2. Objectives
1) Understanding Contracting and Transaction Cost
2) Nature of Firm: Ronald Coase
3) Case: Himont Technology Licensing
1) Why did Himont license its cutting edge
technology
2) Did the design of contract clauses solve some
of the licensor-licensee problems? How?
3. Nature of the Firm: Ronald Coase
“Father” of transaction costs economics
Currently Professor Emeritus of Economics at
University of Chicago Law School
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1991
Posed two Nobel-prize puzzles :
• Why do any firms emerge in a market
economy?
• Why not just One Big Firm for whole
economy?
Definition : “…the system of relationships which
comes into existence when the direction of resources
is dependent on an entrepreneur” (p. 393).
4. Transaction Cost
There are market (transaction) costs associated with using the price
mechanism to organize production
Price discovery costs
Contract and negotiation costs
Regulation costs (taxes)
Uncertainty costs
The firm will engage in the number of transactions where the costs
of doing so in the firm are equal to the transaction costs in the
market or to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur
A firm (under the authority of an entrepreneur) can
coordinate resources and minimize transaction costs
5. Cost curve of the firm
Firm size is determine by-
Amount of transactions
Mistakes
Failure to utilize factors of
production properly
Waste of resources
Supply price of factors of
production
As firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to
the entrepreneur i. e. Loss in efficiency
6. Contracting OR Licensing
For trading their unutilized technological portfolio
(Patents) i.e. intellectual property(IP)
Linear model of technology is no longer sufficient
Shareholders expect faster returns and more rapid
innovation cycles
Challenge of businesses being overtaken by their
competitors
Create additional potential route to capture greater value in
research & innovation
Enables a business to build direct partnerships to penetrate
fresh market
7. Handling problems of Opportunism in Vertical
Contracting
Codification
Reciprocal continuous know-how - Grant back
Difficult for the licensee to invent around the patent
Licensing implies lower control on the diffusion of the
technology
Building tacit know-how with codified knowledge
protected by patent reduces the problem
9. Incentive Compatibility of Licensing Agreement
Win-win situation for both the licensee as well as licensor
Monetary benefits for both the parties
Lack of complementary assets or financial capability were
the main reasons of licensing agreement
Licensing agreement between SEF’s and downstream
companies was mainly business transaction
Licensing between existing firms to newer firms was
mainly strategic decision
10. Rent diffusion effect v/s Revenue
Revenue generated should be more than erosion of profit due to increasing
other firms.
As new entrants increases in the industry, the rent diffusion effect increases
The licensing is an optional strategy when condition(i) is satisfied
Difference between Revenue v/s Rent diffusion is different to SEFs
SEFs are the process technology firm, whereas Himont was downstream
product technology firm.
11. Investing in technology – Sunk Cost
A source of revenues
R&D funding
General Trend – Licensing of old technology ( non – core
technology)
Licensing – A convenient strategy
Revenue Effect v/s Rent dissipation effect
Licensing the technology in-house:
Firms has distinctive complementary assests in
production and marketing
Transaction cost involved in selling or licensing of
technology
12. Strategy of large companies
40% - 50% licensed from third parties
Dow Chemical – acquiring new technology, formed
license group
DuPont – opening up of 25 specialty chemical businesses
Eastman Chemical – formed license unit to sell intellectual
property
14. Diffused licensing
Characteristics of knowledge base
General & abstract -> greater division of labour
Ease of technology transfer – high degree of
codification -> fewer interactions -> ability to reach
large markets
Emergence of chemical engineering as academic
discipline
Self-enforcing mechanism
15. Why did Himont license its cutting edge technology?
Generating licensing income as a stand-alone business to
accelerate R&D
Preventing others from competing in
Building an accelerated global market presence
Creating partnerships and JV to access new market
Allowing faster technology development through licensee
feedback
16. Did the design of contract clauses solve some of the
licensor-licensee problems? How?
Yes! the design of contract clauses solve some of the
licensor-licensee problems by –
1. Feedback from licensee also helped to accelerate the
learning curve
2. Identifying the technologies that are considered to be core
3. To execute self-propelling license cycle with steps:
1. Creating Value
2. Monetizing Value
3. Reinvesting