MASTERS ESSAY FINAL

Applying the Multiple-Streams Framework in a Sub-National Setting:
An Analysis of the Michigan Emergency Manager Law in Detroit
by
Calvin Higgins, Jr.
AN ESSAY
Submitted to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences,
Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
May of 2014
MAJOR: Public Policy
APPROVED BY:
Adviser Date
2nd
Reader Date
(if necessary)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to acknowledge my Masters Essay Advisor, Professor John Strate for his
guidance on this paper and Professor Brady Baybeck who has assisted me on this topic.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
INTRODUCTION 5
POLICY PROCESS FRAMEWORKS 7
THE MULTIPLE-STREAMS FRAMEWORK 17
Problem Stream
Policy Stream
Political Stream
Policy Entrepreneur
Policy Window
LITERATURE ON MULTIPLE-STREAMS 21
Garbage Can Model
Criticism and Support
Advancing the Kingdon Model
DETROIT’S GARBAGE CAN MODEL 23
Detroit’s Problem Stream: An Overall Perspective
The Citizens’ Perspective
The City’s Perspective
The State’s Perspective
Detroit’s Policy Stream
City Officials
Citizens
Non-Government Organizations
The Media
State Officials
Political Stream
Policy Entrepreneur
Policy Window
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 43
REFERENCES 46

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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1. 25
2. 25

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INTRODUCTION
The public policy process is long and complicated. Sabatier (2007) argues that the
process involves multiple actors, lengthy time spans, multiple programs, multiple levels
of governments, lengthy debates, deeply held values and interests, large amounts of
money and sometimes authoritative coercion. Unfortunately, there is no widely accepted
general theory to explain the complexity of the policy process. The search for a general
theory has resulted in the construction of numerous frameworks.
In his seminal work on policy theories, Sabatier (2007) identified nine theoretical
frameworks capable of explaining different aspects of the policy process--Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF), Institutional Rational Choice, Large-N Comparative,
Multiple-Streams (MS), Policy Diffusion, Policy Networks, Punctuated-Equilibrium,
Social Construction and Stages Heuristic. Of the nine frameworks, six focus almost
exclusively on the policy process at the national level, with the exceptions being ACF,
Institutional Rational Choice, and Policy Diffusion (Berry and Berry 2007, 224;
Zahariadis 2007, 80).
In this paper, I look to advance the body of research on the public policy process by
examining the policy process at the sub-national rather than the national level.
Specifically, I examine the policy process leading to the enactment of Michigan's Public
Act 436, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, also referred to as the Emergency
Manager Act, as a policy to address Detroit’s financial problems. I show that Detroit’s
problem was not due to a single cause but to intertwining financial and urban problems
that affected Detroit’s ability to provide basic government services to its citizens.

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Among the nine frameworks identified by Sabatier, which best explains the policy
process resulting in the Emergency Manager Act? I argue that five help to explain the
policy process leading to this law: the Multiple-Streams framework, the Punctuated-
Equilibrium framework, the Social Construction framework, the Large-N Comparative
framework and the Policy Diffusion framework. These frameworks each address
somewhat different questions about the policy process, discussed below. For example, the
Multiple-Streams framework looks at how new policies get adopted--that is, how do
problems reach the governmental agenda and become linked with particular policy
options? How are such policy options, then, able to navigate through the political process
and get adopted?
To preface my argument, I conduct a brief overview of the nine different frameworks.
I then narrow my attention to the Multiple-Streams framework. I review the scholarly
literature on this framework. I then use this framework, in a section titled "Detroit's
Garbage Can Model,” to examine the policy process leading to the Emergency Manager
Act. The section looks at the problem, solution, and political streams. With respect to
the Emergency Manager Act, I identify the relevant policy entrepreneur, and factors
relevant to the opening of a "policy window," defined as a period of time, usually brief,
when there is a confluence of the three streams. I conclude that the Multiple-Streams
framework is the most useful among these nine different frameworks for explaining the
Emergency Manager Act. Further, I advise that other scholars will profit from using this
framework to conduct their own research at the sub-national level.

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POLICY PROCESS FRAMEWORKS
Sabatier’s (2007) Theories of the Policy Process discusses nine theoretical
frameworks in an effort to bring some order to understanding the complexity of the
policy process. What, indeed, do these frameworks amount to? The Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) explains the policy process to be the result of actions motivated by the
core policy beliefs of participants within distinctive policy subsystems. The Institutional
Rational Choice framework explains the policy process as a result of institutional rules
that shape the behavior of individuals who are motivated by material self-interest. The
Large-N Comparative explains policy commonalities or differences across large numbers
of jurisdictions. The Multiple-Streams (MS) framework, metaphorically, describes the
policy process as a chaotic soup of problems, policies and politics that on occasion
become coupled thereby providing a policy entrepreneur(s) with an opportune time or
policy window to enact new policy. The Policy Diffusion framework explains the spread
of policies across political jurisdictions as a result of the emulation or copying of policies
adopted earlier in other jurisdictions. The Policy Networks framework explains the policy
process as a result of informal, decentralized and horizontal interaction among a group of
network participants. The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework argues that the policy
process is marked by long periods of incremental policy change suddenly interrupted by a
major policy change. The Social Construction framework, with a focus on social welfare
policy, explains such policy by studying the narratives or stories that become attached to
client populations. The Stages Heuristic framework explains the policy process by
breaking it down into a series of stages--agenda setting, policy formulation and
legitimation, implementation, and evaluation. Although Sabatier (2007, 8) notes that this

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framework does identify distinctive stages of the policy process that require explanation,
he argues that it does not meet the criteria of a scientific theory since it is entirely
descriptive.
What relevance, if any, are each of these frameworks to the enactment of the
Emergency Manager Act as a solution to Detroit’s problems with governance and
finances? Sabatier and Weible (2007, 189-192) set out the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) to better understand a policy process that deals with “wicked
problems--those involving substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes, and
multiple actors from several levels of government.” The foundation of the ACF is the
policy subsystem. Its most prominent members are actors who specialize in the problem
area, sometimes referred to as technocrats who have strong and shared beliefs and are
motivated to translate those beliefs into actual policy. Furthermore, the ACF policy
actors, because of the authority they derive from their expertise, believe that they are
capable of influencing the selection of a particular policy option. The ACF framework is
most relevant to policy issues that are technical, such as environmental policy where
scientists have considerable influence.
The problems of Detroit, however, are not of this nature. They are chronic and
include an extraordinarily lengthy list. They include crime problems: armed robberies,
auto thefts, car hijackings, dog fighting, drug houses and drug sales, home invasions,
homicides, illegal dumping, larcenies, littering and loitering around party stores, gang
activities, youth gun violence, and the scrapping of abandoned homes. They include
health problems: a diabetes epidemic, obesity, lead poisoning, teen-age pregnancy, and
infant mortality. They include issues of neighborhood blight and infrastructure:

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abandoned and burned out houses and commercial structures, large tracts of vacant land,
wandering pit bulls and feral dogs, broken and non-working street lamps, broken
sidewalks, broken water mains and illegal dump sites. There are problems with the
public schools: safety issues for students walking to school, low test scores, falling
public school enrollments, school violence, and high school dropouts. Residents have
difficulty securing healthy food, with very few full-service grocery stores within the city
(the food desert). City services are mediocre to poor. There is slow police response
time; emergency medical service is slow; there is very little recycling; snow plowing of
residential streets is delayed; water mains can take weeks to get repaired; public
transportation is inadequate. There are chronic problems in collecting property taxes and
water bills from the many unemployed and poor residents. Over the years, many elected
public officials and political appointees have been charged and convicted of crimes
related to a "pay to play" political culture. The middle class faces the high costs of life
in the city: a resident income tax if they work in the city, a very high property tax
millage, high property insurance, high auto insurance, the extra costs of home security
measures, and the costs of private/parochial school tuition if children are not sent to
public schools. Many middle class residents have abandoned the city, moving to the
suburbs. There is also, of course, the long-standing problem of the "de-industrialization"
of Detroit, the loss of high-paid manufacturing jobs, and resulting unemployment and
poverty.
With this lengthy list of problems, there is little or no possibility of a single advocacy
coalition with a shared belief system emerging that is capable of addressing, let alone
understanding, these problems and their interconnections and formulating a “grand”

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policy solution for Detroit. They are all “wicked” problems to be dealt with, if at all, one
by one, using whatever solutions appear to the City’s elected public officials, at the time,
to be most promising. The ACF may be relevant, however, to issues regarding City
finances. Think-tanks such as the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), and
the Mackinac Center for Public Policy (MCPP), the city’s finance director, the city’s
auditor, and state level officials for years have called attention to, and shared their
concerns about, the City’s finances. These actors, however, do not and have not shared a
common outlook or shared belief system.
Sabatier (2007, 9) points out that Institutional Rational Choice is the most fully
developed and the most used of all the frameworks. It is sometimes referred to as the
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). As an analytical tool, IAD
tries to predict individual and group patterns of behavior within an institutional setting. It
asks whether or not the outcome occurred because of the institutional setting and the rules
that prevailed and would a different outcome have occurred under alternative institutional
arrangements (Ostrom 2011, 12-16)? The IAD framework has proved useful primarily in
the analysis of institutions and individuals that are involved in seeking cooperative
solutions to problems (E. Jones 2003 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51). Some examples
include the development of partnerships among public agencies (Lubell et al. 2002;
Heikkila and Gerlak 2005 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51) and the role of entrepreneurship
in collective action (Kuhnert 2001 as cited in Ostrom 2007, 51). The relevance of IAD
for the Emergency Manager Act as implemented in Detroit is to contribute to a better
understanding of the interactions between the Governor, the state legislature, the
emergency manager, the elected public officials and residents of Detroit. To what degree

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did the appointment of an emergency manager create inducements to seek cooperative
solutions?
Blomquist (2007, 261) describes the Large-N Comparative framework (20 cases or
more) as useful in finding commonalities and differences among the policies of different
governing entities. These reveal clues about how the policies are generated and changed.
In 1975, New York City faced a financial crisis equal to Detroit’s present financial crisis.
In a small-N comparative study (n=2), the CRC (2012a, 4) found that both financial
crises were triggered by cash flow insolvency and that their respective recovery plans
were similar in that each state exercised long-term transfer of power to a state-dominated
board with extensive authority over city finances and operations. The report posits that
the transfer of power is the reason for the success of the New York City plan. A
comparison involving only one or a few cases is well below the 20 or more cases required
for using the Large-N comparative method; however, comparison with a few cases may
be useful, at least anecdotally, in identifying what has and has not worked elsewhere,
thereby giving Detroit public officials at least a few clues about what it takes for a
successful recovery. The Great Recession that began in 2007 resulted in great economic
stress for many municipalities that still lingers today. In 2012, within a two-week span,
three California cities moved to file for bankruptcy protection. By the end of the year,
nine others had declared financial emergencies (Pew Charitable Trusts 2013). Currently,
19 states have enacted laws allowing the state government to intervene when a
municipality is declared in a financial crisis1
. The Pew study found that intervention
practices vary among the 19 states. Depending on the state, a state will designate a
receiver, an emergency manager, a state agency head, or financial control board. The
1
The states are CT, FL, IL, IN, ME, MA, MI, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, and TX.

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intervener is allowed to choose among options that include the restructuring of debt and
labor contracts, raising taxes and fees, offering state-backed loans and grants, providing
technical advice, and even dissolving the local government. Some states are more
aggressive (Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island) in their
interventions. Local governments often accept state intervention begrudgingly. It is rare
for a local government to seek bankruptcy protection from a court. A rise in
municipalities declaring financial emergencies throughout the United States has opened
the potential for more robust comparative research.
Zahariadis (2007) describes the Multiple-Streams (MS) framework as a policy
process that leads to new policy through the required coupling of a problem, a policy
solution and favorable politics. When a coupling occurs, a policy window opens,
creating a favorable time for a policy entrepreneur to promote their favored policy
solution. The MS framework also addresses the agenda-setting process--how public
officials come to identify problems and recognize them as needing to be attended to and
acted on. The MS framework appears capable of explaining Detroit’s emergency
manager policy process since, as will be argued below, there is clear evidence of coupling
occurring.
Berry and Berry (2007) describe the Policy Diffusion framework as a method to look
at how policy spreads throughout political jurisdictions (usually states) through emulation
or diffusion. States are able to enact and implement successful policies that have already
been tried out in other jurisdictions and have been shown to work. Kingdon (1995, 141)
argues that policy diffusion plays a significant role in the policy process and that usually
there is nothing new under the sun. He posits that past problems remain around to be

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studied and solutions remain around to be improved upon or discarded. Such is the case
with Detroit’s many problems and the policies it has adopted over time in an effort to
address them. Detroit is not alone in dealing with financial and urban problems. Cities
such as New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis have also faced equally
challenging problems and have formulated, reformulated, rejected and accepted ideas,
alternatives and proposals. The Policy Diffusion framework appears capable of
explaining how the City over the years has tried out many policy ideas that have been
adopted earlier by other cities facing similar problems. The Emergency Manager Act is
state level policy, however, so for diffusion theory to be relevant there would need to be
evidence that adoption of this policy at the state level was due to some understanding by
state level public officials that the approach had been tried in other states and had
worked.
Adam and Kriesi (2007, 131) describes the Policy Networks framework as a policy
subsystem concept that defines the policy process as part of an informal, decentralized
and horizontal process. The strength of Policy Networks is that it includes a diversity of
actors who are from governmental and private and non-profit sectors (Adam and Kriesi
2007, 147). Organizations such as the non-profit Detroit Crime Commission, an
organization that partners with Detroit police officials and government officials to lessen
the burdens of government and the citizens of the southeast Michigan area by facilitating
the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crime. The Detroit Recovery Project, a
private non-profit organization that partners with government and non-government
organizations to support recovery that strengthens, rebuilds, and empowers individuals,
families and communities who are experiencing co-occurring mental illness, and

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substance use disorders. However, just like advocacy groups, policy networks face
Detroit’s “wicked” problems that make it difficult for a host of policy networks to
formulate a “grand” policy solution for Detroit.
Baumgartner and Jones (1991) set out the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework to
explain why policies undergo only incremental change through long, stable periods but
then during chaotic times undergo rapid change. Problem definition is a key element in
the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework; a different understanding of a problem can lead
to growing acceptance of a new solution and to the rapid ascent of an issue onto the
agenda. The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, unlike some other frameworks, helps to
account for a policy process that involves both policy stasis and rapid policy shifts (True,
Jones and Baumgartner 2007, 156). The Emergency Manager Act is a clear example of a
non-incremental policy change. Thus, the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework may be
useful in explaining the policy process that led to it.
In the Social Construction framework, Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that target
populations acquire popular images and that these images form the basis for deciding
who receives the benefit or burden of a policy. This, Schneider and Ingram contend,
makes social construction a powerful influence on both the policy agenda and the actual
policy design. Target groups are socially constructed into four types: Advantage Groups
--politically powerful and positively constructed groups (e.g. AARP); Contender Groups
--politically powerful and negatively constructed groups (e.g. unions); Dependent Groups
--politically weak and positively constructed groups (e.g. abused women and children);
and Deviant Groups--politically weak and negatively constructed (e.g. criminals). It is
policymakers who formulate policy based upon such social constructions, and what they

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are doing at times goes unnoticed by the public. However, for the social construction
theory to be relevant to explaining the Emergency Manager Act, there would need to be
evidence that Michigan's public officials have slotted the residents and leadership of
Detroit into one of these four target groups. There is evidence that some Michigan
policymakers, indeed, have put Detroit into the deviant category, strongly believing that
Detroit's black political leaders are incapable of effectively governing a large city. One
has to look no further than comments by Oakland County Executive L. Brooks Patterson
in a recent New Yorker Magazine interview titled “Drop Dead, Detroit!” (Williams
2014). However, more research is needed to determine if state legislators were motivated
by a similar social construction of Detroit in deciding to formulate the Emergency
Manager Act and vote in favor of it.
The Large-N Comparative, the Multiple-Streams framework, the Policy Diffusion
framework, the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, and the Social Construction
framework appear to be relevant to explaining different aspects of Detroit’s emergency
manager policy process. The Multiple-Streams framework is especially relevant to
explaining the process leading to the Emergency Manager Act. For a long period of time,
there was no focusing event, no extraordinary financial emergency, to give immediate
salience to the City's financial difficulties. The City was able to patch problems and
"kick the can down the road." It issued debt, ignored long term health care and pension
obligations, and hoped for a turnaround in the City’s economy. It was business as usual.
The long accepted understanding was that the City’s financial difficulties were only
temporary; a result of national economic forces beyond its control, and that over time the
local economy would recover. Only recently and reluctantly were local public officials

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able to see that this understanding was terribly mistaken. As often happens with a
pending financial crisis, there's a cash crisis, with money running out to pay employees,
debt payments, and other bills. Some still argue that all of the City's financial difficulties
stem from a swap deal that the City negotiated years earlier that soured when interest
rates dropped sharply. There's some truth to that claim, but the City's overall financial
difficulties are longstanding, as is evident from a careful analysis conducted by the CRC
(2013). The old understanding had to give way to a new understanding that the City’s
financial difficulties were chronic and largely insoluble without the wholesale
restructuring of city government operations, the rewriting of union contracts, and even
bankruptcy.
The Multiple-Streams framework has been criticized for its lack of productive
scholarship at the sub-national level (Zahariadis 2007, 80). This paper is an effort to fill
that gap. I begin by detailing the origins of the Multiple-Streams framework with Cohen,
March, and Olsen’s (1972) “garbage can model.”

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THE MULTIPLE-STREAMS FRAMEWORK
The Multiple-Streams framework originates in Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972)
“garbage can model” that was developed to explain organizational decision making
during times of ambiguity and conflict. The garbage can model posits that organizations
make decisions during these conflicting times by the coupling of problems and solutions
that have been dumped by participants into a garbage can full of choice opportunities
(Robinson & Eller, 2010). Kingdon (1995), with only slight modifications, adopted
Cohen, March and Olsen’s garbage can model to explain government agenda-setting and
policy making at the national level. Kingdon’s garbage can model posits that government
policy choices are the result of the coupling of the three independent streams – problem,
policy or solution, and political--affording a policy entrepreneur an open policy window.
Specific details of the role of the three streams, the coupling process, and the policy
entrepreneur and policy window follow in the next subsections.
Problem Stream
A problem is an issue that catches the attention of policymakers and has become
salient enough that it has to be addressed. According to Kingdon (1995), a
problem/issue garners the attention of policymakers through various mechanisms. One
mechanism is the focusing event. For example, in 2009, General Motors (GM) filing for
bankruptcy garnered immediate public and media attention and became a focusing event
for the Obama administration. Prior to its 2009 bankruptcy filing, GM was a company
marred in financial trouble with declining sales and billion dollar losses. Requests for
government assistance were denied (Vlasic and Herszenhorn 2008). In the midst of the
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, President Obama and members of

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Congress feared the economic disaster that would accompany the collapse of GM, auto
dealerships, suppliers, and the entire U.S. auto industry. Industry and media reports
suggested that a bankruptcy of this magnitude would result in catastrophic job losses, and
significant disruption in the financial markets. GM was too important to the U.S.
economy. It was too big to fail. The federal government needed to intervene in GM’s
bankruptcy to insure it would survive beyond bankruptcy. The issue of GM's survival
climbed to the top of the governmental agenda. The Obama administration put forth, and
pushed for, a reorganization plan that included billions of dollars in bailout money.
Kingdon (1995) argues that not every problem or issue equally arises to the attention of
policymakers and that every focusing event is of the scale of GM’s bankruptcy. For
example, the need for adequate public transportation in Detroit has been an issue in
Detroit for years, sometimes eliciting powerful and emotional debates and feedback from
local residents, but has yet to result in a policy that would result in a comprehensive and
adequate public transportation system.
Policy Stream
The policy stream flows independently of the problem stream and is described by
Kingdon (1995, 116) as a primeval soup that consists of a wide range of ideas,
alternatives, and proposals that are generated by the policy community. This policy
community is composed of researchers from the academia, officials from government and
non-government organizations, and individuals from public and private interest groups.
Kingdon (1995, 122-123) tells us that the policy community is continuously proposing,
judging, altering, reconsidering, rejecting or accepting ideas or alternatives that are in
different stages of development, thereby, indicating a kind of Darwinian struggle within

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the policy stream. From the policy stream will emerge the solution to the problem
existing in the problem stream. What waits now is a favorable political stream.
Political Stream
The political stream also flows independently of the problem and policy streams and
is composed of public moods that indicate to policymakers a need for a change in policy.
This public mood may reflect the views of interest groups that engage in both inside and
outside lobbying in order to pressure on policymakers to change policy. Interest groups
can apply pressure that blocks policymakers from making policy change. The election
cycle and activities associated with it, such as raising campaign money, fending off
primary challengers, and delaying unpopular policy decisions such as increasing taxes,
change the policy agenda priorities of policymakers (Kingdon, 1995). A favorable
political environment is needed to allow the coupling of the problem, policy, and political
stream. This coupling is done by the policy entrepreneur.
Policy Entrepreneur
Kingdon (1995, 179) argues that it is a policy entrepreneur(s) who is willing to invest
their time, energy, reputation and sometimes money to couple the three independent
streams into a policy choice. Kingdon’s policy entrepreneur is similar to a private
sector business entrepreneur who seeks, finds and markets innovative products (Mintrom,
2000). The policy entrepreneur can be an elected official or a non-elected person. It can
be someone in government or belonging to a non-governmental organization.
Regardless, they are someone who possesses an understanding and stake regarding what
they are proposing, are politically connected and are persistent (Mintrom 2000, 180-181).

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Kingdon (1995) describes the policy entrepreneur as lying in wait for the opening of a
policy window so that he or she can join the three streams into a policy choice. However,
Mintrom (2000, 45) suggests that it is better to see a policy entrepreneur as someone who
makes deliberate efforts to draw the attention of decision makers to given problems and,
wherever possible, to force agenda change.
Policy Window
According to Kingdon (1995), a policy window provides policy entrepreneurs the
opportune time to couple the three independent streams into a policy choice that
addresses a problem or issue. The policy window or opportune time can occur regularly,
cyclically, and predictably, for example during policy/program renewals or budget
cycles, or unpredictably because of a problem’s position on the agenda rising, or because
of changes in the political stream (Kingdon, 166). Kingdon argues that once a policy
window opens, it does not stay open long.

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LITERATURE ON MULTIPLE-STREAMS
Kingdon’s theory is recognized as excellent for explaining agenda setting and
policymaking at the national level (Bendor, 2001; Durant & Diehl, 1989). In his theory,
he uses the garbage can model as a metaphor to explain governmental agenda setting and
policymaking
Garbage Can Model
As previously indicated, Kingdon (1995) slightly modified Cohen et al.'s (1972)
garbage can model to explain government’s policy making process. Instead of the four
components of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities, Kingdon
constructed a model of three independent streams of problem, policy and politics moving
within the garbage can waiting to be coupled by a policy entrepreneur(s), thereby opening
up a policy window. Zahariadis’ (2007, 68) assumes that the number of problems/issues
addressed by policymakers is limited due to bounded rationality and time constraints
limit the range and number of alternatives to consider. A number of political scientists
(Bendor 2001; King 1985; Mucciaroni 1992; Sabatier 2007) have accepted this theory as
one that has significantly contributed to the understanding of the agenda-setting process
in policy making.
Criticism and Support
Scholars have criticized Kingdon’s model, and in particular its adoption of Cohen,
March and Olsen’s (1972) original garbage can model. These scholars argue that the
model lacks a theoretical foundation, includes unrealistic assumptions and is ambiguous
about the policy process (Bendor, 2001; King, 1985, Zahariadis, 2007). Bendor (2001)
and Murcciaroni (1992) question whether or not Kingdon’s three streams were

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independent of each other. Mucciaroni concludes that Kingdon’s model was “overly
indeterminate” in part because of Kindgon’s view that the three streams were
independent of each other. In spite of these faults, Muciaroni (1992, 482) believes that
Kingdon “captured much of the complexity, fluidity, and unpredictability of agenda-
setting.” While Robinson and Eller (2010) note that Kingdon succeeded in describing
and explaining the dynamics of the individual streams, and Bendor (2001) and Zahariadis
(2007) applaud Kingdon, arguing that his approach is both theoretically driven, and
empirically validated.
Advancing the Kingdon Model
With Kingdon’s (1995) model being generally accepted as theoretically sound,
researchers still criticized the theory for it being restricted to the national level.
Zahariadis (2007, 80) noted that Kingdon failed to encourage the use of his model
beyond the national level. There have been attempts, nevertheless to apply Kingdon’s
model to other countries. In Britain, France and Germany, it has been used to study
privatization policies (Zahariadis 1995, 1996); and in Greece it has been used to study
foreign policy (Zahariadis 2005). There has been only limited application of the
Multiple-Streams framework at the sub-national level (see McLendon 2003 and
Westervelt, 2001 as cited in Zahariadis 2007, 80; Robinson 2010).
This paper attempts to add to Kingdon’s body of research by determining if the
Multiple-Streams concept can be applied at the sub-national level. Specifically, I will
determine if the Emergency Manager Act in Detroit is supportive of the Multiple-Streams
framework.

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DETROIT’S GARBAGE CAN MODEL
Detroit’s Problem Stream: An Overall Perspective
Detroit’s problems include seemingly innumerable complex, interacting, and
compounding issues that together have become interwoven into a financial and urban
crisis. Detroit’s problems were of such a magnitude that the City today is unable or
barely able to supply basic services to its residents. For a very long time, no definitive
focusing event occurred to push Detroit’s financial and other problems to the forefront of
either the City's or the State of Michigan's agenda; however, multiple sources gave
notice to both City and State policymakers that problems were mounting that could not be
ignored for long. Past policies had failed to solve Detroit's problems, and current ones
were also failing.
Historians and scholars such as Thomas Sugrue (1996) and Edward Glaeser (2011)
argue persuasively that Detroit’s problems were first manifest with the onset of
deindustrialization in the years following World War II. It was at this point that Detroit
began to see a decline in its war-time industry. This deindustrialization brought about
financial instability, declining employment, and increasing crime and poverty. Bomey
and Gallaher (2013) argue that financial instability as a result of declining tax revenues
led to the decrease in resources for public safety and education.
There is ample research showing that problems such as those experienced by Detroit
can develop into an urban crisis. (See Hipp and Yates 2011; and Flango and Sherbenou
1976 for studies on poverty; Cantor and Land 1985, Arvanites and Defina 2006; and
Kleck and Chiricos 2002 for studies on unemployment; Machin, Marie, and Vujic 2011,
2012; LeBlanc and McDuff 1993, and Maguin and Loeber 1996 for studies on low

24
education achievement). Virtually all indicators point to a very stark urban crisis in
Detroit. Detroit’s violent crime rate ranks among the highest in Michigan and the U.S.
Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Report (2012) shows that Detroit had a violent crime
rate of 2,133 per 100,000 population, compared to 455 per 100,000 for the state and 387
per 100,000 population for the nation. Detroit’s unemployment rate is one of the highest
in Michigan and the U.S. Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012)
show that Detroit has an unemployment rate of 18.6 percent compared to Michigan’s
average of 9.1 percent and the U.S. average of 8.1 percent. U.S. Census Bureau (2007-
2011) data shows that 36.2 percent of Detroiters live in poverty compared to 15.7 percent
for Michigan and 14.3 percent for the U.S. Detroit’s illiteracy rate stands at 47 percent
compared to a 23 percent illiteracy rate for the U.S. (Detroit Literacy Coalition, n.d). In
education, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) shows that in 2011
Detroit’s fourth graders scored an average of 203 in mathematics achievement tests and
191 in reading achievement tests, compared to 233 in mathematics and 211 in reading for
similarly large cities and 240 in mathematics and 221 in reading for national average
(NCEC, 2011).
Indicators also point toward a persistent financial crisis in Detroit that is interwoven
with its urban crisis. According to Bomey and Gallagher (2013), Detroit’s population
began to steadily decline in the 1950s, post-World War II. Figure 1 shows that Detroit’s
population dropped from 1.8 million citizens in 1950 to 713,777 citizens in 2010. Bomey
and Gallagher (2013) further suggest that as a result of Detroit’s depopulation, property
values and tax revenues also declined (Figure 2).

25
(Figure 1) (Figure 2)
Bomey and Gallagher cite statistics that show the City of Detroit’s revenue in today’s
dollars fell 40 percent from 1962 to 2012. The City's response to its declining revenue
was to enact new taxes or increase existing taxes so that it could cover service costs and
union benefits; however, Bomey and Gallagher claim that this too contributed to
Detroit’s declining population and deindustrialization by driving residents to the suburbs
and driving businesses overseas. The declining revenue contributed to Detroit’s
diminishing capacity to provide basic public services to its citizens.
Bomey and Gallagher (2013) also point to failed financial policies as contributing to
Detroit’s financial crisis. In particular, Bomey and Gallagher point to former Mayor
Kwame Kilpatrick’s 2005 $1.44-billion pension obligation reduction deal. This deal
included the city selling pension obligation certificates of participation to fund the city’s
pension funds and buying derivatives at a locked rate of six percent. The deal failed
when the interest rates dropped sharply and the stock market collapsed which led the city

26
to pledge its casino tax revenue as collateral. This left the city owing $2.8 billion for
principal, interest and insurance payments over the next 22 years, which represented
nearly one-fifth of the city’s debt (Bomey and Gallagher, 2013). The opportunity cost
associated with this debt is seen as contributing to the city’s inability to provide and
sustain essential public services, such as police, fire and adequate public transportation to
its citizens.
Bomey and Gallagher (2013) argue that Detroit’s policymakers’ failure to exercise
foresight and to act immediately to address the causes of deficits contributed to Detroit’s
financial crisis. They cite the example that from 1994 to 2001, Detroit’s political leaders
failed to decrease the city’s workforce to match the decline in population and the need for
city services. Bomey and Gallagher (2013, 9) point out that there was a 46% increase in
health care spending between 2000 and 2012 during the time that the city’s general
revenue declined by twenty-percent.
The Citizens’ Perspective
As stated in the previous section, Detroit has had a high violent crime rate and it
remains, despite the rate falling over time, as the biggest concern of its citizens. In a
2012 poll conducted by the by The Detroit News that asked Detroit residents to rank their
concerns, nearly 58 percent of Detroit’s residents ranked crime and safety as their largest
concern followed by unemployment at 12.8 percent, public transportation at 3.5 percent,
and the lack of city services at 3.2 percent (The Detroit News 2012). Unless city officials
adequately address Detroit’s crime problem, its efforts to address its other problems will
fail.

27
The City’s Perspective
There is clear evidence that City-level policymakers recognized that Detroit was in
the midst of a longstanding financial and urban crisis that was affecting the city’s ability
to provide basic services to its residents. In a 2013 State of the City Address, Mayor
Dave Bing placed blame on Detroit’s past financial mismanagement as the reason for
Detroit’s current problems. Mayor Bing emphasized that he inherited a $322 million
accumulated deficit, in addition to $13.8 billion in long-term liabilities. This impeded the
City’s ability to provide basic city services, such as health services for its residents, job
placement, human services, public lighting, public safety, and public transportation (City
of Detroit 2013a).
A statement by Detroit City Councilman André Spivey also indicates that Detroit’s
City Council recognized that Detroit’s financial problems were affecting its ability to
provide basic services. In a 2012 statement addressing a state-required consent
agreement between the city and the state, Councilman Andre Spivey stated “a need for
cooperation in moving Detroit towards fiscal stability with an emphasis on improving the
delivery of city services” (City of Detroit 2012a).
The State’s Perspective
In 2012, Governor Snyder dispatched a Financial Review Team to analyze and report
back on Detroit’s financial condition. The Team concluded that Detroit was under a
severe financial crisis based on the following: (1) Detroit continued to experience a
significant depletion of cash and projected a cumulative cash deficit in excess of $100
million by the end of the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2013; (2) Detroit had not
experienced a positive year-end fund balance since fiscal year 2004 and that its General

28
Fund deficit was $326.6 million in fiscal year 2012 and would have accumulated a deficit
of $936.8 million if the city had not issued long-term debt; (3) the City’s long-term
liabilities, including unfunded actuarial accrued pension liabilities and other post-
employment benefits, exceeded $14 billion (State of Michigan, 2013a).
Feedback from multiple sources gave notice to the state's policymakers that current
and past policies were failing; however, it was the feedback from Governor Snyder’s
Financial Review Team that finally caught the attention of state legislators in Lansing,
the state capitol. Detroit's problems moved from the list of problems that were in need of
general attention to the list of problems that were in need of immediate attention.
Kingdon (1995, 3-4) defines the former as an agenda, a list of problems that
policymakers are paying some serious attention at any given time and the latter as a
decision agenda, a list of problems that are up for an active decision.
For many years, Detroit’s problems have been highly visible as gauged by such
indicators of urban pathology as high unemployment, high crime, poverty, high illiteracy
and low education achievement. Moreover, trends in financial indicators such as
declining property values, declining tax revenue and long-term/high risk borrowing
furnished evidence of financial problems and likely financial crisis for Detroit. These
financial problems diminished Detroit’s ability to provide basic government services that
were essential to public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
Kingdon (1995, 94) argues that some problems are not always self-evident and need a
push from a focusing event to capture the attention of policymakers. For years, no
definitive focusing event appeared to push Detroit’s problem to the forefront of City and
State level policymakers’ agendas however; the threat of the City running out of cash,

29
and especially the feedback from a financial review team, finally caught the attention of
Governor Snyder, a Republican and the key policy maker at the state level in a
Republican controlled state legislature. He moved Detroit’s problems from the state
government's general agenda to its decision agenda.
Detroit’s Policy Stream
Detroit’s policy stream appears similar to Kingdon’s (1995) description of the policy
primeval soup of ideas, alternatives, and proposals that came from many different
political corners.
City Officials
In 2009, as a newly elected Mayor of Detroit, Dave Bing proposed a three pillar
Urban Restructuring Plan to (1) Improve the Quality of Life; (2) Create Financial
Stability; and (3) Address Long-Term Liabilities (City of Detroit 2013a ). The plan
would improve the quality of life through (a) a public safety initiative that would
redeploy and reassign police officers to high crime areas, address youth violence,
increase the salaries and benefits of fire personnel, purchase new fire equipment, and
increase the use of technology in public safety; (b) improve public transportation through
increased efficiency and on-time service; (c) improve public lighting by creating a public
lighting authority, installing 3,000 new lights and repair damaged street lights; (d)
improve recreation facilities by launching a plan for active and safe recreation centers,
keeping all recreation centers open and available to residents and to re-open Belle Isle
Aquarium through public-private partnership; and (e) address blight by demolishing
nearly 6,700 abandoned neighborhood structures, launching a public private partnership
with Blight Authority, and demolishing the former Brewster/Douglas public housing site.
The plan would create financial stability by (a) enacting revenue enhancement initiatives;

30
(b) enacting cost savings initiatives; and (c) identifying future cost saving initiatives. The
plan would address Detroit’s long-term liabilities, such as its general fund debt
obligations, pension unfunded liabilities and retiree medical unfunded liabilities.
In his 2013 State of the City Address, Mayor Bing noted some of the
accomplishments of his Urban Restructuring Plan (City of Detroit 2013b). In four years,
the City’s spending was reduced from $1.4 billion to $1.1 billion. To cut costs, City
services such as the Health Department, the Workforce Development Department and the
Human Services Department were privatized. Public transportation was improved
through the implementation of his “415 Plan” that guaranteed bus service every fifteen
minutes at the four busiest bus routes. Public safety was improved through the hiring of
100 additional police officers and the re-opening of eight mini-police stations in the
neighborhoods. Nearly 6,700 vacant properties were demolished. More than 5,000 new
jobs were brought to Detroit. A Regional Transportation Authority was formed to
coordinate the M-1 light rail system. In other cost saving measures, Mayor Bing
negotiated and reached significant concessions with Detroit’s labor unions (Detroit Free
Press 2012). However, for all of his accomplishments, Mayor Bing’s plans were judged
by Governor Snyder and the state legislature to be insufficient in addressing Detroit’s
problems.
A Financial Stability Agreement between the City of Detroit and the State of
Michigan was proposed and agreed upon by Mayor Bing, state officials and city council
members, albeit not unanimously (City of Detroit 2012b). The agreement gave greater
oversight of Detroit’s financial matters to state officials in exchange for not appointing an
emergency manager. The agreement required, among other things, the creation of a

31
financial advisory board, and the City renegotiating with the labor unions in order to
extract deeper concessions than previously agreed upon. In return, the State would
commit resources in support of initiatives such as those outlined in Mayor Bing’s Urban
Restructuring Plan that created jobs and improved the quality of life for Detroiters (City
of Detroit 2012a).
Another proposal centered on the dispute over $220 million in revenue sharing that
the City of Detroit argued it is owed by the State of Michigan. While the facts remain in
dispute and beyond the scope of this paper, the City of Detroit proposed to use the
revenue sharing money to address its fiscal crisis.
Citizens
I was unable to find a grand comprehensive list of ideas, plans, or proposals put forth
by the residents of Detroit to address Detroit’s problems. The reason for this is the lack
of an advocacy coalition. There appears to be no individual or civic organization capable
of understanding the complexity of Detroit’s problems and formulating a grand policy
solution. One thing for certain is that Detroiters were not in support of any plan or
proposal to take away the authority of Detroit's elected public officials to govern the city.
I later cite a poll where 69% of Detroit’s residents did not support the appointment of an
Emergency Manager in Detroit.
Non-Government Organizations
Non-Government Organizations (NGO) also contributed to Detroit’s soup of ideas,
alternatives, and proposals. One such organization that contributed was the Mackinac
Center for Public Policy (MCPP), a nonpartisan research and educational institute
dedicated to improving the quality of life for all Michigan residents by promoting sound

32
solutions to state and local policy questions. The MCPP, located in Midland, Michigan,
is a "conservative" think-tank generally advocates for policy options that reduce the size
and cost of state and local governments, that cut government regulation and red tape, and
that employ market based solutions, such as privatization of publicly owned assets and
contracting. The MCPP assists policy makers, scholars, business people, the media and
the public by providing objective analysis of Michigan issues. The goal of all MCPP’s
reports, commentaries and educational programs is to equip Michigan citizens and other
decision makers to better evaluate policy options. In a Detroit-specific report published
in 2000 titled Michigan Privatization Report, the MCPP suggested the following cost
saving measures: (1) Contract out the operation of the Detroit Department of
Transportation (DDOT) at a savings estimated to be $60 million annually; (2) Sell
Detroit’s electrical power system to an investor owned utility for an estimated price
between $301 million to $501 million; (3) Sell Cobo Hall; (4) Sell the water system for
an estimated price between $1.775 billion and $2.285 billion or contract out the
management of the water system for an estimated annual savings of $47.2 million; (5)
Contract out the collection of garbage for an annual savings of $6.4 million; (6) Privatize
building inspections, permits and licenses at an estimated annual savings of $5.1 million;
(7) Sell Belle Isle for an estimated $370 million and an annual savings of $6.6 million in
care and maintenance costs (MCPP 2011).
The Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), with offices in Livonia and
Lansing, Michigan, is another non-partisan think-tank that conducts policy research on
issues affecting state and local governments in Michigan. The organization has published
numerous reports over the years on issues affecting Detroit. Most relevant are its reports

33
on the financial situation of the City, such as the effects of the population on major
revenue sources (CRC 1989); the fiscal condition of Detroit (CRC 2010); downsizing
Detroit (CRC 2012b); and city revenues (CRC 2013).
The public universities in Michigan, especially the big three research universities that
include the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State
University, provide a home to numerous institutes, centers, and research scholars who
have conducted research on the city's many problems. For example, the Center for
Urban Studies of Wayne State University over the years has engaged in a number of
collaborative efforts with the City, an example being the Urban Safety Program. The
Urban Safety Program works with community organizations and government agencies on
collaborative projects that address persistent public safety-related issues. The program
conducts research on “best practices” and model programs, analyzes crime and
community data, and provides technical assistance to community organizations and
government agencies.
In the soup of policy ideas, it's often difficult or impossible to trace the lineage of any
particular policy idea, but the universities in Michigan no doubt have been the seed bed
of many new ideas later considered by both local and state policy makers.
The Media
Several politically attuned journalists were contributors to Detroit’s primeval soup of
ideas, alternatives and proposals. Detroit Free Press editor Stephen Henderson
suggested that the state takeover Detroit’s debt in exchange for a voice in future funding
decisions. He also proposed that the city rid itself of the ownership and management of
the water department, that serves almost all of the large metropolitan area, and the

34
management of park services (Henderson, personal communication, January 31, 2013).
Detroit Free Press staff writer John Gallagher proposed that non-profits, universities
and urban planners, and not city government, should solve Detroit’s urban blight problem
(Gallagher, personal communication, January 24, 2013). Tax increases and long-term
borrowing were proposed and sometimes used to address Detroit’s financial problem
(Bomey and Gallagher, 2013)
State Officials
State officials have made significant contributions of ideas, alternatives, and
proposals to Detroit’s policy soup. They ranged from doing nothing to a full state take-
over of Detroit. The following overview is not an exhaustive listing of what state
officials have come up with to address Detroit's ills, but it does represent some that the
state's policymakers have seriously considered.
For state legislators, perhaps the most controversial of all ideas was the notion that
the state should intervene and take any kind of action to save Detroit. Many legislators,
especially Republicans, saw Detroit as a hopeless case, deeply mired in the muck of
problems that were the result of decades of incompetent and corrupt leadership. The city
was an embarrassment to the rest of the state.
There were really two questions. First was the question of whether or not the State
should intervene at all in Detroit. The second was whether any intervention should
involve a State political takeover or a State monetary bailout. I've addressed the issue of a
political takeover by the state throughout this paper, but what about the proposal to use
state dollars to bailout Detroit? There was little or no chance of Republican Governor
Snyder and either the Republican controlled House or the Republican controlled Senate

35
giving serious consideration to this option. Indeed, Republican Governor Snyder,
Republican Senate Majority Leader Richardville and Republican House Speaker Bolger
made it clear throughout that a state bailout of any municipality was not an option. In
support of the Emergency Manager Act, Governor Snyder stated that the use of the
Emergency Manager Law “will ensure residents are not cut off from basic services and
protect taxpayers from having to bailout [emphasis added] municipalities that fail to take
action” (State of Michigan, n.d2). In a press conference with Senate Majority Leader
Richardville and House Speaker Bolger on the issue of Detroit retiree pensions, Governor
Snyder again made it clear on the bailout issue when he stated, “We will not participate
in a bailout…” (State of Michigan, n.d3).
Was a federal bailout a possibility? There was no chance of a federal bailout, even
with a Democrat, President Obama, in the White House. Partisan polarization in
Washington in President Obama's second term was extreme, with House Republicans
opposing virtually every presidential initiative. There was little sympathy and support in
the House for a bailout of Detroit. Many in the House were still angry about the bailout a
number of years earlier of General Motors. The House, under control of the Republicans,
would not have considered such legislation. Public opinion was no help here. A
Quinnipiac University poll showed that only a bare majority of 51% of Democrats
supported a federal bailout while 73% of Republicans opposed a federal bailout (Bevan
2013).
With the presence of a financial crisis still looming and virtually no chance of a state
or federal bailout, it was the Emergency Manager Act that ascended to the top of
Governor Snyder’s decision agenda. In March 2013, the Republican controlled state

36
legislature with the urging of Republican Governor Snyder enacted PA 436 of 2012, the
Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, a financial management policy to address
Detroit’s financial and governance problems. The Emergency Manager Act gives the
governor the authority to appoint an Emergency Manager to replace elected officials of a
municipality where a financial emergency has been declared. In the City of Detroit’s
case, Governor Snyder declared a financial emergency after an appointed financial
review team found Detroit to in a financial crisis.
A brief overview of the history of the Emergency Manager Act (Hohman 2012)
shows that the Emergency Manager Act dates back to 1988 when PA 101 was passed
following the court-ordered receivership of the City of Ecorse, Michigan. As a result of
the court-order, a receiver was appointed and given broad authority over the city’s elected
leaders to set budgets, control finances, sell assets, hire workers, close positions, and
negotiate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. However, the receiver was
unable to alter existing collective bargaining agreements or other contracts between the
city and its workers. In order to prevent any future court-ordered receiverships, the
Michigan legislature enacted PA 101 of 1988 that authorized the state to identify and
review local governments under financial stress and appoint an Emergency Financial
Manager (EFM)2
. In 1990, Michigan legislators superseded PA 101 with PA 72, which
expanded the Emergency Manager Act to cover financially distressed school districts.
In 2011, PA 72 was superseded by PA 4 which carried with it clarifications to PA 72
and was significant in expanding the powers of the Emergency Manager to amend
existing collective bargaining agreements and other contracts between the city and its
2
The title Emergency Financial Manager was first used in PA 101 but was subsequently changed to
Emergency Manager in PA 436. Both continued to be used interchangeably, however for this paper I will
use the title Emergency Manager.

37
workers. However, in 2012, PA 4 was nullified by Michigan voters via the ballot, thus
returning the EM's authority back to what it was under PA 72. In response to the
nullification of PA 4, the Michigan legislature enacted PA 436 in 2012 that superseded
PA 72. PA 436 was significant in expanding the Governor’s authority to intervene earlier
when a local government is under a financial crisis (State of Michigan, 2013b).
The authority, purpose, and the intent of the Emergency Manager Act are spelled out
in the statutory language. The purpose of Emergency Manager Act is to return financial
stability to a municipality so that it is able to provide basic government services that
support the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
Beginning with Section 3, Paragraph (a), PA 436 states that:
The fiscal accountability of local governments is vitally necessary to the
interests of the citizens of this state to assure the provision of necessary
governmental services essential to public health, safety, and welfare
Paragraph (c) that states:
That the fiscal stability of local governments is necessary to the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of this state and it is a valid public purpose for this state to
assist a local government in a condition of financial emergency
Section 9, Paragraph 2 empowers the Governor to replace elected officials with the
appointment of an Emergency Manager, it states:
Upon appointment, an emergency manager shall act for and in the place
and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative
officer of the local government
Section 10 empowers the Emergency Manager to govern, it states:
An emergency manager shall issue to the appropriate local elected and
appointed officials and employees, agents, and contractors of the local
government the orders the emergency manager considers necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this act

38
An order issued under this section is binding on the local elected and appointed
officials and employees, agents, and contractors of the local government to whom
it is issued
Public sector labor unions have tried repeatedly to challenge the Emergency Manager
Act. Legal challenges have failed. Political challenges, such as in 2012 when unions
were successful in nullifying PA 4 through a ballot initiative, did not bring lasting
success (Hohman, 2012).
In the next section, I analyze Detroit and the State of Michigan's political streams to
see how conducive they were to being coupled with the problem and policy streams.
Political Stream
Kingdon (1995) argues that the main components of the political stream are the
public mood for policy change, organized political forces that are able to apply pressure
for policy change or block policy change and election activities that can change the
policy priorities of policymakers. In Detroit’s political stream, the overall public mood
in Michigan was in favor of the Emergency Manager Act; organized political forces were
unable to block policy change; and election activities played no significant direct role in
the political stream.
In March 2013, a poll conducted by the Marketing Resource Group (MRG) and the
Inside Michigan Politics (IMP) showed large majorities of likely voters statewide (67%)
in Michigan and in metropolitan Detroit (71%) (mainly suburbs outside Detroit)
supporting an Emergency Manager, but only a minority (41%) of likely voters in the city
of Detroit (MRG, 2013). The split along geographic lines appears to have had little
impact on Governor Snyder's decision to appoint an Emergency Manager in Detroit.
This is explained by the fact that Republican Governor Snyder is a statewide official who

39
was elected with only a small number of his votes coming from largely African-
American (83%) and Democratic Party controlled Detroit. In the last general election in
2010, Governor Snyder received only 5 percent of Detroit’s votes (City of Detroit, 2010).
Michigan labor unions' success in repealing PA 4 through an initiative was only
temporary. The Michigan legislature, ignoring this initiative vote, in the following "lame
duck" session enacted PA 436, which significantly expanded the Governor’s authority to
intervene when a municipality is facing a financial crisis (Hohman, 2012).
Of Kingdon’s (1995) third element in the political stream, I found evidence that
election activity played an indirect rather than direct role in moving Detroit’s financial
and urban problems to the top of Governor Snyder’s decision agenda. Kingdon (1995,
153) posits that agenda change occurs when an incumbent in the position of authority
changes his or her agenda priorities or a newly elected official brings in new priorities.
As a newly elected Governor in 2010, Snyder had his own agenda. He campaigned under
a 10-point plan to “Reinvent Michigan.” That 10-point plan was to (1) Create more and
better jobs; (2) Leverage the new tax system; (3) Reinvent Michigan’s government; (4)
Retain Michigan’s young people; (5) Restore Michigan cities; (6) Enhance Michigan’s
national and international image; (7) Protect Michigan’s environment; (8) Revitalize
Michigan’s educational system; (9) Reinvent Michigan’s health care system; and (10)
Win through Relentless Positive Action (State of Michigan, nd1). Detroit, at the time of
Snyder’s election, was a piece of a much larger state problem, such as a $1.5 billion
structural deficit, a drained "rainy day" fund and a Michigan Business Tax that he felt
was job killing (State of Michigan, n.d1). As indicated before, Detroit’s financial and
urban problems were manifest well before Snyder took office in 2010, and the focus of

40
his election campaign was not directly tied to fixing Detroit, but fixing Detroit was part
of his overall plan to “Reinvent Michigan.”
The political stream appeared to be favorable for Governor Snyder to enact the
Emergency Manager Act in Detroit. The overall public mood in Michigan for its use in
Detroit was favorable. Michigan labor unions, staunchly supporting the Democratic
party, were helpless in thwarting the enactment by a Republican Governor and a
Republican controlled legislature of PA 436. Republicans in the state legislature, holding
majorities in both chambers, and representing largely safe Republican districts, where
many of their supporters were hostile to Detroit, knew that there would be no electoral
repercussions from voting in favor of PA 436. The Governor’s agenda, already getting
enacted and implemented in his first term, included restoring Michigan’s cities. All three
streams now seem ready for coupling by a policy entrepreneur upon the opening of the
policy window. In the next section, I identify the policy entrepreneur and how he
managed to couple the three streams.
Policy Entrepreneur
As previously indicated a policy entrepreneur is someone who can invest a
considerable amount of their time, energy, and reputation to couple the three streams.
Mintrom (2000, 68) insists that the definition of policy entrepreneur must clearly
distinguish between those who should and those who should not be conferred the title.
Mintrom (2000, 152) argues that policy entrepreneurs may include only those who
introduce policy innovations that result in policy change. I take Mintrom’s position a
step further and argue that policy entrepreneurs should also include those, who by their
actions (e.g. acquiring knowledge, persuading others, mobilizing supporters, steering

41
legislation, obtaining budget), are able to introduce, enact, and even oversee the
implementation of new policies
To summarize, Detroit’s problem stream consisted of a series of complex and
compounding issues that were interwoven into a financial and urban crisis. Its policy
stream was made of up of many ideas, alternatives and proposals ranging from an Urban
Restructuring Plan, using revenue sharing dollars, selling off city assets, privatizing city
operations, using non-profits, universities and urban planners to fight urban blight, state
and federal bailout, and State intervention via the Emergency Manager Act. A supportive
public mood, diminished resistance from fatigued and largely defeated and powerless
labor unions, and little public opposition outside the city of Detroit made the political
stream favorable for the Emergency Manager Act. It was Governor Snyder who coupled
the three streams upon the opening of the policy window. It was Governor Snyder who
possessed the legal authority, along with the state legislature, to enact the Emergency
Manager Act, and it was he who had the executive authority to implement it in Detroit.
Policy Window
Kingdon (1995) argues that a policy window can be opened by a compelling problem
and once opened it provides policy entrepreneurs the opportune time to join the three
independent streams into a policy. I point toward February 19, 2013, as the date that the
policy window opened. It is this date that the financial review team declared Detroit to
be in a financial emergency. This is what gave the legal authority to Governor Snyder to
apply the Emergency Manager Act to the City of Detroit. It was the opportune time to
couple the three streams. On March 25, 2013, Governor Snyder appointed an Emergency

42
Manager, Kevin Orr, to address Detroit’s financial problems and return stability to the
city so that it would be able to provide basic government services to its citizens.

43
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The public policy process is a complex process that is carried out on multiple levels
(e.g. international, national, and subnational) by a multitude of individuals and
organizations. Unfortunately, there is no single general theoretical framework that can
explain the complex world of the public policy process (Smith and Larimer 2009, 15).
Today, policy scholars understand and explain different aspects of the public policy
process through the use of nine theoretical frameworks: Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF), Institutional Rational Choice, Large-N Comparative, Multiple-Streams (MS),
Policy Diffusion, Policy Networks, Punctuated-Equilibrium, Social Construction and
Stages Heuristic. It is important to repeat, however, that these frameworks are not
mutually exclusive. They each address somewhat different aspects of the policy process
and are helpful for addressing some, but not all of those aspects. Most researchers have
conducted studies of the policy process at the national level; however, there are many
reasons for wanting to better understand how sub-national governments enact the policies
that they do. Two questions immediately come to mind: How does the policy process at
the sub-national level differ from that at the national level? Can results at the national
level be generalized to the sub-national level?
This paper has examined the policy process at the sub-national level using the case
study of the enactment and implementation of a law enabling the appointment of an
emergency manager to address severe financial and governance problems in Detroit,
Michigan. Five of the nine theoretical frameworks – Large-N Comparative, Multiple-
Streams, Policy Diffusion, Punctuated-Equilibrium,and Social Construction – are
relevant in explaining this policy choice. For this paper, I applied the Multiple-Streams

44
framework to a single case at the sub-national level, finding that it does indeed help
explain what happened.
Ample information from State of Michigan records, City of Detroit records,
newspaper articles, books, government records and statistics, non-government records
and statistics provided feedback to State of Michigan policymakers that Detroit’s
problem was an intertwined financial and urban crisis that greatly diminished the capacity
of the City to solve its own problems. The "last straw" was a financial review report that
was sufficient for Governor Snyder to elevate Detroit's financial problems from his
general agenda to his decision agenda.
There is ample evidence of a primeval soup of policies. Information from State of
Michigan records, City of Detroit records and personal communication show many
examples of the ideas, alternatives, and proposals to "fix" Detroit and its finances.
Ultimately, it was PA 436, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act or the
Emergency Manager Act, that was chosen by Governor Snyder as the policy of choice to
address Detroit’s governance problem. As indicated above, emergency manager laws
were not new to Michigan, but had been around for some time, even though earlier
versions were judged by both the Governor and a majority of state legislators to lack the
authority needed to get the job done in the case of Detroit.
According to data collected from polls and non-government organizations, public
opinion favored the decision to enact the Emergency Manager Act as a policy to address
Detroit’s problem. Furthermore, Governor Snyder possessed the legal authority along
with the Republican controlled legislature to enact the Emergency Manager Act. The
political situation was favorable. It was the Governor who finally coupled this law as a

45
solution to Detroit’s problem, and he became the policy entrepreneur. Records from the
State of Michigan show that on February 19, 2013, Detroit’s policy window opened when
a financial review team declared a financial emergency in Detroit, therefore, providing
the opportune time for Governor Snyder to couple the three streams and provide his
selection of PA 436 as the policy to address Detroit’s problem.
This paper used a qualitative analysis to describe and explain a significant case study
of public policymaking using the Multiple-Streams framework. To truly add to the body
of work that advances the Multiple-Streams framework, however, I advise conducting a
quantitative analysis that includes a sample of cases of policy making at the sub-national
level.

46
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