 211). Moreover, the political challenges that
are central to many development issues can be more easily addressed using international
agreed norms rather than narrow political arguments (Hickey and Mitlin, 2009, p. 211). A HRBA
is thus presented as an empowering strategy towards human-centred development goals
(Darrow and Tomas, 2005, p. 486). By linking local and global action through shared human
rights standards, marginalised groups can achieve greater improvements in their economic,
social, or political condition (Sano, 2007, p. 68). Moreover, in applying a legal perspective to
development problems, a HRBA seeks to provide a secure basis for accountability (Darrow and
Tomas, 2005, p. 486). These advantages are further illustrated below, but it should be noted
that the ‘added-value’ of applying a HRBA is still contested (see section 4.1).
31
3.3. COMPONENTS OF THE HRBA: OUTCOMES AND PROCESSES
A HRBA sets as the outcome of development the fulfilment of all human rights (UNCU, 2003).
For bilateral donors this implies, in first instance, the formal recognition of the human rights
framework by themselves and their partners through the ratification of human rights conventions
and instruments, and amending national legislation thereto. Secondly, it implies enhancing
access to justice, supporting judicial reform, or other measures to improve the effective
enforcement of human rights obligations. This emphasis on legal formalism is often criticized as
a shortcoming of the use human rights-perspective in development practice, as it is unrealistic
to expect actual enforcement of ECSR in development contexts where states lack the required
resources (Darrow and Tomas, 2005; p. 517). In this regard it is crucial to underline the
concepts of ‘progressive realization’ and ‘justiciability’. It allows to differentiate between
‘negative liberties’ which are considered enforceable (generally but not exclusively PCR e.g.
right to life, freedom of expression), and ‘positive liberties’ (ESCR e.g. right to water, health,
education, food) which might not be immediately enforceable because of resource constraints,
but for which States are obliged to ‘[t]ake steps... to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights’ (ICESCR, Article 2.1).19
The justiciability of ECSR is thus often questioned, and as such a legal or HRBA approach to
problems related to extreme poverty (eg. lack of access to health) is not seen as useful.
However, a number of cases indicate the increasing justiciability of ECSR, as experiences in
India, the Philippines and South Africa illustrate (UNESCO, 2011, p. 28-29). A much-cited case
is the South African ‘Treatment Action Campaign’, which through constitutional litigation was
successful in reforming government policy, significantly lowering the cost of care for HIV/AIDS
19 Justiciability refers to legal enforcement on behalf of the victims, by way of filing a claim before national – judicial
and quasi-judicial – and impartial legal claims mechanisms, with a view to requesting a remedy or a redress of the
alleged violation (UNESCO, 2011, p. 27).

32. patients (Heywood, 2009). While the exact impact of legal action is difficult to measure, a
number of studies indicate adjudication of economic and social rights has already brought
substantial benefits to poor people and ‘likely enriched the lives of millions’ (Varun and Gauri,
2008, p. 303; See also Darrow, 2012, p. 93-99).
Although ESCR court cases have in some contexts had a very significant impact on
development processes and poverty reduction, international donors applying a HRBA often do
not adopt formal legal action as a goal or means. Assisting rights-holders to litigate can be part
of a HRBA, but in most rights-based development work actual legal procedures are not
undertaken and the focus lies on broader ‘rights awareness’. For example, DFID’s (previous)
human rights strategy noted how relying solely upon legal measures for the protection of human
rights is not sufficient (DFID, 2000, p. 17) is. Instead, the notion of “rendering the law real in
political and social processes”, and not only in courts or legislation, is important in most
understandings of a HRBA (Gready, 2008; p. 736). This is also illustrated by the ‘Treatment
Action Campaign’ in South Africa, which combined legal action with social mobilization,
awareness-raising and legal education (Heywood, 2009). Therefore the goal of HRBA
programming is often aimed at creating local understanding of human rights to address issues
such as corruption, discriminatory beliefs or public opinion is often part of HRBA programming
and projects often focussing on building the (non-legal) capacity of community-based
organizations (Gready, 2008, p. 739). Thus a HRBA implies using the ‘language of rights’, but
not strictly focussing on legal outcomes. Accordingly, a distinction can be made between using
a ‘legal HRBA’, focusing on more narrow, legalistic outcomes, and a ‘non-legal HRBA’ in which
rights are applied loosely as catalysts of change, for example, in the empowerment of social
movements (Sarelin, 2010, p. 126).
Interpreted either in a legal sense or in a broader political sense, the concept of ‘accountability’
is central in the different interpretations of a HRBA (Uvin, 2007, p. 601-602). By redefining
development in legal or political terms, the lack of accountability in development policy - which
has often been identified at the root of failing development efforts - is openly addressed (Uvin,
2007, p. 601-602). Accordingly, human rights are a means to create ‘a platform to demand
accountability’ (Tomas, 2005, p.173). Instead of isolated technical interventions, a HRBA
underlines the need for structural change by ‘transforming state-society relations’ with the final
aim of ‘strengthening the ‘social contract’ (Piron, 2005a, p. 22). Traditionally, donors have
tended to work on either the supply side -strengthening governance and reforming state- or on
the demand side - supporting civil-society organizations. As shown in box 9, the concept of a
HRBA stresses the need to support both sides simultaneously by linking demand and supply
through the lens of rights-holders, duty-bearers and citizenship (OECD/WB, 2013, p. 74).
This ‘macro-institutional approach’ to development should be guided by the human rights
framework, and posits that all development actors, whether donors, INGOs or local
organizations, conceive their work in terms of policy, law and institutions (Uvin, 2004, p. 131). In
this sense, it has been argued donors should be clearer about their understanding of what long-term
32
development entails by formulating an explicit ‘theory of change’ (Gready, 2011).