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It has been asked in a recent blog post for War on the Rocks, by Col. (Ret) Keith Nightingale,
“Why is America Tactically Terrific but Strategically Slipshod?” Nightingale argues in the post,
“we are always tactically overwhelming and strategically underwhelming.”1 Before delving into
my main argument about the question, one critical issue must be addressed. This paper assumes
that Nightingale is referring to America’s execution of U.S. national Grand Strategy (GS) vice a
more narrow focus on only military strategy. The reader must also consider his assumption
about tactical prowess. Logic would dictate that if the GS was slipshod, then theses faults would
create negative consequences which would permeate down through the levels of war. These
consequences would make being "terrific" less likely in terms of achieving tactical success. In
fact, we have seen this occur in almost every conflict but most relevant in Korea and Vietnam.
Furthermore, predictability in either GS or at the tactical level is not guaranteed. History has
proven that even if the strategy was flawless, it may not result in a tactical victory. Nor will a
string of flawless tactical victories always achieve the goals of a flawed strategy. So the terms
“terrific/slipshod” and “overwhelming/underwhelming” are ill-suited for this poorly constructed
false dichotomy. It is considered understood, that our U.S. military members always strive for
terrific tactical success despite where friction may originate. Thus, this paper will focus on
degrees of the United States’ strategic effectiveness over time. America makes mistakes and
others suffer for those mistakes but in totality our current situation proves that we must get it
right more often than not.
I will argue that although America may appear “slipshod”, since our founding, we continue
to execute a core GS with more enduring strengths than weaknesses which attribute to America’s
current preeminence. I will support my argument by walking the reader through the last three
centuries using a framework first showing consistent core U.S. National interests, followed by

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reinforcing International Relations concepts and lastly via more recent cases of adept Strategic
adjustments. This methodology is important as realists would say that we are in a constant state
of war. “Since the United States was founded in 1776, she has been at war during 214 out of her
235 calendar years of existence.”2 If threats to our National interests and objectives occur that
often, then we better have a consistent framework to understand our foundation, history, and
environment in order to properly adapt to survive. During this process, I admit America has lost
its way at times. When that occurs, we are able to fall back on our documents that outline our
founding principles, regroup, and try again. After all, that is our strategic culture.
The first main weakness most argued by America’s GS detractors is consistency in written
documentation. “Scholars and policy makers have failed to develop a GS that guides their
actions and communicates that strategy to allies and adversaries. If neither the state nor its allies
and adversaries understand a state’s grand strategy, we have a prescription for miscalculation,
crisis, and war”3 Although there has always been the appearance of a lack of consistency in
America’s written GS, it is clearly documented and the core U.S. National interests have not
radically changed since our founding. Although the first formal National Security Strategy
(NSS)4 was published by President Regan that does not mean that America did not have one
prior to 1987. Every administration has produced some guiding document in the form of letters,
principles, or doctrines all the way back to Washington’s letters to the Continental Congress.5 I
will concede that the format and scope of the guiding documents mentioned above varied over
our history but the Constitution, Declaration, and Bill of Rights remains unchanged. These
interests and objectives are always key elements of any U.S. GS document, and supporting
policy or doctrine even if other content changes over time. The struggle for consistency is a
challenge for all nations but is specifically so for the United States based on our democratic form

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of government with included term limits. Standardization of the NSS assists in our articulation of
those core objectives, however, imperfect and serves to compensate for the individual
circumstances facing each administration. Our greatest strength, however, can be seen through
the continuity of themes present in our founding documents over time. “We the People of the
United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity...”6 While the same themes are rightful and
accurately reflected in the 2015 NSS which lists: Security, Prosperity, Values, and our place in
the International order.7 It is necessary to highlight the common theme of security, as it may be
the most prevalent and important term seen throughout our history. So clearly, we may have
weaknesses in our communications as issues change in relation to a developing world but we
have a core set of unchanging interests that are documented. Any form of communication is
subject to potential misunderstanding especially when the audience of our message is so diverse.
If our foundation is concrete, the next weakness to explore may be in the way we advance those
interest.
International Relations over the totality of the 20th century prove that although erratic,
American implementation has stayed true to our core GS interests by using it to calculate
relationships in order to manage our limited national resources. During this most active period,
we faced a plethora of Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) challenges in
WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold war. Through no accident, America’s GS
implementation over the 20th century through multiple individual conflict strategies collectively
resulted in America’s rise to preeminence as the world’s sole superpower.

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Threats to US interests were constantly manifested through GS collisions during the conduct
of multiple wars, assuaging vast domestic concerns, all while attempting to forge international
Coalitions, Alliances, and Institutions. At times, and as an inherent right, the U.S. has even
chosen to act alone to ensure its security. The second main weakness most argued by America’s
GS detractors is consistency in implementation. America does actively manage its
implementation. The consistency perception challenge is compounded when viewed only
through selective periods of time vice the totality. It is easy for the implementation to appear
choppy or disjointed. Some sub theories like the Domino and Containment theory may have been
flawed. However, the core aspects remain and in the end it is after all only a string of theories. “a
GS is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’
security for itself.”8 The key word in that sentence is “best”. When theory collides in a constantly
changing VUCA environment the results are a paradox with unpredictable results that must be
managed. “Theory only helps to put the latest in a long string of policy problems into a context
that inform the “best” possible decision at the time.”9 It is unrealistic to expect multiple
administrations with various levels of inherent capabilities to succeed every time in every case.
By staying true to our core GS, the management of the missteps has produced more than
adequate results. Weaknesses and shortcomings are not a complete failure if they result in
unipolar power. In fact, inconsistency in implementation as a potential weakness may actually be
a strength into our future.
America’s ability to adapt to a changing world is no more apparent than what we have
experienced in the last 20 years. The United States ability to make Strategic Adjustments in the
21st century is a strength that we must leverage because the theories of the past may not be
adequate to ensure continued future success. The liberalism component of our GS which extolls

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the exportation of America’s core values coupled with the accusation that we are constantly
changing our implementation is perceived as a weakness. “…liberalism, and limited liability-
have had a persistent, and even a dysfunctional, effect on the conduct of U.S. GS. But this is not
to deny that these same cultural legacies have also had certain positive effects…over time.”10 In
fact, we are purposefully strategically adapting to an environment which is pushing the limits of
policy and resource decision cycles. I would argue that even if there are negative effects of
exporting our values, the world is still a better place than the alternative. The 21st century has
included Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, a new cold war with Russia, and features the rise of
China. US is threatened as a unipolar hegemon with the War on Terror, Cyber-attacks, renewed
WMD threats, and Space operations. We must be able to rapidly expand or contract strategic
capabilities, commitments, and limited resources while finding a combination that still meets our
security concerns and holds true to the founding documents. “Yet to interpret this zigzag pattern
as indicative of confusion is to sell short those charged with the ship's, navigation. Those who
chart America's course do so with a clearly defined purpose in mind.”11 We will misstep because
this is all a great experiment but try to determine which zig is intentional and which zag was not.
In conclusion, this work should have shown you that the constant permutations of people,
competing paradigms, theories, and global frictions during the last three centuries only serves to
revalidate and reinforce the need for an ever changing GS rooted in core principles. The
argument proved that although America may appear “slipshod”, it is intentional and a strength.
Since our founding, we continue to execute a core GS with more enduring strengths than
weaknesses which attribute to America's current preeminence. This was apparent over the last
three centuries using the above framework first showing consistent core U.S. National interests,
followed by reinforcing International Relations concepts and lastly via more recent cases of

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adept strategic adjustments. Although I disagree with how Col. (Ret) Nightingale phrased the
question and in how he framed the argument, I am glad he asked it in the first place. Because
humans have a limited view of history and tend to make arguments based on single events we
must make every effort to bring this topic to the forefront of intellectual discussion least they
forget. If we do not, the implication is that our tactical military members will be more terrifically
dead than would have necessarily been required. While debating the effectiveness of America’s
tactical prowess and acknowledging persistent examples of strategic shortcomings, one must
agree that perfection is unrealistic. What America has proven, is that over time decisions made
with regard to advancing core interests allow for the greatest chance of preeminence or at least
preservation. So as with any debate on strategy, we must end where we started and quote the
dead general- “It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the time of action is
past”.12
DHL

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1 Keith Nightingale, Why is America Tactically Terrific butStrategically Slipshod?” War on the rocks,September 30,
2015,http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/why-america-is-tactically-terrific-but-strategically-slipshod/ Nov 09,
2015
2 Washington’s Blog,America Has Been At War 93% of the Time – 222 Out of 239 Years – Since 1776,February 20,
2015,http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/02/america-war-93-time-222-239-years-since-1776.html
3 WilliamC.Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice:The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy,
(Cambridge University Press), January 2015
4 National Security Strategy Archive, National Security Strategy 1987,Nov 09,2015, http://nssarchive.us/
5 National Archives, Records of the Continental and Confederation Congresses and the Constitutional Convention
Nov 09,2015, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/360.html
6 Constitution of the United States, Charters of Freedom , Nov 09,2015
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html
7 National Security Strategy Archive, National Security Strategy 2015,Nov 09, 2015, http://nssarchive.us/
8 Barry R. Posen, the sources of Military doctrine, (Cornell University Press, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs),26
August 1986
9 John Schuessler,IR Theory and Grand Strategy (AWC lecture, Aug 03,2015), slide4
10 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Changein American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,2006), pp. 169
11 Andrew Bacevich, American Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,2002),pp. 3
12 Clausewitz,Carl Von. On War. (Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton,N.J.:
Princeton University Press),1976