1.
i
Questioning
the
Columbia
River
Crossing
Project:
Was
an
Accurate
Analysis
of
the
Project’s
Economic
Impact
Completed?
By
Cody
Smith
Senior
Thesis
Econ
496W-­‐01
Prof.
Mascarenhas
May
11,
2015

2.
ii
Table
of
Contents
Introduction
................................................................................................................................
1
Theory
&
Context
.......................................................................................................................
3
1)
Policies
for
Reducing
Congestion
................................................................................................
7
a)
Demand-­‐Side
Management
...................................................................................................................
7
b)
Supply-­‐Side
Management
....................................................................................................................
10
2)
Cost-­‐Benefit
Analysis
...................................................................................................................
14
Analysis
......................................................................................................................................
15
1)
Traveler
Time
Savings
.................................................................................................................
17
a)
Analysis
of
the
Effectiveness
of
Extending
Light
Rail
..............................................................
18
b)
Analysis
of
the
Effectiveness
of
Increasing
I-­‐5’s
Capacity
.....................................................
23
2)
Area
Market
Access
analysis
......................................................................................................
27
Conclusion
.................................................................................................................................
30
References
.................................................................................................................................
33
Appendix
1
–
CRC
Project
Area
Maps
..................................................................................
36
Appendix
2
–
Rose
Quarter
Map
...........................................................................................
38
Appendix
3
–
Vancouver
Light
Rail
Map
.............................................................................
39

3.
1
Introduction
From
1995
to
the
spring
of
2014,
a
joint
project
managed
by
the
Washington
Department
of
Transportation
(WSDOT)
and
Oregon
Department
of
Transportation
(ODOT)
examined
the
impacts
of
potential
improvements
that
could
be
made
to
the
Interstate-­‐5
corridor
connecting
Portland,
Oregon
to
Vancouver,
Washington.
During
this
time
period,
the
project
operated
under
different
names,
the
final
being
the
Columbia
River
Crossing
Project
(CRC).
As
of
May
31st,
2014,
the
CRC
was
closed
down
after
both
the
legislatures
of
Oregon
and
Washington
failed
to
extend
funding
for
the
project’s
future
(Thompson,
2014).
This
came
after
a
proposed
plan
was
unveiled
that
would
replace
the
aging
Interstate
Bridge
system
with
a
new
set
of
bridges
as
well
as
fund
improvements
to
approximately
5
miles
of
I-­‐5
in
the
form
of
widening
sections
of
the
freeway
and
improving
interchanges
(see
map
in
Appendix
1).
On
top
of
roadway
improvements,
the
CRC
proposal
would
have
introduced
Portland’s
light
rail
system
to
Vancouver
as
an
added
form
of
transportation
crossing
the
Columbia
River.
One
of
the
main
aims
of
the
CRC
was
to
reduce
congestion
in
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area.
The
CRC,
an
extension
of
both
the
Oregon
and
Washington
Departments
of
Transportation,
claimed
that
the
proposed
supply-­‐side
increases
of
mass
transit
and
vehicular
transportation
would
be
enough
to
reduce
area
congestion
substantially,
generating
a
net
benefit
of
the
greater
Pacific
Northwest
economy.
The
primary
tool
used
to
analyze
the
viability
of
public
works
projects
is
cost-­‐benefit
analysis.
The
CRC
completed
its
own
cost-­‐benefit
analysis,
finding
the

4.
2
project
would
reduce
area
congestion,
generating
benefit
for
the
Portland-­‐
Vancouver
area
and
their
respective
states
at
large.
Supporters
of
the
CRC
argued
that
increasing
freeway
capacity
paired
with
increases
in
public
transportation
crossing
the
Columbia
River
would
have
resulted
in
decreases
in
I-­‐5
congestion.
On
the
surface,
this
seems
to
be
a
good
solution
for
congestion
reduction
in
the
greater
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area.
However,
the
effects
of
freeway
improvements
in
metropolitan
areas
are
more
complex
than
what
has
been
considered
by
the
CRC’s
analysis,
which
suggests
that
increases
in
roadway
capacity
will
directly
reduce
congestion
levels.
Under
further
examination
by
economic
scholars,
this
commonly
held
assumption
begins
to
fall
apart.
The
Final
Report
(2012)
published
by
the
CRC
indicated
that
completion
of
the
CRC
project
would
have
resulted
in
a
net
benefit
to
the
regional
economy
of
the
Pacific
Northwest.
Did
the
CRC
complete
an
accurate
cost-­‐benefit
evaluation
of
the
project’s
impact
to
the
regional
economy
in
reaching
this
conclusion?
To
examine
this,
the
effects
of
transportation
infrastructure
improvements
proposed
by
the
CRC
must
be
well
understood.
This
paper
examines
the
economic
theory
used
by
the
CRC
to
obtain
a
positive
benefit
to
cost
ratio
for
congruency
with
theory
that
examines
the
effects
of
supply-­‐side
management
solutions
for
metropolitan
congestion.
The
main
point
of
contention
relates
to
the
CRC’s
understanding
of
the
proposed
supply
side
congestion
relief
policy
with
what
economic
research
has
found
characterizes
congestion
on
metropolitan-­‐freeways.
This
is
key
because
if
the
CRC’s
theory
is
found
to
be
inconsistent
with
known
traffic
phenomenon,
then
the
accuracy
of
the
CRC’s
predicted
net
benefit
comes
into
question.
In
order
to
complete
this
study,
this

5.
3
paper
does
not
conduct
its
own
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
of
the
CRC
project;
instead
the
paper
examines
the
economic
theory
that
underlies
the
CRC’s
calculations.
1
In
order
to
conduct
such
a
critique
of
the
CRC
project,
this
paper
first
explains
the
economic
theory
that
is
relevant
to
understanding
the
phenomenon
of
traffic
congestion.
Next,
the
theoretical
framework
underlying
the
market
for
transportation
and
congestion
reduction
solutions
are
defined.
Rounding
out
the
theory
needed
for
this
analysis,
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
examined.
Then,
a
careful
analysis
of
the
theory
implicit
in
the
CRC’s
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
conducted.
The
focus,
again,
is
on
determining
whether
the
CRC’s
understanding
of
congestion
is
consistent
with
the
known
impacts
of
similar
transportation
policies.
If
the
theory
implicit
in
the
CRC’s
analysis
is
found
to
be
divergent
from
known
traffic
phenomenon,
this
would
call
into
question
the
accuracy
of
the
CRC’s
claimed
net
benefit.
Finally,
the
conclusion
summarizes
all
major
points
of
analysis
and
outlines
areas
for
further
research.
Theory
&
Context
In
order
to
fully
examine
whether
the
effects
of
the
CRC
project
were
properly
accounted
for
in
the
CRC’s
cost-­‐benefit
analysis,
the
underlying
economic
theory
generating
the
projected
benefit
values
must
be
understood.
The
topics
and
issues
that
need
to
be
understood
to
begin
an
examination
of
the
CRC
project’s
net
benefit
include
the
economics
of
freeway
congestion,
the
impacts
of
common
policy
applications
for
congestion
and
finally,
cost-­‐benefit
analysis.
In
the
case
of
the
CRC,
1
This
is
because
the
magnitude
of
an
independent
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
for
the
CRC
project
would
prove
to
be
too
massive
to
be
completed
as
a
senior
thesis
project.

6.
4
like
other
transportation
project
related
analyses,
understanding
how
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
conducted
relies
on
an
understanding
of
the
economic
forces
that
drive
congestion.
For
this
reason,
it
is
best
to
first
understand
the
economics
of
traffic
and
the
impacts
for
policy
prescription
before
diving
into
how
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
would
take
place
for
such
a
project.
Traffic
congestion
is
something
that
most
Americans
living
in
urban
areas
have
become
all
too
familiar
with,
as
the
amount
of
vehicles
on
the
road
in
the
United
States
has
increased
over
time.
Congestion
is
most
prevalent
in
cities
and
is
something
that
many
have
come
to
accept
as
a
fact
of
urban
living.
Congestion
effects
are
broad
reaching—in
1994,
“roughly
one-­‐third
of
all
[U.S.
metropolitan]
vehicular
travel
[took]
place
under
congested
conditions”
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
1994,
pg.
446).
Congestion
has
become
a
norm
in
large
cities,
with
effects
that
are
broad
reaching.
This
being
the
case,
it
is
still
frustrating
for
many
drivers
that
experience
congestion
on
a
day-­‐to-­‐day
basis,
as
they
are
held
captive
in
their
vehicles
while
time
slips
away.
But
the
frustration
of
congestion
is
not
limited
to
personal
vehicle
users.
Commercial
transportation
relies
on
the
same
road
network
as
private
vehicles,
thus
causing
important
shipments
to
be
delayed
by
congestion
as
well.
This
means
that
all
transportation
dependent
industries
are
also
affected
by
traffic
delays.
Congestion
is
unlike
other
public
policy
problems
in
the
United
States
because
it’s
affects
are
so
broad
reaching—whether
or
not
someone
is
of
a
high
or
low
income
does
not
affect
whether
or
not
a
driver
will
be
caught
in
freeway
congestion
(Downs,
1992).
Because
experience
with
congestion
is
so
prevalent,
congestion
reduction
is
one
policy
issue
that
almost
all
people
agree
upon.

7.
5
However,
reducing
congestion
on
freeways
is
not
as
easy
as
it
may
seem.
Congestion
is
created
when
the
flow
of
traffic
demanding
a
certain
area
of
road
space
is
greater
than
the
capacity
that
the
area
can
effectively
handle.
These
areas
are
considered
chokepoints.
For
example,
in
the
Portland
area
one
of
the
major
chokepoints
is
the
Interstate
Bridge.
The
Interstate
Bridge
is
narrower
than
the
preceding
roadway
and
is
one
of
the
only
two
Columbia
River
crossing
points
in
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area.
Because
of
this,
at
peak-­‐hours
the
flow
of
traffic
crossing
(i.e.
the
demand
for
road
space)
the
Interstate
Bridge
is
greater
than
physical
capacity
of
the
crossing
(i.e.
the
supply
of
road
space).
This
means
that
cars
that
approach
the
bridge,
when
at
capacity,
must
endure
a
wait
to
cross
the
bridge.
Another
way
that
freeway
congestion
forms
is
through
an
inadequate
surrounding
street
network.
In
this
case,
the
chokepoint
is
not
on
the
freeway
itself
but
just
off
the
exit
ramp.
This
scenario
is
best
explained
by
Günther
et
al.
(2011)
who
suggested
that
freeway
congestion
can
be
caused
by
an
inadequate
surrounding
street
network.
This
approach
to
understanding
congestion
finds
that
if
capacity
of
the
first
intersection
after
exiting
the
freeway
is
exceeded,
queues
for
that
intersection
may
stretch
back
into
the
freeway
(Günther
et.
al.
2011).
This
means
that
road
space
that
should
be
allocated
to
through
traffic
is
occupied
by
those
that
are
exiting
the
freeway.
Many
times
this
backup
affects
multiple
lanes
of
the
freeway
as
surrounding
cars
are
forced
to
slow
down
as
cars
merge
into
the
exit
queue.
This
is
just
another
way
that
freeway
congestion
can
be
understood
in
the
CRC
project
area.
The
CRC
seems
to
acknowledge
that
this
problem
exists
in
the
project
corridor;
one
of
the
commonly
named
areas
that
experiences
a
similar
type
of
congestion
at
the
Rose
Quarter
Exit
in

8.
6
Portland
(see
map
in
Appendix
2).
In
this
area
during
peak
traffic
flow
periods,
the
surrounding
street
network
is
unable
to
disperse
traffic
at
the
rate
at
which
it
is
exiting
I-­‐5.
This
results
in
congestion
backups
of
cars
attempting
to
exit
the
freeway.
The
solution
to
this
type
of
congestion
put
forth
by
Günther
et.
al.
(2011)
focuses
on
alleviating
queues
on
off-­‐ramps
by
detouring
street
level
traffic
in
order
to
allocate
more
of
the
off-­‐ramps
through
capacity
to
the
off-­‐ramp
traffic.
However,
this
detour
does
place
some
of
the
burden
on
the
street
traffic
that
is
diverted
as
these
cars
now
have
a
further
distance
to
travel
in
most
cases.
With
congestion
being
so
pervasive
in
U.S.
cities,
many
drivers
have
developed
ways
to
cope
with
congestion.
Some
of
these
solutions
include
taking
alternate
routes
as
well
as
altering
schedules
to
drive
during
periods
that
experience
lower
levels
of
congestion.
Each
of
these
commuter
choice
based
solutions
can
be
traced
back
to
individual
drivers
making
choices
to
reduce
their
own
private
cost
of
driving.
For
drivers
that
experience
congestion,
there
is
a
cost
associated
with
their
lost
time.
To
avoid
this
loss,
congestion
forces
drivers
to
make
choices
to
re-­‐allocate
their
resources
to
achieve
more
efficient
outcomes.
“Congestion
…
causes
many
potential
rush-­‐hour
vehicle
trips
to
be
canceled,
diverted
(for
example,
to
mass
transit,
to
carpools
and
to
less-­‐congested
routes
and
destinations)
or
rescheduled”
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
1994,
pg.
448).
For
some
drivers,
an
alternate
route
is
a
possibility.
This
route
may
be
a
longer
distance
to
travel
than
if
they
were
to
use
the
freeway,
but
is
chosen
because
it
ultimately
costs
the
driver
the
same
or
less
when
they
take
into
account
the
fact
that
rather
than
waiting
a
given
amount
of
time
in
congestion,
they
have
extended
their
drive
by
a
similar
amount
of
time.
However,
if
congestion
on
their
primary
route
were

9.
7
to
be
alleviated,
they
would
prefer
to
use
the
primary
route,
as
it
would
result
in
a
more
efficient
outcome
for
them.
Other
choices
that
commuters
have
to
avoid
congestion
involve
the
use
of
higher
capacity
transportation
options
that
either
don’t
rely
on
congested
roadways
or
have
specially
designated
lanes,
such
as
high
occupancy
vehicle
lanes
(HOVs)
or
carpool
lanes,
to
allow
for
faster
transportation.
These
options
many
times
do
reduce
the
time
that
commuters
spend
trapped
in
congestion
but
introduce
other
time
costs
to
commuters.
To
ride
public
transportation
requires
that
patrons
arrive
early
at
a
transport
stop
and
wait
for
the
next
bus,
streetcar
or
light
rail
vehicle
to
arrive.
Carpools
too
often
require
some
wait
as
the
other
patrons
arrive
at
the
departure
location
or
are
picked
up
along
the
way.
This
shows
that
even
though
commuters
may
have
found
more
desirable
options
than
commuting
in
personal
vehicles
subject
to
congestion,
it
is
extremely
hard
for
commuters
to
escape
the
costs
that
are
created
by
congestion.
1)
Policies
for
Reducing
Congestion
To
help
alleviate
congestion
in
metropolitan
areas,
policy-­‐writers
and
lawmakers
have
developed
many
different
policies
aimed
at
reducing
congestion.
These
policies
can
be
understood
from
an
economic
perspective
as
falling
into
either
demand-­‐side
management
policy
or
supply-­‐side
management
policy.
a)
Demand-­‐Side
Management
Demand
management
strategies
focus
on
reducing
the
amount
of
vehicles
that
demand
to
use
the
road
during
peak
congestion.
This
can
be
done
in
many
different
ways—he
two
most
common
are
regulating
the
number
of
cars
entering
the
freeway

10.
8
or
the
use
of
a
congestion
tax
to
deter
drivers
from
using
congested
roads.
Although
demand
management
is
not
the
most
common
solution
to
congestion,
it
is
important
to
understanding
how
congestion
works
and
what
the
effects
of
the
CRC
would
have
been.
Within
the
demand
approach,
there
are
two
primary
policy
choices;
the
regulatory
approach
and
a
market
based
approach
(Downs,
1992).
The
regulatory
approach
limits
the
total
number
of
cars
allowed
on
the
road
through
restricting
entry
onto
the
freeway.
This
approach,
unlike
the
market
approach,
mandates
behaviors.
Anthony
Downs
examines
congestion
in
his
book
Stuck
In
Traffic:
Coping
With
Peak-­‐
Hour
Traffic
Congestion.
His
example
for
this
type
of
approach
would
be
if
a
governing
agency
prohibited
vehicles
with
a
license
plate
number
ending
in
a
certain
digit
from
entering
the
roadway
on
certain
days.
For
example,
prohibiting
vehicles
with
plates
ending
in
a
six
from
entering
the
road
on
Mondays
and
so
on
(Downs,
1992).
Another
example
of
the
regulatory
approach
that
is
commonly
used,
and
currently
employed
in
the
I-­‐5
corridor,
is
the
use
of
traffic
control
devices
to
limit
entry
onto
the
freeway.
This
tool
uses
timed
lights
to
slow
roadway
entry
rates
to
a
manageable
level
in
congested
areas.
This
regulatory
approach
works
by
requiring
that
vehicles
that
wish
to
enter
the
roadway
endure
a
wait
to
enter
the
roadway,
with
the
intent
being
that
by
limiting
the
inflows
of
traffic,
the
road
will
remain
at
or
below
capacity.
This
would,
in
turn,
result
in
uncongested
driving
while
on
the
freeway.
Although
this
type
of
regulatory
policy
is
in
use
in
the
Portland
area,
I-­‐5
still
experiences
heavy
congestion
in
this
area.
This
may
be
due
to
multiple
factors
such
as
heavy
traffic
flows
from
earlier,
unrestricted
road
entry
points.
However,
analysis
of
the
effectiveness
of
this
current
policy
is
not
the
goal
of
this
paper
and
will
not
be
directly
addressed.

11.
9
The
other
policy
commonly
called
for
in
the
economic
literature
is
the
implementation
and
use
of
a
congestion
charge.
The
economic
reasoning
behind
this
policy
prescription
is
based
on
the
theory
that
congestion
is
an
external
cost
that
individual
drivers
impose
on
those
around
them
when
they
choose
to
drive.
Thus,
“drivers
do
not
pay
for
the
time
loss
that
they
impose
on
others,”
because
of
this,
drivers
make
socially
inefficient
decisions
regarding
when
and
how
much
to
use
personal
vehicles
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
1994,
pg.
448).
Economists
argue
that
a
congestion
tax
will
internalize
this
cost
for
drivers,
making
personal
driving
more
costly
and
deterring
drivers
from
behavior
that
induces
congestion.
This
would,
in
turn,
reduce
traffic
to
a
socially
optimum
level.
However,
wide
scale
application
of
this
approach
would
not
guarantee
an
end
to
congestion.
For
example,
if
a
congestion
tax
were
imposed
in
an
area,
like
Portland’s
I-­‐5
corridor,
which
taxed
congestive
driving
habits
in
accordance
with
the
costs
they
create,
the
resulting
equilibrium
of
drivers
on
the
road
would
be
considered
socially
optimum.
However,
if
the
socially
optimum
amount
of
road
usage
is
still
above
the
capacity
of
the
roadway,
congestion
will
continue
to
exist.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
policy
is
enacted
and
the
socially
optimum
level
is
below
the
road’s
capacity,
the
road
would
be
underused.
This
set
of
hypotheticals
shows
the
level
of
complexity
that
policies
dealing
with
congestion
must
account
for.
On
the
whole,
demand
side
congestion
management
policies
are
found
to
be
effective
in
reducing
congestion
levels
when
applied
correctly.
But
that
does
not
mean
that
demand
management
does
not
come
without
some
controversy.
Although
effective
in
reducing
congestion,
a
key
argument
against
widespread
application
of
congestion
taxes
is
that
they
would
place
a
greater
burden
on
low-­‐income
households,

12.
10
thus
their
implementation
would
be
considered
to
be
inequitable
(Downs,
1992).
This
is
because
the
tax
that
each
driver
would
be
forced
to
pay
would
be
easier
for
those
with
higher
incomes
to
pay
as
it
would
represent
a
smaller
portion
of
their
income.
Also,
it
is
important
to
remember
that
currently
driving
on
freeways
in
the
United
States
is
not
taxed.
This
means
that
the
adding
of
a
congestion
charge
would
result
in
a
new
tax
for
a
city’s
residents,
an
outcome
unfavorable
to
most
citizens.
So
although
it
can
be
an
effective
policy
when
precisely
executed,
demand
side
congestion
taxes
have
proven
to
be
an
unpopular
option
in
the
eyes
of
the
public.
b)
Supply-­‐Side
Management
The
second
and
more
commonly
applied
solution
to
congestion
is
supply-­‐side
management.
Supply
management
focuses
on
increasing
the
supply
of
road
space
to
reduce
congestion.
Many
times
referred
to
as
the
“build
your
way
out”
solution,
it
is
also
the
more
costly
alternative
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
pg.
446,
1994).
This
is
what
most
people
understand
as
the
intuitive
solution
to
congestion.
This
line
of
reasoning
sees
that
freeways
are
overcrowded
and
reasons
that
if
the
road
had
more
lanes
(or
a
greater
through
capacity)
the
congestion
would
dissipate.
The
logic
behind
this
policy
is
intuitive;
if
there
isn’t
enough
room
for
the
current
amount
of
traffic,
build
more
room.
Although
this
is
an
over
simplification
of
this
policy
approach,
it
captures
the
key
reasoning
for
the
use
for
such
policy.
Other
less
considered
supply
management
strategies
would
include
increasing
the
supply
of
public
transportation
available
or
adding
a
separate
lane
structure
for
buses
or
truck
traffic.
It
is
important
to
consider
the
effects
of
supply
management
solutions
because
this
is
the
primary
policy
that
the
CRC’s
proposal
examined.
The
CRC
concluded
that
widening
I-­‐5
and
adding
light
rail

13.
11
transit
to
the
crossing
would
alleviate
congestion
substantially.
Thus,
a
careful
analysis
of
the
affects
of
supply
management
policy
will
be
key
to
developing
a
sound
critique
of
the
CRC’s
cost-­‐benefit
analysis.
The
CRC
project
contained
two
major
supply
side
increases,
increasing
freeway
road
space
and
extending
light-­‐rail
into
downtown
Vancouver.
First,
the
focus
will
be
on
examining
the
impacts
of
increasing
the
capacity
of
I-­‐5
in
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area
to
allow
traffic
greater
mobility.
To
do
this,
the
project
focused
on
alleviating
choke
points
through
widening
sections
of
roadway
as
well
as
improving
a
large
number
of
interchanges
to
allow
for
more
efficient
entry
and
exit
from
the
freeway
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
This
freeway-­‐based
approach
was
also
paired
with
a
second
major
transportation
supply
increase,
extending
TriMet
light-­‐rail.
The
CRC
project
called
for
the
extension
of
Portland’s
already
established
MAX
(operated
through
Portland’s
TriMet)
light-­‐rail
public
transportation
system
to
be
added
to
the
Colombia
River
Crossing,
providing
a
second
form
of
transportation
connecting
Portland
and
Vancouver
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
Each
of
these
CRC
transportation
improvements
would
fall
under
the
stereotypical
congestion
solution
of
“building
a
way
out
of
the
problem”
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
1994,
pg.
446).
Although
the
CRC’s
plan
happens
to
be
the
most
commonly
used
solution
to
congestion
problems,
there
is
still
question
of
the
effectiveness
of
supply
side
management
of
metropolitan
congestion.
An
alternative
way
of
thinking
about
increasing
highway
capacity
is
put
forth
by
David
J.
Forkenbrock
and
Paul
F.
Hanley
(2010)
as
they
examine
supply
management
through
the
alternative
lens
of
Truck-­‐Only
Highway
Lanes.
In
this
paper,
Forkenbrock
and
Hanley
(2010)
examine
and
endorse
building
separate
lanes
for

14.
12
trucks.
Their
research
concludes
that,
in
most
cases,
adding
truck
only
lanes
would
result
in
benefits
for
both
the
trucking
industry
as
well
as
passenger
vehicle
traffic
(Forkenbrock
&
Hanley,
2010).
Although
adding
truck
only
lanes
to
existing
freeways
is
not
directly
adding
more
road
space
for
personal
vehicles
to
use,
it
has
the
affect
of
opening
up
road
space
because
the
space
previously
used
by
trucks
is
available
for
commuting
vehicles.
In
addition
to
allowing
more
road
space
to
commuters,
allocating
separate
facilities
for
trucks
and
commuter
traffic
has
the
added
benefit
of
grouping
vehicles
with
similar
performance
levels
together.
This
is
because
“the
acceleration
and
braking
performance
of
trucks
is
much
lower
than
that
of
most
passenger
vehicles,”
meaning
that
“removing
trucks
[from
roadways]
would
substantially
improve
flow
of
segments
with
heavy
traffic”
(Forkenbrock
&
Hanley,
2010
,
pg.
102).
Although
truck
lanes
were
not
a
policy
identified
by
the
CRC
as
a
solution,
it
is
important
to
understand
that
there
is
a
multitude
of
different
ways
to
approach
each
of
these
policies.
Thus,
building
an
understanding
of
the
different
ways
to
achieve
a
similar
end
result
will
be
useful
in
critiquing
the
CRC’s
analysis
of
the
application
of
such
policies.
Also
necessary
to
executing
a
critique
of
the
CRC’s
cost-­‐benefit
analysis,
is
the
examination
of
the
effectiveness
of
such
supply
side
policies.
This
examination
of
supply
side
policy
will
be
of
the
greatest
importance
because
this
type
of
policy
makes
up
most
of
the
CRC’s
project.
This,
in
turn,
means
that
almost
all
of
the
CRC’s
predicted
benefits
result
from
supply
increases.
Thus,
making
it
of
paramount
importance
that
the
effectiveness
of
supply
side
congestion
relief
policy
be
thoroughly
examined.
The
effectiveness
of
supply
side
approaches
to
congestion
reduction
is
not
as

15.
13
straightforward
as
it
may
appear.
Skeptics
of
this
approach
argue
that
increasing
the
supply
of
roadways
does
not
necessarily
result
in
reductions
in
congestion.
Although
defined
differently
by
different
authors,
the
reasoning
to
support
this
argument
is
simple—latent
demand
exists
for
many
of
the
congested
routes
in
a
city.
This
means,
“the
traffic
we
see
does
not
represent
the
full
demand
for
peak
travel”
(Arnott
&
Smalls,
1994,
pg.
448).
Most
people,
even
those
without
an
economic
background,
would
agree
this
is
the
case
and
that
congestion
deters
some
drivers
from
using
roads
during
periods
of
congestion.
Many
times
this
is
done
to
avoid
the
time
loss
that
congestion
brings
and
the
solution
is
for
some
drivers
to
schedule
their
trips
during
times
of
less
congestion.
This
would
not
be
their
first
choice,
but
they
have
adjusted
to
avoid
driving
during
peak
congestion.
This
would
mean
that
following
an
increase
in
roadway
capacity,
it
would
be
expected
that
commuters
that
previously
were
deterred
from
traveling
during
peak
hours
now
travel
during
this
time
because
there
is
more
available
road
space.
The
result
is
that
now
a
greater
amount
of
commuters
are
subjected
to
congestion.
Anthony
Downs
(1992)
explains
this
as
the
“triple
convergence”
effect.
Triple
convergence
occurs
after
an
improvement
is
made
to
a
freeway
because
shortly
after
the
expansion
is
complete,
traffic
is
able
to
move
at
an
increased
rate.
This
then
attracts
those
whom
had
previously
traveled
alternate
routes
or
at
inopportune
times
to
join
the
peak
traffic
flow.
Downs’
“triple
convergence”
finds
that
drivers
that
used
alternate
routes,
traveled
at
times
just
before
or
after
peak
congestion,
or
used
alternative
modes
of
transport,
will
converge
on
the
more
efficient
highway
(Downs,
1992).
The
result
is
that
freeway
traffic
continues
to
move
along
at
a
crawl,
only
now
there
are
more
cars
involved
in
the
congestion.
This
has
shown
that

16.
14
the
connection
between
supply
side
congestion
management
policy
and
congestion
reduction
is
much
more
complicated
than
many
consider
it
to
be.
2)
Cost-­‐Benefit
Analysis
The
final
and
most
important
economic
tool
that
needs
to
be
understood
in
order
to
critique
the
CRC’s
project
analysis
is
cost-­‐benefit
analysis.
Simply
put,
cost-­‐
benefit
analysis
is,
“an
economic
tool
for
comparing
the
desirable
and
undesirable
impacts
of
proposed
policies”
(Arrow
et.
al.
1996
pg.
221).
It
is
also
worth
noting
that
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
the
standard
tool
used
in
economic
policy
analysis
and
in
most
cases
is
required
before
government
organizations
can
begin
a
project
of
a
substantial
nature.
Cost-­‐benefit
analysis
“serves
the
single
purpose
of
registering
systematically
the
positive
and
negative
effects
of
infrastructure
investments
and
of
assessing
them
in
terms
of
economic
goals”
(Georgi,
1973,
pg.5).
The
registering
of
each
of
the
positive
and
negative
effects
of
a
policy
choice,
when
summed,
determines
the
net
economic
effect
of
the
implementation
of
that
policy.
The
idea
behind
the
use
of
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
that
if
the
net
benefit
of
the
project
can
be
predicted
before
an
investment
is
made,
rational
decisions
can
be
made
as
to
whether
or
not
a
policy
or
project
should
be
implemented.
To
accomplish
this,
all
of
the
costs
and
benefits
are
estimated
in
terms
of
their
monetary
impact.
In
terms
of
the
CRC,
a
short
list
of
the
beneficial
impacts
that
would
have
been
created
include
possible
time-­‐savings
for
drivers
due
to
decreases
in
congestion,
job
creation,
decreases
in
traffic
accidents,
and
increases
in
freight
mobility.
The
potential
costs
that
the
CRC
could
have
created,
other
than
the
total
cost
spent
to
complete
the
project
are:
possible
increases
in
the
total
amount
of
pollution
generated
in
the

17.
15
project
area,
increases
in
per
person
pollution
rates
in
the
I-­‐5
corridor,
damages
to
the
environment
that
occur
during
construction,
possible
effects
to
river
based
transit
due
to
bridge
clearance
levels,
as
well
as
many
more.
With
the
CRC
having
such
a
broad
reaching
effect,
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
the
go-­‐to
tool
in
an
economist’s
toolbox
because
each
of
the
effects
are
assigned
dollar
values
and
summed.
Cost-­‐
benefit
analysis
allows
a
large
public
policy
decision
to
be
simplified
in
order
to
achieve
desirable
results.
In
terms
of
this
paper,
it
is
important
to
understand
where
the
costs
and
benefits
of
the
project
are
generated.
However,
because
this
paper
does
not
seek
to
complete
its
own
separate
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
of
the
CRC,
it
will
not
be
necessary
to
derive
values
for
these
effects
outside
of
those
presented
by
the
CRC.
In
this
way,
the
point
of
analysis
for
this
paper
is
not
whether
the
CRC
net
benefit
value
was
correct,
but
whether
the
understanding
of
the
effects
of
the
CRC
project
are
accurately
captured
in
the
CRC’s
generated
time
savings
values.
Analysis
In
order
to
determine
the
legitimacy
of
the
CRC’s
projected
net
benefit,
careful
analysis
must
take
place
to
determine
whether
the
theories
underlying
the
CRC’s
benefit
valuation
can
be
considered
accurate.
In
beginning
this
analysis,
it
is
first
necessary
to
explain
how
the
CRC
defined
effects
of
supply
side
congestion
management
solutions.
This
understanding
will
then
be
compared
to
the
previously
defined
theories
that
this
paper
has
laid
out.
If
it
is
found
that
the
CRC
used
accurate
theory
to
understand
the
project’s
possible
impact,
this
will
provide
validity
to
the

18.
16
CRC’s
benefit
valuation.
However,
if
this
is
not
the
case
and
the
CRC’s
benefit
valuation
is
flawed
due
to
inconsistency
with
recorded
economic
theory
regarding
the
impacts
of
congestion
management
policies,
this
will
call
into
question
the
legitimacy
of
the
CRC’s
calculated
net
benefit.
If
this
is
the
case,
this
can
then
be
viewed
as
an
explanation
of
why
the
CRC
project
failed
to
be
completed.
If
the
CRC’s
understanding
of
the
project’s
effects
on
Portland
area
congestion
is
found
to
be
accurate,
then
other
explanations
for
the
project’s
failure
will
need
to
be
explored.
The
CRC
claimed
that
completion
of
the
project
would
result
in
net
benefit
of
approximately
$4
to
$6
billion
in
net
present
value
when
benefits
and
costs
are
estimated
until
the
year
2050
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
To
conduct
a
through
analysis
of
the
CRC’s
claim,
the
projected
costs
and
benefits
of
the
project
will
need
to
be
broken
down
to
be
further
understood.
However,
this
paper
will
not
examine
the
cost
estimations
put
forth
by
the
CRC
because
many
of
the
costs
of
the
CRC
project
are
associated
with
construction
costs.
Although
there
is
always
a
chance
that
any
public
works
project
will
come
in
over
budget,
arguing
that
the
CRC
under
estimated
the
costs
of
construction
is
not
the
goal
of
this
paper.
This
paper
is
most
concerned
with
examining
whether
the
CRC
generated
accurate
values
of
benefits
based
on
its
understanding
of
the
project’s
effects
on
congestion
in
the
Portland-­‐
Vancouver
area,
and
ultimately
on
the
economy
of
the
Pacific
Northwest.
Once
the
CRC’s
calculation
of
the
project’s
benefits
is
understood,
the
CRC’s
methods
for
generating
projected
benefit
values
can
be
critiqued
through
the
theories
previously
presented
in
this
paper.
Comparing
the
CRC’s
predicted
effect
on
the
area
economy
to
what
established
economic
theory
would,
in
general,
find
as
an
outcome
of
such

19.
17
policy,
will
show
whether
the
CRC
developed
a
credible
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
for
the
project’s
impact.
In
developing
its
cost-­‐benefit
analysis,
the
CRC
found
the
project’s
economic
impact
in
two
ways.
First,
that
the
project
would
create
“traveler
time
savings
from
improved
system
efficiency
impacts”
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012,
pg.
5-­‐1).
The
benefits
that
the
CRC
finds
under
this
category
include
reductions
in
the
cost
of
operating
motor
vehicles
in
the
area
due
to
a
predicted
shift
to
public
transit
as
well
as
a
reduction
in
the
costs
of
area
congestion
due
to
increased
highway
performance
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
The
second
main
area
of
benefit
that
the
CRC
finds
in
completion
of
the
project
is
increased
area
market
access
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
This
category
of
benefits
focuses
not
on
the
direct
reductions
of
transportation
cost,
but
on
the
next
level
of
impact.
It
is
found
by
the
CRC,
as
well
as
other
economic
sources,
that
congestion
can
slow
the
growth
of
metropolitan
areas.
Thus
if
congestion
can
be
reduced
in
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area,
greater
economic
growth
can
then
be
experienced
in
the
area
as
firms
are
attracted
to
the
area
to
conduct
their
business.
These
two
main
claims
of
the
CRC
will
thus
be
two
points
of
analysis
for
this
paper.
1)
Traveler
Time
Savings
In
examining
the
first
of
these
claims,
the
predicted
effects
of
the
project
will
need
further
explanation
before
analysis
of
their
individual
accuracy
can
be
conducted.
The
CRC
finds
that
underneath
the
umbrella
of
traveler
savings,
there
are
many
sub-­‐categories
that
would
have
created
benefits
had
the
project
been
completed.
As
previously
identified
as
the
main
area
of
concern
for
this
paper,
the

20.
18
CRC
indicates
that
the
majority
of
the
benefit
in
this
category
would
come
from
a
reduction
in
I-­‐5
congestion.
This
reduction
is
claimed
to
be
the
effect
of
two
sources,
increased
road
capacity
and
a
shift
away
from
personal
vehicle
transit
to
the
project’s
new
light-­‐rail
expansion.
a)
Analysis
of
the
Effectiveness
of
Extending
Light
Rail
The
CRC
finds
that
adding
a
light-­‐rail
public
transportation
crossing
to
the
proposed
Columbia
River
Crossing
Bridge
would
result
in
a
shift
in
modal
transport
in
the
crossing
area.
This
means
that
persons
whom
previously
would
have
used
personal
vehicle
crossings
as
their
mode
of
transport
for
their
commutes
would
now
be
drawn
to
use
public
transportation
instead.
This
shift
would
then
reduce
the
traffic
demand
on
the
I-­‐5
crossing
and
its
surrounding
area.
This
would
then
be
supplemented
by
the
CRC’s
second
claim,
reduced
congestion
stemming
from
increased
performance
from
the
roadway
network
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
This
claim
assumes
that
increasing
the
supply
of
both
roads
space
and
public
transportation
in
the
I-­‐5
corridor
will
create
a
large
reduction
in
congestion.
The
intuitive
understanding
behind
this
source
of
benefit
is,
if
the
capacities
of
area
bottlenecks
(such
as
the
Interstate
Bridge)
are
increased,
a
large
amount
of
roadway
congestion
can
be
alleviated.
This
however
is
not
as
simple
as
the
CRC
leads
some
to
believe.
As
previously
stated,
congestion
and
traffic
management
are
very
complex
issues
needing
deeper
analysis
than
given
in
the
CRC’s
calculation
of
its
benefits
in
its
Final
Report
(2012).
This
prediction
is
now
examined
from
both
a
supply
and
demand
market
perspective
and
also
through
the
lens
of
those
whom
have
conducted
larger
studies

21.
19
of
the
economics
of
traffic
congestion.
Looking
from
a
market
view,
it
should
be
understood
that
there
can
be
a
certain
supply
and
demand
for
a
given
commute,
such
as
the
commute
to
and
from
Portland
and
Vancouver.
This
demand
is
met
with
the
supply
of
any
form
of
transit
that
can
accomplish
this
commute.
Currently,
the
supply
is
almost
completely
made
up
of
options
that
use
road
space
on
the
Columbia’s
two
freeway
crossings.
Market
economics
would
thus
suggest
that
if
the
supply
of
public
transportation,
not
dependent
on
road
space,
for
the
route
between
Portland
and
Vancouver
was
to
be
increased,
this
would,
in
turn,
draw
commuters
away
from
that
road
space.
This
is
because
public
transportation
is
considered
a
substitute
for
personal
vehicle
use.
However,
this
doesn’t
mean
that
public
transportation
is
a
perfect
substitute
for
personal
vehicle
use.
As
Arnott
and
Smalls
(1994,
pg.
446)
point
out,
“the
advantages
of
the
car
are
simply
too
great,”
citing
that
personal
vehicles
provide
more
comfort
and
privacy
than
forms
of
public
transport.
This
would
mean
that
most
commuters
would
prefer
to
use
a
personal
vehicle
rather
that
use
public
transportation.
What
this
would
mean
in
terms
of
the
CRC’s
benefit
calculation
is
that
because
finding
the
exact
preference
for
each
of
Portland-­‐
Vancouver
commuters
would
be
impossible;
estimates
have
been
made
by
the
CRC
to
predict
the
rate
at
which
commuters
would
substitute
public
transit
for
personal
vehicle
use.
This
brings
up
an
issue—because
the
CRC
group
was
very
much
in
favor
of
completing
the
project,
the
CRC
would
have
had
an
incentive
to
use
a
higher
estimate
of
predicted
public
transportation
use.
Use
of
a
higher
rate
of
public
transit
use
would
have
also
meant
lower
predicted
vehicle
demand
in
the
I-­‐5
corridor.
This
would
suggest
that
the
predicted
reduction
in
congestion
would
have
been
much

22.
20
greater,
generating
a
larger
predicted
benefit.
However,
it
is
hard
to
imagine
that
the
CRC’s
addition
of
a
light
rail
crossing
over
the
Columbia
River
would
have
drawn
as
much
ridership
as
predicted
by
the
CRC
due
to
the
known
preference
that
commuters
have
for
personal
vehicles.
Further
examination
of
the
proposed
light
rail
option
highlights
why
most
commuters
prefer
personal
vehicle
use
as
their
primary
form
of
transportation.
When
thinking
about
public
transit,
it
is
important
to
note
that,
for
most
persons
demanding
travel
in
a
metropolitan
area,
there
is
no
public
transportation
route
that
starts
at
their
front
door
and
ends
directly
at
their
desired
destination.
Many
times
this
would
mean
that
an
individual
seeking
to
go
from
their
home
to
their
place
of
work
would
need
to
use
multiple
forms
of
transport
in
order
to
use
public
transportation
to
get
from
point
A
to
point
B.
In
terms
of
the
CRC,
this
problem
may
be
exacerbated
by
the
fact
that
the
proposed
extension
of
Portland’s
light-­‐rail
into
the
Vancouver
area
would
be
limited
to
a
small
area
of
downtown
Vancouver.
Specifically,
one
of
the
major
stations
for
commuters
in
Vancouver
would
be
a
park-­‐
and-­‐ride
near
the
campus
of
Clark
College
(see
Appendix
3).
This
would
mean
that
for
all
trips
to
and
from
the
Vancouver
area,
not
originating
or
terminating
in
the
downtown
area,
light
rail
users
would
require
an
added
leg
of
transportation
to
travel
to
and
from
other
Vancouver
areas
as
well
as
to
and
from
the
terminus
of
the
light
rail
network.
There
are
many
ways
that
this
leg
of
a
daily
commute
could
take
place.
For
those
whom
reside
outside
of
the
downtown
area,
some
of
those
options
could
include
using
a
bus,
cab,
personal
vehicle
or
bike
to
the
light-­‐rail
stations
that
would
be
located
downtown.
Although
it
is
possible
and
inevitable
that
some

23.
21
commuters
will
choose
one
of
these
options,
they
all
add
to
the
cost
that
commuters
would
have
to
endure
in
order
to
use
a
new
light-­‐rail
crossing.
For
example,
if
a
commuter
chooses
to
use
a
bus
in
conjunction
with
the
new
light-­‐rail
option,
on
top
of
the
comfort
and
privacy
they
give
up
by
not
using
a
personal
vehicle,
they
would
most
likely
also
have
to
endure
waits
for
both
the
use
of
the
light-­‐rail
and
for
the
bus
as
they
transfer
modes
of
transportation.
This
added
time
would
deter
commuters
from
choosing
the
new
light-­‐rail
option
over
the
perceived
increased
capacity
of
a
widened
I-­‐5
crossing.
As
analysis
of
the
CRC’s
claimed
traveler
time
savings
benefits
takes
place,
more
issues
become
apparent.
With
the
increased
capacity
of
the
CRC’s
proposed
new
bridge,
more
cars
will
be
attracted
to
fill
this
road
space
rather
than
use
the
CRC’s
new
Vancouver
light
rail
connection.
This
is
because
increasing
the
capacity
of
the
bridge
and
other
chokepoints
in
congestion
with
light
rail
extension
will
initially
mean
that
congestion
will
ease,
reducing
the
cost
to
a
commuter
to
travel
by
roadway.
However,
this
reduction
in
cost
will
then
lure
those
whom
previously
used
to
travel
at
less
opportune
times
and
through
alternative
modes
of
transit
to
now
travel
during
peak
hour,
retaining
high
levels
of
congestion.
Following
this
line
of
reasoning,
more
vehicles
would
then
be
expected
to
be
caught
in
rush
hour
congestion
than
previously.
This
should
be
expected
because,
as
previously
established,
personal
vehicles
are
the
preferred
mode
of
transportation
for
the
American
commuter
for
reasons
such
as
privacy
and
the
ability
of
the
driver
to
manage
their
own
route
(Arnott
and
Smalls,
1994).
Thus,
it
can
be
concluded
that
it
is
more
than
likely
that
the
CRC
has
overestimated
the
benefit
that
adding
a
light
rail

24.
22
crossing
would
create
in
terms
of
traveler
time
savings.
This
assertion
becomes
even
more
damning
when
Don
Pickrell’s
(1989)
work
examining
the
forecasted
ridership
for
nine
U.S.
metropolitan
rail
projects
is
viewed.
Through
Pickrell’s
(1989)
examination,
he
came
to
a
similar
conclusion
that
of
the
nine
metro-­‐rail
projects
studied,
all
of
them
had
actual
usage
rates
that
were
below
or
far
below
the
forecasted
rates
used
to
justify
their
completion.
Even
worse
news
for
the
CRC,
it
was
found
that
for
three
of
the
nine
projects
there
was
diversion
of
personal
vehicle
users.
Included
in
this
study
was
Portland’s
early
light
rail
system,
which
failed
to
meet
its
forecasted
ridership
estimates.
This
shows
that
the
Portland
area
has
already
had
problems
drawing
ridership
to
its
light
rail
system.
Looking
further
into
the
Portland’s
MAX
light
rail
history
paints
an
even
bleaker
picture.
As
pointed
out
by
Joseph
Rose
(2015)
of
the
Oregonian/Oregon
Live,
Portland’s
MAX
has
always
operated
on
the
honor
system,
as
far
as
fares
go.
Under
this
system,
it
would
be
expected
that
ridership
numbers
of
the
MAX
light
rail
would
have
been
bolstered
by
“free
riders,”
those
who
use
the
MAX
to
commute
but
pay
no
fare.
This
would
draw
more
riders
to
the
MAX
because
riders
are
able
to
cheat
the
system,
keeping
their
personal
cost
of
transit
low,
and
in
turn
increasing
the
total
number
of
riders
on
the
MAX
system.
However,
this
may
be
changing—
Rose
(2015)
reports
that
TriMet
is
adding
turnstiles
to
some
of
its
new
stations
in
Portland
to
help
cut
down
on
fare
cheating.
TriMet
states
that
the
turnstiles
are
being
installed
on
a
trial
basis
(Rose,
2015).
Although
it
is
not
explicitly
stated
in
the
CRC
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
report,
it
should
be
assumed,
for
two
reasons,
that
turnstiles
would
be
installed
at
any
of
the
new
Vancouver
stations
should
the
CRC

25.
23
ever
be
completed.
The
first
is,
after
such
a
large
public
investment,
the
CRC
would
need
to
recover
costs
from
the
building
of
the
project.
Turnstiles
make
“free
riding”
on
a
mass
transit
system
much
harder
and
thus,
would
allow
TriMet
to
recover
a
larger
percentage
of
transit
fares.
Second,
turnstiles
could
be
expected
at
any
of
the
CRC’s
proposed
new
stations
because
TriMet
has
worked
extensively
to
build
and
introduce
an
electronic
fare
system
to
work
with
the
turnstiles
(Rose,
2015).
Though
cutting
down
on
free
riding
will
allow
TriMet
to
capture
lost
revenue,
it
will
also
mean
a
decrease
in
the
use
of
the
of
the
MAX
and
TriMet
system,
resulting
in
commuters
shifting
to
alternative
modes
of
transport
such
as
personal
vehicles.
Again,
it
can
be
seen
that
the
addition
of
the
CRC’s
proposed
light
rail
crossing
would
not
generate
the
same
level
of
benefit
predicted
in
the
CRC
cost-­‐benefit
analysis.
b)
Analysis
of
the
Effectiveness
of
Increasing
I-­‐5’s
Capacity
Looking
past
the
impact
of
the
light
rail,
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area
already
experiences
long
periods
of
peak
congestion
as
stated
by
the
CRC’s
Final
Report
(2012)
and
supported
by
other
analyses
of
the
areas
congestion
problems
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005).
These
long
periods
of
congestion
signal
problems
that
are
not
simply
solved
by
adding
lanes
to
a
roadway.
In
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area,
periods
of
congestion
stretch
from
morning
peak
periods
into
the
late
evening
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005),
affecting
not
only
those
who
depend
on
commuting
during
peak
hours,
but
everyone
who
travels
during
the
day.
The
CRC
seeks
to
remedy
a
portion
of
this
congestion
by
increasing
I-­‐5’s
traffic
capacity
through
expanding
the
capacity
of
bottlenecks.
The
CRC
then
predicts
that
by
increasing
the

26.
24
capacity
of
the
I-­‐5
crossing
and
interchanges
in
the
immediate
area,
much
of
this
congestion
can
be
alleviated.
Although
the
CRC
Final
Report
(2012)
does
acknowledge
that
all
peak
hour
congestion
would
not
be
alleviated,
it
paints
a
very
favorable
picture
for
possible
reduction
results.
It
is
concluded
that
there
would
be
massive
reduction
in
congestion
that
would
generate
substantial
benefits
in
terms
of
time
savings.
However,
in
claiming
this
benefit,
the
CRC
neglects
to
address
that
an
increased
road
capacity
will
draw
more
commuters.
Much
like
consumers
having
latent
demand
for
the
newest
smartphone
when
new
features
are
added,
when
the
capacity
of
I-­‐5’s
Columbia
River
Crossing
is
increased,
new
trips
will
fill
this
capacity.
Even
though
it
is
undeniable
that
increasing
road
space
will
have
an
effect
on
congestion,
economists
that
study
congestion
argue
that
any
increases
in
roadway
peak-­‐hour
efficiency
will
quickly
be
overcome
for
multiple
reasons.
The
first
is
addressed
by
Arnott
and
Smalls
(1994)
in
their
examination
of
latent
demand
for
personal
vehicle
use.
They
understand
that
for
most
congested
roadways,
the
resulting
level
of
congestion
may
not
represent
the
full
demand
for
a
roadway
if
traffic
were
to
be
able
to
flow
freely
(Arnott
and
Smalls,
1994).
This
is
because
congestion
itself,
affects
the
choices
that
commuters
make
for
transit
because
it
is
felt
as
an
added
cost
to
driving.
Although
the
cost
of
congestion
to
the
commuter
is
not
monetized,
commuters
still
make
the
choice
to
avoid
this
cost.
This
means
that
when
examining
peak-­‐hour
trip
costs
verses
off-­‐time
trip
costs,
the
monetary
costs
are
very
comparable.
However,
the
non-­‐monetary
cost
for
the
peak-­‐hour
trip
is
much
greater
due
to
congestions
time
loss.
This
added
cost
results
in
the
deterrence

27.
25
of
a
portion
of
trips
that
would
be
made
at
that
monetary
cost
under
less
congested
conditions.
This
brings
Arnott
and
Smalls
(1994,
pg.
448)
to
the
conclusion
that
“Any
reduction
in
congestion
resulting
from
capacity
expansion
encourages
others
to
drive
during
hours
or
on
routes
they
would
normally
not
use”.
This
means
that
as
capacity
is
built
into
a
system,
demand
from
commuters
for
peak
travel
will
grow
to
fill
it.
Further
clarifying
the
concept
of
latent
demand,
transportation
researcher,
Dr.
Patricia
L.
Mokhtarian
presented
“Latent
Demand
in
Traffic”
to
the
California
Department
of
Transportation
in
April
of
2004.
In
her
presentation,
she
makes
a
distinction
that
is
not
made
by
Arnott
and
Smalls
(1994),
that
when
examining
the
phenomenon
of
congestion
and
management
solutions,
there
are
distinctions
to
be
made
when
examining
capacity
induced
demand
changes.
She
points
out
that
latent
demand
is
“Pent-­‐up
[or]
dormant
demand
for
travel
…
that
is
desired
but
unrealized”
while
induced
demand
is
“Realized
demand
that
is
generated
[by]
improvements
to
the
transportation
system”
(Mokhtarian,
2004).
This
distinction
is
important
when
examining
the
benefit
calculation
of
the
CRC
because
when
the
driving
force
of
latent
demand
is
not
considered
when
calculating
time
savings
benefits,
the
phenomena
of
induced
demand
will
be
sure
to
follow
a
capacity
increase
of
the
I-­‐5
Columbia
crossing.
The
CRC
project
seems
to
neglect
the
concept
of
latent
and
induced
demand
as
they
predict
that
the
average
weekly
traffic
flow
for
the
I-­‐5
crossing
in
the
year
2030
would
be
178,500
vehicles
under
a
build
scenario
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
This
is
less
than
the
184,000
vehicles
predicted
to
demand

28.
26
crossing
in
the
year
2030
under
a
no
build
scenario
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).2
Even
stepping
outside
of
the
realm
of
economics,
this
does
not
pass
the
sniff
test.
It
is
hard
to
believe
that
in
the
year
2030,
the
six-­‐lane,
Interstate
Bridge
would
carry
more
weekly
traffic
than
a
ten-­‐lane
bridge,
designed
to
allow
traffic
more
efficiently.
In
calculating
these
estimates,
the
CRC
has
either
underestimated
the
effects
that
latent
demand
in
the
area
would
have
if
the
CRC
were
to
be
built
or
overestimated
the
increase
in
traffic
demand
from
now
until
2030
under
a
no
build
scenario.
As
this
paper
is
focused
on
the
accuracy
of
the
theory
employed
by
the
CRC
and
makes
no
attempt
to
perform
benefit
calculations,
it
is
not
possible
to
say
which
error
the
CRC
has
committed.
However,
both
will
be
further
examined.
Underestimating
latent
demand,
and
thus
finding
a
significantly
low
estimate
of
induced
demand
by
the
increasing
of
I-­‐5
roadway
efficiency,
will
underestimate
the
level
of
congestion
in
the
future
build
scenario.
In
turn,
this
would
overestimate
the
benefit
generated
through
time
saving.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
CRC
has
overestimated
the
increase
in
area
traffic
demand
induced
by
growth
under
a
no
build
scenario,
this
would
overestimate
the
level
of
congestion
and
the
costs
associated
with
it.
Again,
resulting
in
a
CRC
benefit
calculation
that
predicts
larger
reductions
in
congestion
than
should
be
expected
in
reality.
In
both
situations,
the
CRC
is
overestimating
the
effect
that
increased
roadway
efficiency
would
have
on
congestion.
This,
paired
with
the
likely
overestimation
of
the
congestion
reducing
effects
of
commuters
being
drawn
to
the
new
light
rail
crossing,
leads
to
the
likely
2
It
should
be
noted
that
this
number
is
not
the
total
number
of
persons
demanding
crossing
though
all
modes
of
transit,
but
only
the
number
of
vehicles
using
road
space.
The
total
demand
for
crossing
the
Columbia
would
be
expect
to
increase
though
a
combination
of
all
modes
of
transit.

29.
27
conclusion
that
the
CRC’s
first
major
claimed
benefit
of
traveler
time
saving
has
been
overestimated
in
the
CRC’s
Final
Report
(2012).
2)
Area
Market
Access
analysis
The
CRC’s
second
large
claim
of
project
benefit
is
generated
from
predicted
increased
area
market
access
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
This
benefit
is
generated
from
the
theory
that
congestion
imposes
a
cost
on
those
who
demand
use
of
area
roadways.
However,
there
is
a
new
intricacy
to
examine.
This
benefit
draws
on
theory
that
finds
that
congestion
affects
the
access
of
firms
to
a
market
area
and
even
further,
hampers
economic
growth
(Sweet,
2014).
Congestion
has
an
even
greater
effect
of
deterring
firms
that
are
transportation
dependent,
such
as
shipping
or
other
industries
that
rely
heavily
on
transportation.
In
terms
of
the
Portland-­‐
Vancouver
area,
this
is
an
important
area
of
benefit
to
examine
because
of
the
area’s
industry
make
up.
Portland
is
uniquely
situated
in
the
region
to
have
distinctive
advantages
in
transportation
dependent
industries
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005).
Portland’s
advantage
is
due
to
many
factors
both
natural
in
origin
and
human
induced.
The
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area
is
situated
in
the
middle
of
the
Northwest
region,
on
the
Columbia
River.
This
location
provides
natural
advantages
for
these
industries
such
as,
a
central
location
in
the
Northwest
to
allow
for
more
efficient
transport
by
land,
with
access
to
shipping
on
the
Pacific
Ocean
via
the
Columbia
River
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005).
Adding
to
the
area’s
transportation
industry
advantages,
Portland
is
the
intersection
of
I-­‐5
with
not
only
sea
shipping
but
also
both
of
the
West’s
major
rail
lines,
the
Union
Pacific
and
Burlington
Northern
&
Santa
Fe
Railroad.
Added
to
this,
Portland
is
the
home
of
an
international
airport,

30.
28
PDX.
This
presents
a
very
large
amount
of
opportunity
for
the
Portland
area
to
grow
its
transportation
industry,
in
turn
growing
its
economy
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005).
Examination
of
the
CRC’s
claimed
area
access
benefit
must
begin
as
the
previous
analyses
have,
at
the
theory
level.
Here,
we
begin
with
the
CRC’s
understanding
of
how
this
benefit
is
generated.
“Market
Access
Impacts”
are
effects
that
go
beyond
the
costs
of
travel,
affecting
things
like
freight
delivery,
logistics,
productivity
and
labor
markets
(The
Costs
of
Congestion,
2005).
It
is
intuitive
to
understand
how
deliveries
and
logistics
would
be
affected
by
congestion,
as
congestion
leads
to
unpredictable
delays
of
shipments.
This
then
affects
productivity
of
industries
as
they
depend
on
having
inputs
to
produce
goods.
For
the
Portland-­‐Vancouver
area,
the
CRC
claimed
that
the
benefit
created
by
completion
of
the
CRC
project
in
terms
of
increased
business
output
was
predicted
to
be
$332
million
through
the
year
2030
in
2012
USD
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012).
However,
unlike
the
previous
benefit
value
that
the
CRC
has
generated,
it
has
been
determined
that
congestion
does
have
an
effect
on
the
prospects
of
a
regional
economy.
Matthias
Sweet
(2014)
finds
this
to
be
true
when
conducting
his
own
analysis
of
the
topic,
citing
that
many
inter-­‐metropolitan
studies
find
that
higher
congestion
levels
reduce
regional
economic
growth
and
slow
employment
growth.
This,
paired
with
his
own
econometric
analysis
on
the
topic,
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
“higher
congestion
…
appears
to
be
associated
with
decreasing
regional
employment
growth”
as
well
as
connected
to
“slower
productivity
growth
per
worker”
(Sweet,
2014,
pg.
2107).
Following
this
line
of
work,
congestion
is
found
to
have
a
negative

31.
29
effect
on
area
growth.
Thus,
it
should
be
understood
that
eliminating
this
draw
on
the
economy
would
result
in
higher
area
growth
rates.
This
body
of
work
supports
the
claim
of
the
CRC
that
congestion
is
a
hamper
to
area
growth,
especially
due
to
the
area’s
transportation
dependent
industries.
This
means
that
the
theory
that
underlies
this
area
of
the
CRC’s
benefit
calculation
is
sound
as
it
relates
to
the
work
of
others
that
have
studied
the
effects
of
congestion
on
an
economy.
However,
even
though
the
CRC
has
a
properly
backed
theory
underlying
this
section
of
its
benefit
calculation,
this
does
not
mean
that
the
CRC
properly
accounted
for
its
affects.
When
forecasting
traffic
flows
from
2012-­‐2030
upon
which
congestion
levels
would
be
calculated,
the
CRC
Final
Report
(2012)
makes
a
monumental
mistake.
When
calculating
future
baseline
congestion
cost
values
under
a
no
build
scenario,
the
CRC
uses
“the
same
assumptions
as
the
Build
alternatives
regarding
population
growth
and
employment
growth
through
2030”
(CRC
Final
Report,
2012,
pg.
4-­‐2).
This
is
problematic
because
the
CRC
is
assumed
to
increase
“area
access,”
an
outcome
that
is
consistent
with
theory
on
the
topic.
This
would
the
mean
that
the
build
alternative
would
be
assumed
to
cause
growth
in
the
area
economy,
increasing
both
population
and
employment.
This
growth
is
not
taken
into
account
when
the
CRC
assumes
the
same
area
growth
rates
under
both
the
no
build
and
build
scenarios.
Using
the
same
population
estimates
for
both
options
through
2030
would
overestimate
the
population
under
a
no
build
scenario
or
underestimate
the
population
under
the
build
scenario.
Continuing,
because
demand
for
transportation
and
road
space
is
a
function
of
population
and
the
economy,
overestimating
the
population
under
the
no
build
scenario
would
have

32.
30
resulted
in
an
artificially
high
level
of
congestion
in
the
no
build
scenario.
Thus,
inflating
cost
savings
calculated
from
congestion
reduction.
In
the
alternative,
an
underestimated
population
in
a
build
scenario
would
result
in
a
predicted
demand
for
road
space
below
what
would
actually
be
observed.
This
would
in
turn
underestimate
future
congestion
levels
under
a
build
scenario,
generating
an
inaccurately
large
benefit
value
from
“reduced”
congestion.
This
mistake,
paired
with
the
previously
identified
mistakes
of
the
CRC’s
benefit
calculation
of
travel
time
savings
should
leave
us
questioning
the
CRC’s
economic
viability
if
the
project
were
to
ever
be
revived.
Conclusion
In
closing,
the
intent
of
this
examination
was
to
determine
whether
the
Columbia
River
Crossing
Project
was
truly
economically
viable
as
the
CRC
concluded
in
is
Final
Report
(2012).
Rather
than
complete
a
full
alternative
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
of
the
project’s
net
impact
to
the
area
economy,
this
paper
focused
on
critiquing
the
theory
understanding
congestion
(it’s
causes
and
effects)
implicit
in
the
CRC
analysis
of
the
project.
This
research
was
sparked
as
the
project
became
relatively
controversial
after
plans
were
developed
but
construction
never
began
due
to
non-­‐funding
from
Washington
and
Oregon.
Some
understood
this
was
due
to
political
reasons,
while
others
questioned
whether
it
would
have
truly
created
the
benefit
that
the
CRC
claimed.
This
paper
was
intended
to
shed
light
on
the
economics
of
the
project,
ultimately
concluding
that
the
project’s
benefit,
if

33.
31
completed,
would
more
than
likely
not
be
as
large
as
the
CRC
Final
Report
claimed
it
would
be.
This
was
conducted
by
first
looking
at
previous
economic
analyses
of
metropolitan
freeway
congestion
to
develop
theory
understanding
how,
why,
and
what
its
effects
are
on
an
area
economy.
This
theory
included
examining
common
policy
application
to
freeway
congestion
and
their
expected
effectiveness
when
applied
generally.
This
was
followed
by
examining
how
and
why
cost-­‐benefit
analysis
is
the
most
commonly
employed
tool
for
determining
the
economic
merit
of
certain
public
works
projects.
From
this
theoretical
starting
point,
analysis
of
the
CRC’s
claimed
benefits
took
place.
Although
this
analysis
completed
no
calculations
that
disprove
the
net
benefit
presented
in
the
CRC
Final
Report
(2012),
it
has
shown
that
the
theory
that
underlies
a
large
portion
of
the
benefit
calculation
has
major
inconsistencies
with
the
observed
economics
of
traffic.
Each
of
the
main
categories
of
benefit
identified
by
the
CRC
have
been
shown
to
have
some
inconsistencies
when
examined
within
a
theoretical
framework
developed
by
researchers
that
have
conducted
economic
analysis
of
the
phenomenon
of
traffic
congestion.
Key
issues
include
overestimation
of
supply
side
reductions
to
congestion
through
increasing
I-­‐
5
road
space
and
extension
of
the
MAX.
This,
combined
with
the
CRC’s
failure
to
properly
account
for
any
population
growth
that
would
have
been
a
direct
effect
of
any
congestion
reduction
generated
by
the
build
scenario,
led
to
the
conclusion
that
the
CRC’s
Final
Report
(2012)
was
not
an
accurate
analysis
of
the
projects
impact.
These
issues
leave
room
for
doubt
that
the
project
would
benefit
the
area
if
it
were
to
have
been
completed.

34.
32
Further
research
into
the
CRC’s
economic
viability,
if
ever
conducted,
should
take
into
account
the
work
of
researchers
who
have
dedicated
themselves
to
understanding
the
economics
of
traffic.
This
further
analysis
should
include
a
model
that
monetizes
the
benefits
of
the
project
properly.
Through
this,
an
independent
analysis
of
the
projects
effects
will
be
available
to
compare
to
the
CRC’s,
allowing
the
public
to
see
what
the
true
net
economic
effect
of
the
CRC
project
may
have
been.