Parkeringsregler utformas i allmänhet av aktörer i offentlig sektor. Vid utformningen av reglerna bör man ta hänsyn till de hävdvunan regler och sedvänjor som ofta existerar inom ramen för tillgänglig yta och tidigare rgelverk. I presentationen ges exempel på situationer när lokala och privata organisationsformer skulle kunna vara mer effektiva än offentliga regler. Presentation på Transportforum 2015, den 8 januari 2015.

1. Public and private orderings in
parking
Björn Hasselgren, PhD
Arkitektur och samhällsbyggnad
VTI Transportforum, 8 januari 2015

2. Research questions
 How can the use of local (off) streets, such as parking
regulation, in cities be effectively managed and organized?
 Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient?
 What happens when different governance models collide?
 What alternative models might be viable and in which
situations? Spontaneous ordering? Local governance?

3. Some parking related research
 Parking regulation as part of urban planning – standards,
good practices, economic benefits etc (Marsden)
 Parking regulation as related to road use and congestion
management (Button)
 The balance between regulation and markets (Shoup,
Barter)
 Explorations of private ordering-models in parking
(Pennington, Roth, Klein, Levinson)

4. Public or private goods (common pools)?
Roads and streets
on different
geographical levels
Public goods
non-rivalrous, non-
excludable,
externalities
Private monopoly
or association
Public monopoly
Private goods
(rivalrous,
excludable)
Market
Public sector
provision
Market
failure?
Government
failure?
Government
failure?
Market
failure?

5. Spontaneous
order
Centralized
planner
Market failure
Government
failure
Management models (Hayek, Ostrom)
Coordinated
Un-coordinated
Centralized
knowledge
Individual
knowledge

6. - Parking
regulated by
public
regulation but
adjusted
through
customs
- New regulation
implemented,
”one size fits
all”
- Customs and
local
spontaneous
order broken

7. Institutional levels, governance and change
(Williamson, similar in Ostrom)
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – Language, Culture 100 - 1000 y
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT – Created rules and regulations, politics
10 - 100 y
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 1-10 y
RESOURCE ALLOCATION – Prices and incentives Continuous

8. Private and public squares
(Wagner, 1997/2007)
- Private ownership - Collective ownership
- Voluntary - Coercive
- User financing - Tax financing
- Agreement - Regulation
Private
square
Public square

9. Commercial and Guardian syndromes – and
”monstrous hybrids”
Jane Jacobs
”Systems of Survival”
Commerce Syndrome Guardian Syndrome
• Shun force
• Compete
• Be efficient
• Be open to
inventiveness and
novelty
• Use initiative and
enterprise
• Come to voluntary
agreements
• Respect contracts
• Dissent for the sake of
the task
• Be industrious
• Be thrifty
• Invest for productive
purposes
• Collaborate easily with
strangers and aliens
• Promote comfort and
convenience
• Be optimistic
• Be honest
• Shun trading
• Exert prowess
• Be obedient and
disciplined
• Adhere to tradition
• Respect hierarchy
• Be loyal
• Take vengeance
• Deceive for the sake of
the task
• Make rich use of
leisure
• Be ostentatious
• Dispense largesse
• Be exclusive
• Show fortitude
• Be fatalistic
• Treasure honor
Tensions between
carriers of
guardian and
commerce
syndromes shape
“monstrous moral
hybrids”

10. Different models for organization of the society

11. Public and private (Levinson, Roth, Foldvary)
Private, Local Private, Corporate
Private
Public
Local National
Private
roads
Streets,
Commons
Motor-
ways

12. Monstrous hybrids and market failure (or a
possible Coasean bargaining area)? (Jacobs,
Coase)
Efficient
Inefficient
Local National
Public
management
Private
management

13. ?
Incentives aligned?
- From
regulation to
local
management
- Private or
association?
- Possible
revenues
transferred
to local
residents
(Shoup)

14. Conclusions
 How can the use of local streets, such as parking regulation, in
cities be effectively organized? A variety of models according to
the situation are possible.
 Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient? No that
is probably true only for “true” public goods, which might be
scarcer than generally thought of.
 What happens when the different governance models collide?
Monstrous hybrids created. Clash of local use and formal
regulation occurs.
 What alternative models might be viable and in which situations?
Spontaneous ordering? Local governance? Private ordering,
associations, public sector, corporations.

15. Björn Hasselgren, PhD
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Architecture and the Built Environment
+46-70-762 33 16
bjorn.hasselgren@abe.kth.se
www.kth.se/blogs/hasselgren
@HasselgrenB