A Research Paper on the Professionalism in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, and the RAMSI Rectification.

Cameron Gruschow University of Canterbury 29 September 2016
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A Research Paper on the Professionalism in the Royal Solomon
Islands Police Force, and the RAMSI Rectification.
Although not seen at the same scale as interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Reginal Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was a
significant event in state building to many states in the Pacific region.
RAMSI consisted of a joint military, police, and government operation which
is primarily led by the Australian Government, but also featured contingents
from New Zealand, and other states within the Pacific. It has changed the
face of the Solomon Islands (SI), which was stuck with the potential for
ethnic violence on a large scale in 2003, to what appears to be relative
stability presently in 2016. This research paper will assess the
professionalism of the Royal SI Police Force (RSPIF), who act both as the
state’s police and defence force. Using the theories of Samuel Huntington,
and Rebecca Schiff, this paper will provide a conclusion that a lack of
professionalism was a key factor that led to the SI Government (SIG)
requesting a military intervention from Australia, and the creation of RAMSI.
This paper will also look at what military measures RAMSI has undertaken
to ensure the mission is a success, and to re-professionalise the RSPIF. A
number of primary and secondary sources will be used to help determine
the outcomes of these questions.

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Prior to the intervention of RAMSI, the SI defence sector was the
responsibility of the RSPIF Therefore, they held both the responsibilities for
civilian and territorial control. The key background events that led to
questions of the professionalism of the RSPIF, and the creation of RAMSI
were from 1998-2003. In 1998, an ethic conflict, known as “The Tensions”
begun on the island of Guadalcanal, which is home of the SI’ capital,
Honiara. It has been described as a “low-level” conflict, where local militias
begun to harass citizens who had settled there from the nearby island of
Malaita (Dinnen, 2014: 196). The main force was known as the Isatabu
Freedom Movement (IFM), who believed that Malaitan settlers on
Guadalcanal were socially advantaged at the expense of the local Guale
population (Dinnen, 2014: 202-203). At its peak, around 30,000-35,000
people, who were mainly Malaitian settlers were displaced from their rural
homes by force (Dinnen, 2008: 12). In response, militias that justified their
existence to protect the interests of Malaita Province emerged, the main
group known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). This led to violence, and
saw the SIG stuck in the middle. They were seemingly unable to respond to
the unprecedented event where young men had organised themselves into
militia groups that claimed to represent the interests of either Guales or
Malaitians (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300).
The SI has no recognised military force, so the RSPIF is tasked with its
defence. However, its lack of professionalism is possibly a cause to the SIG
seeking military intervention. The theories of Samuel Huntington and
Rebecca Schiff can be used. While both theories relate to factors behind
military coups, it can be used to determine the key factors for the SIG to
seek what would eventually be RAMSI’s intervention. Huntington (1957: 8-
10) argued that there were three criteria for a military to be considered as

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professional; expertise, corporateness, and responsibility to client. Firstly,
Huntington describes expertise as having “specialized knowledge and skill
in a significant field of human endeavour”. This is often achieved through
specialised education and training on military matters. Research appears to
show that this expertise was not present in the RSIPF at the time of The
Tension. On the facts, attempts had been made through the Townsville
Peace Agreement to reduce hostilities between the militias by appointing
Special Constables. Many of these people were in fact ex-militia men,
enlisted to work with the Police force (Fraenkel, 2008: 154). Based on this
information, it is highly unlikely that all of these members were trained to a
level of professionalism which would satisfy Huntington.
Secondly, there is a question as to whether the RSPIF showed a sufficient
amount of corporateness in their conduct. Huntington (1957: 10) claimed
that a “sense of organic unity” and the “sharing of a unique social
responsibility” were key aspects to achieving this concept. If there is
disunity, then the result will be a factionalised force, and potential clashing
of personalities. There are two aspects analysed which are of a concern in
meeting this concept. Firstly, the mass recruitment of special constables,
particularly those who had a militia background. To show lack of trust, the
United Nations decommissioned several hundred officers from a funded
programme (Hameiri, 2007: 431; Dinnen, 2014: 196). The RSPIF was
divided ethnically, which reflected the rival militias’ position. This would be
in correlation with a disproportionate amount of Malatians in the public
service, in particular the police.

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Thirdly, there needs to be a responsibility to the client. This is where a
service is performed that promotes the essential functioning of society
(Huntington, 1957: 9-10). The holder of this responsibility is also required to
have a monopoly of this responsibility. In this case, there are problems that
emerge, such as the raiding of police armouries. The RSPIF hold multiple
responsibilities to both the head of state, and society as a whole, as it acts
as both a police and defence force. While that can be managed, it is
problematic, when officers are supporting the militias which they were
supposed to have been eliminating. At a joint meeting between provincial
and political representatives in 2000, comments had made it clear that the
RSPIF was incapable of acting independently, and so recognising who their
client was (Scales, 2008: 227-228). This reached its peak when then Prime
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was forced to resign after certain entities in
the RSPIF backed a coup (Dinnen, 2002: 285-298).
While looking at Huntington’s military theory of professionalism can be
useful, it is too simplistic, and inconclusive. For example, Huntington
presumes that an unprofessional military may stage a coup d’état. He does
not consider the culture and context of a state, such as the SI. He also fails
to recognise that not all militaries that are unprofessional are capable of
staging a coup, they may just fail to provide adequate protection for the
government. Before RAMSI’s intervention, the SI had no detached military
force, it was the responsibility of the RSPIF. However, in this case
professionalism of the RSPIF in its role of defence can still be analysed.
Rebecca Schiff (1995: 12-16), provides a measure that can be used to
analyse the how the SI Government conducted itself in the lead-up to the
de-facto coup in 2002, and ultimately RAMSI intervention in 2003. Schiff
argues that in order to have a stable state, there needs to be concordance

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between the military (a role of the RSPIF), the state (the SIG), and society
(which includes those in the militias). This means that there are multiple
clients. All three bodies must agree on the social composition of the RSPIF
leadership, the political decision making process (recognition of who the
client is), agreement on a recruitment method, and military style.
The problem that Sinclair Dinnen (2014: 196) found was that the RSPIF
was so divided, that nothing could be done to maintain concordance
between them and the state. The anarchical behaviour of some of these
factions and the societal militias did not recognise the decision making
process, which is why Ulufa’alu was forced to resign. Total disaster was
however avoided, due to the Australian and New Zealand brokered
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) between the rival militias in 2000. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Phil Goff (2013: 2) felt that a
diplomatic approach similar to the Bougainville conflict in Papua New
Guinea was the best approach to take at the time. Here, a neutral venue
was provided, where the militias would be able to sort out their differences.
However, it did not address the underlying problems of professionalism,
and thus eliminate the serious risk of violence from occurring. The state
remained highly militarised, while ex-militants and rogue police officers
engaged in opportunistic violence throughout Guadalcanal, and Malaita
(Dinnen, 2014: 196).
If we look at the social composition of the RSPIF, we can see that it is
primarily dominated by those of Malatian ethnicity. While Schiff does not
require all ethnicities to be represented in the officer corps, in this case, a
Guadalcanal based militia threatening Malatian settlers on the island, the
likelihood of it causing division if the Government were unable to disperse
tensions quickly was high. Consequently, when they were ordered by the

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SIG to suppress the Guale militias as a means to restore order, which just
resulted in a further escalation of conflict because it was seen as a racial
crackdown (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 310). The RSPIF “was so compromised
by its links to former militants and criminal gangs that it was unable to keep
the peace” (Butler, 2008: 271). This analysis would suggest that a number
of Police officers joined, or cooperated with Malatian militias (Amnesty
International, 2000: 4-8). This would show a breach in the social
composition, but also breach the principle of responsibility according to
Huntington. For example, the paramilitary arm of the RSPIF had joined
forces with the MEF (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300). At the very least, we can
conclude that the SIG failed to deal with the Tension appropriately.
The political decision making process was also compromised by the
Government at the time. Their inability of the government to put down the
Guale militiamen’s attempts to force Malitians off the island is likely due to
the great divides within the RSPIF. Society’s confidence in being protected
by the SIG and the RSPIF appeared to be at an all-time low. When RAMSI
did arrive, military personnel that disembarked off the HMAS Manoora were
warmly welcomed by the local population (Glenn, 2007: 23). Even after the
signing of the TPA and the appointment of new Prime Minister Manasseh
Sogavare, the SIG was incapable of implementing any of the provisions in
the Treaty. This was to the point where militias were organising their own
disarmament plans instead of that responsibility being given to an
independent body (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 311-312). When factions of militia
groups, such as Harold Keke, who refused to accept the terms of the TPA,
it required a swift response from the SIG, through the RSPIF. As they did
not have the capacity to do so, they failed. As a result, the decision making
process is not functional, and as a result, there can be no concordance.

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A key concept for there to be professionalism through Huntington’s or
Schiff’s theory is that a professional military must hold a monopoly on
advanced weaponry in the state. With the emergence of the militias, there
was serious concern that the SIG was not able to maintain this for the
RSPIF. When reports of militants holding automatic weapons emerge, it
places a high likelihood on the monopoly being broken (Scales, 2008: 229).
There were also reports that members of a faction from Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (an armed separatist group based in the semi-
autonomous Papua New Guinean of Bougainville) had landed in
Guadalcanal with weaponry, as they looked to repel the Malatan Eagle
Force (MEF) from the province (Scales, 2008: 229-230). This report would
suggest that there was a risk of a movement of weaponry from Bougainville
to Guadalcanal. Additionally, the fractured RSPIF was unwilling/unable to
prevent their armouries from being raided, again leaving the monopoly of
weapons broken. In some cases, there have been reports that in fact
factions of the RSPIF also took part in these raids with the MEF, “which
released modern small armaments into the conflict”, and further broke the
monopoly (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 300).
Even when the TPA was signed, the fact that it was former militias and not
the SIG organising their own disarmament shows that there was a heavy
reliance on the word of these former militants (Allen, Dinnen, 2010: 311-
312). We can therefore conclude that there was minimal concordance
between all three sectors of the state. This played a key role in the removal
of Ulufa’alu from power (Amnesty International, 2000: 8-9), (Hameriri, 2007:
428), (Dinnen, 2013: 196). Although the TPA attempted to restore the
requirements for concordance, the SIG was incapable of governing
effectively, the RSPIF split, and as the institutional factors were not dealt

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with, until RAMSI was introduced. From this we can determine that a lack of
concordance, and professionalism in the RSPIF played a key role in the
escalation of violence and instability in the SI.
So how has RAMSI looked to improve the professionalism of the RSPIF in
its role as a defence force, and bring stability to the Solomon Islands? It
was not until 2003 that the requests from the SIG lead to a full joint military
and police intervention, and a complete shift in Australian foreign policy in
the Pacific. Phil Goff (2013: 3), in his capacity as Foreign Minister felt that
intervention was required to prevent “social, economic, and political
collapse in the SI, which Cabinet only reluctantly approved”. The Australian
Government meanwhile was more easily persuaded to commit to an
intervention. In their eyes, there was a serious risk to security in the Pacific
region if a failed state were to emerge it would provide a safe-harbour for
terrorist organisations (Goff, 2013: 3). There is no doubt that the 2001
World Trade Centre terrorist attacks, and the 2002 Bali Bombings were still
in the minds of Australian officials (Hameiri, 2007: 410). By restoring the
professionalism of the RSPIF and eliminating the continued existence of
militias in the SI, Australia’s objective would be achieved.
RAMSI were given a mandate to carry out four particular goals. Three of
these goals were related to improving the professionalism of the defence
forces; Firstly, to Restore civil order in the SI. The first objective involved
the additional assistance of the Australian and New Zealand militaries
restoring law and order in the country. Secondly, to “rebuild and reform the
machinery of government, improve government accountability and improve
the delivery of services in urban and provincial areas”. Thirdly, to fight
corruption (Reginal Assistance for the SI: 2016). The approach is different
one to what is considered a traditional peacekeeping mission. This seemed

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appropriate, as the state was experiencing a breakdown in law and order,
not a civil war (Hayward-Jones, 2014: 12). The large presence of military
forces was also there to protect police personal, and provide logistical
support (Hayward-Jones, 2014: 12; Wainright, 2005: 2). Jenny Hayward-
Jones (2014: 2) notes that instead of being involved in direct armed conflict,
the military forces in RAMSI played a vital psychological role in convincing
those within the militias to give up their weaponry and surrender. The
results RAMSI showed were impressive, some 3700 weapons, and an
estimated 300,000 rounds of ammunition were surrendered (Goff, 2013: 4).
Law and order was quickly restored without any bloodshed (New Zealand
Defence Force, 2013). Some 3000 of those responsible for the series of
ethnic tensions, subsequent lawlessness and violence were arrested,
including the key Guale militant figure, Harold Keke (RAMSI, 6: 2013). His
surrender showed that RAMSI was having a positive effect in improving the
professionalism of the RSPIF, and concordance between the three sectors.
Many New Zealand Police officers have acknowledged that without the
work of the Australian military, their tasks would have been impossible to
achieve (Ydgren, 2014: 97).
Another key function that RAMSI played was a complete overhaul and
rebuilding of the RSPIF, to a level that would see them become
professional enough to take over the responsibility of defending the state.
As mentioned previously, a lack of expertise under Huntington’s theory may
have attributed to the inability of the RSPIF to operate effectively. This was
a key aim for RAMSI (New Zealand Herald, 2003). Mary-Louise
O’Callaghan (2008: 190) commented on the positive results that RAMSI
has had on RSIPF recruitment, particularly around the development of a
police academy. Additionally, other education and training programmes

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jointly run by the police or military personnel from RAMSI looked to create a
new generation of professionalism. In 2015, RAMSI supported the training
of 511 RSPIF officers (41% of the total force), and had ultimate goal of
rearming the Force. In restoring the monopoly of weaponry to the RSPIF,
RAMSI undertook a number of activities. Some involved discouraging
combat, with the presence of armed forces. Additionally, naval vessels
were stationed between Bougainville and Guadalcanal in order to cease
any transportation of weaponry (Londey, 2004: 228). This training is clearly
important to ensuring that there is an adequate level of expertise within the
RSPIF, and would aid professionalism. Further integration of technology,
and “higher standards for recruitment” played a role in creating a highly
professionalised RSPIF (Ydgren, 2014: 42). From this we can see that the
background role of the intervening military to the benefit of the police
contingent played a key role in improving the professionalism of the RSPIF,
and setting up a possible long-term success in the SI.
To conclude, based on the above analysis, we can likely conclude that the
RSPIF lacked the professionalism along both Huntington’s and Schiff’s
separate theories. We can also note that there was lack of concordance
between the RSPIF, civilian, and political leaders. It is likely that RSPIF was
not able to fulfil its objectives to protect its citizens. The full effect of
RAMSI’s intervention will not yet be known until there is a complete
withdrawal, and the SIG governs in complete self-sufficiency. However, all
participants in RAMSI should look with great pride at what has been
achieved. A lack of professionalism in the RSPIF continually forced the SIG
to recognise the extreme danger of violence emerging from this once failed
state. RAMSI’s response have seriously improved the conditions to ensure
that the RSPIF becomes a defence force that is professional enough to

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protect the state, and society as a whole. While interventions such as this
can be expensive to maintain, the long term benefits for the state and the
region can be recognised if the correct cultural, political, and professional
processes are maintained. While this intervention cannot be seen as the
‘silver bullet’ for all interventions, it provided a blueprint on building trust
and mutual respect with the local populations. In the end however, time will
tell.

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Bibliography
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Chapters in Books
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Journals
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jones_australias_costly_investment_in_solomon_islands.pdf. (Accessed 6
September 2016).
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lessons learned”. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Available at
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